

FROM ILLUSION TO DELUSION

**Globalization and the Contradictions
of Late Modernity**

VICTOR SEGESVARY

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
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Victor Segesvary

TO MY PARENTS WITH GRATITUDE

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PREFACE

It was in the course of my research concerning inter-civilizational relations that I became aware of an unfolding historical process consisting of two developments, set in motion by the de-colonization movement at the end of World War II. The first is the growing importance of inter-civilizational encounters which represent a fundamental turn in the contemporary world and, probably, will dominate the world scene in the future. The second of these developments, closely linked to the first, is that in our age the universalistic dream of the past is slowly fading away. Globalization -- as an ideology and as a process -- is a result of these two phenomena; its appearance characterized the last decades of the twentieth century, and it will probably remain with us during the first years of the new millennium as well.

This new vision of contemporary events compelled me to write a first book on inter-civilizational relations and the destiny of the West, -- whether their issue will be a mutually enriching dialogue, or a confrontation (The Edwin Mellen Press, 1998). It is followed by a second, the present study on globalization which, in a more practical vein, deals with the social, political, and economic aspects of intercivilizational encounters. The third essay (to be published) examines the two fundamental forces shaping human existence: the evolutionary process, and the consecutive creation by men of particular cultural worlds. Cultures are based on biological processes, sources of the human existence, but only cultures make it possible for human beings to transcend the earthly, immanent existence. These three books, then, form a trilogy intending to explain the human predicament in the light of new historical perspectives.

More than two decades ago I endeavored the study of one earlier example of inter-civilizational encounters -- the European and Islamic cultures in the sixteenth century -- in an epoch when the Turkish armies invaded Europe under the banner of Islam. This historic moment, when at the initiative of the Zurich Reformers the Latin text of the Quran was published in Basel for the first time in history in 1543, represented the very opening of the European mind toward other cultural worlds, toward other civilizations. This was the age which saw the birth of the universalistic beliefs of Western modernity. The book is as actual today as it was at the time of its first publication. The original French text is now reprinted, completed by a preface and a substantial summary in English (International Scholars Publications, 1998).

In the perspective of inter-civilizational encounters and a disappearing universalistic worldview, globalization increasingly resembles to a drive toward conquering other cultural worlds by the worldview, forms of life, and styles of reasoning developed within the Western civilization. In this context, the importance of inter-civilizational encounters appears to be fading away, especially as powerful political and economic interests promote globalization as a vehicle carrying their domination further and further.

However, globalization, like the Roman God Janus looking into two directions, has also a double aspect. In addition to what one can appropriately call, on the one hand, the "world revolution of Westernization," it is also, on the other hand, a constant interaction of polar realities: of the global and the particular, of space and place, of historical time and of the present moment. In this dialectical interplay of opposites, it is becoming more and more evident that contextualism will gradually have the upperhand because it corresponds to the requirements of inter-civilizational encounters. Contextualism is understood here in the sense that only given civilizational, regional, and local contexts, each in its own way, are able to unify the polar opposites.

I would like to note that any and all references made in the text to persons as 'he', 'him', and the like, are a matter of convenience and should thus be understood as gender-neutral terms. In respect of the transliteration of names and terms in non-Western languages, I avoided the use of diacritics because the study is not of a linguistic character, which make it necessary to strictly follow the rules of transliteration.

The present study is on contemporary problems, and not a philological or literary examination of classical

and historical texts.

Finally, all ideas expressed, all conclusions made in the reflections hereafter are my own, and I alone am responsible for them.

I dedicated this book to my parents, having passed away a long time ago, without whose spiritual and intellectual legacy I never could have accomplished the work represented by this trilogy. And again, I should like to express my gratitude to my wife, whose understanding, patience, and assistance made possible for me to reach the end of this intellectual Journey.

I also should like to convey my thanks to Dr. Robert West, Director of International Scholars Publications, who genuinely encouraged me to complete the work undertaken.

INTRODUCTION

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, it seems appropriate to draw a balance sheet of the modern age, of its strengths and weaknesses, of its successes and failures. It has to be done, even if the results appear dismaying, as those bright hopes that the Western world nourished since the eighteenth century inexorably fade away. This wariness is expressed in the title of the book -- from illusion to delusion -- which reflects the twilight atmosphere slowly overtaking our minds and souls.

The present investigation is carried out, in this perspective, as an exercise of *de-mystification* or *de-mythologization* of all surviving, though shaken and evermore doubted, concepts and expectations of modernity. It is, consequently, a conscious destruction of the idols of Western humanity which became, through globalization, the idols of many people belonging to other civilizations, destroying in their wake the fundamental values of those civilizations. However, even if I foresee the possibility of a gradual decline of human existence due to the evolution of the contemporary world, this is not a doomsday book. The idea of doomsday expresses the inevitable approach of a final judgement, of an unchangeable destiny; whereas to envisage an approaching tragedy due to our own acts, to our own way of life, to our own conscious or unconscious wrongdoing, does not exclude the possibility of remedying this situation. But it could be remedied only if and when our contemporaries change their mentalities, if and when our governments change their policies and their views of mankind's future, and if and when the encounter of different civilizations creates a dialogue leading to a correction of the misconceptions and contradictions dominating our own culture. I am searching for another caesura in the history of mankind, in Anthony Giddens' sense, "a caesura upon the traditional world, which it [the modern world] seems irretrievably to corrode and destroy. The modern world is borne out of discontinuity with what went before, rather than continuity with it" (Giddens 1984, 239). Thus, I endeavor to wake up minds and consciences to be ready for another world, beyond the modern and the post-modern: a new world for the second millennium.

This endeavor does not aim at dissipating the utopian vision which overwhelms the minds of our contemporaries. A utopia is always something which represents a wishful state but is unattainable in the prevailing circumstances. But today's dominant picture of the world -- best evoked by the concept of globalization -- is not a utopia because people firmly believe that it is becoming a reality, a future which is not only inevitable (as its protagonists pretend it to be) but which brings with it the fulfilment of the hopes and expectations of all of us. Our voluntarist utopia is noticeable not only by its glaring (though rarely emphasized) inconsistencies, as Kolakowski remarked regarding utopias (1990, 138), but also by a denial of undeniable realities deliberately made by those who are materially interested in maintaining the utopian outlook.

Thus, the idols of modernity survive and still dominate as statesmen, scientists, corporate executives, financial gurus as well as the media perpetuate it. The present enterprise of de-mystification and de-mythologization aims, therefore, at stopping the schizophrenic development of our minds in which words, images, ideas, ideologies, beliefs and values do not correspond any more to reality, to real experiences, events and sentiments, to what really is and what supposedly ought to be. In consequence, it is an endeavor parallel to the one pursued by Jean Baudrillard, who characterized today's world and society as nothing but simulacra, illusion, and deception.

Another word of caution in respect of the objective of this study: it is not carried out in order to theorize about globalization and the contradictions of late modernity. I am not interested in theorizing, in inventing and creating new theories about contemporary phenomena, a futile intellectual exercise in my opinion, but in problem-solving through the clear exposition of the facts as I see them. That intention necessitates the clarification of the fundamental concepts I use in these investigations -- those of culture and of late modernity.

Globalization, a sort of universalism, is a new phenomenon, not comparable to anything experienced before in human history: not that humankind did not hitherto hope for, or strive towards unity among all men; not that most great thinkers of humanity did not expect that men will be, in a near or distant future, not divided but united (eliminating, however, any possibility of uniformization, that is, the dissipation of human diversity). This architectonical drive is inborn in man; even Immanuel Kant, in his unsurpassable critique of

human reason, believed, in opposition to his own reason, in the possible future unity of humanity. The core teachings of most great religions are the clearest statements of the overwhelming desire for unity of the human race.

This study, like all my writings, is placed in an inter-civilizational perspective. Culture and civilizations embrace, simultaneously, spatial and temporal dimensions. They are constituted by, and are at the same time constitutive elements of, every aspect of human existence. In this sense, my understanding of culture is much more expansive than the meaning modernity attributed to it, eliminating its spatial perspective and reducing the cultural phenomenon to the sole temporal dimension. On the other hand, my spatial-cum-temporal conceptualization of culture corresponds to the late modern view of globalization, although not in the form of an affirmation of the existence of a world culture.

I use *culture* in Cicero's sense who wrote about *cultura mentis* assigning to the concept a spiritual, mental, moral and social meaning which encompasses religion and worldview, scientific and artistic creation, patterns or styles of reasoning (with Ian Hacking's words), and ethical principles of behavior and action.¹ Civilization here stands for a whole way of life, including technology, living conditions, society's institutions, as well as all material aspects of our earthly life which develop around the cultural core of a given human group.² This distinction does not correspond to the classical distinction used in German historiography between culture and nature; in my perspective culture, as a human creation, is part of nature from which we come and to which we return. Even if I write, though, of a culture or a civilization as such, I always understand these terms in the plural sense, because there were, as there now are, always several simultaneously existing in the world. Consequently, my arguments about modernity and globalization will be made with reference to reality as surrounding us in concentric circles, -- human beings, particular societies, nation-states and the interstate system, -- all part of those prevailing human phenomena, the world of cultures and civilizations.

My conceptualization of cultures and civilizations differs from most of those adhered to by philosophers, social scientists and specialists of globalization, for at least two reasons:

First, I reject those variants of the definition of culture which reflect a concept of culture and civilization as forms of human activities defined by economic parameters. Therefore, according to these views, culture is produced or civilizational phenomena are reproduced in a determinist vision recognizing only material production and related social processes as having a genuine autonomy. The materiality of culture is sometimes largely conceived, and it is recognized that cultural processes are part "of the ongoing process of the construction of meaning and, hence, of the social world."³ In my perspective, culture and civilization are not produced but autonomously *created* by individuals and their communities in constant interaction (of which the expression favored by old-style anthropologies, diffusion, is only one modality). Economic aspects of human activities are part of a human cultural world, or constitutive, among other elements, of a civilization. They are not exclusively dominant in any society and were not primordial at any age in human history, though they represent one of the crucial factors within our earthly existence. I, therefore, resolutely defend the position that the physical and mental universes or, in other words, the material, mental and spiritual

¹ My description of culture corresponds to the four clusters of meaning Raymond Williams assigns to culture: (i) a "general process of intellectual, spiritual, and aesthetic development" of individuals; (ii) a "particular way of life, whether of a people, a period, a group, or humanity in general;" (iii) the "works and practices of intellectual and especially artistic activity;" and (iv) the "signifying system through which necessarily (though among other means) a social order is communicated, reproduced, experienced and explored." Williams, Raymond. 1983. *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society*. Rev. ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 90.

² In this sense, civilization is totally freed from the meaning given to it during the Enlightenment equating it with the European way of life and material progress and as opposed to barbarity designating ways of life in other cultural worlds.

³ "Cultural theory, however, has stressed the 'materiality' of culture", wrote Janet Wolff, by which is meant the 'determinacy and effectivity of signifying practices themselves.' Codes and conventions, narrative structures, and systems of representation in texts (literary, visual, filmic) produce meaning and inscribe ideological positions [...]. What is at issue here is the integral place of culture *in* social processes and social change: the cultural formation and identity of social groups, as well as of ideologies, discourses, and practices... The very codes of art and literature, the narrative structures of the text, are part of the ongoing process of the construction of meaning and, hence, of the social world." Wolff, Janet. 1997, 170-171; italics in original.

worlds, are in constant interaction, and from this creative act of interaction, human cultures are born.⁴ Creation is a long-term historical process not confined to concrete, social contexts of a given epoch, because it is not entirely an intentional act, but an unforeseeable outcome of a multiplicity of interactions. The imponderable element is due to this multiplicity which reflects environmental influences, inherited traditions transmitting cultural creations from generation to generation, or the effects of unknown actions by other humans. Creation implies unavoidable human ignorance and reveals the limited nature of different human worlds.

Second, culture and civilization thus result of the never-ceasing interaction between individuals and communities and between different, co-evolving communities, as well as of the interactions between successive generations via the channels of shared traditions and individual legacies incorporated in a culture's heritage. It is only in this sense that, from my point of view, cultures and civilizations are socially constructed or socially organized. The common usage of these terms attributes culture's and civilization's existence to social processes only. Contrary to such theories of social construction of culture, I see no difficulty in thinking in terms of cultural processes, following Ulf Hannerz (1997), as any human activity taking place in space and time constitutes a process. But in contradistinction to Hannerz's reduction of the societal dimensions of cultural process to four frameworks -- market, state, forms of life and social movements -- in which those processes take place, I believe that his forms of life framework encompasses all the others (except if market or state are hypostatized as autonomous entities, existing independently of people) because human beings, their communities and their institutions are the bearers of cultural processes (and processes do not exist in vacuum). In this sense, I agree with Janet Wolff (1997, 167-169) that any definition of a culture -- mine included -- reflects a certain representation of one's own culture, formulated with reference to what one knows of other civilizations in the world. The phrase Wolff uses, discursive constitution of cultures, is in a way correct, if one gives to it the largest possible interpretation taking into account the complex and intricate relationship between co-existing cultures. However, because of its generally more restrictive interpretation (for example, in the sense of the Habermasian discursive human relationships), I prefer to avoid its use.

The world's great civilizations are designated by an ethnic qualifier (Chinese and Indian), by a religious one (Islamic), or by a geographic connotation (African). Such distinctions usually cover different cultural features which, nevertheless, can be grouped together, as they possess shared elements, if not for anything else but the common physical and form of life framework. Some scholars question the adequacy of the qualifier Western civilization, showing, perhaps, their hidden universalistic inclinations. However, it seems to me that it is fully justified to use the designation Western civilization, as what we mean by the term is not the European civilization anymore; the North American or Australian forms of life are variants of the European one.

More fundamentally, the unity of Western civilization is indicated by what we call modernity. There is no phenomenon such as modernity in the orbit of any other civilization, in the specific sense in which most understand it, that is, a scientific, secularized (disenchanted or de-sacralized) and, consequently, materialistic culture, centered around the dominant idea of the individual. Nevertheless, even Western modernity carries the signs of powerful changes underlying the superficial ripples on the civilization's surface; today it is not the same as it was at the beginning of the century. Our current situation does not deserve to be called post-modernity, because modernity's dominant ideas influence our thinking and action as much as during the last two hundred centuries. Therefore, it is necessary to qualify it as late modernity, that is, modernity as we know it at the end of the twentieth century. If modernity as a civilizational form is applied to the entire world arena, it is precisely because of the contemporary phenomenon of a new type of hegemony, the results of which are crystallized through globalization. In respect of hegemony, I believe that it is not only applicable to political power relations or economic domination like, for example, world-systems and center-

⁴ My point of view is similar to Anthony King's and Pierre Bourdieu's positions outlined by King as follows: "The material world constructs the mental and the mental, the material. Cultures are constituted in space and under specific economic and social conditions: they are physically and spatially as well as socially constructed, whether in regard to the economic basis of people's life, the regions and places they inhabit, the degrees of segregation between them, the symbolic meanings of the worlds they create, the way they represent themselves through dwellings, or the visual markers they use to communicate meanings. These are all part of what Bourdieu refers to as the general *habitus*, a system of dispositions, a way of being." King, Anthony. ed. 1997, 150; italics in original.

periphery theories do, but that the term covers the field of civilizational relations, too.⁵ Late modern globalization is specifically intertwined with trends toward civilizational hegemony. Be it as it may, I shall use interchangeably the two terms: the West or Western civilization, on the one hand, and late modernity, a phenomenon of purely Western origin, on the other hand.

In the following pages, I shall examine, successively and in detail, the existential reality in different sectors of our life pointing to several corresponding myths which dominate on the surface -- thereby frequently hiding from our eyes the realities of existence. In this way, the study will have a clearcut structure: the process of globalization will be juxtaposed to the contradictions of modernity which constitute, at the same time, the roots of origin, the guiding principles as well as the building blocks of the globalization process itself.

⁵ Mike Featherstone summarized recently, though in the usual language of world-systems theory, the trend towards civilizational hegemony as follows: "The assumptions that all particularities, local cultures, would eventually give way under the relentless modernizing force of American cultural imperialism, implied that all particularities were linked together in a symbolic hierarchy. Modernization theory set the model into motion, with the assumption that as each non-Western nation eventually became modernized it would move up the hierarchy and duplicate or absorb American culture, to the extent that ultimately every locality would display the cultural ideas, images and material artefacts of the American way of life." Featherstone 1993, 170.

CHAPTER ONE

FROM UNIVERSALIZATION TO GLOBALIZATION

1. What Is Globalization?

Globalization is the reigning ideology of late modernity, in the sense given to the term by the French historian François Furet, a worldview which provides "the political action of men with a providential character" (Furet 1995, 17; my translation).¹ It is necessary to start the definition of globalization with this lapidary statement, because the concept in a way summarizes both good and evil aspects of late-modern human existence, though it seems nobody knows exactly what is meant by it. As the reigning ideology² of late modernity, globalization offers the best opportunity to dissect and analyze the contradictions of our age, with all its fading hopes and all its difficulties and sufferings, in order to try to imagine the contours of humanity's unknown and unknowable future. Criticism of late modernity, of its ideological biases and of the resulting fundamental contradictions, does not mean that everything modern is evil, that everything brought about by modernity should be rejected; our species does not have to make a leap into the darkness in entering the next millennium. The rationale for criticizing globalization is to free basic values of the modern world from such ideological disguises as globalizing specific value systems and, consequently, freeing human beings and their communities from destructive aspects of globalization, such as the tendency of shallow uniformization of human worlds, thus, an agent of hegemonic powers.

The world tends to drink Coca-Cola and eat Big Macs -- this is globalization at the lowest level. Many people exercise their intellectual potential through reading their boulevard newspapers (*New York Post*, *Sun*, *France Soir*, *Bild*), or looking at television until they fall asleep, or listening to radio broadcasts -- this is globalization at a somewhat higher level. Business activities embracing the whole market is globalization in its most customary sense; people believing that they decide all fundamental questions themselves, following

¹ In a recent work, Beyer enumerates four approaches to globalization -- those of Immanuel Wallerstein, John Meyer, Roland Robertson, and Niklas Luhmann. Beyer 1994, 14-44.

² I prefer to use ideology instead of paradigm because the former captures its activist and worldwide dimension. However, I quote here two excellent definitions of the paradigm concept. Fritjof Capra defines a paradigm as: "A constellation of concepts, values, perceptions, and practices shared by a community, which forms a particular vision of reality and a collective mood that is the basis of the way the community organizes itself. A belief paradigm that is dominant in a given society could be called its dominant social paradigm (DSP). A DSP may be defined as a society's dominant belief structure that organizes the way people perceive and interpret the functioning of the world around them... A defining characteristic of paradigms is that changes of paradigms occur in discontinuous revolutionary breaks, which distinguishes paradigm shift from more gradual kinds of social change." In *ReVISION*. 1986. 9, 1. More practically, Cotgrove writes: "A paradigm is dominant not in the statistical sense of being held by most people, but in the sense that it is paradigm held by dominant groups in industrial societies; and in the sense that it serves to legitimate and justify the institutions and practices of a market economy... it is the taken-for-granted common-sensical view... Paradigms then provide maps of what the world is believed to be like. They constitute guidelines for identifying and solving problems. Above all, paradigms provide the framework of meaning within which 'facts' and experiences acquire significance and can be interpreted." (Cotgrove, Stephen. *Catastrophe or Cornucopia: The Environment, Politics, and the Future*. Chichester/New York. Wiley. 1982. 26-27. Both texts cited by Milbrath. 1989. 116-117)

democratic procedures in respect of their own and future generations' destinies, -- this is globalization at the highest level, at which even the Baudrillardian simulacra reaches its most sophisticated expression.

People have the same material needs wherever they are born, as much as parental love is similar all over the world -- this indicates biological universalism. The need of belonging to a community, to be part of a human group -- this is existential universalism. Man is always a creator of his own world, of his own existential perspectives; this intentionality of his is the basis of universal cultural features, as it expresses his life experiences in symbolic systems, in myths or in different works of artistic creation -- this is cultural universalism. And religious faith and devotion, the belief in a reality beyond this earthly life -- this is spiritual universalism.

For common sense, the ubiquitous presence of Coca-Cola and of Mac Donalds, the cutthroat competitiveness of the world market as well as the quasi-religious belief in democratic legitimation of power, truly represent the globalization of the contemporary world. This image simplifies, of course, the overwhelming phenomenon that is globalization, reducing it to a few of its aspects, and ignoring its artificial, media-created character. There is another version of the picture (in some of the writings of Roland Robertson, for example)³ which pretends that globalization was always present in the history of the world, as the same characteristics, the same events, the same artifacts, the same cultural and social configurations, could be found in various places and at various stages of human development ("a globewide circumstance involving the spatial and temporal compression of the world;" Robertson 1992a, 101). This view, however, reduces the meaning of globalization to nil -- saying, for example, that there were always empires in the world, or that all societies were characterized by continuous struggle between classes or interest groups -- it confirms nothing else but the age-old dictum from the Bible that there is nothing new under the sun.

The major characteristics of globalization, in my view, are the following:

(i) *A worldview based on*

A secular conception of the world, in which religion's role is assumed by our -- highly laudable and, simultaneously pitiful -- science. This vision is combined with a delusive dream of the world transformed into a global village meaning that through an information and communication revolution -- worldwide media coverage and technical facilities like the Internet -- space and time distances disappear and everything and everyone obligatorily becomes uniform (Chapter 2);

A complete transformation of the culture's ethos and practices, implying the disappearance of genuine morality, as every action is ruled by human interests and voluntaristic intentions leading to a situation in which laws or regulations issued by authorities, rules created and enforced by humans, replace the guidance of ethical principles aiming at the good life (Chapter 3).

An impersonal, atomized conception of human relations (based on the de-centered subject), destroying all organic and spontaneous communities and their traditions which hitherto constituted the natural framework for individual human lives, and replaces them with an all-powerful state (the Father-God figure), ideologically posited as benevolent, but in reality dominating individuals and society (Chapter 4).

(ii) *A social dissensus*, reflecting the abandonment of integrating, though continuously re-adapted, traditions, because society publicly and ideologically tends towards equality of all its members but, in fact, increases inequalities to such an extent that it leads social forces towards explosion through a degradation of

³ In a recent text, Robertson summed up his views in this respect as follows: "Throughout that long period [Jasper's Axial Age] civilizations, empires and other entities have been almost continuously faced with the problem of response to the wider, increasingly compressed and by now global, context. The ways in which such entities (in relatively recent history, national societies, in particular) have at one and the same time attempted to learn from others and sustain a sense of identity - or, alternatively, isolate themselves from the pressures of contact - also constitute an important aspect of the creation of global culture. Even more specifically the cultures of particular societies are, to different degrees, the result of their interactions with other societies in the global system." Robertson 1997, 88-89.

the basic conditions of living and a gradual disappearance of communication and consensus between the various actors of public life (Chapter 5).

(iii) An *idolization of democratic processes*, as if democracy represents a solution to all social problems, though it is, in reality, nothing but a legitimation and public coverup for holders of economic and political power -- even if these powerholders are quite easily move upward or are demoted, in accordance with movements of social and political forces (Chapter 6).

(iv) An *illusory extension of specific economic mechanisms and relations to the whole world* -- the world market -- which, instead of promoting economic welfare in conformity with each cultural context, imposes (in the interest of those manipulating the so-called market forces) sometimes correct and unavoidable ways of acting, but in most cases a treacherously inadequate and deceptive pattern on economic activities (Chapter 7).

(v) A *destructive carelessness towards the cosmos* which resulted in an ever-deepening environmental crisis that unavoidably imperils humanity's future on the earth, and represents a crime in respect of both living and coming generations of men (Chapter 8).

Globalization is, therefore, nothing else but the extension of principal features of the late-modern Western civilization to the whole world. Consequently, globalization is, logically, the worldwide dissemination of the late-modern crisis gradually dominating the Western civilizational orbit, a sort of "World Revolution of Westernization."⁴ In this, it resembles the age-old Western concept of universalism, to the analysis of which I now turn.

2. Individuality-Based Universalism Versus Realistic Contextualism

Universalism is a belief characterizing the modern world. It is, in general, not an overtly emphasized principle but something that entered the subconscious of people and emerges only on the surface of their discourse, when called into question. In Western culture, universalism is such a tenet of the reigning worldview that it can be compared to a religious dogma; it is a universalism not in a pure, genuine form but, on the contrary, expressing the conviction that human beliefs, values and approaches identified with those of Western civilization are universally valid, and will be, sooner or later, accepted worldwide. It may therefore be called *autocentric* or *instrumental* universalism, and it is still the dominating discourse and practice on the international scene.

I shall begin the reappraisal of universalism with the definition of the concept and the analysis of its various forms, followed by an inquiry into its origins and a discussion of its validity and applicability within contemporary civilizations and in inter-civilizational relations as the framework of international discourse and practice. I shall then examine universalism in juxtaposition to the process of globalization.

⁴ "The world revolution of Westernization, in short", writes von Laue, "has not created a peaceful world order guided by the ascetic and all-inclusive humane rationalism, the best quality in Western civilization. Universalizing the tensions inherent in its own dynamic evolution, it has rather produced a worldwide association of peoples compressed against their will into an inescapable but highly unstable interdependence laced with explosive tensions. Underneath the global universals of power and its most visible supporting skills - literacy, science and technology, large-scale organization - the former diversities persist... Viewed in this manner, the global confluence thus far has produced not a shiny global city but a global Tower of Babel in which the superficial and ignorant comparison of everything with everything else is undermining all subtle distinctions between right and wrong, good and evil, worth or worthlessness." Laue, 1987. 7-8.

(A) DEFINITION AND FORMS OF UNIVERSALISM

Universalism is a belief of bearers of a worldview that this worldview -- its belief and value systems, its cognitive or reasoning style, its ethical convictions and conceptions of the Good Life, its concept of man as individual constituting communities, its way of life -- uniquely expresses the human being's essence; thus, its tenets are cognitively valid for in all times.

Universalism can, of course, be defined alternatively as the generalization of cognitive conclusions reached: either through inference such as in hypothetically deduced theories, such as the theory of evolution, or through inductive, trial-and-error methods ascertaining empirical facts (not yet falsified), as in the practice of the applied sciences. There is, however, an important difference between universalism and generalization as the former implies that the truths of a worldview are valid at all times, whereas the latter describes states of affairs which are presumed to be general in nature's or humanity's life. It is nonetheless true that cognitive or empirical generalizations can imperceptibly be transformed into universalisms.

Both universalism and generalization are, however, similar in their refusal to recognize contextuality which is the *par excellence* polar opposite of universalism. *The essence of contextuality is that it gives priority to the particular over the universal and, consequently, it affirms the pluralistic worldview.* An important characteristic of the contextual approach is also that in it, no preconceived principles (the so-called theoretical axioms and theorems) can be applied to the contingent particularity of things and to the contingent flow of events as such a procedure would change their relational interdependence and their complex environment. The attitude ignoring contextuality is closely related to the dominant modern tendency of formalism and to the overwhelming importance given to epistemological considerations.

Contextuality overcomes the purely cognitive perspective; its view of the world is relational and dialectic. Therefore, it excludes dualistic thinking as well as the myth of the possibility to be an independent observer in our world.⁵ Thereby the basic distinction of object and subject is eliminated, in a way, the context unites them as its component elements. Particulars *qua* particulars may be grasped in their context not by rational, but through holistic methods.

Some modern developments were preeminently instrumental in promoting universalism at the expense of contextuality. One such modern phenomenon is the idea of the planet Earth as a global village or the transformation of the place, the *par excellence* contextual framework, into the space of the media age and of the exploration of the starry skies. This loss of contextuality is well expressed by Anthony Giddens as time and space distancing consecutive to the modern means of transportation and communication, described in detail by Stephen Kern in *The Culture of Time and Space 1880-1918*.

Basically, there are only two forms of universalism: the pure or genuine, and the autocentric or instrumental. Genuine universalisms are, first, the ontological-biological, and second, the cosmic universalism which, in turn, manifests itself in two forms, the religious and the scientific. Autocentric or instrumental universalism is a distortion of the two preceding genuine forms of universalism generated by certain cultural and social features in specific cultural environments.

Ontological-biological universalism refers to all beings, to the fact of Being under its various appearances; it encompasses everything existent as in the philosophical ontology of Martin Heidegger. Heidegger's theory presents Being as the transcendental foundation of everything in the world and categorizes beings into (i) *Dasein*, the being-in-the-world, the human, conscious presence, and (ii) beings as present-at-hand and ready-to-hand, from *Dasein's* point of view, in the context of worldhood. Ontological universalism is a parallel notion to biological universalism which, however, is more limited in its scope, because it does not embrace mental and spiritual elements of the universe. Both are factual in their universality, and their universality is, simultaneously, transcendent and immanent in this world.

⁵ As Roger Friedland and Deirdre Boden perspicaciously observed: "The search for universals in an objective social world drove social theorists to situate themselves and their object out of space and time, divorced from the particularities of place and period." They later extend their characterization of the modern age when they declare that "our experience of here and now has increasingly lost its immediate spatiotemporal referents and has become tied to and contingent on actors and action at a distance. The experiential here and now of modernity is thus in a real sense nowhere yet everywhere." Friedland and Boden. eds. 1994, 4 and 6.

The referent of cosmic universalism is the universe. The religious version of cosmic universalism encompasses both physical and nonphysical elements of the cosmos. Religious universalism is a logically necessary conclusion of the faith in an omnipotent God as in the monotheistic religions; it can also be derived from a certain idea of the universe and man's status in it, considered ontologically and morally, as in Buddhism and some forms of Hinduism. In the scientific version of cosmic universalism only the physical and psychological components of the universe are considered because they are appropriate for scientific study through the application of empirical or formalizing methods. At the highest levels of scientific inquiry, elements of the universe are treated in a completely theoretical, non-ontological way through the application of mathematical formulae. This highest level of scientific inquiry therefore represents, from science's own point of view, an absolute, because strictly formal, universalism.

The concept of instrumental universalism is linked either to the cultural self-justification of the modern conceptualization of society which is built on individualism and the destruction of any community as opposed to the state; or it is linked to the will to power, the drive to domination, which is the essence of its autocentrism. This instrumental universalism is a typically Western phenomenon, be it in its democratic-liberal or totalitarian form. In fact, Jürgen Habermas' procedural universalism is instrumental as well; it represents the latest effort to save universalism without its objectivistic taint as, for him, universalism does not reside in universally accepted cognitive truth or ethical justice but in the emergence of a rational consensus, under ideal circumstances, of those concerned. Instrumental universalism is exploitative of the above genuine categories of universalism because it distorts their content for its own purposes.

The best example of instrumental universalism produced through the distortion of the religious type is totalitarian ideology which claims the universal validity of its dogmas based on the pronouncements of its charismatic initiators, frequently also taking on a pseudo-scientific garb, like ultra-nationalism or Marxism-Leninism. As far as scientific universalism is concerned, its worst distortion is when some of its representatives pretend to extend the domain of validity of science's claims from the physical and psychological elements of the universe to the whole ontological field, the cosmos -- though the latter also includes the nonphysical, that is, the mental and spiritual aspects of the universe. In both cases, universalism becomes instrumental for the justification of specific principles of modern culture with its ever-changing values and moral framework. Universalism sustains a reckless drive for power, for the domination of other men and other civilizations, driven by the belief of its own righteousness, and its universalist pretensions. It is the extensive damage brought upon humanity by instrumental universalism in its political and scientific-totalitarian versions in the twentieth century that led many people to reject universalist claims even in their authentic, ontological-biological and cosmic forms.

(B) THE ORIGINS OF UNIVERSALISM

Universalism dates back to the most ancient worldviews, which were universalist in the cosmic or in the religious sense. The universalism of cosmic views was, as a matter of course, acknowledged because nothing outside the cosmos could be known by the bearers of these views. What is really striking is the fact that even in most polytheistic religions in which the belief in their own gods did not exclude that other people believe in different gods, the universalism encompassing this anthropomorphic universe was never doubted. Polytheism is tolerant and its world is limited, but it set the boundaries for a primitive but genuine universalism.

In more spiritualistic contexts and, first of all, in monotheistic religions, universalism is a *sine qua* non component of belief. No faith in God would be a true faith if it was not to be accepted, imperatively, by the whole world; the dogmas of such religions could not be believed as such if their validity was not extending to the universe. Universalism is therefore inherent in the religious worldview, or, in the case of polytheistic religions, universalism provided a foundation for their symbolisms, but its concept was cognitively not formulated in their adherents' minds.

In every civilization scientific thinking, especially logic, was universalist from the beginning; this is the second source of universalism in various worldviews. In the Greek world, the first universalists were the philosophers of nature of the Milesian school, Thales and Anaximenes. Later, the development of philosophical thinking reinforced universalistic convictions striving to explain the simultaneous presence of

unity and multiplicity, of order and chaos in the world, and reached its climax in (such philosophers as Parmenides for whom everything was one. However, the most important change, from our point of view, was from the "only partially unified *physis* to a single but complex *kosmos*," so clearly explained by Louis Dupré in his *Passage to Modernity*:

The more comprehensive term *kosmos* constitutes the ordered totality of being that coordinates those processes as well as the laws that rule them. *Kosmos* includes, next to the *physis* of organic being, the *ethos* of personal conduct and social structures, the *nomos* of normative custom and law, and the *logos*, the rational foundation that normatively rules all aspects of the cosmic development... Clearly, its meaning of ordered totality exceeded that of the physical universe we now call cosmos. Moral and aesthetic values were as much part of it as physical (in the modern sense) processes... The modern translation of *kosmos* as 'physical nature' is quite misleading since originally *kosmos* included theological and anthropic as well as physical meanings. The loss of the former two reflects the disintegration of the ancient ontotheological synthesis (1993, 17-18).

Western scientific universalism followed in the footsteps of the reductive conceptualization of *physis* elaborated by the Sophists who separated from it the moral and aesthetic domains; this imprint of Greek antiquity remained, then, embedded in Western scientific thought. For science, universalism means universalism of the functioning of materially existing things, of the physical universe, in accordance with the mechanical laws of nature demonstrated by scientific methods.

The universalism of the modern Western worldview, however, had another source, in addition to the universalism inherited from medieval Christianity and the universalism which accompanied the breathtaking scientific and technological developments of the last three centuries: this was its gradually evolving individualism. The individual served, since immemorial times, as the bearer of human destiny. It was from the multitude of individuals that human communities were built, and the individual gave sense to these communities' belief and value systems, to which it contributed during its earthly existence. Individual lives and the life of communities were closely interwoven; one presupposed and conditioned the other in a truly dialectical and dialogical relationship. If it is true that Christianity emphasized the role of the individual as the sinner and, at the same time, as the receiver of God's grace, it is, however, also true that in the Christian perspective, the community of individuals as believers received as much emphasis. Though the relationship between God and the faithful was direct, the believer's salvation and his or her access to God's grace and to His munificence was a natural outcome of that person's becoming a member of the community of believers.

This interdependent, dialectical relationship between individuals and their community -- an immediate community such as kinship groups, or larger communities such as nations or religious groups -- changed fundamentally with the advent of modernity. The absolute preeminence of the individual over community or any other social group became an untouchable dogma in the West since the eighteenth century. Hegel's exposition of the three moments of universality, particularity, and individuality in the *Science of Logic* and the *Phenomenology of Spirit* still clearly envisages their absolute interdependence: universality implies unity and commonality; particularity denotes definiteness and distinction, and individuality indicates subsistence, singleness, independence of others and self-sufficiency. The last of the three moments is an evidently modern formulation, as it postulates the possibility of independence of the individual and self-sufficiency. In fact, Hegel characterizes the relationship of the three moments as negative, as an identity of the negative with itself in the case of the universal, or, for the ego, a negative relation with every particular in the stream of experience. The ego is the unity not identical with the experienced particular but needing individual experiences in order to be at all. The three moments exist in and through their mutual distinction and correspondence, though they are each self-related and complete in themselves; their separation from each other would leave them without determinate content, as an abstraction. Because they cannot be held apart, they form an immediate unity. Projecting the Hegelian dialectics in the social field, the social whole stands thus for the universal, the particular for a definite role, and the individual for a concrete person. Contemporary society which posits the separation of the universal and of the particular is, consequently, a formal and empty concept; modernity is disjointedness as all mediation given through immediateness is lost. The aggregates of the particulars or individuals cannot, without inner unity, express the whole because the mediation between the three moments has to be posited through immediateness. In modern society the deeply individualized self faces depersonalized megastructures.

The Hegelian view, therefore, foreshadows the late-modern perspective regarding the relationship between the universal and the individual, as expressed with particular acuity by Seligman: "the universal is collapsed into the particular." Modern universalism is a derivative of the individual, that is, the particular is invested with the characteristics of the universal: "The relation between universal and particular is now transformed into the relations between (universal) subjects -- each ontologically self-contained and existing in a state of 'metaphysical' equality" (Seligman 1990, 124).⁶ This means that the individual was divested of personality and became an empty concept represented by the common denominator of every individual,⁷ thus an individual represents the ultimate standard because no other universal criteria exist. In consequence, no meta-level moral principles transcending the individualistic ethic's requirements are conceivable. The individual became abstracted from the living human being and invested by theoretically formulated universal preferences or interests (Bowles and Gintis 1987, 123).

The secularization of Western societies being almost complete, it left as the sole source of values and moral norms autonomous individuals whose competence is only limited by the state which, though it pretends to serve the general will invented by Rousseau, also claims to be through its laws the unique source of cultural, ethical and other valuational norms and standards. Thus, the conflicting claims of individuals and of the state give importance to the issue of civil society. Civil society is expected to ensure the coexistence of different groups in society with divergent belief and value systems and different allegiances.

One of the main effects of the limitless modern individualism was the so-called atomization of Western society composed of autonomous individuals. As a result of excessive individualism, cosmic worldviews were replaced by decentered or differentiated worldviews. Individuals are only constrained by the laws of the state and by regulations of other public institutions; they are otherwise free to pursue their own interests and inclinations. As a consequence, a specific sort of universalism is introduced in moral life, because there still exists a need to have some ethical direction governing moral conduct: universalizability as the ethical meta-norm is proposed -- a norm is only ethical if it is applicable by all and to all -- which shifts emphasis from rules to rights. The ethics of rights express the absolute value of the reigning individual.

To the atomization of society corresponds the universalism encompassing all humanity. It is destined to compensate the disintegration of a society constituted by autonomous individuals through the creation of a worldwide *Gesellschaft* which, precisely because of its merely evanescent shimmering on the human horizon, fits perfectly the lingering longing for a community of autonomous individuals. Nobody wants, of course, to deny the existence of a planetary human community, a community which always existed and which was taken into account by all worldviews in history. What is new, however, is that in the modern worldview, this universalism, originally intended to replace the loss of social cohesion, is created through the alleged universality of everything which is modern; that is, the evocation of a genuine universalism in a completely distorted form. The distortion is, apparently, not perceived. Modern universalism is, then, the combination of two originally genuine cosmic universalisms in a distorted form: religious universalism, which was transfigured into the religious belief in progress and the voluntaristic projection of man's pretended omnipotence over nature; and scientific universalism, originally expressing a comprehensive and unified view of the physical universe (though never formulated theoretically in a satisfactory manner, as Einstein sadly concluded) which was transformed into a worldview encompassing the whole cosmos, as reduced to its physical aspects. These worldviews were complemented, as a corollary, by a de-ontologized, fragmented society existing only in atomized individuals, as well as a universalizable ethics necessitated by the lacking moral orientation in this age of disenchantment.

⁶ "What becomes a universal in the individualist ethic is thus the individual him/herself. That the particular becomes the universal is the reigning ethic of individualistic societies - hence equality (of individuals/particulars). Hence also *Zweckrationalität* as the sum of quantifiable particulars reduced to their common denominator. But in a social formation governed by *Zweckrationalität* there is no ultimate standard beyond the technical competence of individuals... *qua* universal entities." Etzioni 1968, 123-124.

⁷ "The identity of everything with everything else is paid for in that nothing may at the same time be identical with itself... Men were given their individuality as unique in each case, different to all others, so that it might all the more surely be made the same as any other," wrote Horkheimer and Adorno in their sharp critique of Enlightenment ideology. Horkheimer and Adorno 1972, 12-13.

Such a universalism is an outmoded perspective in our contemporary world in which a plurality of great civilizations co-exist in the same space and age. Modern universalism is, thus, not adapted to settle problems which emerge on the international scene because the actions of the international community cannot be derived from irrelevant principles. Therefore, it is unavoidable to return to the principle of *contextuality* which implies a considerable degree of relativism. Contextuality, in this sense, means that each question, each problem has to be envisaged as taking into account the cultural framework and the social and economic conditions prevailing in the civilizational world concerned. The juxtaposition of globalization to universalism will clearly show the consequences of the universalistic approach still operating at the age of globalization.

3. Globalization Versus Universalism

Globalization is a cultural phenomenon. It was defined by Roland Robertson as the view that the world is "a single place," that the "conjunction of different forms of life" has become real, and that a consciousness of immediate and global involvement with the world-at-large has developed (1990a, 25-31). The concept does not correspond to the idea of global village launched by Marshall McLuhan in the fifties because it describes a process reflecting not only worldwide communication facilities, but the compression of phenomena, of the sequence of events. It thus includes the Giddensian concept of space and time distancing distinguishing the modern world from all pre-modern periods, but at the same time it comprises the overcoming of such distancing by the irresistible spread of concepts, views, customs, and lifestyles to the remotest regions of the world. Thus, it is, simultaneously, diachronic and synchronic in its development and in its effects, whereas universalism is a static concept, as it is posited *a priori* that our world is the world. In addition, the awareness of globality also makes evident how enormously diverse the human world is, how extensive the range of local cultures.

Being a process, globalization penetrates all aspects of contemporary life: the lives of and interaction between individuals, nation-states, local and regional communities, as well as the spheres of international and inter-civilizational relations. Being a process, globalization is a framework for dialogues and confrontations, for all contemporary currents of ideas, intellectual endeavors, economic, social and political activities, or encounters between widely differing human cultural groups. Although it is a process, it is, however, bearer of particular ideas, specific cultural traditions and values, economic or social developmental objectives, or political ideologies.

The global field as a whole is a 'sociocultural' system which has resulted from the compression of -- to the point that it increasingly imposes constraints upon, but also differentially empowers -- civilizational cultures, national societies, intra- and cross-national movements and organizations, sub-societies and ethnic groups, intra-societal quasi-groups, individuals, and so on. As the general process of globalization proceeds there is a concomitant constraint upon such entities to 'identify' themselves in relation to the global-human circumstances (Robertson 1992a, 61)⁸.

Pluralism⁹ and a considerable degree of relativism -- both implying diversity, fragmentation and sharp discontinuities -- are thus indispensable correlates of globalization and constitutive of the so-called global

⁸ "Together societies, individuals, the system of societies and mankind constitute the basic and most general ingredients of what I call the global-human condition, a term which draws attention to both the world in its contemporary concreteness and to humanity as a species. 'Globality' refers to the circumstance of extensive awareness of the world as a whole, including the species aspect of the latter." Robertson 1992a, 77-78; italics in original.

⁹ "The global field is highly pluralistic in that there is a proliferation of civilizational, continental, regional, societal and other definitions of the global-human condition as well as considerable variety of identities formed in those respects without direct reference to the global situation. But full-blown pluralism would have to pivot on the global generalization of the value of cultural diversity with particular reference to the idea that such diversity is in and of itself good both for the system and for units within the system; as well as involving elements of a shared global culture in terms of which the

circumstance.¹⁰ Therefore, it would be a mistake to consider globalization as an autonomous movement (*pace* Robertson) operating independently of specific evolutions in the individual, social, political, international or inter-civilizational spheres. It cannot be autonomous because it is constitutive of these various spheres.

Therefore, the process of globalization is a typically modern,¹¹ relationally all-encompassing cultural phenomenon which incorporates all occurrences, events and actions concerning individual human beings or existing entities, institutions, cultures and civilizations. It highlights interdependence between all these elements and the concomitant global consciousness of this interdependence. In Robertson's apt formula, globalization stands for "*the interpenetration of the universalization of particularism and the particularization of universalism*;" (ibid., 100; italics in original);¹² this means that the concept of globalization admits, simultaneously, universalistic tendencies (like the worldwide spread of Western consumerism), and orientations to particularistic self-affirmation (like the revival and global valorization of national consciousness or collective civilizational identities). The world as a single place represents the universalization of the particular and culturally conditioned humaneness, whereas relativistic pluralism affirming the limitless existence of otherness and of multiple differential perspectives, stands for the particularization of the universal. The above formula therefore expresses the dualistic aspect of contemporary reality: the concomitant expectation and experience of universalism and particularism.

In contrast to globalization, universalism is foundational, intending to grasp the world as a whole in the sense that it is promoting universally held beliefs, values, identities and characteristics, as well as collective, institutional structures. The dominant form of contemporary universalism evidently represents modern civilization's scientific and technological beliefs and values, combined with the precedence given to individualism, instrumental rationality, market-oriented economic development and consequent consumerism. This universalism played a crucial role in the intensified globalization which took place in our century; for example, the worldwide, universalistic supply responds to local, particularistic demands, and thus, market conditions correspond to the above characterization of globalization.

In contrast to universalism, globalization recognizes the importance of contextuality. Contextuality, gives priority to the particular over the universal; it eliminates abstract, formalistic approaches (pre-conceived principles) for the benefit of the contingent particularity of things and the contingent flow of events. Globalization encompasses contextuality and contemporary contextual situations incorporate a certain number of global traits; for example, in fundamentalist worldviews, globalization is present in the form of discourse, in the valuations employed, and in the use of particular arguments. In such cases, choices are not imposed but correspond to circumstances, though they are made in globally recognized categories of thought and action which constitute the framework of fundamentalist discourse. In other words, contexts may be globalized, and globalizing tendencies may be contextualized. A good example of this concept are recent efforts by Romania and Hungary to solve the problem of the substantial Hungarian minority in Transylvania.

plurality of entities could minimally communicate. However, such maximal pluralism clearly does not obtain in global terms." (ibid. 70).

¹⁰ More recently, Robertson invented the term "glocalization" in order to emphasize that "globalization is the general condition which has *facilitated* the diffusion of 'general modernity,' globality at this point being viewed in terms of the interpenetration of geographically distinct civilizations... In this perspective the problem becomes that of spelling out the ways in which homogenizing and heterogenizing tendencies are mutually implicative" Robertson 1995, 27; italics in original.

¹¹ "Modernity is inherently globalizing" in Giddens's perception. Giddens 1990, 63 and 177.

¹² This somewhat cryptic formula is explained by Robertson elsewhere: "While the latter process does involve the thematization of the issue of universal (i.e. global) 'truth,' the former involves the global valorization of particular identities... Identity, tradition and demand for indigenization only makes sense *contextually*. Moreover, uniqueness cannot be regarded simply as a thing-in-itself... In brief, globalization -- as a form of 'compression' of the contemporary world *and* the basis of a new hermeneutic for world history -- realizes and 'equalizes' all sociocultural formations... [the] registration of the increasing salience of civilizational and societal distinctiveness." Robertson 1992a, 130-131. It is noteworthy that Ernst Cassirer also arrived at the conclusion that a fundamental fact of all human cultural activity is that "the universal can be perceived only in the particular, while the particular can be thought only in reference to the universal." Cassirer 1955, 1: 86. The concordance between the view of a philosopher and of a sociologist of globalization is truly striking.

In the framework of globalization which, on the world scene, means small Western states try to obtain the support of the so-called international community in order to be admitted into the NATO and the European Union (expected to give them generous economic assistance), both countries felt obliged to show their willingness to make concessions to each other by signing a treaty recognizing the inviolability of their frontiers and the inalienable rights of their minorities. In contrast, the local situation is strained to its limits, as the opposition of a considerable part of public opinion and changing mentalities born out of a century-old conflict cannot evidently be alleviated by the fiat of foreign powers and the international community.

Thus, there is a kind of contradictory movement in late modernity, contradictory to the ever-widening globalization, against the acceleration of time and the Giddensian space-and-time distancing; it is the importance gained by place as the context of human activity, including the human body. Giddens summarized this phenomenon through the concepts of *locale* and *presence-availability* (1984, 118). Locales refer to settings of interaction, that is, they indicate the indispensable contextuality, whereas presence-availability describes a situation of being-together, of co-presence, of the possibility of coming-together. The separation of the media of communication from the media of transportation represents, in this perspective, one of the principal characteristics of modern evolution. What is interesting in Giddens's conception of locale and presence-availability is that the imperceptibly changing public attitude in these late-modern years instinctively veers back towards an appreciation of contextuality in earlier epochs. The perception of a not-so-global village and the instantaneity of happenings gradually convince people of the vital importance of the concrete place and of the concrete temporal dimension, in which they live. One can say, as in Ricoeur's similar pronouncements, that time is closely linked to the *lived* experience of generations of human beings and to the reflexive collections of past events in human memory, and that in the locale, in the contextual place of action, space and experience fuse together in the reality of everyday life. An awareness is growing that interaction in determined contexts -- co-presence -- is an inevitable condition of social integration.

A re-appraisal of the modern concepts of universalism and globalization is indispensable today because it seems more and more evident that universalism is no longer relevant, and the globalization process (as a fact and not as a theorem) is not such as it appears to be. It can be safely assumed that there is no necessity of looking for a bridgehead between coexisting cultures with their sometimes incommensurable, sometimes compatible mental and behavioral frameworks, because some common features of the genetic endowment as well as common human mental and spiritual capacities which define the uniqueness of man among the various species, reinforced by the similarities between different environments in which humans live, constitute a basic core of shared though limited features in different civilizations. This shared core does not justify any concept of universalism, but it is enough to facilitate understanding between persons living in various civilizational orbits.

However, globalization being a cultural process, it is necessary to find an institutional support which is its bearer (no process can take place in a vacuum), even if the determination of such an institutional framework of globalization leads unavoidably to a vicious circle because the cultural process which is institutionalized is, at the same time, instrumental in the creation of its institutional basis. All efforts to peg globalization to a framework, to find for it a fundamental institution, run into this difficulty.¹³ Until now there were two main conceptual elaborations to secure a sound basis for our world's globality and the underlying globalizing processes, beside the evident, practical reality of some globalizing trends in the field of economic activities. These elaborations represent a mix of varying proportions of world-system theories and of conceptualizations linked to the globalization process, affirming the existence of a world culture.

¹³ Not very long ago, Anthony King voiced some doubts in respect of the relationship of culture and globalization: "Yet if defined in terms of 'the process by which the world becomes a single place', globalization has also its ambiguities, irrespective of its silencing of economic, political or cultural parameters. Does it, for example, merely imply a state of inter-connectedness? Or does the interconnectedness take a special form (as an international division of labor)? Does it imply cultural homogenization, cultural synchronization or cultural proliferation? What does it say about the direction of cultural flows? Is the interaction of the local and the global, with the emphasis on the former, or vice versa? Is it the synchronization of temporality?" King concludes: "On the global scale, culture has to be thought spatially, politically, economically, socially and historically and also very specifically." King, Anthony D. "Introduction: Spaces of Culture, Spaces of Knowledge," in King. ed. 1997, 11-12.

First, based on a worldview reflecting economic determinism, is *the world-system theory proper*,¹⁴ focused around the center-periphery divide ("Homogenization results mainly from the center-to-periphery flow of commoditized culture;" Hannerz 1997, 108), completed sometimes by a vague description of a corresponding world culture. If Immanuel Wallerstein was not inclined to include a world culture in his world-system, it was for the good reason that he recognized that cultures are particularistic phenomena, though he pretended that their justification had to be with reference to universal criteria (Wallerstein 1997, 91-94). He, however, recognized later, in the sense of Robertson's principle of convergence of the universal and of the particular,¹⁵ that the various economic flows in the world capitalist economy unavoidably break down national distinctions or cultural particularisms, resulting in an internationalization of habits, customs, and cultural activities.

A variant of the economically-determined world-system approach, based on the globe-wide domination of financial capital and admitting the existence of a globalized, mass culture, is the one presented in the writings of Stuart Hall. Hall, in agreement with the Robertsonian principle, sees global culture as decentralized, or, better, decentered. Analyzing the form of homogenization peculiar to the global mass culture, he says that globalization

Is a homogenizing form of cultural representation, enormously absorptive of things, as it were, but the homogenization is never absolutely complete, and it does not work for completeness... It is wanting to recognize and absorb those differences within the larger, overarching framework of what is essentially an American conception of the world... it is now a form of capital which recognizes that it can only, to use a metaphor, rule through other capitals, rule alongside and in partnership with other economic and political elites. It does not attempt to obliterate them; it operates through them. It has to hold the whole framework of globalization in place and simultaneously police that system: it stage-manages independence within it, so to speak (Hall 1997, 28-29).

Second, Hall's approach leads us to the cultural conceptualization of globality based on a postulated dynamics of global culture independent of the capitalist dynamics of the political and economic sectors. Robertson is, thus, defending the thesis of a culturally pluralistic world system. This version of world-system theory reflects the conviction that contemporary cultural pluralism is penetrated by the awareness that the world is becoming a single place; the acceptance of such a globalizing feeling and emotion, in what Hannerz termed forms of life,¹⁶ marks the road towards a world culture. This explanation of global or world culture was completed by Robertson, with reference to the "consumerist global capitalism of our time" in a bow to the importance of world market trends which involve an "increasing *interpenetration* of culture and economy," though recognizing that the impact of global ecology on the fate of humankind is the truly global issue (Robertson 1997, 74-75). The pluralistic world culture is ultimately based, in this perspective, on the dialectical relationship of universalism and particularism which is the bearer of the globalization process as its institutional foundation and through which the rejected relativist position could be avoided.

¹⁴ Immanuel Wallerstein, the initiator of world-system theories, first did not develop a corresponding concept of a world culture, and gave the following definition of the world-system: "The only link of social system is a world-system which we define quite simply as a unit with a single division of labor and multiple cultural systems. It follows logically that there can, however, be two varieties of such world-systems: one with a common political system and one without. We designate these respectively as world empires and world economies." Wallerstein, Immanuel. "The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis." *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 1974, 16: 390.

¹⁵ "So just as there is a dialectic of creating simultaneously a homogeneous world and distinctive national cultures within this world, so there is a dialectic of creating simultaneously homogeneous national cultures and distinctive ethnic groups or 'minorities' within these nation-states." Wallerstein 1997, 99.

¹⁶ For Hannerz the form of life framework "also has a redundancy of its own, built up through its ever recurrent daily activities, perhaps as strong as, or stronger than, any redundancy that the market framework can ever achieve. It may involve interpersonal relationships, resulting configurations of self and other, characteristic uses of symbolic modes. There is perhaps a core here to which the market framework cannot reach, not even in the longer term, a core of culture which is not in itself easily commoditized and to which the commodities of the market are not altogether relevant." Hannerz 1997, 123.

I suggest that ... we may best consider contemporary globalization in its most general sense as a form of institutionalization of the two-fold process involving the universalization of particularism and the particularization of universalism... thus be regarded as opposition not merely to the world as one, homogenized system but also -- and I believe, more relevantly -- to the conception of the world as a series of culturally equal, relativized entities or ways of life (ibid., 77)¹⁷.

Universalist and particularist features of human existence are, in consequence, complementary. To particular individuals and particular societies correspond the system of societies as well as humankind, both universal by nature, or, in a concrete example, nationalism always involves correlation with internationalism. The institutionalization of the two dialectical elements of our existence is realized in the "interpenetrating processes of societalization, individualization, the consolidation of the international system of societies, and the concretization of the sense of humankind" (ibid., 79-80).

Although my view of the institutionalization of the globalizing process, that is, of the bearer of the universal/particular dialectic is close to the one elaborated by Roland Robertson, it appears to me that the interpenetration of these two features of our existence cannot fully explain a trend toward globality in late modernity. There is a need to dispose of a medium through which such an interpenetration and such an institutionalization of the cultural process, designated as globalization, can take place. In my view, globalization, a cultural phenomenon, was made possible and could only be given institutional support by a combination of factors. The first entails modern technological development, specifically communication and information technologies. The main bearer, the moving force of global processes are the media, especially television and electronic organizational (for example, televised conferences), training and publishing methods. We could not speak of a late modern tendency of globalizing certain cultural features without the first generation of technological developments in communications, such as railways, air transport, wireless transmissions and emissions, nor without the second generation, called the information revolution, including computerized networks, block trading of securities, satellite transmission, etc. This unique and overwhelming role of technology does not exclude the interplay of universalistic and particularistic elements, as other writers noted previously.¹⁸

But technology is nothing but a servant to those who use it, who manipulate it, and who can exploit it in their own interest. Therefore, technology is a vehicle of hegemonic power politics, technology is the servant of any and all powerholders whoever these may be. In consequence, globalization's principal institutionalized framework is hegemonic power or, at least, the will to hegemonic power. The crucial difference in respect to modern hegemonic politics as compared to the past is that old-fashioned hegemony applied its strength and pressures straightforwardly on all those who happened to be in its orbit of influence; whereas in late modernity, precisely because of the special effect of technological progress creating public spaces demanding transparency, hegemonic pressures take into account, and even use for their purposes, cultural, social, political and other differences. An apparently collective will to globalization -- to be understood as veiled unification in favor of the hegemonic interest -- evolves without eliminating the articulation of

¹⁷ It is useful to note here the full explanation of Robertson's elaboration of this dialectical relationship serving as the foundation of world culture: "In more recent world history the universalism-particularism issue has come to constitute something like a global-cultural form, a major axis of the structuration of the world-as-a-whole. Thus rather than simply viewing the theme of universalism as having to do with principles which can and should be applied to all and that of particularism as referring to that which can and should be applied 'locally,' I suggest that the two have become tied together as part of a globe-wide nexus - united in terms of the universality of experience and, increasingly, the *expectation* of particularity, on the one hand, and the experience and, increasingly, the *expectation* of universality, on the other. The latter - the particularization of universalism - involves the idea of the universal being given global-human concreteness; while the former - the universalization of particularism - involves the extensive diffusion of the idea that there is virtually no limit to particularity, to uniqueness, and thus also to difference and otherness." Robertson 1997, 76-77; italics in original.

¹⁸ In John Tagg's view: "A technology has no inherent value outside its mobilizations in specific discourses, practices, institutions and relations of power. Import and status have to be produced and effectively institutionalized and such institutionalizations do not describe a unified field or a working out of some essential causality. Even as they interlink in more or less extended chains, they are negotiated locally and discontinuously and are productive of value and meaning. And it is on the same ground that they would have to be challenged." Tagg, John. "Globalization, Totalization and the Discursive Field," in King, Anthony. ed. 1997, 155-160, especially page 159.

differences. Hence, Stuart Hall's formula that "the global is the self-presentation of the dominant particular." The global is nothing else but the way "in which the dominant particular localizes and naturalizes itself" (Hall 1997: 67) through associating itself with a variety of identities, correctly representing the modification required by the Robertsonian formulation in order to correspond to late-modern reality. Hegemonic intent underlying globalization without aiming at the destruction and disappearance of different particularities, is undeniably a cultural process, a process of adaptation of multiple identities and particularities to the hegemonic, particular identity, though the process is conditioned by the unforeseen, unintended and contingent features of the present world. The aim is not, then, to entirely change what is particular, moulding it in the dominant particular's image, but penetrating it, streamlining it, and bending it enough to be subservient to the hegemonic intent.

These considerations lead us to the third element of the institutionalizing framework of globalization. For technology to be able to assume the role it is expected to play in the globalization process, and for the technology-based hegemonic politics to be able to successfully penetrate and bend the innumerable particularities in the world without eliminating them, a vehicle is needed which ensures the right content and the coherence of message in the dissemination of information by the media. This is the ideology of globalization. Ideology is the empowering factor for technology and hegemonic efforts to achieve the latter's aim of domination through globalizing its own identity, culture, and interests. Without ideology, there would be no coherent message of the media; hegemonic interests could not be hidden behind the so-called unavoidable requirements of globalizing tendencies. Ideology is therefore the essential bearer of globalization processes, the most important of the three components of their institutionalization. Ideology creates and sustains globalization, and globalization processes are the proper source of the ideology of globality -- so we return to a dialectical vision à la Robertson. This dialectical turn indicates that the conceptualization set forth in these pages is not exempt either from the circular view from which other representations of the global process suffer; but, I believe, this is unavoidable because globalization is not an extant, timeless phenomenon in the world, a *Ding an sich*, but a very contextual mental construct which can only be dealt with properly in a dialectical way. And dialectics always involves circularity.

But ideology is not simply an expression of technological possibilities and a coverup for hegemonic power interests -- if so, the analysis of late modernity would be much simpler. The complexity of the situation is, however, created by the fact that ideology is a servant and expression of technology-born hegemonic power interest and, simultaneously, is hegemonic in and of itself, too. Thus, globalization processes are concurrently an expression and a bearer of particular power interests tending towards hegemony and, at the same time, expression and bearer of the proper interests of ideology representing a particular civilization that strives towards hegemony. Globalization, therefore, serves the promotion of twofold hegemonic interests: of those striving for political power and of those striving for the end of history in the form of the conquest of the planet by one particular civilization.¹⁹

Relativism evolved during the last decades of the twentieth century as a result of the opening up of the world, not only through the unexpected development of communications, but because of the movement of decolonization and the entry of non-Western civilizations onto the world scene as independent actors. The universality thesis of Western modernity was born in an age when little was known of other cultures and civilizations.²⁰ In addition, cultures of indigenous populations in countries colonized, until recently, by

¹⁹ I shall explain in detail, in the following chapter, how ideology became such a hypostatized entity becoming itself a hegemonic force in our late modern world. However, I would like to give here two examples of global ideology as servant of a national and/or hegemonic interest, and global ideology as striving towards hegemony on its own. The first case is the free world market doctrine (ideology), fundamental thesis of the American foreign policy. The drive of US negotiators with Japan aims toward a "managed" trade, or Japanese limitations of exports to the United States (national interest). In another version, the dispute between the United States and Europe regarding the Boeing-McDonnell merger and the related exclusivity contracts with some American companies (American, Delta) in which the free market doctrine of the American anti-trust attitude can be added (ideology) against the menace of trade war (hegemonic interest) if the European Union would impose, in accordance with its own anti-trust doctrine (ideology), severe fines on the new US giant in order to defend the European Airbus corporation's competitive edge (national interest). In respect to an ideology's striving to hegemony, the most appropriate example would be the radical egalitarian doctrine reigning in the West since the Enlightenment, which is expected to be incorporated in the cultural core of all other civilizations.

²⁰ Zygmunt Bauman ties Western universalism to Western political domination Bauman 1992, 96, and Daya Krishna explains the expansion of European epistemological universalism by the fact that the expansion of European powers "was accompanied not only by phenomenal growth in some of the traditional fields of knowledge but also by demarcation

European powers, or surviving in remote territories untouched by the impact of modern technology, were not considered on equal footing with our own culture, especially in the glamorous days when infinite hopes were inspired by the progress of science. The Western world only came face to face with non-Western civilizations in the aftermath of the Second World War and in the wake of the accelerating process of decolonization. Due to the globalization of all problems related to world politics, the West encountered the Otherness of the East.²¹ Problems of economic development governed by Western principles as well as difficulties encountered in the course of technical assistance programs, greatly contributed to increased information about the world's other civilizations, their genuine and authentic belief- and value-systems, their ways of life, and their will to affirm their own identity. In this new situation was born the Western civilization's ideological-hegemonic tendency expressed by Featherstone as the West's understanding itself "as the guardian of universal values on behalf of a world formed in its own self-image" (Featherstone 1993: 172). This striving to conquer the world through the ideological message promoting the planetary hegemony of Western civilization, summed up in the end of history prophecies, is mainly sustained by the media and the electronic instruments of dissemination of information -- the institutional framework of the globalization process.

Nevertheless, the awareness of a plurality of coexisting civilizations, each having its right to its own identity and each entitled to live in accordance with its own cosmic vision, its own cultural framework and traditions which evolved over centuries, grew simultaneously with the crystallization of the West's ideological-hegemonic drive. This awareness makes it imperative to adopt an approach to civilizational differences, along the lines suggested by Janet Abu-Lughod, consisting of

Mutual awareness, sensitivity and, if not acceptance, an attempt to interpret and evaluate the beliefs and acts of others on their own, not our, terms. This need not lead to bland cultural relativism. It need not imply no values. One could still believe and prefer, one could choose to associate or disassociate, but one would have to learn to grant to *the other* his/her contextual wholeness.²²

Such an approach would not exclude, whenever possible and feasible, the need to adapt Western scientific views, methods and technologies to a given cultural framework, even implying certain changes in the ways of life of the populations if these adaptations and changes are compatible with their inherited values and traditions. Thus, civilizational pluralism is the major force in dissipating the universalist belief and its concurrent thesis concerning the one and only rationality which is valid for all peoples at all times. The impact of this pluralism is growing with each passing day and brings more new evidence of the coexisting but diverging cultural configuration in the world.

The globalization process is, then, the engine of the self-affirmation and ideological hegemony of Western civilization, and it appears successful in the dissemination of Western civilizational values. This impression is, nevertheless, deceiving *because globalization is a phenomenon solely at the surface of the life of other civilizations*. Its effects, such as pollution, may however be devastating and enduring, non-Western cultures are not affected in their depth by this globalizing process:

and consolidation of new areas designating new fields of knowledge, [whence] the feeling that the claim that all 'knowledge' discovered by the West held universal validity was justified." Krishna, Daya. "Comparative Philosophy: What It Is and What It Ought To Be," in Larson and Deutsch. eds. 1988, 72.

²¹ We have to listen to the touching confession of James Baldwin in his *Notes of a Native Son* (Boston: 1955, 6-7 and 165) concerning his "otherness" in the Western world: "I was forced to recognize that I was a kind of bastard of the West: when I followed the line of my past I did not find myself in Europe but in Africa. And this meant that in some subtle way, in a really profound way, I brought to Shakespeare, Bach, Rembrandt, to the stones of Paris, to the cathedral at Chartres and to the Empire State Building a special attitude. These were not really my creations, they did not contain my history; I might search in vain forever for any reflection of myself. I was an interloper; this was not my heritage... Go back a few centuries and they [of the West] are in their full glory -- but I am in Africa, watching the conquerors arrive."

²² Abu-Lughod, Janet, "Going Beyond Global Babble," in King, Anthony. ed. 1997, 131-137, the quotation is on page 135; italics in original.

An elemental fact emerges about the source of hostility in the global furnace of competitive diversity: a vital collective otherness in any form, whether religious, political, or cultural, tends to constitute by its very presence an act of defiance against the established order. Forever searching for certitude, all people unconsciously universalize their communal way of life, judging by their limited experience of the world the actions of people living under entirely different circumstances, waxing morally indignant over events of which they know nothing. Such a universalization is an intrinsic part of human assertiveness; it lies at the root of cognitive imperialism (von Laue 1987: 342).

Examples of the limited though devastating impact of globalization in other civilizational orbits are the extended urbanization from the structural, the formation of nation-states from the political, the establishment of Western-type judicial processes from the procedural point of views, and, finally, the consumerization of large masses due to the invasion of Western-type products such as clothing or electrical appliances, from the point of view of modification of certain indigenous customs. However, the major impact of modernity on Asian, African and Latin American cultures is the penetration of the means of communication and the concomitant domination of media, which are the foremost instruments of the globalization process itself.

Difficulties encountered in this process and demonstrating the irrelevance of Western hegemonic, ideological beliefs are numerous. I shall briefly analyze such examples from the cultural, social, economic, and political fields, and cite one example concerning experiences made at international level:

Cultural confrontation. A cultural confrontation is currently being waged, though in some cases, is still in the making, between fundamental ideas of our culture, and beliefs and worldviews of non-Western civilizations. There are two clear examples of this confrontation:

First, all other civilizations are based on religious or metaphysical worldviews which rarely disappear but are rather re-invigorated under the attacks of the Western rationalist and secularized overall approach to life. One type of the increasing reaction against the West is the mushrooming of various religious fundamentalisms which try to save the faith and the values drawn from tradition. It is important to beware of the fact that these fundamentalisms are supported, in particular, by the popular classes and resistance to them is limited to the Westernized middle- and upper-classes of the society. This is a cultural self-defense mechanism because it defends the fundamental tenets of non-Western peoples' collective identities.

Second, another form of self-defense against the onslaught of modern ideas is the rebirth of nationalisms based on the defense of one of the major components of collective identities: ethnic solidarity. The nationalist revival is not only manifest in countries belonging to non-Western civilizations, but also in the orbit of the West itself, as demonstrated by the recent war in the Balkans. What is instructive in all cases of nationalist conflicts or ethnic strife is the fact that not only the popular classes are involved, but the non-Western educated middle classes as well, especially the so-called intelligentsia; it is, of course, a historic experience that the middle classes and the intelligentsia, where they existed, were always among those who led nationalist revolts and ethnic-oriented uprisings.

Social de-structuring. Traditional social structures are always modified in the course of economic development. However, such a modification presupposes a corresponding change in the reigning worldview because the gradually emerging new social structure must be embedded in a global mental framework which sustains and justifies it. As a consequence of the conflictual relation between traditional and imported cultural frameworks, emerging social groups, normally weak and limited in numbers, are lost between two worlds. First, they cannot be freed and do not want to be freed from their traditional ties. Second, they are unable to adopt a new cultural approach in its entirety which is not adapted to their specific world. As a result, in most countries belonging to the orbit of other civilizations, there is no middle class which could be the bearer of a new but foreign cultural vision and the actor in new but foreign social roles.

Economic stagnation. Enormous expectations accompanied the achievement of independence by Asian, African and Latin American countries though it was realized that political independence is not viable without economic independence. The hopes of rapid development of the underdeveloped countries did not materialize because of the non-congruence of these countries' cultural and social frameworks and the methods of economic development borrowed from the West. The copying of Western principles, in the name of universalist and globalizing ideologies, went so far, it was not even admitted that these countries could follow a path of growth that did not correspond to the theories of Western scholars and politicians. A concrete case of the impossibility of simply copying the competitive market model is the actual drive for privatization,

or making of the local private sector the engine of the country's growth. There is practically no middle class, in the Western sense, in many developing countries, no private entrepreneurs; whom should the efforts of privatization aim at? The long bureaucratic tradition in most of these countries produced a great mass of employees in public administrations and managers and workers in mostly state-owned enterprises, but no private sector can be developed with people who are accustomed to work in a bureaucratic administration. It should not be forgotten that in the West, it took more than two centuries for the bourgeoisie to acquire enough influence to assume the role of private entrepreneurs.

Political dilemma: disorganization or dictatorship. Two factors play an important role in respect of the dilemma of political organization in other cultural worlds. First, the nation-state formula is irrelevant in different civilizational and social frameworks; the nation-state is, in fact, without a referent. The second factor is the cultural disorientation and social destructuring in those countries due to the impact of Western influence.

It is evident that in different and changing environments, in Asia and Africa especially, the constantly modified and fluctuating system of various state-formations, or the longer or shorter existence of more or less vast empires, was the best adapted political organization in the past. The colonial occupation did not introduce a new political organizational pattern but simply extended to the colonies the nation-state organization as it existed in European countries in the nineteenth century. After independence, the former colonies adopted the political system of parliamentary democracy within the existing borders of colonial territories, borders which were declared untouchable to avoid the dissolution of these territories into small units along the lines of ethnic and tribal divisions. There was no effort undertaken in the decolonized territories by the Western educated intelligentsia to reformulate the inherited political organization and adapting the democratic forms of power to their culture's standards and cosmic vision.

Be it as it may, the non-congruence between non-Western peoples' belief and value systems and their whole civilizational background, and the political society organized in a nation-state and a parliamentary democracy, is undeniable. In most of the formerly colonial territories numerous ethnic groups, frequently divided by religious differences as well, are lumped together; it is only natural that the same problems as those plaguing Europe since the establishment of nation-states on territories where several nationalities lived together are gradually disorganizing the newly independent states' administrative and political systems. In Europe, we have witnessed the successive crises of national minorities living within unified national states -- even in Western Europe. In countries belonging to non-Western civilizations, we witness escalating ethnic warfare, secessionist movements, and almost continuous bloodletting in the form of local conflicts. So-called parliamentary democracies function only in the newly independent countries where a charismatic personality unites the population under the banner of a one-party state. The disappearance of such charismatic leaders, many of whom belonged to the vanishing generation that fought for independence, leaves behind a disorganized society and a weak administration, to be seized by anybody who has the only really powerful instrument under his control, that is, the generals. In consequence, this means that with a few exceptions, like India, parliamentary democracies exist only in name, whether such nations are led by a charismatic leader or by a military dictator.

Local conflicts, peacekeeping and the international community. The United Nations system was created in a world entirely different from our world today. Its main purpose is the maintenance of international security through collective measures and large-scale cooperation of all its members, safeguarding, however, the principle of non-interference into one another's internal affairs. The Charter understandably envisaged carrying out peacekeeping operations in case of localized conflicts between members. This mechanism was paralyzed during the Cold-War era, but has become one of the most important activities of the United Nations since rivalry between the great powers, at least temporarily, disappeared. There are more and more local conflicts, and the number of peacekeeping operations has soared, along with the financial burden for which the richer members of the international community were not prepared. These operations frequently represent involvement in the internal affairs of the countries concerned such as in Cambodia or Somalia. Protagonists of humanitarian intervention openly claim the right of intervening, under the umbrella of the Security Council, in the affairs of members of the international community that are not ready to guarantee the protection of human rights within their boundaries.

It is not even this turn of recent events related to peacekeeping operations which is the most worrisome. The most preoccupying aspect of those recent operations is the conspicuous but inevitable lack of success. Inevitable because all the above factors make the success of United Nations peacekeepers impossible, as only the symptoms of the underlying fundamental problems are addressed -- not the problems themselves.

For example in Cambodia, no democracy could be viably established, and in Somalia, the ethnic strife and the fight between warlords resumed as soon as the presence and pressure of the United Nations was reduced. Finally, the treatment of the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis by the United Nations and the great powers, including the Dayton Agreement, was the most inefficient of all, witnessing a complete ignorance of history and of cultural antagonisms in the region.

CHAPTER TWO

FROM RELIGION TO SCIENCE TO IDEOLOGY

This chapter endeavors to relate human experience to the perspective defined by Borkenau emphasizing that all cultures represent the road "from the mythical, on which culture may be founded, to the nonmythical which disrupts it," leading to the erosion of the coherence of society (Borkenau 1981, 44 and 48). Individuals' and communities' views, choices and acts are inevitably and ineluctably subjective and ambiguous, lacking in continuity and coherence if they do not have an all-embracing framework with transcendental reference that assures an overall orientation. The religious, mythical or transcendental-metaphysical framework creates order and makes it possible to avoid stagnation and disintegration. The road traced here leads from a religious culture to a scientific one, which ends in the confusion of numerous pluralistic frameworks constituted by ideologies of all kinds.

1. The Transcendental-Civilizational Framework

All cultures, except Western modernity, are centered around a religious, polytheistic, monotheistic or transcendental-metaphysical core: whether they were constituted by varying conceptions of God and the world, as in Hinduism; whether they are concerned in the "beyond-the-river," other-worldly reality, as in Buddhism; whether their belief is centered in the cult of the ancestors and in the sacred, impersonated by an omnipotent ruler, as in China. The imperative of religion was summed up by Wittgenstein, when he said that "the sense of the world must lie outside the world," or that "the solution of the riddle of life in space and time lies *outside* space and time" (Wittgenstein 1974, 71-72; italics in original). The religious core of a culture provided its members with an essential and meaningful ontological and cosmic framework in which all aspects of the world were ordered; it determined a comprehensive worldview, a view of life in Heidegger's sense¹ but, as Kant emphasized, such a worldview could not be universal because "there is a plurality of worlds if world is always a perspective of totality."² One of the most crucial functions of religion is to secure the moral guidance of the believers in this life. *The transcendental core of a culture gave sense to the vicissitudes of life; it explained, gave meaning, and assigned a role and a permanent value to all occurrences in the physical world, in society, and in individual lives.* An ontological/cosmic framework could only assume this function because it constituted a transcendental perspective: "The transcendent is constituted through a *post hoc* act of civilizational understanding, while conversely, this civilizational act is as it is in view of a civilization's grasp of transcendence" (Wyschograd 1981, 59).³ Ontological/cosmic frameworks, therefore, represent a constant, dialectical interplay of transcendental and immanent realities.

¹ "A world view is in itself always a definitely directed and comprehended opening and holding open of the world. A world view is in itself always 'perspectival'... [It is] a metaphysically determining element of every existing being in itself in accordance with which it -- in various stages of clarity and consciousness of the drive toward itself -- relates to beings as a whole, and behaves and acts in terms of this fundamental relation." Heidegger 1985, 5, 18.

² Kant, Immanuel. *Works*. Akademische Ausgabe. XXI, 70, quoted in Heidegger, *ibid.* 17.

³ Wyschograd recognizes that traces of transcendence -- in her rather murky definition of transcendence -- cut across cognitive-rationalist and instrumental aspects of a civilization, because "when ontological primacy is granted to an aboriginal and fixed-meaning complex, the alternatives available within this framework yield accounts of transcendence

In this sense, a distinction has to be made between ontological/cosmic frameworks and mythical worldviews which, following Kolakowski,⁴ transcend this-wordly experience, but cannot explain reality or offer ethical guidance in everyday life. Religion is concerned with the real; therefore, it represents an all-embracing ontological framework.⁵ The added cosmic qualifier emphasizes that its ontology includes the physical and distant universe as well. The ontological/cosmic framework makes it clear that man and his culture are part of nature, of the global whole.⁶ In this perspective, most religious worldviews encompassed the natural and social environments. That religions are concerned with the real man and the real world is clearly shown by their knowledge that good and evil are equally present both in man's existence and in the world's history, that the immanent world and the concrete human being can, in their ontological essence, be either. That religious worldviews concern reality is also proven by the fact that they address individual and community at the same time because these views recognize that the destinies of individuals and their communities are inextricably interwoven; they cannot exist one without the other. The simultaneously transcendental and realistic orientation of the ontological/cosmic frameworks in human cultures safeguard them from falling into any of the extreme tendencies, that is, from becoming any kind of individualistic or collectivistic religions -- serving the Ego, its passions, desires, and preferences, or serving the state, some self-proclaimed finalities, or actions undertaken to promote specific collectivities' interests.

If the ontological/cosmic framework is an all-encompassing perspective and an integrative force in human life, it is not only because it concerns the real, but also because it includes finality as one of its most important aspects. It is looking beyond death, disappearance, dissolution or, in general, beyond the fading or passing away of everything and everyone in this earthly existence. This naturally implies that such a framework contains a transcendental teleology in whatever form; it is impossible to have a teleology which is imprisoned within the boundaries of the immanent world. There is no explanation for death and disappearance in terms which ignore anything but the ontic conditions of life. Ernst Mayr is right; human science limited to efforts aimed at understanding the physical world in which we live cannot be teleological, but only teleonomic discovering nature's rules governing the existence of various forms of being.

A brief review of the world cultures' transcendental core will illuminate the importance of a framework for the human lifeworld. It is well-known, starting with the so-called Abrahamic religions, that one of the strictest ontological/cosmic frameworks was, of course, the one decreed by the three monotheistic faiths -- Judaism, Christianity and Islam. In these religions, the distance separating man from God, the omnipotent and omniscient Lord of all worlds, is unspeakable; in fact, there cannot be monotheism without an absolute transcendentalism. But in the sense of the very specific dialectics inherent in all monotheisms, there is no such transcendental distance between God and man, His creature, because God came to the encounter of man, to make it possible for man to believe in Him and to live in accordance with His commandments. The encounter of God and man became reality through His revelations, the Old Testament in Judaism, the *Quran*

which either break with ordinary canons of coherence or nullify the canons themselves." Wyschograd 1981, 61, 63, and 72.

⁴ "I call 'mythical' every conviction which not only transcends finite experience in the sense that it does not describe it (since every hypothesis in this sense steps beyond experience) but also in the sense that it relativizes every possible experience, referring it to realities whose verbal description cannot in principle be tied logically with verbal descriptions of experience. In other words, the realities of the mythical order can explain nothing about the realities of experience, nor, even less, be derivable from them. They are also nonoperative; they do not enable us to predict or explain anything." Kolakowski 1989, 26.

⁵ It is important to note that in some religions, the all-embracing ontology includes the negation of extant things as well. This is well-expressed by Streng with reference to Buddhism: "The implication of this ontological experience of negativity is that a thing is 'itself' when it is non-itself without ceasing to be itself. When one perceives 'emptiness' one recognizes that the character of a particular form is intrinsically related to other forms, and thus there is no need to preserve its own identity independently... The common reality in both, according to Nishitani, is that both are empty of any substantial essential being. No essence or anything else can stand ontologically independent of anything else... the standpoint of emptiness of which Nishitani speaks is that one loses the substantial and subjective reality while at the same time affirming the close essential *interrelationship* among all things." Streng, Frederick J. "Structures of Ultimate Transformation and the Hermeneutics of Cross-Cultural Philosophy of Religion," in Dean. ed. 1995, 218.

⁶ Louis Dupré quotes Chrysippus, who said: "Living in accordance with virtue is equivalent to living in accordance with experience of what happens by nature -- for our natures are parts of the whole." Dupré 1993, 28.

in Islam, and, the person of Jesus Christ, God's Son, in Christianity. In monotheistic religions, the encounter between God and man happened in two distinct modes. First, between Him and His chosen people to which apply the teleological predictions of the prophets (as in Judaism); thus, the individual practically does not exist, for God speaks to His people, to the community of believers, and not to persons. In Christianity and Islam, community as well as the individual are the objects of God's revelation and commandments, the bearers of the destiny He imparted them and the addressees of His promises and pronouncements. Though in Islam, the emphasis is on the community; in Christianity, it is on the individual, his faith and the moral quality of his acts. Frequently it is said that the individualism of modernity is Christian in its origin; this is, however, an error. Though God's grace and salvation through Christ's sacrifice is applicable only to individuals who are members of the Christian community, the visible Church here on earth and the invisible Church in eternity. It is unacceptable and unscientific, in the case of any religion, to collapse into each other a religious faith's tenets and the principles of a metaphysical credo or of an ideology.

The oldest Indian *Vedic* religion, contained in the *Upanishads*, was entirely monist in affirming that everything is one with *Brahman*: "The One God is hidden within all beings. He is the all-pervading, all filling Inner-Self (*antar-atman*) of all beings; the overseer of all activities."⁷ Therefore, "That art thou" (*tat twam asi*), the great principle of *Vedantic* truth means, in Zimmer's explanation, "'thou art to be aware of thine inmost essence with the invisible substance of all and everything' -- which represents an extreme withdrawal from the differentiated sphere of individualized appearances" (Zimmer 1974a, 360-361).⁸ But this unity with *Brahman*, this absolute conception of transcendence, can only be reached through an intuitive awareness which offers an affirmation of the sanctity of life. The vision exposed by the *Bhagavad Gita* unites the transcendence of Brahmanism with the immanent dualism of later non-Aryan doctrines because it recognizes that the individuals' souls are part of the divine Being. This means that everyone should fulfil his earthly duties, carry out his activities here but with a detachment from the world, from the gains and losses, joys and sufferings, which are unavoidable: "Give thought to nothing but the act, never to its fruits, and let not thyself be seduced by inaction. For him who achieves inward detachment, neither good nor evil exists any longer here below" (*Bhagavad Gita*, 2.47; *ibid.*, 386). In contradistinction to the Christian view, in which God's incarnation in the world was a unique event in human history, for Hinduism, God's participation in all aspects of mundane existence is, in Zimmer's words, "a rythmical event conforming to the beat of the world ages" (*ibid.*, 389), expressing the cosmic unity of the Hindu vision. As Embree noted: "The genius of the Brahmanical tradition is precisely its extraordinary continuity and its adherence to its own inner core of meaning, and it is this that provides the substance of the ideology that is a major factor in the unity of the Indian civilization."⁹

In *Tantrism*, one of the most recent forms of Hindu religiosity, the personal God obliterates the abstract *Vedic* ideal of Brahman, though *Tantrism* never rejected the authority of the *Vedas*, that is, the Hinduist orthodoxy. In this, *Tantrism* is truly representative of popular Hinduism; both follow the teachings of *Advaita* but emphasize the positive aspects of *maya*, our world of illusions. *Tantrism* thus confesses a non-dualistic worldview, but not transcendent in the usual sense of the term. It does, however, obliterate the limits of social and biological differentiation in an all-embracing acceptance of nature as the existential framework. All these aspects are manifest in the *Tantrist* return to the figure of Mother-Goddess, *Maya-Sakti* (*ibid.*, 568-573).

On the contrary, the non-Aryan belief systems of India were characterized by a strict distinction, a logical dualism between spirit and matter, between the principle of the immaterial, pristine individuality and the polluting, darkening, material Otherness. *Jainism*, for example, distinguishes spirit (*jiva*) from matter (*ajiva*), though, at the same time, affirming their final synthesis. Animate beings consequently consist of the soul as the essence of consciousness, perceiving and intelligent, and the body. Nonconscious entities are divided into two categories: those with form (*rupa*) like matter, and those without form (*arupa*) like space, time, motion, etc. (Radhakrishnan, and Moore 1957, 259-251). This duality, bordering on a quasi-

⁷ *Bhṛhadaranyaka Upaniṣad*, 2.4.5, quoted in Zimmer 1974a, 367.

⁸ "That Self (*atman*) is not this, not that (*neti, neti*). It is unseizable, for it cannot be seized; undestructible, for it cannot be destroyed; unattached, for it does not attach itself; it is unbound, it does not tremble, it is not injured," says the same *Upaniṣad*, 4.5.15. *ibid.* 363.

⁹ Embree, Ainslee T. "Indian Civilization and Regional Cultures: The Two Realities," in Wallace, Paul. ed. 1985. *Region and Nation in India*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 23-24.

transcendentalism, does not correspond to the distinction between being and nonbeing, mutually entailing each other, but manifested successively in given contexts. Being is nothing else but the characteristic feature of objects and phenomena in the world which sums up, and therefore eliminates, all other features such as form, substance, place, or time. In consequence, all knowledge and judgement are contingent and relative, because reality is indescribable, transcended in experience only (Singh 1987, 17-20 and 55-58).

Confucianism is not a religion in the sense as we understand it and, in contrast to Taoism, the Confucian worldview is situated entirely within the immanent world. It is more an ethical perspective, a guidance of moral action associated with the cult of the ancestors and of the emperor who represents Heaven and Earth. The ancestor cult certainly reflects the remnants of ancient Chinese religions. In the classical Chinese tradition, the aesthetic order enjoyed a pronounced primacy over the logical order. As a consequence of this modified perspective on the epistemological plane, the conceptualization of the world as correlatively related polarities -- *yin* and *yang* -- appeared, "each requiring the other for adequate articulation" (Ames 1989, 199). The self and the other were constituted in such a polar relationship:

Each particular is a consequence of every other, such that there is no contradiction in saying that each particular is both self-determinate and determined by every other particular. That is, the other 'particulars' which make up existence are intrinsically related to and thus constitutive of 'self' (ibid., 129).

The *Taoism* of *Lao Tzu* and *Chuang Tzu* emphasizes the dynamism of incessant change in nature and the polarization of paired existences which corresponded to the basic duality of *Tao* (the Way) and *Te* (the power or the virtue of a thing), or of being (*yu*) and nonbeing (*wu*). Such oppositions constituted the transcendental comprehension of the cosmos in Chinese culture.¹⁰ In David Hall's interpretation, this Taoist dialectic of being and nonbeing indicates that the cosmos is not represented by an eternal totality ordered in a particular way, an abstraction, but a sum total of all possible orders. Orders of worldly existence are construed from a particular perspective; it is the *Te*, the principle of individuation, which represents the particularistic essence (Hall 1989, 108). The doctrine of the "parity of things" is what Ames calls the Taoist *ars contextualis* (1989, 142): the world-conceptualization in correlated polarities results in that the human being unavoidably becomes a person, a being-in-environment. Man and nature are mutually creative because their creative powers are coextensive. The reduction of nature to an instrumentality annihilates its creativity as much as the creativity of man.

In his excellent analysis of Chinese religious-metaphysical thinking, Chung-ying Cheng shows how Western ontologies, because of the Greek influence on Western rationalism reflected by our language structures and semantics, is different from the holistic Chinese worldview linked to their image-creating, ideogrammatic language (Chung-ying Cheng 1989, 167-168). He summed up this worldview as follows:

In light of both the trinity of heaven, earth, and man, and the unities of knowledge/action, substance/function, and fact/value, we have thus an integrative unity of the trinity of unities. *This is the most enriched reality which the Chinese metaphysical thinking has brought out and which embodies an infinite possibility of understanding and interpretation as well as an inexhaustible source of meaning and value* (ibid., 182; italics in original).

In consequence, cosmology is part of the ontological framework which, in turn, manifests itself in the functioning of the cosmos. The ontological is not conceived in a static way because the *Tao* represents in it

¹⁰ On these basic dualities of Taoism see Fung Yu-Lan 1983, 1: 175-182. He explains, in particular, that "*Tao*, since it is the first principle of all things, cannot itself be a 'thing' in the way that Heaven and Earth and 'the ten thousand things' are things. Objects can be said to be Being (*yu*), but *Tao* is not an object, and so may only be spoken of as Non-being (*wu*). At the same time, however, *Tao* is spoken of as both Being and Non-being. Non-Being refers to its essence; Being to its function. Therefore the Lao Tzu says: 'The *Tao* that may be called *Tao* is not the invariable *Tao*. The names that can be named are not invariable names. Non-being is the term given to that from which Heaven and Earth sprang. Being is the term given to the mother that rears the ten thousand things (on earth). Of the invariable Non-being, we wish to see its invariable secret essences. Of the invariable Being, we wish to see its borders. These two have issued together but are different in name. The two together we call the Mystery (*hsüan*).'" ibid. 178; italics in original.

the simultaneous prevalence of being and becoming, permanence and change. Change is, however, only possible when there is difference between opposite though complementary processes, symbolically articulated by the *yin* and *yang*.¹¹ Being and non-being are complementary; there can be no being without non-being, which is being's transcendent aspect. Therefore, *Lao-Tzu* identifies *Tao* with non-being, the non-existent, which also means the world to which man returns at the end of his life. Finally, in another of Chung-Ying Cheng's striking formulae, knowledge in the Chinese tradition aims at the harmonization of self and world, whereas in Buddhism, for example, it is expected to help man to overcome the self, and in Western culture it is the instrument to master or conquer the world (*ibid.*, 172).

Buddhism, a transcendentalism combining metaphysics with an ethical way of life, focused on the nature of experiential reality, on the common ground of existence which is conceived of as encompassing "myriad realms." This common ground was created by the fact that each being originated in interdependence, or in unison and simultaneously with everything else (doctrine of "dependent origination" of the Buddha),¹² not as part of a whole or in the order of succession of their appearance. *Samsara*, the immanent destiny, and *nirvana*, the "beyond-the-river" reality, are complementary. The latter makes possible man's escaping from the former. In his preaching, Buddha said: "Monks, there is a not-born, a no-become, a not-made, a not-compounded. Monks, if that unborn, not-become, not-made, not compounded were not, there would be apparent no escape from this here that is born, become, made, compounded."¹³ The key functions of the non-existent, the non-self, or emptiness "is to foil any empirical or epistemic thrusts" (Inada 1989, 239) of the human mind.

In *Theravada* Buddhism, especially in the *Vaibhasika* doctrine, there are two kinds of existences. First, the *dharmic* existence which has its own unique characteristics; it is a substantial existence, inherent in nature, though spanning only a moment (and the moment is defined as the shortest possible unit of time). Second, it is an existence by *designation*, a result of referring to it by linguistic convention, representing a compounded entity of the primary, *dharmic* existences. The secondary existence corresponds to the changing needs of specific individual lives and societies. These two sorts of existences express the "distinction between the ultimate truth and the experiential truth" (Griffiths 1986, 49-53). Nevertheless, in accordance with Winston King,

In Buddhist thinking truth and reality are ultimately one; value and fact are identical on the highest level. When these two elements are separated, except for the temporary purpose of intellectual analysis, it is an indication of lower and relativistic experience of both truth and reality. So Nibbana [Nirvana] in its aspect of ultimate reality is also ultimate truth, or better Absolute Truth-Reality, which must be directly realized to be truly known (King 1964, 91).

In the classical *Yogacara* teaching, especially in *Vasubandu's* writings, the duality of existences is recognized, but it is affirmed that the only reality is mind; thus, representations reflect "mental events with

¹¹ "The progression from unity to multiplicity - without thereby creating something completely different - is made possible by the fact that multiplicity is already inherent in unity, although it cannot as yet be seen in its germinal state... This multiplicity in unity makes further unfolding, further development, possible. It is immediately obvious that this is not the result of the creation of the world at a specific historical time... it shows itself equally within the spatial world, in the continuous regeneration of life." Introduction by R. Wilhelm to *Lao Tzu's Tao Te Ching*. Lao Tzu 1985, 21.

¹² "*Dependent arising* is often referred to as *dharmata*, which is the Buddhist term for *nature*... It does not presuppose the sharp dichotomy between human life and nature... A human being is part of nature. Like everything else in the teeming and dramatic richness of nature, he is dependently arisen or causally conditioned. He comes into being depending upon various conditions, contributes his share to the drama, and makes his exit. He is part of nature, that is, in a constant process of becoming (*bhava*), evolution (*parinama*), and dissolution. This process of becoming or evolution is neither haphazard nor strictly teleological. The world is neither an empirical sand nor an ever-elusive absolute. Its dramatic richness lies in its concrete contextual fruitfulness." Kalupahana, D. J. "Toward a Middle-Path of Survival," in Callicott and Ames. eds. 1989, 252.

¹³ *The Minor Anthologies of the Pali Canon*. Trans. F.L. Woodward. Part 2: *Itivuttaka: As It Was Said*. Part 1: *Udana*. Verses of Uplift, 98. London: Geoffrey Cumberlege. Quoted in Inada 1989, 235.

intentional objects," including sense perceptions. Consciousness is, therefore, an ensemble of representations of intentional objects -- representation and mind are identical (ibid., 80-81).

A very particular case is the Chinese-Buddhist *Hua-Yen* worldview. According to this uniquely non-transcendental metaphysics, as Cook explains it, all beings are isolated though in active and infinitely repeated interrelationship, meaning their "simultaneous *mutual identity* and *mutual intercausality*" without any teleology; the cosmos, consequently, is a "self-creating, self-maintaining, and self-defining organism" (Cook 1989, 214-215). The *Hua-Yen* represents an ontological/cosmic framework which lacks finality and the communal perspective, though not without an integrating force, and closely corresponds to our Western scientific image of the world.¹⁴

2. Modernity: The Immanent Framework of Rationality and Science

In respect of the modern worldview, it is important to at once dissipate a misunderstanding concerning what I understand by modernity. In my perspective, modernity is not simply a chronological definition, a most recent age distinct from the remote past. Consequently, one has not only to clarify "whose version of modernity we are operating with," and "when and where that version comes to be fixed as a dominant paradigm."¹⁵ Modernity is a specific, typically Western cultural phenomenon, born during the centuries from the late Middle Ages through the Renaissance, Reformation and the seventeenth-century beginnings of the scientific culture to the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. Vattimo's definition, "modernity is the era in which being modern is the base-value" wonderfully characterizes the modern age (Vattimo 1988, 103). In contradistinction to pre-modern times in Europe, modernity stands for three major characteristics: first, Weberian disenchantment, the replacement of religion by rationality as the ontological/cosmic framework; second, the elevation of man to the highest status in the universe, that is, the reign of the individual; and, third, voluntarism, the faith in human capabilities, in the limitless possibilities of the human being, as well as Western science and technology. Giddensian self-reflexivity is a combined result of the second and third characteristics. In a recent text, Alain Touraine summed clearly up this essence of modernity:

In its most ambitious form, the idea of modernity was the assertion that men and women are what they do, and that there must therefore be an increasingly close connection between production, which is made more efficient by science, technology or administration, the organization of society governed by law, and a personal life motivated by both self-interest and the will to be free of all constraints. What could provide a basis for this correspondence between a scientific culture, an ordered society and free individuals, if not the triumph of *reason*? Reason alone could establish a correspondence between human action and the order of the world... Reason inspires science and its applications; it also requires the adaptation of social life to individual or collective needs. Reason replaces the reign of arbitrary power and violence with the legal State and the market. By acting in accordance with the laws of reason, humanity was advancing towards affluence, freedom and happiness (Touraine 1995, 1; italics in original).

¹⁴ "The Hua-Yen world is completely nonteleological. There is no theory of a beginning of time, no concept of a creator, no question of the purpose of it all. The universe is taken as a given, a vast fact which can be explained only in terms of its own dynamism, which is not at all unlike the view of twentieth-century physics... In short, we find it much easier to think in terms of isolated *beings*, rather than one *Being*. Being is just that, a unity of existence in which numerically separate entities are all interrelated in a profound manner. Beings are thought of as autonomous, isolated within their own skins, each independent by and large from all the rest of beings (both animate and inanimate)... The Hua-Yen universe, on the other hand, has no hierarchy. There is no center, or perhaps if there is one, it is everywhere. Man certainly is not the center, nor is some god." Cook 1989, 215-216; italics in original.

¹⁵ King, Anthony B. "The Times and Spaces of Modernity (Or Who Needs Postmodernism)?" in Featherstone, Lash and Robertson. eds. 1995, 113-114.

(A) THE DISENCHANTMENT OF THE WORLD

The Weberian disenchantment of the world meant the replacement of the pre-modern ontological/cosmic framework -- discredited as meta-physical, mythical, magical, superstitious -- by human rationality, immanent in the world but considered universal for all humankind. In this way, human history was reduced to a three-stage development: in the Comtean scheme from the theological through the philosophical to the positivist age; in the Weberian presentation, the religious, meta-physical or mythical outlooks were rationalized from polytheism and other forms of paganism into monotheism, which, in turn, gave way to a thoroughly rationalistic culture, a secular organization of society and an autonomous individual life dominated by the powerful human reason. This argument of philosophers and sociologists was illogical, indicating a fundamental category-mistake, because pre-modern religions, meta-physical and mystical beliefs cannot be judged or evaluated in a rational way as they do not fall into the domain of reason. Faith and reason are the mainstay of two completely different, incommensurable mental worlds. Weber's theory of rationalization of religions, as much as his theory of the disenchantment of the world, now appears as nothing but the theoretical justification of a given cultural and social situation.¹⁶ The former religious framework was pushed aside, and secularization became the doctrine of the age, transformed, in late modernity, into an ideology, as Jeffrey Hadden noted so well: "*The idea of secularization became sacralized*" (Hadden 1989, 4; italics in original). The work of creative destruction undertaken by modernity was thus accomplished, and the endless conflict of polytheistic values goes on (Turner, Bryan 1990a, 6).

Precisely because religion and secularization concern all aspects of human life, because human beings need a transcendental perspective, it is logical to consider that fundamentalist tendencies in modernity and late modernity represent a response to the globalization process when fundamentalism is defined as

A proclamation of reclaimed authority over a sacred tradition which is to be reinstated as an antidote for a society that has strayed from its cultural moorings. Sociologically speaking, fundamentalism involves (1) a refutation of the radical *differentiation* of the sacred and secular that has evolved with modernization and (2) a plan to *dedifferentiate* this institutional bifurcation and thus bring religion back to center stage as an important factor or interest in public policy decisions (Shupe and Hadden 1989, 111; italics in original).

Globalization takes for granted secularization, as Shupe and Hadden argue (*ibid.*, 115). For this reason, globalization processes encounter the greatest resistance in non-Western civilizations.

In modernity, rationality replaced nature in the function of directing and coordinating human thought and action, though nature still determines our rationality through capacities and limits innate in the human species. This replacement was the result of the belief that man is above nature due to his mental and intellectual capacities; instead of living in harmony with nature, he has to overpower and dominate it. However, nature and rationality were not always strictly separated in all cultures. What is natural is rational, what is rational is in harmony with nature -- that was the *Leitmotiv* of many thinkers who were not even religiously inspired. In monotheistic religions, rational is what is in conformity with God's teachings, and in polytheistic religions, rational is what corresponds to the gods' will and behavior. Scientific rationality resides in objective reasoning concerning matters relating to the physical universe and in the application of specific scientific methods in order to test the validity of theorems and theories relevant to the natural sciences.¹⁷ In both cases, rationality and nature are completely separated; rationality is superior to nature. The orientation

¹⁶ This statement is also valid for his explications of the role of the Protestant ethic in the development of modern society and, in consequence, in the disenchantment of the world. If one seriously studied the ethical teachings of Luther, Zwingli, and Calvin, one cannot conclude that the principles of the Protestant ethic, as deducted from the Bible by the Reformers, could constitute the basis of the formation and existence of capitalist economic development and of the atomized society of our modern world.

¹⁷ Rescher expressed most clearly the doubts in respect of the pretensions of science: "It is mere mythology to think that the 'phenomena of nature' can lend themselves to only one correct style of descriptive and explanatory conceptualization. Different cognitive perspectives are possible, no one of them more adequate or more correct than any other independently of the aims and purposes of their users." Rescher 1993, 41.

of modern rationalism is certainly linked to the primacy of the epistemological over the ontological;¹⁸ the will to know suppresses interest in what is, in being.

In late modernity, the age of establishing the balance sheet of modernity's successes and failures, the total failure of scientific rationality or of instrumental reason is clearly evidenced by the environmental problems our world is facing. The principal merit of science, in the eyes of its protagonists, is to be able to foresee what otherwise would still be the secret of the future. But scientific rationality failed to forecast the demographic consequences of the wonderful advances of preventive and curative medicine, and, even more, it became totally disqualified because of its complete, if not deliberate, ignorance of the environmental damages caused by the industrial revolution and consecutive scientific and technological advances. Nobody can and should disregard the enormous benefits that science and technology brought about for humanity, but one has to acknowledge that this so-called progress led to such destruction in our environment and to such a loss of quality of life in many parts of the Western world, especially in urban centers, that we have to remake our vocabulary and speak of meaningful rationality instead of scientific rationality. *Meaningful rationality is definitely contextual because it is meaningful in a certain cultural and environmental context.*¹⁹ Nicholas Rescher also advocates a similar concept of rationality in what he calls perspectival or contextual rationalism. He affirms that such a rationality, like the meaningful rationality proposed in this study, does not authorize anti-rationalism, but only limits the operations of human rationality within a domain delimited through boundaries imposed by evolutionary givens and actual circumstances of the existence (Rescher 1993, 114).

Rationalization theories of modernity commit two serious blunders which completely falsify and make their conclusions unacceptable: First, theories of rationality and rationalization relate only to what one calls instrumental or purposive rationality, that is, a rationality which concerns the choice of means and the practice of these means in view of the realization of ends which are left at the arbitrary discretion of individuals and institutions. The great achievement of the modern age, the free choice of man in whatever matter, became, through purposive rationality, the choice of processes instead of the choice of ends, ignoring whether the ends, the results of choices, are globally relevant in the given circumstances.²⁰ The

¹⁸ William Connolly is right when he concludes that "the primacy of epistemology turns out itself, of course, to embody a contestable social ontology. The empiricist version, for instance, treats human beings as subjects or agents of knowledge; it treats things as independent objects susceptible to representation; it treats language as a primary medium of representation, or, at least, a medium in which the designative dimension of concepts can be disconnected rigorously from the contexts of rhetoric/action/evaluation in which they originate." Connolly 1995, 6.

¹⁹ It is important to recall, at this point, what Herbert Simon wrote more than a decade ago in connection with his study of human rationality and the more moderate requirement of satisficing ("good enough") solutions in social life. Simon complained of the "faddish" quality of information and institutional behavior, and the credulousness of some people in this respect. But he mainly directed the attention of his readers to the problems raised by multiple value-systems and the chronic uncertainties of contemporary life: "Another problem deriving from the limited rationality of individual human beings is that our political and social institutions have no easy or magic way of dealing with multiple values." With reference to Arrow's postulate that "different people are to be allowed to weigh their values in different ways -- that we don't want to force all people to have the same set of values," Simon thought that "if we accept assumptions like these, we discover that really we don't know how to compare values between people; it's a matter of apples and oranges. Thus, under some plausible assumptions about the diversity we want to permit in human choice, we are unable to define a social welfare function that would solve the problem of conflict of interest... [An additional] difficulty that social organizations inherit from the cognitive limitations of their members is difficulty in dealing with the problems of uncertainty." Simon, Herbert 1983, 84-85.

²⁰ Bauman points out that the impersonal character of rationalism excludes the possibility of moral choices, especially the morality of the autonomous self: "What unites purposefulness, reciprocity and contractuality is that all three imply *calculability* of action. They all assume that thinking precedes doing; definition precedes the task; justification precedes the duty... the actions under consideration are also objective in the sense of being *impersonal*: their choice is the work of reason which is no one's personal property, and different choices can be explained solely in terms of the difference between knowledge and ignorance, or reasoning skills versus mental ineptitude. It is precisely this impersonality of rational action that permits its portrayal as rule-guided action, and an action following rules that are universal in theory and universalizable in practice." And Bauman concludes: "I suggest, on the contrary, that morality is endemically and irredeemably *non-rational* -- in the sense of not being calculable, hence describable as following rules that are in principle universalizable... As a moral person, I am alone, though as a social person I am always *with* others." Bauman 1993, 59-60; italics in original.

gradual annihilation of any ontological/cosmic framework which precisely indicated the great orientations -- ends, objectives, values -- for human thought and action, deprived man of any perspective. This type of rationality excludes alternatives and therefore reduces the freedom of choice, especially as it bases its mode of operation, more frequently than not, on impersonal mechanisms; and falls victim to an inevitable circularity, because there are no meta-rational standards according to which we establish who is and who is not rational. We predetermine the applicable standards of rationality ourselves and, with reference to these standards, evaluate and judge the rationalities of other people and of other cultures. The only justification of instrumental rationality is its effectiveness in reaching the desired ends and purposes. It functions in the immanent world only and does not necessitate any transcendental outreach serving the individual's present and immediate interests -- without regard to other men, without regard to environment, and without regard to whatever forces could influence human destiny.²¹ Instrumental rationality is like a ship or an airplane without any guiding equipment, or like a computer with a program which is not geared to implement any particular task. The originally envisaged unique human rationality has been fragmented in accordance with the Weberian-Luhmannian doctrine of differentiation of society into autonomous spheres. Thus, we have now an almost infinite number of rationalities, a state of affairs which, for Alain Touraine, corresponds to an endogenous conception of modernity and modernization (Touraine 1995, 10). It is all the more baffling, then, that the Western belief in rationality became a champion of universalism.

Second, human reason was conceived as universal, constituting the same innate characteristic of every individual in all human communities.²² This common human rationality presupposed a single world vision. Rationality normally means to have reasons for one's thinking and acting because, according to Harold Brown's demonstration, "the predicate 'rational' characterizes an individual's decisions and beliefs, it does not characterize propositions, and it does not characterize communities" (Brown, Harold 1990, 193-194). However, reasons justifying one's thinking and acting are conditioned by one's experience, one's cultural traditions and the community in which one lives, especially if one accepts that man is the result of the interaction of genetic endowment, of changing environment, and of diverse cultural background. Human culture, developed over the course of evolution to complement man's phenotypic configuration through mental and spiritual capacities, is based on a community's common experiences, traditions and shared belief and value systems. Because of the interaction of genetic and environmental factors with the life of human communities, culture is eminently variable as much as environment itself is variable.

Rationality is linked to human mental capacities and cultural conditioning. It is therefore impossible to believe that reasons provided for behavior and action can be identical in all different cultures. Or, in other words, different reasoning patterns in different cultures will inevitably produce different behavior and action patterns in different civilizations, because reasoning is motivated as much by environmental influences or genetic background than by varying cultural traditions and conceptual structures, "rationality is always *situated rationality*" (Wolterstorff 1983, 155; italics in original). There is no rationality independent from the interaction of genetic, environmental and cultural changes, and this undeniable fact invalidates the force of the frequent emphasis on so-called impersonal objectivity boasted by the rationalist doctrine's protagonists. For example, Habermas & rationality' theory of communicative action in which conditions of argumentative discourse are the core of common human rationality, is entirely embedded in the modernity of the West. Openness to critique, argumentation, and validity based on consensus reached in the course of a free and unhampered dialogue presuppose a modern frame of reference shared by all parties participating in the dialogue. The Western rationality concept reflects, in Hilary Putnam's sense, a criterial conception in that it

²¹ See Herbert Simon's devastating critique of the rationality concept in Simon 1983, 5-6. Simon proposes to limit the power of instrumental rationality by suggesting a behavioral model of *bounded rationality* in which "one doesn't have to make choices that are infinitely deep in time, that encompass the whole range of human values, and in which each problem is interconnected with all other problems in the world." *ibid.*, 19.

²² The universalist inclinations of reason are well analyzed in Jaspers 1971, 54-58. Castoriades also examines the diversity of rationalities and their historical and social determinateness, and writes sarcastically of those advocating universalism on a rationalistic basis. Castoriadis 1992, 244.

In the context of political ethics, Onora O'Neill clearly expressed the founding function of universal rationality: "If we have no transcendent vindication of the authority of reason, practical reasoning that claims universal scope can be vindicated only by showing that it is accessible and cogent without restriction of audience. Hence justifiable universal scope and universal accessibility of ethical or political reasoning are intimately linked." O'Neill, Onora. *The Public Use of Reason. Political Theory*, 1986, 14: 523-551.

appeals to institutionalized norms, themselves products of a given culture (Putnam 1981, 110-111). Or, as Ernest Gellner formulated it:

The essence of the Cartesian tradition was the supposition that a cognitive *procedure* existed which stood outside the world and any one culture, and was capable of independent judgement of cognitive claims about the world... So Reason has to be declared extra-territorial by Kant: it thus becomes the only possible bearer of our identity, our responsibility, our cognitive competence and capacity for moral choice. It alone can *know* Nature; but by the same token, there is no room for it *within* Nature. Nature has no place for either knowledge or moral choice." [And Gellner adds]: "If a reason is cogent, it must apply to all like cases (1992, 82-83; italics in original).

The universalistic pretensions of rationalism are sustained by the very essence of the concept, namely, its instrumentality, serving whatever ends it is required to serve in their realization. This was refuted by Ian Hacking when he wrote about styles of reasoning (Hacking 1985). Borrowing the term from A. C. Crombie,²³ Hacking believes that "a style of reasoning may determine the very nature of knowledge that it produces" (ibid., 128).²⁴ Patterns of reasoning -- I prefer to use the term pattern instead of style, as it indicates the fundamental nature of the differences referred to -- are contextually-bound, culturally motivated ways of thinking, of evaluating, of acting in accordance with the dominant belief and value systems of a given culture. It is true that the concept of rationalism, as it is advocated in our culture, was elaborated by people who had only very limited knowledge of the non-Western world; the qualities, the existence itself of other civilizations was rarely appreciated as equal to the Western ways of thinking. What is truly astonishing is that even in the present century, especially after the movement of decolonization and the intensification of worldwide communications and cultural exchange, the protagonists of the same old point of view are still dominant, ignoring the knowledge and information available about other civilizations.

In retrospect, it can easily be seen that the formulation of the Western concepts of reason and rationality were closely correlated to the development of the scientific thinking, to the advancement of technological applications of science's achievements, and, finally, to the conquest of human minds by an inevitable corollary of the scientific progress -- the materialistic worldview. Instrumental reason and a naturalistic approach were, in a sense, complementary. Therefore, the source of modern rationalism is Western science. Scientific development occurred at a point in time when the process of secularization advanced at an increasing pace, and a manifest need to replace the outmoded ontological/cosmic framework appeared. This thesis does not require a long argument to prove, as it is evident that whenever we talk of rationalism, we speak of a manner of thinking and judging which is concordant with the rules established by the sciences: logic, empiricism, inductive or deductive methods, falsification, and so on. Ulrich Beck expressed this view in an excellent formula, "everything that comes into contact with science is planned to be *changeable, except scientific rationality itself*" (Beck 1992a, 164).²⁵

²³ Crombie used the term in his *Styles of Scientific Thinking in the European Tradition* (1983). Hacking 1985, 127.

²⁴ In a recent study defending a theory of pragmatic and relativist account of cognitive evaluation (or contextual rationalism), Stephen Stich pointed out that "the fact that a given system of cognitive processes prevails in a culture does not even begin to show that that system is the best one for that culture. The pragmatist is perfectly prepared to find that people in some other culture would be doing a better job of cognition if they were to replace their own cognitive processes with ours. But he is also prepared to find that people in another culture are doing quite a good job of cognition, given their goals and circumstances, even though their system of cognitive processes would be a disaster for us... Perhaps alternative cognitive systems produce alternative beliefs that are not logically incompatible but rather logically 'incommensurable' in some way... There is no unique, intrinsically desirable head-world relationship to which all cognitive agents should aspire... there is no universally desirable endpoint of cognitive activity." Stich 1990, 141, 143, 145.

²⁵ "The scientific religion of controlling and proclaiming truth has been *secularized* in the course of reflexive scientization. The truth claim of science has not withstood penetrating self-examination, either empirically, nor in the theory of science. On the one hand, science's claim to be able to explain things has retreated to the *hypothesis*, the conjecture subject to recall. *On the other hand* reality has sublimated into *data* that are *produced*. Thus 'facts' -- the former centerpieces of reality -- are nothing but answers to questions that could just as well have been asked differently, products for rules for gathering and omitting." Beck 1992a, 166; italics in original.

I do not mean to say that these scientific methodologies and procedures could be variable in changing circumstances, but I mean to emphasize that they are not obligatorily and inevitably applicable in all contexts. Logical rules as such are unchangeable because they are formalistic and unrealistic; empirical and deductive methods, or the Popperian falsification, are invaluable as devices of the human intellect, though their validity is not universal but limited to specific domains. They are not even universally applicable in our understanding of the natural world after the Einsteinian revolution of relativity and the discovery of the world of microphysics. This is the reason why the pretended universality of Western rationalism is a fake, a straitjacket employed to suffocate the wonderful diversity of human thinking.

The rationality of scientific universalism required the belief in a unique truth and denied the possibility of what Ricoeur called pluri-dimensional truth. For him, "the *realized* unity of the true is precisely the initial lie" (Ricoeur 1965, 176; italics in original). The evolution of Western thinking, after the promising beginnings of the Renaissance toward pluralism, bifurcated toward totalization. Because the imposition of a specific reasoning is violence, Ricoeur declared: "Historically the temptation to unify the true by violence comes and has come from two powers, the spiritual power and the temporal power" (ibid., 166).²⁶ It is, of course, possible to consider truth not as a quasi-ontological entity or a property of an object or proposition but, as Luhmann suggests, "a symbolically generalized communication medium, which operates under changing social conditions... Truth [then] is a medium for conveying experienced selections, whose selectivity is attributed to the world" (Luhmann 1982, 360-361). This corresponds to the instrumentalization of truth but not to relativism as it is generally understood.²⁷

The instrumentalization of truth makes possible the enormous risks present in our contemporary world because *science has reconstructed in its image not only the natural world but our own human society*. Giddens summarizes the picture of this reconstructed world as follows:

To live in the universe of high modernity is to live in an environment of chance and risk, the inevitable concomitants of a system geared to the domination of nature and the reflexive making of history. Fate and destiny have no formal part to play in such a system, which operates (as a matter of principle) via... open human control of natural and human worlds. The universe of future events is open to be shaped by human intervention -- within limits which, as far as possible, are regulated by risk assessment... The notion of risk becomes central in a society which is taking leave of the past, of traditional ways of doing things, and which is opening itself up to a problematic future... it is part of a more general phenomenon concerned with the control of time which I shall term the *colonization of the future* (Giddens 1991, 109 and 111-112; italics in original).

Giddens then concludes: Apocalypse has become banal, a set of statistical parameters to everyone's existence (ibid., 183). If the scientific reconstruction of reality may be doubted, then, behind the veil of scientifically-selected imperatives serving not-publicly-justifiable decisions, there may be latent ideological, fashionable or other reasons that lead the scientific enterprise to assume calculable or even incalculable risks for local communities, as well as for the whole of mankind.²⁸ It is enough to refer, in this respect, to

²⁶ Ricoeur points to the fundamental contradiction between scientific objectivity and the inevitable subjective element in rationalism: "Science proceeds to the reduction of the objects of culture at the same time as to that of perceived objects. Moreover, it reduces man to the same measure of objectivity, man who is the bearer of this culture; biology, psychology, and sociology are departments of natural science in which man has, as an object of science, no privilege whatsoever. And yet this science, which resorbs man as an object, *presupposes* scientific activity and man as a subject, the sustainer and author of these activities. The very reduction of man to the status of an object is only possible within a cultural life which encompasses him in his total praxis." Ricoeur 1965, 168; italics in original.

²⁷ This was already recognized, in fact, by Weber, who wrote in his introduction to *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, "life may be rationalized from very different basic points of view and in very different directions." Weber 1958, 25. As Habermas justly pointed out, this formulation makes the relativism of value contents dependent on "the level at which the pluralism of 'basic points of view' is set." Habermas 1984, 181.

²⁸ "In modern social conditions, however, crises become more or less endemic," in Giddens's view, "both on an individual and a collective level. To some extent this effect is rhetorical: in a system open to continual and profound change many circumstances arise which loosely can be thought of as 'crises.' But it is not *just* rhetoric. Modernity is inherently prone to crises, on many levels. A crisis exists whenever activities concerned with important goals in the life of an individual or a

circumstances surrounding the creation and functioning of the nuclear industry, including the various accidents and their handling by public authorities, or to the total breakdown of what was known even half a century ago as public accountability related to all scientific aspects of social and economic issues. Those responsible are always excused with reference to an expert advice which is, of course, scientific.

In discussing the role of science in modernity, it is useful to hint at some truly important scientific achievements in other cultures, in order to show that Western science is not something unique, except in that it reached a position through which it dominates all other spheres of life in our civilization.

Frits Staal demonstrated that Indian science concerned itself, as much of Western science, with rule-governed activities, though it was based on a different type of rationality than ours. He refers to the grammarians who established a correlation between logic and language when studying deep linguistic structures. They discovered, before logic was born, the existence of linguistic universals. The great linguist Panini developed such distinctions as those between language and metalanguage, theorem and metatheorem, or use and mention, much earlier than Western logicians (Staal 1988, 158). The principle of non-contradiction, for example, was emphasized, which is not only a feature of negation in logic but also of the semantics of natural languages (ibid., 34). Some trends of Indian thought, in the *Mimamsa*, for instance, arrived at constituting rules even of meta-linguistic nature, called *nyaya*. This term later designated systems of logic. In the course of the evolution of Indian logics, the law of contradiction was widely utilized, "when two are mutually opposed there is no occurrence (of both) within the same class," said Udaya in the tenth century A.D.²⁹ Staal even considers that if Western logic could have freed itself from the Aristotelian heritage and had studied more extensively prescriptive sentences like those developed by the *Mimamsa* and the Indian legal works known as *dharmasastra*, Western jurists and ethicists could have evolved structures of negation and contradiction superior to that which were developed in the natural sciences, -- which evidently became dominant in our culture. This is another proof, from Staal's point of view, that the Indians were much more inclined toward sciences related to man than toward those inquiring about the laws of nature.

Radhakrishnan and Moore in their *Sourcebook of Indian Philosophy*, offer ample evidence regarding the complexity of various forms of Indian logical and philosophical thinking. I refer here just to a few examples of this richness: the *Nyaya Sutra* (Book One, Chapter 1, pars. 3 and 4) says that "perception, inference, comparison and word (verbal testimony) -- these are the means of right knowledge" and "perception is that knowledge which arises from the contact of a sense with its object, and which is determined (well-defined), unnamable (not expressible in words), and non-erratic (unerring)" (Radhakrishnan and Moore 1957, 359). The *Nyaya Sutra* gives a very detailed examination of time,³⁰ whereas the *Padarthadharmasamgraha* (Chapter 5, par. 154) defines universal phenomena as follows:

As a matter of fact we find that when we cognise [all] individual objects as belonging simultaneously to a particular class, and we have such cognitions repeatedly, then there is produced in our minds an impression; and when in view of this impression we review those past cognitions, we come to recognise a certain factor that inheres in every one of the objects cognised; and it is this factor that constitutes the universal (ibid., 429).

collectivity suddenly appear inadequate. Crises in this sense become a 'normal part' of life, but by definition they cannot be routinised." Giddens 1991, 184.

²⁹ Datta, D.M. "Epistemological Methods in Indian Philosophy," in Moore, C.A. ed. *Essays in East-West Philosophy*. Honolulu: 1951, 73-88; quoted in Staal 1988, 125.

³⁰ "39. There is, some say, no present time because when a thing falls, we can only know the time through which it has fallen and the time through which it will yet fall.

40. If there is no present time, there will it is replied, be no past and future times, because they are related to it.

41. The past and future cannot be established by a mere mutual reference.

42. If there were no present time, sense perception would be impossible, [and therefore no] knowledge would be possible."

Nyaya Sutra, Book 1, Chapter 2. Radhakrishnan and Moore. eds. 1957, 367.

The *Jainas* interpreted *nyaya* differently. Man either considers a thing in itself or in its relational web, called *nyaya*. In this respect, *nyayas* represent the prevalence of a particular standpoint, an abstraction from reality, describable by expressions like somehow, perhaps, or may be, wherefrom the designation of the Jaina doctrine as *syadvada*. As an enlarged doctrine, this stood for reality as always multiform and excluding absolute predication; thereby *Jainist* metaphysics avoided the problem of relativism (ibid., 250-251 and 261).

The Buddhist worldview is not, in our Western sense, rational. It placed more emphasis on intuition than man's rational capabilities because it believes in an existential path to reality. This perspective is linked to the doctrine of self-generating instantaneity; reality is not a continuous process, but is perceivable only in an instantaneous, discontinuous way. Things come into being and pass away constantly in every instant. There is no duration; things and their existence are revealed by their effects, and their before and after is incorporated in their instantaneous existence. Time is, by definition, irreversible. In accordance with this doctrine, there can be no causality in our sense, it is a sort of mechanical naturalism. In Buddhist logic, too, universals, described by names which stand for images or concepts, are recognized but not as representing reality constituted exclusively of particulars, but as indirect reflections of it. Inference and language are indirect ways to know reality; logic is not real, universals must be understood as dialectical (Stcherbatsky 1962, 458-459).³¹

The dialecticians of China produced, perhaps, the most curious metaphysical speculations in ancient times. Many of their thoughts turned around the relativism of everything existent and the dialectical relationship between existence and non-existence. The most sophisticated of them, *Kung-Sun Lung*, offers a new approach to the problem of universals in his *Discourse on the White Horse*: each particular thing (*wu*) is made up of an infinite number of universals (*chih*), which are themselves unchanging and completely distinct from each other. Names (*ming*) designate actualities or concrete particulars (Fung Yu-Lan 1983, 1: 203-217).³²

There were also expressly naturalistic views advanced by metaphysicians belonging to other civilizations, views which are effectively similar to some aspects of the naturalistic philosophy in antiquity and in our days.³³ The two naturalist schools in India whose metaphysical position can be qualified as a materialistic monism are the *Carvaka* and the *Ajivika*. The *Carvaka* metaphysicians clearly denied the existence of universals and thus affirmed their nominalistic beliefs; as everything is an individual instance, there can be no universals or knowledge of universal truths. Only an infinite concomitance of perceptions could assure that universal characteristics exist. The "Carvaka demands the knowing of all instances of agreement in presence and all instances of non-agreement in absence" (Riepe 1982, 61). However, they affirm without hesitation the existence of a world external to man, a real world, and they point out that the self is gathering

³¹ The dialectical method of Buddhists, in Stcherbatsky's view, "maintains that all concepts and the names expressing them are negative, because they express their own meaning through a negation of the contrary... But, on the other hand, the Buddhist Dialectical Method contains the solution of the quarrel between Nominalism and Realism. Since concepts are purely negative, their universality, their stability and their inherence are explained as being mental, logical and dialectical. There is no contradiction for a Universal to be at once completely and continually present in a multitude of things if it is only a negative mark of distinction from other things." Stcherbatsky 1962, 476.

³² I reproduce here a text of Kung-Sun Lung in order to show the extreme dialectical nature of his argumentation: "There are no things (*wu*) that are not *chih*, but these *chih* are no *chih*. If the world had no *chih*, things could not be things. If, there being no *chih*, the world had no things, could one speak of *chih*? *Chih* are what do not exist in the world. Things are what do exist in the world. It is impossible to consider what does exist in the world to be what does not exist in the world. In the world there exist no *chih*, and things cannot be called *chih*. If they cannot be called *chih*, they are no *chih*... They are no *chih*, [and yet it has been stated above that] there are no things that are not *chih*. That there are no *chih* in the world, and that things cannot be called *chih*, does not mean that there are no *chih*. It is not that there are no *chih*, because there are no things that are not *chih*... There are no things that are not *chih*, but these *chih* are no *chih*. That there are no *chih* existing in the world, arises from the fact that all things have their own names, which are not themselves *chih*... *Chih*, moreover, are what are held common in the world. There are no *chih* existing in the world, but things cannot be said to be without *chih*. That they cannot be said without *chih*, means that there are none that are not *chih*. That there are none that are no *chih*, means (we return to our opening statement) that there are no things that are not *chih*. There are no *chih* that are non*chih*." Kung-Sun Lung-Tzu, 70-72. Fung Yu-Lan 1983, 1: 209-210.

³³ Riepe quotes *Pakudha*, who purportedly said, "What is cannot be destroyed; out of nothing comes nothing," and compares it to fragments from Democritus and to Lucretius's *De rerum natura*. Riepe 1982, 37.

information about this world through immediate sensations which correspond to those external realities.³⁴ The *Ajivika* doctrine represents an almost unique determinism and, in opposition to the *Carvaka*, believed that everything happening in the universe was predetermined. This conception erased even the last vestiges of freedom which the *karma* of Hindu religions still offered to humans. In the vision of such unchangeable destiny, every being developed in accordance with chance and nature, but *niyati* or destiny was the exclusive cause of all unfolding processes in the world (ibid., 43-44).

The best known Chinese naturalist is the neo-Confucian *Wang Fu-chih*. He conceived the universe as consisting of an indeterminate substance which fills space and which is subject to all possible transformations. This is the ultimate reality. The forms of change are either concentration, coming into being through assuming a form, or dispersion, the process of disintegration representing the end of being, thus safeguarding the traditional opposition of *yu* and *wu* (Chung-Ying Cheng 1975, 473-474). In *Wang Fu-chih's* elaboration change is creativity, the origin of everything, the teleological or purposeful process and movement of indeterminate substance matter: "That which makes it comprehend things is its nature," and "that which generates things is its function" (ibid., 475). The differentiation of matter strives towards a complete variety of all things and all phenomena, and ends up in an ultimate harmony, the fundamental concept he borrowed from *Chang Tsai*. It is possible, therefore, to say that *Wang Fu-chih's* interpretation of reality was monistic, as indeterminate substance represented, at the same time, the ultimate harmony and the ultimate void. But reason, the creative activity of substance designated in its totality as *Tao*, stood for the force of actualization of the world and the principle of ordering and patterning of life (*ch'i*). The ontological and functional relationship of reason with indeterminate substance is the most complex aspect of *Wang Fu-chih's* thinking and can be characterized by identity and correlation simultaneously. Reason is linked to the human mind which recognizes patterns in the world. Reason is nature with which man is endowed, and it orients and dominates all aspects of human life, even desires and ethical conduct. *Wang Fu-chih's* naturalism is well summed up by Chung-Ying Cheng: "What is significant is that the nature and mind which distinguish man as man are not alienated from the primordial reality of indeterminate substance. Neither nature nor mind possess independent reality over and above indeterminate substance" (ibid., 482).

In conclusion, one can say that *Western rationalism can only be globalized, or made a universal characteristic of all human beings if, and only if, humankind is Westernized as a whole*. This would mean that Western modernity -- as it is now, at the end of the twentieth century -- spread out to all parts of the globe, replacing all other cultural traditions and worldviews, carrying through a mental revolution in the orbits of every civilization until its final conquest of the whole world. Such globalizing tendencies and universalist pretensions of Western rationalism are, however, explicable only in terms of the role and importance of science and technology in the West.

(B) MAN AS THE HIGHEST CREATURE OF THE UNIVERSE

What I called as the second characteristic of modern evolution, the elevation of man to the highest status in the universe, is a heritage from two sources of the Western civilization. Since Greek Antiquity and Christianity, man has been considered as the ultimate end of the evolution of the natural world.³⁵ In this

³⁴ On the *Carvaka's* refusal of all inferences and the impossibility of understanding the cause and effect relations see Radhakrishnan and Moore. eds. 1957, 231-245.

³⁵ Montaigne wrote in a famous passage of his *Apologie de Raimond Sebond*: "Let man make me understand by the force of his reason, upon what foundations he has built these great advantages he thinks he has over other creatures. Who has made him believe that this admirable motion of the celestial arch, the eternal light of those luminaries that roll so high over his head, the wondrous and fearful motions of that infinite ocean, should be established and continue so many ages for his service and convenience? Can anything be imagined so ridiculous, that this miserable and wretched creature, who is not so much as master of himself, but subject to the injuries of all things, should call himself master and emperor of the world, of which he has no power to know the least part, much less to command the whole?" de Montaigne, Michel, *Essays* 2, Chap. 12. *The Works of Michael de Montaigne*. 2. ed. Trans. W. Hazlitt. London: 1845, 205.

respect, *the worldview of our culture is fundamentally different from most other cultures in which no special status is granted to the human species.*

The view of the individual man we inherited was first constructed in Athens, in the context of the intensive social life of the *polis*, especially by Protagoras and Democritus. The influence of their ideas is still persistent in shaping our comprehension of the problem of individuality. It was Protagoras who proclaimed that "*Man is the measure (metron) of all things: of those which are, that they are, and of those which are not, that they are not.*"³⁶ This maxim of the Greek philosopher has been much misunderstood and misinterpreted since; therefore, in dealing with the supreme status in the universe man gained in modernity, it is important to delimit the contemporary conception from the one developed by Protagoras and Democritus. In reality, Protagoras' maxim concerns the way things are; it conceives man as a sensing and judging being (Farrar 1988, 49). In fact, what Protagoras believed was that human understanding of the world and human knowledge in general, cannot but be empirical, derived from the collective experience of mankind and of particular groups of men. The individual man's experience is concretely empirical, but mankind's collective experience secures stability and regularity, a generalizable standard. This comprehension of Protagoras' maxim reflects what contemporary philosophers like Karl Popper believed -- that *a priori* knowledge is derived from collective experience (Popper 1987b). Even if there is a shared and common basis of men's knowledge, differences exist because men and their environments are different, and men are unevenly endowed with intelligence and virtue. Some are wiser than others, and these wise men, through reflective judgement and taking others' experience into account, refine their concepts and their ways of understanding.

But for Protagoras, as for his contemporaries, man's place, his cultural and social environment, is the *polis*, which represents a world of shared belief and value systems and thus encompasses the experiential background out of which each citizen elaborates his measurement of the world. Even if the individual is prior to society in Protagoras's view, his survival depends on his living in a community, and this necessitates compromises to reach harmony. Classical Greek individualism never embraced such extremes as Western individualistic ideology, because it appeared indisputable for the people of Athens that man, as a citizen, is a member of the community of the *polis* and participates in its political and social life. Life in democracy, as conceived by Pericles and his contemporaries, constituted a collective self-expression and a collective self-restraint which, through the interaction of citizens, reflexively shaped and oriented each member's opinions and judgements. In consequence, any naturally able man could achieve excellence in public life if he possessed the expertise and the moral reputation required, because the *polis* offered equal opportunity to all of its citizens. It is important that the Protagorean concept of relations between man and his society are un-modern as life in the community is constitutive of human life, but these same relations are internally reflexive as in modern times. Society is not an external, institutionally imposed structure on man, but is derived from his interaction with others.

Democritus' view of man was an expression of his atomistic concept of the world which may be called cosmic materialism, the reconciliation of *nomos* and *physis*.³⁷ His individualism was more complete and more modern than the man-measure idea of Protagoras, because he considered man as a self-sufficient entity who can attain his own good by his own forces and following his own interests. All constraints on man's freedom of action -- social or political -- are, for Democritus, derived from the features of man's own situation. The cosmic framework is the most decisive feature of this situation and represents the main constraint on an individual's intentions and will; cosmic influence is responsible for order in human existence because the unhampered interaction of physical forces produces order in the cosmos as well as in the *polis*, the two realms linked through cosmic regularities and laws. In Greek atomism, the phenomenal world was not reduced to its components belonging to the non-phenomenal universe, the difference between the two being due to viewing from a different distance. Man belongs to both worlds; to the objective, real world -- the

³⁶ Plato, *Theaethetus*. 152a 3-8. However, the firmness of Protagoras's conviction can be questioned because as a real Sophist he confessed that concerning any question one can advance two opposite arguments and prove each of them. Diels, H. ed. *Die Fragmente des Vorsokratiker*. 6. ed. Berlin: W. Kranz, 1951, 80 A 1, 6a and 80 B 5.

³⁷ "*Nomos* is, for Democritus, an expression of what man needs and, over time, creates, yet this expression is itself limited by and grounded in human nature. The atomist definition of human *physis* serves as a standard distinct from social norms (an internal constraint), but it is not a reductionist or primitive account. Just as in its general explanation of phenomena, the atomist theory of human nature succeeds in accounting at once for the variety and mutability and the regularity of human experience by providing a non-phenomenal foundation for reality." Farrar 1988, 242.

cosmos; and to the phenomenal but autonomous world of his species -- the *polis*. Mental phenomena are not only parasitic on configurations of atoms, but are, at the same time, controlled by them through the soul. The mind is an aspect of the soul, though not identical to it, and reflective thinking is a form of perception; this linkage secures the differentiating distance between the phenomenal and the non-phenomenal. Through experience, human reason endeavors to understand the cosmos, though it can never really know reality and, therefore, truth. Democritus said, according to Sextus Empiricus, that "man is what all we know" (Farrar 1988, 215). Human freedom and autonomy are guaranteed precisely by the ordering forces of cosmos which work through man himself as internal necessity (term used by the Epicureans), not as external constraints.

In Democritus' philosophy, one can also discover an emphasis on the morality of the autonomous self, as the Greek thinker insists that man must act justly for his own reasons and not for fear of external sanctions. He has to elaborate his own *nomos*, his own legislation, with due respect to himself, in order to avoid acts inappropriate or harmful to his community, for his own soul and for his phenomenal well-being. Through this, man will enact justice in his behavior toward other men and the world he has to confront as it is. Social practices are nothing but reflections of man's interests. Democritus gave absolute priority to the individual as opposed to society. The individual's reflexivity produces the social order's correspondence with his interests and, at the same time, enables him to internalize the norms of society with which he cooperates. Nevertheless, the autonomy of the individual in Democritus's thinking has a totally different function than in the modern conception as a result of his insistence on the all-encompassing cosmos grounding social as well as individual human life in the physical-cum-mental universe.

Public life in the Athenian *polis* disintegrated soon after the great century, and the cultural context changed rapidly; a polarization of interests, as described by Thucydides, led to the deterioration of the social climate and to the disintegration of socially defined values. Individual, egoistic interests replaced the primacy of what was good for the *polis* itself; individuals became masters of their well-being and wanted to be freed from constraints imposed by the community. The fundamental conflict of order and autonomy destroyed Athenian democracy. With the Epicureans, Cynics, and Stoics, following in Democritus's footsteps, the self-sufficient individual was born; the relativization of values in favor of such an individual led to the creation of separate worlds.

Christianity came into existence in the Hellenistic world, impregnated with the concept and importance of man as individual. However, the Christian idea of the individual person cannot be compared to the Greek or modern ideal of the individual, as the Christian person is an individual-in-relation-to-God, the person in need of salvation. It is undeniable that in Christian theology, the individual person is the interlocutor of God and the object of His grace; the message of salvation is addressed to each individual believer. However, it would be false to say that Christianity ignores community in favor of the individual, because the individual's being an object of redemption is a consequence of the fact that he is a member of the community of the elect or of the invisible Church. The individual sinner and the community of believers are bound together in the redemptive action of God's grace. In consequence, it is correct to depict, with Troeltsch, the Christian belief as representing absolute individualism and absolute universalism in relation to God and the Savior. Therefore, Christian individualism is transcendent in the sense that it transcends the world of man and of social institutions; this is the foundation of the dualism reflected in the Christian attitude to the immanent world.

The individual as the object of salvation and of Christ's redemptive action did not mean the limitation of the works of God's grace to the human species; the Bible refers many times to the fact that the redemptive action of grace encompasses the whole universe. Man is endowed by the Creator with consciousness, with the awareness of the human predicament and with moral responsibility; he has the power to choose among alternatives and is therefore responsible for his acts. These are the components of man's destiny, and explain the fact that he is the object of salvation.

The aspect of biblical teaching, referred to in most cases as the foundation of the West's belief in the superiority of the human species, is the metaphor of man being created in the image of God. This metaphor is closely linked to the relation between man's situation involving his moral responsibility and God's redemptory act to save him. That man and his species were created in the image of God means that he is endowed with capacities to assume moral responsibility, to assume the burden of making good or bad choices. I do not think that the biblical metaphor depicting man as being created in the image of God could ever be justly explained as the superiority of the human species over all animate or inanimate beings in the cosmos.

Both explications justifying man's exalted status in modern culture are simply distortions of the Christian teaching for instrumental reasons or, to put it in another way, projected it from the sacred into the mundane plane to support the individualistic ideology. As always, in the case of transplantation of images and metaphors from one particular context into a totally different, incommensurable one, this is an inadmissible reduction of two independent and entirely unrelated views into one, especially if one accepts the Kantian position that the world of faith and the world of immanent realities are, and should be kept, separate.

As early as in the utopian works of Campanella or More, it was admitted that man controls his immanent destiny by molding his environment through scientific and technical knowledge and efficiency. This trend was, of course, reinforced by the unlimited faith of Bacon in the possibilities of rational thinking proceeding through empirical investigations; epistemology eliminated ontological thinking. Therefore, in the second phase of development of the new temporal horizon, the historical view was replaced by the belief in an infinite progress of humanity on the path of scientific and technological successes because "whenever human action shapes the future, the idea of history as indefinite progress logically follows" (Dupré 1993, 152). History thus became a one-directional movement toward future, requiring a constant reinterpretation of the past. This belief in an infinite progress of mankind, controlled by man's science and technology, became a crucial component of modern individualism as it fueled the self-consciousness of Western man.

(c) VOLUNTARISM

The combination of faith in science, rationalism and the perception of man as the center of the universe naturally led to the human voluntarism of modernity. By voluntarism I mean: the belief in the possibilities of humankind to reach the highest degree of knowledge of the world and of man itself; to be able to improve conditions of life for the ever-growing multitude of human beings as well as to facilitate their material existence in every possible way; and to believe that rational and conscious action will render continuously better and more satisfactory individual life in the framework of existing political and economic institutions (social engineering).³⁸ In sum, voluntarism is the foundation of the modern creed in progress and in the inevitable elevation of what is new over old ways of life defined by traditions. The idea of progress involves, in fact, the attribution of causality to the passage of time, imperatively presented as a linear process, instead of considering temporal dimension as a framework only for the practices and processes which may or may not produce progress, as in other cultures in which time may be seen as being not only linear, but circular. The essential trait of the modern conceptualization of time and progress is well summed up by Vattimo:

Secularization, as the modern, is a term that describes not only what happens in a certain era and what nature it assumes, but also the 'value' that dominates and guides consciousness in the era in question, primarily as faith in progress -- which is both a secularized faith and a faith in secularization. But faith in progress, understood as a kind of faith in the historical process that is ever more devoid of providential and meta-historical elements, is purely and simply identified with faith in the value of the new... [This is so because] the ideal of progress is finally revealed to be a hollow one, since its ultimate value is to create conditions in which further progress is possible in a guise that is always new. By depriving progress of a final destination, secularization dissolves the notion of progress itself (Vattimo 1988, 100 and 8).

Voluntarism has two major components in addition to the belief in science and in man's position in the center of the universe. First, every man is fundamentally good and capable; there is no evil in man, and his base instincts and sometimes horrendous actions are the result of society's obsolete and incomprehensive institutions and organizations, and of the deleterious effects of traditional spiritual ideals, social orders, and

³⁸ At the dawn of modernity, Pico della Mirandola, in his famous *Oration on the Dignity of Man*, defined the voluntaristic doctrine of the future, making God advise to Adam: "We have not made you either celestial or terrestrial, mortal or immortal, in order that you may, as it were, *become your own maker and former, and shape yourself in whatever form you like best.*" Cassirer, E., Kristeller, P.O., and Randall, J.H. 1948. *The Renaissance Philosophy of Man*. Chicago: University Press of Chicago, 125.

cultural conditioning. Second, man being capable and good, it is just a question of education to make him better, to improve his mental capacities and practical behavior, and to erase his culturally inherited detrimental features.

A little noted consequence of the general acceptance of voluntarism as the basic human perspective is the quasi-disappearance of hope from people's mentalities. Hope was replaced by expectations based on the capabilities of modern man and institutions. The distinction is important. It indicates that hope which always concerned something unknown and definitely uncertain in the future, in most cases in relation with something transcendently possible (that is, in relation to something not from this immanent world), got lost with the changing world picture. In the world of science's unquestioned capability to realize humanity's most distant dreams, hope in the unknown had no place in the human mind, it had to be replaced by rational expectations -- rational in the sense that they were calculated to become reality in the course of an inexorable progress. Hope is like the view of distant, beautiful, forest-covered mountains approached after a long voyage in the desert or on an arid high plateau; one wished to reach them as quickly as possible, but they simmered for a long time in the distance before becoming reality. Expectation, on the contrary, is like a film projecting an intentionally constructed reality before the eyes of the viewers convinced in advance -- a rational, unquestionable consequence of the planned, calculated, willed transformation of the future in accordance with each individual man's own interests, desires, or not even avowed wishes, an irrational expectation of the realization of rationally elaborated dreams.

The modern era was, in this voluntaristic sense, the age of rising expectations, fueled by the belief in science and man's unlimited capabilities to shape his destiny. It is because of this particular character that a growing disappointment set in during the last quarter of this century, transforming our age into an era of deceived expectations, disillusion, and increasing loss of personal identity. The most dangerous consequence of the disappearance of voluntaristic expectations is, in late modernity, the alienation of more and more people in our society, alienation here meaning the loss of a sense of identity. The identity-feeling created by the voluntaristic worldview, based on the over-confidence in reason and in the scientific and technological possibilities of an ever-continuing advancement, was not a real identity, but an imagined one which, however, gave assurance to people to participate in a magnificent endeavor, in the greatest adventure in human history. This, incidentally, also contained the promise of improving material conditions of life until earthly eternity could be attained.

3. Late Modernity: Technology and Contingent, Ever-Changing Fashions

Late modernity represents a unique peculiarity in world history, in that there is no ontological/cosmic framework in this age which constitutes, as pretended, the end of grand narratives or the end of history -- a sort of calcified eternity.³⁹ To put it in another way, in William Connolly's words, late modernity represents the globalization of contingency, especially in respect of the profound troubles of our societies and the ever-growing environmental crisis (Connolly 1995, 22). However, one can define the mental framework of late modernity as consisting in the self's insatiable desire of immediate gratification, and the self being the dominating entity, it was transformed into a stratagem by the ideologists of the age to coverup the lack of a real ontological/cosmic framework of human existence. Thus, the emptiness of the self is given content by an all-powerful technology and its capability to manipulate the self through artificially created fashionable creeds -- ideologies which take on the garb of suddenly appearing and soon evanescent fads. Anything goes; that means that everything goes according to fashions which appear to serve the interests and caprices of the self, but which, in reality, serve only to strengthen the grasp on human existence, as in Neil Postman's Technopoly, of those who are in command. I use the terms ideology, fashion, or fad interchangeably because fashions and fads are different forms or appearances of the ideologies invented in the interest of technology's domination. They serve, consequently, the interests of those strata of society who manipulate,

³⁹ It is apposite here to mention Hebdige's commentary on postmodernism, which characterizes the latter as "modernity without the hopes and dreams which made modernity bearable." Hebdige, Richard. 1989. *Hiding in the Light: On Images and Things*. London: 195.

at a given moment, people's minds and ways of life. It is in this sense that Baudrillard says that fashion subverts all identities "because of its potential to revert all forms to non-origin and recurrence... The enjoyment of fashion is therefore of a spectral and cyclical world of bygone forms endlessly revived as effective signs" (Baudrillard 1993, 88). Late modern ideologies, fashions or fads are, then, entirely decoupled from rationality, and the circle becomes complete: modernity based on the concept of universal reason devours itself in the late manifestations of its own essential feature, the instrumental or purposive rationality.⁴⁰ This de-coupling of ideologies and fashions from rationality is, consequently, part of the general decentering trend.

Consumerism, as contemporary ideology, is a basic requirement of the technological/economic age, therefore it makes its appearance in innumerable forms: fashions in lifestyles and evanescent fads -- the changing of modes of *haute couture* from season to season. Another contemporary ideology is the insistence on the security of the average citizen precisely in order to hide the reality of the ever-growing dangerousness of existence in our risk society in which those who are in charge of technological development, social institutions, and everything which may influence the life of a simple citizen, endeavor to give the impression that everything is done to avoid or even annul the risks menacing all. This is so whether the risks are manifest (i) in civil aviation (despite the increasing number of accidents); (ii) in the human food chain (despite, for instance, the mad cow disease); or, (iii) in the continuing application of nuclear technology in the production of energy indispensable for the functioning of the technological apparatus (despite the efforts to hide the real effects of nuclear accidents and incidents all over the globe, in order to avoid panic in the population). The ideological character of all these phenomena is revealed by the fact that these creeds, fashions, or fads -- like all their ideological predecessors -- are contrary to reality. They do not reflect ingrained beliefs, values and habits in the human mind, but inexorably follow their own logic in manipulating public opinion and transforming people's lives without those people even noticing it.

Is it, then, not natural that Baudrillard qualifies our age the age of simulacra? The contemporary world lives under the law of indeterminacy and under a code-governed regime of significations resolutely decoupled from reality. Simulacra are not like symbolic representations of the experienced and of the unexperiencable; they are pure inventions, successful make-beliefs in the service of ideologies, fashions, and fads.⁴¹ The thing referred to, the signified, as opposed to simulated significations, is neutralized, eliminated, in order to liberate the space for ideologies and fashions: "The irruption of the binary question/answer schema is of incalculable importance... this schema short-circuits every dialectic of the signifier and the signified, a representative and a represented" (Baudrillard 1993, 64). This gives place to a "vertiginous manipulation of social relations," as social control is carried out by means of the code-governed "prediction, simulation, programmed anticipation and indeterminate mutation," following scientific, in particular biological, models (ibid., 60). The usual binary codes of our times are, in accordance with Luhmann, "totalizing," "all-encompassing constructions," which lead, being abstractions, to "the contingency of all phenomena," as even the use of a code is contingent (Luhmann 1989, 38). Finally, the age of simulacra produces a collapsing into a unified vision of the real and of the imaginary; this is what Baudrillard calls the "hyperreal," "*the hallucinatory resemblance of the real to itself*" (ibid., 72; italics in original). The hyper-real is and must always be reproducible just like natural phenomena in the age-old scientific method of experimentation.

⁴⁰ "Fundamentally fashion imposes upon us," wrote Baudrillard, "the rupture of an imaginary order: that of referential Reason in all its guises, and if we are able to enjoy [*jouir*] the dismantling or stripping of reason [*démantèlement de la raison*], enjoy the *liquidation* of meaning... enjoy this endless finality of fashion, we also suffer profoundly from the corruption of rationality it implies, as reason crumbles under the blow of the pure and simple alteration of signs." Baudrillard 1993, 87-88.

⁴¹ "The modern sign dreams of its predecessor, and would dearly love to rediscover an *obligation* in its reference to the real. It finds only a *reason*, a referential reason, a real and a 'natural' on which it will feed. This designatory bond, however, is only a simulacrum of symbolic obligation, producing nothing more than neutral values which are exchanged one for the other in an objective world... all forms change from the moment that they are no longer mechanically reproduced, but *conceived according to their very reproducibility*, their diffraction from a generative core called the 'model.' We are dealing with third-order simulacra here. There is no more counterfeiting of an original, as there was in a first order, and no more pure series as there were in the second; there are models from which all forms proceed according to modulated differences." ibid. 51; italics in original.

To refer to late modernity as the world of simulacra is not in contradiction with the reign of Technopoly (the alliance between technocratic bureaucracy and political and economic power) because even the world of technique suffered a degradation in comparison to the preceding technocratic age. This can best be shown by juxtaposing the ideas of Jacques Ellul, the French philosopher whose deep analysis of technocracy is still unsurpassable, and those of Neil Postman, who recently published a penetrating examination of the technopolic as opposed to the technocratic age.

For Ellul, technique is rational, absolutely efficient, and it is a product of man's desire to master nature through his scientific achievements. "Science has become the instrument of technique" (Ellul 1964, 10). What is for Ellul the important divide between the past and the present role of technique in culture and society, is that in past civilizations, technique was fully integrated, embedded in the cultural framework of the place and of the age; it was one sphere of life and activity among many others. As such, technique was tied to its cultural environment; it was not a good to be exchanged between men living in different civilizational worlds (ibid., 69). This means that diffusion of techniques must have been rather limited between early human groups, and also that a common biological and mental endowment led some human beings living in similar physical environments to have recourse to the same technical means and, frequently, to the same means of artistic expression as invented and used by others. Contrarily to the past, modern technique, in Ellul's opinion, has universal pretensions because it is reduced to formalized methods, thereby making it impossible to respond to extreme environmental diversities. In addition, it robs man from making free choices in the conduct of his life, thus eliminating spontaneity and creativity. Technique becomes self-driven: "Technical progress today is no longer conditioned by anything else than its own calculus of efficiency" (ibid., 74).

There is a fundamental opposition between technique and human intention, will and freedom because technique needs determined results and predictability. "Technique must reduce man to a technical animal, the king of the slaves of technique" (ibid., 138). Technical civilization therefore represents a civilization in which man became the object of technique instead of being its master. Technique takes the lead in all public matters and locates man mystically in an abstract world, deprived of personality and creative power:

Nothing belongs any longer to the realm of the gods or the supernatural. The individual who lives in the technical milieu knows very well that there is nothing spiritual anywhere. But man cannot live without the sacred. He therefore transfers his sense of the sacred to the very thing which has destroyed its former object: to technique itself. In the world in which we live, technique has become the essential mystery (ibid., 143).⁴²

The difference between the analyses of the technocratic age given by Jacques Ellul and Neil Postman is striking not because they are not in agreement, but because they differ in extremely fine nuances that reflect the evolution in late modernity. For Neil Postman, specialist of culture and communication, techniques are all-powerful because "embedded in every tool is an ideological bias." Techniques determine human beings' mental world together with their symbolic ways of meaning, their material and immanent interests, as well as their relation to each other because their community structures constitute the social environment of technical developments (Postman 1993, 13 and 20). In Postman's historical scheme pre-modern cultures were tool-using, modernity was characterized by technocracy, whereas late modernity is the age of Technopoly, of extreme technological supremacy -- the latter two are, naturally, numerical, mathematico-logical cultures.

Technopoly is characterized by the disappearance of all old beliefs, values, traditions, and symbolisms which survived during, or co-existed with, the advancement of technocracy. But this is only an illusion, because the belief in technique is nothing else but a revival of the old magical forces -- except that the Shamans are now the technocrats and other protagonists of technological progress. In Technopoly, which simply ignored the old remnants of bygone ages and thereby rendered them ineffective, at least superficially,

⁴² "The technicians' myth is simply *Man* -- not you or I, but an abstract entity... Other modern myths, -- for example, the myth of 'progress' or of the 'proletariat' -- are immeasurably less real than the myth of the abstract entity of Man, in which he finds his justification." (ibid., 390). Technique produces an inner, mental and spiritual dissociation in humans, therefore "the essence of the techniques of 'humanization': to render unnoticeable the disadvantages that other techniques have created." Ellul 1964, 413.

an appropriate, technically adapted alternative seems to have taken the place of cultural traditions to assure the sovereign domination of technology over all spheres of life and culture.

With all this, however, the world did not become more comprehensible, but less, especially as technological alternatives and modes of conceptualization and operation change at a terrifying speed for those not trained in specific disciplines. And, at the same time, these rapid changes do not signify real transformations of fundamental existential facts. It is thus true, what Herbert Simon posited that the self's inability to grasp the complex aspects of modern life in their wholeness, that is, to deal with uncertainty, explains, at least partially, the appearance of ideologies, fashions and simplistic, single-issue creeds which inundate our world through the channels of the mass media (Simon, Herbert 1983, 80-106). "We believe because there is no reason not to believe" (Postman 1993, 58). The function of these ever-changing ideologies, then, is not only to assure the attainment of Technopoly's objectives, but also to make available some beliefs and values to be shared -- in the absence of a commonly held framework -- beliefs and values which can coordinate individuals' actions motivated solely by their selfish, instrumental rationality. It is a consequence of this state of affairs that, as Christopher Lasch pointed out, our secularized culture became an infinitely permissive culture in which the concept of evil and sin was replaced by the concept of sickness (Lasch 1995, 216). Therefore, in late modernity the Rieffan therapeutic culture is prevalent. The individual or unnatural causes are not held responsible for sick behavior leading to evil acts, but society, the conditions in which we live and which were created by modernity itself.

To grasp the complex nature and ramifications of contemporary reality is truly impossible for individuals. This certainly is one of the reasons for the transformation of our world into a therapeutic society as Technopoly's globalizing influence engendered a tremendous spatial shrinkage of the world. Transnational mobility, communications, and an apparently unlimited flow of information in infinite variations became so prevalent that local, regional, national, supraregional, and global contexts were, for all practical purposes, compressed into each other. It is, nevertheless, a fact that people's profound attachment to the local, regional, or national contexts determining human existence did not change, and concurrently with the ever-increasing cultural transnationalization through communication and information exchange, a widening revolt manifests itself under different forms, such as nationalism, fundamentalism, or simply apathy in respect of public affairs.

However, as Postman indicates, Technopolists would not accept that the advances of the so-called Information Age do not solve problems of individual persons and of society, -- they stick to the conviction that "what the world needs is yet more information" (Postman 1993, 60-61):

This is the elevation of information to metaphysical status: information as both the means and end of human creativity. In Technopoly, we are driven to fill our lives with the quest to 'access' information. For what purpose and with what limitations, it is not for us to ask; and we are not accustomed to asking, since the problem is unprecedented. The world has never before been confronted with information glut and has hardly time to reflect on its consequences... Indeed, one way of defining a Technopoly is to say that its information immune system is inoperable (ibid., 61 and 63).

This information glut, this perennial invasion by new facts and explanations, purported to be essential for the future, makes necessary the indispensable use of experts and expert systems. But being necessitated by this information glut, experts and expert systems also become an instrument of strengthening Technopoly's grip on society and on each of us (ibid., 90). These experts are supposed to be specialists in their narrow domains, and they thus pretend, like all bureaucratic regimes and systems, to have competence to exercise power and to settle matters in all spheres of cultural, social, and moral life. Thus, through these expert systems, through supporting the belief that scientific methods as applied in the natural sciences can also be applied to human and social matters through piecemeal social engineering, technocratic power establishes control over all aspects of human life and social activities. Finally, Technopoly strives to appear capable of securing for humanity an ontological/cosmic framework consisting in the faith in science "as a

comprehensive belief system that gives meaning to life, as well as a sense of well-being, morality, and even immortality" (ibid., 147).⁴³

It is only natural that under the conditions of late modernity, nostalgia takes over the minds and souls of our contemporaries. Nostalgia is a result of being at the mercy of uncontrollable events, of displacement in the universe because the indispensable ontological/cosmic framework is missing. *Nostalgia is a direct result of alienation less due to aggravated social than to impoverished cultural conditions.* I am, therefore, in agreement with Stauth and Turner that nostalgia is the result of the realization by conscious human beings of their limitations and finitude in contradiction to the predicted but impossible empowerment by voluntaristic ideologies, and a result of the broken promises and deceived expectations of science and technology (Stauth and Turner 1988, 516). Today's infinitely pluralistic cultural environment, the reign of mediocrity, and existential perspectivelessness contribute to such feelings of melancholy, of being lost in an incomprehensive world. Nostalgia is a specifically characteristic phenomenon of late modernity.⁴⁴ This does not mean, of course, that men did not feel nostalgic in other ages because of the unstoppable passage of time, and the unavoidably negative effects of reification on the spontaneity and authenticity of human existence.

Is, then, the cultural perspectivelessness and ontological nostalgia a reason to see a trend towards nihilism what Gianni Vattimo defined as "a destiny of the Being itself?" (Vattimo 1988, 179):

Nihilism does not mean that Being is in the power of the subject; rather, it means that Being is completely dissolved in the discoursing of value, in the indefinite transformations of universal equivalence... The consumption of Being in exchange-value, that is, the transformation of the real world into a fable, is nihilistic even insofar as it leads to the weakening of the cogent force of 'reality'... In the world of generalized exchange-value all is given -- as it always was, but now in a more evident and exaggerated fashion -- as narration or *récit* (ibid., 22 and 27; italics in original).

⁴³ Postman defines, in consequence, scientism, in addition to the view that methods of natural science are applicable in human affairs as well, as "the desperate hope, and wish, and ultimately the illusory belief that some standardized set of procedures called 'science' can provide us with an unimpeachable source of moral authority... science has no more authority than you do or I to establish such criteria as the 'true' definition of 'life' or of human state or of personhood... To ask of science, or expect of science, or accept unchallenged from science the answers to such questions is Scientism. And it is Technopoly's grand illusion." Postman 1993, 161-162.

⁴⁴ In their study, Stauth and Turner summarize in an excellent way the roots of late modern nostalgia: "First there is the notion of history as decline and fall, involving a significant departure from a golden epoch of hopefulness. Secondly, there is the idea that modern social systems and their cultures are inherently pluralistic, secularized and diverse; this pluralization of life-worlds brings about an intense fragmentation of belief and practice. Thirdly, there is the nostalgic view of the loss of individuality and individual autonomy, since the autonomous self is trapped in the world of bureaucratic regulation under the dominance of a modern state. Finally, there is the sense of the loss of simplicity, authenticity and spontaneity. The regulation of the individual within a bureaucratic and administered world prohibits genuine feeling and emotion." Stauth and Turner 1988, 513.

Is, then, nihilism the outcome of what we call the Information Age? Is the reign of all-invading rhetorics, of unbridled aestheticism and narcissism of the self, and of the unlimited power and influence of the media which definitely shape our worldviews, really the end of our culture, if not of human history -- though until our old Gaia exists, and on it there are human beings, there can be no end to history as we know it?

CHAPTER THREE

THE ETHOS OF LATE MODERNITY

1. Ethos, Pluralism and Globalization

Almost 25 years ago Clifford Geertz made a distinction, in his well-known *The Interpretation of Cultures*, between *ethos* and *worldview* (Geertz 1973, 126-127). He classified the moral and aesthetic, evaluative elements of a culture as *ethos*, and the cognitive or existential aspects as *worldview*. If *ethos* and *worldview* are congruent with each other a meaningful relationship is demonstrated "between the values a people holds and the general order of existence within which it finds itself." I shall borrow from Geertz the term *ethos*, which will also encompass, in my usage, what he designates by *worldview*. But I shall add the concept of cultural practices.

The core of a culture is, in my understanding, always a religion, an ontological/cosmic framework; all civilizations are transcendently anchored. Culture is based, therefore, on a transcendently oriented thinking which in itself is a worldview, a philosophical outlook, whether reflecting the transcendental inspiration of its origins or not. But culture as immanent, existential phenomenon consists, in the first place, of its *ethos*, which comprises evaluative and cognitive elements, and, in the second place, of its cultural practices. I do not think that it would be possible or useful to want to link each aspect of an *ethos* to a cultural practice; the relationship is much more complex than a one-to-one correspondence. The *ethos* of a culture includes cognitive aspects, symbolism, arts, ethics, a people's way and style of life which together express a structural ensemble of meanings and summarize people's everyday attitude to the world surrounding them. Cognitive forms, reflecting the culture's patterns of reasoning, include practical philosophies (as against meta-physical thinking) such as conceptualizations of the world, of nature, and of people themselves; the philosophy of language, the philosophy of science, hermeneutical philosophy as well as the various scientific endeavors would also fall into this category. The practices of a culture consist of religious and mundane rituals, of social, economic and political institutions, rules, roles, and activities proper to each of the spheres constituting a culture's lifeworld.

Thus, *ethos* and cultural practices are based on the transcendently inspired worldview, but if we look at them from an other perspective, they are bound together, or brought into synthesis by the dialectics of the individual-community relationship. A culture's *ethos* represents the creative side of human nature and of the human world. Individual creativity enriches both *ethos* and cultural practices, taking, at least partially, its inspiration from the community's tradition. In order to have a lasting effect, it has to become part of that tradition. A community's tradition can live and be renewed only through individuals' activity and creativity and, simultaneously, allows them to share the treasures accumulated during past generations.

Now, in late modernity, the *ethos* and practices of our culture represent hitherto unknown new forms of thinking and belief, and a value system which reflects an entirely different emotional disposition and existential approach than in past ages. Cultural *ethos* and practices became servants to dominating and rapidly changing ideologies and fashions, to ever-renewed technological innovations and more and more

abundant information flows.¹ Even these go through rapid mutations continuously, due to their instability and inner dialectics involving constant modifications of the ethos and practices of the culture.

Cultures are different from one another. This is a fact of life. We live, if considering the matter in a realistic way, in a pluralistic world. This pluralism requires, of course, a respect for diversity, hence the reign of relativism.² Not that reality is variable, but our way of seeing it and understanding it is variable: "It is a core aphorism of the post-Nietzscheian position... that the objective world is incapable of being represented completely if represented from any one point of view, and incapable of being represented intelligibly if represented from all points of view" (Schweder 1989, 131). The differential view of the universe, of the reality surrounding us denies, therefore, the belief in universal human rationality, the existence of a uniform, not disjointed, context in space and time, and the requirement of a uniform ethos. The difference is not in the reality which exists independently of us, but in our perceiving or seeing *that*, or appreciating and evaluating *that*, as our seeing or appreciating *that* varies in accordance with experiential sequences:

The very core of cultural relativism [wrote almost a half a century ago Herskovits] is the social discipline that comes from respect for differences -- of mutual respect. Emphasis on the worth of many ways of life, not one, is an affirmation of the values in each culture (Herskovits 1973, 33).³

It is in this respect that the role of ethos is fundamental; it gives sense to the Gadamerian attitude according to which truth is not a propositional doctrine, a correspondence with facts, but an experienced reality which, through constant self-interrogation, ever renews itself. In the same vein, Jaspers believed as well that reality is subject to "*unlimited interpretation and re-interpretation*," especially as in his perception that "*authentic reality cannot be thought in terms of possibility... any known actuality is a realized possibility*" (Jaspers 1971, 67 and 69; italics in original). The ethos of late modernity completely reversed this perspective because it takes possibility as reality, projecting in an indefinite temporal dimension its present ideology and fashions.

The concept of pluralism defended here has to be clearly distinguished from two contemporary phenomena. The first extends it in such a way that culturally conditioned pluralism is replaced by idiosyncrasies invented or felt by individuals or alienated social groups -- William Connolly's ethos of pluralization; the second, limiting it to a simple lack of consensus -- Nicholas Rescher's dissensus pluralism. For Connolly, the ethos of pluralization is, in the perspective of the dialectic of identity and difference, the recognition of the endless redefinition of relational identities as against the rigidity of social enactments, moral codes (those, in particular, derivable from transcendental origins), or simply congealed identity formulations. The ethos of pluralization is thus the ethos of critical responsiveness to any and all newly produced identities. This implies, in turn, the continuous revision of individual and collective self-identities, and the reconsideration of all aspects of such relational determinations of existence (Connolly 1995, xvi and xviii). The existential flow of intra- and intersubjective differences, properly understood and responded to, must, in Connolly's vision, lead to the pluralization of pluralism in order to combat the old ethos of territorialization and of exclusion promoted by different forms of fundamentalisms. The ethos of critical

¹ Computer technology, for Postman, is "the dominant metaphor of our age; it defines our age by suggesting a new relationship to information, to work, to power, and to nature itself. That relationship can best be described by saying that the computer redefines humans as 'information processors' and nature itself as information to be processed. The fundamental metaphorical message of the computer, in short, is that we are machines -- thinking machines, to be sure, but machines, nonetheless. It is for this reason that computer is the quintessential, incomparable, near-perfect machine for Technopoly. It subordinates the claims of our nature, our biology, our emotions, our spirituality. The computer claims sovereignty over the whole range of human experience, and supports its claim by showing that it 'thinks' better than we can." Postman 1993, 111.

² The conditioning of our views by our cultural ethos is explained by Rorty: "It is not that we live in different worlds than the Nazis or the Amazonians, but that conversion from or to their point of view, though possible, will not be a matter of inference from previously shared premises." Rorty 1985, 19, note 13.

³ As Wittgenstein said: "What today counts as an observed concomitant of a phenomenon will to-morrow be used to define it." Wittgenstein 1989, 37-38.

responsiveness therefore dissolves all identities in an eternal flux of transformation of individual and collective self-recognition. It really cannot be called an ethos, but a late modern ideological stance justifying whatever identity differences are claimed by its protagonists.

Rescher's argumentation about pluralism as the justification of factual dissensus among groups and individuals is, in reality, a *faux problème*. Pluralistic multiplicity of visions can reflect a consensus on particular points, and a universalistically construed world can also witness dissensus in specific fields. Rescher's approach is, however, understandable if considered in a restricted sense, that is, as against the conceptually circular and truistic thesis of many modern philosophers concerning the "universal agreement among rational people," which means nothing less than a consensus of all who accepted standards of rationality predetermined in our culture. This rationality is contextual, depending on prevailing circumstances, on the information at hand, and on the practical congruence between our beliefs and empirical evidence (Rescher 1993, 41). Rescher seems to retain the concept of instrumental-purposive rationality though recognizing that "there is no *rationaly cogent* way of choosing" (ibid., 109; italics in original). Value judgements are relational, intertwined, as it were, with a web of other beliefs and value judgements. Consensus, then, cannot but be a substitute to the unavailability of inherently universal rationality, considered as a regulative ideal, in the Kantian sense (ibid., 2-3). Pluralism reflects varying patterns of reasoning conditioned by the cultural ethos in its interaction with the natural environment, thus pluralism means a relativization of evidence,⁴ not an indifference:

Pluralism holds that it is rationally intelligible and acceptable that others can hold positions at variance with one's own. But it does *not* maintain that a given individual need endorse a plurality of positions -- that the fact that others hold a certain position somehow constitutes a reason for doing so oneself... Pluralism is the feature of the collective group: it turns on the fact that different experiences engender different views. But from the standpoint of the individual this cuts no ice. We have no alternative to proceeding as best we can on the basis of what is available to us. That others agree with us is no proof of correctness; that they disagree, no sign of error (ibid., 89; italics in original).

Modernity was firmly anchored in a universalistic belief: truth claims must be valid everywhere because they reflect reality; universal standards in logics, morals and artistic expression as well as in the rightness of the cultural ethos of Western civilization cannot be disputed. In our pluralistic age, the problem really is to get rid of such a foundational belief -- the Cartesian goal of the certainty of knowing, which characterized centuries of modernity. Although many contemporary thinkers believe that it was late modernity which brought a relativistic outlook with it, meaning by it the conditioning of one's view of the world by a culture's fundamental beliefs, ethos and practices; I am convinced, on the contrary, that *relativism is an existential, human condition, inevitable because there is no human being who does not, at least partially, owe its identity and worldview to the culture in which he was born.*⁵ It is striking that against science's universalist and

⁴ "Different cultures and different intellectual traditions, to say nothing of different sorts of creature, are bound to describe and explain their experience -- their world as they conceive it -- in terms of concepts and categories of understanding substantially different from ours... The science of a different civilization would inevitably be closely tied to the particular pattern of their interaction with nature as funnelled through the particular course of their evolutionary adjustment to their specific environment. The 'forms of sensibility' of radically different beings (to invoke Kant's useful idea) are likely to be radically different from ours." Rescher 1993, 69-71.

⁵ Melford Shapiro distinguishes two fallacies in the universalistic conception of man without denying invariant components in his nature due to biological, social, and cultural constants. First, "*the fallacy of assuming that the cross-cultural variability in social behavior and personality implies that the organism is an empty or black box*. Despite the variability in culture, it does not follow that man has no invariant psychological characteristics, because some, at least, are biologically determined...*The fallacy of not distinguishing the phenotypic from the genotypic, or (using a more fashionable metaphor) surface structure from deep structure, in culture...* in its role as mediator, culture is necessarily variable across space and over time because, as a product of man's symbolic capacities, culture can (and must) vary with a host of variable historical conditions -ecological settings, diffusionary opportunities, politically powerful and charismatic leadership, unpredictable physical and social events (war, drought, invasion), and so on. If, then, culture is the means by which men and groups adapt to the functional requirements of individual and group existence, it is not surprising to find a wide range of differences in the form and content of culture as a function of an equally wide range of differences in man's historical experience." Shapiro 1987, 23 and 26; italics in the original.

secular vision, some of the most outstanding scientists and biologists also recognize the overwhelming influence of cultural ethos in human life. Thus, Roger Sperry attributed to human value priorities a fundamental causal influence in all events as he conceived consciousness as an integral dynamic property of the brain process in essence. He advocated a holistic worldview based on the interaction of physical and mental components in human beings (Sperry 1985). Eric Weil also emphasized the importance of ethos when he linked unrelated values, or the lack of value systems, to arbitrary choices and behavior, and criticized scientism's distinction between facts and values on the basis that scientists themselves are conditioned by their culture.⁶

The ethos of late modernity is, thus, not relativistic, it is empty. Under whatever aspects we analyze it, it becomes clear that the only ethos of our age is the constant flow and changing configuration of ideologies, fashions and fads; consequently, Touraine's thesis that "perhaps no other civilization has lacked a central principle to this extent," (Touraine 1995, 98-99) is undeniably true. I agree with Baudrillard that one of the fundamental paradoxes of late modernity is between the linear time of technical progress and historical evolution, and the cyclical time of ethos, of the ever-changing fashions and ideologies (Baudrillard 1993, 89). For the French philosopher, though, this appears not to be a real paradox, because it belongs to modernity's essence to produce, simultaneously, old and new in accordance with its binary logic. But precisely this permanent commutation of values, this myth of change is, in my understanding, paradoxical in comparison to the modern belief in technical progress and in the evolution of mankind toward the end of history. Niklas Luhmann also recognizes that binary coding -- the language of late modernity totalizes reality at the same time that it makes all reality contingent -- resolves the paradox of self-referential relations which are at the origin of the myth of change, but creates a paradox of its own because it has to change with "conditions of social plausibility" (Luhmann 1989, 36-43). If we pursue Luhmann's argumentation further, the paradox of binary coding, beyond its essential function of integrating differences, creates historically irreversible complexities. And through such complexities it eliminates the ethos of the culture and, thereby, its existential world.

The emptiness of late modernity's ethos, the myth of change, and the transformation of modern society into a risk society led our contemporaries to an unavowed fatalism, a resigned acceptance of risks, because they have no means to eliminate them from their life; at the same time, it also led some of them to a manifest nostalgia referring to pre-modern conditions.⁷ Anthony Giddens considers that chance and risk are inevitable concomitants of an age oriented toward the domination of nature and reflexive individual and social attitudes:

The notion of risk becomes central in a society which is taking leave of the past, of traditional way of doing things, and which is opening itself up to a problematic future... The openness to things to come expresses the malleability of the social world and the capability of social beings to shape the physical settings of our existence. While the future is recognized as intrinsically unknowable, and as it is increasingly severed from the past, that future becomes a new terrain -- a territory of counterfactual possibility... The calculation of risk... can never be fully complete, since even in relatively confined risk environments there are always unintended and unforeseen outcomes (Giddens 1991, 111-112).

⁶ "Disinterestedness, objectivity, and so forth are values; science has no way of proving that they ought to be values, because the very idea of proof -- the appeal to consistency of discourse -- presupposes that these values have been acknowledged beforehand. We shall have to say, since there is no other possibility, that these values are basic to our civilization. But that admission reverses, and completes, the thesis of absolute separation between facts and values in a highly surprising manner. Facts depend upon science and on the questions asked by the scientist, because it is he who decides which facts are relevant, i.e., scientific facts; thus facts depend upon the spirit in which these questions are formulated, on the scientist's axioms; and the choice of these axioms is actually a choice, in other words, a value judgement. It is certainly true that values do not follow from facts, but it now appears that facts become relevant only through values... What we discover is that science and consistency are unable to justify fundamental values, and particularly themselves, as necessary... To consider science as the universal measuring rod for values is an unscientific ideology." Weil 1965, 209-210 and 212.

⁷ See, for example, the revival of the Islamic creed and attitudes and of Moorish social conventions in Spain's Andalusia, half a millenium after the disappearance of the Moors from the country. *Der Spiegel*, 1995, No. 50, 167-168.

Individual and collective risks are linked through institutionalization; therefore, life chances of individuals are even more conditioned by social conditions than before (ibid., 117-118). Greater interdependence means greater vulnerability, but abstraction makes our perception of the risks involved, for example the environmental effects of industrialization, less conscious. When risks are higher, deferred in time or remoter in space, we realize their importance much less because their nature and effects escape us entirely. Otherwise, our sole defense lies in excluding them from our daily existence -- for the moment at least. This is the late-modern form of alienation, in which other alienating aspects due to secularization, to the loss of value systems and of firmly established worldviews, are always present. Late-modern alienation, a consequence in our contemporaries' consciousness not only of the feeling of human finitude but also of the powerlessness against unknown risks, constitutes the already indicated "ontological problem of nostalgia" (Stauth, and Turner 1988, 512).

In conclusion, from the perspective of the contextuality of all human events and of the particularities of ethos and practices in different cultures, globalization as the interpenetration of the universal and of the particular is a useful concept, but not as another name for world culture or globalization of a particular culture, nor for a universalism that eliminates the identity and characteristics of world civilizations.

2. Ethos, Meaning, and Symbolism

Human cultural worlds are constituted by structured meaning-ensembles and corresponding symbol systems which evoke and materialize, through signs and other means of incorporation, the meanings of all phenomena in the world. Thus, meanings are significations inserted into the ontological/cosmic framework which express the sense given by men and their cultures to reality and its multifarious aspects. Meaning-ensembles and symbol systems are created by humans by virtue of their capabilities to transcend the immanent world, to refer-beyond-themselves in their perception and understanding of this world.⁸ They comprise all aspects of what Geertz called people's ethos and worldview. The cultural determination of meanings and symbols cannot but be contingent precisely because they are situated in the existential and historical dimension of temporality as mediated through traditions; thus, meanings and symbols naturally find their place on a continuum extending from generation to generation. This is the reason why men inescapably become alienated in a meaningless world.

Structured meaning-ensembles and corresponding symbol systems are created by communities and individuals together: the community is the bearer of a culture, with its meanings and symbols elaborated by generations of human beings; individuals, through their own reflections, actions, and interaction with other individuals, represent the innovative drive as they add to the existing cultural treasure or modify it, in accordance with their existential perspective and the perspective of their times. There is no individual who is not embedded in his community's culture, and there can be no community without creative and innovative individuals who ensure the incessant reformulation of their cultures' meanings and symbols in accordance with the requirements of their age. A culture is, as Hannerz said, a "network of perspectives" or an ensemble of "perspectives toward perspectives" (Hannerz 1992, 65 and 128).

Meanings refer to reality -- a reality as seen by particular individuals and human communities -- that is, a reality which in the specific vision of the culture's bearers unites the two kinds of seeing: *seeing that* and *seeing how*. This fact reveals the Janus-like double aspect of meanings. First, a meaning can be manipulated in accordance with the requirements of individual and group interests, especially in the interests

⁸ Luhmann explains meaning as a basic concept in a similar way: "Experience experiences itself as variable - and unlike transcendental phenomenology we assume organic bases for this. It does not find itself closed and self-contained, not restricted to itself, but is always referring to something that is at that moment not its actual content. This referring-beyond-itself, this immanent transcendence of experience, is not a matter of choice; rather, it is the condition on the basis of which all freedom to choose must first be constituted. Nor is the reflexive turning to experience as such (let alone to the experiencing subject) able to escape this condition; it too exhibits the same structure and simply points experience in a particular direction, alongside which others still remain possible. The problem of integrating the actuality of experience with the transcendence of its other possibilities remains inescapable, and inescapable, too, is the form of experience processing that accomplishes this. It is this that I call meaning." Luhmann 1990b, 25-26.

of those in power, with the help of an apparatus invented specifically for this purpose, such as the printed word or the electronic media. But, second, such a de-natured meaning which lost all reference to human or cosmic reality can never endure, cannot for a long time be used to alter people's perception of the world, precisely because meanings are closely tied to experience, to the fact of everyday life. Thus, in Hannerz's parlance, a meaning's relation to reality, in a culture's perspectives, can be symmetric -- congruent with its worldview -- or asymmetric -- manipulated and indicating profound dissent among members of the cultural community. Asymmetry signifies, in this context, the hegemony of a specific or dissident orientation in one culture, or the domination of other cultures by one specific culture.

In late modernity, a particular asymmetry characterizes the Western cultural orbit, namely, the manipulation of meanings by experts, bureaucrats, professionals, or the media, because the authentic ethos and worldview of our culture is so evanescent that individuals can no longer be guided by its structured meaning-ensemble. In a meaningless world, or in a world of confused meanings, the alienated individual has no other recourse but the hope to glean an orientation from these experts and professionals, without realizing that expert or professional advice is closely linked to the interests of whatever powers there may be. The media's role in a meaningless world is even more important than that one of meaning-creating or meaning-inventing experts and professionals. In McLuhan's formulation, the medium is the message, the elaborate devices used to disseminate centrally constructed, manipulated meanings, is itself the message. Meaning-ensembles and their symbols are transformed, recreated, invented by the media which, under the label of serving the advent of the information society, diffuses meaning combinations and de-natured symbols in order to promote the interests of those to whom they belong. Media are flexible and willing ideological instruments of the social controls of economic, political or cultural powers. And this manipulation is certainly part of the media's devastating effect on human minds which they overburden with frequently invented or reinterpreted information.

The media's meaning-manipulating role is independent of their immense potential as instruments of communication at large distances, though the concentration of sources of information clearly facilitates the manipulation of meanings, thereby creating an uneven distribution of correct and reliable information between human groups. This uneven distribution of information is particularly pronounced if it concerns societies belonging to different civilizational worlds, because meanings and symbols utilized by worldwide media networks are not congruent with people's own ethos and meaning structures in different parts of the globe. It is only if one ignores cultural differences and the ideological manipulation of the meanings and symbols that statements pointing out that "the media, such as television, allow culture to become globalized by neutralizing space" (Hannerz 1992, 246), can be accepted as true.

Like meaning, symbolism is a reaching out beyond the immanent world, "a reaching out of life beyond itself," as Georg Simmel once wrote.⁹ There is no culture without symbolism; even in present-day Western civilization symbolism has remained very important, though it is of a completely different kind from that which characterizes other cultures or, for that matter, the Western culture of pre-modern times.¹⁰ From the point of view of a cultural ethos, the reason for the importance of symbolism is that it makes possible the establishment of an infinite number of links between things, ideas, and relations, but its main aspect remains to fulfil in human consciousness two essential functions. First, it organizes and structures all sensory and mental perceptions and cognitive, intellectual as well as emotional impressions, thereby integrating all these

⁹ Simmel, Georg, *Lebensanschauung*. 2. ed. 1922, 13; quoted in Gadamer 1985, 62.

¹⁰ "Symbolic assimilation," wrote Huizinga in his epoch-making work on the Middle Ages, "founded on common properties presuppose the idea that these properties are essential to things... The assimilation is produced because the attributes are the same... But this similarity will only have a mystic meaning if the middle-term connecting the two terms of the symbolic concept expresses an essentiality common to both; in other words, if redness and whiteness [of roses] are something more than names for a physical difference based on quantity if they are conceived as essences, realities... Now beauty, tenderness, whiteness, being realities, are also entities; consequently all that is beautiful, tender or white must have a common essence, the same reason of existence, the same significance before God." Huizinga 1984, 185. It is also important that Huizinga makes very clear the difference between symbol and allegory: "Symbolism expresses a mysterious connection between two ideas, allegory gives a visible form to the conception of such a connection. Symbolism is a very profound function of the mind, allegory is a superficial one. It aids symbolic thought to express itself, but endangers it at the same time by substituting a figure to the living idea. The force of the symbol is easily lost in the allegory." *ibid.*, 186.

perceptions and impressions in a coherent worldview.¹¹ Second, it constitutes for human beings the par excellence instrument to express their ideas and feelings about the world, about community, and about human beings as individuals. It is therefore correct, in my view, to consider symbolism as the mainstay of cultural traditions which secure the transmission of an ethos's worldview from generation to generation. In this sense, symbolism constitutes a structured memory in Heidegger's holistic formulation ("the totality of involvement"), concerning the ontological fore-structure of understanding and interpretation.¹²

Symbolism is man's unique creation;¹³ it is a reciprocal relation between man and the world, between object and subject, imposed by humans on nature. A defining feature of every symbolism is, therefore, that it is arbitrary, varying with every cultural context. But the creation of coherent symbolic structures is inserted into the framework of the limits and constraints represented by nature's independent forces. It is in this sense that one can say that symbolic systems follow their own inner, meaningful logic, and relate their particular, interwoven meanings into a coherent and consistent whole: the ethos of the culture.

Ernst Cassirer, the great philosopher of symbolism, showed how worlds of symbols are constituted through language:

The process of language formation shows, for example, how the chaos of immediate impressions takes on order and clarity for us only when we 'name' it and so permeate it with the function of linguistic thought and expression. In this new world of linguistic signs the world of impressions itself acquires an entirely new 'permanence,' because it acquires a new intellectual articulation. This differentiation and fixation of certain contents by words, not only designates a definite intellectual quality through them, but actually endows them with such a quality, by virtue of which they are now raised above the mere immediacy of the so-called sensory qualities... And beside the world of linguistic and conceptual signs stands the world of myth and art, incommensurate with it and yet related in spiritual origin... If we judge [mythical fantasy] by the ordinary empirical standards provided by our sensory experience, its creations cannot but seem 'unreal,' but precisely in this unreality lies the spontaneity and inner freedom of the mythical function (Cassirer 1955, 1: 87-88).¹⁴

The birth of symbolism, in consequence, is due to the attribution of a sign to a phenomenon relating it to its meaning and endowing it with a definite place in the ethos of the culture. The meaning attributed becomes a permanent characteristic of the signified which, through the attribution of it, is liberated from the continuous

¹¹ "A *genuine* symbol," wrote Pierce, "is a symbol that has a general meaning." And in contrast, "There are two kinds of degenerate symbols, the *Singular Symbol* whose Object is an existent individual, and which signifies only such characters as that individual may realize; and the *Abstract Symbol*, whose only Object is a character." Pierce 1940, 112; italics in original.

¹² "In every case this interpretation is grounded in *something we have in advance* -- in a *fore-having*... In every case interpretation is grounded in *something we see in advance* -- in a *fore-sight*... [Any interpretation] is grounded in *something we grasp in advance* --- in a *fore-conception*." Heidegger 1962, 191; italics in original. In the Jungian perspective, symbolism is necessary because "there are innumerable things beyond human understanding," beyond the edge of certainty, even if man has recourse to the most sophisticated instruments enhancing the capabilities of his senses. Jung 1964, 21.

¹³ "The symbol is connected with its object by virtue of the idea of the symbol-using mind, without which no such connection would exist." Pierce 1940, 114.

¹⁴ Cassirer recognizes that the first to analyze languages as symbol-systems in a similar way, was Wilhelm von Humboldt, at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Humboldt's conception of symbolism was holistic and, in congruence with German philosophy, he looked at linguistic symbolism as the 'bridging' of the objective and subjective: "In speech the energy of the mind breaks a path through the lips, but its product returns through our own ears. The idea is translated into true objectivity without being withdrawn from subjectivity. Only language can do this; and without this translation into an objectivity which returns to the subject -- and such a translation occurs, even though silently, wherever language is at work -- the formation of concepts and hence all true thought would be impossible... Just as the particular sound mediates between the object and the man, so the whole language mediates between him and the nature that works upon him from within and from without. He surrounds himself with a world of sounds in order to assimilate and elaborate the world of objects." Humboldt, Wilhelm von. *Gesammelte Schriften*. Ed. A. Leitzmann. Königlische Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 7: 55; quoted in Cassirer 1955, 1: 92.

flow of sensations, perceptions, and impressions -- the Bergsonian *durée*. Man can attribute a meaning, a content to a single symbol but not without, at the same time, positing a complex of interdependent meanings or a complex of other contents. In accordance with this intertwining of meaning-complexes every single meaning involves, without mediation or representation, the whole complex of meanings. This explains why in the temporal dimension the present always contains the past, or what is no longer actual, as well as the future, which is not yet actual. The same is true of the spatial dimension, in which the mind brings about the successive synthesis of interrelated spatial meanings contained in various temporal series. Thus, the meaning-ensemble of an ethos, expressed through a coherent symbolism, is the creation of the human mind in particular cultural conditions; because symbolism is man's own creation, men of all cultures use it freely in their interactive and communicative relations. In Cassirer's perspective

Myth and art, language and science, are in this sense configurations *towards* being: they are not simple copies of an existing reality but represent the main directions of the spiritual movement, of the ideal process by which reality is constituted for us as one and many - as a diversity of forms which are ultimately held together by a unity of meaning (ibid., 106-107; italics in original).

Thus, the quintessential significance of symbolism consists not only in that it constitutes an integrative pattern of the mind but also that it opens new intellectual and spiritual vistas in a culture. By tying a particular meaning into a whole, it leads to the discovery of hitherto unsuspected interrelations of partial meaning ensembles.

Among symbolic systems, language is the best known and most frequently analyzed, though myth is an important symbolic structure not only in pre-historic or pre-modern ages, but even in cultures of our times. In Schelling's view, myth "is one of the primeval ideas that force their way into existence" (quoted in Blumenberg 1985, 149-150); it is a fundamental method of expression because it admits multiple meanings instead of the usual cognitive intent endeavoring to reach unambiguousness. Myth is conditioned by the operation of a powerful imagination, but not by the respect of logical rules and considerations.¹⁵ The interest of such cultural historians as the late Hans Blumenberg, who wrote a monumental study on myth, or of such thinkers as Leszek Kolakowski, who also analyzed myth as a modern phenomenon, is proof of the actuality and importance of mythical symbolism today.

In Blumenberg's understanding, two features characterize myth in particular: its iconic constancy and its reference to an absolute past as against the relativity of the historic past, fixed forever in its symbolic imagery (Blumenberg 1985, 149 and 161). Through these two qualities myth lends universal relevance to archaic happenings and their memories in the perception of individuals who could not experience them but belong to a particular culture's orbit in which the myth is an essential part of the symbol system. In addition, mythical symbolism is also an important element in the reinforcement of solidarity in a community; thus it promotes intersubjective communication. Therefore myth, like any other symbolic expression, is continually remade in the course of intersubjective dialogue, and especially in its transmission from generation to generation.

Art is a *par excellence* symbolic form and expression, as it is not based on a conventional, intersubjective agreement among a group of people but derives its meaning from the spontaneous, creative impulse of an individual artist, who, nevertheless, reflects in his work the ethos of his age, *l'esprit de son temps*. Spontaneity does not mean, of course, the lack of intentionality, as a work of art is born out of the all-embracing vision of its creator whose intention to express himself is irresistible. The symbolic structure developed by the artist over the course of his lifetime reflects a global view of the world and combines the ethos of the age with his own ethos. Every form of art is a discovery, a disclosure of the reality from the

¹⁵ On mythical imagination Blumenberg notes: "Imagination's poverty of accomplishment only establishes that in its historical position, under the power of delusions, all that it can accomplish is the consolidation of the existing state of things... If only the obstacle of the existing state of things is removed, then the projection of a new totality, by the process of the negation of the negation, will proceed creatively after all... The scandal of contingency that every institution produces as soon as it is pressed (which is an everyday sport) to demonstrate its legitimacy is increased by myth's refusal, if not to continue to give reasons at every barrier where it is stopped for questioning, at least to promise them. Consequently myth has appeared to every historical formation of 'enlightenment' as more an encumbrance than a treasure." Blumenberg 1985, 163.

artist's own perspective. Any art, like any symbolic structure, is not copying, not explaining, not relating, not repeating, but a genuinely new perception and vision of reality, a true creation. Therefore, art strives to reach a unity of the manifold, a unity obtained in a particular vision without ignoring or suppressing the world's wonderful diversity, in contradiction to all human activities which tend towards abstraction, the impoverishment of reality. Artistic vision embraces concrete reality even though it transforms this reality in conformity with its own perspectives, and offers an alternative to the customary ways of seeing the world. Cassirer's definition of art takes on great importance in this context when he writes that art "is an interpretation of reality -- not by concepts but by intuitions; not through the medium of thought but through that of sensuous forms" (Cassirer 1944, 146).

Thus, reality is grasped by intuition and, simultaneously, re-created in accordance with the artist's perception and global vision; understanding art therefore belongs, like understanding all symbolisms, to the Heideggerian fore-structure of man's mental abilities. In this way, artistic symbolism is beyond all rationality and all calculated probabilities of our technological world. Aesthetic experience eludes any explanation because it is, in Vattimo's words, "a lived, momentary, and ultimately epiphanic experience" (*Erlebnis*), or, with reference to Heidegger, an "ungrounding of historicity," a leap into the subject's "own mortality" (Vattimo 1988, 122 and 125). Artistic symbolism is the optimal way to transcendence:

The aesthetic experience is not just one kind of experience among others, but represents the essence of experience itself. As the work of art as such is a world for itself, what is experienced aesthetically is, as an experience, removed from all connections with actuality... it suddenly takes the person experiencing it out of the context of his life, by the power of the work of art, and yet relates him back to the whole of his existence. In the experience of art there is present a fullness of meaning which belongs not only to this particular content or object but rather stands for the meaningful whole of life. An aesthetic experience always contains the experience of an infinite whole (Gadamer 1985, 63).

The analysis of aesthetic experience offers a good possibility to turn to the symbolism of modern and late-modern art. Modern art is autonomous, frequently non-realistic to the point of being non-referential, and, consequently, self-legislating. Scott Lash expresses this in an excellent formula: "Modernism conceives of representations as being problematic, whereas postmodernism problematizes reality" (Lash 1990, 13). In late modernity, signification and the signifying process, in their original sense, are less important; it is the real -- great narratives or everyday events -- which are fundamentally questioned. Modern art consciously differentiates itself from the aesthetic views of preceding ages, whereas the art of the late-modern age is characterized by de-differentiation (Lash 1988, 311-312) because differentiation lost its importance. Signification or representation both become unstable and fluid, changing with points of view, or simply the momentary interests of the self-styled artist.

Though it appears contradictory, this fluidity leads to a situation in which signification and representation in the form of ideologies, fashions or fads replace reality. Finally, we even reach the point to perceive by means of representation, and we represent through previous or other representations (Lash 1990, 24). Such a way of perceiving things results, in the long term, of one's loss of the sense of reality, and anything which is represented, for example, by the media, is accepted as reality. Consequently, artistic symbolism and symbolic structures totally lose their anchoring in reality; the semiotic triad of signifier, signified and referent become entirely meaningless. Tolerance of diversity becomes an ideology of anything goes; collective identity is expressed in the shared credulousness in forms and expressions symbolic and artistic only in appearance:

Postmodern culture has often been understood as having its effectivity not via meaning but via *impact* on its audience... Meaning is only achieved by connection of the signifieds to signifiers. If there is an oversupply of such signifiers -- as there appears to be in today's constant bombardment of images and sounds -- and only a finite number of signifieds go around, then large numbers of signifiers will persist with no meanings attached, and be literally experienced as such (ibid., 42-43; italics in original).

The final results of such an evolution are: the de-differentiation of signifier and signified; the contingency of everything; artificiality; disruption of temporal and spatial dimensions, and destruction of stable identities.

Our contemporaries, therefore, perceive reality in accordance with the representations of representations. Late modernity is the era of mass production of mass culture in artistic as much as in any other cultural activity. The commercial motive replaces the creative, artistic impulse in Adorno's sense: "The entire practice of the culture industry transfers the profit motive naked unto cultural forms."¹⁶ The mass media create, on a wide scale, the artistic consensus, in addition to shaping the taste of the multitudes in respect of symbolic forms and structures or in respect of the norms and values characterizing contemporary art. They create, simultaneously, the forms and content of aesthetic experience as well as the public which participates in and enjoys this experience. The ever-changing meaning system created by the media and incorporated in the corresponding symbolic structures is, therefore, not legitimated ontologically because it is not part of the ethos of a community's shared aesthetic norms and values, but artificially imposed on the public. Symbols as use-values instead of sign-values can, nevertheless, be utilized to mark off different lifestyles and, consequently, to serve to destabilize long standing social hierarchies and to demarcate unstable and fluctuating social relationships. *The function of symbolism was thus transformed in late modernity: it became a factor of disintegration instead of integration, and the expression of moods and styles, instead of being the expression of fundamental, shared realities in a human group's life.*

"A process of fictionalization of reality within the social lifeworld" set in, according to Axel Honneth, who considers that "cultural activities lose their character as a communication-generating *praxis*" and "culture becomes a technological environment for humans robbed of their aesthetic potential" (Honneth 1992, 164-165; italics in original). Thus, symbols become trivialized and meaningless in our contemporary Technopoly (Postman 1993, 165), as the advancement of science and the overwhelming technological domination destroys old symbol systems and diffuses its own symbolic representations through the mass media. In fact, the mass media are nothing but the communication channels for Technopoly's ideology, for the fashions and fads with which it overloads human minds. The simulacra of modern culture is replaced, under the supervision of Technopoly, by a non-discursive operationality of which the driving force is its own myth in the form of fashions and fads -- fictional and unreal because without referent.

In fashion, all signs are exchanged just as on the market all products come into play as equivalents. It is the only universalizable sign system, which therefore takes possession of all others, just as the market eliminates all other modes of exchange... Fashion still holds to this immorality: it knows nothing of value systems, nor of criteria of judgement: good and evil, beauty and ugliness, the rational/irrational -- it plays within and beyond these, it acts therefore as the subversion of all order... It is power's hell, the hell of the relativity of all signs which all power is forced to crush in order to maintain its own signs (Baudrillard 1993, 92 and 98).

The degradation of symbolic forms and structures into ideologies and fashions would, of course, not be possible if people would not accept it. This evidences the phenomenon Bernard Shaw referred to when he wrote that the average person today is about as credulous as was the average person in the Middle Ages;¹⁷ this view was completed by Postman: "In the Middle Ages, people believed in the authority of their religion, no matter what. Today, we believe in the authority of our science, no matter what" (Postman 1993, 57-58). In a similar manner, but using a much stronger language, Leszek Kolakowski affirmed that contemporary society and its self-destructive way of living represents "the retreat into infantilism" (Kolakowski 1990, 173). It is as if we would turn back to ancient mythologizing -- the mythologies of Technopoly, in form of ideologies, replacing the realistic worldview. This is a most difficult phenomenon to acknowledge and to state publicly. However, it is time to be sincere with ourselves and to recognize that the disappearance of the true ethos of our culture, the transformation and degradation of the signs and symbolic structures expressing and reflecting our worldview, and the meaninglessness of our lifeworld could only overwhelm us because we did not put up the necessary resistance to such cultural developments. We allowed ourselves to be indoctrinated, dominated and abused by a dehumanized, media-governed, technological-social power. What are we then globalizing, our own helplessness and misfortune?

¹⁶ Adorno, Theodor W. 1975. "Culture Industry Reconsidered," in Alexander and Seidman. eds. 1990, 276.

¹⁷ John Milton, as a result of his elevated vision of humanity, was extremely critical with regard to his contemporaries whom he qualified "a credulous and hapless herd, begotten to servility," quoted in Bauman 1993, 23.

3. *Ethos and Ethics*

If structured meaning-ensembles and symbolic systems express the worldview of an ethos, the ethical order represents the effect on everyday life of the same ethos as well as social practices related to it. Ethos and ethics are interdependent; their congruence is a *sine qua non* condition of cultural coherence. This congruence gives them authenticity and authority. As there is no culture without symbolism and a coherent whole of interdependent meanings, there is no culture either without ethical principles on which individual and collective action can be based. The dialectic of actuality and potentiality frames the problem of correspondence of ethos and ethics:

The most important feature of the differentiation between Actuality and Potentiality found in experience resides in the character of the overabundance of possibilities, which by far exceeds what can be realized through action or actualized in experience. The actual, given contents of experience always point by way of reference and implication to far more -- whether taken together or as a sequence -- that can be brought into the narrow spotlight of consciousness. Alongside direct, immediate conscious experience there stands a world of other possibilities. This self-overburdening of experience with other possibilities exhibits the double structure of complexity and contingency (Luhmann 1990b, 26).¹⁸

Ethical reasoning and moral practice in Western culture finds itself in a terrible predicament since the dawn of modernity. This predicament took on the form of a fundamental double paradox, of an inescapable, paralyzing twofold contradiction: first, the contradiction between universalistic and particularistic, thus pluralistic and relativistic tendencies, and, second, the incompatibility between the classical ethics of value and virtue, based on Greek and Christian moral principles, and the ethics of right, based on the requirement of justice innate in the human conscience. They are not only contradictions but paradoxes because both antinomies are voluntarily created, due to modern ethics' absolutistic claim to universality.

The first of these paradoxes between the universalistic, pluralistic and relativistic tendencies is a permanent fact of human existence. Our existential contextuality, our perspectives determined by the cultural ethos and worldview which we inherited and which we continue to re-create and reinvent, render inevitable the pluralistic view of what is a good life. The pluralism of values and dominant virtues, as well as the manifold ways which lead to a good life, clearly make the requirement of universalism impossible and obsolete. The contradiction between pluralism and universalism was aggravated by the incompatibility between the modern utilitarian, quasi-rationalistic ethics and the unrealistic requirement of universalism.

The second contradiction, the one between the ethics of value and the ethics of right represented, since the beginning of modernity, a double paradox derived also from the requirement of universalism or universalizability. It decreed rights and duties to be respected and to be fulfilled which, since there could not be any universal lawgiver in a secularized age, simply hung in thin air. The ethics of right were pegged to human conscience in the form of a categorical imperative which was unilaterally declared by a so-called practical reason (Kant); to the social imperative of equality with reference to the Enlightenment's endlessly cited authorities (Rawls); or to some sort of a form of life.¹⁹ Larmore's form of life as the basis of the

¹⁸ Luhmann explains the meaning of complexity and contingency as follows: "The term *complexity* is meant to indicate that there are always more possibilities of experience and action than can be actualized. The term *contingency* is intended to express the fact that the possibilities of further experience and action indicated in the horizon of actual experience are just that -- possibilities -- and might turn out differently than expected." Luhmann 1990b, 26.

¹⁹ Larmore explicated his views in a recent essay on modern ethics: "There is, I believe, but one possible escape from this dilemma. If the idea of a core morality applicable to all does indeed figure among our most settled convictions, and if it cannot be understood in terms of the priority of the good, then at the heart of our moral convictions lies a belief in the priority of right. Why can these convictions not stand on their own? If we place at the center of our moral thought the fact that these are convictions from which we will not budge, then there will be something we can adduce as the source of these categorical duties: not God, nor practical reason, but rather the way of life expressed in these convictions. There will no longer be any positive reason to doubt the authority of conscience when it speaks of duties that are unconditionally ours, once it is taken to be no more than the voice of the way of life to which we hold." Larmore 1995, 40. And intending even to save the rational foundation of his ethics of form of life: "...we can still recognize in our form of life

universally valid ethical right is a most curious proposal because it appears to deduce such a right from the plurality of cultural ethos and moral practices. It is necessary to ask oneself what form of life out of the many prevailing in our days is designated as the foundation of the universally applicable, categorical imperative for ethical behavior and moral attitude in late modernity?

A resolution of these paradoxes was attempted by making ethical principles so abstract, -- for example, in the empty formulae of the Kantian or Rawlsian philosophies, in the rationalist ethics of mathematical presentation, or in procedural conceptualizations of justice, -- that ethics as guidance for practical morality, the morality of individual behavior and of participants in social interaction, completely disappeared. In the same way, the ethical ideal of freedom disappeared and could not be saved either by the Kantian autonomy of the individual, or by the Rawlsian veil of ignorance. However, all these tentatives were condemned to failure for one inescapable reason: *any ethics of right, any categorical imperative or any intrinsic interest in morality has to be based on a conception of the good life, on an end to be achieved which is required by the belief in values and virtues of those who are making moral choices.*

(A) UNIVERSALISTIC VERSUS PLURALISTIC ETHICS

The antinomy of universalism and pluralism in ethics is an artificially created antinomy in modern Western thought and practice. Hampshire is, of course, right that since antiquity, there has been a "contrast between those moral requirements which are grounded in human nature, and those which are grounded in the particular conventions of one particular society" (Hampshire 1983a, 294), and that both are equally binding.²⁰ However, the essential question is, which moral requirements are grounded in human nature? Is it possible to speak of human nature only, or do we have to include human dignity as a grounding factor too? And what is the proportion between moral requirements grounded in human nature and those grounded in particular cultural conventions, or within a particular human ethos as we call it? The plurality in the moral domain does not exclude that there are common features of human behavior, attitudes common to all men, which are inevitable components of human existence given our common biological makeup as a species -- genetic background and phylogenetic characteristics resulting from interaction with the environment. It is undeniably true that there are ethical universals shared by all humans, like parental and maternal love, the respect of the wisdom of the elders, or the caring for the dead. But, for example, could the principled moral requirement of honesty be considered grounded in human nature and not in social convention because it appears as a necessity for the survival of a human group or society? Be it as it may, one can agree with Hampshire that

There is no logical incoherence, or logical error, in combining a recognition of diversity with the belief that one's own morality, or one's own attitude to religion, is the only acceptable one. Even the second-order belief that God has implanted the correct moral convictions in one's mind and heart is not incoherent, considered by itself. But the fact that there exist different and incompatible moral beliefs, sincerely and thoughtfully maintained, is not to be denied, and has to be accepted as a feature of morality (ibid.).

Hegel, whose ethical thinking Charles Taylor so clearly analyzed (1979a, 125-134), could not imagine a lively society not sustained by a particular *Sittlichkeit*. *Sittlichkeit* was, for him, the sum of a community's public and private moral requirements. He justly believed that when an incongruence occurs between people's ethical reasoning and the conditions of life in their lifeworld, an alienation from their culture or from

a commitment to a universal ethic of categorical duties. By reasoning *within* this form of life, we are not doing less than reason demands." ibid., 64; italics in original.

²⁰ "As in the arts, so also in morality, the dispositions and needs of human nature emerge in the variety of conventions which prove to be adapted to them. An entirely universal morality, universal in its content, is as much a speculation as is a universal language, and for similar reasons. Morality, like language, serves to differentiate men and women, and to preserve their distinction and identity, at the same time that it also unites them in respect of their differences and in respect for the common requirements that arise from a common humanity." Hampshire 1983a, 296.

their society follows which cannot but lead to chaos, unhappiness, and disintegration. Hegel also foresaw that in modernity, cultural homogenization -- an unavoidable result of globalization -- will disrupt community and lifeworld structures and destroy the particular *Sittlichkeit* of differing human groups, following the advent of global conditions.

But Hegel also realized that the assumed universality of *Sittlichkeit*, of human ethical principles and moral practices, was derived by the eighteenth century Enlightenment from the thesis of the universality of reason. And rationality, if expected to be universal, could it be anything else but purely formal, abstract, empty of any content and totally meaningless?²¹ Human beings are all conditioned by their cultural milieu, by the collective treasure of categories of thought, beliefs, values, symbols, norms and other mental patterns they share with the community in which they were born (Scheler 1973, 520-521). This is especially true for the ethical and aesthetical domains, because, as Melville Herskovits noted, "evaluations are *relative* to the cultural background out of which they arise" (Herskovits 1973, 15; italics in original).

Herskovits's formulation already evidences the well-known difference between two kinds of judgements: first, the consideration of natural processes concerning which any human being's judgement is based on a common rationality, because this judgement relates to nature's realities; second, the judgement of the phenomena in the human world -- patterns of reasoning, ethical norms, aesthetic experience -- which are conditioned by one's own cultural background. This is not the difference of judgement of what is and what ought to be, as is usually pretended; what is and ought to be in human existence is governed by particular conventions corresponding to cultural traditions. The universal nature of human rationality is only in evidence when nature, the cosmic reality surrounding us, is concerned; it constitutes the basis of great scientific achievements. It is unfortunate that this mental feature of man was illegitimately transposed from the domain of natural sciences into the multiple spheres of activity which are part of the world of culture and of human intention and interaction.

From this difference, the existence of two kinds of relativism can also be derived: epistemic relativism as far as the natural world is concerned -- untenable from the scientific point of view; and cultural relativism as far as the human world is concerned -- which is a fact. Therefore, one should not endeavor to collapse one relativism into the other or to negate the validity of one in favor of the other. Nevertheless, even rational judgements concerning nature and its processes are, undoubtedly, influenced by culturally motivated worldviews (for example, the unfalsifiable mechanistic concept of the world), and this phenomenon was aggravated in late modernity because, even in science, ideologies and fashions frequently overrule rational arguments.

Ethical principles and everyday morality -- as much as meaningful rationality -- are contextual, that is, related to a person's or a society's ethos, traditions, and cultural practices. Ethics and moral action are the result of reflective judgements, mutual criticism of individuals, and collective reflections in a community bound together by cultural ties. Ethical pluralists, in John Kekes's formulation, admit that

Good lives require the realization of radically different types of values, both moral and nonmoral, and that many of these values are conflicting and cannot be realized together. Living a good life requires the achievement of a *coherent ordering of plural and conflicting values*, but coherent orderings are themselves plural and conflicting (Kekes 1993, 11; italics in original).

²¹ Onora O'Neill, liberal protagonist of universalism as opposed to pluralist ethical views, defends the recourse to abstraction, to emptiness or contentlessness of moral precepts: "Abstraction, taken literally, is a matter of selective omission, of leaving out some predicates from descriptions and theories." Objections to abstractions are, in truth, objections against idealized conceptions of agency: "An idealized account or theory not merely omits certain predicates that are true of the matter to be considered but adds predicates that are false of the matter to be considered... Abstract but nonidealized accounts of agents and their reasoning can apply to agents of diverse *Sittlichkeit*; idealized accounts of agents and their reasoning not merely do not refer to the varying historical and cultural characteristics of particular agents, but apply only to idealized, hypothetical agents whose cognitive and volitional features may be missing in all actual human agents... The expulsion of *Sittlichkeit* from a theory of justice is unavoidable in societies which are not ideologically homogeneous. Yearnings for a more determinate view of citizenship are at best nostalgia; at worst they fuse citizenship with nationality or culture and license forms of racism, hostility, or exclusion." O'Neill, Onora 1988, 711-713.

But even if ethical judgement and everyday morality are bound to be contextual, even if moral conflicts engender unavoidable sufferings, losses and evils, ethical pluralism has undeniable and positive effects: enrichment of human lives through the multiplication of the possible, coherent ethical orderings one can select and adhere to; as well as the extension of existential freedoms through increased mastery of one's biography (ibid., 12-14). Cultural communities having different ethical values can even communicate with each other as Alasdair MacIntyre illustrated: "Each community, using its own criteria of *sameness* and *difference*, recognizes that it is one and the same subject matter about which they are advancing their claim; incommensurability and incompatibility are not incompatible" (MacIntyre 1989, 190). There can be a dialogue, a communication between people living in different cultural configurations as much as within any cultural community or society.

(B) FOUR MAJOR ETHICAL ORIENTATIONS

There are many ethical views and practical moralities in the world's different cultural orbits beside the four fundamental ethical orientations we know in our own culture:

- the Aristotelian ethics of good life;
- utilitarianism in its various forms;
- the ethics of right, agent-related, based on the Kantian universalizable human autonomy; and, finally,
- the ethics of the moral self (following Emmanuel Lévinas, Alfred Schutz and Zygmunt Bauman) which is an ethics oriented towards the responsibility of the person, based on the original face-to-face relationship between humans.

In fact, these varying ethical worldviews always existed simultaneously in the life of Western societies, except that in late modernity, hedonistic utilitarianism and a specific version of justice-oriented deontology became predominant in the wake of liberal-socialist ideologies. In other civilizations (without listing exhaustively all ethical conceptions) we find the ethics of world-renunciation, as in Buddhism; the classical Hindu ethics based on the transmigration of souls; the hedonistic ethics of the Indian *Carvaka*; the earthly ethics of *Tantrism*; the *Confucian* morality inspired by respect of the emperor and of the ancestors, as based on the necessity of social integration; the moral stance derived from mythical or magical religions as in Africa; and, finally, the ethics based on God's law and commandments in monotheistic religions like Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.

The Ethics of Good Life

The ethical reasoning and moral attitude of Western modernity is rooted in our classical and Christian heritage, though on the surface, there are not many traces of the Christian influence in the moral life of individuals and collectivities except in communities of practicing Christians. But even at the time when Christianity had much more influence on the behavior and actions of Western men, the Aristotelian ethics of good life never lost its importance. The Greek philosopher who influenced cognitive developments and ethical thinking during the Middle Ages -- not only in the West but among Muslim intellectuals and literati as well -- founded his ethical views on the combination of perceptual judgements and moral intuitions. In a word, morality had to be guided by intuitive reflexivity based on the conviction that the best a man can achieve in this immanent world is a good life. The Aristotelian good life meant, in my interpretation, the enjoyment of existence with everything it brings, but without resorting to hedonism. It entails acting and living in a way that life's simple pleasures in one's family and in one's community are obtained concomitantly with the fulfilment

of one's duties and obligations toward the same persons. To live a good life means to follow a way of life which encompasses the respect of basic virtues in regard to oneself and to one's community's shared ideals, as well as the respect of moral prohibitions and injunctions concerning specific categories of behavior or action.

It is important, especially in view of the dominant utilitarian trend that Aristotle distinguished between acting (*praxis*) and making (*poiesis*),²² practice being the truly moral form of action, as in it, the thing done is an end in itself and not merely a means to a further end as in making (Cooper 1975, 2). In addition, moral agents are expected to choose their actions themselves constituting an end in themselves because they are good actions. Virtue is a disposition to choose those actions leading to a good life determined over the course of deliberation which takes place either in the inner being of an individual or in public debate. In such deliberations, practical intelligence is manifested, not discursive knowledge, and this intelligence is distinguished from discursive knowledge by the fact that it concerns what is ultimate and what is in accordance with moral reasoning (which, in turn, is distinguished from everyday reasoning). *Eudaimonia*, human good, is a complete whole in this perspective, an entire lifetime devoted to morally virtuous actions, the fulfilment of human capabilities our species is endowed with by nature;²³ this is the proper teleology of good life, as against most single-ended ethics of modernity.

The Aristotelian *phronesis*, a mental capability which always accompanies moral virtues, operates when man reaches a correct judgement.²⁴ Though Aristotle's concept of means to an end is a comprehensive one,²⁵ any kind of maximization scheme is excluded from moral practice because it is not something integrated into the comprehensive whole of principles, virtues, and rules which constitute the basic contexture of moral action. Reflexive moral judgement is especially required when there are conflicts between virtues, obligations or prohibitions -- imperfect alternatives, according to Hampshire. The plurality of all ethical qualities and duties is unavoidable; therefore, good life cannot be reached through the realization of a single moral criterion. The pluralism of virtues, obligations and pleasures, as well as the interplay of individual and communitarian aspirations, is a condition of a good life. It implies a choice between conflicting desires, possibilities, and obligations on criteria constantly kept in mind, and made with a view to actualizing the ultimate good, the preferred way of life.

John Kekes's morality of pluralism, a modern version of Aristotelian ethics, emphasizes the importance of values which contribute to the attainment of good life and are constituents thereof, though Kekes states clearly that it is not their content which is of interest to such a morality, but the relational complex of moral as well as nonmoral values. The latter are important for ethical behavior because they are as much part of realizing a good life as moral valuations. In this sense, good life is not the result of the realization of moral values only, but of nonmoral ones too. Yet Kekes does not make it clear, that if good life is the supreme aim of moral action, why those nonmoral values which are instrumental in obtaining it are not considered as objects of moral valuation? This would resolve the paradox of his argumentation that in case of a concrete conflict between moral and nonmoral values, moral action may consist in preferring the realization of nonmoral values. Related to this paradox of Kekes's moral theory is that he divides moral values into primary

²² *Nicomachean Ethics*, VI 2 1139b1-4 and 1140b1-7.

²³ *Eudemian Ethics*, 1219b5 and 1219a38-39, where Aristotle says that "good life" is "the activity of a complete life in accordance with complete excellence;" see also *Nicomachean Ethics*, I 7 1098a18-20.

²⁴ "It is not possible to be a morally good person, in the strict sense, without practical intelligence, nor practically intelligent without moral virtue." *Nicomachean Ethic*, 1144b31-32. Thus, ends are provided by moral virtue or some sort of intuition, and practical intelligence assures, by calculation, the means needed to realize those ends.

²⁵ "The conception of 'means' to end with which Aristotle works in developing his theory of deliberation is broad enough to include among 'means' not merely things instrumentally related to their ends, but also constituent parts of complex ends and particular actions in which the attainment of some end may be said to consist. Morally virtuous action may then be a 'means' to the ultimate end of flourishing [good life, in Cooper's terminology], not in the sense that it tends to bring it about, as doing favors for the right people makes a government functionary rich, but in the sense that it is one constituent part of the conception of flourishing which constitutes the virtuous person's ultimate end... For the ultimate end is desired for its own sake (indeed it is desired for itself *alone*), and if morally virtuous action is one of the constituent parts of this, it -- along with other parts -- will thereby also be desired for its own sake." Cooper 1975, 81-82; italics in original.

ones that are universally human, culturally invariant and historically constant, that is, context-independent, and secondary ones which are contextually and historically determined (Kekes 1993, 18-19). In fact, the source of the Kekesian paradox, placed in a specific perspectivist framework (*ibid.*, 48), lies (i) in the initial decision that not the content but only the relation of values is of interest for the morality of pluralism; and, (ii) in his assertion of a rational conception of good life, although he recognizes, against the protagonists of ethical monism, that no uniquely reasonable conception exists. "Good lives are plural because they are constituted of the realization of different valued possibilities as well as differently valued possibilities" (*ibid.*, 14).

The plurality of values leads to moral conflicts within individuals, between individuals, or between human communities. In this respect Kekes recognizes that such conflicts are unavoidable because of the intrinsic incompatibility or incommensurability of values -- an argumentation based on the twofold reality that there is no overriding moral value, and that such values cannot be measured, quantified, or compared in a way acceptable to all. Incommensurable values are, of course, not always incompatible and may simultaneously be part of a good life. The resolution of moral conflicts is, for Kekes, possible due to universally shared, context-independent, objective values. In view of these moral conflicts, he insists on the importance of a "rich supply of possibilities" of a good life by a community's tradition, out of which individuals may choose in accordance with their preferences and thus have access to a greater extent of freedom (*ibid.*, 27-28).²⁶

But this plurality should not be thought of as valuable merely on account of making available the largest number of means to the achievement of a common end. Living a good life *is* the end, but it is not a *common* end. For the plurality of value possibilities entails the plurality of good lives in a double sense. Different lives may be made good by the realization of different possibilities, and even if the possibilities are the same in some lives, the value attributed to them may differ from one good life to another. The plurality of possibilities is important for good lives, therefore, not merely because the possibilities are means to good lives but also because they are constituents of them (*ibid.*, 29; italics in original).

Utilitarianism

Utilitarianism is the great ethical invention of modernity though it is only an explicit formulation of a common attitude of all humans, as it reflects a view that most ethical principles and moral practices in the history of civilizations endeavored to restrain. Modernity elevated this common fact of life condemned by pre-modern morality to the dignity of a publicly-approved and respected way of life. Utilitarianism is a single-criterion morality, as justice-oriented deontology is a single-issue ethical conception. Although this single criterion was always formulated, after Bentham, as the requirement of the greatest general happiness for the greatest number of people, it really does not concern the happiness of all -- which is an elusive concept -- but relates to the satisfaction of the purely material interests of each member of a society (maximizing utility). Utilitarianism is nothing else but the promotion of crudely conceived individual and collective interests, as abstractly defined as possible, in order to make the realization of good life in the Aristotelian sense possible.²⁷ If, in theory, the good to be maximized in order to bring about the greatest good for all should be derived from a categorical principle, this would represent an existential impossibility; moral choices are not made behind a veil of ignorance.

Utilitarianism thus reduces the interplay between modalities of the actual and the potential to a single choice and to a single result, annihilating the intentional, cognitive and emotional human diversity and

²⁶ In this manner, Kekes saves the ideal of moral progress: "Just as pluralists can make sense of the notion of moral progress on the level of tradition, so they can also do so on the level of individuals. In both cases, the progress is toward an ideal, but the ideal is not a specific value, not even a combination of specific values. The ideal is a form of life in which the widest possible range of specific values may be pursued." Kekes 1993, 36.

²⁷ "We would be unable to commit ourselves to particularistic projects," in the view of Charles Larmore, "involving substantial ideals of the good life, if we believed that we should always do whatever is best overall for all concerned." Larmore 1987, 141.

ignoring any differentiation between desires, goods, pains and sufferings. For utilitarianism there are no cultural or historical differences, no varying contexts and environments, only empty and abstract formulas destined to be acceptable for all beings who are rational. It is clear that utilitarianism is very closely linked to purposive-instrumental rationality, which is incapable of determining ends or contributing to moral choices; consequently, utilitarianism designates the simple end which should be pursued by all rational men: their own particular interests.

The Ethics of Right

The ethics of right tradition, or the Rawlsian ethics of fairness, was born out of the main ethical principles of modernity: equality and equity. It was first expressed by Kant, who claimed that the concepts of good and evil must be deduced from the moral law which precedes them.²⁸ The moral law exists in the universal human conscience as an empirically unconditioned insight, totally independent of contextuality, but articulated by practical human reason. In Kant's perspective, this legislative power of the universal human reason, unfettered by any kind of worldly attachment and temptation was, at the same time, the foundation of genuine moral freedom. This Kantian ethics of right was sharply criticized by his contemporary, Hermann Andreas Pistorius, who rightly pointed out that first, the principle of right, the moral law, must be proven to be good.²⁹ Larmore's formulation of the inherent paradox of this ethical thinking is revelatory:

Conceiving of this polarity as thus a social institution implies that in one sense our interest in morality is empirically conditioned: we develop it only through our experience in society. But in another sense, which is the one essential to the priority of the right over the good, this interest remains empirically unconditioned. It is an *intrinsic* interest in morality... an interest in what we ought to do, regardless of what we may want... What we morally ought to do is not explained in terms of an interest we all have or could have, and so in terms of an attractive notion of the good, since we can describe the interest in question only as an interest of what we ought to do. The notion of right remains supreme (Larmore 1995, 33-34; italics in original),

even if historically contingent because rooted "in one or several traditions of moral thought." In this manner, the content of the moral law remains universal, but its justification contextual (ibid., 56-57). For someone who is not ideologically committed to the egalitarian and universalist ethics of right, this conceptualization of the moral law is clearly unintelligible, though it had fateful consequences.³⁰

Thus, by transforming the Kantian categorical imperative into a social institution, law replaces morals. Max Weber saw very well that as a result of the grandiose movement of rationalization, legal and rational will have to become quasi-synonymous. Legality also meant legitimation, or the application of procedural correctness (due process) by an impersonal authority. In addition, as laws were promulgated by authorities composed of fellow beings and not by transcendental sources or traditional institutions felt to be above contemporary society, the enactment and revision of laws, once the required procedures were respected, became not only possible, but frequently practiced.

²⁸ Kant, Immanuel. *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. Werke*. Berlin: Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1900-1942, 5: 62-63.

²⁹ Pistorius, H.A. "Rezension der Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten," in Bittner, Rudiger and Cramer, Konrad. eds. *Materialen zu Kants Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*. Frankfurt: Suhrkap, 1975, 144-160; quoted in Larmore 1995, 26-28.

³⁰ My views are concordant with those expressed by John Dewey a half a century ago: "We believe -- to judge by our legislative actions -- that we can create morals by law... and neglect the fact that all laws except those which regulate technical procedures are registrations of existing social customs and their attendant moral habits and purposes. I can, however, only think of this phenomenon as a symptom, not as a cause. It is a natural expression of a period in which changes in the structure of society have dissolved old bonds and allegiances. We attempt to make good this social relaxation and dissolution by social enactments, while the actual disintegration discloses itself in the lawlessness which reveals the artificial character of this method of securing social security." Dewey 1994, 66-67.

In the same vein as Weber, Habermas -- who prefers to use the expression positivization of the law based on the rationalization of social processes acquiring, consequently, universal validity (Habermas 1993, 93-97) -- considers that modern jurisdiction fills in the functional voids of the social order, intending to enlarge the possibilities of human freedom (ibid., 61 and 64). Nevertheless, he qualifies the increased societal role of law as an anonymously dominating system, to which he opposes the association intentionally and continuously created by legal partners whose cooperation is made possible by the fact that they are members of a speech community and thus can mutually communicate about applicable norms. In Habermas's perspective, law is thus the link between various sub-spheres of society and, especially, between society and lifeworld (*Lebenswelt*), and ensures the legitimation of the existing social order.

The space left open to individual action by laws is larger than the space left free by morality, wrote Bloch (1986, 230). Conversely, the space regulated by juridical duties is more restricted than the space governed by ethical rules. As a consequence,

Social contract loses the characteristic of being a natural occurrence; it becomes instead a regulative idea... The attempt is made to posit determinations of the content according to the purely formal principle of noncontradiction... The logical principle of noncontradiction, which makes a criterion of practical reason under the names of *universality* and *necessity*, unifies the philosophy of right and ethics, but it does so at a price: both become indifferent with respect to any content and therefore -- and this is the same thing -- both can tolerate any content (ibid., 67-68; italics in original).

The separation of the legal from the moral led to a situation in which the former can be instituted and imposed solely from outside (by the courts and the state's coercive power), whereas moral duties cannot be externally imposed and cannot be prohibited by external powers, as they are inscribed in the individual and collective conscience. It is in this respect that Habermas, with reference to Parsons, seriously errs when he posits that modern law is simultaneously capable of stabilizing the relationships between structurally differentiated and functional sub-systems of the *Lebenswelt* comprising a complex society, and ensuring, at the same time, the continuous, legitimate validity of inherited, profound links of solidarity in civil society which were, through the rationalization process, transformed into totally abstract relationships (Habermas 1992, 101-102).

In respect to justice, it is useful to distinguish between commutative and distributive justice. The first concerns the equal application of society's rules to all members of that society. Distributive justice concerns the fair distribution of society's wealth among its members, keeping in view the end result of all economic activities, as well as the equal access of the members of society to all cultural, political and economic opportunities and benefits (status, education, leisure, etc). The latter aim can be summarized as the maximization of welfare of the least advantaged in society, to be reached by proper procedural fairness and equity, or, in a more restrictive, Nozickian version, by way of legitimate entitlements which alone justify the state's distributive function. As Habermas noted, law in the welfare state became "instrumentalized for the purposes of the political legislator" (ibid., 554). Positive law and legal procedures do respond less and less to the feelings of insecurity in society; law cannot replace the ethical principles and moral freedom of the autonomous self.

What is most striking in both utilitarianism and the ethics of right is that one of the basic theses of the modern worldview, the requirement of pluralism, was lost somewhere. This happened because, instead of the pursuit of the Aristotelian good life, each version of liberal ethics determines an overriding "good" which entirely dominates its moral perspective (Kekes 1993, 202) and thus the plurality of values is obviously forgotten. For utilitarianism, it is each person's material interest, and for the ethics of right, the realization of justice evidently has a definite priority over the plurality of good lives. For this reason, the ethics of right ignores the variety of substantive values underlying diverse conceptions of the good life and promotes procedures which are expected to ensure that everybody's right to a commonly defined conception of the just is respected and realized in society's practice. Such a deliberate ignorance of the pluralistic character of human endeavors determined by concrete environmental, historical, and social circumstances, as well as a lifelong cultural conditioning, led to the complete failure of such procedural remedies. The modern moral attitude is, therefore, a radically egalitarian ideology without proper moral considerations as a foundation.

This development in modernity led to two grave anomalies. The first consists in the fact that *egalitarianism and pluralism are mutually exclusive* because equality, as the overriding value governing individual and

collective behavior requires, consequently, uniformity of values. In contrast, pluralism, reflecting a plurality of values all leading to a good life, requires diversity.

The argumentation of Sir Isaiah Berlin, who links equality to rule-following ("All rules, by definition, entail a measure of equality" (Berlin 1978, 84]) makes it easy to understand why modern egalitarianism gradually turned more and more to the state. The state, as the highest authority in human societies, has the capacity to issue appropriate rules in order to ensure egalitarian treatment of all and, especially, to put into practice an egalitarian distributive justice (or justice of fairness). This road logically led, in the end, to the creation of the welfare state. Sir Isaiah formulates clearly the fundamental contradiction between egalitarianism and pluralism:

In its simplest form the ideal of complete social equality embodies the wish that everything and everybody should be as similar as possible to everything and everybody else... In the ideal egalitarian society, inequality -- and this must ultimately mean dissimilarity -- would be reduced to a minimum... [though] the unequal distribution of natural gifts is a well-known obstacle to economic equality... Only in a society where the greatest degree of similarity between the members occurs -- where physical characteristics, mental endowment, emotional disposition, and conduct are as uniform as possible -- where people differ as little as possible from each other in any respect whatever, will true equality be attainable (ibid., 90-92).

Such an ideology reflects the overwhelming influence of the scientific, deductive methodology. If all empirically assertable versions of a good life are supposed to be compatible, then all true corresponding descriptions -- which must, by hypothesis, be consistent -- mutually entail each other (ibid., 95-96). As a consequence of this scientific argumentation, equality, or the obliteration of differences, is a natural requirement, while pluralism -- the respect for diversity and differentiation -- is against the nature of empirical reality.

The second anomaly, in itself paradoxical because it contradicts the egalitarian aspiration of modern society, transforms pluralism into an ethos of pluralization and an endless process of dissolved and reconstituted -- because always voluntaristically constructed -- identities and differences. In William Connolly's formula, the endless process of pluralization of collective relational identities and differences and the consecutive incessant transgression of all sorts of boundaries, necessitates a critical responsiveness to any new ideologies opening up new cultural spaces. The designation stands for self-criticism of existing differentiated life-conceptions, and the designation responsiveness stands for the acceptance of the ever renewed and self-authorized identities and differences (Connolly 1995, xvi). Both are based on a supposed but not proven unreality of shared beliefs, principles, and values (as all these existential elements are always self-constructed). The ethos of pluralization, for Connolly, even deconstructs and disempowers universal human rights as their "sufficient moral condition sets up a barrier to new pluralizing drive" (ibid., 185). Such a view, therefore, is not pluralism, but a totally unethical conception of human existence without values or norms.

The Ethics of the Moral Self and Moral Freedom

The essence of this ethics is first, the expression of autonomous individual and collective identities -- which can be distinguished from each other only with some difficulty,³¹ and, second, a pluralistic ethics because it recognizes that moral choices and judgements as well as their consequences are never, and can never be, unambiguous. The uncertainty of moral choices and judgements is not a consequence of the

³¹ Says Charles Larmore: "Our deepest moral commitments -- that we ought to abide by the strictest deontological requirements and that we ought to bring about the greatest urgent good overall -- are commitments whose meaning for us (whatever their origin) is that we *come* with them *to* the world, and not that we *infer* them *from* the world. That is, their role is not even that of (scientific) 'background knowledge,' something we once learned, which guides our inquiries now, but which in principle remains subject to revision or rejection. Instead, these commitments are what make us moral agents at all." Larmore 1987, 149-150; italics in original.

pluralism of everyone's path toward a good life. Moral ambiguity is an inherent feature of human existence, except for those confessing rationalistic-universalistic ideals. The ethical conception of the moral self is based on the individual's intention to find an expression of his moral convictions in his moral freedom and, therefore, on his fully assumed responsibility for his acts and attitudes.³² In the moral self, the individual's own intentionality and freedom are entirely intertwined with the heritage and moral traditions of his community. The identity of the one reflects the identity of the other: this is the basis of the relationship characterized by Zygmunt Bauman as "being *for* the Other before one can be *with* the Other" (Bauman 1993, 13; italics in original). The moral self is grounded in the ontological/cosmic framework and, in consequence, transcends immanent existence. It is not something that remains inexplicable and autonomous because postulated as such, nor something that follows a heteronimic guidance, should it be that of the state, of society, of reason, nor something located in the affective part of the ego. The ethics of the moral self is situated in the whole of the personality concerned.

In the course of history, no universalizable, rational rules or legal instruments enforced by the collectivity or by the society could ever induce men to do what they are able to do if they have the inner conviction and moral force to guide them. Such acts occurred, not infrequently, in the concentration camps of Nazi Germany or Stalin's Russia. The temporalizing tactics of modernity, called belief in progress, cannot continuously deny the imperative of the moral self or the hierarchical pluralism of diverse ways toward a good life. Emphatically, the ethics of the moral self is not an individualistic ethic, a rationalistic-utilitarian ethic based on self-interest, or an ethic obeying fashionable ideological convictions or laws, ignoring contextuality under the guise of the veil of ignorance, especially in respect of fairness in a society. Moral responsibility cannot be replaced by state-imposed legal rules and regulations derived from collective regulations; it can only be reflected in individuals' attitudes reflecting the community's values. Moral freedom, the only fundamental freedom, cannot be generated by legal manoeuvres and ideological manipulations; it is a fruit of a person's (as I designate MacIntyre's situated self) identity in which he is imperceptibly but surely sharing in the identity of his community.

The moral self of the individual, immersed in the ethical values and orientations of his community, is not based on a reciprocity with the Other, with his fellow-man. It is the greatest contribution of Emmanuel Lévinas to our contemporary ethical thinking that he indefatigably emphasized this fundamental aspect of the moral self. The relationship between one's self and another self is not a mathematically calculable, opportunistically exploitable connection -- as the utilitarians and some other modern ethicists wish -- but a unique relationship in which the I assumes more responsibility for others than he expects from them (Lévinas 1985, 99). There is no reciprocity here, because the standard applied is unique as it is the standard dictated by inner convictions in respect to behavior towards the Other. The responsibility for others is not a shared principle based on the negation of moral proximity (a word preferable to intimacy), that is, based on impersonal rationality (Bauman 1993, 59-60), but is the consequence of the most direct relationship between one and another. It is concrete and real. Moral freedom does not mean that one creates the other -- like giving him a name or lending a meaning to his existence; such an idea would be a "de-meaning" of the other. The "being-for" of freedom is participation in the other's existence through responsibility for him. Freedom is not a freedom without or against the others, it is a freedom in which those others participate, of which they are part, otherwise it could not be a real moral freedom. It is important to recognize that, as Schelling said, human freedom is "a capacity for *good and evil*" (quoted in Dallmayr 1984, 125; italics in original), and therefore, our moral freedom "fatefully does include not only the capacity of doing evil; it implies that evil cannot be eradicated" (Kolakowski 1990, 46).

Recent events give ample evidence of the reality of evil, that men are capable of the worst. The principal sign of the inner moral freedom being in great danger is that in late modernity, ethical attitudes and actions appear liberated from the constraint of death. Death-awareness is a guarantor of moral freedom because it represents the inexorable limit of this worldly existence, and because it is the indication of some sort of existential continuum for those who believe in it. Nevertheless, death-awareness is artificially and with all possible means erased from the conscience of today's man: "Death as such is inevitable; but each concrete instance of death is contingent. Death is omnipotent and invincible; but none of the specific cases of death

³² Sophocles's Antigone knew that she is transgressing human law in obeying unwritten and unchangeable laws inscribed in her soul, which, as she put it, "live always and forever, and no man knows from where they have risen." Sophocles. *Antigone*. Trans. G. Young. ii. 452-460.

is" (Bauman 1992, 5).³³ However, there cannot be real human freedom without death-awareness, as it is the latter which gives depth, strength, and perspective to man's inner freedom. Death is real; man's being and his body are definitely separated. The transference of death into the imaginary sphere of life deprived man, for Baudrillard, of his reality, of his concrete quality and, we can add, of the possibility of real freedom. Such an artificial disjunction became a flight from the real into the imaginary and transposed the fundamental disjunction of life and death, of freedom and unfreedom, onto the plane of fiction. This innovation of modernity abolishes the continuum between two phases of human existence:

The irreversibility of biological death, its objective and punctual character, is a modern fact of science. It is specific to our culture. Every other culture says that death begins before death, that life goes on after life, and that it is impossible to distinguish life from death. Against the representation which sees in one the *term* of the other, we must try to see the radical *indeterminacy* of life and death, and the impossibility of their autonomy in the symbolic order... But our modern idea of death is controlled by a very different system of representations: that of the machine and the function. A machine either works or it does not. Thus the biological machine is either dead or alive. The symbolic order is ignorant of this digital abstraction... [In it] neither life nor death can any longer be assigned a given *end*: there is therefore no punctuality nor any possible *definition* of death (Baudrillard 1993, 158-159; italics in original).³⁴

Death thus acquires meaning through exchange and socialization in a particular community, due to the shared ontological/cosmic framework of a human group in which it occurs. In fact, violent death (which is, for Baudrillard, the real transmutation, because due to the will of a group) and suicide prove that death and freedom are closely interconnected, as both are consequences of a free individual or of a collective choice, that is, of human freedom. In these cases, the linkage between freedom and death is especially underscored. The transformation of the death concept in modernity and the artificial erasing of death-awareness from human consciences leads directly to the problem of the present environmental crisis which is, first and foremost, a crisis related to our ethical principles and to our practical, therefore moral, behavior.

4. Ethical Conflicts: Is Globalization Possible?

The ethical domain may reveal as many conflicts between Western and non-Western civilizations as the striking differences between their ontological/cosmic core are numerous, especially the contradiction between secular and religious cultural worlds.³⁵ Non-Western ethical approaches can be divided into three different categories: first, the ethics of world renunciation, of which the mainstream theistic, Hindu ethical teachings and the non-theistic Jainist and Buddhist moralities are representatives; second, the social ethics

³³ "There is an irreversible revolution from savage societies to our own," writes Baudrillard, "little by little, *the dead ceased to exist*... Strictly speaking, we no longer know what to do with them, since, today, *it is not normal to be dead*, and this is new. To be dead is an unthinkable anomaly; nothing else is as offensive as this. Death is a delinquency, an incurable deviancy... Death is ultimately nothing more than the social line of demarcation separating the 'dead' from the 'living'; therefore, it affects both equally." Baudrillard 1993, 126-127; italics in original.

³⁴ "Only in the infinitesimal space of the individual conscious subject does death take on an irreversible meaning. Even here, death is not an event, but a myth experienced as anticipation. The subject needs a myth of its end, of its origin, to form its identity... In biological death, death and the body neutralize instead of stimulating each other. The mind-body's duality is biology's *fundamental* presupposition." *ibid.* 159-160.

³⁵ Bankimchandra Chatterji, one of the great Hindu thinkers of the nineteenth century, declared: "With other peoples, religion is only a part of life; there are things religious and things lay and secular. To the Hindu, his whole life was religion... To the Hindu, his relations to God and his relations to man, his spiritual life and his temporal life, are incapable of being so distinguished. They form one compact and harmonious whole, to separate which into component parts is to break the entire fabric. All life to him was religion and religion never received a name from him, because it never had for him an existence apart from all that had received a name." Quoted in Chaudhuri. N.C., 1979, *Hinduism: A Religion To Live By*. London: Chatto & Windus, 11-12.

of *Confucianism* without any transcendental harboring, and the non-theistic, metaphysically anchored *Taoism* which, however, did not stress world renunciation; and, third, the Islamic ethics based on the doctrine revealed in the *Quran*.

(A) THE ETHICS OF WORLD RENUNCIATION

The theistic ethics of world renunciation in *Hinduism* was already contained in the oldest *Vedas*, in the form of a dualism of the pure consciousness and of the natural, material being, emphasizing a radical discontinuity between reality and worldly experience, in spite of their holism as expressed in the unity of the universal Self and the individual soul. Thus, in the *Vedic* tradition an ethical concept, reminiscent of the ethics of the moral self in our own culture, was explicitly defended. Later developments reflected the importance of the *dharma*, which was, simultaneously, the expression of the divine will and the inner law implanted in each person, the respect of which guaranteed the morally good behavior of the individual.³⁶ This led to the formulation of the four-stage depiction of a worthy life (*ashram*) and, especially, to the belief in the renunciation of worldly pleasures within *karma*, which secures for the individual the real freedom (*moksa*):

What is to be abstained from is the tendency to indulge in the gratification of all our sensuous desires and what is to be renounced is the disposition to hanker after the fruit of actions performed, but what is necessary is the performance of actions in strict conformity with the dictates of our dharma... Karma is a potent source of bondage when undertaken with an eye to its fruit, but it becomes a potent source of freedom and peace when undertaken as part of the necessity of our spiritual being (Singh 1987, 86).

The *Bhagavadgita*, in comparison to the *Upanishads*, made more rigid the doctrine of the *karma* based on the absolute obligation to follow one's own *dharma*, and with this promoted the crystallization of different spheres of activity, giving way to the elaboration of the caste-system.³⁷ Later Hindu ethical thought was increasingly dominated by the self's autonomy, for example, as in *Shankara's* doctrine.

In contrast to this, though still respecting the *Brahmanic* foundations, an ethic of world-affirmation came to the fore in modern, popular Hinduism, the recently evolved *Tantrist* ethics. Although it is adhering to the authority of the *Vedas*, *Tantrism* absorbed a great deal of the life, ritual, and thought in popular Hinduism, that is, it shifted the accent to the positive side of the earthly life. Immanent existence, *maya*, being a continuous manifestation of divine activities, has to be understood in its specifics, penetrated by enlightenment and celebrated in all its aspects.³⁸ The *Tantric* moral attitude approaches, to a certain extent, some trends in modern ethics in that it overcomes all social and biological differences in the fivefold ritual expressing the spiritual transcendence of the dualistic character of the phenomenal world: "The world is affirmed, just as it is -- neither renounced, as by an ascetic, nor corrected, as by a reformer" (Zimmer 1974a, 573).

Of the non-theistic world renunciation ethics, *Jainism* also shows some resemblances to the ethics of the moral self in Western culture, as it affirms that moral autonomy is founded on the soul's inner principles; all heteronomy, or determination by others, represents moral evil. The external forces, the *samsara*, therefore jeopardize the soul's integrity, which through renunciation, though the cleansing from the phenomenal

³⁶ Prabhakara asserted that "an action to be characterized as truly moral must be so willed that the content and authority of its choices are derived from no other source than *dharma* itself." Singh 1987, 118-119.

³⁷ Singh refers to Chapter 3: 4, 6, 8, of the *Bhagavadgita*. *ibid.* 85-86. There are a series of texts referring to renunciation of, or detachment from, the world in: Radhakrishnan and Moore. eds. 1957, 110, 113-114, 120, 157-158.

³⁸ The four aspects of *maya*, unified in one overall existential experience, are: "*Artha* (prosperity), *kama* (the fulfillment of sexual desires), *dharma* (the enactment of the religious and moral rituals of everyday life, with an acceptance of the burden of all the duties), and *moksa* (release from it all)." Zimmer 1974a, 571.

world's impurities, as well as through spiritual learning (ignorance being the cause of non-abandonment of the world) has to escape from these external menaces into freedom.

In *Buddhism*, the *par excellence* non-theistic religion of morality and ethics of world renunciation, an ethics of autonomous development of the self is affirmed. However, this definition has to be qualified. Though the Hindu concepts of *dharma* and *karma* were retained, the entire moral perspective was changed by Buddha's teaching that only qualities or particulars -- not the underlying essences or substances -- are real. In consequence, the Buddhist *dharma* is without a self and the Buddhist *karma* without an agent. The belief in *anatta* (no-self, no-soul, no true substance) and in *anicca* (the impermanence of the phenomenal world) are considered the core of Buddhist ethical teaching. Man houses his *dharma*, the content of his awareness, which is manifested in his actions and his whole life; thus, it is the *dharma* which can be liberated from this transient and unsubstantial world. Human existence is nothing but living from moment to moment, and changing, though rapidly and infinitesimally, with the fleeting time in the waning, illusionistic environment surrounding us. This view gives to the present moment a great importance as it is only in this moment that the *karmic* process can be redirected or, ultimately, escaped, because *karma* registered all past events, thoughts, and words, but every new moment brings with it new possibilities of existence and new opportunities for freedom. Buddhism's world picture, built on the iron determination of causality of the physical and the psychological, represents, then, for each man the *Dhamma*, the true perspective or the true path. The *Dhamma* leads to the *nirvana*, the end of this mechanistic world of the not-self, the non-*dharma*, the liberation from the bondage of suffering and impermanence. The universe being an impersonal, meaningless construct, there are no ultimate moral rules, only patterned processes and flux. The only indicator of the true Path, the *Dhamma*, is the body of Five Precepts or Five Principles; their acceptance assures that the *nirvana*, the supreme good, the consummation of the *anatta*, is approaching.

The Buddhist idea of the good life is the perfect balance between the mind and the body. Thus, all bodily ills spring from mental, and consequently moral, impurity, as it is the spiritual *dharma* which gives life to the body. Buddhism affirms that man possess free will, and existence is an opportunity to exercise it in accordance with the *Dhamma*. Hence the importance of mental training through meditation; this may erase the moral evil -- ignorance and delusion. Delusion is nothing but the belief in the existence of a permanent self, or in the individuality of each human being, as well as the lust for existence of each individual. The purity of mind with which man is endowed makes it possible to reorient him toward the true path. However, in the course of later developments of Buddhist teaching, the mechanized and deterministic interpretation of reality led to the recognition of the existence of individual merit and of its accumulation by those *Boṭṭhisattvas* who are able to share their merits with other, less saintly, persons. This, of course, meant a deviation from the original teaching of Buddha and from the principle of the eternal *karma*.

(B) THE ETHICS OF SOCIAL LIFE

The most remarkable social ethics among different civilizations is the Confucian ethics. It is without transcendental harboring, as it is completely focused on the harmonious functioning of the society of men, on the immanence of human life. This aspect is particularly emphasized by the five fundamental concepts laid down by *Confucius*: the rectification of names, the Mean, the Way, Heaven and *jen* (humanity). The first is important, as through the establishment of the correct reference of words and action, of names and actualities, it contributed to the proper organization of the social whole. The Mean, a cardinal idea in the Confucian ethical system, referred to the necessity of moderation as a central force in human life, ensuring its equilibrium. The Heaven does not stand for an antropomorphic God-figure as in the old Chinese religions, but for an ideal supreme being, reigning over the world through the moral law it edicted, a law which operates autonomously in the world. The Way, *Tao*, is the path in which human beings should advance and civilization should develop; it is identical with the moral law. Finally, the *jen* designates in the *Analects* (as against its former meaning of kindness or benevolence) human perfectability. A man of *jen* is the perfect or superior man, the true *chün-tzu*, who "wishing to establish his own character, he also establishes the character of others, and wishing to be prominent himself, he also helps others to be prominent" (*Analects*, 6:28). Denoting the harmonious relationship of self and society, *jen* is expressed as conscientiousness and altruism -- they stand for the Mean, or the golden rule. The source of *jen* is uprightness or *chih*, which means observance of rules inscribed in the self, or moral autonomy; these rules are those which indicate what is

appropriate to do (*li*)³⁹ in different situations. These rules of propriety are expected to be universal. It shows the consistency of fundamental features of human existence and the similarity of the problems which arise in human communities all over the world. We find the modern principle of universalizability in *Confucius's* thinking as well: "Do not do to others what you do not like yourself" (Analects, 15:23).

The *Tao* is a non-theistic, metaphysically elaborated ethics, promoting a mystically conceived and transcendently conditioned moral conduct. It is, in a way, the antithesis of the *Confucian* social ethics, though accepting prevailing conditions of life in society as unavoidable. *Tao* originally meant the way or the road, and assumed, in China, a metaphorical significance designating the way of man, the way of truthful conduct, of human morality. It became with *Lao-tzu* a metaphysical concept, the all-embracing first principle in which originated all beings, the universal Being. Its holistic nature is well described in the *Han-fei-tzu* (Chapter 20):

Tao is that whereby all things are so, and with which all principles agree. Principles (*li*) are the markings (*wen*) of completed things. *Tao* is that whereby all things become complete. Therefore it is said that *Tao* is what gives principles. When things have their principles, the one (thing) cannot be the other... All things have each their own different principles, whereas *Tao* brings the principles of all things into single agreement. Therefore it can be both one thing and another, and is not in one thing only (Fung Yu-lan 1983, 1: 177).

The concept of *Tao* is completed by that of *Te*, meaning the power or efficiency inherent in a thing, sometimes also taken to signify virtue. The domain of *Tao* and *Te* is the world of Invariables, and human morality is the reliance on the knowledge of these Invariables, the Taoist enlightenment. Such an ethical view, such a moral conduct avoids all partial opinions, all worldly advices, but endures submission to fate. Ethical life is simplicity, modesty, frugality, and selflessness. For Taoists, only the spiritual or intellectual consequences of life-experience are of interest, because their aim is the mystical apprehension of truth, of the ultimate reality in *Tao*, manifested in the dialectic of binary realities -- *ying* and *yang*.

(C) THE MONOTHEISTIC ETHICS OF ISLAM

In the felicitous words of Bassam Tibi: "Unlike Christianity, Islam is not an ecclesiastical, but organic religious system; it offers regulations for all spheres of life as a religious whole" (Tibi 1990, 41). In this sense, Islamic ethics, like Judaism, is a legalistic ethic, though not comparable to the reigning ethics of rights and justice in the West. In consequence, Islamic law (*Sharia*), as revealed in the *Quran* and the *Hadith*, is the full expression of holistic ethical teachings, though administrative measures (*siyasa*) taken by the heads of the Islamic community (*ummah*) became recognized as equivalent with the ethical/legal doctrines of the Prophet. In addition, especially in view of the unchanging nature of these doctrines, there were legal means to circumvent established legal norms. Finally, a distinction was admitted in medieval times between legally enforceable norms and morally desirable or permissible rules adjudicated by individual moral consciences.⁴⁰

³⁹ Antonio Cua gives an interesting, and from this perspective, very important, explication of the concept of *li*: "Fundamentally, *li* are the prescriptions of reason. Any rule that is deemed right and reasonable can be accepted as an exemplary rule of conduct. 'The *li* are the embodied expression of what is right (*yi*). If an observance stands the test of being judged by the standard of what is right, although it may not have been among the usages of ancient kings, it may be adopted on the ground of its being right'... More generally one must use *yi* to cope with changing circumstances... But in dealing with customary practices of other communities, one's sense of appropriateness must determine proper conduct... Most importantly, in any situation which he deems exigent, whether within or outside his community, the *li* have to be declared irrelevant, while they may be 'absolute' as a first consideration in moral reflection. An exigent situation calls for immediate attention. The issue here has nothing to do with building an exception to the rule. The rule retains its absolute character, but judged as irrelevant to the exigent situation... The primary function of *li* is to prevent human conflict." Cua, Antonio S. "The Concept of Li in Confucian Moral Theory," in Allinson. ed. 1989, 212-214.

⁴⁰ "In theory, of course, the Shari'a has always been a totalitarian and comprehensive code of conduct covering every aspect of human life and regulating the individual's relations with God, with the state, with his neighbor, and with his own

In view of the divergences between different cultures in respect of people's ethos, cultural practices and, especially, ethical principles and moral attitudes -- is it possible to imagine the process of globalization as anything but the extension of Western culture to other parts of the world? Can globalization as the particularization of universals and universalization of particulars lead to a unified world-ethos, with shared ontological/cosmic worldviews, common symbols, myths, artistic expression, or language, and to worldwide cultural practices, ethics and morals, in particular garbs but with universal content or in universal forms containing particular convictions and their expressions? It seems to me that to believe in globalization must reflect, from the ethical point of view, an extraordinary optimism.

conscience on the same single basis of the dictates of the divine command. Thus, any human activity, any social institution in Islam has in the final analysis a religious significance... But by the time the Shari'a has achieved its maturity of expression in the medieval legal manuals there had emerged, in practice, a broad division between the religious duties that the individual owed to God and the social duties that he owed to his fellow men. Moreover, within the field of social relations there was an accepted distinction between standards that were legally enforceable through the courts and standards that were morally desirable though their observance was a matter left to the individual conscience." Coulson 1969, 81-82.

CHAPTER FOUR

INDIVIDUALITY, PERSON, AND COMMUNITY

If one wanted to characterize the modern age with one simple statement, the best way would be to say that it is dominated, to a hitherto unknown extent in human history, by *the reign of the individual*. The merits of individualism include an unprecedented enrichment of individual human existence in regard to particular identities, intentions, and creativeness; yet one must also take into account the equally unprecedented damage and destruction caused by the overwhelming domination of the ideology of individualism in human societies. This may sound like a heresy in our times, because the individual's role and value are so highly appreciated, all social institutions are subject to his pre-eminence. For example, democracy is based on the aggregate of individual wills, imagined by Rousseau, or all productive activities are geared to the individuals' preferences or priority orderings -- or, at least, appear to be so.

However, individual and community are together the bearers of a culture's religious or scientific core, of shared worldviews, ethos, cultural practices, and ethical principles. The relationship between community and individual is, therefore, the third great domain of resistance and conflict in the encounters of Western civilization and of non-Western cultures. This chapter will attempt to address three central aspects of the individual-community relationship:

First, the changing relationship between individual and community in late modernity, which is one of the main aspects of worldwide globalization;

Second, the link between individual and community constituted by traditions as the temporal framework overarching the life of successive generations; and

Third, the fundamental modifications which led to an essential change in the character of their membership.

1. Differentiation Between Individuals and Persons

(A) THE CONCEPTUAL DIFFERENCE

The role of the individual became overwhelming at the dawn of the modern era. This implied a complete change in the concept of the individual being. Originally, the designation individual meant, and means even today in its natural perception: a creature in the biological sense with its proper spatial and temporal delimitations; an entity with its own life functions and corresponding physical needs; and a particular being with its mental capabilities produced by the evolutionary development of the species, and accompanied by the need to satisfy spiritual, cultural and emotional requirements.

This conception of the individual was entirely transformed by the modern tendency of individualism,¹ which entails that the above described human being obeys only its proper will, its proper inclinations and passions.² All entities or institutions believed to be above this individual, incorporating it into a more comprehensive whole and guiding it through the accumulated spatial and temporal experiences of past generations, had to be devalued in order to safeguard his rights and his autonomy. His existence and achievements represent the culmination of the species' development. Only an individual is real, only an individual can be rational.

Steven Lukes defined the core values of individualism as the respect for human dignity or for human beings, autonomy (or independence in directing one's existence), privacy, and self-development. These core values of individualism are linked to the two great ideals of modernity: the first to the ideal of equality, and the other three to the ideal of freedom (Lukes 1977, 150-153). He also ties these core values to other cognitive doctrines, traditionally related to individualism and, to what is important for our argumentation, epistemological individualism³ which refers to a disembodied, abstract individual endowed with theoretically attributed interests, wants, purposes, and needs. But such an individual is an absolutely lonely being, without any existential contact, without any organic relationship to any other individual, because definitely separated from everybody else by its own autonomy, by the unsurpassable limits of its own ego, by its own irremediable solitude.

In contemporary language, the formula, the ontology of abstract individualism, characterizes well the individualistic ideology, or, couched in Marxist terms, the modern individual is a continuous process of accumulation of self because individuality is the product of a person's choices and action. Perhaps the best expression of modern individualism was given by the great artist Braque, who, in defining his existence as a perpetual revelation, pointed out in almost Bergsonian terms: "I have made a great discovery. I no longer believe in anything. Objects don't exist for me except insofar as a rapport exists between them and myself."⁴ He recapitulated the idea that modernity perceives only the present; all historical perspective, all fundamental relation with the Other is ignored because individual existence is a Foucaultian creation of ourselves in our autonomy. The searching for autonomy is of the essence of modern individualism; man is not looking to the cosmos or to his community for orientation but tries to discern his own particular purpose in life. In conditions of mass society, an affirmation of the individual's freedom and autonomy became a burning urge to conquer an originality through a cult of oneself. Culture and society became entities derivative of and constituted by the activities of individuals and their relations to each other, as far as these relations are motivated and justified by their self-interests. The ontological primacy of the individual is maintained in all circumstances.

¹ I find John Dunn's differentiation between individual and individualism to the point: "To be individual, then, is to be distinctive; and to be an individual is simply the common human fate. But to be an individualist is to embrace this fate with a suspicious alacrity, to make a vice out of necessity. Being individual -- in aspiration at least -- is simply doing one's own thing, a private concern or a consensual pleasure. But being an individualist is well on the way towards disregarding the interests of others or denying the presence of any basic affective commitment of one human being towards another. Being individual is an almost a purely aesthetic category and on the whole an affirmative one. Being an individualist is plainly a moral category and veering strongly towards a negative one." Dunn 1993, 34-35.

² This description of the individual covers also what one calls his self-reflexivity, a subject I am not dealing with here because being self-reflexive is a condition of existence without which the human species could not have survived.

³ A good description of this epistemological individualism is given by Niklas Luhmann: "An essential requirement for this process of the intersubjective constitution of a meaningful world of objects is the *nonidentity of the experiencing subjects*. Only this makes possible the separation of the subject living inextricably within his experience from the contents of his experience; his objects are also those of the other subjects and thus have their autonomy in what makes them accessible for all -- in their meaning. This leads to a repair of the perspective-given distortion of the world and this in turn to a reflexive consciousness of one's own perspective as only one among many that are possible. As such, it can then be consciously chosen from among those that other coexperiencing subjects hold ready in their experience. The other subjects involved here relieve the individual's actual consciousness of having to make possible, alone and solely on the basis of the contents immediately given to it at any time, of all the possibilities of the world, i.e., relieve it of having to function by itself as the condition of all possibility. Only thus can a complex world be constituted as the horizon of the potentialities of actual consciousness, as the unmanageable and overburdening source of all selections." Luhmann 1990b, 38; italics in original.

⁴ Golding, John. Two Who Made a Revolution. *The New York Review of Books*, 31 May 1990, 10.

Individuality is frequently construed as subjectivity, presupposing that "subjectivity establishes a personal, individual and unique relation to intersubjectivity (and not to the object)" but, of course, in relation to an intersubjectivity which must be accepted by the subject itself (Heller 1992, 223). Subjective individualism is basically relativist as individuals are free to ignore, to recast or to reaffirm values, norms and beliefs, producing the well-known phenomenon of the decentered subject or, as its derivative, the de-structured society.

It is a correlate of individual subjectivity that the time perspective is shortened: the *now*, the present, is the center, the decisive moment, and it is living in the *now* that the individual embraces the horizon of the past and of the future, if at all, in the Gadamerian fusion of horizons. "Our ready-made individuality, our identity, is no more than an accidental cohesion in the flux of time," as D.H. Lawrence remarked (quoted in Taylor, Charles 1989, 463). As the time concept changed with the development of individualism, the unique temporal moment of *now*, corresponding to the reign of the individual, was expressed in the Husserlian internal time-consciousness, gradually replacing objective time or world time. It structured the individual's existence and gave it a definite meaning.

Simultaneously, this modification of the perspective carried with itself, in a first phase, an extension of the temporal horizon. "The future is regarded as essentially open, yet as counterfactually conditional upon courses of action undertaken with future possibilities in mind. This is a fundamental aspect of the time-space 'stretch' which conditions of modernity make both possible and necessary" (Giddens 1991, 50-51). The new vision of time corresponded to a new sense of freedom, to the voluntaristic liberation from traditions and from everything past; history became a proof of the distinctness of the modern from bygone events and values.⁵ It is justified to say that modern time-consciousness is a de-construction of the temporal dimension,⁶ of past and future as well:

With transience and ephemerality reformed into daily practice, glorified and ritualistically celebrated, the strategy of survival comes full circle. It is now immortality, not mortality, which is deconstructed; but deconstructed in such a way as to show that the permanence is nothing but the sequence of evanescences, that time is nothing but a succession of episodes without consequence and immortality is nothing but a simple aggregate of mortal beings. Deconstructed, immortality reveals mortality as its only secret. Mortality need not be deconstructed: it ought to be lived. Consumer bliss is final, long solicited and expected, yet slow to come, stage of secularization. Now, truly, *everything* is in human hands. But the meaning of 'everything' has changed (Bauman 1992b, 30; italics in original).

The modern conception of the individual as his own master (as much as master of the world by the grace of science) had for human beings three fateful consequences. First, communities in which an individual was born were condemned to disappear in order to free him from all contrivances, from all imposed frameworks of life, from all obligations and hindrances which could limit his autonomy. As a result, human society became an impersonal collectivity in which no links related its members to each other but those which were concluded between autonomous individuals to ensure the cooperation necessary for their living together in the same space and same conditions. Human society was, thus, transformed into a conglomerate of atomistic components bound together by the pretended contractual obligations expressed in a sort of

⁵ In Dupré's words: "An unprecedented awareness grew that what humans accomplish in the transitoriness of time definitely changes the very nature of human life. History thereby suddenly acquired an existential significance that it had not possessed before... The historical awareness introduced by this particular distinction [between past as *magistra vitae* and past representing something irreducibly other] resulted in a comprehensive understanding of the entire past as different." Dupré 1993, 145-146.

⁶ Luhmann explains the simplification of the temporal dimension in modernity by a "distinction between the temporalness and the temporal locus of the constituting experience, on the one hand, and the temporalness and the temporal locus of the constituted meaning, on the other. It is absolutely necessary that this difference itself be experienced, if the horizon of meaningful experience is to have temporal extension, i.e., if one is to be at all able in the present, to imagine past and future meaning (or present meaning extended into the past or the future)... On this level of meaning-constituting experience, the social conditions for the constitution of material or objective meaning involve an important reduction of the possibilities of the temporal dimension: there can be no time difference between experiencing subjects. Their ongoing actual experience must be synchronized." Luhmann 1990b, 39-40.

Rousseauian general will (which nobody could really define until now, and nobody could locate in any human collectivity), to be discovered and manifested by the democratic processes:

The fallacy of supposing that the new industrial régime would produce just and for the most part only the consequences consciously forecast and aimed at was the counterpart of the fallacy that the wants and efforts characteristic of it were functions of 'natural' human beings... Instead of the independent, self-moved individuals contemplated by the theory, we have standardized interchangeable units. Persons are joined together, not because they have voluntarily chosen to be united in these forms, but because vast currents are running which bring men together (Dewey 1994, 106-107).

However, a society composed of atomistic individuals, although crowned as the immortal subjects and bearers of an all-purpose democracy, invited the only existing power in the collectivity, the state (as Hobbes has shown it so clearly long time ago) to take the place of the disappearing communities. The state framed, filled with purpose and, if needed, regulated by force the lives of individuals. In consequence, in late modernity, we are in a situation in which autonomous but powerless individuals are face-to-face with the powerful state, expected to be the expression of their common will with prerogatives and actions granted to it by the citizens through certified democratic processes. This unavoidable interface between individuals and the unique power existing in the collectivity destroys civil society and leads to the continuously degrading social conditions of human life in the West, with its corollaries of terrorism, violence, drug abuse, political and social apathy, and so forth.

Second, the above situation in society explains that in the absence of ethical principles -- the evanescence of an autonomous moral self -- human relationships and the indispensable cooperation between human groups is solely regulated through legal mechanisms issued by the state and other authorities, all representing societal power. There is no more question of morals but of rights, always justified in the name of justice which is determined by the state or by those reputable persons who are the servants of the official ideology. The rights of individuals in a democratic society are, however, only emphasized when it is a question of either natural qualities, characteristics of human beings which are attributed to them unreflexively in any community. Rights are destined to alleviate the effects of what the collectivity and the state did in the past or do in the present; duties are each individual's contribution to the conservation and progress of the state's policies. Thus, morals are replaced by legality.

Third, the autonomous individual, without guidance from the experiences of generations transmitted to him through community traditions, does not have the capability to judge for himself all contingencies in the natural and human worlds. His only guide is his own interest, whether material and crude, intellectual and refined, good or bad, useful or useless, beautiful or ugly. These attitudes and consecutive actions serving or harming his fellow men, are decided taking into account his own interest alone.⁷ However, individual interest is not enough of a guiding force, even in the simpler circumstances of an isolated existence, and still less in the complex matters of modern societal life. Thus, the individual cannot avoid having recourse to those who appear to be able to elucidate for him complex problems and relationships. He borrows and collects, bit by bit, components of his worldview from those sources which are at his disposal: the experts, or men of science; the dominating ideologies, and the media which, in fact, does not but channel to the multitudes the expert opinions and ideological theses. In doing so, the media accomplish a very important act of selection and interpretation through which they become themselves sources of knowledge and of opinion. The expert is one who has the science to respond to certain questions and to explain certain phenomena. An expert therefore becomes an expert not only through scientific habilitation, but also through certification by the state, by other ideological authorities, and by the media themselves who, nevertheless, pretend to simply reflect popular opinion. In view of the enormous requirements of the media in personnel and the amount of work imposed on them, journalists, reporters, and even editorialists, do not have the necessary knowledge to analyze or explain all the problems of the modern world. They are therefore obliged to sustain what they say

⁷ "Selfishness blights the germ of all virtue; individualism, at first, only saps the virtues of public life; but in the long run it attacks and destroys all others and is at length absorbed in downright selfishness. Selfishness is a vice as old as the world, which does not belong to one form of society more than another; individualism is of democratic origin." Tocqueville 1956, 1: Part 2, 104.

with reference to an expert opinion. The innumerable fields of expertise, as we know them, make it evident that the principal guide of the individual today is science, or what is considered to be science by the public.

To the ignorance and disorientation of the individual corresponds the omnipotent knowledge and overwhelming guiding force of science comparable, in this domain, to the face-to-face relationship of individual and state. In public opinion, science replaced culture (as much as, for example, the concept of business replaced that of economics) or, one could say that science even replaced the church, with its dogma of infallibility (despite the often contradictory scientific studies and reports). This situation is bad enough from the point of view of the individual who does not have any means to verify what science says or orders; but even worse, scientific opinions and experts do not feel necessarily bound by the true scientific deontology and serve the interests of the various powers or the specific needs of certain media. Many simply become non-experts by declaring whatever public opinion expects from them in order to make a career or to satisfy their material interests.

The unbelievably powerful role of various ideologies is also well-known. I mean here by ideology a doctrine which is conceived to influence the identity and action of individuals in accordance with specific interests, that is, to make them servants to these interests. The best known examples of dominating ideologies in the modern age are nazism and Marxism-Leninism. Both offered their followers a ready-made worldview, a holistic framework for life, which, once adhered to, coherently explained everything and established a program of action. Therefore, ideologies do not need people who think as adherents, but men who believe and execute, men who obey without question the program espoused by the ideology's teachings. Ideologies, the new mythologies of late modernity, thus replace ethos and worldview, ethics and morals. They even claim the emotional and inner allegiance of their adherents. Precisely for this reason, ideologies fill a void in modern society by giving guidance to those who look for orientation in a world in which they are lost, especially as science gradually loses its authority in consequence of its disastrous mistakes in forecasting future.

Finally, the media are a source of knowledge and information on their own, because they carry out an important selective function in the course of the transmission of information, and this selection is perceived by the lonely individual as the true representation of things in the world. The media can aggrandize or belittle the impact of 'expert' opinions as much as of ideological messages, and this is already a function comparable to those of experts or ideologists. A striking example of this is the role of the media in the promotion of consumer culture. They promote the consumption of their own products, but they are also promoting consumerism in general, as well as the audiences' inclination to consume a specific product, in an effort to erase all intention of those in the audience to formulate their own opinions and judge the merits of the products in accordance with their own criteria.

One has to differentiate between the individual as defined by modern individualism and the human *person*. I designate by a person a human being who is characterized by unique and particular features which indicate the person's embeddedness in a concrete cultural, social and natural environment.⁸ Whereas an individual is always an abstract concept, a person is a living creature considered in his specific, empirical context, a true and real human community.⁹ Person and community are inextricably intertwined in an organic relationship while interlaced by shared beliefs and values, common worldview and ethos, as well as ethical

⁸ Even Steven Lukes recognizes that though formal equality and formal freedom represent important gains in the course of modern evolution, they must be transcended if true equality and liberty are to be realized: "That can only be achieved on the basis of a view of un-abstracted individuals in their concrete, social specificity who, in view of being *persons*, all require to be treated and live in a social order which treats them as possessing dignity, as capable of exercising and increasing their autonomy, of engaging in valued activities within a private space, and developing their several potentialities." Lukes 1973, 153; italics in original.

⁹ "Any objective or impersonal knowledge of the human," wrote John Macmurray a generation ago, "any science of man, whether psychological or sociological, involves a negation of the personal relation of the 'I' and the 'You,' and so of the relation which constitutes them as persons. Formally, such knowledge is knowledge of the 'You,' that is, of the other person; but not of the other person in personal relation to the knower, but as object in the world. I can know another person *as a person* only by entering into personal relation with him. Without this I can know him only by observation and inference; only objectively." Macmurray, John. *Persons In Relation*. London: Faber & Faber, 1960, 28; italics in original.

principles which govern both a person's and a community's moral action.¹⁰ There cannot be, any contradiction, any separation between a person and his community, because the two interact: the community determines the person's world, its ideals and its way of life; whereas the person -- even if generally in an imperceptible, though sometimes in a very visible, public way -- modifies, transforms, and re-creates the community's perceptions of the world, its belief and value systems, its aesthetic imagination, and its moral purposiveness. There is no doubt that the community guides the person throughout his life through traditions, inherited ways of acting, and through the ontological/cosmic worldview which is integral part of the community's culture. In a genuine interaction with his community, the person builds his experience, his emotional life, his acquired convictions and values into the community's treasure of cultural heritage for the benefit of coming generations. This is the enormous difference between an autonomous individuality based upon a person's desires and interests, having a dignity derived from the individual ego, appreciated only by the same and nobody else, and the person having deep roots in his surrounding world of fellow humans sharing solidarity and an appreciation of human dignity. Even if dignity is implied in being-in-the-world, that is, even if it is an ontological attribute for members of the human species, it becomes effective only as dignity comprehended and respected between members of a community. And universal human solidarity is not a reality, but solidarity between members of a community is one of the first rules of all communities' shared existence; it is the main recourse for people who are going through hard times in their lives.

(B) THE DIFFERENCES OF IDENTITY

The birth of the modern individual, concomitant with the secularization of the medieval world since the fifteenth century, led to a privatization of the path to salvation ending in an increasing differentiation of religion from other spheres of society. It also made necessary the reconstruction of individual identity through the creation of an immanent perspective freed of all cosmic ties, but firmly anchored in the voluntaristic, scientific worldview. Since Kant, a new subjectivity became possible which was vested, simultaneously, with an empirical particularity and a transcendental generality. The individual, the Cartesian subject, emerged as a self-contained entity able to claim to be a transcendental source of certainty within itself and an empirical individual as well, the sole link between the differentiated segments and spheres of society.

This epistemological-individualistic turn in our modern culture could, of course, not remain an exclusively intellectual phenomenon. Individualism became a social fact, a determining factor in public affairs that had a decisive influence on the evolution of our society. What is rational is not defined as corresponding to the necessities relevant to the existence of a group, a community, or a society, but as a determinant of the individual's intentions, desires, needs, and wants, or as an aggregate of such elements of the individual's subjectivity.

The centrality, legitimacy, and institutionalization of individualism in society's life had a feedback effect on individuals' behavior as well. Its positive effects can be exemplified by increased self-reflexivity and self-awareness of individuals, in their autonomy and expression of their own dignity. Its negative effects are manifest in the elimination of most communal ties, in the diminishment of the integrative force of even such small groups as families, and in the gradual disappearance of all shared values, rights, and duties inherited

¹⁰ Max Scheler's linked ethics to intentional action in writing about the human person and the human community: "The being of the person as individual person is constituted within a person and a world in general in the special essential class of singularizing acts; the being of the collective person, in the special essential class of social acts. The *world* of a community is the *total* content of all experiencing of the kind 'experiencing with one another' (in relation to which 'understanding' is only a secondary kind). This is the *collective world*, which has as its concrete subject on the act side the *collective person*. The world of the individual, the individual world, is the content of all experiencing in singularizing acts and acts of experiencing-for-oneself. This is the *singular world*, which has as its concrete subject on the act side the *individual person*. Hence an individual person *and* a collective person 'belong' to every *finite* person... It is therefore *in* the person that the mutually related *individual person* and *collective person* become differentiated." Scheler 1973, 520-521; italics in original.

from the past. As a consequence, the individual lost¹¹ what was his attribute in the modern dream -- empirical particularity and transcendental generality:

The particular and the universal stand in a uniquely unmediated relation to one another... What becomes a universal in the individualistic ethic is thus the individual him/herself. That the particular becomes the universal is the reigning ethic of individualistic societies... For the relation between universal and particular is now transformed into the relations between (universal) subjects -- each ontologically self-contained and existing in a state of 'metaphysical' quality. (Seligman 1990, 123-124).

Thus, corresponding to the differentiation between individual and person is the difference between their identities. The individual's identity is constituted, first, by his ego, which comprises all his psychological givens; his physical and material needs and their satisfaction; his emotional and intentional personality; and his cultural endowment. The latter govern his way of life as he endeavors to develop his biography and, at the same time, set his particular pattern of behavior. These aspects cover what Habermas calls the ego's self-determining and self-realizing identity (Habermas 1984/1989, 2: 98-105). In this respect, Amitai Etzioni wrote: "What becomes a universal in the individualistic ethic is thus the individual him/herself. That the particular becomes the universal is the reigning ethic of individualistic societies -- hence equality (of individuals/particulars)" (Etzioni 1968, 123).

The cultural endowment of an individual's identity initially results from his informal (family) and formal (schooling) education. But later in life, it is mainly shaped by the piecemeal scientific information and by the various expert opinions he accepts and by the dominating, but sometimes also contradictory, ideological influences he is exposed to. Finally, the individual is completely engulfed by the enormous quantity of all kinds of uncontrolled and unabsorbable information the media of Technopoly pours on him. It is normal that most individuals who do not possess a framework into which to fit all the bits and pieces of information they receive cannot consolidate them into an integrated whole, into a coherent picture of the world. They, therefore, do not comprehend at all what happens around them but feel a total meaninglessness, except the small and appreciable things of everyday life. This confused identity makes of the late modern man an alienated being unable to find his place in the world.

However, this alienation has two other important sources: consumerism and citizenship. The essence of consumerism is well summarized by Jonathan Friedman:

Consumption is driven here by a fantasy-fueled drive to establish an identity space, a lifestyle, the realization of a daydream of good life, which always ends in deception and a search for yet other styles or goods. This process is rooted in the dissolution of fixed social identities and the formation of a complex of phenomena known as modernity, and, with respect of consumption, is dependent on the emergence of the modern individualized subject, bereft of a larger cosmology or a fixed self-definition (Friedman 1994, 150).

As far as late-modern ideologies are concerned, humanity lives in the age of a dominating world market¹² in which the individual as consumer has an incredible range of choice, but in fact has none, as he

¹¹ John Dewey also speaks of the "lost" individual in the secular age: "The significant thing is that the loyalties which once held individuals, which gave them support, direction, and unity of outlook on life, have well-nigh disappeared... Stability of individuality is dependent upon stable objects to which allegiance firmly attaches itself... I have thus far made no reference to what many persons would consider the most serious and the most overtly evident of all the modes of loss of secure objects of loyalty - religion... But it is hardly possible to overstate its decline as a vitally integrative and directive force in man's thought and sentiments. Whether even in the ages of the past that are called religious, religion was itself the actively central force that it is sometimes said to have been may be doubted. But it cannot be doubted that it was the symbol of the existence of conditions and forces that gave unity and a center to men's views of life... disintegrated individuals can achieve unity only as the dominant energies of community life are incorporated to form their minds." Dewey 1994, 52, 62 and 65.

¹² "Every social and cultural movement is a consumer or at least must define itself in relation to the world of goods as a non-consumer. Consumption within the bounds of the world system is always a consumption of identity. Canalized by a

can choose only from what is produced, that is, what is decided by others to be put on the market. Those who have the means to make such decisions have also the means to convince people of the necessity to choose between what is offered, and to convince them that it is their privilege to have this possibility of selection. If the possibilities of choice are great, it is so because the individual does not have the means to correctly judge the necessity of the goods offered, their quality as compared to other possible offerings, and the real value of what is offered. The result of this state of affairs is that the individual, who is reduced to horizons of only material satisfaction in his life, endlessly seeks out bargains, buying even if he does not need items, and takes pleasure in just looking at the available assortment of the goods offered. It is in this way that one of the main aspects of the modern individual's identity came to be a consumer. *This is one aspect of human identity that globalization processes are spreading worldwide, inducing other cultures to conform to. The ideal is to have consumers all over the world.*

The other source of an individual's identity in our modern age is citizenship.¹³ To be a citizen means to belong to a state and to have the rights and duties the state bestows on its citizens. To be a citizen gives the feeling belonging -- even if it is easy and frequently practiced to change one's citizenship. To be a citizen is to benefit from the rights conceded by the state to its citizens. It is also to have the illusion to be among the decision-makers in the state, as democratic processes allow for periodic elections of those who become, as the people's representatives, parts of the state's governing institutions. But to be a citizen also means the obligation to carry out the duties the state imposes on the population: paying taxes, military service, and participating in all actions decreed by the governing bodies with power over the ordinary citizen. But above all, it is to be the bearer of a new patriotism, the patriotism conceived as a loyalty to the state and expressed in an allegiance to the current constitution (current because constitutions as any other legislative documents, can be changed according to the will of those in power). This allegiance to the state in which one happens to live for the moment (in accordance with the old adage, *ubi bene ibi patria*) is expected to be the highest-level emotional and intellectual attachment for an individual, which gives a significant content to modern man's identity. Such a conceptualization of the citizen surely ignores the old truth recently expressed by Orlando Patterson: "The idea of civic bond makes sense only where people have some sense of community" (Patterson 1991, 228).

Consequently, *the identity of the modern individual is composed of the three elements mentioned above: the classical ego, the consumer, and the patriotic citizen.* This individual identity is pluralistic enough in the sense that each individual has his own identity ("No identity is the true identity because every identity is particular, constructed, and relational" (Connolly 1991, 46)), but these infinitely pluralistic identities of modern men naturally conflict and initiate sometimes merciless competition.

The identity of a *person* is entirely interwoven with the identity of his community -- one could speak in this case of a symbiotic identity. This does not mean that the person as an individual does not possess the ego, the classical structure of an individual personality, that his specificity is dissolved in the sea of other identities, in the community's shared identity. The congruence of the two identities is a clear-cut case of interpenetration: the person's identity, as member of a community, is thoroughly penetrated by all the components of the community's identity (beliefs, myths, mentalities, values, moral and cultural practices as well as ways of life), and the community's identity is enriched by the contribution of the person's particular vision of the world, the unique experiences made in the course of his biography, and the subjective perception and elaboration of the events of his age in his own inner life. This is the reason why a person, even if he reveals extreme particularisms in his ideas or in his attitudes toward the outside world, feels at

negotiation between self-definition and the array of possibilities offered by the capitalist market... Thus, while engagement authenticates, its consumption de-authenticates." Friedman 1994, 104.

¹³ Ellen Wood in her analysis of Hobbes's and Marx's political thinking, placed emphasis on the unnatural quality of 'being a citizen': "Thus, in one sense, man is split into two contradictory and antagonistic elements: man as individual and man as citizen, particular and universal, subjective and objective. In an even more concrete sense, in actuality, man's 'universal' communal being takes on an existence abstracted and independent of his individual life and becomes hypostatized in the state... the very nature of civil society and of man's private life in civil society means that, insofar as the 'unactual universality' of his individual life must be actualized in the form of a common interest, as it necessarily must be if man is to live in political society, it must be done by a power alien to him, at best through his participation in a fictional community which is antagonistic to his *real* life and must be enforced without. In short, even the ideal, perfected political state, in the form of an ideal liberal democracy, means a violation of individual freedom and a denial of *human*, as opposed to simply political, emancipation." Wood 1972, 148-149; italics in original.

home in the community. The congruence of the two identities, that is, the interpenetration of the elements in a person's and a community's identities is the result of cultural conditioning, of an existential interaction. There is nothing mystical or unexplainable about this; the essential link between the two identities is the cultural world in which both the community and the person participate.

The individual as a person does not cease to be a consumer, but his or her preferences are much more reasoned intentions integrated into the community's way of life than media-created fashions or fads-following preferences, frequently taking the form of quickly changing whims. The community's culture assures the necessary guidance for a person in a confusing world in which most individuals do not find any orientation but their own desires. In the same vein, a person remains a citizen, not as an atomized individual at the mercy of the powerful state, but as a subject who is capable of evaluating the state's actions in accordance with the community's value norms and moral standards.

It is, consequently, evident that the difference between individual and personal identities consists in the person's being an autonomous moral self characterized by certain qualities, and by certain ethical principles and moral behavior derived from an inner conviction implanted into him by the community's cultural heritage. This rootedness of the person in the community gives him his dignity and his place in society.

(c) THE NIHILISTIC DIMENSION OF INDIVIDUALITY IN LATE MODERNITY

Contemporary changes in the concept of individuality are influenced by the transformation of time and space perspectives inherited from modernity, because the primacy of the subject is "a function of the reduction of Being to presence" and self-consciousness consists solely in "the locus of evidence," as Vattimo pointed out (1988, 43). The process of the ever-new or always-new clearly revealed the hollowness of the idea of progress. Individual biographies replace the great narratives, as Lyotard argued two decades ago, and self-reflexivity becomes the *Leitmotiv*. The aesthetic gains an overwhelming importance, and a kind of nostalgia permeates life appearing more and more as a simulacrum à la Baudrillard. The end result is, unmistakably, the loss of meaning and the uneasiness of ontological insecurity.

The postmodern sentiment that we are at the end of history (in Gianni Vattimo's and not in Francis Fukuyama's sense) shows that progress became routine dissolving the category of the new, as one new follows the other in rapid succession. The dissolution of history means the breakdown of its formerly conceived unity, and its interpretation is frequently distorted as far as understanding of the past is concerned. History became a narrative, a rhetorical presentation, just as the concept of truth became a rhetorical or individualistic trope -- rhetorical because truth is reduced to common sense, or individualistic because it represents an opinion corresponding to the particular world of one person. The acceleration of time, so typically modern, also considerably sharpened. This is shown by the ephemerality of products, fashions, technologies, ideas and ideologies, all trying to catch the attention of the de-centered individual; the shift from the classic consumption of goods to the consumption of services, or the quasi-delinking of the financial system from any real base, material and productive, enabling it to serve the ever-changing needs of the individual. Postmodern society is a society of images and image-creation, in Baudelaire's sense of the fleeting, superficial, and illusory; in fact, images serve individuals, entities and political regimes as well, to establish their identity in the marketplace.

Anthony Giddens describes the life history of an individual as a reflexively organized biography, a spatial and temporal trajectory expressed by a cluster of habits and practices -- the lifestyle. This trajectory spans over various institutional settings of contemporary social life, and is gradually transformed by the globalization of its environment. Thus, the dialectics of the local and the global corresponds to the dialectics of the self and the society. This dialectics is complemented by the self-reflexivity of individuals, meaning, principally, the loss of collective memories as well as the elaboration of so-called single, ephemere value systems because exclusively oriented to the individual's inner logic. In late modernity, as a consequence, the self as an internally referential, reflexive project is embedded in abstract systems of institutions and impersonal social orderings. It is exposed to the risks inherent in these institutions and orderings, and it is subject to their fateful impact, as these abstract and impersonal systems intervene in the formation and continuity of the individual trajectory. Society became internally referential as well, and the individual person is enclosed in this internally referential social system as in an iron cage. This phenomenon is very well

encapsulated in the Giddensian formula of the sequestration of experience,¹⁴ a loss of genuine identity and of moral freedom.

The need of ontological security is deeply embedded in the ontic being, and is only satisfied in a coherent and intelligible ontological/cosmic perspective. Therefore, ontological insecurity is closely linked to the existential awareness of being. Giddens's existential contradictions express the feeling of such ontological insecurity. Among these existentially troubling questions are: the ordering of time hitherto accomplished by tradition; the consciousness of finitude due to man's capability to embrace the temporal dimension (the death-awareness of Theodosius Dobzhansky); and, the relationship to the Other, to members of the human community. But perhaps the greatest of these existential problems is the growing feeling of personal meaninglessness, resulting from the elimination of moral resources sustaining the life experience of individuals, and leading to a sort of existential isolation. Moral values and legitimation are replaced by authenticity understood in the sense of corresponding to oneself (Giddens 1991, 47-52).

Jürgen Habermas identified the crisis of modern individuality as a crisis of morality because of the disappearance of worldviews on which the individuals' and their societies' meaning-construction efforts were founded:

The fundamental function of world-maintaining interpretive systems is the avoidance of chaos, that is, the overcoming of contingency. The legitimation of orders of authority and basic norms can be understood as a specialization of this 'meaning-giving' function... If world-views have foundered on the separation of cognitive from socially integrative components, if world-maintaining interpretive systems today belong irretrievably to the past, then what fulfills the moral-practical task of constituting ego- and group-identity? (Habermas 1975, 118).

Later, in *The Philosophical Discourse on Modernity*, Habermas asks whether modern subjectivity and the structure of self-consciousness embedded in it are able to provide foundations for the contemporary world and its science, art, or morality. Are the criteria offered by individualism sufficient to guide our world, cut off from all historical perspective, and to guide the individual himself in the perplexities of modernity always at variance with itself (Habermas 1987, 17-20).

Modern art expresses the breaking up of the community in favor of the all-dominating and de-centered individual, but the postmodern trend goes much further, as aptly formulated by Scott Lash: "Modernism conceives representations as being problematic whereas postmodernism problematizes reality" (Lash 1990, 13). A contradiction thus appears between the immediacy of experience, the overwhelming present, and the quasi-exclusive turning toward the future -- the quest for the ever-renewed self, mirrored in new objects of consumption. It is, however, the close connection between the self-identification of the individual and his consumption of goods which resolves, in fact, the contradiction between the overwhelming present and the imagined horizon of an overshadowing future. *Consumption became a means for the affirmation and maintenance of individual selfhood.*

The de-traditionalized mode of life of the modern individual, "a historically contradictory process of socialization,"¹⁵ leads to an immediacy of individual and society, an immediacy due to the successive crises engendered by risks (Beck 1992a, 90). The individual becomes part of the standardization and institutionalization of the modern way of life, and, at the same time, is also much more easily controlled through the processes of institutionalization. As a result, institutionally enforced norms and socially

¹⁴ For Giddens, "The sequestration of experience is in some part the contrived outcome of a culture in which moral and aesthetic domains are held to be dissolved by the expansion of technical knowledge. In some considerable degree, however, it is also the unintended outcome of the endemic structuring processes of modernity, whose internally referential systems lose contact with extrinsic criteria." Giddens 1991, 165.

¹⁵ In view of the recent events in the former Soviet empire and in the Balkans, it is particularly important that Beck defines the "new sources for the formation of social bonds and for the development of conflict": "They lie first in *ascribed* differences and inequalities of race, ethnicity, nationality, gender, age, and so on: second, in new and changing differentiations which arise from reflexivity in the domain of private social relations and private ways of living and identity. Thus, new social lifestyles and group identities inside persistent social inequalities begin to emerge." Beck 1992a, 99; italics in original.

legitimized norms increasingly develop in different directions. It is particularly important that institutionalized risks heighten the menace and the danger for all mankind: they become high-consequence risks such as nuclear war, ecological catastrophe, terrorism, or the devastating impoverishment not only in non-Western regions of the globe but even in industrialized societies themselves. The evident conclusion is that man, the atomistic individual, gained a very large independence with the advent of modernity, but this independence was slowly transformed by the multiplication of abstract, self-referential systems into a new, different type of interdependence, which concomitantly increased the vulnerability of the individual.

In consequence, the individual lives in a late-modern world which evolves toward nihilism, the fulfilment of the deconstructing and de-structuring enterprise that represents the logical outcome of the reign of the individual itself. Is this, perhaps, the death of the individual, of the Cartesian subject? Foucault describes contemporary reality in Western society as heterotopia, or the coexistence of an infinite number of fragmented, juxtaposed, possible worlds, incommensurable, superimposed on each other. Such a coexistence of multiple incommensurable worlds is reflected by the fact that no determinate and identifiable relations between signified and signifier exist anymore, and message as well as medium are continuously newly combined, changing the physiognomy of language games. In such a fragmented lifeworld, everything is questioned in respect of being; the main concern, in Foucault's words, is "to grant the highest value, the greatest dimension, to the distance that both separates and links thought-conscious-of-itself, and whatever, within thought, is rooted in non-thought" (Foucault 1973, 324). This is a direct consequence of abstract individualism because the ontological un-thought is related to the Other, to the unavoidable duality of the I and Thou. Such an orientation has far-reaching consequences. For example, in aesthetics, the interpretation of an artist's work, the signification and meaning of his creation are not considered as defined by him, but is open to popular determination through the impulses of each consumer. No matter that incoherence results, it corresponds to the exclusive value judgement of each individual, it is justified by it and is consistent with the view of life as fragmented and incoherent in itself. This deconstructionist aspect of the late-modern age is nihilism; a deconstructed worldview does not even promise coherence because it considers such an effort as illusory.

Late modernity is sometimes identified as the age of transformation; characterized by the increasingly difficult search for individual and collective identity, for secure moorings in a shifting world, the individual's insertion into a multidimensional reality of discontinuity. It is possible that human mental capacities, as a result of fragmented discourse and the lack of integrating worldviews, will be unable to match contemporary realities. It is, nevertheless, possible that nihilism gives birth to a completely new world, based on a renewed vision of the human person embedded into its natural community and into an appropriately conceived ontological/cosmic framework.

2.The Encompassing Community of Culture

(A) DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN COMMUNITY AND OTHER HUMAN GROUPS

Because of its biological makeup and its unique capabilities to develop culture, the human species is naturally divided into different groupings corresponding to physical characteristics (for example, small and tall people), organic characteristics (for example, kinship-based or otherwise hierarchically structured), or to numerous cultural divisions within specific cultural orbits (in accordance, for example, with specific interests, types of professional occupation, or adopted lifestyles). Beside the physical characteristics which are given and unchangeable as a result of biological evolution, all other differences between human groupings can and do overlap, or are unconsciously or consciously combined. All human groups, however, have one thing in common: they owe their differences to cultural conditioning.

Therefore, the main demarcating lines between large human groups are cultural differences. The consequence of this state of affairs is that any community is a culturally-constituted, culturally-conditioned

community.¹⁶ This statement concerns, first of all, those human groupings with the largest contours, that is, cultures or civilizations¹⁷ -- those still living and co-existing and those of the past. Within these cultural or civilizational worlds -- Chinese, Indian, Islamic, African, or modern Western -- there are many other, limited cultural orbits, as in the mosaic-like cultural configuration of African cultures on three continents (Africa, North and South America)¹⁸ or the colorful, many times sharply divided subcultures of the Western civilization (such as the ethnically-based divisions between Italian, Spanish, French, German, or English). In these large or small cultural worlds there are even further divisions of communities, rural or urban, sport associations, professional or literary guilds, and so on. But these communities, associations or other groupings are all included in one overarching cultural world which defines their contours and main content, their cohesion and integrative force. The culturally-based conception of the all-encompassing human communities excludes, as a consequence, all other foundation, at this meta-level, of such human groups like ethnic constitution (including all racist theories), or utilitarian-interest orientation.

Two examples from our contemporary world might help to illustrate this statement. First, it is immediately evident that religious groups evolve culturally, because virtually every culture has in its core a religion (which may later be divided into sects, denominations, etc.); thus, nearly every culture has a founding religion, and in cases like the Islamic civilization, the religion is all-powerful and influences every aspect of life. Second, in respect to ethnic groups or nations, it is also evident that ethnicity is culturally-created and conditioned. There are no ethnically pure peoples in today's world, as a variety of events over the course of history (among which migrations were the most important) produced a complete intermingling of populations, and precisely because of this fact, cultural ethnicity plays an intensive and integrating role in the survival of ethnic groups over centuries. Whatever the arguments and debates about tribalism and nationalism, with their concomitant attitude of superiority of those not believing but in the utilitarian, interest-oriented, universalistic trend dominating in Western societies, -- all the dramas of tribal divisions, ethnic turbulences, and national confrontations prove that culturally-conditioned ethnicity will exist always.

Can one, then, say that communities are organic entities? Yes, one can. In such a perception, biological-organic links are replaced with cultural interdependencies in the form of reciprocal awareness in which symbolic patterns, varieties of worldviews based on some fundamental convictions, ethical evaluations derived from shared basic principles, and forms of artistic expression represent an integrative force ensuring the functioning of the organic whole. In this sense, the organic character of communities means their holistic conception; organic and holistic are equivalent designations of the nature of cultural communities. It is then clear that this conceptualization abolishes the endlessly repeated difference between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* because Tönnies's differentiation, based on the juxtaposition of the organic with the impersonally and voluntarily organized society, is simply false: a *Gesellschaft* cannot exist, cannot survive if it does not have at its foundation the shared culture of a community or, at least, the evanescent memories of such a culture (but in this case even the *Gesellschaft* itself is passing away). It is, therefore, incorrect to speak of collective deliberation in respect of social goals, or collective determination of social

¹⁶ Walter Lippmann differentiated in this sense two meanings of the term "people": "When we speak of popular sovereignty, we must know whether we are talking about The People, as voters, or about *The People*, as a community of the entire living population, with their predecessors and successors... It is often assumed, but without warrant, that the opinion of The People as voters can be treated as the expression of the interests of *The People* as an historic community. The crucial problem of modern democracy arises from the fact that this assumption is false. The voters cannot be relied upon to represent *The People*. The opinions of voters in elections are not to be accepted unquestioningly as true judgements of the vital interests of the community... *The People* are a corporation, an entity, that is to say, which lives on while individuals come into it and go out of it" Lippmann 1955, 31-32 and 35; italics in original.

¹⁷ I use the expression "culture" to distinguish the core of a culture, from the whole world it creates around itself, civilization. Therefore, civilization really stands for what I call cultural world, including, in addition to the core which consists of the ethos, of morals and of cultural practices, all everyday behavior and action patterns.

¹⁸ It is amazing to see the lack of comprehension, even among the descendants of Africans themselves in the New World, that their main denominators are cultural, which survived centuries of slavery and oppression, and not racial or otherwise biological. This can only be explained by the emotionally charged historical background of racial confrontations in the United States and the Caribbean colonies; as a counterproof, it suffices to refer to the striking differences in thinking and behavioral patterns between native Africans born in an African country and African Americans visiting their lands of origin.

choices, because deliberation and determination are conscious acts (and as such reminiscent of political processes). They are carried out by individual persons in cultural communities not by the collectivity. Culture and its inherited traditions penetrate, in fact, through the unconscious and the routine¹⁹ a person's inner life and are rarely objects of deliberate acts.

The organic-holistic constitution of a group explains the natural and constant interaction between a community and the successive generations of its members. A person, part of a community and bearer of the community's cultural heritage, adds to this heritage through his innovative thinking and creative ways of acting. In addition to changes in the surrounding environment, the interaction between cultural community and an individual person is the main force behind the gradual modifications in a culture's various configurations. Such a dialogical process can only be hermeneutically approached:

To have any access to the 'we', to the community, we must not deconstruct but hermeneutically interpret and thus evade the categories of agency and structure, subject and object, control versus contingency and the conceptual versus the mimetic. This sort of interpretation will give access to ontological foundations, in *Sitten*, in habits, in background practices of cognitive and aesthetic individualism. It will at the same time give us some understanding of the shared meanings of community (Beck-Giddens-Lash 1994, 144; italics in original).

Here is, then, the root of the natural reflexivity of a human person uncovering the depth of cultural conditioning in a community, conditioning which is hidden in categories of the unthought, of the undisclosed, and in the unpronounced prejudgements with respect to the world. Cultural holism expresses the community's own reflexivity which cannot be compartmentalized in accordance with spheres of activity because everything hangs together.

Communities evolving out of nascent cultures and civilizations also embrace a very long historical time span. There is no temporal limit to the succession of generations constituting and reinvigorating such communities. The culturally-conditioned community therefore represents a particular dimension of time. This particular temporal dimension is an important element in the community's worldview, ethos, symbols, artistic expressions and moral evaluations; it is expressed and conserved through the symbolic representations of its major themes of religious and cosmic beliefs, ethical and aesthetic values, ways of life, or attitudes and practices mutable in form but not in essence. Symbolism and temporality are, therefore, closely interrelated.

Most important of all, in a community, there is genuine human solidarity as a natural outcome of the intertwined relations of its members; this is a solidarity one cannot recreate either by universal attachments to all human beings on the earth, or by legalistic measures or charitable actions. Solidarity can neither be charity, nor can it be a legal obligation, a commandeered duty. Solidarity is a spiritual, not an intellectual, disposition. It is a moral force inculcated in a human being by the community's value system and traditions, and it is engendered by the feeling of security mutual assistance creates during difficult times and in recurrent crises of life. It is transfigured in the autonomous moral self and becomes an imperative impulse in the inner life of a person.

¹⁹ Giddens analysis of tradition and routine must be referred to here: "Tradition is routine. But it is routine which is intrinsically meaningful, rather than merely empty habit for habit's sake. Time and space are not contentless dimensions they become with the development of modernity but are continually implicated in the nature of lived activities. The meanings of routine activities lie in the general respect or even reverence intrinsic to tradition and in the connection of tradition with ritual. Tradition, in sum, contributes in basic fashion to ontological security in so far as it sustains trust in the continuity of past, present, and future, and connects such trust to routinised social practices." Giddens 1990, 105. More recently, Scott Lash affirmed: "Cultural communities, the cultural 'we', are collectivities of shared background practices, shared meanings, shared routine activities involved in the achievement of meaning." Beck, Giddens, and Lash, 1994, 147.

(B) THE COLLECTIVE IDENTITY OF THE COMMUNITY

A community's collective identity is thus constituted by its culture. Its culture is contained in its traditions, and does encompass all the elements of ethos, cultural practices, ethical principles and moral action patterns. Collective identity is best expressed in the traditional, cultural symbol-systems -- meaning by system not only the symbols themselves but their mutual relationship and their cohesion as well -- which reflect the dominant worldview, the community's ontological relations to transcendent realities, and the perennity of adopted ways of life and everyday practices.²⁰ It is concomitant to this conception of the community's collective identity that its members -- individual persons -- fully share it, that their own identities are, in consequence, determined by it. A person's and the community's identities mutually shape each other.

At this point, a very much debated question concerning traditions has to be addressed. It has been believed since the eighteenth century that through the rejection of traditions, the human being will be liberated from the domination of the authority of obsolete dogmas and convictions, of the views, morals, and vicious practices of bygone ages, based on the authoritarian principle. But this liberation never took place because one cannot live in human society, human groups, without authority (as Hobbes noted it). The authority which replaced traditions became the authority of the majority (in the wake of the application of the Rousseauian general will) which, *in fine*, degenerated into the authority of an all-powerful state; the authority of science, which degraded into the authority of ever-changing expert opinions; and, finally, the authority of ideologies, fashions and fads, which encourages people's irresponsibility and inability to make sound choices in the name of absolute freedom. Therefore, the authority argument against traditions' role in a community or society is an evident *non sequitur*.

The close relation between a person's and a community's identities explains why the former is fundamentally different from the atomistic individual, why he does not need all the outside assistance guiding him in the world. Instead of expert advice and the overwhelming but many times fallacious scientific orientation, instead of the all-embracing ideologies offering easy answers to all the problems of life, and instead of the overburdening flow of information from the media, the person benefits from the secular wisdom of the community, accumulated from generation to generation and proven through personal experience. For this reason, a person can better resist consumerist pressure in the so-called globalizing market economy. Similarly, a person feels like a member of the cultural community constituting the state before being a citizen in the case of nation-states, or a member of one of the communities living in the territory of a state, in case of federally organized or multiculturally constituted states.

The most important element in determining and expressing the collective identity of a community is its heritage and its traditions. These represent the collective memory on which the community's belief structures and value systems are based. Traditions have two essential characteristics: they have an organic character as much as their bearers, the communities; and their authenticity cannot be questioned because if it is, then the community itself is destroyed. A vital function of traditions is that they encompass past, present, and future generations: this is their all-important temporal dimension. In this sense, Giddens means that traditions not only look back toward the past, "tradition is also about the future, since established practices are used as a way of organising future time" (Beck, Giddens, and Lash 1994, 62).

As Nicholas Rescher indicated in discussing the perspectival vision of human cognitive and evaluative capabilities, such a vision requires, not only on normative but even on rational grounds, a validation beyond the order of cognitive propositions or normative and aesthetic pronouncements (Rescher 1993, 117). This is the essential task achieved by a community's accumulated experiences, thereby benefitting today's generation from the knowledge and experience of former generations. There is plurality but not relativism of conventions within traditions. Only relations between differing traditions are relativistic, as there is no meta-

²⁰ Michael Oakeshott writes about the Masai in East Africa: "Change is a threat to identity, and every change is an emblem of extinction. But a man's identity (or that of a community) is nothing more than an unbroken rehearsal of contingencies, each at the mercy of circumstances and each significant in proportion to its familiarity... The Masai when they were moved from their old country to the present Masai reserve in Kenya, took with them the names of their hills and plains and rivers and gave them to the hills and plains and rivers of the new country." Oakeshott, Michael. *Rationalism in Politics*. London: Methuen, 1977, 171.

level to justify any worldview. For this reason, there is a plurality of cognitive systems and possibilities, a plurality of explanations of the world in culturally-elaborated worldviews, and a plurality of ethical conceptions related to what one considers as a good life in a given context. Relativism related to the multiplicity of cultural worlds means that there are no universally accepted, culturally invariant values revealing historically constant characteristics. These values are not culturally but biologically conditioned as they serve the individual's, the population's, and ultimately, the species' survival.

Inversely, the plurality and relativity of cognitive, experiential and moral conventions signify that there were, and there will always be, conflicts between different features within particular cultural worlds, the resolution of which can only be achieved by an individual person on the basis of his ranking of the appropriate values. A person recalls corresponding experiences from the collective memory or reconstructs them in a slightly different way, but never fictionalizes reality. This is, specifically, one of the most important aspects of an individual person's imaginatively innovative and creative contribution to his cultural heritage, constituting the real and profound effect of the constant interaction between the community and such persons. An individual person's innovative and creative interventions are, in turn, made possible precisely because they become traditionally validated conventions in the community. This also is the explanation why most traditions do not become orthodoxies, even if they evolve at a much slower pace than successive generations.

The impact of modernity on man's lifeworld, accentuated in late modernity, resulted in the disintegration of communities and, with them the gradual disappearance of traditions. One of the main instruments to achieve the latter result was, in Axel Honneth's words, the "increasing incorporation of culture into the economic utilization process."²¹ Honneth links the postmodern emptiness, meaninglessness, which reflect the spiritual, moral, and communicative vacuum created by the end of meta-narratives, to the waning of traditions:

What Lyotard describes as the 'end of meta-narratives' is, when dispassionately viewed, nothing other than the accelerated process of a destruction of those narratively constituted traditions, in which the members of a community could communicatively reach an understanding in the present about a common past and a correspondingly projected future... Cultural traditions of this kind, that is, narratively-constituted, context-spanning presentations of societal development, seem, on the one hand, to lose their philosophico-historical basis of legitimation with the definite shattering of metaphysical background certainties. On the other hand, however, there is still no equivalent of a post-metaphysical character for that identity-securing and communicating-generating functions of the disintegrating meta-narratives. For this reason, there is a danger that, together with the erosion of cultural-normative traditions... the cultural-normative interaction medium of the lifeworld will dry out (Honneth 1992, 165).

Therefore, two questions of overwhelming importance concerning traditions result. First, are there still, in late modernity, at our disposal such spiritual, cognitive, normative, and expressive resources which may shape and nourish the interaction between individual persons and communities with a view to create the conditions of a new identity-securing and communication-generating lifeworld? Second, what is the meaning of globalization in a world in which strong traditions with meaningful contents and untouched communication capabilities face traditionlessness and the disappearance of the lifeworld model of Western culture? Is globalization a process of worldwide fictionalization of reality?

The crucial role of traditions and values in all non-Western civilizations is well known. To illustrate this role as well as to evoke the different possibilities of inter-civilizational encounters, I shall refer here to the role of traditions in Japan, India, and in the Islamic world, which all face the globalization process of Western modernity.

It is justifiable to consider that the case of Japan constitutes one of the most intriguing examples of a successful combination of its own symbolic-traditional heritage and values related to Western-type structural-

²¹ "A tendency to dissolve the aesthetic mediating medium of the social lifeworld accompanies this increasing incorporation of culture into the economic utilization process. Cultural activities lose their character as a communication-generation *praxis* within the societal world of interaction and assume the character of a merely secondary, electronically reproduced outer world -- in short, culture becomes a technological environment for humans robbed of their aesthetic potential." Honneth 1992, 164; italics in original.

organizational differentiation. According to Dilworth,²² the periodicization of the age, corresponding to our modernity, is made in Japanese culture by separating the *kinsei* (Confucian) and *kindai* (Western) stages, which, in fact, meant that the earlier value-system remained the matrix for the later sedimentation of foreign ideas. Japanese culture did not replace the older, traditional value structure with those of the new culture, but absorbed the imported values into its overall framework in a sort of stadial layering. In this sense, the Japanese modernization process is a good example of Gadamer's fusion of horizons.²³ Dilworth argues that the acceptance of Confucianism under the reign of *Ieyasu*, followed by the adoption of the practical teachings of *Sung* and *Ming* philosophies, made possible the appearance of a worldview based on the free development of man's nature and mind. It was expressed by the concept of *shushigaku*, which stands for the notion of pluralistic consciousness, meaning a multiplicity of intentionalities in the cognitive, moral, religious, or aesthetic fields, and thus securing the survival of the earlier strata of ethical values. Robertson believes that the different components of the Japanese belief-system catered to different needs and considers that between these different components an interlegitimation takes place (Robertson of values in Japan 1992a, 94-95).

Another explanation of the Japanese miracle was put forward by Bellah who strongly emphasizes the group loyalty of the Japanese, acknowledging that "value is realized in groups which are thought of as natural entities" (*Gemeinschaft, kyodotai*) (Bellah 1971, 378-380), practically eliminating the tension between universalistic and individualistic tendencies. The high marks given to performance are also explicable as a means of goal-attainment, a cultural and social dimension of the integrative values' predominance. Thus, the modifications of certain traditions and of the inherited value-system do not create social and cultural upheavals, a sudden and radical shift in the community's objectives insofar as it is authenticated by the highest authorities and prioritized in conformity with existing conventions. In addition, Bellah also affirms that the reason for the successful absorption of other traditions by the Japanese culture is the contentlessness of the old Japanese *Shinto* religious framework, which was then filled with successively borrowed systems. He concludes: "The continuity is mainly in the realm of values and the structure of group life. The change is mainly in cultural content and large-scale institutional and organizational forms" (*ibid.*, 385). Elsewhere, Bellah also shows that such cultural continuity was particularly important in the case of Japanese modernization because "there is a limit to which economic growth can answer the question of the meaning of life," and that several conditions of modernization were already in place such as cultural homogeneity or some egalitarian tendencies (Bellah 1985, xviii and xx).

In respect of Hinduism in India, Heesterman recognizes that *dharma*, representing inexorable destiny and unbroken tradition over thousands of years, reflects a monolithic, predetermined and immutable order of things. It is atemporal and not subject to changes which intervene during consecutive world ages (Heesterman 1985, 2-3). Therefore, *dharma* poses an insoluble dilemma to people living in the Hindu cultural orbit, though the dynamic inner tension between the temporal and the atemporal requirements of Hindu culture traditionally shows a certain degree of adaptive flexibility. The dilemma of *dharma* reflects the inner conflict of the immanent and of the transcendent. This dual character offers redemption from the sufferings and evils of earthly life, but makes an adaptation to other cultural models more difficult.

In respect to the Islamic world, Albert Hourani referred to lost generations, to people who were educated in Western ways and, consequently, lost their cultural, national and Islamic heritage, without really assimilating Western belief and value systems or being assimilated into a Western-type society. The Moroccan writer, Abdallah Laroui, distinguishes between *tradition-structure* and *tradition-value* or, simply expressed, traditional social system and traditional value system, and rightly believes that when the two coincide, the community or society is in a homogeneous state avoiding conflicts among its members. This is even more true for societies in which transmission of fundamental traditional beliefs and values has always

²² Dilworth, David A. "Jitsugaku as an Ontological Conception: Continuities and Discontinuities in Early and Mid-Tokugawa Thought," in de Bary and Bloom. eds. 1979, 471-514.

²³ This conceptualization of Japanese modernization was presented by Watsuji Tetsuro in his *The Stadial Character of Japanese Culture*, where he affirmed that "the synchronistic coexistence of various sediments of Japanese value traditions in a variety of integrative contexts... The Japanese cultural quantum-lattice, as it were, allows for the fact that transcended elements live on as transcended elements, and thus provide for a complex pattern of interflow among stadially inter-present levels and their potential energies, in a given context of integration." *ibid.*, 472.

been oral. Homogeneity is broken when the traditional social structure is modified and, as a consequence, the community is also weakened; that is, the traditional value system remains intact but the social structure evolves in accordance with the actual experience of people, the "lived tradition" (Laroui 1974, 55-57). Laroui therefore seeks the convergence of Arab identity and cultural authenticity through the phenomenon of emancipation from tradition and Western domination, as well as through the historic process of integration of the renewed Arab identity into a universalistic conception of mankind. He abandons the idea of reconstituting a purely Arab authenticity, but accepts the recognition of the European or Western Other in the perspective of a transcendental universalism, "to recognize the universal is to become reconciled with oneself" (Laroui 1967, 164).

It appears an undisputed fact today that in Muslim countries, the traditional belief and value system and the societal structure undergoing gradual modifications are no longer congruent. Their disjunction in many Islamic societies is almost complete. This is partly the result of the impact of modernity in the whole Mediterranean basin, the area most exposed to Western influence in the entire non-Western world. Many thinkers believe that the relative backwardness of the Arabo-Islamic world in comparison to the contemporary West, was probably due to the symbolic closing of the gates of *ijtihad*, the elimination of free reflection, of free individual search for immanent solutions, being bound forever to the hitherto established verities, values and norms. However, Arabs like Hasan Saab, who tried to find a way to adapt their countries societal life to the Western requirements while safeguarding their basic religious beliefs and cultural values, conceive of Islam as a dynamic system, an ideological framework "whose civilization can always be creatively renovated with the help of creative minds" (Boullata 1990, 68 and 72). Many Muslim thinkers agree with this opinion, among them Indian Muslims, particularly Muhammad Iqbal, who, in *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, linked the reopening of the gates of *ijtihad* to contextual relativity, or to the temporal and spatial limitation of the consensus (*ijma'*). In the same vein, one of the Arab reformers, Abd al-Wahhab Khallaf insisted that not personal *ijtihad* should be reopened, but a collective *ijtihad*, a collective legislation on the basis of the *Sharia*, an *ijtihad* joining the concept of *ijma'*. This would represent the agreed-upon but personally determined opinion of such learned men who possess the required moral and intellectual qualities.

A key distinction of Muhammad 'Abduh, and a usual reformist move in all civilizations, was between essential and inessential doctrines in Islamic teaching. All the pronouncements related to the fundamental questions of life such as belief in God, worship, death, morals, religious life, are essential. Living in accordance with the *Quranic* imperatives necessitates conformity not only to the prophetic revelation, but reason as well. He considered reason a sort of interpreter of difficult doctrines, especially those contained in the prophetic traditions, the *hadith*.²⁴ It was also in the reformist sense that Jamal al-Din al-Afghani considered representative institutions comparable to those of the West necessary in Muslim countries and gave a new interpretation to the general principle of the *shura*, in accordance with the *Quran* (*sura* XLII, 36): "Their affairs are subject to consultation among themselves."

Such a formal justification of Western-type representative institutions could not suffice, if it was not accompanied by a large-scale mobilization of popular support. Al-Afghani's and 'Abduh's case is a clear-cut example how transplantation of foreign institutions is condemned to failure if no adaptation to unique cultural and social contexts is undertaken, and no congruence between value-system and social structure is achieved. None of these reformers succeeded in elaborating a coherent doctrine harmonizing innovative efforts with people's ingrained concepts and beliefs.²⁵

Sayid Qutb, the main theoretician of the Muslim Brotherhood movement paid for the ideas he fought for with his life. Qutb followed a different path from that of other Muslim reformists examined above. First, he affirmed that the whole world being God's creation, the sacred law (*Sharia*) and natural law or the law of

²⁴ Binder affirmed in respect of the teachings of 'Abduh, and this is partially valid for the reform generation in Islam, that "his modernity within the Islamic context is not the result of his acceptance of a Western mode of analysis. It is rather the result of his rejection of the Islamic idea of history as being somehow religiously constitutive of right. It is in his rejection of history and the contemporary state of Muslims that Abduh becomes modern." Binder 1964, 72.

²⁵ Identification of traditional Islamic terms with modern political or sociological concepts as, for example, the identification of *maslaha* with utility, of *shura* with parliamentary democracy, and of *ijma'* with public opinion, were simply formal without the least effort toward an essential, cultural adaptation.

creation (*sharia kawniyya*) cannot but be two aspects of the same reality. Existence is becoming, process, and movement; man understands the world through intuition and representation and expresses himself through action. The fundamental linkage of sacred and natural laws in human life ought to be achieved through what Binder calls ontological integration (Binder 1988, 305). Man's alienation from the natural and human environment cannot be overcome but through the Islamic faith. From this radical standpoint is derived Qutb's second important thesis, which rejects all sorts of idealisms, essentialisms and intellectualisms, and requires from Muslims a total commitment to existential praxis. Experience is not phenomenological or discursive but direct and based on God's creation. Islamic faith and Islamic praxis are one. Qutb makes Islamic commitment anti-determinist, contextual and situational in the sense that a Muslim's consciousness as well as intentional action are fully integrated into prevailing conditions and circumstances of the community.

(C) THE PRIMORDIAL CULTURALLY-CONDITIONED COMMUNITY: THE NATION

The nation is the single most fundamentally important community among human groups. The nation is usually considered as an ethnic group (therefore, the deprecatingly intended designation of tribalism), though there can be no doubt about its basic character as a culturally-conditioned community. There are no nations today which are founded on a purely ethnic basis as foreigners were always admitted, sometimes in quite large numbers, in a national community and were, over time, absorbed (in fact, ethnically constituted races were always defined without reference to their history, so important for a nation's self-definition). To describe the cohesive force of a nation, it is better to avoid the term nationalism,²⁶ with its chauvinistic implications (giving, in Hroch's words, an "absolute priority to the values of the nation over all other values and interests"²⁷), but to use the designation *national consciousness*, expression of the national identity, manifested in religion, language, arts, symbols, and traditions representing historical continuity, and the myth of common ethnic origin.²⁸ Individual and national identities are not contradictory but symbiotic and synergetic, because national identity penetrates the individual persons's identity.

The integrative elements in a nation's existence are, first of all, symbols and myths (signs, legends, stories, traditions, customs) which express feelings and motivations inherited by members of the community from generation to generation. Language, with its world-creating power and function as the depository of the inherited treasures of the community, is the most important force in shaping a nation's culture. Further, a national community also possesses a societal organization like kinship systems, which is closely interlinked with and influenced by other cultural elements, but which evolve in a coordinated manner with the group's changing environment. In fact, societal arrangements can also be seen as responses to environmental constraints -- adaptation to the available niches -- imposed by certain cultural givens of the community, even if it is not always evident that they represent the best response to the existing situation. This shows that

²⁶ Elie Kedourie's definition of nationalism is still valid. Nationalism, he says, "is a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century. It pretends to supply a criterion for the determination of the unit of population proper to enjoy a government exclusively of its own, for the legitimate exercise of power in the state, and for the right organization of a society of states. Briefly, the doctrine holds that humanity is naturally divided into nations, that nations are known by certain characteristics which can be ascertained, and that the only legitimate type of government is national self-government." Kedourie 1960, 1.

²⁷ Hroch, Miroslav. From National Movement to the Fully-Formed Nation: The Nation-Building Process in Europe. *New Left Review*. March-April 1993, 3-20; reprinted in Eley and Suny. eds. 1996, 60-77; the quotation is on page 62.

²⁸ "Because nations embody ethnic as well as civic components, they tend to form around pre-existing 'ethnic cores.' The fact that pre-modern areas have been characterized by different type of *ethnie* is therefore vital to our understanding of the ways in which modern nations emerged. The number, location and duration of such *ethnies* are crucial for the formation of historical nations. The relations of power and exploitation between different kinds of *ethnie* also help to determine the bases for historical nations. It is this latter circumstance that provides an essential key to the processes of nation-formation in modern times... Today's nations are as much in need of common myths, memories and symbols, as were yesterday's *ethnies*, for it is these former that help to create and preserve the networks of solidarity that underpin and characterize nations. They also endow nations with individuality." Smith, Anthony D., 1989, 113; italics in original.

cultural perceptions can be as much enhancing as limiting factors in the community's life. One of the grave problems in every national community's life is that social structuration may have to change much faster in response to the changing environment than the underlying cultural foundations, hence the incongruence between the society's institutional and mental buildup.

National consciousness never required a chauvinistic attitude, the urge to impose one's national characteristic on others; even in its political form as patriotism, it concerned simply the defense of the land to which one belonged, the inherited culture and ways of life, and traditional relations to God and to cosmic forces.

One major aspect of the nation's life as a community is the genuine solidarity which links together its members. This is the ethical content of national belonging. Such solidarity is genuine because it is not mandated by any authority, or imposed by some kind of universal attachment to all mankind; it is awoedly a feeling of ethical particularism in a pluralistic framework.

In acknowledging a national identity, I am also acknowledging that I owe special obligations to fellow members of my nation which I do not owe to other human beings... There is nothing in particularism which prevents me from recognizing that I stand in *some* relationship with all other human beings by virtue of our common humanity and our sharing of a single world... The ethical particularist is not an advocate of partiality. He will agree that ethical conduct must be impartial, but he will simply deny that impartiality consists in taking up a universalist perspective (Miller, David, 1995, 49 and 53-54; italics in original).²⁹

This kind of solidarity is mainly made apparent in great and grave moments of a nation's life, otherwise, it sinks into the depth of the unconscious. In addition, within all national communities -- which are always complex entities, in Niklas Luhmann's sense -- there are sub-groups or smaller communities with their own solidarity requirements which, most of the time, are mutually exclusive. It is for this reason that the existence of a nationwide solidarity is frequently forgotten as the multiple group-solidarities are much more visible, especially in societies such as the American society, where there is no national solidarity but a constant process of adjustment between partial solidarities.

As a consequence, there is no world society, no so-called world community, because there is nothing which resembles a world culture. The only real communities larger than nations are those created by civilizations; however, none of them embraces the whole world. Religions play a double role in respect to nations. First, a religion is frequently one of the main impulses in the creation of a nation, that is, it is part of that nation's identity, and the church embodying that religion is a national institution, as is the case of the Orthodox Church in Russia. When a religion is absorbed in a national identity, the values of the particular cultural community assimilate the values of the religion. This, of course, does not mean that sooner or later, contesting religious groups could not reject the assimilative pressures, and are either suppressed or integrated in one community, with the dominant religious force. In this case, the national identity may also absorb, at least partially, the values of the new religion. The new value system rarely replaces the old one in the national consciousness. Religion is, thus, a constitutive element of the national culture.³⁰ Second, religions with a great expansive force -- sometimes monotheist, sometimes nontheist, like Buddhism -- create communities at the meta-national level, communities such as the Islamic *'ummah*, which encompass peoples, nations, and continents, even if religious teachings are somewhat at variance in comparison to the original beliefs.

²⁹ "With regard then to ethical judgements," wrote G.E. Moore, "which assert that a certain kind of action is good as a means to a certain kind of effect, none will be *universally* true; and many, though *generally* true at one period, will be generally false at others." Moore 1992, 22; italics in original.

³⁰ It is for this reason that Tenbruck is right to link attacks against the national idea to the secularization of Western culture: "With the idea of progress, however, history acquires an inner-worldly goal and therefore also an end-point... Wherever the vision of an inner-worldly fulfilment of the history of mankind has become triumphant, there the existence of nations and national cultures disturbed the dream of a secular ecumenicity. The vacuity (and limitations) of this vision becomes apparent in an almost total absence of any serious reflections concerning the fate of these historical givens in the developmental process." Tenbruck 1990, 201-202.

In consequence, religions which are at the core of a great culture and civilization unite several national communities of which the basic belief and value system is the same but which, nevertheless, differ in quite a number of respects. Modern Western civilization is a case in point here, though revealing a unique feature in its evolution. It is unique because it is not a religion but a secularized worldview that replaced the civilization's founding beliefs, and has all the features of a new religion,³¹ though, despite all the negations of the believers of the new, secular religion of modernity,³² it kept a great number of the original tenets of the founding Christian religion in a disguised or re-baptized form. Now, considering the role of religions in meta-national communities, is it possible to see globalization as the creation of a worldwide community by a secular ideology? This would suppose the existence of an all-embracing civilization. Does the late-modern Western civilization have such a creative impulse and the not-yet-exhausted culture patterns necessary to accomplish this task?

National communities, in the course of modern evolution in the Western world, adopted the nation-state formula as their political organization. These entities replaced multinational empires consisting of loosely governed entities or small principalities, all constituted by national communities differentiated culturally.³³ This overwhelming change in political organization of European society brought with it a fateful nationalist rewriting of the conception and constitution of national communities and of the elaboration of national identities.³⁴ Real national communities lived together in the past; the emphasis was placed more on regionalism and on the cultural milieu in which one lived one's life, than on imagining compact national units (*pace* Benedict Anderson) excluding all heteronomy. Nationalist movements became the protagonists and creators of nation-states, ignoring all the cultural richness of national identity and national consciousness because they focused exclusively upon loyalty to the state and on the exclusion of other nationals. Consequently, national belonging and consciousness were replaced by citizenship, characterized by loyalty to the state (by definition a nation-state) which imparted to each citizen its rights and obligations. Thus,

³¹ It is useful to remember here Kolakowski's discussion of the various meanings of the term secularization: "Secularization does not imply the decline of organized religion, and it may be seen in churches as well as in religious doctrines. It takes the form of a blurring of the differences between the sacred and the secular and a denial of their separation; it is the tendency to attribute to everything a sacred sense. But to universalize the sacred is to destroy it: to say that everything is sacred is tantamount to saying that nothing is... The secularization of the Christian world does not necessarily take the form of a direct denial of the sacred; it comes about indirectly, through a universalization of the sacred... This is a Christianity which hastens to sanctify in advance all forms of secular life because it considers them to be crystallizations of divine energy: a Christianity without evil." Kolakowski 1990, 68.

³² Rustum Roy describes the new, secularized, technological religion realistically: "In the religion of technology, the vector of its development started out with the uses of technology and the practice of its disciplines. Then it worked its way inwards to influence (or condition) human behavior. It gave rise to a priestly caste which undertook the subtle adoption of the core beliefs of Western science into its 'theology.' In most religious systems, Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam, for example, the vector ran in the opposite direction: their development started with a person and that person's or founder's ideas and small groups of followers which grew in time and took over the control of the socio-political-economic system. I will show systematically that that IT, the International Technology system, is in fact today a full-blown religion with its theology, a powerful priesthood, rituals, icons, and a claim to exclusive truth." Roy, Rustum. "The Coming Clash of the Titans," in Matthews and Varghese. eds. 1995, 129-154; quotation is on page 130. To offer a convincing evidence of his thesis, Roy quotes Daniel Koshland from the review *Science* (8 February 1985): "A Department of Science could be useful if it is devoted to untidiness and *evangelism*. It could serve as a catalytic force for increasing scientific research and generating *scientific approaches in all phases of our society* and our governmental structures. It could send out its missionaries to bring the *gospel of basic research* to the *heathen* in the *outer darkness*." *ibid.*, 132; italics by Roy.

³³ On the distinction between the European situation before and after the creation of the nation-state, see the excellent article of Szűcs, Jenő. "Történeti 'eredet'-kérdések és nemzeti tudat." *Valóság* (Budapest), 1985, No. 3, 31-49.

³⁴ John Breuilly writes concerning the relationship of nationalism and the state that, "First, the modern state creates the conditions under which nationalism as the ideology of political movements can be formed. Second, the idea of nationalism is centrally an idea about taking power in order to establish a certain kind of state... Logically the two concepts of nation - a body of citizens and a cultural collectivity -- conflict. In practice, nationalism is a sleight-of-hand ideology which tries to connect the two ideas together " Breuilly, John. "Nationalism and the State," in Michener, Roger. ed. 1993, 19-48; quotations are on pages 22 and 24.

patriotism or love of one's land and community³⁵ were replaced by the readiness to defend, at any price, the state or the territory in which one lived. This development was, then, theorized by Habermas as state patriotism or constitutional patriotism (loyalty to the state's constitution in which one lives momentarily), in order to give a respectable appearance to the naked subjugation of the atomized individual by the all-powerful state.

Nationalism, as understood in the West, is a typically foreign phenomenon in the non-Western world where, in contrast to the historic nations of the West, there are many historic peoples, populations not ethnically based, but with common histories. Nationalism in the non-Western world serves, therefore, two restricted purposes: to integrate peoples having different cultures and ways of life into a state established within the borders of former colonial territories, that is, as a device of state-building following the Western model; and to promote modernization policies in the face of the resistance of traditional attitudes and practices. India provides a good example of pluralistic nation-building where, as against separatist nationalisms, the state's

Secular nationalism, the official doctrine of India's national identity since independence, seeks to preserve the geographical integrity of India. In principle, it includes all ethnic and religious groups in its definition of the nation, and respects their beliefs and cultures. (Varshney 1993, 230).

In contrast to this pluralistic, secular nationalism stands Hindu nationalism, which affirms that Hinduism is the sole source of national identity providing cohesiveness. Religion is, then, the core of Hindu nationalism³⁶ reminding us of the possible conflict between religious universalism and the nation.

³⁵ According to Meghad Desai the "Gujarati poet Khabandar expressed the notion of nationality succinctly when he wrote early in this century 'Wherever there dwells a Gujarati, there is forever Gujarat.'" Desai, Meghad. 1993, "Constructing Nationality in a Multinational Democracy: The Case of India," in Eley and Suny. eds. 1996, 223-235; quotation is on page 223.

³⁶ However, there are Hindu nationalists giving an extremely large sweep to the definition of who is a Hindu: "A Hindu means a person who regards this land... from the Indus to the Seas as his fatherland as well as his Holyland." Savarkar, V.D. *Hindutva*. Bombay: Veer Savarkar Prakashan, 1989, 110. Varshney summarizes well the three competing themes about India -- territorial, cultural, and religious -- all related to the nationalist stance: "The territorial notion is that India has a 'sacred geography,' enclosed between the Indus river, the Himalayas, and the Seas, and emphasized for twenty-five hundred years since time of the Mahabharata. The cultural notion is that ideas of tolerance, pluralism, and syncretism define Indian society. India is not only the birthplace of several religions (Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, and Sikhism) but in its history it has also regularly received, accommodated, and absorbed 'outsiders' (Parsis, Jews, and 'Syrian' Christians)... In the process, syncretistic forms of culture and even syncretistic forms of religious worship have emerged and become part of India... *Sarva Dharma Sambhava* (equal respect for all religions) is the best cultural expression of such pluralism. Finally, the religious notion is that India is originally the land of the Hindus, and it is the only land which the Hindus can call their own." Varshney 1993, 234.

Chinese nationalism, in contrast, was an expression of the drive toward modernization following the Western model, reflecting, perhaps, an "intellectual alienation from traditional Chinese culture," as Joseph Levenson thought (Levenson 1958, 95). This was a departure from *t'ien-hsia*, the Celestial Empire signifying the world during Chinese history and an adherence to *kuo*, the concept of a country or a nation (ibid., 99-105). However, this nationalism was coupled with a civilizational consciousness -- the conviction concerning the superiority of the Chinese mind and culture -- as the modernists pretended not to touch to the core of Chinese civilizational values, but to modernize only those areas which are of practical importance for the country's material development, through a Nietzschean transvaluation of values. This reform movement was known as the *t'i-yung* rationalization, a movement doomed to failure but prefiguring the coming Maoist revolution.

Nationalism and reformist modernization were also closely linked in Turkey, where Ziya Gökalp elaborated the principles of a total, modernist and secularizing reform of the state by Kemal Atatürk.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE FOCAL POINT OF GLOBALIZATION: SOCIETY

1. The Nature of Society

The term society today carries multiple meanings and is used in all possible senses; therefore, it hardly has a meaning at all. However, it is the focal point of globalizing tendencies, as globalization is entirely conditioned by the congruence of civilizational characteristics and societal evolution.

Society is a collectivity of human beings the boundaries of which are set geographically and/or politically. The designation can be applied to larger or smaller collectivities, and the former may contain several smaller (sub)societies within them (like there is a European society and French, German, Italian, or English societies; or an Arab society based on the common Islamic faith, and Arab societies shaped by a country or region's history). Society is not an organic entity like a community. If its cohesion is ensured through cultural bonds, this is due either to a dominant culture or to the convergence of different community cultures encompassed by it. The texture of a society can vary from very loose to tightly woven; there is absolutely no need that a society should be closely integrated by the domination of a given culture. In world history, all societies were pluralistic, incorporating different cultural groups that frequently lived together in peace, but many times fiercely opposed each other as well. The relationship of coexisting communities, however, depended on a number of complex factors, such as the structuration of society, the power assumed by one or another of the communities, or the environment constituted by the surrounding human world (relations with foreign societies), etc. However, there is no universal society covering the whole globe. The belief in globalization, the endless talk about such a historical process is a last, desperate attempt to achieve the realization of a two-hundred-year-old dream: a world society. In this universalist perspective, societies or human collectivities represent the true terrain and the focal point of globalization processes.

Society can be defined as an ensemble of private and public spaces, but its appearance as a public space is most visible because it is the scene of interaction between individuals, communities, and organized human groups. Such a definition of society is the consequence of the fact that society, like communities, encompasses individual human beings as well as human groups, institutions, and organizations. The collectivity is a *sui generis* phenomenon composed of individual persons, without the two being linked organically, as in communities. However, social facts and events being outcomes of interaction between individuals, individuals and groups, and, finally, between human communities, when speaking of society, our concern is with the contours of public spaces and the transformations these spaces are undergoing. Globalization as a fundamental transformation of cultural orientations, social structures and institutions, and ways of life operates in both private and public spaces, though at a perceptibly superficial level in both.

Society being a complex collectivity constituted by private and public spaces, a distinction between society and a social system is unwarranted, because the concept of the social system does not correspond to anything in empirical reality. The extensive theorizing about reflexively self-referential social systems is one of the fashions of our age.¹ Superimposing a system to society is to create a meta-level in order to better

¹ Luhmann explains briefly but clearly the necessity, in his own view, of applying the systems concept to society: "The sociological classics conceived of differentiation very much as the division of labour. Even Parsons began with 'role differentiation.' The advantage of differentiation could therefore be treated as self-evident. It required no further

explain social phenomena or, rather, to substitute an ideal space to the collective, public space in which posited elements and features of theories that do not fit into the framework of social reality can be located. This allows for a superior explanatory position, in comparison to simple reality. Luhmann's compact theory of society contains extremely important insights and observations, yet the superimposition of systemic considerations is unavoidable in order to accommodate his two theoretically posited principles: the functional differentiation of spheres and sub-spheres of social activities leading to a destruction of the holistic perspective of society and the consequent ever-growing complexity of the social world; complexity which becomes itself, in systems theory, the supreme aim and reality of a society. It is justified to ask if there was ever a society on this earth which did not consist of functionally differentiated spheres of identity and activity. The answer: hardly any. The difference between pre-modern and modern societies lies only in grades of differentiation and of complexity, not in fundamentals.

Differentiation for differentiation's sake and complexity for complexity's sake, -- this end-result has nothing to do with social reality but serves as an impressive intellectual construction.² Such phenomena as segmentation ("subsystems presuppose their environment as a set of equal subsystems"), stratification ("subsystems presuppose their relation to their environment in terms of a rank order of systems"), and functional differentiation ("subsystems specialize themselves on specific functions and presuppose that their environment cares for the rest" (Luhman 1984, 65-66), unnecessarily complicate the concepts referred to. Segmentation can simply be explained as the division of society into distinct groups in accordance with varying characteristics. Stratification is a stage of hierarchization of the existing segments, according to criteria such as allocation of power, resources, status or prestige. Finally, functional differentiation is self-explanatory (as Parsons already used the term). Functional differentiation, in the Luhmannian view, can neither produce social progress along the lines of rational considerations nor revolutions, because it is neutral. One can question, then, why it is that rationalization or the Weberian disenchantment of the world occurred as it did? Did it happen for mystical reasons which took on functional differentiation as a garb?

In addition, as Luhmann himself recognizes it, functional differentiation irrevocably implies an intensification of existing tensions and the creation of new contingencies, in particular because of the non-substitutability of functions. As a consequence,

The continual displacement of problems from one system to another... [leads to a] simultaneous intensification of independencies and interdependencies (dependencies) whose operative and structural balance inflates the individual systems with an immense uncontrollable complexity... Consequently, structural contingencies generate an order of values without considering the possibilities of concretely causing effects, i.e., without considering the attainability of corresponding conditions (Luhmann 1989, 110-112).

argument, a footnote on Adam Smith would be enough. On the whole, increasing differentiation would mean increasing efficiency and therefore progress... Today, systems theory offers the possibility to discontinue this tradition. The concept of differentiation is no longer used in the large and unqualified sense, including differentiation of tasks, roles, activities, terminologies. It can be confined to mean system differentiation, and this reduction gives access to the rich analytical possibilities of systems theory. All systems are based on a difference between system and environment. Therefore, system differentiation means the repetition of of this difference within systems. The differentiated systems become decomposed into subsystem and (internal) environment, for instance as the political system and its societal environment. Subsystem and internal environment add up again to the total system, and this may be repeated several times, according to the number of subsystems. In this sense, system differentiation is equivalent to multiplication of the system by different internal perspectives. It means increasing complexity, depending on the ways in which the difference of systems and environments is realized." Luhmann 1984, 63.

² The adaptation of reality in the form of intellectual construction to the necessities of ideological/theoretical requirements is fittingly evidenced by Luhmann: "In distinction to Durkheim and the predominant sociological tradition, stratification has to be treated as a case of system differentiation - and not simply as an unequal allocation of power, resources and prestige. Then, the historical process of modernization can be described as a slow replacement of stratification by functional differentiation, with religious secularization (*Entsäuberung*), rationalization, industrial and economic development and monetary integration of the economy (capitalism) being partial aspects of this very process. The essential change relates to the primary mode of system differentiation. It transforms the relatively frequent type of stratified (or aristocratic) society into an order of higher complexity and higher improbability: functional differentiation. Everything else is a consequence, including the increasing difference of interactional and societal levels of system building." *ibid.*, 64.

Thus, a theoretical conceptualization of reflexive, self-referential social systems cannot avoid the fatality of a vicious circle because it refers, simultaneously, to the same differentiating process as both the procedure and the final outcome of efficient social change. Nevertheless, Luhmann's insights are extremely valuable in respect to structural conditions (for example, simultaneous autonomy and interdependence, distinct spheres of social activity, etc.), engendering uncertainties or recurrent crises in one or the other of the spheres. The reason for such occurrences is the neutral or mechanical character of the functional differentiation process which does not follow any established ranking order or any strategic priorities corresponding to evaluative judgements.

A further limitation of society is its necessary distinction from the state. In fact, society is what today is called civil society -- and this tells a great deal about our late-modern epoch. The notion of civil society dates back to classical antiquity. Aristotle used the description of *politiké koinonía* to designate the *polis*, the Greek city-state. The concept was later carried over, with the mediation of Roman thinkers, into Western culture, where it was incorporated under different names such as *civitas*, *societas civilis*, or *res publica*. Though it currently appears to many that civil society refers to political society because it has to do with *res publica*, activities in the public space, or with *societas civilis*, a society or collectivity with publicly defined and organized contours -- city, country, nation, region, or state -- this seems to be an error, due to the designation of one aspect of a collectivity's affairs, the affairs of governance, as determinant for society. The political is nothing but one aspect of the shared lifeworld of a community; it is, therefore, justified to consider that civil society stands for the whole society.

The distinction civil is needed to separate this society from the state which, in conditions of late modernity, totally invaded both the private and public spaces of a collectivity. In Hegel's sense, members of civil society "recognize themselves as mutually recognizing each other" (Hegel 1977, #184 and #143), or, in a modern formulation, civil society is "a multiplicity of democratically constituted nonstate public spaces" (Bowles-Gintis 1986, 199). If this interpretation of the notion of civil society is accepted, then it will also be clarified why that society did not need any particular legitimation as, indeed, holding the political power and exercising its prerequisites would always require such a legitimation.³ It is for this reason that numerous contractarian theories served only the purpose of legitimizing the power of those in power. Therefore, it is not even necessary to see the notion of civil society as a normative concept or as an ideal towards the achievement of which human societies strive, because, in the classical sense, civil society does not require justification or legitimation; it is simply there, an empirical fact.

The concept of civil society as opposed to the state has been all the more justified since Aristotle, as this society represented the collectivity of free men of equal status, members of the community. The reality of the *polis* as collective organization based on membership in a community excluded whatever institutional domination of men over men. Such a domination was excluded by the fact that the socially necessary institutional arrangements were based on rules, established by a decision based in the framework of public space, which was governed by the shared values of the community. Domination entered the scene when the

³ Hinting at the problem of legitimation of power and the bureaucratic complexities of the functioning of modern states, Offe gives a comprehensive analysis of the contradictory trends in the modern states' position vis-à-vis civil society: "The more extensive the state's claims to organize and regulate societal affairs become, and the more the concomitant deployment of resources by the state increases, the more hapless, at the same time becomes the claim to (1) sovereign and 'binding' as well as (2) 'rational' decision-making. For on the one hand, the claim to sovereign, imperative, and obligatory decision-making suffers from the continuous expansion of the subject area in which such decision-making is supposed to take place. The affairs that are to be regulated can only be dealt with if the state *cooperates* with the addressees of the state's orders. Consequently, these addressees have to be granted formal veto power, bargaining positions, and factual opportunities to obstruct the state's efforts. And on the other hand, and quite independently of this, the state's claim to national decision-making suffers from the fact that a multiplication of the responsibilities is accompanied by a corresponding increase of instances, authorities, and administrative agents. This results in an internal pluralization and fragmentation of departmental perspectives within the administration, an escalation of respective rivalries, and, on the whole, an increasing unpredictability of the resulting long-term and 'synergetic' effects of individual policies which are nearly impossible to coordinate. Such contradictions between the increase in tasks and the loss of authority and rationality, between increasing assumed responsibilities for social problems and decreasing regulatory capacities as a consequence of this... [lead to a] 'decomposition of state power by increase in functions'." (The latter definition is borrowed by Offe from Dieter Grimm's "The Modern State: Continental Traditions," in Kaufmann, F.X., Majone, G. and Ostrom, V. eds. *Guidance, Control, and Evolution in the Public Sector*. New York and Berlin: 1986, 104). Offe 1996. 63.

tyrants exploited public disagreements and governed arbitrarily, that is, against the common will and against the shared rules of the lifeworld. The civil society in the Greek *polis* was, however, an exceptional historical occurrence. In most other cases, there was a clear-cut cleavage between civil society and the dominating power structure, subsumed under the designation of the state.

The most frequent form of political organization of pre-modern society, known as empire, was still based on the social reality of communities loosely linked together by the dominating power of emperors, khalifs, khans, sultans, or other heads of government. Communal life was only disturbed by economic hardships, for example, the burden of taxation imposed by those at all levels of authority, or the devastation caused by the frequent wars or local skirmishes. Hobbes's Leviathan was the first conceptualization of the separation of society and state in the modern West, and represented a total rupture with the pre-modern age. This historical discontinuity was, in Europe, the result of the transformation of the political organization into centralized nation-states which brutally undertook the task of eliminating communities, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, of the endeavor to visualize and systematize the organization of the public space through the relationship between state power and autonomous (but powerless) individuals, having recourse to various forms of unrealistic, contractarian concepts.

The major innovation of Rousseau was the emphasis placed on the freedom of human beings as citizens of the state and not as members of the civil society. This clearly indicates the identification of civil society with the nation-state, a firm conviction in modernity since the French Revolution. The enormous difference in comparison with the citizens of the *polis* was, however, that for the latter, rights were natural or inborn, whereas in the Rousseauian imagination these rights were derived from the common exercise of legislation carried out by all citizens. The inalienability of natural rights became rights granted by the majority (or the general will, if such a chimeric phenomenon could ever exist) and, *in fine*, by the state power. It was only Kant who insisted upon man's inalienable freedom, an existential trait of his being. Yet he could not devise any practical solution for realizing such a freedom in society, except in deducting it from universal human rationality, postulating inalienable freedom as an ideal.

It is thus evident that for all contractarian approaches the general will was an *a priori* unified will, unified by means of the postulated universal human reason. As a result of such an intrasubjective manoeuvre of legislative universal reason, the subjective right became a universally objective right and/or obligation. As much as Rousseau, Kant postulates universal reason in accordance with which an individual's freedom is limited or circumscribed by the freedom of other individuals. Inalienable freedom and full equality became legally limited freedom and legal equality corresponding to the rational principles codified as fundamental rights by the modern state. The latter granted these to its citizens who, in principle, are enabled in a democratic regime to contribute to and to participate in the legislative process.

2. Major Features of Modern Society

The fundamental transformation of Western society in the modern age was parallel to the creation of the centralized European nation-state. This historical development is well known; it is not necessary, therefore, to retell here its great narrative. It was, however, only in late modernity that certain corrosive features of the construction of modern society became evident -- in fact, as late as the last three decades. Modernity may be characterized as: respect, above all, of individual liberties; electoral democracy; impersonal mechanisms of the market economy, and cosmopolitan tolerance, or acceptance of the mingling of groups of whatever origin, culture, creed, or ideology, within a certain political entity. These features of late modernity resulted in the fragmentation and slowly advancing disintegration of Western society, along with an ever-increasing control of its members by the dominating political and economic powers.

(A) SOCIETY AS THE FOCUS OF 'SACRALIZED' HUMAN LIFE

The disenchantment of the world, as the process of secularization and instrumental-purposive rationalization is called by Weber, produced, in turn, a sacralization of human life and, hence, a sacralization of human society. This was succinctly expressed by the French philosopher, Marcel Gauchet:

The radical originality of modern Western culture is evidenced by the reincorporation into human relationships and activities of that sacral element which hitherto modeled them from the outside. If there is an end of the religious era, it is not manifested by the withering away of belief, but by the re-creation of the human-social universe without any religious framework -- even more through reversing the original sense of the religious element [by sacralizing everything human]. (Gauchet 1985, i; translation by the author).

Human becoming was identified with progress, realized through the self-legislating power of man, and the creation of a social order was not suffered but purposely willed by him (ibid., vi.) More simply, Alain Touraine expressed the same idea, indicating that "the rejection of all revelation and of all moral principles creates a vacuum which is filled by the idea of society, or in other words social utility" (Touraine 1995, 9).⁴ Modern society, thus, is an anthropocentric collectivity with, as corollaries, the belief in the unlimited possibilities of the human mind, in a voluntarism based on scientific progress, and, finally, in man as the master of the universe.

In fact, the important Giddensian insight that modern society is an internally referential or self-referential entity puts the same idea in a postmodern formulation.⁵ And Giddens links the internally referential social relationships to the "reflexive project of the self" (Giddens 1991, 145); the empirically de-centered self is liberated from all kinds of temporal (sequence of generations) or spatial (kinship and ties to places) links,⁶ and its existence is structured around open perspectives, pretended to be rich in possibilities. Institutional or individual internal referentiality is, however, nothing else but the affirmation of human autonomy, the transference of the sacred from the external, religious reference scheme to the human being itself and to its

⁴ The complete citation from Touraine's recent work is as follows: "The triumph of modernity meant the suppression of eternal principles, the elimination of all essences and of artificial entities such as the Ego and cultures in favour of scientific understanding of bio-psychological mechanisms and of the unwritten and impersonal rules that govern the exchange of commodities, words and women... Modernism is an antihumanism, because it is well aware that the idea of man is bound up with the idea of the soul, which necessarily implies the idea of God. The rejection of all revelation and of all moral principles creates a vacuum which is filled by the idea of society, or in other words of social utility. Human beings are no more than citizens. Charity becomes solidarity, and conscience comes to mean respect for the law. Jurists and administrators replace prophets." Touraine 1995, 30.

⁵ "Social systems only become internally referential, on a thorough-going basis at any rate, in so far as they become institutionally reflexive and thereby tied to the colonisation of the future. To the degree that social life is organized according to tradition, taken-for-granted habit or pragmatic adjustment to exogeneous nature, it lacks that internal referentiality fundamental to modernity's dynamics. Crucial to these processes is the evaporation of morality, particularly in so far as moral outlooks are integrated in a secure way with day-to-day practice. For moral principles run counter to the concept of risk and to the mobilising of dynamics and control. Morality is *extrinsic* so far as colonisation of the future is concerned." Giddens. 1991 145; italics in original.

⁶ Fortes's description of Tallensi society is a good example of the intricate relationship between different aspects of the sacral kinship institutions: "One of the striking things about Tale kinship institutions is the socially acknowledged sanction behind them. When we ask why natives so seldom, on the whole, transgress the norms of conduct attached to kinship ties, we inevitable come back either to the ancestor cult or to moral axioms regarded as self-evident by the Tallensi. To study Tale kinship institutions apart from the religious and moral ideas and values of the natives would be as one-sided as to leave out the facts of sex and procreation. On the other hand, our analysis has shown that it is equally impossible to understand Tale religious beliefs and moral norms, apart from the context of kinship. A very close functional interdependence exists between these two categories of social facts. The relevant connecting link, for our present problem, is the axiom implicit in all Tale kinship institutions, that kinship relations are essentially moral relations, binding in their own right." Fortes, M. *The Web of Kinship Among the Tallensi*. London: 1949, 344-346.

relationships to others -- society.⁷ This fact explains that the socialization process of the past practically does not exist anymore, because it is incompatible with individual autonomy, with the state's dominating power, as reinforced by the straightjacket imposed on individual minds by ideologies and the medias' corrosive influence. The socialization process is, nevertheless, still functioning in non-Western societies, where its role is to constrain individuals and populations to internalize an alien society's rules, customs, and ideological principles which are not congruent with the surviving, traditional cultural framework.

Giddens realizes that modernity's controlled society deprives individuals and the social collectivity from the rich, open perspectives of existence. He writes, therefore, about the *sequestration of experience* (ibid., 149) -- all powers in social relationships are objectified and hypostatized as forces totally independent from the collectivity. This loss of human autonomy, because that is meant by the sequestration of experience, is a consequence of the internal referentiality of both self and society, as the extrinsically provided moral principles of pre-modern times were only replaced⁸ by a kind of ethical orientation based on the sacrality of humanness. This state of affairs is reflected in the widespread opinion that whenever an individual commits a crime, it is not that individual who is responsible for it, but society, or, expressed otherwise, the lack of appropriate education and socialization provided by the collectivity. This is not only paradoxical in view of the assumed sacrality and overall autonomy of the individual human being, but it also serves a practical purpose in attributing responsibility to the very general category of society to render invisible (more properly, to mystify) the responsibility of those in power. Another paradox of the individual and institutional reflexivity in modernity is the continued acceptance of the idea of collective responsibility, for example in the case of genocide, which is, however, entirely contradictory to the reigning individualist ideology, but fits well into the conception of the state as the seat of limitless power.

In fact, it is entirely justified to ask what the expression of internal referentiality refers to: in the case of individuals, the self's desires, wants, needs, and preferences; and in the case of society (which lost its cultural heritage, traditions, and shared memories) to the aggregates of the same -- as society is but a collectivity of atomlike individuals. This means that internal referentiality has no other referent but a fact of the past evoked as object of internal referentiality (a regress without end). However, the infinite multiplicity and diversity of individual or aggregate desires, wants, needs, and preferences does not constitute a moral basis for human existence and action. In late modernity we have, as a consequence, a de-centered subject and a fragmented and disintegrating society.

(B) SOCIAL STRUCTURE: DIALECTICS OF PERMANENCE AND CHANGE

Considerable changes took place over the course of modern social development, but these changes do not represent modifications in the fundamental structures of society. The underlying patterns of segmentation, stratification and dominant power relations remained the same. In this sense, Marxist and other leftist conceptualizations (including class categorization and affirmations of class struggle), as well as modernist pretensions forecasting the advent of a literally democratic society, have proven to be dreams. This is not surprising if one takes into account human nature and human interests. The democratization of forms of social structuring, though it relieved some old tensions and created a number of new ones, simply remains an ideologically posited and promoted historic event. Therefore, we have today, as much as before, segmentation and stratification simply because a society, as a consequence of biological and environmental

⁷ But death, the end of human existence, cannot be incorporated in an internally referential human autonomy: "Death remains a great extrinsic factor of human existence; it cannot as such be brought within the internally referential system of modernity. However, all types of event leading up to and involved with the process of dying can be so incorporated. Death becomes a point zero: it is nothing more or less than the moment at which human control over human existence finds an outer limit." Giddens 1991, 162.

⁸ "Moral conscience, perhaps of the kind described by Weber, may have been of key importance in the early modern period, because it was on this basis that extrinsic moral imperatives became converted into intrinsic parameters of socialized action." ibid., 155.

givens of human existence, is always segmented, stratified, and patterned according to the momentarily dominant power relations.

Segmentation is an everyday phenomenon; the collectivity is segmented into ethnically, culturally, and otherwise differentiated groups, especially those separating social strata according to their economic power. It is the most telling disavowal of modernism's ideological tenets that ascriptive characteristics never ceased to be the primordial basis of social segmentation. In citizen-societies, the perseverance of segmentation is even more important than in those in which citizenship requirements are still combined with national features, denoting the impossibility of creating social cohesion through citizen-patriotism. It is enough to glance at today's American society to make one aware of the persistence of segmentation into separate communities. Class segmentation, defined on the basis of the place individuals are located in the occupational structure, does not play such a role as before because the greatest part of society is considered to constitute a middle-class population, in accordance with lifestyle criteria. However, social divisions according to material possessions exist as much today as before, but cannot be qualified as belonging to a class, because the differences based on material wealth fluctuate at a rhythm consonant with the ever-faster rate of change in the economic and political life of the society.

It would be, of course, a sign of ideological blindness not to see that differences in material richness are as important in our age as in pre-modern societies. These differences are becoming ever greater, disparity between haves and have-nots, and thereby more and more of the collectivity's aggregate material wealth is in the possession of a few. But these differences, and the resulting social segmentation, are not shocking in a democratic society, because the distribution of wealth is viewed as arrived at democratically. For example, the number of albums sold by a singer are assimilated to a public approval, thus the millions earned by the singer are considered to be legitimate. This appearance veils the power relations hidden in the background behind publicity, media campaigns, and other inventions of public relations experts.

Stratification seems to have disappeared from modern societies because it cannot be found in its pre-modern forms, especially the hierarchical social orderings of the past. Though it changed its form, stratification effectively survived until late modernity, and even if social strata are undergoing considerable fluctuation, the pattern remained virtually the same. However, the present forms of hierarchical ordering are not only veiled by superficial changes, they are also accepted because they claim to have democratic legitimacy. Thus, two fundamental changes in modern society as compared to past societies are that stratification is not based on birth or it does not reflect, in principle, belonging to a specific group of society, and that the rigidity of stratified order is alleviated by the permanently fluctuating nature of social reality. However, in the course of the restructuring of society during the last two hundred years, ascriptive features, though not birth, gained again an upperhand. For example, the selection of leaders from certain definite social strata maintain quasi-permanent divisions, if not by any other means but the enhanced educational opportunities of the children of formerly privileged groups.⁹ The inherent rigidity in any social stratification led again to some degree of immobility, though this is far from being excessive, in part because democratic legitimating procedures do not guarantee competence, and political or business leaders have to be demoted and changed, not infrequently, if a crisis of legitimacy or economic disasters are to be avoided.

Where is the place of the Luhmannian functional differentiation in this picture? Functional differentiation always existed in all societies, but to a much lesser extent than in today's complex social world. However, it was not functional differentiation which created complexity, but extra-societal factors that led to increasingly complex social relations which, in turn, necessitated functional specialization. Functionalization, like bureaucracy, is simply a consort of modern scientific and technological development and of corollary phenomena, such as demographic explosion, growing needs of environmental adaptation, more and more complicated economic mechanisms, etc. It is also true that social transformations are certainly due, to a large extent, to what Hawley designates as nonproportional changes in the structures of society (Hawley 1986, 115-116). Such nonproportional changes signify that whereas social relations increased in an exponential way, the functional texture of society increased only in a linear fashion. This disproportionality of change between interaction patterns and functional differentiation led, as Luhmann also pointed out, to a more complex social structure, frequently showing discontinuities and imperfections. At critical junctures,

⁹ A special case in this respect is the situation in the former Communist countries where members of the nomenclature switched, without any difficulty, to occupy leading positions in the new political democracies and in the new market-oriented economies, whereas their children benefit from easy access to the universities in Europe and America.

social interaction is blocked or hindered because solutions to complex structural problems are attempted through excessive centralization or bureaucratization, accompanied by overregulation and unnecessary regimentation of social activities. With such growing complexities functions required are continuously multiplied, creating new administrative and technical duties and responsibilities. It was, therefore, the mental and intellectual development in modernity (that always conditions social interaction) which made necessary more numerous and more complicated functions, influencing the material and social conditions of human existence and leading, in consequence, to functional differentiation and nonproportional changes. Structural phenomena, like segmentation and stratification, are thus phenomena completely independent from societal functions; functional differentiation does not replace, enhance, or obstruct them in any way. Excessive functionalization is a specific, concomitant aspect of the evolution of Western civilization in recent history.

From a historical perspective, segmentation and stratification express, and are based on, power relations and power positions. This is an iron law of social life. It did not change with the advent of modernity but became even more pronounced than before in the centralized, bureaucratized modern societies. The overwhelming development of technologies and of the means of communication and information greatly enhanced, especially in late modernity, the possibilities of controlling the lifeworld's social structure by those in power. This led to a curious reversal in the effects on human existence of modern ideologies. As against despotism and tyrannical regimes of the past, modern democratic society alone in world history, made possible power concentrations to a hitherto unknown extent. It is only in modernity that the totalitarian phenomenon appeared. And it is important to note that not only technologies' and coercive techniques' unforeseeable development played an important role in this evolution, but the disappearance of the old, hierarchical type of stratification as well.

Hierarchies are, as a rule, condemned by ideologies of modernity; to defend hierarchical social ordering exposes one to be condemned as not only conservative, but truly reactionary (though Niklas Luhmann got away with it). Nevertheless, hierarchical stratification may have represented in many cases important safeguards which do not exist in modern social conditions. In established hierarchies like medieval, European feudalism, the respective roles of society's members were, at each level, determined, and each strata's rights and duties were well-known to all. The powerholders' position was thus delimited in transparent ways, and transgressing their rights and shirking their duties was, therefore, a move bearing considerable risks. Historically, hierarchies structured societies in a way that all their members found a place in them; all knew exactly where their place was, what rights and what duties their hierarchical position secured them or imposed on them. With the advent of modernity, the ontological security of society's members disappeared; existential insecurity, due to the uncertainties of the modern way of life and the fluctuating social situation created by a versatile democratic legitimation, inevitably led us in late modernity toward social dissonance and fragmentation.

(c) FUNDAMENTAL DISSONANCE AND FRAGMENTATION

The unequal relationship between individuals who make up society, and the more and more powerful state and its faithfully servile bureaucracy, led, through the destruction of organically and culturally constituted communities, to a totally disproportionate distribution of power. This unequal relationship is officially presented as a well-functioning democracy though it deprives individual citizens of all real influence in the management of public affairs, -- atomlike individuals face the all-powerful state. From this empirical fact, ignored voluntarily by representatives of the state and of its organs, as well as by the media and ideologues of various types, all other major features of late modern society are derived. There is no need to revive, once again, the age-old debate concerning Tönnies's famous distinction between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*; the preceding chapter already described in detail the importance of communities in human life. Nevertheless, it is appropriate to quote here how he characterizes these two types of society disclosing their ontological difference:

The theory of the *Gesellschaft* deals with the artificial construction of an aggregate of human beings which superficially resembles the *Gemeinschaft* in so far as the individuals live and dwell together peacefully. However,

in the Gemeinschaft they remain essentially united in spite of all separating factors, whereas in the Gesellschaft they are essentially separated in spite of all uniting factors (Tönnies 1988, 64-65; italics added).

The modern society of abstract individuals is a society of alienated human beings -- people alienated from other fellow human beings and alienated from nature. Alienation in this sense means only an eternal search for identity and for a meaningful existence. The feeling of a definite loss of control by each member of the society over the social conditions of existence is a most important component of the alienation of modern man.

The concomitant concept of alienation is power, because it is power which -- mostly through the means of its centralized, controlling form, the state -- makes people alienated and leads to social disturbances and fragmentation. Power, or the capability of groups of agents, of particular agencies and institutions to impose their will on others in their own interest and not for the sake of the common good, is a relational phenomenon which was constitutive of every social structure in the course of human history. The possibility of power to operate depends on the prevailing interactional social context and on the evolving institutional milieu; this is the reason why in a society where the community's normative belief and value system disappeared, including the guidance of traditions reflecting past generations' experiences, the unbridled course for power and its unhampered exercise, totalitarianism, are the ever-present and ever-menacing fate of individuals. Contrary to today's reigning ideology, democracy is not an assurance against the domination of power; democratic majorities can lead to the suppression of minorities when it is believed that "the will of the majority determines not only what is law but what is good law" (Hayek 1960, 103). Procedures democratic in appearance can produce arbitrary results, especially as people's judgement is not infallible. Democratic controls fail many times to prevent the corruption of democracy into tyranny (as it happened in ancient Athens) (Hayek 1944, 53).

The constitution of late modern society by alienated individuals also explains the increasing inequality, despite public insistence on, and ideological pronouncements in favor of, equality, as proclaimed by the French Revolution two centuries ago.¹⁰ The fact is, there never existed an egalitarian society in this world. Equality was always a dream of religious thinkers¹¹ or of popular tribunes using it as an ideological weapon. Who would dare to say that there is factual equality in the Western civilization today, where, in John Dewey's words, equality became "a creed of mechanical identity which is false to facts and impossible of realization," because "equality denotes the unhampered share which each individual member of the community has in the consequences of associated action" (Dewey 1994, 150-151).¹² In modernity the binary, equal/unequal

¹⁰ Hayek explained well the great importance of differentiation between a belief in all men being equal, or the attitude of treating all humans equally: "Only because men are in fact unequal can we treat them equally. If all men were completely equal in their gifts and inclinations, we should have to treat them differently in order to achieve any sort of social organization. Fortunately, they are not equal; and it is only owing to this that the differentiation of functions need not be determined by the arbitrary decisions of some organizing will but that, after creating formal equality of the rules applying in the same manner to all, we can leave each individual to find his own level. There is all the difference in the world between treating people equally and attempting to make them equal. While the first is the condition of free society, the second means as De Tocqueville described it, 'a new form of servitude'." Hayek 1948, 15-16.

¹¹ A great deal was said of Christian egalitarianism by disciples of modernity. However, it is evident that at the doctrinal level it is posited that Christians are considered equal *before God*, and only in consequence of that in their everyday life. The egalitarianism of the early Christian communities was due to contextual circumstances such as a more emotional than doctrinal coherence and the limited size of these communities as well as the persecution suffered at the hands of a worldly power.

¹² The complete text of this important passage from Dewey's book on *The Public and Its Problems* is as follows: "Fraternity, liberty and equality isolated from communal life are hopeless abstractions... Equality then becomes a creed of mechanical identity which is false to facts and impossible of realization... the outcome is a mediocrity in which good is common only in the sense of being average and vulgar. Liberty is then thought of as independence of social ties, and ends in dissolution and anarchy. It is more difficult to sever the idea of brotherhood from that of a community, and hence it is either practically ignored in the movements which identify democracy with Individualism, or else it is a sentimentally appended tag. In its just connection with communal experience, fraternity is another name for the consciously appreciated goods which accrue from an association in which all share, and which give direction to conduct of each. Liberty is that secure release and fulfillment of personal potentialities which take place only in the rich and manifold association with others: the power to be an individualized self making a distinctive contribution and enjoying in its own

relationship was displaced to a different level in comparison to the pre-modern world as a result of technological developments and changing social mentalities. Today, it seems that the trend was reversed and as a result of new technology and the consequent transformation of mentalities, inequality is growing at a hitherto unknown pace.¹³ In a society composed of atomlike individuals inequality is, then, a major driving force of fragmentation and disintegration, especially when it reaches proportions of impoverishment, which contradicts expectations of progress and of continuous improvement of living conditions. It must be said that in hierarchical societies where equality never was an ideal, inequalities existed and persisted but would have never increased in such a manner as in the industrialized modern world. This is the reason why there is so much talk of rising and deceived expectations which push the orientation of social transformations more and more toward inequality.

Inequality is growing because there is no real solidarity in modern society, in contrast to communities where the cultural and other links between a community's members are the basis on which solidarity thrives. If in hierarchical societies there is no solidarity on the whole, there certainly is between people who find themselves at one or another rank of the hierarchical division, automatically creating community relationships. This is perhaps the greatest misfortune of the society of the modern West: the lack of solidarity between autonomous individuals because such a solidarity cannot be artificially created. The state cannot replace either the communal belongings destroyed long ago or the waning family and kinship ties which offered to each relative genuine support in difficult circumstances.

(D) BELIEF IN PROGRESS AND CONSUMERISM

In late modernity, belief in progress disappeared -- except in the ideologies of those who materially or politically benefit from the maintenance of the unrealistic faith in infinite progress. According to Touraine, "the assertion that progress leads to affluence, freedom and happiness, and that there is a close connection between these three objectives, is no more than an ideology to which history has constantly given the lie" (Touraine 1995, 2). In fact, what is mostly ignored is that progress was condemned by its own success, reaching its climax in the abundance of consumer society. It was abundance that actually killed progress, together with the so-called unintended consequences of technological development and the consumer habits of sacralized humanity, like environmental degradation or increasing social impoverishment. Therefore, consumerism and progress are closely linked in modern social history, and late modernity represents the end-phase of this relationship.

In modernity, society became a market where only material values are recognized, only exchange takes place (excluding, as a matter of course, solidarity), and the quest for money and an uncertain identity replaces the quest for cultural and moral values. It makes no difference whether consumption concerns goods available on the mass markets of fashion dominated by publicity or lifestyle promotions, or whether it concerns services up to the point of evident unreasonableness (but always in the limits of legality), in order to increase sales and profits. Lester Thurow clarified the essence of consumerism through describing the role of the media in it:

way the fruits of association. Equality denotes the unhampered share which each individual member of the community has in the consequences of associated action... Equality does not signify that kind of mathematical or physical equivalence in virtue of which any one element may be substituted for another. It denotes effective regard for whatever is distinctive and unique in each, irrespective of physical and psychological inequalities. It is not a natural possession but it is a fruit of the community when its action is directed by its character as a community." Dewey 1994, 150-151.

¹³ "Increasing inequality is also understandable as an inherent tendency of modernity," writes Göran Therborn, and continues: "Any open-minded accumulation of social resources that takes place in an *aggregate*, rather than in a bounded *collectivity* of people should be expected to exhibit a tendency towards increasing inequality. Without the mechanisms of redress and redistribution possible in a collectivity, the success at utilizing available resources at round one, should be expected to constitute an advantage in round two, and so on. Global accumulation and global aggregation have outpaced global collectivization." Therborn, Göran. "Routes To/Through Modernity," in Featherstone, Lash, and Robertson. eds. 1995, 124-139; quotation is on page 130, italics in original.

Human culture and human values are the first time being shaped by a profit-maximizing electronic media. Never before have societies left it almost completely to the commercial marketplace to determine their values and their role models... The media simply provide whatever sells whatever maximizes profits... What sells is speed and instant gratification... For the TV hero, death and all real limitations are abolished; there is no duty or sacrifice, no role for the community, no common good; all behavior is depicted as legitimate; feelings, not actions, are supposed to demonstrate values. Emote, don't think. Communicate, but don't commit. Be cynical, since all heroes will ultimately be shown to be fools (Thurrow 1996, 82 and 85).

The domination of society by the market and by consumer trends reflects the elimination of temporal perspectives for the benefit of the present alone. Volatility and ephemerality, the passion of the new for the new, is constitutive of everything which is modern. The increasing importance of identity-creating imagery, the search not for the real thing but for the image projected by the media, -- these phenomena automatically contribute to the advent of a more and more unstable and fragmented society in which inequality is growing through unemployment and the diminishing real life-chances for all. Such an evolution -- implying the elimination of all stable points of reference -- had unforeseeable consequences for the sacralized human being, because society as a market and the consumer identity deprived him of the dignity of his person, as a consumer has only the value of the money he possesses. Through the promised possibilities of the market and through the passion of buying -- both enhanced by more and more extensive publicity campaigns -- indoctrinated consumers became a facile prey of the controlling powers in society. It is undeniable in my eyes that publicity is a form of control exerted by the economic powers of the moment. Consumerism then replaces such old devices in mastering the multitudes as the famous Roman gesture of offering bread and circus to the people for the satisfaction of their physical needs and violent inclinations. A society without past and without history but ripe with circumstances producing constantly degrading conditions of life, may well be on the road to a form of schizophrenia -- a lack of congruence between cultural and social realities, an incoherence between temporal, social and material signifiers and their referents.

3. The Metamorphosis of National Society Into a Society of Citizens

Societies throughout the modern period have been national societies, that is, societies living within the boundaries of a nation-state. The formation of national societies, which first became perceptible in the late Middle Ages, continued through the Renaissance and the Reformation, was completed at different moments of Western history. Some European nations were already formed during the earliest period, such as the English, the Swiss, the Spanish, the Germans (as founding collectivity of the Empire), the Hungarians, the Czechs, and the Poles. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the French, the Dutch, the Belgians, and the Russians formed nations, and only in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries did the Italians or the Romanians form such societies. Many nations obtained an independent existence with the waning of the age of Empires. The classical example is that of the Greeks.

No development of national societies can be evidenced in other civilizations and continents -- except those where populations of European origin lived and which were dependencies of European powers until their liberation like the Americans, Canadians, or Australians -- because the concept of nation is not applicable in other civilizations. India, the variously constituted African political entities, and the Mezoamerican Indian empires, were not based on national communities. Although China has to be included in the latter category, it is evident that its main constitutive element were the Han Chinese, an ethnic but not a national community. The formation of nation-states in Asia, Africa, and South America was, as it were, a Western legacy and therefore did not correspond to any societal reality.

The transformation of national societies into citizen-societies is a major phenomenon in modernity. It means that instead of belonging to a national community that determines the basis of membership of a social collectivity, *it is the fact of being a citizen of a given state which is the decisive characteristic of this membership*. This transformation reflects the permanent interface between atomlike individuals and the all-powerful state, a completely inequitable relationship. Until national societies existed, membership was acquired through belonging to the national community constitutive of the state, or to an accepted minority living in the territory of the state, though this belonging became more and more fictionalized. The new situation opposing individuals to state power was formalized in the status of citizenship, a decisive

development for the future of Western countries. The appearance of citizen-societies reveals two important contradictions: first, it legitimizes the definite separation of the state from civil society, a development which, in turn, may sound the deathknell of the state. Second, it is based on the requirement of becoming citizen of a state when the destiny of the nation-state, or of any existing state-formation, for that matter, is more and more questioned. The advent of citizen-societies, in this perspective, contributes to the crisis of the state and points towards an evolution, more and more evident, in the direction of more or less extensive and inclusive regionalisms in which citizenship loses its importance.

There were two main reasons for the transformation of national societies into citizen-societies. In the first place, it was the result of an extensive intermingling of populations between nation-states belonging to the Western cultural orbit (the disappearance of pure nation-states), and the growing consciousness of ethnic, cultural, religious, or other minorities (of varying size and influence) in their differences with the ruling nation. This evolution culminated in the declaration by President Wilson of the right of peoples to self-determination. In the second place, worldwide migration, due mainly to economic reasons, as well as to the devastation of wars conducted with technically sophisticated, modern weaponry widely distributed by Western technology, created such extensive movements of populations between different civilizational areas that the notion of national societies gradually became obsolete. This migratory movement, of which the direction is almost exclusively South-North (in distinction from the nineteenth century, when it was East-West), was obviously facilitated by the rapid development of transportation and communication in late modernity. At the same time, it aggravated the crisis of the state -- especially the crisis of the welfare-state -- in Western countries by its unforeseen magnitude. At present, we live in the age of such huge migratory movements of populations that were not seen in the course of the last millennium; this forewarns the gravest challenge for the nation-states of the West in the coming century.

To be a citizen does not mean to have a personality, to be an individual human being with his own good and bad characteristics; it is an abstract, idealized concept, compared sometimes to some sort of *Sittlichkeit*.¹⁴ Citizenship can be defined only in relation to a state (a state one can change as many times during a lifetime, as respective regulations permit) because it is the state which grants the quality to be a citizen and defines duties and obligations, rights and benefits of those in its citizenry. This is the same for someone who was born in a state, or for someone who was naturalized into the state he has chosen as home. In fact, the acquisition of citizenship by birth is a residue of the national society bounded by the limits of a nation-state. The entry in a citizen-society is the legal admission by the state, following the desire of the newcomer; it is the state which admits the new citizen into the bonds constituted by the duties and rights granted by that state to its citizens. O'Neill expresses with great clarity the reigning view why the transformation into citizen-society is inevitable:

The expulsion of [the traditional concept of] *Sittlichkeit* from a theory of justice is unavoidable in societies which are not ideologically homogenous. Yearnings for a more determinate view of citizenship is at best nostalgia; at worst they fuse citizenship with nationality and culture and license forms of racism, hostility, or exclusion (O'Neill 1988, 713).

But this is a fallacy. It is currently characteristic of the protagonists of citizen-society to have recourse against any objection. Accusations of racism allow minority groups to cut short the argument which could jeopardize their liberal and/or socialist point of view. It is not through the creation of citizen-societies alone that racial discrimination, hostilities due to economic difficulties, or exclusion from the benefits of the state can be eliminated.

¹⁴ O'Neill writes on the distinction between abstraction and idealization, especially in defending Rawls's theory of justice: "An idealized account or theory not merely omits certain predicates that are true of the matter to be considered. Idealization requires abstraction, but they are not the same thing... Abstract but not idealized accounts of agents and their reasoning can apply to agents of diverse *Sittlichkeit*; idealized accounts of agents and their reasoning not merely do not refer to the varying historical and cultural characteristics of particular agents, but apply only to idealized, hypothetical agents whose cognitive and volitional features may be missing in all actual human agents. Typically idealized models of human agency assume various superhuman capacities, such as completely transitively ordered preferences, complete knowledge of the options available and their outcomes, and unwavering powers of calculation." O'Neill 1988, 712-713.

The promotion of citizen-societies is a solution to problems due to the arrival of new minorities and their integration into a state's society. The qualification newcomer is destined to clarify that in most countries there have always been minorities, sometimes called historic minorities, whose existence was always problematic in modernity's nation-state (as against the former great empires where the integrative force was not loyalty to a nation but to a ruler). The designation newcomer indicates recently immigrated people in established states -- national or federal -- almost exclusively from countries belonging to other civilizational areas than the West. This immigration is mostly motivated by economic difficulties in the home countries of the emigrants who search for a better living for themselves and their descendants in countries of the industrialized West. Their accelerated arrival during the last decades coincided with a deteriorating economic and social situation in the countries of destination created by the deepening crisis of the welfare state and the effects of economic globalization.

Contrary to the population movements or refugee waves in the Western world until the aftermath of the World War II, these immigrants are totally different in their ways of life, customs, beliefs, and value systems from the inhabitants in the target countries, as they were socialized into completely different societies and were conditioned by the worldview and the morals in other cultures. The transformation of national societies into citizen-societies is, therefore, finalized by efforts to complete the latter's characteristics by the notion of multiculturalism. Multiculturalism is today a hot topic in the United States of America -- a country which has been nothing but an immigrant country since its inception, because the indigenous population was practically exterminated. As its sizable historic minority, the African American population demonstrates,¹⁵ the melting pot theory believed to be functioning in American society since the nineteenth century, simply did not happen.¹⁶

Intermingling of populations of various cultural origins can be considered as a principal vehicle of globalization.¹⁷ It is in the perspective of cultural globalization that some speak of world culture as if mixing some customs and values would already signify the birth of a new cultural conglomerate. World culture protagonists mean, however, nothing but the extension of Western culture, especially its American version, to the whole globe. In this sense, *cultural globalization is cultural imperialism*. An empirical proof of this thesis is offered by the Caribbean region in which American political imperialism was simply replaced by American cultural imperialism, justified by the fact that the livelihood of most of the island states depends on the continuous inflow of millions of American tourists each year. Globalization for the Caribbean, then, means that it gradually becomes culturally, economically and politically the backyard of the United States.

Those who defend the thesis of a nascent world culture do not even think of knowing the cultural treasures of all civilizations, but hope that through selective acceptance of different cultural features from one culture to another, a global culture will be created. In the most simplistic way, it is taken for granted that

¹⁵ A very perceptive, honest, and excellent evaluation of the situation of African Americans in the USA was given in: Patterson, Orlando. "The Paradox of Integration." *The New Republic*, 6 November 1995, 24-27. Patterson also analyzed the problems facing Caribbean immigrants in the US in connection with Colin Powell's decision not to run for President: "The Culture of Caution." *ibid.*, November 1995, 22-26. A very realistic article on the American problem of immigration appeared in the November 1996 issue of *The Atlantic Monthly* (51-80) by Professor David M. Kennedy under the title: "The Price of Immigration: Can We Still Afford To Be a Nation of Immigrants?"

¹⁶ "The notion that the intense and unprecedented mixture of ethnic and religious groups in American life was soon to blend into a homogeneous end product has outlived its usefulness, and also its credibility... The point about the melting pot... is that it did not happen." Glazer, Nathan and Moynihan, Daniel P. *Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians, and Irish of New York City*. 2. ed. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1970; quoted in Moynihan 1993, 22.

¹⁷ "The smooth operation of the machine does not demand philosopher-kings, or enlightened citizens, but 'equals,' interchangeable elements capable of interlocking efficiently with one another in innumerable combinations. The variety of the possible relationships condemns the actors of the social game to homogeneity, to standardization... there are no longer opposing poles of conformity and nonconformity. There is only an endless race for uniformity, because as the runners move forward, it transforms the image that they are pursuing," as Gu  henno summarized our contemporary society's vying for uniformity. He adds with a little malice: "The breaking down of the world into modular elements now permits the creation of mass-produced difference: it is the combination of elements that creates the unique -- a unique combination of standard elements." Gu  henno 1995, 79, 81 and 85.

through the influence of Western media, Western economic production methods and, particularly, of Western consumption patterns, populations all over the world will be converted to the tenets of our own late-modern culture, already sadly impoverished in comparison to our own past. What is most astonishing is that none of the protagonists of global culture ever thought to imagine a solution according to which coexisting cultures and civilizations, though borrowing from each other or exchanging between each other certain elements completing their cultural repertoire, as it happened always in history, could live together peacefully without giving up their ways of life and cultural traditions in favor of a culture-transfer.

Economic globalization is the other main pillar of globalization processes. Only one aspect of it will be dealt with here concerning two extremely serious consequences of the South-North migration. First, what will happen with the countries whose people, especially the young, the well educated and the enterprising, leave their respective countries searching for a better living in the West -- when these countries, in order to achieve higher levels of development, would need all the talent, all the goodwill, all the helping hands to realize a brighter future for themselves and for the coming generations. There is, in this respect, a profound paradox in the Western attitude: we help and assist non-Western countries with expertise, finance and investment, sometimes at the expense of the satisfaction of real needs of our own peoples, to achieve a gradual elevation of living standards through the inclusion of these countries into the globalizing world economy. At the same time, we attract and accept those who could contribute, perhaps the most, to the achievement of a better life in those countries.

Second, the unforeseen amplitude of migration puts such a burden on the economies and social infrastructures of the receiving Western countries that these countries are unable to take on any more newcomers. They are already in the throes of a crisis of the welfare state, following modifications in the population's age-structure and chronic unemployment due to profound technological changes and rigid attitudes. Thus, they cannot absorb and provide for the endless incoming stream of migrants. This is not to mention the problems of cultural adaptation between the migrants and the population of the receiving countries, clearly evidenced by hostilities, violence, and an inability to understand the other's ways, customs, and values. This lack of mutual understanding, hostility, and violence is not racism; they are unfortunate consequences of a historical situation and of the real ineptitude of national leaders, politicians, and self-professed humanitarians on all sides. Western leaders are unable to create circumstances in the migrants' home countries that would permit them to stay at home in decent, gradually improving material conditions and, above all, in their customary cultural and social world. In sum, the citizen-society is not a panacea for all contemporary problems.

4. The Imperative of Human Rights in a World of Citizens

The analysis of late modern citizen-society leads to the discovery of the imperative necessity of inventing human rights. The situation of the atomlike individual in the face of the all-powerful state, the citizen whose rights, duties and obligations are determined by the state which endows, at its pleasure, its population with freedoms, entitlements and rights (though, in theory, the citizenry's status is decided upon by the collectivity of citizens in a democratic process), obviously makes it unavoidable to protect individual persons through special legal or moral provisions. The well-known specialist of human rights, Jack Donnelly, states that the necessity of human rights is justified by the "moral hazard represented by the modern state" (Donnelly 1989, 113).¹⁸ In fact, human rights appear as a legal category today, although their legitimation should be, in the first place, derived not of legal texts but of fundamental moral convictions found in all cultures.¹⁹ The most

¹⁸ "Due to the breakdown of an either ontologically or consensually conceived universal moral order, we have historically opted for a conception of 'rights,'" Kratochwil wrote recently. "Hence, competing considerations can normally enter the debate only via particular rule-based exemptions or exceptions, or as part of the never exhaustively specifiable 'background' considerations imposing certain limits on the exercise of rights." Kratochwil, Friedrich. "Sovereignty as Dominion: Is There a Right to Humanitarian Intervention?" in Lyons and Mastanduno. eds. 1995, 21-42; quotation is on page 34.

¹⁹ Though humanitarianism has to be distinguished from human rights as understood worldwide, the links between the two are obvious. In this respect, it is necessary to refer to some thinkers, like Jean-Claude Guillebaud in France, who

important human rights texts, from the Declaration of the Rights of Man of the French Revolution, to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations (and subsequent documents of international bodies), do not really have a legally binding character because, until the present time, no international body possesses a legislative power over sovereign states. All these pronouncements are based on the moral convictions of human beings.

Nietzsche expressed the essence of modern legality by considering law "a matter of the will to eternalize a momentary relation of power" (Bloch 1986, 182), whereas Weber clearly characterized modern society as legal domination (Habermas 1993, 541-543). The Weberian, as well as the late modern legal conceptions are based, of course, on the Kantian presupposition of a morally legislative faculty of autonomous reason in every man, where the legitimation of legal domination is derived from human rationality, or the rational character of human institutions. The legitimacy of the modern legal order is thus guaranteed by a rationality reduced to juridical formalities because the laws promulgated by democratically elected authorities must be accepted by all rational persons if their preparation and promulgation followed prescribed legal and rational procedures (Habermas describes it as *Regelrationalität*, which is a perfect correlate to instrumental-purposive rationality or the Weberian *Zweckrationalität*). This means that legal domination can be established through rational and legitimate principles, or, in other words, legal domination must correspond to legitimizing legal formalities. This empty legalism led, of course, to absolutely nonsensical situations, as it could and can be used to authorize immoral comportments and human rights abuses by autocratic and totalitarian regimes and rulers. The best example of such an unacceptable legalism in our times is given by the argumentation of those who were in power in former Communist countries and their defenders, champions of velvet revolutions. Such an argumentation posits that leaders of former Communist regimes cannot be judged for the acts they committed at the time of their rule because they carried out their actions in a legally authorized way, in accordance with the legislation then in vigor. Legalism makes this argumentation superficially legitimate because there is no mention of how the legitimate laws and the whole jurisdictional framework came into being; as if the legitimacy of the laws would not be derived from their having been promulgated by the democratically elected representatives of a country's population. Of course, to accept and believe in such a thesis, one must be a protagonist of velvet revolutions, carrying over the totalitarian heritage of the past into the present.

Human rights, including basic freedom and autonomy, can only be considered in a morally and legally valid manner if they correspond to a human being's status as recognized in an appropriate framework -- like a community. Jean-François Lyotard recently wrote that "what makes human beings alike is the fact that every human being carries within him the figure of the other. The likeness that they have in common follows from the difference of each from each" (Lyotard 1989, 136).²⁰ This is a true and vibrant formulation of the universal basis of human rights. However, Lyotard introduces a confusing and counterfactual distinction between what he calls a republican principle and a democratic fact. He identifies the *demos* with community (for example, a nation) in which individual differences are not important, whereas in the republican or citizen-society alterity, alienness is revealed through communication or linguistic interlocution. Thus, he misrepresents the citizen-membership of a society which, instead of the (demotic) community, enables the other to acquire the status and consecutive rights, through functional universalization inherent in speech, the "addressing the other" (ibid., 139; italics in original).

consider that the appearance of humanitarianism, "this ostentative competition in favor of the victim," is a "powerful phenomenon of symbolic compensation. Humanitarianism, in sum, is the confuse expression of bad social conscience." (Guillebaud, Jean-Claude. *Entre progrès et régression. Le Débat*, mars-avril 1995, 8-11; quotation on page 9.

In the same issue of *Le Débat*, Pierre Lellouche sees in humanitarianism the "syndrom of the powerlessness of the modern State to resolve the great social and international problems of our times." But he mainly blames the media and, in particular, television for the degradation of humanitarian attitudes regarding entertainment. Lellouche, Pierre. *Les sanglots de l'impuissance. ibid.*, 11-19; both quotations in author's translation).

²⁰ Lyotard discusses the problem of human rights with reference to Hannah Arendt, who wrote in *The Origins of Totalitarianism*: "It seems that a man who is nothing but a man has lost the very qualities which make it possible for others to treat him as a fellow man." For Lyotard, Arendt has defined the "fundamental condition of human Rights: A human being has rights only if he is other than a human being. And if he is to be other than a human being, he must in addition become an *other* human being. Then 'the others' can treat him as their fellow human being. What makes human beings alike is the fact that every human being carries within him the figure of the other. The likeness that they have in common follows from the difference of each from each." Lyotard 1989, 136.

The major shortcoming in respect to human rights is that they are based, in accordance with modernity's conceptual framework, on the individual. Only individuals can have these rights, not groups, communities, or whatever other forms of man's associative life; in consequence, it is necessary to recognize the *sui generis* character of group or community rights (Segesvary 1995). Only individuals have moral worth: they only constitute "self-originating sources of moral claims."²¹ All individuals are equal to each other, they all have equal moral status, and the society and the state must treat each individual with equal concern and respect, granting to each of them equal rights and entitlements. In Jack Donnelly's words: "Human rights are the rights one has simply because one is a human being, as they usually are thought to be." He adds that the moral universality of human rights is completed by their international normative universality because of their acceptance by the whole international community (Donnelly 1989, 1-2).

Thus, human rights are derived from two sources: first, from the dignity of being human, that is, they are inherent in the sacralized human being; and second, from social and international practices reflecting the conviction that human nature is as much a project as it is given. In respect to the second consideration, Donnelly nevertheless recognizes that this aspect represents "a social choice of a particular moral vision of human potentiality, which rests on a particular substantive account of the minimum requirements of a life of dignity" (ibid., 18). It is, then, evident that we face here an ideologically founded ontology which excludes from the moral space of human rights all collective or group rights. The community, which certainly itself is a source of valid moral claims is ignored in order to safeguard the individual's sanctity. To state it briefly, the community or other human groups are not existent, they are omitted from the vision of the individualistic human rights conception.

This egalitarian individualism was, in truth, reinforced through the transformation of national societies into citizen-societies because it serves the objectives of the latter by ignoring all differences between humans beings. Exceptions to this rule are only endorsed when in line with dominating ideological commitments, as in the United States where affirmative action was accepted because it was believed to be indispensable to reach a color-blind society. Such an orientation engenders a genuine conflict between real human needs and respect for modernity's ideological tenets. In fact, many individual human rights cannot be effective outside a group or community framework: how can one use one's own language alone? How can one benefit from teaching in this language, if not in the group's or community's schools? How can one practice one's religion if not in a religious group's designated places of worship? And, in general, how can one share one's cultural treasures and values in solitude? The respect of human dignity and human otherness in today's culturally pluralistic societies requires the protection of cultural communities, and the renunciation of egalitarian formalism by granting citizenship rights to diverse cultural groups, not only to individuals.²² Differential human rights, especially in the domain of cultural not physical needs (because everybody needs a shelter, food, etc., but not necessarily, for example, the right to have access to the media), would not be irreconcilable with citizenship rights. The few areas of conflict between them could be resolved through understanding each other's needs -- if requirements of reigning ideologies, of the controlled society, and of those in power would not obstruct such a mutual understanding.

Genuine, *sui generis* group rights have to be clearly distinguished from the rights of individuals acting collectively. It is wrong to declare that self-determination is not a group right but a right derived from the collective action of individuals, because the right of self-determination is a prerogative of a community sharing cultural and other characteristics. It is, however, correct that recognition of group rights necessitates abandoning the single, national culture idea, and reforming the structures and modify the prerogatives of the nation-state. In other words, it is indispensable to separate the national community from the state, the concentration of all the powers that be. Pluralism, even in the domain of human rights, means at least a certain amount of relativism. Jack Donnelly recognizes as well when discussing cultural relativism that human beings are conditioned by their culture, but he refuses to accept that rights are culturally determined. If it would be so, he posits, then there could not be any universally valid human rights. In addition, human rights advocates exclude any kind of collective rights or entitlements because they can be used against the

²¹ Rawls, John. Kantian Construction in Moral Theory. *Journal of Philosophy*, 1980, 77: 543.

²² "The modern notion of equality," wrote Charles Taylor, "will suffer no differences in the field of opportunity which individuals have before them. Before they choose, individuals must be interchangeable; or alternatively put, any differences must be chosen." Taylor, Charles, 1979a, 132.

individual. There is an ideological bias here because the recognition of group or community rights could be considered genuine claims against the state (see the case of minority rights, the *par excellence* collective rights), just as the individualistically conceived human rights, on the condition that the identity of the group or community is distinguished from the state.

I propose to distinguish two sorts of group rights. First, quasi-group rights based on purely natural -- biological or accidental -- origin, among them sex and sexual orientation, age, physical disability, etc. These rights are justifiably included in the individual human rights regime because the differentiation of, and eventual discrimination against, these groups is not linked to cultural or social, that is, man-made contexts (Segesvary 1995, 101). Second, *sui generis* group rights,

Derived from the constitution of a specific social and cultural environment by groups of men, having its distinctive symbolic orderings, belief- and value-systems, and, particularly important, shared historic experience... *The origin of group rights resides in the fact that members of the group are discriminated against precisely because of their group membership and not for their specific characteristics, qualities or defects, as individuals...* For the constitution of a group's rights as *sui generis* legal provisions, the integrative force of solidarity and loyalty within the group is extremely important because it assures the group's survival, first, through the vicissitudes of successive ages and generations (temporal dimension) and, second, when the group is dispersed across distant regions and varying environments (spatial dimension). The continuity of a group's existence in history is the major argument to justify the recognition of *sui generis* group rights (ibid., 102; italics in original).

Civilizational differences, which are becoming more and more evident in our contemporary world, make it inevitable to recognize group rights without abandoning the prevailing doctrine concerning individual human rights. In addition, various aspects of human rights should be included into non-Western civilizational perspectives. The problem of human rights is not considered in the same way by all cultures;²³ to impose our views on other human collectivities, under the aegis of humanitarian globalization, is not only unpracticable but creates conflicts and confrontations on the world scene. The only possible approach to widen the acceptance of our human rights ethics is to convince the elite and ruling forces of other cultures to incorporate in their ethical framework basic principles of certain human rights.

Acceptance and application of human dignity is not contrary to any of the world's major civilizational frameworks if it is not linked to some other concepts which are placed, in our Western culture, at a similarly high level as human dignity -- for example, social or economic equality, or the freedom of choice in all avenues of life. However, no conscious effort has been made yet to reveal and consolidate the human rights aspects in each civilization's cultural framework, and to harmonize our human rights conceptions with those in other civilizations. In fact, as in other matters, it was not recognized until today that global efforts aiming at the protection of individual and group-oriented human rights cannot succeed if the concept of human rights itself does not conform to a given civilization's framework. *Respect for human rights cannot be imposed, much less imported with alien value systems, but has to be culturally and contextually validated.* This does not mean, of course, that human rights are not to be sharply delimited from the powers of the state and from the prerogatives and privileges of social strata and protected from the abuses of powerful political and economic groups. This has to be done, however, in the accepted terms of the symbolic order and justified in accordance with prevailing belief and value systems.

Human rights not only represent entitlements but also generate duties, and this has to be taken into account when the human rights regime, of which the West is the protagonist, is validated and justified in other civilizational contexts. The globalization of human rights depends upon the recognition that human

²³ For example, Piscatori shows clearly how difficult it is for Muslims to adhere to the Western human rights doctrine: "Many Muslim states have difficulty in subscribing to the emerging law of human rights and particularly object to the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and subsequent documents which fail to take into account Islamic sensitivity about the role of women and the freedom to change religion. The language of inalienable rights in these matters disturbs Muslims who believe that the only unassailable rights are God's and, at any rate, this teaching on women and the sanctity of the faith is at once more binding and more satisfying than any article of an international covenant. Islam, they also feel, can be morally instructive in the search for a juster international economic order since it combines respect for private property with commitment to the welfare of all citizens." Bull and Watson. eds. 1984, 321.

rights have corresponding duties as well -- duties toward the individual's own physical or spiritual existence, and duties towards the welfare of the individuals' respective community and society.

5. The Essence of Controlled Society

Though modernity evolved in the direction of a controlled society since the seventeenth century, the controlled nature of the private and public spaces of social interaction became dramatic, or one could say unbearable, only in late modernity. Controlled society is the result of technological progress,²⁴ offering unlimited possibilities for the extension of more and more dominant power structures. At the same time, it gives birth to an unexpected child of which the appearance, however, was foreseeable: globalization. *Globalization is one aspect of the extension of control over the whole world -- world culture, world economy, world organization, etc. -- of any of the actual or aspirant political and economic powerholders.*

Control is more than an influence; it is surveillance of social interactions in an institutionalized form, with the purpose to achieve the predetermined goals of those in power, however the latter is defined. Controlled society is, of course, not the same thing as the well-known phenomenon of social control practiced within communities, groups and other entities of civil society, or the employment of diffused control techniques by different types of authorities at varying levels of the society in pre-modern times. Controlled society is, first and foremost, based on impersonal techniques of supervision contributing, in an ever greater extent, to bureaucratic processes in every domain of life. These represent in late modernity quasi-totalitarian tendencies.

The foundation of society's control over both impersonal techniques and bureaucratic administration was, as Max Weber recognized it, carried out by rationalization, penetrating the public as well as the private spaces in society. One of the basic paradoxes of rationalization is that it instituted, through establishing impersonal criteria, the regulation of even interpersonal relationships, in contradiction to the reigning individualist doctrine of the Enlightenment. People became *qua* things in order to facilitate the bureaucratic and impersonal governance. In our time, it is evident that rationalization is not a *sui generis* phenomenon but designates an ideological-philosophical orientation corollary to the scientific, technological, and political-organizational revolution of modernity. There is a reciprocal relationship between rationalization and modern scientific, technical, and political developments. One feeds on the other and they are, simultaneously, the originators of each other and the result of each other's success. It is certain that rationalization did not reduce the amount of information to be processed by society -- an achievement frequently attributed to it by believers in technological progress -- but increased this amount to an unimaginable extent through the functional differentiation and social complexities which followed the rationalization process.

Every control requires a program that sets out a scheme of purposive action towards a predetermined goal in terms of teleonomic processes, that is, obeying to laws and rules of those processes, but not to goals determined outside the rationalizing context and information technological framework. This is an evidently circular conceptualization reformulating the essence of self-referentiality. The program is, in addition, based on methods of a reifying and hypostatizing reduction of meaningful reality. Reifying and hypostatizing not with a view to reduce the amount of information, but to abstract from social reality quantifiable and impersonally defined aggregates, manipulable with formal methodologies and incorporated in technical considerations. The result is the idea, for example, of piecemeal social engineering to realize the goals assigned to social change predetermined by those in power. In the temporal dimension, however, long-term programming is fraught with dangers even at the age of information and communication technologies, because the results will not be as expected if the replication of programs deviate from the models.

²⁴ "Beginning most noticeably in the United States in the late nineteenth century, the Control Revolution was a dramatic if not abrupt discontinuity in technological advance," wrote James Beniger. "Indeed, even the word *revolution* seems barely adequate to described the development," he continued, "within the span of a single lifetime, of virtually all of the basic communication technologies still in use a century later: photography and telegraphy (1830), rotary power printing (1840s), the typewriter (1860s), transatlantic cable (1866), telephone (1876), motion pictures (1894), wireless telegraphy (1895), magnetic tape recording (1899), radio (1906), and television (1923)." Beniger 1986, 7; italics in original.

Control techniques are based, as Beniger pointed out (Beniger 1986: 8), on information processing and communication which in general follow channels from the top down. In fact, whatever form control takes, it represents only a one-way artificial communication, not a dialogic relationship (*pace* the protagonists of the cybernetic theory). Control implies, without exception, a power relationship which excludes a dialogue. Even the feedback effect can be ascribed not to a reciprocal flow of communication, but to power relationships as the feedback can be motivated by fear, pecuniary reward, or ideological indoctrination. Another fateful feature of technology and control is their tendency to endlessly extend their domain -- technology begets new technology and control begets further control through the invention and application of new and more sophisticated information technologies. Crisis situations are created by a lack of appropriate techniques and control devices capable of leading to the integration of society and to technical and social progress; they are resolved by the appearance of new information technologies and innovative possibilities of control, permitting increased functional differentiation and specialization as well as creating higher levels of organization and complexity. This expansive trend has, of course, a definite limit, and at the end of the second millennium, it seems that that limit was reached, as fewer and fewer of the new innovations serve an intelligible purpose.

Impersonal techniques are material devices crowned, at present, by the revolution in information technologies. It is, for example, without doubt that communication through Internet and other worldwide systems of computerized information is eliminating the possibility of personal contact or, the other way around, increasing information flows between unknown and unknowable participants and erasing all immediately genuine expressions of personal feelings, sentiments, or dialogic interaction. These impersonal techniques comprise the growing importance of financial markets as controlling society's evolution through financial channels facilitates, to a great extent, the implementation of the controlling function of bureaucracies. The institutional, centralized bureaucratic controls were well-known in pre-modern societies, especially in the great empires, but the efficiency of such controls was enormously enhanced by the ever-increasing possibilities of offered by information technologies and other technical devices. Weber, the age of Germany's nascent bureaucracy, was the first admirer and intellectual promoter of these instruments of societal control,²⁵ but it is plausible to assert that even Weber would have been reluctant to accept the bureaucratic mushrooming and the pervasiveness of bureaucratic controls we witness today. His famous reference to the coming age of the iron cage of bureaucratic society indicates, however, a resentment of the future evolution he correctly foresaw. Today, in late modernity, *bureaucracy is an essential and integral part of the control structures and technologies in our societies.*

6. From Controlled to Risk Society

Ulrich Beck links to reflexive modernization, a radicalization of modernity, the transformation of modern, controlled society into a risk society. In his view

'Reflexive modernization' means the possibility of a creative (self) destruction for an entire epoch: that of industrial society. The 'subject' of this creative destruction is not the revolution, not the crisis, but the victory of Western modernization... The category of risk stands for a type of social thought and action that was not perceived at all by Max Weber. It is post-traditional, and in some sense post-rational, at least in the sense of being no longer instrumentally rational (*post-zweckrational*). And yet risks arise precisely from the triumph of the instrumentally rational order (Beck, Giddens, and Lash 1994, 2 and 9).

In this perspective, risk society signifies that technological, social, economic, and political developments get entirely out of hand. They become uncontrollable because people accept the certitudes of modernity concerning progress, the hazards brought about by modern economic development and the ecological crisis, and, when deceived, try to rationalize the perceived failures as negative effects of industrialization without

²⁵ On Weber's rational-legal conception of bureaucracy see Beetham 1987, especially 67-83.

being aware of their disastrous impact on society's life.²⁶ This is the reflexive component of risk society constituting a democratic self-disempowerment.

In late modernity, the *logic of risk distribution* replaced the *logic of wealth distribution* and would necessitate a conscious and reflexive risk management. Thus, the incalculability and disorder resulting from the unintended, unseen and unexpected effects of industrial development made society itself the subject of its own reflexivity. In addition to the hazards and insecurities created by modern economic and social development, the integration of nature into society, its becoming a social project, aggravated the situation from which self-reflexivity is believed to be the only way out. As a result of the narrowmindedness dominating public thinking, all efforts to "renaturalize" nature are nothing but "denaturalizations" (ibid., 27). Therefore, an external reference scheme hardly exists anymore, the required reflexivity has no Archimedean point for reference and judgement.

The failure of scientific rationality is strikingly evident. In Beck's view, science lost its position as an arbiter because its methodology does not correspond to the requirements of the prevailing circumstances and because its refusal to take into consideration ethical aspects of increasing uncertainties and resulting risks (Beck 1992a, 29). The larger and larger vistas opened by new technological, that is, instrumental-rational options, carry the growing incalculability of their own consequences, making our contemporary predicament, "ascribed by civilization" (ibid., 23) all the more dramatic:

In developed civilization, which had set out to remove ascriptions, to evolve privacy, and to free people from the constraints of nature and tradition, there is thus emerging a new global ascription of risks, against which individual decisions hardly exist for the simple reason that the toxins and pollutants are interwoven with the natural basis and the elementary life processes of the industrial world (ibid., 41).

This clearly poses a problem: in our reflexive modernity would people accept, for example, to renounce their cars, a utility and a status symbol in most societies today? Would such a general requirement of abandoning the everyday use of automobiles (except for essential purposes such as medical evacuation or other emergencies) not lead our contemporaries to a revolt in order to defend this outstanding achievement of progress? Would manufacturers, shareholders, unions, and others interested in the continuous economic development in accordance with the paradigm of modernity, acknowledge the imperative necessity to eliminate the risk factor from our society even at the price of job losses, diminishing profits, restructuring of industries, renunciation of the oh-so-alluring amenities of contemporary life?

The transformation of modern society into a risk society also has an important effect on the political scene, in particular on the functioning of our democracies. Most problems, and especially the major risks in today's social life, are scientifically and technologically created problems, therefore it is believed that they can only be treated and resolved by scientists.²⁷ In a democratic framework, the most important decisions concerning human future are not decided by democratic majorities, but by a scientific confraternity which has lost its credibility, except in the eyes of the powerholders and their allies who, for their own purposes, are

²⁶ "Collective and group-specific sources of meaning (for instance, class consciousness or faith in progress) in industrial society culture are suffering from exhaustion, break up and disenchantment. These had supported Western democracies and economic societies well into the twentieth century and their loss leads to the imposition of all definition effort upon the individuals; that is what the concept of 'individualization process' means. The difference to Georg Simmel, Emile Durkheim and Max Weber, who theoretically shaped this process and illuminated it in various stages early in the twentieth century, lies in the fact that today people are not being 'released' from feudal and religious-transcendental certainties into the world of industrial society, but rather from industrial society into the turbulence of the global risk society. They are being expected to live with a broad variety of different, mutually contradictory, global and personal risks." Beck, Giddens and Lash 1994, 7.

²⁷ In the spring of 1997, the news media informed the public of a stunning 'first' in international politics. The trade dispute between the European Union and the United States about American imports of meat to the old continent was resolved by a scientific panel in favor of the US. The dispute concerned meat of animals treated with different kinds of artificial (chemical) substances to accelerate their growth and milk yield, which the European public, already extremely suspicious about animal husbandry practices in their own countries, rejected. The anti-democratic nature of this procedure is obvious, but it is concealed by reference to the sacrosanct scientific ideology.

protagonists of the scientific religion. People, even if they already lost their faith in progress, are absolutely unable to change technocratic-bureaucratic decisions and the corporate power's monopoly over research directions and applications of technological procedures. These decisions will inevitably stand because they are covered by science's infallibility and the consciously entertained ideology regarding the inevitability of progress. Frequent decisions concerning fundamental public policy issues leading to social change are thus taken out from the democratic process and transferred to scientific authorities and corporate managers whose decisions are based on economic and political cost/benefit ratios and immediate profitability prospects:

With the globalization of the industrial society, then, two contrary processes for organizing social change interpenetrate one another: the establishment of political parliamentary democracy and the establishment of an unpolitical, non-democratic social change under the legitimating umbrella of 'progress' and 'rationalization' (ibid., 184).

This means that in late modernity, there are two contradictory trends, democratization and de-democratization; they are the pure products of society's development in the Weberian age of secular religion, rationalization, and disenchantment. In many respects, because of the nature of problems and because of the processes set into motion by modernity *political authority is fictionalized*, rendering obsolete and inappropriate system differentiation theories, among them those concerning the differentiation of the political sphere from other spheres of social activity. The only remedy against the dangers of controlled and risk society can be a turning back towards place, the local, contextual framework which, notwithstanding the existing space and time distancing consecutive of technological development, would contribute to eliminate the corrosive distances between people and decision-making concerning their fate. This reduction of cleavages between civil society and whatever forms of higher political and economic coordinative organs would facilitate the transformation of a society composed of atomlike individuals into a society reflecting the communal togetherness of persons.

The foregoing description of the state of affairs in modern and late modern societies represents, it seems to me, a fateful condemnation of the globalizing trend. Because the features of all societies in other civilizations are totally different from ours, and because of the critical state in which our society exists today, can we, in good faith, promote the globalization of a social ordering which thoroughly failed in our own world?

CHAPTER SIX

A JEFFERSONIAN CRITIQUE OF THE UNHOLY MARRIAGE OF STATE, DEMOCRACY AND BUREAUCRACY IN MODERNITY

1. The Standard View: The Differentiation of the Political Sphere in Modernity

The meaning of political concepts changes with time and, using a fashionable expression, becomes temporalized, and new designations are created for realities formerly denoted by some old concepts.¹ This means, according to Reinhart Koselleck, that in the process of temporalization, the concepts of political life move from experience -- concentrated on the overwhelming present but also looking back to the past through the mirror of traditions -- to expectation -- attitude exclusively oriented toward the future.² The theme of differentiation and, in particular, of the differentiation of the political sphere from other domains of collective existence emphasizes a tendency of temporalization or, expressed differently, an effort toward adaptation of political concepts to the perception of changed contexts. Differentiation, in fact, is another designation for what has been known since Max Weber as the disenchantment of the world; it stands for the deconstruction of the holistically constructed social life.

Considering society as differentiated into various spheres of activity does, however, not change the fundamental fact that we know a great deal about what is going on in the world but we understand it very little in depth. We actually know very little of the essential context of most events -- past, present and future. Pre-judgements or prejudices strongly influence our worldviews, and stereotypes, inculcated in our minds by ideologies and reigning orthodoxies of which we are not always aware, frequently distort the picture we have, especially, of political realities.³ For example, we believe that in the statal framework of the Western political sphere, the separation of powers, as prescribed two centuries ago by Montesquieu, exists. Do we really know if during these centuries, it was more than an ideal to which society was expected to strive? We can reasonably suspect that in view of the prevalent societal power structures, the ideal was far from realized.

¹ Spike Peterson identified the essential features of political epistemology when he wrote: "Of particular significance is how dichotomies differentiate concepts both oppositionally (as mutually exclusive poles of meaning) and hierarchically (as asymmetrically privileged categories)." As a consequence positivist dichotomies frame and effectively (re)produce "ways of knowing that are reductionist, ahistorical and static." Peterson, Spike V. "Shifting Ground(s): Epistemological and Territorial Remapping in the Context of Globalization(s)," in Kofman and Youngs. eds. 1996, 11-28; quotation is on page 15.

² Koselleck, Reinhart. "Time and Revolutionary Language," in Schuermann. ed. 1989, 297-306.

³ "Conceptions of political value are permanently at risk in two sharply distinct dimensions. Like any human attempt at understanding, they are epistemically at risk -- potentially in error in their assessment of what is the case. And like any human attempt to assess what is of value, what is good or right, they are ethically at risk -- potentially in error in their assessment of the *moral* force of a particular conception. But also, and in a markedly different manner, they are at risk in their exposure to the vicissitudes of economic, social, and political history." Dunn 1985, 154; italics in original.

But what we know for sure is that in our contemporary political life, this ideal could never be reached; the power represented by the media and by dominating ideologies, a form of power unknown in Montesquieu's time, fundamentally influences the judiciary as much as the legislative and executive branches of government. Thus, because of the media's and ideologies' corrosive and, simultaneously, integrative influence on the various branches of the structure of state power, their separation is not possible anymore -- except ideologically.⁴ The power of the media and of various political ideologies became more and more widespread in the world as a result of globalization -- one of the truly real aspects of the globalization process.

There is a collective symbolism in political discourse. Jürgen Link⁵ justifiably argues that through the analysis of such symbolism, one can correctly define political concepts. Thus, referring to Hannah Arendt's description of the process of atomization of the individual in modern societies, as well as to Carl Schmitt's observation that the state is pressured into the establishment of a totalitarian regime in order to overcome the disorder and chaos created by rebellion of segments of the society, Link concludes that totalitarianism means: first, the breaking down of civil society's fundamental institutions as a result of the intrusion of power structures into the private sphere; and, second, the refusal and abolition of pluralism in every aspect of human life.

In order to avoid the pitfalls of political concept formation and of the fallacious practical reasoning derived thereof, the usual modern move is to have recourse to abstraction, or to think in terms of ideal-types. In this respect, as Habermas pointed out, one has to distinguish two forms of idealization: the first, which concerns the generalization of meaning and in fact, social conventions; and the second, which relates to such general meanings' truth-content or normative value, -- obtained through reference to something transcending individuals and communities (such as, for example, Peirce's principle of rational acceptability or Habermas's own ideal of communicative understanding) (Habermas 1992, 28-31). Be it as it may, generalization-abstraction is especially required in light of the growing cultural and ethical pluralism in Western societies and corresponds to the vision of a rapidly progressing globalization-modernization, in which a viewpoint is rapidly transformed into a point of view. The thesis of differentiation -- idealizing developments which hide, in truth, social and political fragmentation -- is the abstract solution to the problems posed by pluralization, and by the questioning of dominant ideas and activities in the political sphere. But if there is cultural pluralism in Western society and civilizational pluralism between different human groups, then not only the belief in globalization but also the belief in differentiation may be refuted, as the existence and perseverance of pluralistic differences proves that holistic configurations cannot be replaced by differentiated functional spheres.

As to the non-congruence between pluralism and globalization, I refer to the concept and practice of democracy. Democracy has, in the Western vision, a universalistic value. It is considered to be the best available form of political regime, assuring the rule of the majority and applicable in all parts of the world, or in all civilizational frameworks. Consequently, the democratic idea should be universally accepted not only within particular states but in inter-statal relations as well. However, despite all hopes and pronouncements following the disappearance of the greatest totalitarian empire in history, democratization is not taking hold worldwide. In particular not in inter-state relations. Democratization is, at least in the present, not part of the globalization process, and it certainly is not practicable in inter-civilizational relations. The logic of Westphalia, the logic of the sovereignty of states, unequal in their status, still prevails.

⁴ Jean-Marie Guéhenno analyzed with much wit the relations between today's politics and the media: "The politician, in tandem with the television journalist, organizes collective perceptions. The two live off each other, and the ideal -- which Ronald Reagan came close to -- is realized when the politician no longer has to react to images that cannot be controlled (the tearing down of the Berlin wall, for example), but creates an image, a visual situation that will attract the attention of the media... The question of perception becomes crucial, for complexity is tedious, and an argument that cannot be summed up in a single sentence has no media value... In fact, the ultimate stage of democracy by media will be reached when political debate has no longer any influence on actual decisions but on the collective perception that a people has of itself." Guéhenno 1995, 27-29.

⁵ Link, Jürgen. "Collective Symbolism in Political Discourse and Its Share in Underlying Totalitarian Trends," in Schuermann. ed. 1989, 225-238.

In respect to the truly universalizing effect of globalization as opposed to pluralism, indicating a rare congruence between these antithetical concepts, I refer to the bureaucratic form of administration. This becomes more and more widespread as it satisfies varied geographical, demographic, technological and societal realities in our contemporary world. Bureaucracy not only reigns supreme at state level, it dominates the inter-statal scene as well, precisely because it is part of the globalization process. It can, nevertheless, not be considered as a tenet of the universalistic credo as it does not represent, as such, a value in the liberal-democratic or social-democratic belief systems.

2. The Concept of the Modern State

State formation can be depicted and analyzed as a process of individuation in comparison to the pre-modern era of empires. The most important of the numerous characteristics of this process is, with reference to the modern state-system, "individuation as increasing control and decrease of (random) intrusions from the environment."⁶ The process of the construction of nation-states, in which the power and authority of smaller political units were naturally subordinated to the power and authority of the nascent state (in principle founded on a unitary nation), must be considered a retreat from the era of empires with universalistic pretensions. The protagonists of world- state or world-systems theories want, precisely for this reason, to reverse this characteristic development of modernity through reaffirming the pretensions of universalism. The same can be said of the protagonists of globalization, because even if we apply the Robertsonian dialectic of the universal and the particular in the form of processes of integration and decentralization to the problematic of nation-states, the trend towards decentralization, even fragmentation, appears to shape humanity's future: the affirmation of particular identities.

The state, taken as a generic category, means the supreme organization of the public life of a given human society. It includes all forms of cooperation and coordination and, above all, it is always an expression of power relations -- whether a tribal confederation, in great empires like the Chinese, the Roman, or the Muslim, or in what we call the modern state. The latter, as an impersonal and (theoretically) culturally neutral⁷ institution, is one of the most outstanding creations of Western man in the age of disenchantment. It evolved from the Roman concept of *status reipublicae* and, subsequently, of the concept of *status civitatum* of the Italian city-states (Skinner 1989, 91-95).⁸ Over the course of the medieval evolution of the concept, the state was soon identified as standing for: the lands or the territory over which the ruler or chief magistrate, the holder of power, exercised control; and the institutions of government and the means of coercive control -- the power structure -- of a *regnum* or *civitas* required for the preservation of order, the administration of territories and populations, and the maintenance of domination over them (ibid., 100-101).

These features denoted an important modification of the conceptualization of the political sphere: the differentiation of the state as such from the ruler's person. The evolution towards an impersonal state was made possible through this de-personalization. A further important step in the evolution of the concept of the state was the definitive elaboration of a republican tradition, originating in the Italian city-states during the Renaissance, which made it clear that governmental authority could not be equated with the power of particular persons, but was embodied in the legislative and institutional structure devised with a view of the common good, and thus corresponded to the interests of the community.

⁶ Mlinar, Zdravko. "Individuation and Globalization: The Transformation of Territorial Social Organization," in Mlinar. ed. 1992, 15-33; quotation is on page 17.

⁷ On the problems of cultural neutrality of the contemporary state see Chaplin, Jonathan. "How Much Cultural and Religious Pluralism Can Liberalism Tolerate?" in Horton. ed. 1993, 32-49.

⁸ As Skinner shows the aim was always to reach the *optimus status reipublicae*, of which the following definition was given by Erasmus in his *Institutio* of 1516: "The happiest *status* is reached when there is a prince whom everyone obeys, when the prince obeys the laws and when the laws answer to our ideals of honesty and equity." Skinner 1989, 95; italics in original.

However, the full exposure of the doctrine of the modern state was only achieved later, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, with the so-called doubly abstract notion of the state. Following Burke, Skinner briefly summarized this doctrine as the recognition that "the state must be acknowledged to be an entity with a life of its own; an entity which is at once distinct from both rulers and ruled and is able in consequence to call upon the allegiance of both parties" (ibid., 112).⁹ It is important to note that the advocates of this doctrine denied, despite its evident absolutist implications, to enumerate the contrasts between the power of the people and the power of the state. People were simply supposed to have renounced of their original sovereignty in favor of the state's bureaucratic administration, a renunciation admittedly effective forever. It was taken as a natural consequence of this doctrine that subjects of a state power could not longer swear allegiance to a sovereign ruler, but only to the state itself. This concept of the state represented a particularly noticeable shift because it reflected the populist thesis of people's sovereignty as opposed to the belief in the republican tradition, which attributed sovereignty to the communities and their members (*civitates* and *cives*).

The most striking theory tracing the birth of the modern state to the disenchantment process or, we could say, the birth of the modern state out of the ashes of a civilization founded on a religious culture, was proposed by Marcel Gauchet, the French philosopher, in one of his recent works subtitled as "a political history of religion" (Gauchet 1985).¹⁰ Gauchet's enterprise is, of course, only possible because he attributes to religious thinking and action the feature of being essentially concerned with the social patterning of human life and with creating the foundations of society and, inversely, because he treats the state as representing the full expression of societal relations and of their ever-changing configuration (as a quasi-religious phenomenon). The state was born out of the elimination of the transcendental foundation of society in religious and cosmic worldviews and the re-appropriation of its characteristic attributes recognized by these worldviews, endowing it with an immanent, voluntaristic character: "Refraction of the divine alterity inside the social space, and concretization of the extra-human in the economy of intra-human relationships... It is to pass insensibly from the *received* order to the *willed* order" (ibid., 30-31; italics in original).¹¹

The consequence of such a conceptualization is that the state must be expansive and aims at the absorption of all other possible seats of power; it must be dominant within its borders by maintaining a sovereign distance to the populations which are subject to it.

In Gauchet's perspective, this fundamental modification of the human world,¹² -- the universal made human, -- is reflected in two contradictory phenomena. First, the hierarchical structure of society, which formerly incorporated the transcendent alterity into immanent societal relationships, an integration through differentiation, is destroyed by the foundation of the state in immanent reality and the instauration of state

⁹ Skinner refers to Bodin's expression -- *l'estat en soi* -- the state in itself, signifying that the state's authority was not dependent on the type of government actually governing, because it was only the state which represented an "indivisible and incommunicable sovereignty." (Bodin, Jean. 1576. *Les Six Livres de la république*. Paris, 282-283). ibid., 120.

Hobbes had the same opinion: sovereignty is inherent in the state or commonwealth, and the subject-citizens have to pay allegiance not to rulers but to the state itself. (Hobbes, Thomas. *De cive*. The English Version. Ed. H. Warrender. Oxford: Clarendon, 1983, 89 and 151. See also his *Leviathan*. 1968. Ed. C. Macpherson. Harmondsworth. Penguin, 1968, 227). ibid., 118 and 124.

¹⁰ All quotations from Marcel Gauchet's work were translated by the author.

¹¹ There were other writers who also thought that after the disappearance of religion, sacrality was transferred to the political power: "The sacred does not disappear," wrote Sironneau, "but is re-incarnated in other spheres of human activity, in particular in the political sphere." Sironneau, J.P. 1982, *Sécularisation et religions politiques*. La Haye: Mouton, x; translation by the author.

¹² Gauchet emphasizes that for him a "a world *metaphysically* closed in itself is a world *physically* open. The ontological closure of the human sphere is parallel with its material opening. The infinite is an instrument and, at the same time, an element of the [metaphysical] closure: wherever one goes, through whichever distance one travels in thought, one will always stay *within* the physical universe. The infinite, in other words, is our *prison*, the surest proof of the fact that it is impossible to transcend the limits of the immanent." Gauchet 1985, 63, note 1; italics in original.

power and administration based on representation.¹³ Second, the reification of supranatural powers' unique and sole authority in the authority of the state. Consequently, all inter-individual relationships are absolutely subordinated to political power. The state takes the form of a quasi-mythical force replacing the deities, who in previous worldviews, governed the world. In the temporal dimension, this fundamental transformation means the saltation from the past into the present and the future, from a temporal exteriority to a spatial exteriority through the territorialization of the state. This shifting from the distant to the proximately real, through unifying what existed in original potentiality and what exists in actuality, and through making simultaneously operational "the divine difference and the autonomous rationality of the world":

The difference of God leaves the community of men strictly on his own. The independence of the body politic is, thus, materialized in the development of its sovereign power and its own capacity to give laws to itself... In the mirror of the power of one, the power of all becomes reality (ibid., 64-65).

The cosmic framework having been ruined, an objectified and reified world appears before the stunned eyes of man, carrying with it the destruction of the ontological unity of all living and nonliving elements, the separation of man from nature [nature is "in its totality *before* us, radically external to humanity which, however, can appropriate it in its integrality" (ibid., 85; italics in original)], and the waning of all finality of all things in the universe.¹⁴ Man achieved absolute freedom through being incorporated in a sacralized state, in an immortal institution, as a result of the replacement of the external legitimation of previous rulers through the democratic self-legitimation of the administrative power of the sovereign state. The temporal dimension of the state is eternity; eternity is transplanted into the *hic et nunc* of the human world.

The tendency to be transformed into a tool of different power groups, instead of serving the common good, takes on a particular importance in the twentieth century, because it reveals the gradually evident totalitarian character of the modern state:

Totalitarianism... is a tendential property of the modern state... surveillance is the necessary condition of the administrative power of states, whatever ends this power may be turned to. It is not only intimately connected with polyarchy, but more specifically with the actualization of citizenship rights (Giddens 1981/1985, 2: 295 and 309).¹⁵

The notion of citizenship is a corollary of the modern concept of the state. I accept Michael Walzer's definition of citizenship as it corresponds to the classical republican ideal: the citizen is member of a political community, enjoying all the prerogatives granted to him as member of such a community, but also assuming all duties and burdens this membership entails.¹⁶ It is also true, as Walzer points out, that citizen-allegiance was indispensable for the survival of the state.

¹³ In the famous formulation of Abbé Sièyès: "The people cannot speak and cannot act but through their representatives." (Sieyès, E. *Ecrits politiques*. Paris. Ed. des archives contemporaines, 1985, 238). ibid., 26.

¹⁴ This fundamental transformation was materialized in Christendom, according to Gauchet, because the doctrine of Incarnation made evident the unbridgeable distance between the "two orders of reality" and revealed, simultaneously, the autonomy, the "ontological completeness" of the immanent world in itself. The disjunction and absolute differentiation of the divine and human took place through, precisely, the mystical union in Christ, as much as the absolute separation of the terrestrial and celestial existences which were linked hitherto in a hierarchical arrangement. ibid., 97-98.

¹⁵ "For my thesis, as against that of Arendt," wrote Giddens, "is not that terror is the prime basis of rule of totalitarianism, but that mass support generates the political leverage within which terror can be used against categories of 'deviants'... The overall significance of polyarchy in modern states is not unrelated to totalitarianism... because polyarchic involvement in political systems provides for possibilities of mass mobilization otherwise precluded." Giddens 1981/1985, 2: 305 and 307.

¹⁶ "A citizen is, most simply, a member of a political community, entitled to whatever prerogatives and encumbered with whatever responsibilities are attached to membership... Citizenship was to replace religious faith and familial loyalty as the central motive of virtuous conduct. Indeed, citizenship, virtue, and public spirit were closely connected ideas,

Consequently, all other values, virtues, and allegiances than those derived from or directed towards the existence of the state had to be gradually eliminated. In the perspective of the modern state concept, as opposed to classical republicanism, the citizen was supposed to be compensated for the loss of membership in civil society by becoming the principal actor in the political sphere and by achieving real freedom as the maker of the laws to be obeyed -- as in Rousseau's sense, liberty consists in the individual's being his own lawmaker. However, Rousseau's concept of liberty is unwarranted and idealistic because one man cannot be, in truth, his own lawmaker. The emphasis was then shifted from the communal aspect of liberty to its individual aspect. What was meant by the notion of common liberty is simply the sum of negative and positive freedoms of an individual guaranteed by the state. What constitutes the freedom we understand under the label of positive liberties is therefore a matter of definition; for example, are all the entitlements in the welfare state justifiably part of such liberties?

The evolution of the political sphere later led to the appearance of a second, liberal conception of citizenship, according to which there are no horizontal connections between citizens as citizens; their existence is linked to each other through their vertical relationship with the state. To expose the different characteristics of the republican and liberal concepts of citizenship, I quote Walzer who gave an excellent summary:

The first describes citizenship as an office, a responsibility, a burden proudly assumed; the second describes citizenship as a status, an entitlement, a right or a set of rights passively enjoyed. The first makes citizenship the core of our life, the second makes it its outer frame. The first assumes a closely knit body of citizens, its members committed to one another; the second assumes a diverse and loosely connected body its members (mostly) committed elsewhere. According to the first, the citizen is the primary political actor, law-making and administration his everyday business. According to the second, law-making and administration are someone else's business, the citizen's business is private (Walzer 1989, 216).

A third variant of citizenship, in addition to Walzer's categorization, is democratic citizenship; I shall deal with it in developing the concept of the democratic state.

3. The Two Faces of the Modern State: Territory and National Sovereignty

(A) TERRITORY

European history indicates clearly that *the individuation process of the nation-state was a process of territorialization* and, as such, a process of spatial determination of political units: it limited the state's power and authority to a determined territory but, in the name of national sovereignty, it made it absolute within these boundaries.¹⁷ The phenomenon of territorialization was thoughtfully analyzed by Bertrand Badie, who

suggesting a rigorous commitment to political (and military) activity on behalf of the community -- *patria*, not yet *nation*." Walzer 1989, 211; italics in original.

¹⁷ "Another consequence derives from the particular nature of the territorial social bond," wrote Pizzorno in comparing religious, kinship and territorial bonds and orderings. "It is different from the associational bond, since in the associational bond the individual voluntarily chooses to enter, whereas it is not so, or only very exceptionally, in the case of the territorial one. It is different from the kinship bond, which predetermines not only membership but also its hierarchical ordering. And it is different from the religious bond, where membership is optional and not predetermined -- at least in principle. But the hierarchical ordering, insofar as it is of divine origin, is predetermined. The territorial bond is to be contrasted, therefore, on two dimensions to the religious one: The individual is born into it, but then no other string comes attached to it, since the social structure, as in the case of voluntary associations, does not receive any preordained form." Pizzorno, Alessandro. "Politics Unbound," in Maier, Ch. M. ed. 1987, 27-62.

emphasized the important role played in the process of territorialization by the transformation of a territory into the exclusive resource base for state power; and the overcoming of the hierarchical principle of social organization through giving the power of the state an absolute character guaranteed by the territory placed exclusively at its disposal (Badie 1992, 82-97). However, Badie's most important insight is that

[Territoriality] supposes the abandonment of the community's social logic. In the statal order, territory became the functional framework for political redefinition, because it implied that individuals' identities and allegiances were entirely to be oriented towards a centre which pretended to monopolize authority. In this perspective, the territorial logic is contrary to the construction of the social in a community: affirming the value of belonging to a tribe, to a clan, or to an extended family renders incertain, ambiguous, and contestable the principle of territorial identification. Such an identification is, on the contrary, efficient when all mediation between individual and state disappears, when the state's territory becomes the geographical concretization of the idea of public space (ibid., 83; translation by the author).¹⁸

Such an identification of state territory and public space represented the most fundamental change in comparison to the pre-modern ages of great empires. In these empires, people's identification was not based on belonging to any territory but on being part of a cultural -- linguistic, religious, and ethnic -- community. The empire was practically without boundaries, and communal and territorial delimitations were fluid, changing without jeopardizing the existence of the state. Governance was local; there were, therefore, multiple competencies and overlapping jurisdictions. As juxtaposed to this spatial openness of the empire-concept, the territorialization of the state reached, in the constitution of nation-states, a stage at which their recognized territory was sacralized and citizenship, as an unconditional submission to the central state power, was ruthlessly imposed. Jenő Szűcs rightly stresses that before territorialization in Europe there were a "plurality of small spheres of freedom" constituting a coherent public space:

Unity in plurality meant that 'freedoms' became the internal organizing principle of the structures and led to something which drew the line so sharply between the medieval West and many other civilizations: the birth of 'society' as an autonomous entity. The boundaries between the hierarchically divided groups were always drawn by some higher authority, but *since authority was not identical with sovereignty there were everywhere ascending legal maxims and 'customs' imposed upwards from below* (Szűcs 1988, 306-307; italics added).

In the era of globalization, territorialization as the characteristic of the nation-state is endangered because the globalization process will, most likely, result in a *de-territorialization* of the existing political units. Globalization cannot make sense except as a movement of simultaneous diversification. Thus, de-territorialization also stands for what one could call de-systematization of political thinking about territorially-based units and activities. The movement towards de-territorialization is irresistible because community cultures and identities could not be exterminated and persist in most parts of the world. In addition, various cultures construct their idea of a territory as public space in a totally different way from the modern state's conception. This is particularly true for those regions where, in our own days, community integration could not be replaced by territorial identification. For example, the only legitimate collectivity in Islamic lands is the *ummah*; or in the galactical political order (with Badie's expression) in Hindu India where the only territorial conception retained after independence, dates from the time of the British raj. In these cases, political mobilization is achieved through cultural motivation and integration, not through territorial determination.

Cultural communities construe the notion of territory as concrete and sacred, inherited from generations whose traces are lost in the remote past, which constitutes the spiritual bode and ancestral home of the community. Such a concept of territory excludes considering it as a political as opposed to a sacred public

¹⁸ A good example of such a totalitarian conception of the state is, from the time of the French revolution, the famous Chapelier Law of 9 May 1791, which prohibited assemblies by various professional categories, in view of the defense of their common interests, because no specific interest of corporations as well as no particular interest of individuals were recognized; *there cannot be groups or specific interests mediating between the individual and the state*. There is only the general interest invested and represented by the state. *Archives parlementaires*, 27: 679, in Gauchet 1985, 22; italics added.

space (Badie 1992, 93). The Western conception of territory is pragmatic and institutional, in which territory is an instrument, though essential, of the formalization of ruler-subject relationships and of the citizen allegiance to the state's power. For this reason, the annihilation of communities and their territorial attachment was a *sine qua non* requirement of the creation of nation-states. Both conceptualizations of territory give to it an absolute stance: the first, derived from community cultures, is a transcendent absolutism relativizing territorial limitations for safeguarding spiritual and cultural identities; the second, derived from the existence of the nation-state, is an immanent and controlled absolutism, rejecting all considerations which make of the idea of territoriality a matter of convention. The Western territorial concept was sacralized when it was derived from natural right doctrines (since the great Spanish jurists in the sixteenth century), thus granting it a normative appearance on the basis of which the inter-statal system (commonly designated as international system) was called into being.

De-territorialization, however, will not mean a de-spatialization of political organization, because politically autonomous human communities will always be tied to their spatial characteristics elaborated in historical time. In other words, de-territorialization will not abolish human groups' territorial identities; on the contrary, its motive force will be the aggressive affirmation of cultural and social differences which make up territorial identities. De-territorialization, then, will be replaced by re-localization, enhancing the importance of place in a spatial framework. One outstanding evidence of de-territorialization on the contemporary political scene is, of course, the complete mingling of what belongs to the domestic and to the external affairs of a nation-state. Questions related to human rights, minorities, or transnational corporations and the birth of a new international division of labor represent good examples of un-categorizable domains of state policies.

The advent of de-territorialization and re-localization will, nevertheless, not serve the formation of supranational political units but, on the contrary, it will be the main source of regionalism, of the trend to constitute such units on regional bases. Regionalization and regional integration are part of the territorially-based political sphere; regionalism, in contrast, refers to more and more autonomous, historically and culturally defined units which will unavoidably be part of extensive, cooperative networks. This will give a particularly important impetus to a democratic revival, as democracies cannot properly function in extensive political systems but only in more limited, localized structures. Regionalism will again come into focus as a conclusion of the examination of the crisis of the nation-state and of the gradually increasing contradiction and strife between state and civil society.

(B) NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY

The formation of modern states and nationalism are inextricably linked to each other; for this reason, one designates these states as nation-states, though most of them have been multi-national entities since their inception. The idea of the nation, the existence of a coherent group by which, or in the name of which, the state was created over the course of a historical process, is essential to the existence of the state as we know it. The source of legitimacy for the supreme and independent jurisdiction of the state over its territory and population derives from the people who constitute the national community. This condition of the birth of the modern state was not much evidenced in the doctrine evolving from the Middle Ages to the English, Scottish, and French theorists of the Enlightenment, because in their time, Europe's cultural pluralism was not yet perceived. National particularities were not yet affirmed with such a force as in the following centuries. The locus of political structures and institutions were the empires and large, powerful kingdoms in which populations divided by nationalities -- ethnic, cultural, religious groups -- could live alongside each other more or less peacefully, under the distant umbrella of a dynastic power and its (frequently oppressive and always exploitative) governance.¹⁹ This was the time of McNeill's "civilized polyethnicity" (McNeill 1986).

¹⁹ "The traditional concept of sovereignty is fundamentally singular in nature. There is only one sovereign, the emperor, whose realm is universal. That is to say, all other political leaders are deemed politically inferior and subject to the emperor's ultimate authority. For instance, the Roman emperor was *dominus mundi*, lord of all world. Such a definition meant that there could be no 'recognition' of any other polity as autonomous. If in practice some people were outside imperial political control, this was a wrong to be righted, since all owed allegiance to the universal lord. For instance, when a British delegation visited China in 1793, they were treated as vassals of the emperor, resulting in their country being added to the list of 'kingdoms of the western ocean' pledging allegiance to China. In an imperial system, it can be

However, it became evident that modern states could not be built on such a heterogeneous basis. They had to find culturally and politically integrative elements to unify their populations²⁰ in an artificially created community not only to accept the impersonal mechanisms and absolute dominance of the new political entity, but also to submit voluntarily to the new and contingent power structures, statal requirements and obligations in the service of a certain ideal. Hence, the birth of bounded sovereignty and of the nation-state: a modern institutional-organizational form hooked up on old, traditional allegiances and bondages (Beetham 1984, 217), instead of having recourse to oppression.

In order to clarify the exact nature of the nation-state, it is necessary to clarify here what I mean by nationalism. As I explained in Chapter Four, Section 2, the two terms of national consciousness and nationalism belong to separate orders of human existence. National consciousness is the inner conviction and publicly professed attachment of belonging to a cultural community. Nationalism, on the contrary, can be defined as the intentional action (frequently outright indoctrination) to transform national consciousness, or attachment to a specific existential context, into a political force in order to secure for the communal life of the nation its own political framework -- the nation-state.

It has to be recognized that in many cases such a transformation of the national sentiment was forced upon a national group by outside pressure; by other groups that wanted to suppress its specificity and integrate the nation into a state, into a political entity with hitherto unheard-of prerogatives, dominated by those groups which provoked the nationalistic reaction. Whatever the origins of any nationalistic ideology, it must, however, be recognized that in historical perspective, all nationalistic movements and the nation-states they succeeded to create, lost their legitimizing links with their base and became subservient to ideologies and political forces entirely foreign to the reality of national sentiments and heritage. This was as valid in the past, in the case of the French state which issued from the revolution, as in the case of Serbian and other Balkan nationalisms.

In conclusion, sovereignty based on territory and nationalistic pretension is the essence of the modern nation-state. Such features are, however, aggravated by the complete victory of absolutistic tendencies in the functioning of states, coupled with extremely fragmentary policies of a democratic-cum-populist nature, as against civic republicanism based on the inextricable link between the political community and its members. In the democratic-populist context of the absolutistic modern state, the individual is juxtaposed to the all-powerful statal power and bureaucracy. Any mediation by intermediary social and cultural institutions was eliminated, and the fragmentation of the political sphere dramatizes ever more the fragmentation of the entire society.

(c) WHITHER THE NATION-STATE?

The end of the nation-state is frequently evoked around the world. There are multiple reasons for questioning the existence and role of the presently dominant political institution. Doubts mostly result from the undeniable dysfunctionality of the nation-state in contemporary social, economic, and political life as well as in military matters. We do not have to dwell on the ineptitude of this state, in comparison to such present-day realities as

-- social fragmentation and differentiated cultural identities, coupled with incessant and continuous technological change in all branches of activity escaping entirely from the control of national societies and nation-states;

no other way; all politics have to be fitted into a slot below the emperor who occupies the apex of the political hierarchy." Taylor, Peter J. "The Modern Multiplicity of States," in: Kofman and Youngs. eds. 1996, 99-108; quotation is on pages 101-102.

²⁰ "Persuasive arguments and discussions seem inconceivable without conscious reference by those involved to their mutual and reciprocal awareness of being co-participants not just of this one debate, but in a more encompassing common life, bearing the imprint of a common past, within and from which the arguments and claims arise and draw their meaning." Michelsen, F. Law's Republic. *The Yale Law Journal*, 1988, 97: 1513.

-- the seemingly unstoppable formation of a single world market, of which the main actors are not states but transnational corporations;

-- the breakdown of democratic mechanisms even in the states which are considered as democracies *par excellence* -- not only because of the demographic explosion or the moral unaccountability of those who govern, but because democratic procedures produce tyrannies of majorities instead of global social consensus; and, finally,

-- the uncontrollable progress in the production of more and more sophisticated and devastating weaponry, including nuclear armament, which engenders not only the possibility of humanity's extinction, but also increasing criminality, international and domestic terrorism, and a growing number of savage and unforeseeable local conflicts.

In his usually perspicacious way of analyzing problems, David Held pinpointed some of the disjunctures between the nation-state and the phenomenon of globalization at the end of the millennium (Held 1995, 101-140). The most important disjuncture is represented by the globalization of the world economy, that is, the worldwide extension of the activities of production, distribution and exchange, thus liberating them from national controls and supervision. This trend is reinforced by two crucial developments reducing the nation-state's power in a considerable degree. First, the widening international division of labor which represents the greatest danger to the survival of many productive activities at a national scale. Second, the totally uncontrollable extension of financial transactions on the world market. It is evident that these phenomena overcame the resistance of the nation-state as a result of the hitherto unimaginable technological progress in transportation and communication, and the conquering grasp of multinational economic entities worldwide. The same technological and economic developments contributed to the creation of hegemonic power structures as well as regional and international organizations of cooperation, reducing further the space of influence and action of individual states.

4. The Democratic State

In our times, the concept of the state is collapsed with the concept of democracy; it is not enough, therefore, to consider the modern state as the uniquely dominant, contemporary political organization, but it is necessary to examine in what respect and in what measure the fusion of the democratic concept with that of the modern state changed the nature and characteristics of the latter. By democracy, I mean the so-called Madisonian interpretation of the political order "as a set of institutional arrangements which allow for the rule of multiple minorities through competition for the selection and influence of elites, subject to periodic voter approval" in which "decision-making is inevitably incremental and frequently disjointed" (Held 1989, 61).²¹ Thus, as a result of the evolution of the modern state concept from ruler sovereignty to popular sovereignty, democracy is a source of legitimacy for the government and a decision procedure in the context of self-determination. In our days, democracy is usually conceived in two very different ways. I shall, consequently, analyze the two faces of the democratic state in accordance with these two senses given to the age-old concept of democracy in modernity.

²¹ "We should bear in mind the essentially uncontroversial fact," notes Claus Offe the truth which is contrary to the dogmas of the reigning liberal-socialist ideologies, "that the 'will' of the people is an *artefact* of those institutional procedures which we ostensibly only use to *measure* precisely that will. The will of the people *does not exist* prior to these procedures and independent of them, but *instead* arises in them. The will of the people has the character of an answer, and what is important, then, is the question which is put in order to come up with the answer, and the procedure used to arrive at it." Offe 1996, 91; italics in original.

(A) THE REPUBLICAN DEMOCRATIC STATE

In the classical sense, democracy is the proper mechanism of the political sphere, in that it assures the participation of all members of a society in the management of their common affairs, and makes even possible for them to assume public functions²² in order to carry out the clearly and concretely expressed will of the community (and not the nebulous general will of Rousseau). Republican, civic democracy involves two distinct elements: an active participation of the citizens in the political sphere, and their self-control permitting the realization of the objectives of the community, of the good life for all. Such a democracy is the home of freedom, the blossoming of freedom achieved by all. It is a collective experience: "The clear consciousness of a communal life, in all its implications, constitutes the idea of democracy," wrote Dewey three quarter of a century ago (Dewey 1994, 149).

Classical democracy, as we all know, is not an invention of modernity. It was already practised in antiquity in the Greek city-states and in other civilizations, too. Affairs of governance, conceptualized in a republican democratic way (taking republic in its Latin connotation: *res publica*), represent one side of the great divide in the human world in matters of organizing public space and institutionalizing practices of governance. We can call it, with Walzer, "the *political way* of allocating power" (Walzer 1983, 304). The other side of the divide is dominance by groups or individuals who succeeded to appropriate powers and forces of the state or of any other political organization through manipulation of the popular vote, in order to exploit them in their own interest. This is the eternal dialectical oscillation characterizing the political sphere of human society all along history.

In fact, participative democracy could never be, even in small communities, direct democracy, except in the case of vitally important decisions. It is not possible that everybody should intervene, at every occasion, into the day-to-day management of public space, not only because of the material impossibility but, especially, because of the lack of competence of people to understand and manage the ever-more complex and intricate affairs of a community. Therefore, representative democracy became the usual form of democratic regimes, as people delegated executive powers to those they considered able to carry out the commonly approved decisions based on the community's shared values, beliefs, and traditions. I do not believe that a corporatist version of representative democracy, as defined, for example, by Philippe Schmitter,²³ would serve better republican interests than the parliamentary form of it what we today recognize as the inherent form of democracy. Such a conception would only make segmental differences in society and competition between them more intense and more devastating from the collectivity's point of view. And in Schmitter's conception, corporations would only be instruments of the all-powerful state.

Representative democracy is nothing but a form of elite rule,²⁴ meaning by an elite a group of selected people having the trust of all and having the required competencies to govern society. There is no other

²² "This is what complex equality means in the sphere of politics: it is not power that is shared, but the opportunities and occasions of power. Every citizen is a potential participant, a potential politician. That potentiality is the necessary condition of the citizen's self-respect." Walzer 1983, 310.

²³ Schmitter defined corporatism two decades ago as "a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized and licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports." Schmitter, Philippe. Still the Century of Corporatism? *Review of Political Studies*, 1974, 36: 93-94.

²⁴ Niklas Luhmann is more than sceptical in regard to the principle of representation: "The parliamentarism of particular interests cannot represent unity... Representation must indeed be parliamentarized, and thus the fiction of the general will must be created. The legitimacy of parliamentary representation must then be grounded in the fact that a representation of unity, a representation of the system in the system, is no longer possible. Since then, 'representative' has been a hopeless, romantic category... My argument is that the problems of the legitimacy of political power are linked with this impossibility of representation." (Luhmann, Niklas. The Representation of Society Within Society. *Current Sociology*, 1987, 35: 103-104.

reasonable way to assume the proper functioning of public institutions than by putting responsible, competent persons in charge, accountable to all members of a community. The tragedy of this republican conception of democracy is that it always leads, without exception, to authoritarian or tyrannic regimes because those participating in political life cannot agree among themselves on matters to be decided,²⁵ and sooner or later yield power to an usurper group or ruler who eliminates democratic institutions and procedures. The greatest danger in republican democracies is that majority rule becomes a tyranny, through the lack of comprehension of democracy's essential tolerance by those who hold the majority. Absolute power is always tyranny as taught to us by John Adams, a true republican democrat: "The fundamental principle of my political creed is, that despotism, or unlimited sovereignty, or absolute power, is the same in a majority of popular assembly, an aristocratical council, an oligarchic junta, and a single emperor."²⁶

The status and nature of citizens in the republican democratic state generally corresponds to the one described in the analysis of basic characteristics of the modern state: the citizen's loyalty is entirely directed towards the republic, of which he serves the interests (confounded with the shared interests of all individuals and their communities living in the state). The difference in comparison to the citizenship concept as developed above is that the citizens' rights, duties and responsibilities are determined not by the state, but in terms of the republican values and democratic procedures shared and approved by all. Therefore, the possibility of being in contradiction with the republic's ideals does not arise because republicanism and republican democracy do not determine these ideals, values and procedures; these are defined by the community's traditions, cultural heritage, and contextually perceived best interests.

(B) THE EGALITARIAN DEMOCRATIC STATE

The general acceptance of the egalitarian creed²⁷ in the Western world fundamentally changed the essence of the republican democratic state. The major achievement of egalitarian democracy was, at the institutional level, the creation of the welfare state and, from the point of view of cultural investment of the public space, the total conquest of minds in the almost exclusive domination of the egalitarian doctrine in all spheres of life. However -- and this is the greatest irony in the recent history of the West -- the egalitarian democratic state did not achieve the objective of equality for all in all matters; it strives to realize with all the means at its disposal and, first and foremost, by destroying all diversity,²⁸ including creative individuality as well as communal solidarity.²⁹

²⁵ John Dewey's words remain relevant today: "The same forces which have brought about the forms of democratic government, general suffrage, executives and legislators chosen by majority vote, have also brought about conditions which halt the social and humane ideals that demand the utilization of government as the genuine instrumentality of an inclusive and fraternally associated public. 'The new age of human relationships' has no political agencies worthy of it. The democratic public is still largely inchoate and unorganized." Dewey 1994, 109.

²⁶ Adams, John. *Works*. 10: 174; quoted in Randall 1976, 249.

²⁷ Klaus Eder gave a good analysis of inequality, with a view to clarify the sense of the equality: "In order to speak of social inequality two cognitive operations must be carried out. The first consists in classifying vertically the social world. The second consists in attributing this vertical classification of the social world to a deviation from the ideal of equality. Vertical classification as such is a cultural universal... This fact shows that the concept of 'inequality' is part of an evolutionarily specific meaning-ensemble, a meaning-ensemble which presupposes the discourse on equality constitutive of modern societies." Eder, Klaus. "Gleichheitsdiskurs und soziale Ungleichheit. Zur Frage nach den kulturellen Grundlagen sozialer Ungleichheit in der modernen Klassengesellschaft," in Haferkamp. ed. 1990, 177-208; quotation is on pages 178-179; translation by the author.

²⁸ "The central problem of democratic politics in modern society," according to Claus Offe, "is to maintain the diversity within civil society while creating some measure of unity, or bindingness, of political authority: *E pluribus unum*. The problem is more easily solved in political systems whose underlying diversity remains one of *interests*: it becomes more difficult when values or cultural models must also be mediated. In the first case, the individual and collective political actors share an evaluative framework. They differ in their interests but agree on the values (for example, control over economic resources) in terms of which those interests are defined. A conflict over values creates a more complex situation. Society must resolve not only the distribution of rewards but the more fundamental question of whether

Notwithstanding the contemporary domination of egalitarianism in public life, social tensions created by the duality inherent in the concept are mounting with the aggravation of modernity's contradictions. By the duality of the concept of equality, I mean equality-as-justice and equality-as-sameness, especially as the doctrine of egalitarianism equates the two. It contends that men are entitled to equal rights and opportunities because they are equal ontologically and socially; this is, however, a fallacy, as *there is no logical connection between the moral requirement of justice in a given context, and the pretended sameness of human beings, that is, a de facto equality*. Equality can be claimed on moral grounds, but not on grounds of sameness or biological, social or whatever equality. In fact, man's natural status -- biological endowment, cultural heritage, and individually reached characteristics -- reflects inequality; in social life, these natural inequalities are inevitably amplified. The egalitarian doctrine represents an application of the methods of the sciences which reduce difference to mechanical or formal identity in the non-human world. Such a procedure is a misled attempt to deal with the problems of humans as if they were objects in the physical universe. Differences are repudiated in favor of equal identities, whereas the possibility of a plurality of identities, or of "newly emerging constellation of identities" (Connolly 1995, 153) is one of the great achievements of modernity. Be it as it may, in our late modern age, it became evident that the seemingly uncontested reign of the egalitarian worldview always remained a Pyrrhanean victory, because the officially and publicly professed egalitarianism covers dangerous, sometimes totalitarian, tendencies, aiming solely at "creating an environment that would make dissent impossible," using Mark Miller's words (quoted in Ophuls 1997, 260). As authoritarian rule which uses egalitarian ideologies sets in, populist messages are greatly enhanced by the media to indoctrinate the alienated masses, making them believe that only their interests are served and only their needs are considered.

The welfare state has served as the main device trying to alleviate personal sufferings and social troubles consecutive to the breakdown of society's structure, the advent of a risk society, and the disappearance of communal solidarity,³⁰ as based on the egalitarian worldview and its inherent requirement of (re)distributive justice.³¹ There were two ways to look at welfare: either "treating different people differently in order to treat them equally," or "treat people, who may or may not be different, identically in order to treat them equally" (Rae 1979, 48). The modern welfare state chose the second alternative of Rae who clearly demonstrated the reasons why statal democracies did choose this way of action.³² He also analyzed the method of combining,

rewards allocated *count* as valuable. This second-order conflict over the *criteria* of goodness of public policy is the key to understanding current conflicts over the proper scope and boundaries of the political in some Western European polities." Offe, Claus. "Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics: Social Movements Since the 1960s," in Maier, Ch. M. ed. 1987, 63-105; the quotation is on page 65; italics in original.

²⁹ "There is no escape from the contradiction," in Ophuls's opinion, "by the very nature of things, the more equal, the more mediocre. In fact, a state of perfect equality would be a state of perfect entropy as well -- marked not just by mediocrity but also by stagnation, exhaustion, even death. Unfortunately for the egalitarian, the very basis of life is 'negentropy': the significant differences of potential or energy that make possible the flow and organized complexity of life." Ophuls 1997, 140.

³⁰ Logue defines the concept of welfare state as follows: "It implies the provision of economic security for the overwhelming majority of the population through a large public sector and a considerable sense of social solidarity. It is a state democratic in form, interventionist by inclination, and eager to manage the capitalist economy to achieve steady economic growth and maintain full employment... [The welfare state is not an attempt] to tamper with the distribution of income *inside* the market: it is *after* the market distribution of income that an effort is made to reduce the degree of inequality between those in and those outside the labor market and, to a lesser extent, among those employed." Logue 1979, 69 and 71.

³¹ Claus Offe correctly emphasized the close interrelation between the welfare state and participatory democracy: "The continued compatibility of capitalism and democracy, so inconceivable to both classical liberalism and classical Marxism (including Kautsky and the Second International), has emerged historically due to the appearance and gradual development of two mediating principles: mass political parties and party competition, and the Keynesian welfare state (KWS). In other words, it is a *specific version* of democracy, one with political equality and mass participation that is compatible with the capitalist market economy. And, correspondingly, it is a *specific type* of capitalism that is able to coexist with democracy." Offe 1984, 182; italics in original.

³² The apostle of egalitarianism, Tawney, believed, on the contrary, in the correctness of the first solution when he wrote: "Equality of provision is not identity of provision. It is to be achieved, not by treating different needs in the same way, but

within the alternative chosen, the two possible ways of realizing the egalitarian ideal: the approach of equal opportunity and the approach of equal prospect of success (ibid., 48-52). The solution chosen produced an unforeseen result, what Offe calls the "spiral of constantly re-induced forms of 'relative deprivation'" (Offe 1984, 76) or what Bell designates as the "revolution of rising entitlements" (Bell, Daniel 1978, 23).³³ People quickly considered the welfare state as "a cow which is fed in the sky and which one can milk here on the earth,"³⁴ in the words of the former German Chancellor, Ludwig Erhard, the father of his country's economic miracle after World War II.

This is the reason why Michael Walzer, postulating that justice is a social construction and, therefore, can have different meanings, recently elaborated a pluralistic theory of complex equality in order to accommodate particular interests:

Different social goods ought to be distributed for different reasons, in accordance with different procedures, by different agents; and that all these differences derive from different understandings of the social goods³⁵ themselves -- the inevitable product of historical and cultural particularism (Walzer 1983, 5-6).

In consequence, distributive criteria are intrinsic to a context and not to the goods themselves, they are not applicable in every context. The contexts reflected in distinct social meanings legitimate relatively autonomous, coherent, and open-ended principles, criteria and processes of distribution. There is no single universal standard for welfare, not even the untouchable utilitarian measuring rods:

Justice is relative to social meanings... There cannot be a just society until there is a society; and the adjective *just* doesn't determine, it only modifies, the substantive life of societies it describes. There are an infinite number of possible lives, shaped by an infinite number of possible cultures, religions, political arrangements, geographical conditions, and so on. A given society is just if its substantive life is lived in a certain way -- that is, in a way faithful to the shared understandings of the members (ibid., 312-313; italics in original).

Clearly, Walzer's conception of complex equality corresponds to Rae's first alternative, it promotes maximum differentiation in a truly pluralistic society; if it would become official policy in welfare states, the latter would be, perhaps, able to survive the present crisis.

Egalitarianism completely transformed the character of democracy. It replaced a reasoned argument about the governance of society with a belief that cannot be empirically proven or falsified because it is simply a creed. It exchanged a coherent worldview about the solidarity of men and their communities against a theoretical, one-issue, and in its conclusions, excessive and destructive ideology.³⁶ My main criticism of

by devoting equal care to ensuring that they are met in the different ways most appropriate to them, as is done by a doctor who prescribes different regimens for different constitutions, or a teacher who develops different types of intelligence by different types of curricula. The more anxiously, indeed, a society endeavours to secure equality of consideration for all its members: the greater will be the differentiation of treatment which, when once their common human needs have been met, it accords to the special needs of different groups and individuals among them." Tawney, R.E. *Equality*. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1952, 49-50.

³³ With Zijderfeld's words, the welfare state "does no longer guarantee *minimal* standards of welfare and well-being, but is counted upon as the provider of maximum standards of welfare." Zijderfeld, Anton Z. The Ethos of the Welfare State. *International Sociology*, 1986, 1: 452-453.

³⁴ *Der Spiegel*. 1996, No. 26.

³⁵ Walzer defines goods as social because "goods in the world have shared meanings because conception and creation are social processes. For the same reason, goods have different meanings in different societies." Walzer 1983, 7.

³⁶ Walter Lippmann formulated the basic idea of the welfare state as follows: "When modern states abandoned the Jeffersonian principle of special privileges to none they became committed to the principle of special privileges to all," quoted in Ophuls 1997, 67. This shows clearly why the egalitarian democratic state and its economy run into

egalitarianism is that it concerns abstract human beings based on models and prefabricated ideas, without which it could not have been formulated.³⁷ The egalitarian ideology is empirically untrue: there are no two individuals in the world who are the same, who have the same needs and who require the same satisfactions (except for the basics of survival as is the case even for animal species). This is the reason why such theories as utilitarianism or the ethics of right, are inapplicable in the real world, as individual happiness and its aggregates cannot be calculated with mathematical formulas. Human reality escapes mathematics.

There is only one sense, and this is for me the most important sense, as it was for Rousseau, in which all men are equal: *men are equal from the point of view of their innate dignity, from the point of view of the respect we owe, all of us, to each other.*³⁸ Equality is a function of moral (and not juridical) justice, expressed in mutual respect, and excluding the dependence of one human being upon the good will of another. A social and political order evolving in the framework of the life of a community has to be devised to assure that dignity and mutual respect define the existence shared by the people, and that any possibility of humiliating subservience of man by man be made impossible. An essential human freedom visualized as the vertical coordinate of human life as against equality as its horizontal coordinate, is alone coherent with the belief in equality in human dignity.

In egalitarian democracy the character of citizenship was also modified in the sense that its main component became the principle of equality of opportunity in participation, voting, benefits and entitlements. In essence, citizenship is the right to one's part in accordance with a fair distribution of all these elements. This metamorphosis reflects the abandonment of the republican point of view of caring about collective interests, and replaces it by the requirement to assure the individual's autonomy. Such a formulation of the essence of citizenship appears to enhance the prevalence of plurality, but the plurality enhanced by egalitarian democracy is the infinite plurality of individuals, not the plurality of coherent human groups and communities. As a consequence, citizens are not much involved in public affairs (except those whose business is to be involved in them), and it is rare to find genuine devotion directed towards problems of the collectivity. The alienation of people from public activities is more and more evident in all contemporary democracies.³⁹

In sum, egalitarianism totally disfigured the democratic state, it transformed it into a welfare state, and with that, it changed all its functions. Thus, citizenship in the egalitarian democratic state made from a human being somebody who is entirely dependent on the state, is expecting everything from the state as an entitlement, as a right every citizen is born with, thinking only in terms of individual but never in terms of collective interest. This is the overwhelming difference with the civic, republican-democratic state: in the latter, democratic procedures legitimate the state's actions as serving the common good, whereas in the egalitarian democratic state, the common good, what is in the interest of everybody, is always interpreted in terms of individual interest. This is the main reason why there is no solidarity in the egalitarian society:

unsurmountable difficulties. And the comment by Ophuls is justified in that when people can vote to obtain resources they need instead of creating and acquiring them by themselves it indicates the end of the egalitarian-welfarist adventure.

³⁷ The nineteenth century French revolutionary Louis Blanc wrote in his *Catéchisme des Socialistes*: "What is Equality? - It is, for all men, the *equal* development of their *unequal* faculties, and the *equal* satisfaction of their *unequal* needs." Quoted in Randall 1976, 454; italics in original.

³⁸ Montesquieu wrote in his *Esprit des lois* (Book VIII, Chapter 3): "The spirit of true equality is as far from that of extreme equality, as the sky is from the earth. The first does not consist in a system where everyone commands and no one takes orders, but in a system in which one commands and obeys one's own equals. Its aim is not to have no masters at all, but to have only one's equals as masters." English translation quoted in Sartori 1962, 132-133, note 39.

³⁹ I agree with John Dunn that "what must be emphasized very firmly is that the comfortable vision of distributive politics as exhausting the political meaning of membership in a community is an extremely callow and superficial one. And if nationalism as a political force is in some ways a reactionary and irrationalist sentiment in the modern world, its insistence on the moral claims of the community upon its members and its emphasis that civic order and peace is not given but an achievement which may well have to be struggled for again is in many ways a less superstitious political vision than the intuitive political consciousness of most capitalist democracies today." Dunn 1993, 73.

solidarity is the outcome of a community's shared existence, of its irresistible integrative force, reflected in the republic's political structure and procedures. But where is such a solidarity in egalitarian democracy?

5. The Bureaucratic State and Civil Society

In the course of the formation of the modern state, state and civil society were definitely separated when the non-territorial system of political organization disappeared;⁴⁰ this process culminated in the hypostatization of the state as a distinct personality or entity, different from the body of society.⁴¹ It is because of this evolution civil society now means social organizations, institutions, and activities entirely independent of the state or, frequently, in opposition to it. This became a fact of life for all of us, and we have to try to find a solution for the harmonization of the two in our individual and communal existence.

This cleavage between society and the state became aggravated over the course of the last two centuries. First, through a legalistic culture⁴² and the concomitant formalization of relations and procedures adopted by the democratic state in order to compensate for a devastating social anomie:

The state was a functional response to the general disruption of a once integral society. It does have a connection with science, but less with its spirit of calculation than with its subversion of conventional beliefs. It reflects also the corrosion of development: the growth of modern commerce and industry, above all its effects on the sociopolitical stratification of 'estates'; and in the same vein it reflects the effects of novel democratization (Eckstein 1979, 16).

The separation of civil society and the state was a correlate element of the rejection of the old cultural world and of the belief in a possible emancipation from old traditions and particularistic allegiances replaced by the credo of progress. It also correlated with the expectation of new rights and entitlements and, finally, with the elaboration of the new conception of citizenship.

Second, bureaucratization contributed to the aggravation of this divorce between state and society, although there is no doubt that bureaucratization has been a necessity for the fulfilment of the tasks -- ever wider and more numerous, especially in the framework of egalitarian democracy and the welfare state -- which modern evolution assigned to the supreme political institution.⁴³ True enough, bureaucracy pervaded

⁴⁰ Badie refers to the example of the Chinese empire in this respect: "The Chinese imperial order, after the legalistic experience (third century before J.-C.), was a communitarian and antibureaucratic system of government (*fengtian*), in which the political sphere was not constructed upon the disappearance of the communities but, contrarily, upon the establishment of a correspondence between communal life, family and peasant, and the imperial centre... The contract thus concluded did not have anything of a Hobbesian nature: it did not sanction an exchange between liberty and security, it did not produce a sovereign regime, but created a social harmony which, if safeguarded, was the guarantee of the perennality of the imperial dynastic centre... In such a model, in addition, the civil service was almost entirely merged into the social order: without having the necessary resources, the imperial centre was sustained by the mobilization of communal structures... The progressive disintegration of this model which was seriously eroded by the process of Westernization, led to the establishment of a bureaucratic, centralized state (*junxian*), distinct and separated from society and its economic life." Badie 1992, 78; translation by the author.

⁴¹ For Harry Eckstein "the notion of uniqueness surely played a role in making constitutional materials central in the new field. At least as important, though, is that the idea of sovereignty (deliberately?) separated the structure of the State from those of society. It exalted the State both as abstraction and as concrete fact. The separation of State and society surely engendered a tendency to 'endogenous' explanation: the explanation of the political by itself. This meant, and could only mean, the explanation of political regularities by political rules." Eckstein 1979, 7.

⁴² "A society is legalistic if it exhibits a culture-theme that codified law has some peculiar, 'transcendent,' in the old sense 'sovereign' (superior, 'excellent') quality, a quality most familiar to us in religion." *ibid.*, 12.

⁴³ Dennis Thompson thus declared: "No-one has yet shown that the quality of life that citizens in modern democracies demand can be sustained without bureaucracy or a form of organization very much like it." Thompson, Denis.

not only the structures of the state, but even those of most modern institutions: corporate bureaucracies of industrial or trading companies (through which bureaucracy influences even the functioning of the market), and to such institutions of civil society as trade unions. It is a historical fact that some sort of bureaucracies already existed in pre-modern times, in the great empires for example, but their role and impact cannot be compared to those of today, where the actual concentration of power in the hands of bureaucrats represents a clear usurpation of it in the age of democracy. All features and effects of bureaucratization to be evoked here concern other bureaucratized institutions as well.

Since Weber, it is customary to describe bureaucracy's main features as follows: hierarchic authority; functional specialization; rule-orientation; impersonal relationships; processes of decision-making in accordance with standardized procedures, using uniform criteria without consideration of contextual elements; and, finally, a secretive attitude in order to safeguard the bureaucrats' influence and power. As in all similar matters, a bureaucracy's functioning and the services it renders to the public depends on the personal quality of the bureaucrats, especially of those at the highest rungs of the hierarchic ladder. Nevertheless, I agree with Poulantzas that

State bureaucracy is becoming not merely the principal site, but also the principal *actor* in the elaboration of state policy... [Therefore] the administrative and governmental apparatus as the dominant state structure perfectly embodies... the hermeneutic insulation of power from democratic control.⁴⁴

This statement expresses the essential problem with respect to bureaucracies' role in the state, and with respect of the latter's relations to civil society. Another aspect of this problem is the displacement of goals or shifting the priorities which were determined by democratic procedures in the public space -- bureaucracy being, in principle, an organ of implementation of what society wants -- precisely because bureaucracy escapes public control. Alienation and indifference are results of bureaucratic handling of public affairs, as people whose democratic rights to participate in decisions are eliminated by not only the influence, but even by the existence of bureaucracy. For this reason, it is considered a democratic requirement to put bureaucracies under the direct control of participatory mechanisms. The undemocratic role of a bureaucracy does not change, even if it is taken out of the statal framework in a process of regionalization, as indicated by the widening popular resistance to the decisions of the European Union's highest organ, the commission. This resistance explains the growing emphasis on the principle of subsidiarity -- meaning that decisions are taken at the lowest possible level -- in order to regain popular support for the efforts of unification. For Eisenstadt, the paradox of bureaucratic organization is that in order to execute its tasks, it must gain considerable autonomy:

This ambivalence is rooted in the fact that whatever its genesis, every bureaucracy, in virtue of the services it performs, the areas it regulates, the interests between which it mediates, and its own structure and organization, develops into a centre of power which may become independent and unregulated (Eisenstadt 1958, 102).

It is also justifiably held against bureaucracies that they are inefficient in carrying out their tasks, for example, the neutral allocation of resources, rights, and entitlements; and, above all, that they stifle all

"Bureaucracy and Democracy," in Duncan, Graeme. ed. *Democratic Theory and Practice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, 235-250; quotation is on page 236.

It is also true, nevertheless, what Ophuls emphasizes: "The fundamental delusion of the democratic Leviathan is to think that social problems can be solved by administrative or technological means rather than basic political decisions. But there are no technical solutions to social and political problems, only governmental policies that are more or less judicious and effective. Trying to handle such problems administratively is therefore either an evasion of responsibility or a prescription of failure." Ophuls 1997, 262.

⁴⁴ Poulantzas, Nicos. *State, Power, Socialism*. London: New Left Books, 1978, 224-226; italics in original.

human creativity.⁴⁵ Bureaucratization in the modern age is a consequence of two closely related, phenomena: the changing demography, or the increase of population to a hitherto unknown extent in the whole world; and the rapid evolution of the man-made environment, due to the enormous pace of technological changes that modify the world of men in a way so that it becomes simply impossible to understand, let alone master.⁴⁶ Calling modern bureaucracies formal, Beniger considers that bureaucracy, together with the Weberian rationalization of the world, is an appropriate technological solution to the crisis of control in a "controlled" society as it serves to control most other technologies (Beniger 1986, 13). Thus, bureaucracy is the state's arm of surveillance in the implementation of various policies. It cannot be denied that the existence of an administrative state was probably a necessary, but not sufficient condition of the success of industrial capitalism, as well as of the market economy. There is no doubt that demographic explosion and incessant technological innovation represent the best explanation of the bureaucratization of modern institutions which must handle increasingly complicated problems and a growing number of people to be taken care of.

Bureaucracy, together with exponentially developing demography and ever-increasing technological innovations, is one of the true actors, as well as one of the real objects of today's trend of globalization.

6. The Inter-Statal System

In the view of some of our contemporaries, states do not represent more than local authorities of a global, worldwide system -- a system beyond the inter-statal level, a society of states (Bull 1995, 13).⁴⁷ It is, however, a moot question who is in charge of governance in such a global entity as neither ruler sovereignty nor popular sovereignty dominates, and international organizations have only a diffused authority. No organization can exercise sovereign rights over the peoples of the world, and the latter do not form an entity with a common will, but are fragmented into innumerable human groups in accordance with civilizational differences.⁴⁸ As political interests became transnational in the wake of mutations which replaced states as unique actors on the world scene with a multiplicity of actors, especially transnational corporations, political conflicts became globalized and discontinuities in the pattern of world politics grew larger and larger. These possibilities, as well as the costs of tentative steps toward hegemony, increased the lack of centralized

⁴⁵ "Any originality of thought or action requires that we be rooted in shared existence; but the more firmly rooted one is in bureaucracy, the less likely one is to think differently, or in any way to make a new beginning. In bureaucratic settings the requirement of creativity - that is to be linked to others - stifle creativity; the very process of self-creation is threatened. Put another way, in conditions of administered life, individuals, both bureaucrats and clients, come to see each other and themselves as the objects of administration. The source of the rules and norms governing their behavior... is precisely the rules of the organization itself." Ferguson, Kathy E. *The Feminist Case Against Bureaucracy*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1984, 14.

⁴⁶ From Technopoly's point of view, as Neil Postman notes, "In principle a bureaucracy is simply a coordinated series of techniques for reducing the amount of information that requires processing... Beniger offers as a prime example of such a bureaucratic rationalization the decision in 1884 to organize time, on a worldwide basis, into twenty-four time zones... the idea of 'God's own time'... had to be considered irrelevant. This is important to say, because in attempting to make the most rational use of information, bureaucracy ignores all information and ideas that do not contribute to efficiency." Postman concludes that no restrictions whatsoever could be placed on Technopoly's bureaucracy, which "now claims sovereignty over all of society's affairs." Postman 1993. 84-86.

⁴⁷ Bull, however, recognized that "if contemporary international society does have any cultural basis, this is not any genuinely global culture, but is rather the culture of so-called 'modernity.' And if we ask what is modernity in culture, it is not clear how we answer this except by saying that it is the culture of dominant Western powers." Bull 1995, 37.

⁴⁸ David Held justly asks: "And can the principle of democratic legitimacy be defended when the international order is structured by agencies, organizations, associations and companies over which citizens have minimum, if any, control, and in regard to which they have little basis to signal (dis)agreement... In short, what is, and ought to be, the meaning of democracy in the context of the changing enmeshment of the local, national, regional and global?" Held 1995, 135-136 and 139.

authority. There is no world government; there cannot therefore be either a unique governance in a globalized world, or a self-governing world order.

The inter-statal system in late modernity is based, as a result of technological development (military, transportation, communication, and information transmission) on the interdependence⁴⁹ of actors on the world scene. There do, however, exist more-or-less autonomous powers in the system, specifically in the case of those members that are, militarily and economically stronger than the others. Interdependence was enhanced by the coherence required between individual states' domestic and external policies, the former reducing the margin of external action of most of the states in the world. This reality is expressed through the trend towards globalization in the political sphere, globalization which does not eliminate but rather increases the tendency towards an anarchy in interdependence instead of leading to an order in interdependence. All efforts to establish an order on the world scene cannot be undertaken, in this age of globalization, but by a hegemonic power. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States revealed their intention to assume such a role in making the world safe for capitalism as well as for the conceptions of the free market, of a democratic order and of human rights.⁵⁰

As long as nation-states exist, there will be an inter-statal system which guarantees the collective legitimation of the existence of sovereign entities through the mutually accepted principle of sovereign equality. States' actions have to be justified by the inter-statal system's collective legitimation. When the old Westphalian order was reversed, states emerging through the exercise of their right to self-determination were admitted to the system as members because the right of self-determination was considered collectively legitimate. The principle of state succession involved, in the same time, the requirement that emerging states had to be constituted in the form of nation-states (even if there was no nation, but only populations eager to conquer their independence) in order to become members of the inter-statal system. Thus, "extant (historical) territorial jurisdiction has (so far) triumphed over culture, religion, language, ethnicity, or any other nonjuridical definition of statehood in international relations."⁵¹

The historical transformation in the second half of the twentieth century, the movement of decolonization, thus led to an enormous increase in the number of sovereign entities on the world scene. The new states, emerging from decolonization, represented, however, a specific case of the usual accreditation of nonmembers by the inter-statal system because they were vested with the attributes of external sovereignty without benefitting from the necessary domestic empowerment and authority. The transfer of sovereignty from colonial power to indigenous government was assured through a new, constructivist mode of the world's political evolution by international recognition. The states emerging from the colonial era became sovereign members of the system, although they did not completely possess the institutional features usually attached heretofore to this quality.⁵² Robert Jackson gave the best appreciation of the status of the so-called quasi-states:

⁴⁹ Oran Young defines interdependence in terms of "the extent to which events occurring in any given part or in any given component unit of a world system affect (either physically or perceptually) events taking place in each of the other parts or component unit of the system." Young, Oran R. 1982, 57. An important complement of this definition is given by Rosencranz and his co-authors: "By 'interdependence' we mean the direct and positive linkage of the interests of states such that when the position of one state changes, the position of others is affected, *and in the same direction*." Rosencranz, et al. 1982, 126; italics in original.

⁵⁰ An interesting article on the hegemonic policies of the US was written by Benjamin Schwarz, *Why America Thinks It Has to Run the World*. *Atlantic Monthly*, June 1996.

⁵¹ Jackson, Robert H. "International Community Beyond the Cold War," in Lyons and Mastanduno. eds. 1995, 59-83; quotation is on page 67. Jackson cites the case of Somalia to illustrate how nonsensical the imposition of a certain form of state organization is for new members of the system: "What we witness in Somalia is the extreme case of a purely notional country - a place on the map - that lacks even the appearance of a national government with which foreign powers and other international agents can deal. But they insist on pretending that Somalia still exists, because that is the norm they must observe. In short, Somalia enjoys an international juridical existence even though it is entirely lacking in national substance." *ibid.*, 65.

⁵² "The international legal order does not provide foundation for the State: it presupposes the State's existence. Recognizing the appearance on a territory of a political entity showing the characteristics generally attributed to the State, it merely invests it with personality in the law of nations." C. de Visscher. *Theory and Reality in Public International*

This is entirely new, the result is a rather different sovereignty regime with an insurance policy for marginal states. In short, quasi-states are creatures and their elites are beneficiaries of non-competitive international norms... Never have disparities between the outward forms and the inward substance of sovereign states been any greater than they are today... quasi-states are creatures of changes in the rules of membership and modes of operation of international society which were deliberately made to replace the institutions of European overseas colonialism (Jackson 1990, 24-46).

Empirical factors ("Whether or not a new state has actually begun to exist is a pure question of fact"⁵³) became secondary as against a virtual reality based on moral requirements.

The new states emerging from colonization by virtue of the application of the self-determination principle -- without the qualifier national, as colonies were not encompassing European-style nations⁵⁴ -- received the benefit of the so-called negative sovereignty, but could not be made to have enabling capabilities which constitute the elements of positively exercised sovereignty. Inter-statal aid policies and developmental assistance were therefore designed to create the conditions in which the new states could also acquire the attributes of positive sovereignty. The basic normative changes in the inter-state system following World War II and the decolonization movement were: the consequent application of self-determination because considered as a moral imperative, and entitlements to material and technical assistance. In addition, the self-determination principle itself was given an extensive interpretation in the perspective of the Western nation-state categorization, because the independence granted by the former colonial powers and legitimated by the inter-statal system also included the inviolability of ex-colonial territories.⁵⁵ Thus, the artificially created political demarcation lines separating colonies, which reflected contingent historical occurrences determined by where the armies of two colonial powers met, were also legitimated and guaranteed by the other states in the system. The new conceptualization of sovereignty came to full circle with the recent developments concerning individual human beings becoming subjects of a world society benefitting from legal entitlements in the form of human rights, consecrated and promoted by the inter-state system.

7. Regionalism and Regionalization: The Jeffersonian Vision Reaffirmed

The only possible issue out of the chaos created by the egalitarian state and the democratic polity is the acceptance of the orientation of our society toward a gradually evolving regionalism at all levels. Regionalism, or a network of regions, is the only structuration of divergent human groups compatible with a

Law. Trans. P.E. Corbett. Princeton. Princeton University Press, 1968, 174-175. For Robert Jackson, "state-building is primarily a domestic process occurring over a long period of time that can only be brought about by the combined wills, efforts and responsibilities of governments and populations." Jackson 1990, 21.

⁵³ Brierly, J.L. *The Law of Nations*. 2. ed. London: 1936, 102-103.

⁵⁴ "The new doctrine changed the definition of both the collective 'self' and political 'determination.' The self was no longer either historical or ethnic 'nations' but artificial ex-colonial 'jurisdictions' which were multi-ethnic entities in most cases and ironically reminiscent of the old multinational empires of Europe. The 'nation' was now merely all who had been subjects of a particular colonial government and were of different race from their alien rulers. Indigenous successors to those rulers were by definition legitimate whether or not they expressed the popular will. Their rights as sovereigns and the human rights of their subjects to self-determination were one and the same. The self was not determined by plebiscites and virtually no concern was shown for minorities. Determination came down to the eviction of alien European rulers and the assertion of majority rule based on a racial definition of the majority. Since colonialism was essentially 'a violation of racial sovereignty,' self-determination was decolonization." Jackson 1990, 77.

⁵⁵ Mussa Traoré, the President of Mali, expressed this reality with great clarity: "African unity demands... complete respect for the legacy that we received from the colonial system... If we desire that our nations should be ethnic entities, speaking the same language and having the same psychology, then we shall find no single veritable nation in Africa." Quoted in McEwen, A.C. *International Boundaries of East Africa*. Oxford: 1971, 24.

multidimensional world in which no territorial sovereignty is involved. Thus, no authority can embrace all aspects of sovereign rights at any meta-level above the real human communities. In regional frameworks, it will be possible to "manage identities and ensure the compatibility of these identities with other identities" in a constant readjustment between the "logic of homogeneization of relational nexuses and the logic of differentiation" (Guéhenno 1995, 64). Social identification will not be based on territory but on cultural belonging. Regionalism will not mean, however, the disappearance of close links between space and human identifications in a cultural and symbolic sense, as much as it will not mean that some form of political organization will not always exist, as the need for coordination, for common problem solving will never disappear. Such a coordination will be required in a world composed of smaller or larger regions because it will always be necessary to undertake a limited number of common actions; for instance, for the protection of the environment. Regionalism will enable the democratic process to reach its natural end-state with the largest possible extent of decentralization of society's political-institutional structure.

Contrary to what is generally believed today, the future will not affirm the hegemony of the global over the local, but the hegemony of the local over the global -- the preeminence of the local, nevertheless, in a global, not statal, framework. As Dewey expressed it: "The local is the ultimate universal, and as near an absolute as exists" (Dewey 1994, 215). When, as a result of some not-yet-unforeseeable circumstances, state power and its subservient structures disintegrate, decentralized local institutions will take over most of the functions of the centralized state.⁵⁶ The transition will, of course, be much more painful in the industrialized countries of the West, but the disintegration of society and the popular alienation in regard to public affairs will not leave another possible escape for the collectivity's survival. In Western politics, both liberal and socialist ideologies contributed, sometimes to an unwarranted evocation of totalitarian political order, to render the state indispensable for its pretended distributive social functions, and to hypostatize the state's power into a moral imperative in relation to human rights and fundamental democratic aspirations.⁵⁷

Regionalization should be understood here in a double sense: as regionalization within the boundaries of one presently existing state, and as regionalization within the inter-statal system, or the presently existing collectivity of states, frequently and misleadingly designated as the international community. I shall call *the first type of regionalization as regionalization proper, or centrally initiated decentralization, and the second type, the requirement and defense of local autonomies -- cultural, political, and economic -- as regionalism, or a society of proximity.*

Beginnings of intra-statal regionalization are already present in most Western countries, to varying degrees, but the resistance against such initiatives is so enormous that at present, one cannot speak of a real, politically willed regionalization either in centralized states, or in those with a federal or quasi-federal structure. In fact, federalism is frequently misunderstood as decentralization or regionalization, though it is nothing but the replica of a centrally-governed state at a lower level. Regionalism means full autonomy for smaller geographically and culturally defined units of society, loosely hanging together for the performance of

⁵⁶ The concept of the "local state" emerged recently as a possible intermediary between the state and civil society; this may signify an initial change in the direction I am describing here. Thus, Andrew Kirby developed the idea, with reference to an article by W. Magnusson (Bourgeois Theories of Local Government. *Political Studies*, 1986, 34, 1-18), that local governments are much more products of local politics than "extended instruments of the state": "As polities, they are at a crucial position between civil society on the one hand, and the state on the other. Expressed within the language of contemporary state theory, the local state is both part of that apparatus, but also in conflict with the institutional arrangements of the latter. This is no ritualistic competition with respect to fiscal property, but is seen realistically as an elemental struggle between groups within civil society and the state." Kirby, Andrew. "State, Local State, Context, and Spatiality: A Reappraisal of State Theory," in Caporaso. ed. 1989, 204-226; quotation is on page 221.

⁵⁷ In this respect, Migdal describes very clearly the double and contradictory function of the United Nations, the focal point for inter-statal coordination: "The United Nations, it can be said, canonized a paradoxical view of change in the contemporary world. On the one hand, it hallowed the status quo by making the large territorial state, a political form of a limited period of all human history, inviolable. States were to be building blocks of the United Nations, while the United Nations, in turn, would attempt to safeguard them from aggression. At the same time, the United Nations was elaborating comprehensive plans for undermining the status quo through economic and social programs promoted by states. Little concern was exhibited for the near impossibility of undermining the status quo in one realm without also disturbing it in the other and the very real possibility of social and economic change bringing domestic and international political instability. Broad acceptance of United Nations plans and goals by populations throughout the world was simply assumed." Migdal 1988, 13-14.

necessary tasks in domains in which coordination of activities -- economic policies or resolution of common problems such as the protection of the environment -- is unavoidable. It is thus evident that the two fundamental *Leitmotive* of regionalization and regionalism are the principle of decentralization as fully interwoven with the principle of subsidiarity. The two are different faces of the same reality.

Demands for the recognition of regions may be stimulated by economic or social grievances, underdevelopment, or political dissatisfaction with democratic expectations. Whatever the reason, they certainly express resistance "to forms of human organisation that have grown too large in scale for their own efficiency, to inappropriately bureaucratic methods, and to lack of control by ordinary citizens over decisions that affect their lives" (Coombes, Rees, and Stapleton 1991, 120). Regionalism and regionalization are empirical phenomena based on the specificity of local conditions such as spatial and cultural patterning. These specifics include: physical conditions (land, raw materials, and climate); transport and communication infrastructures; settlement patterns, political institutions and culture; cultural values; and social relationships. Traditions of self-government or administrative decentralization, imperatives of taking into account regional disparities or those entailed by environmental factors in economic policies, all contribute to what some call the new localism.

It is of the greatest importance that regionalism is the only way to solve the problem of national, historic minorities whose ethnic and/or cultural identities were never respected by the nation-state, and whose cultural differences separating them from the majority-constituting nation render impossible their integration into some state formation. Regionalism is part of the postmodern world, meaning the end of great narratives, and, perforce, of the dialectic of globalization:

Post-modernism is marked, among other things, by the rejection of the value of uniformity (equality, homogeneity) which characterizes the old thinking and which descends from the requirements of the rule of law, of bureaucracy, and of mass production. Instead, it extols the values of diversity and multiplicity... Post-modernism is also marked by a revival of localism. Localism represents one of the possible ways out of anomie, alienation and identity loss, typical of modernity... The possibility of being exposed, through modern communication technology, to the whole infinity of places, persons, things, ideas, makes it all the more necessary to have, as a compensation, a center in which to cultivate one's self. The easy access of the whole world, with just a little time and money, gives new meaning to the need of a subjective center -- a home, a community, a locale -- from which to move and to which to return and rest.⁵⁸

It is important to keep in mind the impact of what is usually called the information and communication revolution. This revolution has a double effect on regionalism. Positively, the increasingly widening application of information and related communication systems facilitate or, in particular areas, make possible the coordination of social, political, and economic activities between regions hitherto lacking such means. The essential role of information systems is the same in both regionalism and regionalization, if there is a political will in all interested parties, and if they have the material means to develop the necessary infrastructure. Negatively, the recently invented information and communication systems facilitate the coordinating and surveillance activities of nation-states as well, thereby rendering more difficult the development of cooperation between regions and the crystallization of regional political and economic units. This double effect leads, then, to aggravation of the conflict between states and to rendering impossible regional aspirations toward more autonomy and toward cooperation between regional units.

The conflict between regionalism and any type of statal organization -- centralized or federalist -- reflects the contradiction between a political unit built on the direct relationship of the abstractly conceived individual facing alone the state power, and the individual, member of communities and collectivities, through which each individual is naturally integrated in larger, but not coercively constructed, frameworks (Lepsius 1992, 59-60).⁵⁹ Culturally, spatially and historically based regionalism is sometimes called "transnational

⁵⁸ Strassoldo, Raimondo. "Globalism and Localism: Theoretical Reflections and Some Evidence," in Mlinar. ed. 1992, 35-59; quotation is on page 46.

⁵⁹ It is in this sense that Hedley Bull writes in respect of the lessons to the de-colonization movement: "Yet as Asian, African, and other non-Western peoples have assumed a more prominent place in international society it has become

regionalism" (Fawcett and Hurrell 1995, 40) which, as an expression, is an oxymoron. Transnational refers to nation-states, whereas regionalism is making it possible for national minorities to become separate nations benefitting from complete autonomy. Regionalism refers to a world in which the major actors on the international scene will be regions, thereby transforming the inter-statal system into a inter-regional system. It is most difficult to imagine how this transformation will take place, and it is certain that the first stage of such an evolution will be a progressive regionalization within states. Thereafter, more and more regions will gradually secure independence from the statal power in order to become members of the worldwide network of greater or lesser autonomous units. The essential problem at this stage will be how to assure inter-regional coordination and cooperation without re-installing in the inter-regional network the hypostatized, sovereign powers of states, or the hegemonic powers of one superstate. These future arrangements may be of the consociationalist type, or adopt a sort of pre-modern or neo-medieval model⁶⁰ in which territoriality and sovereignty are replaced by overlapping identities and corresponding authorities -- having democratic legitimation.

Regionalism will, thus, mean the disappearance of the principle of state sovereignty and the weakening of territoriality as determining the configuration of autonomous units. *In this sense, structural, regional interdependence will be a strong feature of the process of globalization*, and the present contradiction between nationalities and nation-states is one of the examples of such contradictory tendencies promoting globalization on the world scene. It is also evident that certain truly globalizing tendencies in the world -- economic integrative factors or ecological disasters demanding collective management and solutions -- will make a crucial contribution to the trend towards regionalism. Regionalism, or inter-regional globalism, may represent the only functional response to the correlates of globalization -- integration and fragmentation -- as cultural commonalities, situational homogeneities, and convergences of interests at regional levels will facilitate the resolution of contradictory tendencies in inter-societal relations.

clear that in matters of values the distance between them and Western societies is greater than, in the early years of national liberation or decolonization, it was assumed to be." Bull and Watson. eds. 1984, 223.

⁶⁰ In their review of various regionalist theories, Fawcett and Hurrell describe a conception of regionalism which "provides one way in which responses to demands for self-determination can be broadened and in which minorities and stateless groups can find a secure place and a measure of representation within a larger political community. It is for these reasons that the regionalist road to a 'new medieval' order is seen as providing the basis for a more stable order in the many regions where diffuse and changing identities can never be made to fit neatly within the boundaries of the state system. The emergence of new kinds of regional polities can make two kinds of contribution: first, by allowing sovereignty to be 'unpacked' and parcelled out, both up to regional institutions and down to subregional bodies; and second, by institutionalizing at the regional level (through regional bodies and through strict criteria for admission) a commitment to multiparty democracy, the rule of law, and the entrenchment of fundamental human rights. Such strategies represent a potentially promising means of mitigating what are widely perceived to be the dangers of excessive fragmentation implicit in the doctrine of self-determination and constructing a broader and more encompassing order, albeit one that is very different from traditional interstate arrangements." Fawcett and Hurrell. eds. 1995, 313-314.

CHAPTER SEVEN

GLOBALIZATION, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE PRESENT ECONOMIC CRISIS

1. *Economic Globalization Defined*

Globalization in the economic field is obvious -- with production centers distributed worldwide responding to criteria other than the classic comparative advantage; the worldwide labor market; an expanding world market for goods and financial transactions; and the creation of a worldwide communication and information network -- that the most widely accepted sense of the term usually attributes an exclusive emphasis to these phenomena. However, globalization is a very complex phenomenon, of which economic globalization is but one aspect. Economic globalization simply stands for the extension of the characteristics of Western economic institutions, organization, methods, and practices to the whole world.¹ It is the only sense in which the world appears to be a planetary village. In consequence, economic globalization became the truly dominant ideology of our time,² even justifying the use of repressive forces in order to safeguard the stability of the world economy, of the "world as a single place." This reality is well reflected by the widely spread thesis that if there are crises following the intensification of globalization, the only effective remedy must be -- what else? -- further globalization.

Economic globalization expresses, according to Robert Cox,³ the differentiation between the international and the world economy, both reflecting "a *mutual* but *unequal* dependence among states and their societies." (Keohane and Nye 1977, 8-11; italics in original). International or inter-statal economy represents the sum of economic phenomena -- movements of trade, investments and payments -- across frontiers of the nation-state and regulated by the states themselves or by international organizations in the framework of which those states cooperate. The world economy, on the contrary, designates cross-border movements and operations which escape national or inter-statal regulatory powers; in fact, it was born out of territorial fragmentation.

The core of the Robertsonian dialectics of economic globalization can, therefore, be stated in the following terms. The worldwide conquest of economic activities modeled on the enormously successful Western

¹ "So the global economy should really be thought of as the global capitalist system," wrote recently George Soros. Soros, George. *Toward A Global Open Society*. *The Atlantic Monthly*, January 1998, 20.

² "But ideologies were just as important as technologies in the development of a global economy. When the capitalistic global economy began its development in the immediate aftermath of World War II, the new technologies that are now thought to be essential to a global economy did not yet exist. Ideology sent the capitalistic world off in a global direction that was later reinforced by technology. The technologies to expand and reconfigure a global economy that would come later would still have been developed but historic ideologies would certainly have delayed their usage - and may have prevented it entirely. Technology accelerated the development of today's global economy, but social attitudes and the government actions that flowed from those attitudes created the global economy." Thurow 1996, 115-116.

³ Cox, Robert W. "A Perspective on Globalization," in Mittelman, J. H. ed. 1996, 21-30.

principles and methods of economic development result in cultural and social homogeneization, in a humanity-wide commodification of ideas, values, principles and emotions:

Global capitalism both promotes and is conditioned by cultural homogeneity *and* cultural heterogeneity. The production and consolidation of difference and variety is an essential ingredient of contemporary capitalism, which is, in any case, increasingly involved with a growing variety of *micro*-markets (national-cultural; racial and ethnic; genderal; social-stratificational; and so on). At the same time micro-marketing takes place within the contexts of increasingly universal-global economic practices. It must be emphasized, however, that capitalism has to accomodate itself both to the *materiality* of the heliocentric global world, with its inherent space-time contingencies, and to the *culturality* of human life, including the making sense -- indeed the construction -- of the geosocial contingencies of in-group/out-group relations (Robertson 1992a, 173; italics in original).

Economic globalization, the reality of the world market, means a radical disembeddedness of the economic from the social sphere, and it results from the inherent drive of capitalist economic forces that tend to extend their reach and increase their profit potential.

There are two agents of this unique and dramatic transformation: the transnational corporation and the so-called competitive state. Transnational corporations conquered the entire planet in their drive to acquire more resources, to widen the range of industries or populations consuming their products, and to achieve increasing rates of profit for the benefit of their shareholders and management. In this sense, economic globalization is a natural consequence of entrepreneurship and of the market economy until it does not enter into conflict with the public interest, that is, with the economic interests of collectivities possessing differentiated human, cultural, and social backgrounds as well as varying natural endowments. The fear which inspires the antagonists of global oligopolies is that such transnational corporations will dominate a large number of sectors in industries and services. They fear that not only will smaller competitors not be able to resist the pressure of these giants to disappear through absorption, but that such companies operating worldwide will be in a position to:

- unlawfully benefit from advantages creating worldwide disparities through internalizing transactions between their branches located in different countries;⁴

- escaping responsibility the harmful effects of their activities through externalization, that is, through the elimination of these effects from their balance sheet, pretending that they are due to independent factors -- in particular because of the possibilities offered by their global presence. In Thurow's words:

A global economy creates a fundamental disconnect between national political institutions and their policies to control economic events and the international economic forces that have to be controlled. Instead of a world where national policies guide economic forces, a global economy gives rise to a world in which extranational geoeconomic forces dictate national economic policies (Thurow 1996, 127).

When the state, a collectivity's political organization, became part of the globalization game, then modern economic development quickly slid into a state of crisis. This is the decisive moment in the progress of economic globalization, occurring after World War II, as it signalled, simultaneously that transnational corporations went beyond all legitimate limits in the extension of their activities across frontiers, and thereby forced states and, for that matter, all communities and all people around the world, to enter the process of globalization in order to maintain themselves in what became to be called the competitive world order.

States thus became actors in a competitive marketplace through promoting economic activities, with all possible instruments at their disposal, in favor of economic operators on their territories. They assume, thus, the function of a transmission belt between the requirements of economic globality -- called global

⁴ In fact, intra-industry trade and constant trade relations with subsidiaries worldwide ("outsourcing") are now the rule, owing to the increasing complexity, specialization, and differentiation of many products.

competitiveness, -- and economic activities on their own territories.⁵ As a consequence, states were locked into an inextricable situation as they became actors and decision-makers in the transnational marketplace and, at the same time, remained regulators of economic activities on their territory responding essentially not to transnational but to domestic political constituencies.⁶ In the name of reigning ideologies, which profess an unshakable belief in salvation through market mechanisms, the state was even drawn, in Cerny's words, "into promoting the commodification or marketization of its own activities and structures." (Czerny 1996, 132-133).

There is, under the umbrella of globalization ideology, a transnational consensus formation between governments and enterprises with worldwide activities which consists in the adjustment of national policies and guidelines by the state to the necessities and exigencies of the globalized world economy. In this sense, economic structures and processes do not represent the result of spontaneous interactions of individual economic agents (as economic theory would have it), but the outcome of interactions of competing social, political and economic interests in the presumed setting of globality.

The requirements of global competition are threefold: first, the constant development of new technologies and the indispensable adaptation to them; second, the technology-driven creation of a world market which, once it reached its physical limits, is prone to recurrent crises; and third, the imperative need of continuous restructuration of all economic activities at country, regional, and worldwide levels, which inevitably introduces an element of instability in the economic globalization process. This instability is manifested, for example, in the fact that financial transactions became increasingly dominant and influence, frequently in an unwarranted manner, public policy decisions in respect to exchange rates and interest rates, tools *par excellence* of monetary and economic regulations.

Worldwide globalization of the characteristics of Western economic activity and organization is, undoubtedly, much advanced. What is questioned, however, are the results of this economic globalization for countries which belong to the Western orbit and enjoy a hitherto unimaginable, though gradually diminishing, material welfare, and for countries which are eager to be part of the globalized abundance but did not yet succeed to be integrated, fully or partially, in this global drive.

It is not my intention to analyze in detail various features of economic globalization or the worldwide conquest of Western methods of economic development, but to concentrate attention on three aspects of it: the reasons for the globalization drive of Western economic forces; the advantages and disadvantages of worldwide economic integration and of the formation of a global economy for the various actors on the world scene; and, finally, the future of a globalized economy, in view of the cross-currents between economy, society, and culture corresponding to the interwoven character of human activities. Economic globalization resulted in deepening social and economic contradictions in rich and industrialized countries and creating worldwide contradictions not only in the social and economic spheres but, above all, at civilizational and human levels.

⁵ "Government is not picking winners and losers," writes Lester Thurow, "but it is expanding time horizons and the scale of operations and making it cheaper for firms to play tomorrow's game... A country's technology policy is its industrial strategy. It determines where the country will play the game. Technological investments conversely require an industrial strategy." Thurow 1996, 79.

⁶ It is, nevertheless, true that "the state very often faces political or economic constituencies that are in the traditional sense domestic, but where many of the dominant interests are in important respects transnational economic actors and can, therefore, elude state policy tools to a considerable degree. The ties of interdependence that operate through the changing structures of the market highlight the importance of considering how non-state actors affect the politics of the state, and how this in turn rebounds on the politics of the international system." Underhill, Geoffrey R.D. "Conceptualizing the Changing Global Order," in Stubbs, R. and Underhill, G.R.D. eds. 1994, 17-43; quotation is on page 23.

2. Reasons for the Globalization of Capitalist Market Development

The most evident reason for the worldwide extension of the capitalist entrepreneurial system and of its world-market corollary is its undeniable success in the creation of material wealth, compared to all other types of economic development methods and institutions. The difference in material welfare and average living standard between those who invented, applied, established, or copied these methods and institutions, and those who lived and live in other, different economic conditions, is striking, and appears to justify the global conquest of Western economic success.

The success of the Western capitalist enterprise is an important practical but not a profound motive behind economic globalization since World War II. I see three basic reasons for the latter, reasons which lead directly to the question related to advantages and disadvantages of the economic globalization process.

First, the Western worldview (as it evolved since the Renaissance and the scientific advances obtained in the seventeenth century) proclaims, beginning with Descartes and Bacon, that man's principal aim is to conquer nature, to enslave it for his own purposes. The creed representing man as the ultimate and highest element in the universe destined to dominate the whole natural world through his intellectual superiority made our civilization's economic success possible. This implied, as a corollary belief, the necessity and possibility of man's conscious striving towards the realization of this objective, that is, a fully justified, voluntaristic attitude.⁷ Such a voluntarism was even transposed to the field of society and politics in the form of social engineering, or the voluntaristic transformation of social structures and economic conditions in the sense of adapting them to the aim of conquering nature and to certain ideologies, like egalitarianism, concomitant to science's and technology's advance.

Second, the creed affirming man's dominant position in the world and the corollary voluntaristic attitude were complemented by another uniquely Western characteristic: the creation of the individual in the shape of the economic man, armed with a purposive-instrumental rationality to achieve his aims of mastering the natural and human worlds through technology and globalization. The most important component in the individualistic worldview became, in the course of the last centuries, the selfishness of the individual and the exclusive predominance of its own interests, justifying purposive-instrumental rationality. The self-oriented individual, ignoring the interests of his community and of the public in general, is the real engine of the capitalist economy and of the market forces. In fact, the invisible hand of Adam Smith is, ideologically, nothing but the compound of individual interests and, in reality, the compound of powerful and dominating individual and group interests. About this fact there should be no doubt in anybody's mind. Without the voluntaristic selfishness of the Western economic man, there could not have been such successes in the economic sphere as we witnessed them, and from which, up to a certain point, most people in the Western cultural orbit did benefit.

Third, it is impossible to write about globalization of economic processes in the late modern age without implicating from the outset the determining impact of technological development. Debates are occurring between distinguished economists to determine which of the two phenomena -- globalization or technology -- explain better the contradictions in the economic sphere or the deepening economic crisis in Western economies. It is, however, evident that both had, and still have, determining effects on the destiny of the world, as they reinforce each other's impact on our lives. Based on the voluntaristic destiny of Western man and on his instrumental rationality serving exclusively individual interests, the main engine of his economic successes was, without doubt, the advance of science and of its technological as well as military applications. This advance was linked to a series of cultural givens, particular human contexts and historical developments, which enabled the intellectual elite of the West to achieve the results known and appreciated by all. Again, however, the application of scientific results and of technological miracles for the purpose of

⁷ There is no place here to refute the Weberian thesis about the linkages between capitalist development and Protestantism. Suffice it to say that Weber should have better known the essence of Protestantism, for example through the writings of Luther and Calvin, and not to let himself become impressed by the ideology of American Protestantism, especially as it was conceived in New England and derived from very particular historic circumstances. The writings of the Age of Reformation and the subsequent development of Calvinism and Lutheranism in European countries do not at all sustain the Weberian theses.

nature's domination and with a view to transform society from a mosaic of communities into a world of atomized individuals is unique in our civilization, in comparison to other co-existing cultural worlds.

3. Advantages and Disadvantages of Economic Globalization in Late Modernity

(A) ADVANTAGES - PRESENT AND PAST

Discussing the advantages brought about by the global extension of the Western economic system in late modernity, it is important not to lose sight that all facts and events related to globalization have their economically, socially, and culturally good and bad aspects. In other words, every empirically evident advantage carries with it the reality or the potentiality of a corresponding disadvantage although this is not frequently recognized, or believed. In fact, as with everything in the Janus-faced evolution of modernity, the inherent drive of capitalist production and market-stimulated consumption patterns carries with it the imperative to push given or imagined possibilities to their utmost limit: *the capitalist and market-oriented forces always tend, without exception, toward disequilibria understood in a holistic way* -- that is, involving the entire civilizational and social field. This suggests that the fundamental danger of economic globalization, evoked by some contemporary thinkers such as Ulrich Beck, is that the world as a single place simultaneously became a risk society as well.

To discuss advantages and disadvantages of economic globalization appears to be the best way to analyze economic reality, as it determines our existence in modernity. To proceed in this way also permits reflection on our contemporaries' utilitarian worldview, in which the Shakespearian dilemma of whether be or not to be was replaced by the egotistic-consumerist dilemma of have or not to have. In fact, the greatest attraction of economic globalization is, in addition to improved living conditions, the possibility of entering into the world of those who can have, or the possibility of entering the world of consumer societies.

Improvement of Living Conditions

Advantages of modern, globalizing economic development are so well known, even overestimated, that it is not necessary to dwell on them too long. We shall discuss here only the five major ones, of which the first and foremost is the unquestionable improvement of living conditions, physically and mentally, of one part, although the minor part, of humanity. This concerns the satisfaction of basic needs: food; shelter; access to safe drinking water; sharing in the benefits offered by the advancement of medical sciences and technology; order and security in society; and a considerable freedom for the human person in most, if not all, fields of cultural and social activities. This can be generally stated, but it would be impossible to quantify, or to proceed in Bentham's way by summing up all individual happiness in order to arrive at a universalizable evaluation of the human condition. Beside considering the satisfaction of elementary needs we share with the animal world, the effort to evaluate living conditions, let alone determine human happiness, can only be done contextually and with regard to each person's own unique world. Be it as it may, it is undeniable that modern economic evolution brought large-scale existential improvement to a limited number of human populations, including a small part of those populations living in non-Western countries.

Extension of Educational Possibilities

The second advantage derived from Western economic development was the extension of educational possibilities to large strata of populations -- even if educational levels became shallower and less intensive as a result of their continuous extension, and even if education, as John Stuart Mill realized, may become a means of despotic domination of human minds.⁸ Extended facilities at all levels of education had corresponding effects on the organization of social life and on political activities. They fundamentally contributed to the modern democratic wave and to the self-assurance of individual egos, as well as to the consciousness of various social groups (ethnic, cultural, occupational, etc.), without implying that they also enhanced the feeling of human dignity in people, as such a feeling does not depend on external factors like education.

Breaking Down of Distances in Space and Time

The third greatest advantage of this evolution was the breaking down of distances in space and time which started with the invention of writing and, later, printing, and which, for the first time in history, "decontextualized communication" and thereby achieved its "fixity across space and time."⁹ The effective opening up of the world (or its self-disclosure, as Heidegger would have said) hitherto isolated physically and compartmentalized culturally, and the historically unparalleled increase of information flows, brought with them fundamental changes in our societies. The transformation was fundamental because it led, in the economic sphere, to a growing volume of trade and financial transactions, and to the establishment of a worldwide communication network -- rail, sea, air, radio, telegraph, telex, fax, and so forth -- which made the increase of such transactions possible between continents. It facilitated, as well, the worldwide dissemination of science and technology's achievements through coordination and mutual exchange of information between all participants. Most importantly, it promoted among peoples and societies their knowledge of each other cultures, ways of life, and social practices.

Economic Development in non-Western Civilizations

Economic globalization opened up new vistas for countries within the orbit of non-Western civilizations to develop, industrialize, and join the consumerist trend. The global spread of Western methods of economic development, if not those of economic growth, certainly have had a beneficial effect on the living conditions of populations whose existence consisted until now, and still consists frequently, of bare survival in a world of poverty. Taking just one example, bringing drinking water to African village communities is an unmeasurable

⁸ "A general State education is a mere contrivance for moulding people to be exactly like one another: and as the mould in which it casts them is that which pleases the predominant power in the government, whether this be a monarch, a priesthood, an aristocracy, or the majority of the existing generation; in proportion as it is efficient and successful, it establishes a despotism over the mind, leading by natural tendency to one over the body." Mill 1991, 117.

⁹ Friedland and Boden summarized the simultaneous progress and regress represented in human life by the invention of writing and printing: "Writing, with its decontextualization of communication and its fixity across time and space, emerges out of administrative notation. Written notation allowed the emergence of a sense of linear time and hence the development of chronological -- both narrative and historical -- forms... The ideology of *pax romana* was based on the organization and control of space; both the ability to define boundaries of territories and control those confines constituted the empire itself. Similarly, time as defined and subsumed under Roman control through *consecutio temporum*, the linear and irreversible logic, direction, and ordering of official time... After Gutenberg and the invention of printing, the link between empires and communication, and between discourse and surveillance, became ever more defined. Yet it also opened up the genuine possibility of emancipation and democracy, exposing one of the first contradictions of the early modern era." Friedland and Boden. eds. 1994, 7; italics in original.

blessing in the life of these communities; it also permits women, for example, to start some simple economic activities like horticulture, bringing some additional monetary income to the family. However, this can be considered an advantage only if it was integrated into a cultural framework congruent with contextually determined beliefs, values, and life styles. This conditionality of economic development is of the greatest importance, if looked upon from the perspective of the common good of the people concerned, as the common good is jeopardized if noncongruence of developmental policies with the local cultural framework is the rule -- as happened frequently in late modernity. Violent reactions of religious fundamentalisms, or social resistance to external influences, constitute for this the best evidence.

It is an inevitable problem for the countries concerned to decide what Western model should be globalized: the market economy or the socialist model. It was supposed, for a long time, that because of the century-old tradition of communal existence in countries of Asia and Africa, the socialist model is more congruent with their way of life. This was proven to be an error not only because human beings are individualist everywhere, even in a communal setting, but also because socialism in these countries meant, in the first place, centralization and destruction of local social structures, of precisely those communities which socialistic policies were supposed to reinforce. In the second place, it created huge bureaucracies centered in the capital city which suppressed all creative individual or community-inspired economic undertakings. The market economy model which is now accepted and applied in the whole developing world can be adapted in such a way that it should be congruent with local ways of life and cultural givens but, nevertheless, risks causing enormous damage. It may destroy traditional community structures by promoting an excessive individualism. It can gradually transform the spatial distribution of people by provoking a growing internal migration from the rural areas towards the already overcrowded and unhealthy cities where there is little job opportunity and only a meagre existence, if any, in the informal sector activities. And, finally, it may impose structural changes in the economy which are not contextually adapted, but are promoted for ideological reasons, that is, in a manner which simply copies everything as it happened in the West.

Political and Social Benefits of Economic Globalization

Finally, some limited political and social benefits consequent to economic globalization also have to be taken into account. Without entering the debate whether the free market economy obligatorily carries with itself the necessary establishment of democratic political regimes, it is evident that, under pressure of their tutelary powers, developing countries endeavor to imitate the democratic process. This statement has to be taken, however, with numerous qualifications, because democracy in many of these countries is a superficial phenomenon.¹⁰ In most, there are traditional and autocratic, or totalitarian and military rulers in power. Even in countries like India, which is known as the largest democracy in the world, one can question the applicability of democratic principles where society is so divided culturally and socially, without possessing an integrative force like national consciousness or religious cohesion, as in many other countries of Asia and Africa. Thus, the fundamental question is whether the democratic form of politics is applicable in other social systems and cultural worlds, even if it cannot be denied that as a result of the application of Western economic models, social constraints and rigidities were relaxed in many non-Western societies, creating a freer public space than that which existed before.

This appreciation leads to the recognition that improved living conditions and relaxed social and political relationships within the framework of economic globalization can (but does not obligatorily) bring about a certain amount of freedom in the private and public spaces of society in most non-Western countries. Such an evolution is conditioned by the necessary congruence of forms of individual and social freedoms with the cultural context because if fundamental beliefs and values are endangered, consecutive reactions can even

¹⁰ Robert Kaplan clearly summed up the truth concerning democracy in other civilizational worlds: "The category of politics we live with may depend more on power relationships and the demeanor of our society than on whether we continue to hold elections... Modern democracy exists within a thin band of social and economic conditions, which include flexible hierarchies that allow people to move up and down the ladder. Instead of clear-cut separations between classes there are many grey shades, with most people bunched in the middle. Democracy is a fraud in many poor countries outside this narrow band." Kaplan 1997, 80.

destroy traditional freedoms which existed before in these civilizations. To pretend that economic globalization creates free private and public spaces in the life of populations in developing countries just because they enter into the capitalist, market economy would be preposterous and unrealistic.

There were, of course, many other advantages attributed to capitalist and market-oriented economies which today are, recognizably, of questionable value. Such is the international division of labor -- a reality destroyed, in its classical sense, by globalization. Such is the constantly increasing volume and diversification of production and the continuous progression of all economic indicators -- a valuation which, ignoring social troubles, loss of meaning, identity crises, and environmental destruction caused by present-day production methods, became obsolete. The balance sheet of constant growth became negative for human society. Finally, such an advantage turned sour is the possibility of endlessly varying, insatiable, morally and humanly harmful consumption of all and any goods at all and any time. Consumerism became the greatest flaw in our societies, as it deprives men of all their creative, genuine qualities and, through enhancing egotism, destroys human communities and solidarities. And globalization constitutes the primary vehicle for consumerism.

(B) DISADVANTAGES - PRESENT AND FUTURE

Loss of Values or the Predominance of Materialism

The greatest disadvantage that capitalist development, the establishment of a market economy, and the crystallization of a corollary cultural world, brought about is in the spiritual and moral spheres. This should not be a surprising statement in the modern world, which is determined by the economic perspective. The birth of economic man and his principal characteristic -- voluntaristic selfishness -- had extremely serious consequences in our culture, most notably the predominance of the materialistic worldview. There is no doubt that in all civilizations, there were always materialistic tendencies, but in no other culture did materialism eliminate to such an extent the spiritual content of life, and the precedence of the mental and spiritual orientation over other aspects of existence as in our own Western culture. As a result, all other value systems than that based on material interests were brushed aside as legacies of a tyrannical tradition, obstructing the triumphal advancement of modernism. In fact, the true expression of this materialism is not atheism or agnosticism but, indeed, Western consumerism; its typical manifestation is the mushrooming of innumerable commercial centers, veritable temples of "having," around the world. There are all sorts of materialisms occupying people's minds: from the crass, everyday materialism of conventional consumers, through the doctrinaire Marxist-Leninist one, to the sophisticated, scientific one of today's neuroscientists and sociobiologists who want to explain even the smallest human manifestations by chemical reactions in brain synapses or biological necessities derived from grandiose theories.

The core problem of the contemporary materialistic trend is that the only measure of value which remained after the elimination of the old value systems is money, which, served by self-interest and the purposive-instrumental rationality, represents the worst possible choice for humanity. It institutes an a-temporal world order (making possible, simultaneously, instantaneity and deferral) in which place and space are annihilated because, as notions, they are emptied. The true essence of consumerism, in which even fleeting images and illusory expressions of superficial realities become commodities, this transience of all values also explains, at least partially, the shift towards more and more services in the economic sphere.

Most important of all, if monetary and self-interests are dominant there can be no place for human solidarity; in a money and self-oriented world it is insane to try to stimulate people to show empathy toward others, or to try to impose on them requirements of solidarity by laws and pious exhortations. The devaluation of old value systems inherited from Christianity, from other world religions, or from ethical teachings like those of Confucius and the Buddha, left human existence centerless and meaningless, and it left human beings without guidance as to the correctness of different social practices.

Open-ended Expectations of Rights and Entitlements

The real improvement in conditions of life also became distorted because it was coupled with ideologies born out of the eighteenth century Enlightenment: anything obtained once upon a time by a group of people in particular contexts and in particular circumstances, became a necessary condition of life for everybody on the planet. The always renewed and extended lists of rights and entitlements considered indispensable for improved living conditions are nowadays codified in charters of human rights and in other such august documents. Thus, we came to see that courts (in the present case in the Federal Republic of Germany) consider the possession of a television set as a basic human right.

The trend toward more intensive expectations of higher and higher entitlements in contemporary societies of the West is reinforced by the obviously corroding economic effects of what Mancur Olson called distributional coalitions. These coalitions, which represent special interests in the workforce or the population in a given country, depending on the number and occupational importance of their members, influence to a great extent not only patterns of income distribution, but the configuration of the overall welfare situation, as well. And they do not care about what results their actions will have from the point of view of the general interest:

In short, the typical organization for collective action within a society will, at least if it represents only a narrow segment of the society, have little or no incentive to make any significant sacrifices in the interest of the society; it can best serve its members' interests by striving to seize a larger share of a society's production for them. This will be expedient, moreover, even if the social costs of the change in the distribution exceed the amount redistributed by a huge multiple; *there is for practical purposes no constraint on the social cost such an organization will find it expedient to impose on the society in the course of obtaining a larger share of the social output for itself* (Olson 1982, 44; italics in original).

And Olson concludes that the destructive effect of distributional coalitions' activities inevitably leads to reduced economic efficiency and reduced aggregate income and wealth creation conducive to political fragmentation and divisiveness (ibid., 47).

The Disappearance of Spatial and Temporal Dimensions

Ephemerality is characteristic of modernity because time horizons disappeared. Ephemerality penetrated not only mentalities and ways of life through the domination of fashion and popular fads, but also economic processes, by transforming production and exchange patterns in the service of immediate access, instantaneous usage and satisfaction. In the temporal perspective, modern evolution gave an absolute value to the present moment, discounting the future for the present's sake. This fundamental fact about economic modernity was well-expressed by Lester Thurow who referred to the time preference of economic man¹¹ and the governments' myopia in capitalistic democracies: both are imprisoned in short time horizons.

¹¹ "If the rate of return on investment exceeds the rate of time preference, consumers will voluntarily quit consuming and lend their consumption funds to those wishing to invest. By doing so they increase the total net present value of their lifetime consumption... If every individual chooses not to save, the whole society cannot grow, but that is still the individual's right. Capitalism is not a doctrine that promises maximum growth. It promises only to cater to individual preferences. If those preferences are perverse with respect to economic growth -- so be it." Thurow 1996. 282 and 297. Referring to governments' short-term, politically motivated calculus, Thurow explains: "Technically, many governments have negative time horizons. If governments' budget deficits are bigger than the investment activities in those budgets, as they are for the American federal government, governments are net subtractors from the pool of investable funds. Effectively, they are reducing future growth to support current consumption." ibid.

The disappearance of distance in space and time brought with it a great number of disadvantages for all humanity; it is a prime factor in the disorganization of the world economy experienced over the course of the globalization process. Five glaring examples may help to demonstrate this reality:

The *spatial and temporal disorganization of production patterns* through relocation of production sites in accordance with short-term advantages. It is pretended that production sites are chosen according to advantages offered by local market conditions (the potential global relevance of the local marketplace, and vice versa), mainly the cheapness of manpower or advantages offered by host countries eager to attract economically important foreign investments. Thus, production sites are wandering around the world, constituting the so-called corporate geographies; they create the devastating phenomenon known as de-industrialization and introduce a long-term instability in the production process. The expression wandering -- meaning passage between focal points of production networks based on shifting divisions of labor, resource mobilization perspectives, and local cultural endowments -- is not misplaced, because as soon as favorable local circumstances disappear, enterprises solely motivated by increasing their profits, look for other locations, in order to benefit from the remaining spots on the globe where people work for less, but possess the necessary qualifications and potential for further training.

There is a hierarchy of spatial elasticities in the modern marketplace -- which factors move fastest and farthest in response to spatial differentials of returns: liquid capital moves fastest and farthest, fixed capital investment less so, and wage workers slowest and least of all. Capital has progressively separated in time and space from labor. Economic restructuring thus brings in its wake radical geographical restructuring and the disruption of communities and mass migration (Friedland and Boden 1994, 13).

This wandering may only continue endlessly, even if the number of locations with cheaper manpower is, in principle, limited, because this kind of strategy pushes down salaries and other fringe benefits in regions with formerly well-paid staff. Enterprises may always return, if other conditions of the market remain equal. Nevertheless, these strategies void all classical theories of comparative advantage, still taught in academe, replacing them by the privileged function of increasing shareholder value (and managerial remunerations as well), which considers momentary and monetary advantages exclusively. The disorganization of worldwide production patterns exerts the most disastrous impact on the economies of Asian, African and South American countries, because they render inoperative developmental policies based on selected priorities and selected economic sectors.

The elimination of spatial and temporal distances involving the breakdown of all cultural and civilizational differentiations, also results in the *disorganization of the world labor market*. This disorganization is closely linked to the disorganized globalization of worldwide production patterns, and represents, first of all, a menace for the economically-active population of those countries which, until now, had higher standards of living and a better trained working force. It is a "social disengagement on a massive scale," in Lester Thurow's words (1996, 30).¹² The chronic unemployment in most European countries is, at least partially, a result of economic globalization and its corollary of structural inadaptation, constituting a vicious circle, as it can only be explained in terms, again, of globalization. The second source of the chronic unemployment in the Western world is, without doubt, the growing use of labor-substituting technologies -- automation, computerization, or the more and more frequent use of robots -- which represents another aspect of globalization and late modernity's fundamental contradictions.

Economic restructuring contributes, in a great extent, to the global restructuring of the labor market, too. It is inconceivable that most economists and politicians, not to mention those who benefit from the actual

¹² Having his sight, first of all, on conditions in the United States, Thurow insists on the effects of downsizing and the employment of contingent workers: "Downsizing with outsourcing allowed the search for soft productivity gains (a workforce with better motivation and higher levels of cooperation) to continue while simultaneously reducing real wages... In the process of downsizing, American firms are developing a contingent workforce composed of involuntary part-timers, temporary workers, limited-term contract workers, and previously laid off 'self-employed' consultants who work for wages far below what they had previously receiving... With contingent workers, companies get lower labor costs and greater deployment facility. Contingent workers receive lower wages, less fringes, fewer paid holidays, and must accept greater economic risks and uncertainty." Thurow 1996, 27 and 29.

situation, do not see the losses suffered by all advanced capitalist and market economies because of the dominant trend of increasing job opportunities in the service sector,¹³ while reducing truly productive activities in these economies. Nobody asks how these economies will survive if they do not produce goods representing economic value, and all those persons active economically will only render services to each other; that is, services will be paid for by services. If, as forecasted, forty percent of the workforce in economically-advanced countries will consist of analysts, technicians, and researchers, as well as of the managerial class linked to social groups in power and benefitting from higher and higher revenues, while the rest survive on very low incomes drawn from activities in the service sector, -- then, the future looks very bleak.

No doubt, the considerably increased *worldwide migratory movements* -- most of the immigrants escape from degrading poverty and inhuman conditions of existence -- represent an additional factor linked to the dissolution of spatial and temporal distances and, consequently, to the disorganization of the worldwide labor market. Migratory movements are, of course, entirely understandable from the human point of view, but nonetheless create troublesome problems for both the countries of migrant origin and destination. In the countries of origin, which receive considerable amounts of financial and technical assistance from the industrialized world, the departure of citizens who, in some cases, already benefitted from some kind of training or work experience, is a never-recoverable loss because migration of part of the workforce is not the way to develop those countries' economies, reduce poverty, gradually improve conditions of life. In fact, policies of aid and assistance to developing countries and, simultaneously, the admission of migrants from the same countries, is a totally incoherent position on behalf of the industrialized world.

The disruptive effects of contemporary migratory movements is all the more evident in that the migrants, generally lacking the qualifications required for most jobs in their countries of destination simply swell the masses people living on welfare payments. Most importantly, as these migrants come from different civilizational contexts, the potential of more and more culture clashes, partly motivated by economic hardships, lead to continuous difficulties in living together in the same society.

One of the essential spatial effects of economic globalization is the *urbanization drive* -- a reduction of spatiality through concentration involving the abandonment of large rural areas -- which not only created enormous urban conglomerations in industrialized countries but, even more, in other continents. People flow into the capital cities or regional centers in the hope of finding a better living. Modern urbanization slowly killed off rural civilization, its values, lifestyles, and existential stability -- a way of life which sustained our culture during centuries:

What emerges as the most important characteristic of all cities and regions, regardless of their relative position in the new international division of labor, is the instability of their economic structure and social dynamics, as a consequence of the volatility of movements in the international economy (Castells 1989, 346).¹⁴

The de-linking of financial market operations from the production processes in which agricultural and industrial enterprises, the only entities creating economically valuable investment or consumer goods, resulted in a total distortion of the functioning of the world market. *De-linking of financial from productive*

¹³ In respect of the service sector, it has to be pointed out that part of the service industries employ skilled, well-paid labor, but the major part of the industry pays very poorly for unskilled labor. However, this difference is not of importance here, because *all kinds* of jobs in services are non-productive, that is, do not produce goods representing real, economic value.

¹⁴ Castells depicts a dramatic situation as the result of globalization: "A growing social schizophrasia has resulted between, on the one hand, regional societies and local institution and, on the other hand, the rules and operations of the economic system at the international level. The more the economy becomes interdependent on a global scale, the less can regional and local governments, as they exist today, act upon the basic mechanisms that condition the daily existence of their citizens. The traditional structures of social and political control over development, work, and distribution, have been subverted by the placeless logic of an internationalized economy enacted by means of information flows. The ultimate challenge of this fundamental dimension of the restructuring process is the possibility that the local state, and therefore people's control over their lives, will fade away, unless democracy is reinvented to match the space of flows with the power of places." Castells 1989, 347.

operations can be seen as the foremost destructive consequence of late-modern economic development. It is destructive because of its destabilizing effect on worldwide economic activities¹⁵ -- such as the consequences of the so-called block trading at stock exchanges which can disorganize financial markets in a very short time span. Its adjudicating capital flows and investment preferences not in accordance with real needs and satisfactions in different regions of the world, but according to its own criteria, namely, the potential profit of shareholders and speculators is also problematic. It is perfectly true, as Thurow noted, that no country today except those with the largest economies, can have recourse to Keynesian counter-cyclical policies, because the activities of world financial markets make this impossible (Thurow 1996, 216-217). This is evidenced in the inability of most European governments to surmount the devastating crisis of unemployment in the mid-nineties: their hands are tied by the eventual market responses to moves they would have otherwise taken in order to fight their domestic economic woes. It is one of the most deplorable illusions in late modernity that financial markets reflect real world conditions in the productive fields of economic activity.

This phenomenon is mistakenly called global financial integration because of the instantaneity and simultaneity of operations at a worldwide level, and it is believed that it succeeded to eliminate distances and boundaries, that it signifies "the end of geography" in the words of Richard O'Brien. The two key driving forces of financial integration are, according to O'Brien, technological changes in the field of information and communication, and regulatory changes indicating modifications in the surveillance authorities' attitudes (another example of the importance of changes in the states' role to promote world markets) (O'Brien 1992, 3). Of course, regulatory controls are made impossible by new technologies; operators go to search electronically for more favorable conditions whenever controls are imposed by the state authorities in one location. O'Brien's conception is evidently an ideologically-motivated notion of the de-linking of financial transactions from reality. In Baudrillard's formulation: "The monetary sign is severed from every social production and then enters a phase of speculation" (Baudrillard 1993, 21); the end of geography discourse is based on the conception of money and financial operations as "relieved from every message and every signification" because they become autonomous simulacra: "The indeterminacy affecting terms, the neutralisation of a *dialectical opposition into a pure and simple structural alternation*, produces the characteristic effect of an *uncertainty surrounding the reality of the crisis*" (ibid., 33; italics in original).

All these factors led to a *multiplication of decision-making structures at the global level*. This multiplication means that there are, in fact, two such structures simultaneously existing, uncoordinated in any way, as a consequence of the respect of two sacro-saint principles: the sovereignty of the nation-state and the absolute freedom of economic enterprises. The first represent societal organization at the highest level and, therefore, are responsible to act in the interest of their populations; the second follow solely their own rationality, instrumental in the realization of their objectives, -- the maximization of profit. The complexity and importance of economic structures at the international scale, and the power represented by those who dominate them, practically dwarfs inter-state relations. The transnational identity of economic entities and of other organizations by definition eludes state control. What is problematic is the delimitation of public interest at global levels, as one can, without doubt, raise the question whether the powerholders of the state or the top managers of worldwide economic activities really represent the public interest?

The double decision-making structure on the international scene resulted in evolving economic diplomacy in the nation-states, and in the inauguration of the age of worldwide international trade negotiations. But all these efforts do not change the basic fact that the so-called multinationals' power and influence on matters of world politics is not taken into account in international relations. Representatives of large firms often accompany a country's highest officials on their visits to other states which offer a sizable market for the firms' products or with which problems regarding fair competition have to be settled. This should not be considered as a rapprochement between the parallel structures of decision-making at a worldwide level, because these joint visits of political and economic leaders is nothing but a promotional effort.

¹⁵ It is interesting to note here the opinion of one of the outstanding participants in financial transactions at a worldwide level, George Soros: "Economic theory has been built on the misleading concept of equilibrium. In my view, equilibrium is elusive because market participants are trying to discount future that is itself shaped by market expectations... Market participants, if they are rational, will recognize that they are shooting at a moving target rather than discounting a future equilibrium... Markets cannot be left to correct their own mistakes, because they are likely to overreact and to behave in an indiscriminate fashion." Soros, George. Toward A Global Open Society. *The Atlantic Monthly*, January 1998, 22.

Representatives of economic power are not integrated in international bodies such as the United Nations (the example of the International Labor Office, where representatives of employers as well as workers are participating in the organization's work is not relevant). It is for this reason that a former United Nations Under-Secretary General, Sir Bryan Urqhart, proposed some years ago that a way should be found to incorporate representatives of multinational corporations into the negotiating structure of international organizations.

The Impossibility of Economic Prediction

Economic prediction was always critically important because it plays a fundamental role in economic policy and society's development. Economic forecasting could never satisfy the criteria set by Sir Karl Popper for scientific prediction of "well-isolated, stationary and recurrent phenomena" which must be derived from a universal law well tested and corroborated; and be based on independently checked, specific initial conditions (Popper 1963, 339). However, economic generalizations -- designated as trends, tendencies, or patterns -- referring to presuppositions and axioms, qualified by the *caeteris paribus* clauses, were considered sufficient for solid economic forecasting in the Friedmannian perspective. In Popperian terms, they were exposed to procedures of verification or falsification, without even claiming to be unambiguous or approaching any degree of verisimilitude. The problem of axioms or, rather, axiomatic assumptions and of *caeteris paribus* clauses always represented the Achilles heel of economic prediction. Both axioms and *caeteris paribus* clauses consist of individual judgements and presuppositions about a state of affairs, reflecting patterns or trends based on historical series without any possible link to a universal law or independently verified initial conditions. Such arbitrary judgements and assumptions were unavoidably formed among uncertainties and conditions of greater or lesser ignorance; even predicted probabilities suffered from this weaknesses.

With modernity advancing, it was increasingly recognized that in economic and social affairs, unpredictability became a significant factor. It is therefore evident that in late modernity's economic globalization context, thoroughly interwoven with a civilizational texture which is characterized by the universalization of the particular and the particularization of the universal, it became nearly impossible to arrive at reliable economic predictions. *In the era of globalization, economic prediction based on abstract formulations and calculations lost all its relevance.* Widely varying patterns of customary behavior in different civilizations (as against a stable general culture postulated by Pigou at the beginning of the century), as well as the growing discretionary character of individuals' economic activities, render impossible any serious forecasting of economic trends in our times. Therefore, the criticism of abstract theorizing in economics made by Sir Henry Phelps Brown a quarter of a century ago, still remains valid in the age of globalization:

I believe that it is impaired from the first by being built upon assumptions about human behaviour that are plucked from the air. That it proceeds by abstraction and builds models or follows paths of reasoning to reveal the outcome of assumptions, is in itself nothing against it, for doing this is a necessary part of the endeavour to understand any process, in human affairs no less than in physical. But what does impair it, scientifically and practically, is that the human propensities and reactions it purports to abstract are not in fact abstracted, that is to say drawn out from observations, but are simply assumed -- assumed out of everyday knowledge, or introspection, or convention, or the faith that however unaccountably some people may behave on some occasions, in the long run and for social aggregates it is rational, maximizing behaviour that prevails.¹⁶

Can it be sincerely supposed that economic predictions, using methods and formalistic approaches that are not at all adapted to the enormously varying cultural and social contexts of the world, can be employed in a globalized economy when their relevance and usefulness was already contested in the framework of national economies?

¹⁶ *Economic Journal*, March 1972, 3.

Science and Technological Development

It is difficult to sum up the disadvantages of the extraordinary scientific and technological development in the West because there are so many, and because they are so varied. I shall examine them, even if I have to ignore some of minor importance, under three headings. First, it is today common knowledge that science and technology, instruments of man in his economic exploitation of nature's riches, are mainly responsible for the never imagined *environmental deterioration* of our world. Whatever the immediate causes of the destruction of nature, it is its economic exploitation using all available contemporary technology which fundamentally jeopardizes our existence. Underlying this economic activity is, of course, the totally unacceptable mentality, evolved in the course of the last centuries, which considers nature as man's servant or property or, with today's fashionable expression, as a simple social construct. All those who think in this way forget that it is not nature which is a social construct, an artificially created environment, but our own world where, for example, automobiles reign supreme. This is the reason for the insurmountable difficulty of government attempts to curb the use of automotive engines through fiscal or other legislation. We reached, in fact, a situation in which environmental and socio-economic interests inevitably clash in cases like woodcutting, for instance, where respect of elementary ecological requirements unavoidably leads to local unemployment and resistance of producing enterprises. It has to be said, for once, that if economic and environmental interests are in conflict, this is the result of modern technology, especially in a world which is under the unbounded reign of purposive-instrumental reason and of crass interests (because exclusively directed to money-making). In such a world, no solidarity can survive: either solidarity with one's fellowmen, or solidarity with our cosmic environment, nature.

Second, the joint economic enterprise of technology and power is responsible for the second disadvantage of technological development: *the threat of humanity's annihilation by nuclear power*. The risk lies in making available to anyone who is intent to buy and use the most dangerous weaponry in all history, including those arms put at the disposal of home-grown as well as foreign terrorism. It appears that most, if not all, states realized that their own existence is as much jeopardized by nuclear weapons as the existence of others and, therefore, there is a general agreement that the use of such weapons should be made impossible for all (the only exceptions being potential great powers like China, or some peripheral states like Libya). However, there is no assurance against accidents, either in the case when irresponsible people obtain such mortal weapons, or in the case of nuclear electricity production plants like Chernobyl.

But dealing with weaponry technologies and economics of armaments, it is necessary to consider non-nuclear dangers too, including local conflicts and terrorism. If the number of these so-called local conflicts grows throughout the world, it is because high technology industries supply the arms needed by the combatants, should it be in Cambodia, in Rwanda, or in Bosnia. Peacekeeping efforts of the United Nations (with all their ineffectiveness) are, thus, a meagre response by those who do not restrain the activities of these industries. They are evidence of a disgraceful attitude on behalf of technology's masters. Worse, armament production at high-tech levels makes possible both domestic and foreign terrorism, which menace the roots of our societies' existence. Under domestic terrorism (which may also be designated as social terrorism), I categorize all kinds of criminal activities, especially the horrific examples of random violence as well as political terrorism which aims at changing either the social order or challenges the government and, consequently, strives to replace those actually in power with another group of people representing different political, economic or, simply, crass pecuniary interests.

Third, the alliance of economic forces with technocrats resulted in the *total transformation of the social order*, involving pauperization and inequalities on the increase and reflecting an ever-widening abyss of economic differences separating social groups, professional and occupational classes, majorities and minorities, poor countries and rich countries. This was, of course, an unintended result not accounted for in the expectations of a never-ending economic and social progress and the ever-continuing redistributive blessings of the welfare state. Nonetheless, it is a logical outcome of the evolution of modern economies because all economic and social factors pointed in this direction (although few people were ready to recognize them).

For example, the demographic explosion at worldwide level, which was the result of the elimination of the equilibrating functions of biological forces through the progress made by the medical sciences, represent a real improvement in life conditions but, at the same time, destroyed nature's own efforts to maintain human populations at a level acceptable for environment and society. In addition, the development of technology

and the economic activities sustained by it allowed the gradual destruction of social forces at work in human communities, forces which from time immemorial tended to counteract nefarious and disequilibrating effects of technological progress. This effect was inevitable because of the inherent, unalterable drive towards disequilibria, towards total domination, towards globalizing differences and inequalities of non-human origin inherent in technological and economic progress.

These examples of transformations and destruction brought about by technologically sustained, globalizing economic activities had, in sum, a common source: the egotistic, self-oriented human being who was justified and aggrandized by modern ideologies of individualism. Moral man was and still is not up to the technological and economic challenges of late-modern globalization.

Modernization Through Imposed Patterns and Models

The last aspect of economic globalization's disadvantages to be dealt with concerns globalization and the non-Western world. Globalization in general, and economic globalization in the form of modernization in particular, means that our approaches, concepts, methods, and institutions which evolved since the Enlightenment in a specific historical, cultural, and social context, should be dis-embedded and transplanted, without further ado, into the totally different contexts of other civilizations.¹⁷ As Tenbruck pointed out:

Wherever the vision of an inner-worldly fulfilment of the history of mankind has become triumphant, there the existence of nations and national cultures disturbed the dream of secular ecumenicity. The vacuity (and limitations) of this vision become apparent in the almost total absence of any serious reflections concerning the fate of these historical givens in the developmental process. The question where development as a cultural process is leading to does not form part of this thinking... The more we push on with uniform and collective development the more it will have to acquire the tacit traits of a global cultural struggle (Tenbruck 1990, 202-203).

Such processes reflect not only the voluntary ignorance of incommensurable civilizational contexts, but negate one of the greatest achievements of modernity, the acceptance of pluralism (apparently, applicable only within the Western cultural orbit).

Blueprints elaborated out of context were applied without any attention to new and totally different circumstances. Existing structures, habits and ways of life were destroyed in order to implant structures, habits and ways of life borrowed from Western theory and practice. This resulted in a perfect incongruence between developmental thinking, methods and operations, and cultural givens, that is, inherited, traditional perceptions, customs, and basic beliefs and values. Though much time was lost, it is not too late to correct past mistakes. An overall effort should be made by all those involved, to re-think and re-formulate developmental programs, taking into account the respective civilizational contexts and other diverse local constraints, as well as the environmental consequences of any action undertaken.

How profoundly unjust the ignorance of pluralistic divergences is has been demonstrated by the difficulties encountered in the so-called transitional economies, that is, the economies of formerly Communist countries.

¹⁷ "Development was viewed," writes von Laue in his landmark study already quoted, "as a transfer of methods of productivity -- institutions, technologies, cultural skills -- from the developed to the less developed countries, based on the assumption that the recipients were prepared (like the beneficiaries of the Marshall Plan) to continue on their own; their economies would take off. Western economists believed in the existence of a universal pattern of economic growth without taking into account two crucial factors. First, an economic system freely evolved out of its own inherent dynamics cannot be a model for economies disoriented by foreign intervention and governed by external forces. Second, economies function in the context of cultures -- cultures which by their nature are mutually incompatible. Prevailing Western opinion, however, held that Western achievements in demand throughout the world could be lifted out of their invisible cultural wrappings and readily implanted elsewhere. What needed to be arranged were only the details of transfer." Laue 1987, 311.

They were devastated by decades of not only inadequate economic policies, but an entirely incompetent governance and management, and incapacitated to carry out the necessary adaptation to conditions of capitalist entrepreneurship and the world market because of people's mentality, which suffered incurable damages from the long ideological *Gleichschaltung* at the hands of Marxist-Leninist regimes.¹⁸

The lack of success of most developmental efforts and the rising cultural resistance against Western economic and civilizational influence in many countries of the Third World or in some of the states of the former Soviet empire, represent the most telling examples of the unnecessarily erroneous methods of economic, social and cultural globalization.¹⁹ There is no proportion between the official and private financial aid and investment flows and the amount of technical assistance and cooperation channelled into developing countries and emerging markets, and the results obtained by which the efficiency of assistance can be measured. This disparity comes precisely from the inapplicability of many, though not all, economic principles, theories, methods, and institutions which are embedded in the specific context of Western culture. A good example of such theories and principles is the West's insistence that developing economies aim at the famous equilibria in various fields of the economic sphere, posited by economic experts (though it is doubtful that such equilibria ever existed in our economies). It must, however, be evident to any unbiased observer that in Asian, African and South American countries, only a disproportionate development could lead to the desired results, disproportionate in the sense that it privileges certain sectors, in a given phase of development, at the expense of others. I do not mean that I am in favor of the only disproportionality practiced in developing countries, namely, the absolute prioritization of industrial development against agricultural production (agriculture financing the creation of industries by undue transfers imposed by the state), of which the disastrous effects are well known.

It is also easy to show that the insistence on privileging private entrepreneurship, with reference to its importance in the West's economies, is completely mistaken in developing countries and in transitional economies because, in the first case, there simply are no (or in very limited numbers) private businessmen, whereas in the second case, the inherited mentality makes it difficult for most people to enter a business on their own. Therefore, those who became private entrepreneurs are the members of the former state enterprise bureaucracies, having the necessary material means for that purpose, but rarely manifesting the appropriate talents and savvy required for entrepreneurship.

The right to development granted by the inter-statal system to countries emerging from the colonial status was conceived in accordance with the idea of an international distributive justice, as part of the universal moral community's ideal (Little 1982, 324), transposing the ideal of the egalitarian democratic state to the world scene.²⁰ Sovereignty thus became a right not only to political independence but also to foreign aid and development assistance, as colonization was considered to be the cause of the former colonies' underdevelopment. This inter-statal entitlement was also extended to an equitable share of global resources and opportunities, such as exploitation of oceanbeds or technological achievements which were obtained in

¹⁸ The unsuccessful application of Western economic methods justifies the question raised by Sophie Mappa in a recent article entitled: "Development Through Democracy," in Mappa 1995. In fact, the merging of requirements for democracy and for economic development by Western propaganda resulted, for example in countries of the formerly Communist Europe, in people believing that the advent of democracy will automatically ensure the raising of living standards up to those levels prevalent in Western countries in the present.

¹⁹ "The histories of the world richest countries illustrate an iron law of economic development. No country can become rich without a century of good economic performance and a century of slow population growth. Many of today's poor countries have population growth rates between 3 and 4 percent. If Japan, Germany, and the United States had had such rates of population increase, their standards of living today would be no higher than they were one hundred years ago." Thurow 1992, 207.

²⁰ Robert Jackson explained how positive entitlements of inter-statal distributive justice were accepted simultaneously with the maintenance of the classic negative rights derived from state sovereignty: "Classical negative rights of nonintervention are still retained by all states, developed and underdeveloped alike... If developed states have obligations to come to the assistance of underdeveloped states -- as is often claimed -- they certainly have no corresponding rights to ensure that their assistance is properly and efficiently used by governments of the latter... There is a fundamental incompatibility, therefore, between classical liberal rules of reciprocity and commutative justice and contemporary doctrines of nonreciprocity and distributive justice." Jackson 1990, 44.

other countries on the planet. The above situation, then, amounted to a voluntary limitation of reciprocity by the industrialized states and an extension of preferential treatment to specific categories of developing countries, in order to compensate them for losses which they eventually suffered under domination by foreign powers. Roling wrote shortly after World War II, "The world community is bound to become a welfare community, just as the nation-state became a welfare state."²¹

Aid and assistance policies led to the creation of what Badie calls "neo-patrimonialism" (Badie 1992, 24), or the birth of "the rentier-state"²² in a double sense. First, as the newly independent countries do not have the financial resources (fiscal revenues are insignificant proportionately to their developmental needs), they cannot avoid taking a greater or lesser part of their revenues, even for current expenditures, from external sources received in the form of aid or loans (whence their ever-growing indebtedness). This, of course, has an extremely detrimental effect on these countries' social development, because all aid and assistance is channelled through the state -- the only entity recognized by the inter-statal system -- and, thus, civil society is entirely subjected to the state power, that is, to those who are invested with it at any moment of time.²³

Second, such a dependence on the external world, and an effective, if partial, incorporation in the movement of economic globalization, create a dual economy, or an economy at two distinct levels: one which is integrated into the world market and ensures corresponding benefits to foreign and local economic operators and to the powerholders; another which remains outside the so-called logic of the market, the greatest part of agriculture (even if not only serving subsistence purposes) and of the service sector (that part of it which continues in the traditional way).

4. Economic Globalization and the Future

No one can accurately foretell the future of such complex phenomena as economic globalization (it would be extremely pretentious to make such claims, as some writers do, for the 21st century). However, it is possible to propose a certain number of suggestions concerning the evolution of globalization in the economic sphere for the coming decades.

I strongly believe that many aspects of economic globalization will remain with us, as far as we can see into the future. This prevision is justified, in view of the importance of the results obtained by communication and information technologies, though the road ahead will certainly be bumpy, since not all inventions and not all seemingly revolutionary achievements heralded by the media as epoch-making events will be proven useful through the lifetime of successive generations.

²¹ Roling, B.V.A. 1960. *International Law in an Expanded World*. Amsterdam, 83.

²² Beblawi, H. and Luciani, G. eds. *The Rentier State*. London: Croom Helm, 1987.

²³ "Any system of distributive equity between states almost certainly would not be just for individuals living in them owing to the categorical differences between states and individuals. Persons are natural entities and more or less equal whereas states are artificial entities that are highly unequal in virtually every respect except legal status. Distributive equity between states even if it rested on a per capita basis would still not begin to achieve distributive justice unless a corresponding system of justice operated within states as well as between them that could insure a just domestic distribution of resources and opportunities. States are internally differentiated into rulers and ruled. The key to justice between states is the willingness and ability of sovereign governments to translate international justice into domestic justice... Distributive justice between states as seen from the outside might on closer examination be privilege for political elites who are strategically positioned to divert material goods to themselves or their supporters." Jackson 1990, 182.

(A) THE WORLD MARKET

As a consequence of communication and information technology's realizations, a substantially reshaped world market will continue to exist in a very different form that functions in the present. Taking here the meaning of the world market in its largest sense, I mean that production networks, trade relations, consumption structures (though not patterns), and financial operations (though not integration of worldwide financial markets) will evolve in a global framework, including transnational corporations, but with such a great number of qualifications that the ideological protagonists of today's world market concept would not even recognize it.

Fundamental Changes in Production Systems and Labor Requirements

One of the main variables in the constitution of the world market of the future will be linked to the development of communication and information technologies; in all production and distribution systems as well as all material and financial transactions, technology-induced but *man-made comparative advantage will be the decisive factor*, as Lester Thurow so justly emphasizes it. He also insists that economic globalization means factor price equalization at worldwide level.²⁴ This evolution will, of course, transform global economic activities.

First, in a regionalized global world, communication and information technologies will permit the decentralization of productive activities to a hitherto unknown level. Not in the same way as it happens now -- following unwarranted competitive principles in search of conditions producing more profit and producing growing instability at the same time -- but in a more stable manner in which locations and capacity distributions will follow a pattern determined by civilizational givens and, above all, ecological constraints and possibilities. Thurow's brainpower availability will be one of the important factors influencing decentralization of the productive structure, together with essential contextual conditions such as popular acceptance, resource availability and factor proportions (availability of capital and labor). These factors, in Thurow's view, will lose their importance in the future, as he strongly believes, in my judgement wrongly, that natural resources, capital and labor (but not brainpower) will be transferable and, therefore, available anywhere in the world.²⁵

Second, a complete overhaul of the labor force and of the educational and vocational training systems in all parts of the world will take place. The magnitude and the extent of this change cannot yet be foreseen, because the projected and expected triumph of the above mentioned technologies is still nothing but an assumption, not taking into consideration cultural, social, and, above all, human factors. It is, however, most probable that there will be market for people with the necessary brainpower to create and manage new technologies and their application processes, and for skilled labor in productive and service activities. Unskilled labor will be relegated to fill in the least important and least interesting functions in agriculture, the service industries, and public services and administrations. Wage differentials were always justified by higher productivity which, in the future, will be closely linked to brainpower and skills.

²⁴ "By definition a global economy is one where factors of production - natural resources, capital, technology, and labor - as well as goods and services move around the world... In this process of searching around the globe for the highest returns, wherever they may exist, prices, rents, wages, interests payments, and dividends become more equal." Thurow 1996. 166-167.

²⁵ This is as good a place as any other to point out how much it disturbs me that Lester Thurow's deep insights into capitalism's and the market economy's problems and failures are mixed with ideological (in his own terms) beliefs in the inevitability of all what appears to be wrong in recent economic developments in the West, especially in their globalizing form; this concerns, especially, his convictions in respect to technology's fundamental goodness and invincibility (even if it leads humanity to complete disaster) as well as in respect of the media's inexorable domination of the minds and their shaping of our future.

Here, we touch at one of the greatest question marks in a globalized economy: what will happen to the masses of unskilled or not-enough-skilled workers, whose wages will tend to decline? What will be their destiny in the globalized economy of the future? With globalization advancing factor price equalization, wage equalization at a worldwide level will also progress, and the jobless or the low-paid, unskilled workers will have no chance to find any possibility to participate in economic activities. They will be deprived not only of income, but also of their dignity as humans.

Not So Free Trade and Competition

There is no doubt in my mind that free trade ideologies²⁶ and the obsession with fierce competition will not constitute, in the future, absolute rules of the global market, precisely because governments, politicians, economic theorists, and populations will have to learn the lessons of our times concerning infatuation with anything big, especially large-scale activities. Entirely free trade and limitless competition are destructive.²⁷ It is also striking that, for example, the United States, which is championing free trade in global terms, in cases where it suffers from the effects of restrictive (but in its own vision justified), domestic policies of one of its partners, Japan, proposes to have recourse to managed trade. Finally, free trade and competition, even if they increase efficiency (though certainly not in all cases), lower quality standards at the same time. To reduce costs in order to be competitive in a free trade arena, companies or individuals may be obliged to have recourse to practices which are against the common good (such as, among others, elimination of pollution controls or negligent ignorance of work safety norms, etc.). And as cost reduction is not enough in most cases, competition leads to the most popular measure practiced by businesses and entrepreneurs in order to maximize their profits and keep their products' or services' competitive edge: externalization of all possible costs which cannot be directly manipulated, if the rules do not make such a procedure too risky.

I believe that free trade and competition can be maintained only in the framework of certain rules of the game, established in a coordinated way by actors on the global scene. This also means that in a new configuration on the world scene, a regional re-patterning analyzed below, domestic production for domestic needs will have to take the priority. It will thus be possible to avoid what is now almost the rule, that compliance with assumed requirements of free trade and cut-throat competition should lead countries and populations to increasing environmental and societal risks artificially created for ideological reasons -- obeying the mysteries of free trade and contemporary prophecies of global competition.

²⁶ The main postulates of these ideologies is well summarized by David Morris: " Competition spurs innovation, raises productivity, and lowers prices; the division of labor allows specialization, which raises productivity and lowers prices; the larger the production unit, the greater the division of labor and specialization, and thus the greater the benefits." And Morris adds: "The adoration of bigness permeates all political persuasions." Morris, David. "Free Trade: The Great Destroyer," in Mander and Goldsmith. eds. 1996, 218-228, quotations are on page 219.

Herman Daly correctly points out that the Ricardian free trade ideology was based on a long-forgotten assumption which is not valid anymore in a global economy, that "factors of production (especially capital) are internationally immobile." Daly, Herman E. "Free Trade: The Perils of Deregulation," *ibid.*, 229-238; quotation is on page 230.

²⁷ As an example, I want to refer to the analyses I did myself in West Africa at the beginning of the eighties, in respect to the results of the free trade area set up in the framework of the six nation Community of West African States. This regional grouping consisted of two more developed members -- Ivory Coast and Senegal -- which disposed of ocean harbors and, for this reason, of oil refineries and similar industrial establishments, and four less developed members (the so-called *hinterland* states) -- Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Mauritania (the latter had smaller ports which were hardly capable of handling the country's only exports, its minerals). All the detailed, statistical analyses of the intra-community trade clearly evidenced that the two with a somewhat more developed economy benefitted almost exclusively of trade liberalization measures enacted in the community; jointly they represented more than eighty percent of the intra-community trade.

Transnational Economic Regionalism

I expect to be the essential variable modifying the world market's present perception to be the trend towards regionalism as discussed already concerning the political organization of the future.²⁸ I wish to characterize economic regionalism in terms somewhat similar to those recently spelled out by Andrew Hurrell (Fawcett-Hurrell 1995, 39-46). This transnational regionalism will

- Be based on societal integration or, in other words, on social cohesion in a given region, corresponding to civilizational elements;

- Represent autonomous, undirected processes which lead to more intensive interdependence within a geographically and culturally defined region, in the form of coordinated policy decisions within such regions across a range of economic and social issues. Such regionalism will permit development from below,²⁹ especially in non-Western cultural spaces; it is most appropriate for local, endogenous development with strong participatory and cooperative components. One definition of this concept of development is particularly explicit in this respect, as it points out that endogenous development represents "the capability of the inhabitants of a region to act in an autonomous way and thus to maximize their own potential and enhance their own cultural background;"³⁰

- Comprise not only flows of goods and services in the region, but flows of people as well, following multiple channels of group belongings, cultural communication, economic opportunities or, simply, the pleasure of creating new circumstances for one's existence;

- Comprise specific institutional forms which may start with setting up a series of strong interstate arrangements and regimes,³¹ then sharing policy approaches and decisions constituting, later, some sort of consociationalist links (Paul Taylor), or replacing territoriality and sovereignty with a pattern of overlapping identities in a kind of neo-medieval order;

- Be promoted by civil society -- in this case market forces, non-statal investment decisions, small-scale business operations, trade flows, and decisions of persons as consumers -- which will be the main force behind regionalism.

The aspects of transnational regionalism enumerated above are strongly reminiscent, or correspond to a large extent to what Adam Smith set forth as presuppositions in his theory developed in *The Wealth of Nations*. Smith's idea of a competitive market functioning under the guidance of a self-correcting mechanism (the invisible hand) was a market composed of small buyers and small sellers. This is clearly shown by the fact that he frequently referred to society and neighborhood as designated social entities constituting the context of economic activities (by neighborhood probably meaning some small, provincial markets).³² State

²⁸ Keinichi Ohmae radically juxtaposes the nation-state and regionalism in the form of the region-state: "The nation state has become an unnatural, even dysfunctional, unit for organizing human activity and managing economic endeavor in a borderless world. It represents no genuine, shared community of economic interests; it defines no meaningful flows of economic activity." Ohmae, Keinichi. *The Rise of the Region State*. *Foreign Affairs*, 72: 78.

²⁹ This is a development "determined from within by the people of that society themselves, based on their own resources -- human, physical and institutional. Each strategy is therefore unique to the society in which it evolves... it is egalitarian and self-reliant in nature, emphasising the meeting of the basic needs of all members of society... The ultimate aim of such a strategy is an improvement of both a quantitative and a qualitative type in the life-style of all members of society." Stohr, W. and Taylor, D.R.F. *Development From Above or Below? The Dialectics of Regional Planning in Developing Countries*. Chichester: Wiley, 1981, 454.

³⁰ Bassand, M. et al. 1986. *Self-Reliant Development in Europe*. Aldershot: Gower, 104.

³¹ Stephen Krasner defines a regime as an ensemble of "explicit or implicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making processes around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations." Krasner, Stephen D. "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Vehicles," in Krasner, Stephen D. ed. *International Regimes*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983, 42.

³² See his discussion "Of the Natural and Market Price of Commodities," in Smith 1982, 157-166.

support and protectionism would have distorted the functioning of such a market in which any goods exchanged would have had a natural price -- the effective value of the merchandise -- and a market price obtained in accordance with market conditions. In this image of the market, competition was the instrument to harmonize, in the framework of an immediate relationship of sellers and buyers, supply and demand in both the short and in the long-term. Competition thus did not mean driving out other producers in the market, but to ensure that a producer/seller could obtain the best possible price; monopoly power, distorting these simple relationships, would not have been tolerated. Beside this conception of the market, it appears today most important that for Smith, not only immediacy, but also contextuality was a fundamental characteristic of the marketplace. Contextuality in the sense of being local, of being closely intertwined with and committed to particular conditions of human existence (a natural presupposition, in view of the difficulties of communication and transportation in Smith's time, but complacently forgotten by today's promoters of the globalized market economy), necessitating immediacy between all participants in economic activities.

There is, of course, no possibility to re-establish as such the market conditions advocated by Adam Smith, but it is extremely important to remember them for two reasons. First, because of the inevitability of basing regional cooperation of local markets in accordance with the ideal exposed by Smith and the presuppositions and assumptions he brought forward; and, second, because to demonstrate the highly deceptive procedure employed by the protagonists of radically liberal market conceptions and economic globalization. These economists pretend that today's realities reflect Adam Smith's ideas, when they evidently have nothing to do with what Smith projected for the future.

The interaction between tendencies toward economic regionalism and globalization is more and more evident. Globalization frequently promotes regionalism as problems like environmental deterioration require collective management and regulation at a supra-national level. But, in order to remain manageable, they must not extend beyond the level of regional cooperation, which promises more efficiency in implementation and adaptability to local conditions. Commonality of culture and value systems, homogeneity, or similarity of social conditions and organization, that is, a shared regional identity, certainly facilitates solutions to common problems in a regional framework because globalizing and integrative pressures and trends toward fragmentation and disintegration can be better handled in such a context. Again, with reference to globalization, the Robertsonian dialectics of the universal and the particular appear applicable.

Regionalism can also play a motivating role in the promotion of the globalization process. It makes possible, first of all, a common resistance to hegemonic efforts by regional or even global, superpowers -- a resistance to what Charles Kindleberger called hegemonic stability.³³ Second, it facilitates adaption, integrating pressures by transnational companies to regional conditions and establishing a convergence of interests, because for corporations operating worldwide, it is anyway inevitable to take into account local market conditions. To find an optimum size for the market of specific products can be facilitated through regional cooperation. Regionalism can offer a better functional response to transnational efforts of production and marketing than nation-states or inter-statal organizations. Third, from the point of view of regional populations and economies, inter-regional as well as intra-regional externalities can be more easily reduced in a cooperative framework than on a national or worldwide basis.

³³ "The point here is to emphasize the two-way relationship between the domestic and international domains and between markets and politics," according to Geoffrey Underhill, who substantiates his statement: "The political choices of important actors or groups, well placed politically within the powerful states of the international system, are projected into the international domain. This leads to a restructuring of the market and institutions of international economic management, and in turn feeds back into the domestic politics of countries in the system. In this way, liberalization and 'marketization' intensify the competitive pressures on domestic firms, which use their political resources to press for policies that will manage the new situation." Underhill, G.R.D. op. cit. 37.

It is exactly this process that Thurow describes in respect to the United States's hegemonic role in the aftermath of World War II: "To work well, the global capitalistic system as it was designed after World War II needed a dominant economic locomotive -- a country that could act to help others improve their economic conditions since it did not have to worry about its own economic condition. But in the first half of the 1990s, the United States was no longer such a country... The change in America's willingness to adopt policies that would help the rest of the world was dramatic, since there were no domestic excuses for its unwillingness to act more aggressively." Thurow, op. cit. 214.

(B) WELFARE AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS

It is evident that solving modernity's internal contradictions related to social problems, partly created by the globalization process and partly inherent in modern economic and social development, will be an indispensable if immensely difficult task. The constant element in this domain is the requirement, legitimated not only by fundamental human solidarity but by social and political necessities as well (such as random criminality, terrorism and civil wars), to continue to aid those in need -- the poor, the sick, the unemployed, the refugees -- through communal and institutional assistance and private charity. Welfare programs will, thus, always be with us, as they have always been necessary since the beginning of human history.

However, the conception of welfare practiced in modern states has to be fundamentally changed because in its present forms -- social security, old-age, disability and unemployment insurance, family allowances, -- it represents such an unbearable burden for the collectivity that the welfare state went practically bankrupt because of the rapidly growing charges (of course, the aging of the population, the inflow of poor immigrants, and the dramatic increase of unemployment, contributed substantially to the breakdown of the welfare state). How can this situation be remedied?

It is a commonplace today, and the strongest argument against the prevailing practices of the welfare state, that society's assistance should be strictly limited to those in need. Welfare payments and social insurances should not be part of a large-scale revenue redistribution policy guided by the state. The whole drama of the welfare state resides in the misguided conception that it is the state's duty to realize an equitable distribution of income, a redistributive policy unjustifiably considered as the equivalent of social justice. It is this erroneous ideology that linked egalitarianism with curing the ills of society which led to the collapse of the welfare state. Certain transfer payments burdening the future of generations to come in favor of those presently benefitting of social privileges are driving a wedge between these generations, as well as between social strata or professional, ethnic, and other groups, destroying the potential for a peaceful social existence. It is not my intention to deny that conspicuous income inequalities represent a most serious social problem, but I believe that these are not to be dealt with in the framework of social welfare. In truth, it is one of the aberrations of our times to think that income inequalities are an abnormal phenomenon, although history can witness that they always existed because they are a consequence, in part, of different mental and physical capabilities of human beings, and of social contexts. They are also a consequence, at least in part, of environmentally varying circumstances.

Such inequalities always existed, they are part of the human predicament. However, society must find the means to alleviate the consequences of such inequalities.³⁴ Among these means, the most important will have to be the community's solidarity and not the intervention of institutions (like the state); family and kinship structures, associative and communal links will have to be restored, if possible, to play the greatest role in resolving social problems. Nonetheless, institutional arrangements such as the requirement of assuring the minimum living standard for those unable to work, temporarily or permanently, will be necessary in the future, as well. But any kind of automatic entitlements should be discarded because they give rise to unjustifiable claims. Thus, the essential element for the solution of welfare problems has to be the principle that society's assistance is only granted to those with justified needs, real needs, and not to those belonging to certain categories of the population in accordance with some ideological definition. Again, this shows the importance of political and economic regionalism, because it will be easier to determine communal criteria at regional levels for the granting of social assistance to persons in need through channels of the civil society.

The above ideas are in agreement with those Pierre Rosanvallon, the French sociologist and political scientist, set forth in his recent contribution to the debate about social welfare. Rosanvallon predicts that the

³⁴ This unwarranted pretension of the democratic state was added to both the state's and the market's exclusively individualistic ideology: "Unfortunately, neither capitalism nor democracy is a unifying ideology. Both are process ideologies that assert that if one follows the recommended processes one will be better off than if one does not. They have no 'common good', no common goals, toward which everyone is collectively working. Both stresses the individual and not the group. Workers are expected to maximize their own incomes - quitting whenever wages are higher somewhere else. Firms are expected to maximize their profits - firing workers whenever it will raise profits. Voters are expected to vote their self-interest. Neither imposes an obligation to worry about the welfare of the other." Thurow op. cit. 159.

"alternative to the welfare state is not primarily institutional, but societal" (Rosanvallon 1988, 204), as in civil society, decentralization and greater autonomy will secure the necessary public space for welfare reform through "more localized identification of needs and and aspirations" (ibid., 212).³⁵ Egalitarian society and the welfare state represent the dominating utopias in modernity -- and as utopias, they led to a complete breakdown of social structures and mechanisms.³⁶ The welfare state's impotency and its dramatic breakdown is so well described by Rosanvallon, that I shall quote him extensively here.

The liberal individual and the liberal state go hand in hand. The phenomenon of social massification always accompanies the trend towards social fragmentation; the two developments are not contradictory but complementary. In such circumstances the social bond is torn between two extremes, while the system of satisfying needs is itself bipolar; either the market or the state. No other scope exists for satisfying needs. The limits of the market, which results either from the structures for distributing primary incomes or the market's own dysfunctions, thereby serve mechanically to reinforce the state intervention requirement in all spheres. The satisfaction of social needs is governed completely by this dichotomy, which results in an extraordinary *inflexibility*. The crisis of the welfare state is in large measure an expression of the exponential social costs of this inflexibility. The forms of solidarity currently secured by the state, as well as the way services and social provisions develop, are no longer adequate to compensate for social fragmentation. Hypersocialization from above is incapable in coping with the demands induced by desocialization from below (ibid., 203; italics in original).

Thus, the crisis of the welfare state cannot be solved but through abandoning the statal framework in favor of the public space of civil society, because the coexistence of capitalist economy and the welfare state was only possible "under a historically unique condition of economic growth which permitted a continuous, positive-sum economic game" (Hinrichs-Offe-Wiesenthal 1988, 217).

(c) ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION AND DEMOCRACY

In the course of late-modern globalizing economic development a quasi-identification of a democratic political society with a free market took place. Even if it is true, to a certain extent, that the two go together in every society, this does not mean that they should be interdependent. There can be democracy without an entirely free market, and there can be a more-or-less free market in an autocratic political regime.

The tendency to identify the two is due to a historical coincidence, namely, the fact that the emergence of the liberal, constitutional parliamentary regime and the birth of the industrial revolution and the market economy occurred in England during the same historical period. In contrast to this heritage, in order to respond to the needs of new global actors and of new instruments of the global trend -- transnational corporations and organizations, information flows and communications networks -- the emphasis started to shift towards a separation of the political and economic spheres, re-discovering, albeit in certain limits, the Luhmannian idea of functional differentiation.

The reasoning behind this later turn in the ideology of economic globalization is clear: it aims to free the so-called cutting edge competition in world markets from the fetters still obstructing it, such as national

³⁵ "Such an immense revolution in our present forms of legal and political representation would mean moving beyond the welfare state as the sole expression and instrument of collective mutual support... The only way to reduce the state intervention requirement in a non-regressive fashion is to encourage the multiplication of community self-help initiatives or locally organized, small-scale public services." Rosanvallon 1988, 205-206.

³⁶ "The dream of a consistent egalitarian utopia," wrote Kolakowski, "is to abolish everything that could distinguish one person from another: a world in which people live in identical houses, identical towns, identical geographical conditions, wearing identical clothing and sharing, of course, identical ideas is a familiar utopian picture. To preach this ideal amounts to implying that there is an intrinsic evil in the very act of asserting one's own personality, even without harming other people -- in other words, that there is something essentially wrong in being human... Radical and consistent egalitarian utopias are thus antihuman... The perfect egalitarian utopia is thus a secular caricature of Buddhist metaphysics." Kolakowski 1990, 140-141.

legislative or regulative barriers or the resistance by smaller and weaker economic operators in different areas of the world. However, Geoffrey Underhill raises a substantial objection to this approach, when he emphasizes that

The separation of markets from politics, from their political and institutional setting, is problematic. This is to misunderstand what the market actually is. It is not a natural phenomenon resulting from spontaneous interactions among individuals; it is instead a complex political institution for producing and distributing material and political resources... Furthermore, if markets are properly understood as political institutions, the assumption that they are automatic or 'self-regulatory' breaks down -- it becomes clear that markets, like any other political arrangement, are contestable and open to manipulation by those who have the power to do so.³⁷

In capitalist economies, the disconnectedness of the democratic system and of the market is somewhat illusory, as economic wealth can be and is easily translated into political power. Power as a political prize is the ultimate consumption good.

Globalization, in contradiction to the tendency of separating the political and economic spheres, simultaneously promotes market economy and democracy. That is, economic and political globalization is spreading the idea of the free market based on capitalist industrialism and overwhelming consumerism, as well as the practice of democracy (American style), because, in the globalization drive, both are necessary in the confrontation with other civilizational worlds. On the one hand, democracy works for the achievement of the best conditions of a market economy, including freedom of trade, and consumerist satisfaction for those who adhere to democratic mechanisms, like voting without claiming the establishment of other freedoms. On the other hand, market economy supports the implantation of democratic political regimes, even if on the surface only, because the satisfaction of material desires and individual preferences of the population, giving the illusion of attaining the lifestyles of the rich propagated by the media, is assimilated to the democratic ideal. Both market economy and democracy are collapsed into one, deceiving vision of a better life in a society of media culture and individual happiness.

(D) MORAL TRANSFORMATION AND ECONOMIC FUTURE

It is thought that morality has nothing to do with economic activities, that the domain of economics is an autonomous field of human intentionality and behavior. However, modern economic evolution was based on a totally modified moral paradigm: the economic man's morality -- self-interest, purposeful-instrumental action, utilitarianism -- a unique ethical orientation in world history. As William Ophuls wrote, consumption in late modern societies "is less about achieving satisfaction than escaping *dissatisfaction*;" it leads to a materially insatiable human life. Correspondingly, "above a certain level of absolute deprivation, therefore, poverty is largely a *state of mind*, not a sociological datum. Plato says that such a state of mind is caused not by 'the absence of goods,' a physical condition, but by 'the overabundance of desire,' a mental condition" (Ophuls 1997, 125-126 and 135; italics in original).³⁸

This moral condition is, of course, directly linked to what Giddens called productivism (Giddens 1994, 175), placing existence, after having completely eliminated traditions and their guidance in everyday practices, into a framework of exclusively material orientation. Addiction to the endless acquisition of consumption goods pushes human beings into a state against their own nature and against nature as cosmos, an obsession which may, finally, lead to self-destruction. This is the constant moral element of universal validity (not dependent on contextual circumstances) in the perspective of our age of globality. This explains why ecological revolution requires, in Ophuls's words, "a spiritual transformation... a formidable leap to a new level of moral awareness and social integration" (ibid., 273-274).

³⁷ Underhill, G.R.D. op. cit. 28.

³⁸ Ophuls also quotes Mahatma Gandhi who promoted a radically new vision: "The essence of civilization consists not in the multiplication of wants but in their deliberate and voluntary renunciation." Ophuls 1997, 274.

The materialistic, productivistic obsession transformed our world into one in which there is less and less freedom -- because people are not really interested in freedom, if it means the loss of material advantages. Our contemporaries sell their rights to a life based on fundamental human values (and the rights of the coming generations too) -- like Esau sold his rights of the first-born in the Biblical story -- for the marvels of goods and services satisfying their desires as consumers; hence the flight from freedom. The loss of freedom also reflects the loss of social mores grounded in moral tradition, which can only legitimate authority in a civil society. Any kind of majorities -- democratically elected majorities, media-inspired public opinions, or ideologies imposed from above by administrative decisions -- can never legitimate moral attitudes, decisions, and choices.

Consequently, the economic future of the world, the future of economic globalization, depends entirely on a thorough change in Western mentalities, and a return to the moral grounding of behavior and action in everyday human life. Such a metamorphosis would, of course, change considerably economic practices and would mean an end to productivism, consumerism, and all contemporary forms of economic materialism. Such an overwhelming reversal of the trend would also mean that opposition to Western influence within non-Western civilizations would lose ground, because populations could find moral legitimation for the imported but culturally adapted economic methods and activities in their own traditions and civilizational heritage.

The imperative of spiritual and moral renewal leads us to the last aspect to be dealt concerning the future of economic globalization: the ecological revolution. Our environmental problems, the fact that human activity destroys *our* cosmos -- the physical surroundings indispensable for the survival of man on this planet -- is the direct consequence of our mental attitudes and of our moral irresponsibility. The ruthless exploitation of our natural environment through technological means, in the service of a purposive-instrumental pattern of reasoning, made it possible to boost economic welfare and to create a society of abundance.

CHAPTER EIGHT

GLOBALIZATION AND THE ENVIRONMENT

Hegel perceived already that "desacralization" (*Entgötterung*) of nature signified, in a voluntary effort of conquest, the breaking of man's communion with it (Taylor, Charles 1979a, 50). Western civilization brought with it a revolution in human beings' relationship with nature reaching a full-fledged environmental crisis in late modernity. It now has to have enough creative impulse to launch, in order to secure its own survival, a second revolution, the greatest in all human history. We have to put an end to the sequestration of human life from nature, we have to put human beings back into their true, natural habitat and environment recognizing the age-old principle that nature knows best. The ecological revolution signifies to break completely with what Giddens called the "internally referential system of knowledge and power" (Giddens 1991, 144). But before we deal with various aspects of this crisis, we have to clarify the meaning of the concepts used.

1. Conceptual Definitions

In the terminology employed in this study, *environment* is an open-ended but relational notion; therefore it may be extremely diverse in its usage. The concept of environment thus presupposes a precise delimitation between the entity for which it constitutes its environment¹ and to which, consequently, it is ontologically external. Such a precise delimitation in the case of man and his natural environment does not raise any particular problems, although it has to be recognized that man is, through his body and even through his culture, which is linked to the cosmos by human cerebral activities, simultaneously part of nature and separate from the natural world.

Ecology, distinguished from environment, stands for the relational interdependence between an organism and its environment, whereas an *ecosystem* designates a number of organisms, located in a contiguous space-time domain, which live in relational interdependence with their common habitat; it is, thus, a group of organisms which interact with each other and with their shared environment. An ecosystem is constituted not only by ecological and biological components but of the organisms' physical and abiotic environment, as well, with which they also interact. The complex interaction pattern constitutes a network of interdependencies between organisms, and between these organisms, taken serially as well as conjointly, and the common environment. An ecosystem is structured. This means that as a whole, it reveals properties which are not distributed among its parts; such a structural ordering, or the place and role of each part of the system in relation to others and to the environment is more or less stable through time. The functioning of an ecosystem refers to its smooth operation as an integrated holistic dynamics, and not to a specific role assigned to it.² Ecosystemic interdependence can be understood as an adaptive mechanism from the

¹ Philip Wagner wrote that an environment is an "environment in relation to something it environs." Wagner, Philip. *The Human Uses of the Earth*. Glencoe. Ill., Free Press, 1960, 6.

² King, Anthony W. "Considerations of Scale and Hierarchy," in Woodley, Kay and Francis. eds. 1993, 19-39). King illustrates the difference between ecosystemic function and function as a role or job as follows: "The distinction is analogous to the difference between the functioning of an automobile and its function as a means of transportation." *ibid*.

biological point of view, as there is an uninterrupted flow of energy and information between the constitutive parts of an ecological framework.

Changes in the ecosystem respond to changes in the relationships between the organisms which are part of it, and these relational changes between organisms reflect changes taking place within the organisms themselves. Now, what happened in man's relations with his environment and in the ecosystem which surrounds his existence is that man initiated, through his technology, an exponential increase in the information flows directed to, as well as in the mechanical interventions produced by him in the established structural order of the ecosystem. By way of cumulative changes, the human ecosystem was transformed at an accelerated rate. It became more and more complex, whereas the cosmos, or man's global environment, did not change correspondingly, and its capacity for further cumulative transformations reached an absolute limit. Gaia's integrity is reduced if by integrity of a living system we mean that "when subjected to disturbance, it sustains an organizing, self-correcting capability to recover toward an end-state that is normal and 'good' for that system."³

2. What Does the Environmental Crisis Mean?

I shall here review briefly what the essence of the environmental crisis is, without addressing its specific aspects. The environmental crisis consists in the complete planetary disequilibrium between human populations living on the surface of the earth and Gaia's resources that these populations consume. This crisis is demonstrated by data showing the demographic explosion and the excessive resource consumption in the twentieth century.

Since 1900, the world's population multiplied more than three times. Its economy has grown twentyfold. The consumption of fossile fuels has grown by a factor of 30, and industrial production by a factor of 50. Most of that growth, about four-fifth of it, occurred since 1950 (MacNeill, Wisemius, and Yakushiji, 1991. 3).

Expressed in the customary language of economics, the global ecosystemic imbalance, thus, can be obtained by multiplying the number of people with per capita resource consumption. The ecosystem of men, part of the global ecological framework, expropriates all material inputs from the available resource reservoir of the natural environment and returns in the form of wastes, all the used resources and all the residues of transformed energies. In this way, one can get a clear image of the throughput, the two-way commerce between man's economic activities and the natural world, which represents the extent of the ecosystemic imbalance man created.

There is an environmental crisis because the human ecosystem is open. It can expand infinitely from the point of view of science and technology through ever extracting material and energy resources from the environment and returning them to it as waste. In contrast, nature is changing but not growing; it is a closed ecosystem in which matter circulates but does not increase or decrease in quantity. Only energy flows move through it (this in accordance with the first law of thermodynamics). The difference in the functioning between the closed, global ecosystem and the open, human ecosystem, subordinated to the former, leads to the depletion of the environment's resources beyond the natural world's regenerative capacity and the pollution, through waste, of the same natural world beyond its absorptive capacity.

The difference between what is and what ought to be, from the environmental point of view, is best illustrated by the fact that our neo-classical doctrines consider the economic sphere in human activities in the opposite way: it considers that the economic sphere is the global framework of which nature is a subordinate part. It is the economy which is a closed system without constraints on its growth, because energy and goods and services exchanged circulate without entering or exiting the system. In this manner, the natural environment being only part of the global economic framework, other parts can easily substitute for what it

³ Regier, Henry A. "The Notion of of Natural and Cultural Integrity," *ibid.*, 3-18; quotation is on page 3.

supplies -- precisely because circulating flows are channelled in accordance with the guiding forces of the global system. Such a conception of nature from the point of view of economic activities is expressed in a more general, voluntaristic way in saying that nature is a social construct or that nature was created by man. Such unbelievable arrogance of our species inevitably led to the crisis which is throwing a dark shadow on all human existence.

The above description of the environmental crisis reflects both approaches to the ecological deterioration of man's world. There was, first, the "limits to growth" approach in the 1970s, which placed an emphasis on population growth, mounting resource scarcity, and accumulating environmental pollution -- effectively limiting economic growth. In the present, the *global-change* approach prevails, which underscores the disruptive impact of human activities on global ecological conditions such as climate regulation, solar radiation, water and nutrient recycling, maintenance of biological diversity, and so forth. Global means, in this respect, not only such planetary phenomena as the warming of the atmosphere, but also seemingly local events which are transnational in their global, causal interdependencies and in their global impact. In fact, these two approaches are interwoven, because the problems emphasized by limits to growth principles are those which result in the fundamental transformations highlighted by the global change perspective.

There are today two other approaches to the looming environmental crisis. The first, a proposed *global ecological management*, remains solidly embedded, culturally, in the late modern outlook and, economically, in dominant theories and policies. The second, to be called the *ecological revolutionary perspective*, steps out of all hitherto prevailing cultural presuppositions in respect to man's situation and status in the universe, and promotes a new look at economic realities and the indispensable economic activities of the human species. Wolfgang Sachs summarized the difference between the two approaches most clearly:

For the task of global ecology can be understood in two ways: it is either a technocratic effort to keep development afloat against the drift of plunder and pollution, or it is a cultural effort to shake off the hegemony of aging Western values and gradually retire from the development race. These two ways may not always be exclusive in detail, but they differ deeply in perspective. In the first case, the paramount task becomes the management of the biophysical limits to development. All powers of foresight have to be mustered in order to steer development along the edge of the abyss, continuously testing, surveying, and manoeuvring the biophysical limits. In the second case, the challenge consists in designing cultural and political limits to development.⁴

I believe that only the second approach will bring a solution to the ever-wider environmental crisis of our planet, and I will, therefore, extensively discuss perspectives of the ecological revolution. I think, however, that it will be impossible to realize such a total transformation of our contemporaries' mentalities in the near future. In consequence, I would prefer to see a global ecological management put into practice -- as the second best solution.

3. Global Ecological Management

The global economic management of environmental dangers is an approach which does not aim at restoring nature's dignity but at "the preservation of human-centered utilitarianism to posterity," or "regulating the global transformation of nature in an optimal fashion."⁵ Nature's place remains the same in this perspective; it is still considered a variable in utilitarian calculations of global change. Biocentrism or, as I prefer to call this tendency, cosmocentrism, which requires a complete new conceptualization of nature, does not replace in the global ecological management approach, the anthropocentric worldview of the modern

⁴ Sachs, Wolfgang. 1990. "Neo-Development: 'Global Ecological Management'," in Mander, and Goldsmith. 1996. eds. 245.

⁵ *ibid.*, 244 and 252.

faith. As market institutions revealed their evident limits in regulating the uses of environmental resources⁶ and, especially, their inadequacy for the management of public goods, new means to achieve economic growth and development are sought by protagonists of global management. Nevertheless, the same goals are pursued as before, with the sole intent to keep a planetary balance between human extraction, emission and waste and the regenerative capacities of nature at an optimal scale.

One of the new buzzwords of the ecological management concept is sustainable or qualitative development,⁷ meaning to maintain the actual state of the economy.⁸ Sustainable or qualitative development has, in fact, a triple goal: first, efficient resource allocation; second, fair resource distribution; and, third, respect of a sustainable scale of resource use. Such a development is sustainable through maintaining the present rate of growth; at the maximum, it foresees a zero-growth scenario. Sustainability thus appears to be the solution in the framework of the principles and methods, production and consumption patterns, consumerism and welfare policies of the market economy and the modern state.⁹ One could qualify

⁶ "Ecological sustainability of the throughput is not guaranteed by market forces. The market cannot by itself register the cost of its own increasing scale relative to the ecosystem. Market prices measure the scarcity of individual resources relative to each other. Prices do not measure the absolute scarcity of resources in general, of environmental low entropy. The best we can hope for from a perfect market is a Pareto-optimal allocation of resources (i.e., a situation in which no one can be made better off without making someone else worse off). Such an allocation can be achieved at any scale of resource throughput, including unsustainable scales, just as it can be achieved with any distribution of income, including unjust ones. The latter proposition is well known, the former less so, but equally true. Ecological criteria of sustainability, like ethical criteria of justice, are not served by markets. Optimal *allocation* is one thing; optimal *scale* is something else." Daly 1996, 32; italics in original.

⁷ One of the definitions of sustainable growth is given by Herman Daly: "Development without growth is sustainable development. An economy that is steady in scale may still continue to develop a greater capacity to satisfy human wants by increasing its efficiency of its resource use, by improving social institutions, and by clarifying the ethical priorities - but not by increasing the resource output." Daly, Herman E. "Free Trade. The Perils of Deregulation," in Mander, and Goldsmith. eds. 1996, 229-238; quotation is on page 237.

It is striking to see how much an environmentalist John Stuart Mill was almost 150 years ago, when he pronounced himself in favor of a stationary economy: "I cannot... regard the stationary state of capital and wealth with an unaffected aversion so generally manifested towards it by political economists of the old school. I am inclined to believe that it would be, on the whole a very considerable improvement on our present condition. I confess I am not charmed with the ideal of life held out by those who think that the normal state of human beings is that of struggling to get on; that the trumpling, crashing, elbowing, and treading on each other's heels which form the existing type of social life, are the most desirable lot of humankind, or anything but the disagreeable symptoms of the phases of industrial progress. The northern and middle states of America are a specimen of this stage of civilization in very favourable circumstances... and all that these advantages seem to have yet done for them (notwithstanding some incipient signs of a better tendency) is that the life of the whole of one sex is devoted to dollar-hunting, and of the other to breeding dollar-hunters... It is scarcely necessary to remark that a stationary condition of capital and population implies no stationary state of human improvement. There would as much scope as ever for all kinds of mental culture, and moral and social progress." Mill 1899, 2: 336-340.

⁸ The other meaning, much more limited in its application, concerns sustainable development in developing countries where it stands for the concerned countries' future capacities to continue, with their own material and human resources, developmental policies started with foreign aid and assistance.

⁹ The plight of developing countries in the era of sustainable development is even greater than that in industrialized countries: "While development as economic growth and commercialization are now being recognized as being at the root of the ecological crisis in the Third World, they are paradoxically offered as a cure for the ecological crisis in the form of 'sustainable development'. The result is the loss of the very meaning of sustainability. The ideology of sustainable development is, however, limited within the limits of the market economy. It views the natural resource conflicts and ecological destruction as separate from the economic crisis, and proposes solution to the ecological crisis in the expansion of the market system. As a result, instead of programmes of gradual ecological regeneration of nature's economy and the survival economy, the immediate and enhanced exploitation of natural resources with higher capital investment gets prescribed as a solution to the crisis of survival." Cooper and Palmer. eds. 1992, 188-189.

sustainability as a somewhat more conservative management of nature, without giving up the concept of nature as the servant of man and of his welfare.¹⁰

To refer to two important preconditions of sustainability's completely anthropomorphic doctrine: it faithfully safeguards the principle of substitutability of nature and capital or the substitutability of nature and manpower, an evidently incorrect presupposition of the capitalist economic system. Another fundamental error underlying the sustainability creed is that it endows our environment with an unlimited capacity to absorb all the waste resulting from production processes and from unbridled consumerism, whereas it is today evident that even if the decline of nature's assimilating capacity could be stopped, the damage wrought is irreversible. Though it is impossible to give a precise definition of ecological sustainability, it is clear that its absolute requirement is to maintain the resilience of our natural environment including the corrective measures -- if there are still any -- in order to achieve the slow re-establishment of ecological equilibria.

Global ecological management counts on the possibilities offered by Thurow's overwhelming brainpower factor to reduce man's dependence on natural resources produced by the earth, which are expected to be replaced by man-made materials. It is also believed that because substitution possibilities were increased by brainpower and technological development, the emphasis on environmental constraints shifted to the planet's sink function, and thus the necessity to limit overall throughput became all the more important. Consequently, sustainable development requires that

-- the extraction of renewable resources should not be in excess of expected regeneration rates, and waste emissions should be kept below renewable capacities; and

-- the extraction of nonrenewable resources should not be above their expected replacement possibilities by renewable substitutes.

Suggestions to reach sustainable development and a steady-state economy¹¹ naturally include avoidance of any externalization of effects of economic activities, and the relocation of such activities or, at least, to promote domestic trade in order to internalize costs into domestic prices. This, of course, would facilitate to enter environmental costs in national and corporate accounting.¹²

The other proposal to attain sustainable or qualitative development is efficiency through new means put at man's disposal by science and technology, in order to reduce throughput of energy and materials and to impede nature's further degradation -- an efficiency, the belief in which is comparable to the belief in progress proclaimed by modernity at its beginnings. Yet even substitution of high technology does not eliminate, but only reduces throughput of some specific materials and of some energy, leaving undisturbed intensive usage of other resources or other forms of energy. In light of the extent of the environmental

¹⁰ Michael Common defines the sustainability perspective as "how to address problems of inequality and poverty in ways that do not affect the environment so as to reduce humanity's future prospects." Common 1995, 1. It is also significant that the *World Commission on Environment and Development* defines sustainability without even mentioning nature. It only takes into account the satisfaction of human needs: "Sustainable development seeks to meet the needs and aspirations of the present without compromising the ability to meet those of the future." World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987 Report, 40.

¹¹ Professor Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen strongly criticizes the concept of steady-state economy: "The crucial error consists in not seeing that not only growth, but also a zero-growth state, nay, even a declining state which does not converge towards annihilation, cannot exist forever in a finite environment... there are simple reasons against believing that mankind can live in a perpetual stationary state. The structure of such a state remains the same throughout; it does not contain in itself the seed of the inexorable death of all open macrosystems. On the other hand, a world with a stationary population would, on the contrary, be continually forced to change its technology as well as its mode of life in response to the inevitable decrease of resource accessibility. Even if we beg the issue of how capital may change qualitatively and still remain constant, we could have to assume that the unpredictable decrease in accessibility will be miraculously compensated by the right innovations at the right time... the miracle can not last forever; sooner or later the balancing system will collapse. At that time, the stationary state will enter a crisis, which will defeat its alleged purpose and nature." Georgescu-Roegen, Nicholas. 1975. "Selections From 'Energy and Economic Myths'," in: Daly and Townsend. eds. 1993. 89-113; quotation is on pages 95 and 97.

¹² "By spatially separating the costs and benefits of environmental exploitation, international trade makes them harder to compare. It thereby increases the tendency for economies to overshoot their optimum scale." Daly, Herman E. 1996. "Free Trade: The Perils of Deregulation," in Mander and Goldsmith. eds. 1996, 237.

disaster, any global management can involve rapidly increasing marginal costs, despite the much praised and hoped-for efficiency gains, and may lead to social upheavals.

To monitor the progress of sustainable development, a great number of proposals were already made to include resource depletion and waste into national accounting or corporate balance sheets. An important step to restore our environment could be to take into account the estimated amount of natural resources utilized not only in national income accounting practices,¹³ but in governmental policies (fiscal and financial in particular), and in industrial and agricultural production accounting, as well.¹⁴ Through consensus between all interested parties, a conventionally fixed amount of natural resources absorbed in different sectors of economic activity could be included in intermediate and consumer pricing schemes, in order to make all consumers support together the burden of resource exploitation. However, the limits of guaranteeing security by means of legal rationality should not be forgotten. It was recently emphasized by Preuss, that in view of the mathematically conceived binary schemes of the rule of law, the not explicitly prohibited is permitted. Regulatory legislation, therefore, could exonerate economic operators if the unethical effects of their activities remained under the standards promulgated. In consequence, in environmental protection law technical standards have "the function of rights to pollute the environment."¹⁵ This is a clear example of how judgements based exclusively on technical considerations may be entirely contrary to the requirements of ecological sustainability.

The decades since World War II evidenced that nothing could be expected from market mechanisms in re-establishing the ecological balance between the human and natural worlds, in particular to safeguard ecological diversity essential to planetary equilibrium. Private interests cannot be trusted to take into account, in a proper way, common goods or public goods which come, principally, from the exploitation of natural resources.¹⁶ To overcome the so-called barriers to collective action is, of course, fraught with immense difficulties:

Collective environmental management poses a severe, and therefore politically sensitive, challenge because it involves the creation of rules and institutions that embody notions of shared responsibilities and shared duties, that impinge very heavily on domestic structures and organization of states, that invest individuals and groups within states with rights and duties, and that seek to embody some notion of a common good for the planet as a whole (Hurrell-Kingsbury, 1992, 6).

When considering possibilities of global ecological management, one has to take into account "the fundamental incapacity of governments to control the destructive processes involved, the scarcity of effective

¹³ On natural resource accounting or environmental accounting, see Common 1995. 189, and Peter Passell's article in the *The New York Times*, 27 November 1990.

¹⁴ For a detailed discussion of charges and environmental pricing see Anderson et al. 1977, 5-30. About the difficulties of applying such governmental policies accounting for environmental damages William K. Stevens wrote in his article: "Congress Asks, is Nature Worth More Than a Shopping Mall? Thinking About Cost-Benefit Analysis." *The New York Times*, 25 April 1995.

¹⁵ Preuss, U.K. 1988. "Sicherheit durch Recht-Rationalitätsgrenzen eines Konzepts." *Kritische Vierteljahrschrift für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft*. 3: No. 4; quoted in Offe 1996, 50.

¹⁶ "Nowhere is capitalism's time horizon's problem more acute than in the area of global environmentalism... However large the negative effects [of investment decisions] fifty to one hundred years from now might be, their current discounted net present value is zero. If the current value of the future negative consequences are zero, then nothing should be spent today to prevent those distant problems from emerging. But if the negative effects are very large fifty to one hundred years from now, by then it will be too late to do anything to make the situation better, since anything done at that time could only improve the situation another fifty to one hundred years into the future. So being good capitalists, those who live in the future, no matter how bad their problems are, will also decide to do nothing. Eventually a generation will arrive who cannot survive in the earth's altered environment, but by then it will be too late for them to do anything to prevent their own extinction. Each generation makes good capitalistic decisions, yet the net effect is collective social suicide." Thurow 1996, 302-303.

policy levers, and the importance of certain forms of resource extraction (and hence environmental destruction) for key state-society alliances."¹⁷ Environmental policies and protection can thus easily become instruments to serve purposes of those in power or of those contesting the privileges of the powerholders. In fact, as incessant economic growth is the principal legitimation of democratic regimes and market institutions, environmentalism and ecological management became part of the political discourse, a weapon in an all-out political competition.¹⁸

At a worldwide level, the three main issues, beside finding arrangements which are construed as not impinging on the states' sacrosanct sovereignty, are: first, setting priorities agreed upon by all members of the international community;¹⁹ second, distributing the cost of managing the global environment; and third, creating an institutional framework for common action, thus adding to the already heavy international bureaucracy a new layer. It is well-known that negotiations on environmental issues are susceptible to provoke North-South conflicts, not only because states of the South consider that the ecological crisis is a problem proper to the North,²⁰ but also because they believe that northern states use ecology as a new leverage or as a new bargaining power in the perennial dispute about development cooperation.²¹

It is important to realize that the global ecological management method is still based on abstraction and generalization, ignoring contextuality -- place, time, and culture -- which would make it easier to evaluate the situation from the point of view of planetary balance of human efforts and nature's absorbing capacity. It is still reduced to a sort of economic vision of the human situation, not taking into account any other perspective, much less any moral judgement. In respect to the environment, as much as all other human matters, there is no universal truth and knowledge applicable everywhere at any time. Beside some fundamental empirically proven facts, most ecological matters are contextually conditioned. The interplay between the global and the local is inevitable, reminiscent of the Robertsonian dialectic of globalization. It is sometimes proposed to decentralize the tasks of global ecological management to local levels, but in this case, the difficulties of coordination are enormous, even if so-called "resource management regimes" are put in place to facilitate harmonization of the measures taken.

¹⁷ Lipschutz, Ronnie D. and Conca, Ken. "The Implications of Global Ecological Interdependence," in Lipschutz and Conca. eds. 1996. 327-343; quotation is on page 332.

¹⁸ "Emerging norms of planetary ecology may undermine sovereignty in this inward-looking sense if they weaken the rule-making authority of this state, the scope of the state's reach, or the degree of legitimacy accorded to the state by its citizens. However, to the extent that environmental regulation becomes codified as a responsibility of the state, aspects of state authority, legitimacy, and control could indeed be strengthened... Emerging principles and norms of environmental protection are thus taking an institutional form as a hodgepodge of relatively narrow efforts to build functional, issue-specific international regimes, in ways that do not pose a more direct challenge to the sovereign rights of states." Conca, Ken. "Environmental Protection, International Norms, and State Sovereignty: The Case of the Brazilian Amazon,.." in Lyons and Mastanduno. eds. 1995, 147-169; quotation is on pages 149 and 153. Does this text not foresee the attitude of the United States concerning reduction of environmental destruction in the 1997 negotiations at the United Nations Conference on Environment?

¹⁹ "It is here, in the process of articulating and mediating diverging goals and interests, that the ecological problem gains its political dimension, i.e., that *ecology* becomes *political ecology*. It becomes *international political ecology* when there is divergence between the goals and interests pursued by actors belonging to, or representing, different states." List, Martin and Ritterberger, Volker. "Regime Theory and International Environmental Management," in Hurrell and Kingsbury. eds. 1992, 85-109; quotation is on pages 87-88; italics in original.

²⁰ I heard myself such an argument in the mid-eighties in Ghana when I was invited by the Faculty of Environmental and Developmental Sciences at the University of Kumasi, the capital of Ashanti, to discuss programs of development and regional planning supported by UNDP.

²¹ The Beijing declaration expresses this view by saying that "the developing states have the sovereign right to use their own natural resources in keeping with their developmental and environmental objectives and priorities." Hurrell and Kingsbury. eds. op. cit. 45.

4. The Ecological Revolutionary Perspective

The revolutionary perspective to eliminate the environmental crisis is born out of the conviction that piecemeal measures of correction, while maintaining the hitherto reigning worldview and economic outlook, could never produce the effects expected. Several concepts express this vision, as, for example, bioregionalism.²² Taking into account various aspects of the dominating cultural trend, I shall consider as indispensable conditions of an ecological revolution the elimination of three fundamental beliefs in our present life, before describing -- or imagining -- the contours of such a revolution.

(A) THE RE-SACRALIZATION OF NATURE THROUGH THE DE-SACRALIZATION OF MAN

A total revolutionary upheaval in our thinking about nature would mean, first of all, to de-throne man as the crowning creature of the universe, and to eliminate what Larson justly designated as "the sovereignty of the subject."²³ Such a re-sacralization of nature through de-sacralizing man is a *sine que non* condition of reestablishing the cosmic equilibrium. We have to get rid of the notion that nature, the cosmos, is a social construct, to which only man, individually and collectively, gives meaning.²⁴ I do not mean to deny that each individual and each cultural community has a particular approach to nature and endows with specific meanings and values some natural phenomena; but I want to affirm that the cosmos is an ontologically independent entity of man, and has an inherent meaning and value quite apart of what man thinks of it. It is not created by man and cannot be socialized. As the great scientist René Dubos so well formulated it:

The relationships that link mankind to other living organisms and to the earth's physical forces thus pertain to science but also transcend science. They involve a deep sense of engagement with nature and with all processes central to life. They generate a spirit of sacredness and of overriding ecological wisdom which is so universal and timeless that it was incorporated in most ancient cultures. One can recognize the manifestations of this sacredness and wisdom in many archaic myths and ceremonials, in the rites of preclassical Greeks, in Sung landscape paintings, in the agricultural practices of preindustrial peoples. One can read it in Marcus Aurelius's statement that 'all living things are interwoven each with the other; the tie is sacred' (Dubos 1972, 44)

²² Kirkpatrick Sale gives an excellent summary of bioregionalism, bordering on a poetic presentation: "But to become dwellers in the land, to come to know the earth fully and honestly, the crucial and perhaps only and all-encompassing task is to understand the *place*, the immediate, specific place where we live. The kinds of soil and rock under our feet; the source of the waters we drink; the meaning of the different kinds of winds; the common insects, birds, mammals, plants, and trees; the particular cycles of seasons; the times to plant and harvest and forage -- these are the things that are necessary to know. The limits of its resources; the carrying capacities of its lands and waters; the places where it must not be stressed; the places where its bounties can be best developed; the treasures it holds and the treasures it withholds -- these are the things that must be understood. And the cultures of the people, of the populations native to the land and those who have grown up with it, the human, social, and economic arrangements shaped by and adapted to the geomorphic ones, in both urban and rural settings -- these are the things that must be appreciated. That, in essence, is *bioregionalism*." Sale, Kirkpatrick. "Principles of Bioregionalism," in Mander and Goldsmith. eds. 1996, 471-484; quotation is on page 472; italics in original.

²³ Larson, Gerald J. "'Conceptual Resources' in South Asia for 'Environmental Ethics,'" in Callicott and Ames. eds. 1989, 267-277. I have to recall what Arne Naess wrote about the unity of man and nature: "To distance oneself from nature and the 'natural' is to distance oneself from a part of that which the 'I' is built up of. Its 'identity,' 'what the individual I is,' and thereby sense of self and self-respect, are broken down." Naess 1989, 164).

²⁴ See, as an example, Georg Simmel's point of view: "Oceans and flowers, alpine mountains and the stars in the sky derive what we call their value entirely from their reflections in subjective souls. As soon as we disregard the mystic and fantastic antropomorphizing of nature, it appears as a continuous contiguous whole, whose differentiated character denies its individual parts, to which we ascribe meaning and value. Ironically, we then construct poetic fictions which create a natural beauty which is holy within itself. In reality, however, nature has no other holiness than the one which it evokes in us." Simmel 1968, 33.

To give a very recent example of a totally different vision of human existence, I shall analyze here the thoughts of the German social philosopher, Klaus Eder, one of the outstanding representatives in late modernity of the conceptualization of man's relationship to the cosmos as "the social construction of nature." In his most recent work bearing the same title, Eder links our concepts of nature to the evolution of society. By this he means not only that how man sees nature is dependent on his world, on the antropomorphic context in which he lives, but that man *creates* nature according to the conditions of his social existence,²⁵ though without dominating it. He wants ultimately to break with what he calls naturalism favoring a disenchanted nature. A certain hesitation concerning such a social construal of nature's existence -- sometimes as an apparent refusal to deprive nature from its ontological character, sometimes considering it as man's opposite in a social-cultural interface -- is clearly perceptible in Eder's study, especially as he speaks of man's interaction with nature:

Yet the history of the social construction of nature is always the history of a cognitive, moral and aesthetic interaction with nature. The transition from nature to culture is not exhausted in a history of the subjugation of nature. The social construction is always part of a human history of nature, which cannot be reduced to a mere history of domination. The unique aspect of the human history of nature being both part of and the result of a culture, eludes this theoretical perspective (Eder 1996, 8).

The social construction of nature follows the triple phase of human activities in a Habermasian lifeworld: cognitive, normative, and, finally, symbolic appropriation. The cognitive aspect of the social construction of nature is related to the human history of nature, which breaks with natural evolution and selection concerning the connection of nature and society. Nature as an objective constraint in social relations disappears, because it is socially produced. Consequently, societal divisions, until now believed to be a consequence of biological evolution, are construed in a self-referential way, through differentiating people by abilities and skills: "The cognitive differentiation of knowledge becomes an initial mechanism of the cultural construction of a societal relationship to nature" (ibid., 21). It is, however, not clear how a so-called cognitive differentiation of knowledge can modify biological givens; or, in reverse, the statement may be understood as if human knowledge would lend socially acceptable expressions to such givens fitting them into the society's structures. But in the latter case, the term cultural construction is misplaced, as it suggests that such a construction replaces the biological fundamentals of human life.

In whatever way we consider the cognitive aspect of a cultural construction of society's relationship to nature, we run into the difficulty that nature's role, constituting the ontological framework for man's existence, cannot be ignored in such a construction because nature must be considered as the primary determinant; the cultural or social construal of society's relationship cannot but be secondary to it. Forms of material appropriation of nature are a consequence of the cognitive construction of nature by human society. Eder insists that modernity's formulation of man's appropriation of natural resources -- nature is a nonhuman, objectivized phenomenon which, in consequence, is legitimately exploited -- represents a completely de-natured comprehension of the material appropriation thesis. "If one interprets interaction with nature only in economic terms, the interaction with nature remains external to it" (ibid., 25); nature as an *alter ego* of mankind disappears. The material appropriation of nature, formulated in cognitive terms, can only be explained taking into account the second aspect of the social construction concept of nature, the normative aspect.

In the sense of the normative perspective proposed by Eder, there is no natural economy, the so-called exchange value of nature is a fiction linked to the dominant conception of man's position in the universe and to the technological voluntarism of the conquering mentality. The normative conception of nature, therefore, has to be linked to the normative order of any society: "The mechanism that makes the social appropriation of nature on the level of distribution possible is the mechanism of the moral construction of nature" (ibid., 26). Thus, interaction with nature always has to be a normatively regulated action, with overall conditions always in sight. The strategic, material appropriation of nature becomes a normative appropriation; nature is granted moral appreciation not as such, but as a useful element for the realization of society's normative order

²⁵ However, Eder does not seem to accept Luhmann's concept of autopoiesis which, in the form of social self-creation, reduces nature "to the description society produces of it." Eder 1996, 18, note 21.

(referred to above by the expression the level of distribution). The normative aspect of the social construction of nature boils down to the normative conceptualization of such a construction in the wake of a moralizing drive -- compounded by avowedly controversial elements. We have therefore returned again to the anthropological perspective, because the moral reconstruction of nature in its relationship with society, as Eder clearly states it, is derived from a given epoch's social conflicts.

Finally, the symbolic aspect of the social construction of nature not only completes but precedes the cognitive and normative ones, as nature has a meaning not as a phenomenon itself, but one "produced and reproduced in the consumption process;" which is thus given to it through "consumptive appropriation." In my view, there is here a terminological confusion which obfuscates the understanding of Eder's thought, because he exemplifies the consumptive meanings he referred to with reference to "joy and sorrow" or "hope and fear," emotions which have strictly nothing to do with what we generally understand as the pleasures of consumption (ibid., 29). It seems evident that tying the symbolic aspect of the social construction of nature into our contemporary consumption culture was made necessary in order to keep its symbolic as well as the normative perspectives in the social- anthropomorphic framework (transcending the moral critique of pre-modern social relationships with nature), thus degrading nature's symbolic value to humankind. Societal symbolization of nature does not depend on it, as nature is only the signifier; the signified in symbolism is always society itself which, in a self-reflexive move, establishes the rules of the symbolization process. "Modern society is therefore increasingly compelled to find a description of nature that can also be part of the self-description of society" (ibid., 32). This conclusion is supposed to assign environmentalism its role in today's society. *In fine*, it is only possible to see Eder's endeavor to find a new conceptualization for nature in our late modern conditions as a rehearsed version of the old modernist concept of nature as man's instrument for its own purposes.

(B) RE-SACRALIZATION OF NATURE THROUGH THE DE-SACRALIZATION OF REASON

The re-sacralization of nature also requires that we dethrone reason -- the highest faculty a creature can have in the Kantian perspective -- and not to place it above nature, but to recognize that it is part of it, as human culture is part of the natural cosmos. Such a move is all the more necessary, since we cannot sustain anymore Enlightenment's heritage that reason is the same in all men and equally possessed by all humans because the reality of different civilizations witnesses to the existence of very different reasoning patterns among various human groups. Nature has to be again contextualized, linked to concrete space and time, instead of being the object of scientific investigation, instead of being thematized in an unnatural way. In addition, it has been known since Plato that particular phenomena and events cannot be grasped by our rational methods. Therefore, patterns of reasoning used in other civilizations as, for example, analogies or searching for similarities instead of identities, should be explored²⁶ -- never losing of sight the holistic, not generalizing, perspective. This is the task undertaken by the Aristotelian practical reason.

In Eder's idea of the social construction of nature, practical reason also reappears as the product of social evolution, though it has to be preceded by interaction with nature as an objective precondition of the evolving social praxis (ibid., 34, and 46-47). Because it did not respect this precondition, utilitarian reason became a restricted form of practical reason, that is, an unpractical or productivist reason. But if this precondition is respected, then it is cognitive reason which regulates society's relationship to the environment. One can conclude from Eder's argumentation that the solution of the ecological crisis is a matter of cognitive ordering of society and a cognitively elaborated regulation of the appropriation of nature. As nature is a social construct, ordering of society's relationship with it has to be viewed as the development of a self-regulatory organization of the societal collectivity.

²⁶ "In the absence of a hypostatized rational system by means of which to organize experience, Eastern philosophy has typically sought analogical similarities -- rather than identities -- among particulars. By means of this approach one may at once preserve the uniqueness of particulars and at the same time achieve a coherency in one's intellectual grasp of nature and society." Callicott and Ames. eds. 1989, 15.

Utilitarian, productivist reason still dominates our world; reasoning patterns formed along the capitalistic and materialistic development of our society are unchangeably instrumental-purposive. In the sense of regulative societal ordering, late modern society, even more than during the heyday of modernity, is regulated by the motivating force of material gain -- should it be profit, rent, wage, income or the product of robbery -- which does not recognize any limits in its unstoppable drive. The problem is not with profit-oriented entrepreneurial activities, a must in a capitalist market economy, but with the expectation of immediate profit at the expense of long term interests of the human collectivity, whose environment is exploited in order to maximize the rate of annual gain of economic actors.

Therefore, the de-sacralization of this instrumental-purposive reasoning is a second *sine qua non* condition of the ecological revolution; we have to find or if necessary to invent, what one could call a meaningful reason. Meaningful reason designates Hacking's styles of reasoning, which take into account the limits imposed on us, as well as the vistas opened by the ontological/cosmic framework we live in. Meaningful reason represents harmony with our global world, demarcated by the beliefs, values, and traditions of the coexisting great civilizations, as well as by the local features of each particular context -- without imposing on the latter a formal, abstract straightjacket of supposedly universal laws and rules.

(C) DE-SACRALIZING TECHNOLOGY AND THE MARKET AS INSTRUMENTS OF THE DOMINATION OF NATURE

The de-sacralization process involves that we humans living at the brink of an ecological disaster in the late modern age, have to give preference to nature as opposed to technology, machines, and industrial civilization. These instruments became masters not only of nature but of man, too: "The destructive demon in scientific technology is man's own creation" (Dubos 1972, 210).²⁷ Our contemporaries have to abandon the utopic idea of the mastery of nature through human inventiveness, technology, the ruthless exploitation of the natural environment, and the urge of satisfying not real material necessities of life, but of extravagancies of consumerism. These include such manifestations as the acquisition of status symbols, like the automobile or sophisticated household equipment. Nature truly shrinks as the market grows.

The environmental crisis "is a product of the drastic mismatch between the cyclical, conservative, and self-consistent processes of the ecosphere, and the linear, innovative, but ecologically disharmonious processes of the technosphere," according to Barry Commoner (1990, 15). In addition, beside the control impulse inherent in our internally referential systems of knowledge and power and the successes of instrumental technology in mastering the earth, there is a further destructive element of modernity, namely, the results -- breathtaking and, simultaneously, devastating -- of our medical sciences and technologies. Widespread economic globalization inevitably calls to mind, because of the Giddensian internal referentiality which denotes a tragically closed system of reasoning, the image of a trap or a vicious circle which humanity has fallen into. Not only medical progress but all the factors of modern economic development contribute to create an open-ended growth both of human populations and, directly related to it, of certain economic activities.²⁸

²⁷ "Since a standard represents a point on a scale, its practical meaning depends entirely on the nature of the scale," states Barry Commoner. He continues: "Although the position of the pointer is simply a number and therefore objective, the choice of the scale and therefore the *meaning* of the number is entirely arbitrary. This creates an opportunity to disguise self-interest as science, for the scale is readily manipulated to govern the apparent meaning of the standard." Commoner 1990, 62; italics in original.

²⁸ "The predicament is deepened by two contrary properties of growth. On the one hand, the growth of population accelerates the rate at which new problems appear and grow to large proportions. This means that population growth increases the need for society to be able to respond quickly and rationally to new situations. But while it increases the need, population growth diminishes the ability. The difficulties of government and management increase with size: bureaucratic structures and regulations become more complex, less flexible, less responsive; the governors become more remote from the governed." Ehrlich et al. 1973, 16.

This exponential demographic and economic growth implies serious time lags between events determined by the exponentiality of growth and corrective measures to be carried out immediately, as well as the breakdown of institutions responsible for handling problems caused by such a rate of growth, -- especially in view of avoiding those irreversible effects of global growth which are the result of unbounded natural resource consumption, leading to environmental deterioration. The present situation is all the more menacing, in that "environmental degradation is not the sum of independent causes, it is the multiplicative product of interconnected ones" which makes it imperative to undertake all corrective measures simultaneously (Ehrlich et al. 1973, 12). There is no time to proceed by selective prioritization, strategic planning, or whatever other corporate or political devices. *The modern predicament is precisely this: capitalist market economies cannot thrive if not predicated on infinite economic growth*, destructive from the environmental point of view, but one of the principal legitimating causes of Western economic, social, and political institutions.

5. The Only Road to a Genuine Ecological Revolution: A New Morality

Among the gravest problems of our age is the continuous destruction by humanity of our organic and inorganic environment. The environmental problematic has two fundamental aspects: the ethical and the technico-economical. Both influence individual mentalities and social attitudes. They are entirely interdependent, yet mutually motivate each other. The environmental problem was created by a multiplicity of causes, some spiritual (such as the anthropocentric view of the universe), and others intellectual or material (such as the scientific and technological development in modernity). Their convergence resulted in the unwarranted voluntaristic attitude of Western humanity as based on the creed in the idea of progress and the worldview inherited from the Enlightenment.²⁹ Even the basis of all scientific endeavors, the epistemological urge, is an aspect of anthropocentrism. Epistemology as a human enterprise is naturally anthropocentric, but ontology is cosmocentric³⁰ because being as such is constituted by all extant entities in the universe -- a thesis in full accord with the teachings of developmental biology (if taken seriously).

In our late modern age we have, therefore, to return to what the ancients called conformity with the order of nature, to a conception of the cosmos in which, as Leiss put it, "the concept of nature has a *prescriptive force* for human ethical and political consciousness" (Leiss 1972, 181; italics in original) because it limits the scope of human activities.³¹ Respect for nature is a moral attitude because it puts ethical limits on man's

²⁹ "There is something Newtonian, not yet Einsteinian, besides something morally naive, about living in a reference frame where one species takes itself as absolute and values everything else relative to its utility." Rolston, Holmes III. "Challenges in Environmental Ethics," in Cooper and Palmer. eds. 1992, 135.

³⁰ I prefer to use the designation cosmocentric instead of the usual biocentric or life-centered, as the latter excludes non-organic beings in the cosmos. This qualification does not exclude the Taylorian biocentric outlook which takes human life to be "*an integral part of the natural order of the Earth's biosphere.*" Taylor, Paul W. 1986. 101; italics in original.

³¹ It is appropriate to quote here the horrifying utopia of the great scientist, John Haldane, who acknowledged, nevertheless, the moral dangers of scientific civilization for humanity and for democratic society: "Before very long the technical conditions will exist for organizing the whole world as one producing and consuming unit. If, when that time comes, two rival groups contend for mastery, the victor may be able to introduce that single world-wide organization that is needed to prevent the mutual extermination of civilized nations. The world which would result would be, at first, very different from the dreams of either liberals or socialists; but it might grow less different with the lapse of time. There would be at first economic and political tyranny of the victors, a dread of renewed upheavals, a drastic suppression of liberty. But if the first half-dozen revolts were successfully repressed, the vanquished would give up hope, and accept the subordinate place assigned to them by the victors in the great world-trust... Given a stable world-organization, economic and political, even if, at first, it rested upon nothing but armed force, the evils which now threaten civilization would gradually diminish, and a more thorough democracy than that which now exists might become possible. I believe that, owing to men's folly, a world-government will only be established by force, and will therefore be at first cruel and despotic. But I believe that it is necessary for the preservation of a scientific civilization, and that, if once realized, it will gradually give rise to other conditions of a tolerable existence." (Haldane, J. S. "Icarus, or the Future of Science," in *Essays, and the Wisdom of the Ancients*; quoted in Leiss 1972, 6-7.

actions toward his environment as much as on individuals' desires, instincts, and intentions. Such a moral attitude truly limits individuals' and collectivities' unbridled activities toward their social and natural worlds. A good, though drastic, example of nature's limiting capabilities concerning human expectations is the checks and balances method it applies in every ecosphere whenever the menace of disequilibrating overpopulation is manifest. When, for example, the relationship between food supply and a given species' population is unbalanced, reduction in the first results in a corresponding reduction of the second. Starvation in a world abundant in food supply in some of its parts, or the appearance of unknown epidemics and sicknesses -- could they not be conceived of as a reaction of the earth's ecosystem to the unnatural and immoral attitudes and practices of humans?³²

The great French writer, Albert Camus, clearly understood the human predicament when he wrote that "man is the only creature who refuses to be what he is,"³³ who tries to escape his destiny because he does not acknowledge the limits of his existence -- mortality and fallibility. To man's limits as individual being correspond the limits of his lifeworld; the boundedness of the two results in the absurdity of the human situation. The human situation is absurd because man does not see lucidly what a gap separates his desires from the possibilities offered by his world. The only way out from this absurdly unrealistic situation, as Camus saw it, is an absolute lucidity,³⁴ a recognition of what characterizes our existence: its limitations as against exaggerated human expectations, its absurdity as against the grandiose vision of man, the omnipotent lord of the world.³⁵

Thus, in addition to the biophysical limits³⁶ the human species encounters, there are ethical limits to man's egoistic, rational, instrumental-purposive action. From these ethical limits can be derived ethical duties to be respected in our lifeworld:

(i) *To enforce a cosmocentric, not anthropocentric optimum* in order to preserve our natural environment and avoid its collapse resulting from the process of cumulative decline. All our activities have to be redirected to respect the indispensable existence of all entities -- organic and inorganic -- of nature;

³² The changes brought about by modern medicines provoked the elimination of natural checks and balances from human ecosystems as many outstanding biologists like the late Theodosius Dobzhansky recognized, are masterfully depicted by Garrett Hardin: "In the days before Pasteur man's population was maintained approximately constant from generation to generation by a cybernetic system in which the principal feedback element at the upper limit was disease. The crowd-diseases -- smallpox, cholera, typhoid, plague, etc. -- are, by the ecologist, labelled 'density-dependent factors,' whose effectiveness in reducing population is a power function of the density of the population. No growth of population could get out of hand as long as the crowd-diseases were not conquered... With the development of the bacteriological medicine, all this has been changed. Now, the feedback control is man himself... Having eliminated all other enemies, man is his own worst enemy. Having disposed of all his predators, man preys on himself." Hardin, Garrett. *Nature and Man's Fate*. New York: Mentor Books, 1959, 289-290.

³³ Camus, Albert. 1956. *The Rebel: An Essay on Man in Revolt*. New York: Knopf, 11.

³⁴ Camus, Albert. 1955. *The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays*. New York: Knopf, 36.

³⁵ Camus wrote of the Greek legend of Sisyphus, who was punished by the gods to eternally roll a boulder up a mountain only to have it fall back down again, giving it an interpretation to conform with his "philosophy of limitations": "The lucidity that was to constitute his torture at the same time crowns his victory... 'I conclude that all is well,' says Oedipus, and that remark is sacred. It echoes in the wild and limited universe of man... I leave Sisyphus at the foot of the mountain... He too concludes that all is well... The struggle itself toward the heights is enough to fill a man's heart. One must imagine Sisyphus happy." *ibid.*, 3-8.

³⁶ Writing from the point of view of an economist, Herman Daly wrote: "The biophysical limits to growth arise from three interrelated conditions: finitude, entropy, and ecological interdependence... these three basic limits interact. Finitude would not be so limiting if everything could be recycled, but entropy prevents complete recycling. Entropy would not be so limiting if environmental sources and sinks were infinite, but both are finite. That both are finite, plus the entropy law, means that the ordered structures of the economic subsystem are maintained at the expense of creating more-than-offsetting amount of disorder in the rest of the system." Daly 1996, 33.

(ii) *To safeguard the ecosystemic diversity* through immediately arresting the destruction of the habitat of a whole range of species whose existence is endangered, if they are not extinct already, by the egotistic human conquest of the lands and forests belonging to them;

(iii) *To ensure intergenerational justice* by avoiding the transfer of the burden of the environmental crisis and by the inevitable hardships accompanying the efforts to resolve it from ours to our successors' generations;

(iv) *To re-establish the moral dimension of human life* through modifying the moral foundations of human beings' and communities' existence. This requires abandonment of the erroneous sacralizing of self-interest and the replacement of the scientific-technocratic domination of our societies by an ethical vision rooted in an ontological-cosmic framework. Only a total moral reversal of our habits and outlooks can secure the realization of the preceding three ethical imperatives.

The first two ethical imperatives were already dealt with extensively in the literature and are slowly becoming part of the contemporary public's conscience, as the question of the intergenerational transfer of the environmental burden sometimes emerges in public discussion as well. But the fact that they can only be realized if the moral dimension of human existence is reestablished was not yet perceived at all, and did not yet penetrate people's minds and hearts. The assumption that humanity reached the highest possible ethical level in the course of the three-hundred centuries of modernity is an evolutionary myth (Eder 1996, 53). It is this myth that crumbled irrevocably not only with the gradual collapse of our late modern lifeworld, but with the environmental crisis as the ultimate sign and, at the same time, the final signifier of the urgency of an ecological/moral revolution.

My central contention in respect of this revolution is that *it has to be absolutely distinct from all contemporary social and political issues*, without denying, of course, the fundamental importance of social values such as freedom or justice. Saving our human world from the environmental catastrophe makes it, for example, inevitable to keep separate and distinct this issue from the question of social egalitarianism. Welfare state or income redistribution have strictly nothing to do with saving our world from the ecological predicament brought about by modernity. This is unfortunately not understood by the steady-state or environmental economists, nor by most modern thinkers and movements who are sincerely struggling for a new environmental ethics.³⁷ It even appears that for many protagonists of profoundly changing modern social practices, the looming ecological catastrophe is but a formidable tool, and not the essential objective, in their struggle against the existing societal structures and the corresponding economic organization. *Ecology cannot be put in the service of anthropocentric utilitarianism*. In the same vein, if action in favor of the environment is just a means to serve social justice or fairness, then it can never succeed. Ecological revolution requires a responsibility to nature, not to other men or other human groups.

Mixing environmentalism with any kind of political views is as harmful to the environmental cause as its unwarranted combination with actual social problems. This concerns, above all, the necessity to avoid linking humanity's ecological future to the worldwide victory of democracy. The democratic form of political life has no connection whatsoever to the solution of our environmental crisis. If there is a link between democracy and ecology, then it is the one, already mentioned, between popular expectations of general well-being and the endeavor of politicians to satisfy them, even at the price of a deepening environmental crisis. This situation justifies also the exigence of a radical moral reversal in the mentality of our contemporaries which offers the only possibility to eliminate such a negative effect of participatory democratic politics and, at the

³⁷ Eder presents an excellent example of the collapsing of these two separate problems: "Our thesis is that environmentalism is a test of the capacity of modern societies to develop institutions that are capable of providing rules of fairness in the provision of collective goods... This indicates that what is at stake in environmentalism is not the survival of mankind, but the cultural foundations of the social order of modern societies." Eder 1996, 162.

Richard Neuhaus, reflecting not a universal but a very contemporaneous point of view, remarks: "Who wants to breathe clean air in a racist society?... Survival may be a precondition for developing a moral purpose, but survival itself is not a moral purpose," quoted in Kassiola 1990, 162. Such utterings show a fundamental lack of comprehension of the environmental crisis and demonstrates how many social scientists are obsessed by the predominating issues of the day.

same time, to reinvigorate the legitimacy of institutions and of political leaders in an age of widespread disenchantment of the masses.

The only ethical but anthropologically oriented framework in which the ecological revolution fits perfectly is the ethics of common good. The so-called public goods -- anything offered free to man by Mother Nature -- are, of course, a part of the concept of common good. But the ethics of the common good presupposes a particular vision of the world in which man lives, a coherent vision of the three worlds -- physical, personal and social -- which constitute his environment. Hence, it must include this ethic in an overall conceptual, emotional, and expressive perspective, an ontological/cosmic framework which entails meaning to everything that surrounds us, through the legacy of preceding generations, our traditions.

The environment is not only a problem for communities, as the ecological crisis represents an existential responsibility for every individual whose own life, as much as the lives of his descendants, are endangered. For this reason, every individual has to internalize the ethics of environment, the imperative need to re-establish the cosmic equilibrium between man and nature. This is only possible in an ethical life, characterized by the ethics of the autonomous moral self who lives in moral freedom.

The ethics of the common good and the ethics of the autonomous moral self both naturally involve the respect of intergenerational justice. If people do all they can to avoid the environmental crisis, if today's societies take all the measures necessary, even if they represent unpopular sacrifice, then the required measure of intergenerational justice is satisfied. It is a sad reality of our epoch that most of our contemporaries seem to be not even conscious of such a dimension of their behavior and, worse, if they are conscious of the burden shifted on the shoulders of future generations, they just ignore their misdeed. Future generations do not even have a chance to protest or to accuse; where is, then, in this case, our famous modern *Leitmotiv* of fairness and equal opportunity? A new morality is, thus, the unique solution for the elimination of intergenerational injustice.

The new ethics is evidently based on the re-appropriation of the inner recognition of the finitude, fragility, and mortality of the human condition. This is the reason that the adoption of it necessitates the acceptance of an overall ontological/cosmic framework of existence. Without this profound change in our belief structure and mentalities, there is no place for an environmental ethics in our value system. The new, ecological revolutionary ethics presupposes the primacy of ontology above epistemology, the recognition of the legitimate diversity of existence of all extant entities. Again, the adherence to the ontological beauty and diversity of the cosmos of which humanity is but a small part, constitutes a *sine qua non* condition of the articulation of an intelligible and convincing environmental ethics. It is an imperative requirement for those who renounce of the illegitimate and unjustifiable anthropocentric worldview.

Such an enlargement of our ethical perspective will reflect the full development of human freedom as Heidegger envisaged it:

Nature and what is so designated remains [now] what is negative and only to be overcome. It does not become constitutive for an independent ground of the whole existence of man. But where nature is thus understood, not as what is merely to be overcome, but as what is constitutive, it joins a higher unity with freedom (Heidegger 1985, 84).

Man has to recognize the "essential immutability of Nature as cosmic order" (Jonas 1974, 5), and understand that ethical principles, attitudes and action cannot be limited to behavior regarding other men but have to be applicable to the natural universe as well. It is necessary that man's actions toward the cosmos be, in the Aristotelian sense, a *praxis* and not a *poiein*, recognizing the intrinsic value of everything that exists in the cosmos. The intrinsic value (or inherent worth, in Paul Taylor's terminology) of all extant entities in the universe has, therefore, its root in ontology and not in human valuation. Moral autonomy means, in the environmental context, not an absence of constraints, but a positive freedom, a will to act in conformity with the relational nexus in which the human species is placed in the cosmic world. In this respect, the analogy is to be understood in a very wide sense; environmental morality is comparable to biological adaptation and can be considered as a behavioral trait being part of the phenotype.

An ethical worldview, a new moral discourse embracing the whole cosmos, recognizes the symbiosis of everything existent in the global ecosystem. It means the acceptance of the integrity³⁸ of all ecological structures, the safeguarding of which is in the interest of the whole. Environmental ethics cannot but be holistic, and thus intergenerational human relations enter the scene. We are beneficiaries or victims of how past generations acted in regard to the cosmic universe, as future generations will be beneficiaries or victims of our own ethical attitudes and practices in interaction with nature. It is certainly deceitful to envisage that an environmentally correct ethical behavior simply means to abstain from actions harmful to the integrity of cosmic entities because the ethical attitude in our relations with the surrounding world requires positive action, resulting from deep changes in our mentalities and, accordingly, in our activities.

The class of moral subjects, following Paul Taylor, can be defined as "any being that can be treated rightly or wrongly and toward whom moral agents can have duties or responsibilities" (Taylor, Paul 1986, 17) -- whatever the definition of moral agents be. The right or wrong treatment does not mean, as Taylor would have it, that moral subjects should be susceptible to benefit from or to be harmed by a certain interaction with them -- this would mean to continue the argument in the framework of human ethics. But it means to maintain all moral subjects' integrity in their state, as defined by the cosmic order. Taylor's basic principle that a valid moral norm "in the domain of environmental ethics is *respect for nature*" (ibid., 26; italics in original) expresses the fact that cosmic reality is the environment in which we live independently of our will or preference. Ethical attitudes and moral judgements concerning the environment reflect our moral freedom and autonomy in the framework established by our biological nature and our spiritual understanding of the world, though explicitly excluding the use of cosmic entities for human, instrumental purposes:

It is worth adding here that all of us who live in modern industrialized societies owe a duty of restitutive justice to the natural world and its wild inhabitants... We are part of a civilization that can only exist by controlling nature and using its resources... None of us can evade the responsibility that comes with our high standards of living; we all take advantage of the amenities of civilized life in pursuing our individual values and interests (ibid., 191).

6. Ecological Revolution and Globalization

The environmental crisis and the ecological revolution it necessitates in contemporary mentalities are the real subjects of globalization. Theirs are the only phenomena and fundamental requirement in human life which represent a truly global nature. The destruction of environment through capitalistic economic development and free-market practices, as well as the spread of Western lifestyles accompanied by waste and irresponsible use of nature's resources, are the most evident examples of globalization as understood today. Ecological revolution in the form of a new, cosmos-oriented and ontologically-motivated ethics represents the only hope of reestablishing the planetary equilibrium between nature and man. It must also be global in its extension to encompass all living human beings.

But even this is not enough. The new, cosmos-oriented and ontologically-motivated ethics must also be profound in the sense that it penetrates to the innermost depths of our individual and collective psyche; it has to identify in the treasures of the traditions of all co-existing civilizations those values to which it may appeal as a legitimating force reflecting timeless principles, and social as well as individual practices. Thus, the birth of the new ethics and the consecutive ecological revolution has to be the outcome of inter-civilizational encounters. The renewal of Western moral attitudes toward nature would be facilitated to a large extent by such an interchange of civilizational values complementing the re-appropriation of the elements of our own

³⁸ In respect to integrity as a tenet of an environmental ethics it became a rule to refer to Aldo Leopold's use of this expression: "A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability and the beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise." Leopold, Aldo. *A Sand County Almanac*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1949, 201-206.

tradition which attest to the ontological and cosmological embeddedness of man throughout the long history of Western civilization.

EPILOGUE

Globalization and the coexistence of different civilizations in the contemporary world are antithetical. Our future will be determined by this antithesis because globalization represents nothing but the worldwide domination of certain ways of life and of certain ways of doing things: the ways of Western civilization. If there is not a constructive dialogue between civilizations, a devastating conflict may loom on the horizon:

The ideology of development -- inherent in a seemingly objective terminology -- makes us blind to the fact that history proceeds by the formation and dissolution of peoples, languages, cultures, nations, states, and will continue to do so more than ever in our era of global development. The expansion of European cultures has resulted in the ubiquitous co-presence and interpenetration of all cultures... Yet what we presently perceive as a manifest increase in multi-cultural conjunctures will historically prove a contest over preservation, survival, domination, dissolution and extinction of cultures" (Tenbruck 1990, 204).

Pluralism in our world must be recognized as an unavoidable characteristic of contemporary societies. It means that there is an unquestionable division between cultures and societies, in spite of the appearance of unity and integration. In consequence, pluralism requires a de-sacralization of the universal and the re-sacralization of the local and the contextual. Globalization, once its place in the lifeworld is thus correctly defined, will remain with us as an interplay of the global and of the local, of space and place, of historical time and of the evanescent moment of the present.

Answers to the Faustian question of what holds the world together at the core, endeavor to explain the unfolding history of the world from one civilizational point of view, but never gave an appropriate explanation. Our epoch can certainly be seen as the age of globalization in the history of the world, even if it appears to many as the age of alienation, but a history constituted by the histories of particular events and happenings in space and time in the framework of globality.

Such considerations place globalization at the middle-level of Braudel's scheme of temporal dimensions. The first, instantaneous or cybernetic real time, corresponds to the local, contextual histories; conjunctural time, the medium term, relates to certain historical or intellectual paradigms, to specific social and economic configurations at the scene of world history, in which our epoch's globalizing reality and obsessions are to be framed. Finally, the *longue durée*, standing for the temporal dimension reflecting the life of civilizations, encompasses the slow movement of ideas, values, mentalities, symbolic representations, social and cultural institutions and practices. Whether the movement towards globality, through its success in most spheres of societal life will become part of the *longue durée*, only the astute observer living in the second half of the twenty-first century could decide.

The review of the phenomenon of globalization carried out in the preceding pages did not show a world which could be characterized as an empirical globality evidencing uniform traits in all spheres of human life. Far from it. Globalization became in our age a terribly destructive force, a force of disjunction between cultural worlds, precisely because it is the product not of an interaction between these worlds but sprung out of the particularity of one single civilization. It became clear that globalization, not only in the public mind but, above all, in empirical reality, stands for only four aspects of our contemporary world:

First, the irresistible changes in conditions of human existence through the enormous technological progress in global communication and transmittal, treatment or exchange of information which offer, to the superficial onlooker, the image of an integrated world;

Second, the extension of the capitalist economic system to the whole world based on the profit motive, the free market economy, private enterprise, and fierce competition for the material enrichment of individuals and collectivities as well as corporations;

Third, the worldwide conquest of consumerism, of the perpetual and life-consuming quest for always more of everything, and a certain lifestyle prioritizing material goods at the expense of spirituality and intellectual enrichment;

Fourth, the sacralization of the individual human being that makes modernity the reign of the individual and, interwoven with this individualism, the worldwide spread of democratic ideology promoting participatory politics and government. The latter, however, mainly reflects the globalization of an ideology but not the real democratization of society's life, because there is no congruence between the underlying human realities and the requirements of political democracy.

I believe that I have already made clear my belief that humanity's future will not be determined by globalization, but by the advent of a new morality. The requirement of a new morality certainly indicates that the self-referentiality of modern man and the internally referential character of modern societies are really empty concepts without the significance generally attributed to them. They failed to become the source of a meaningful world, and they failed to assure for humanity an existential well-being and to constitute an integrating force in social relations. The quasi-extinction of morality led to the loss of guidance for individuals in the lifeworld and an external, institutional domination, exactly the opposite of what internal self-referentiality was expected to achieve. Without moral renewal, defined by Inglehart as a postmaterialist perspective, the problems of our modern societies cannot be resolved, especially in view of Giddens's thesis that "the nature of modern institutions is deeply bound up with the mechanisms of trust in abstract systems, especially trust in expert systems" (Giddens 1990, 83), a feature discredited precisely through the failure of these abstract systems. Suffice it to note here the growing awareness of all sorts of risks in contemporary society instead of the promised endless progress; risks and social turbulences in the face of which abstract systems, especially scientific or technological expertise, are completely disempowered. Globalization also means the globalization of those risks, contingencies, and social turbulences -- crime, terrorism, corruption -- worldwide, and only a change in human mentalities can stop this trend.

The moral revolution which is indispensable to make our existence possible in the coming century will recognize the limits of this earthly life, acknowledging that all along, we live in the shadow of death -- the absolute limitation of the human lifespan, which inexorably renders human conceit and voluntarism the matter of a fleeting moment. Should we say that death is as much the limiting factor of the globalizing trend as for anything else in the human world? Must we say that death is, however, part of the ontological/cosmic framework in which we live because, as the oldest human wisdom already made it clear, the universe is but the eternal round of birth, of passing away?

Man has to change. His mentality and his vision of life must change. For this purpose, we need the new morality to make of him a dignified and not an alienated man -- a man who throws off the yoke of his self-imposed sacralization to become part of a whole which is and must be sacralized. This man who throws off the yoke of the global media and of the markets, the yoke of the globalization myth, may find his autonomous self and his way of life in an ethics of respect of nature and solidarity with his other fellow men.

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