

MŰHELYTANULMÁNYOK

DISCUSSION PAPERS

MT-DP. 2004/21

**THE MINIMAL DOMINANT SET IS
A NON-EMPTY CORE-EXTENSION**

LÁSZLÓ Á. KÓCZY
LUC LAUWERS

Institute of Economics
Hungarian Academy of Sciences

Budapest

**THE MINIMAL DOMINANT SET IS
A NON-EMPTY CORE-EXTENSION**

LÁSZLÓ Á. KÓCZY

LUC LAUWERS

Budapest
December 2004

KTI/IE Discussion Papers 2004/21
Institute of Economics Hungarian Academy of Sciences

KTI/IE Discussion Papers are circulated to promote discussion and provoke comments. Any references to discussion papers should clearly state that the paper is preliminary. Materials published in this series may subject to further publication.

The paper was selected for the 4th Budapest Summer Workshop for young economists, organised by the KTI/IE on 29–30 June 2004.

The Budapest Summer Workshops intend to bring together young economists with foreign PhD education, frequently still working or studying abroad.

The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension

Authors: László Á. KÓCZY, Department of Economics, University of Maastricht, P.O.Box 616, 6200MD Maastricht, The Netherlands.
E-mail: l.koczy@algec.unimaas.nl

Luc LAUWERS, and Centre for Economic Studies, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Naamsestraat 69, B–3000 Leuven, Belgium.
E-mail: luc.lauwers@econ.kuleuven.ac.be

The support (SOR-H/99/23, SOR-H/00/01, COE/01/02, DB/02/18) of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven and the Soros Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. We thank Hans Peters, Effrosyni Diamantoudi and Licun Xue for their helpful comments.

HU ISSN 1785-377X
ISBN 963 9588 22 9

Published by the Institute of Economics Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, 2004.
With financial support from the Hungarian Economic Foundation

The Publications of the Institute of Economics

BUDAPEST WORKING PAPERS ON THE LABOUR MARKET

BUDAPESTI MUNKAGAZDASÁGTANI FÜZETEK

BWP 2003/1	Ágnes Hárs	Channeled East-West labour migration in the frame of bilateral agreements
BWP 2003/2	Galasi Péter	Munkanélküliségi indikátorok és az állásnélküliek munkaerő-piaci kötődése
BWP 2003/3	Károly Fazekas	Effects of foreign direct investment on the performance of local labour markets – The case of Hungary
BWP 2003/4	Péter Galasi	Estimating wage equations for Hungarian higher-education graduates
BWP 2003/5	Péter Galasi	Job-training of Hungarian higher-education graduates
BWP 2003/6	Gábor Kertesi and János Köllő	The Employment Effects of Nearly Doubling the Minimum Wage – The Case of Hungary
BWP 2003/7	Nemes-Nagy J. – Németh N.	A "hely" és a "fej". A regionális tagoltság tényezői az ezredforduló Magyarországon
BWP 2003/8	Júlia Varga	The Role of Labour Market Expectations and Admission Probabilities in Students' Application Decisions on Higher Education: the case of Hungary
BWP 2004/1	Gábor Kertesi	The Employment of the Roma – Evidence from Hungary
BWP 2004/2	Kézdi Gábor	Az aktív foglalkoztatáspolitikai programok hatásvizsgálatának módszertani kérdései
BWP 2004/3	Galasi Péter	Valóban leértékelődtek a felsőfokú diplomák?
BWP 2004/4	Galasi Péter	Túlképzés, alulképzés és bérhozam a magyar munkaerőpiacon 1994–2002
BWP 2004/5	István R. Gábor	Capitalist firm vis-à-vis with trade union, versus producer cooperative
BWP 2004/6	Bódis L.–J. Micklewright–Nagy Gy.	A munkanélküli ellátás indokolttsági feltételeinek érvényesítése: empirikus vizsgálat az elhelyezkedési készség ellenőrzésének hatásairól

RESEARCH IN LABOUR ECONOMICS

(Volumes based on conferences organised by KTK/IE and the Labour Science Committee HAS)

Munkaerőpiac és regionalitás az átmenet időszakában. Budapest, 1998.	Ed.: K. Fazekas
A munkaügyi kapcsolatok rendszere és a munkavállalók helyzete. Budapest, 2000.	Ed.: J. Koltay
Oktatás és munkaerőpiaci érvényesülés. Budapest, 2001.	Ed.: A. Semjén
A felzárkózás esélyei – Munkapiaci láttelet a felzárkózás küszöbén. Budapest, 2003.	Ed.: Gy. Kővári

LABOUR MARKET YEARBOOKS

Munkaerőpiaci tükrök – 2000. Budapest, 2000.	Ed.: K. Fazekas
Munkaerőpiaci tükrök – 2001. Budapest, 2001.	Ed.: K. Fazekas
Munkaerőpiaci tükrök – 2002. Budapest, 2002.	Ed.: K. Fazekas
Munkaerőpiaci tükrök – 2003. Budapest, 2003.	Ed.: K. Fazekas
Munkaerőpiaci tükrök – 2004. Budapest, 2004.	Eds.: K. Fazekas, J. Varga
The Hungarian Labour Market – Review and Analysis, 2002. Bp., 2002	Eds.: K. Fazekas, J. Koltay
The Hungarian Labour Market – Review and Analysis, 2003. Bp., 2003	Eds.: K. Fazekas, J. Koltay
The Hungarian Labour Market – Review and Analysis, 2004. Bp., 2004	Eds.: K. Fazekas, J. Koltay, Zs. Gergely

Papers can be downloaded from the homepage of the Institute of Economics <http://econ.core.hu>

MT-DP. 2004/1	Attila HAVAS	Assessing the Impact of Framework Programmes in a System in Transition
MT-DP. 2004/2	Max GILLMAN–Michal KEJAK	Inflation and Balanced-Path Growth with Alternative Payment Mechanisms
MT-DP. 2004/3	L. AMBRUS-LAKATOS–B. VILÁGI–J. VINCZE	Deviations from interest rate parity in small open economies: a quantitative-theoretical investigation
MT-DP. 2004/4	HALPERN László és szerzőtársai	A minimálbér költségvetési hatásai
MT-DP. 2004/5	FALUVÉGI Albert	A társadalmi-gazdasági jellemzők területi alakulása és várható hatásai az átmenet időszakában
MT-DP. 2004/6	Mária CSANÁDI	Budget constraints in party-states nested in power relations: the key to different paths of transformation
MT-DP. 2004/7	Mária CSANÁDI	A comparative model of party-states: the structural reasons behind similarities and differences in self-reproduction, reforms and transformation
MT-DP. 2004/8	KARSAI Judit	Helyettesítheti-e az állam a magántőke-befektetőket? Az állam szerepe a magántőke-piacon
MT-DP. 2004/9	Judit KARSAI	Can the state replace private capital investors? Public financing of venture capital in Hungary
MT-DP. 2004/10	Mária CSANÁDI	Do party-states transform by learning?
MT-DP. 2004/11	István CZAJLIK – János VINCZE	Corporate law and corporate governance. The Hungarian experience
MT-DP. 2004/12	L. HALPERN et al	Firms' Price Markups and Returns to Scale in Imperfect Markets: Bulgaria and Hungary
MT-DP. 2004/13	Norbert MAIER	Explaining Corruption: A Common Agency Approach
MT-DP. 2004/14	Gergely CSORBA	Screening Contracts in the Presence of Positive Network Effects
MT-DP. 2004/15	K. BOGNÁR – L. SMITH	We Can't Argue Forever
MT-DP. 2004/16	JUHÁSZ A. – SERES A. – STAUDER M.	A kereskedelmi koncentráció módszertana
MT-DP. 2004/17	Júlia LENDVAI	Inflation Inertia and Monetary Policy Shocks
MT-DP. 2004/18	A. FREDERIKSEN – E. TAKÁTS	Optimal incentive mix of performance pay and efficiency wage
MT-DP. 2004/19	Péter KONDOR	The more we know, the less we agree: public announcement and higher-order expectations
MT-DP. 2004/20	B. BARANYI – I. BALCSÓK	Határ menti együttműködés és a foglalkoztatás – kelet-magyarországi helyzetkép

Papers can be downloaded from the homepage of the Institute of Economics: <http://econ.core.hu>

KÓCZY Á. LÁSZLÓ – LUC LAUWERS

A LEGKISEBB DOMINÁNS HALMAZ A MAG EGY NEM ÜRES BŐVÍTÉSE

Összefoglalás

Egy átváltható-hasznosságú karakterisztikus játék kimeneteleinek egy adott halmazát dominánsnak nevezzük, ha a kívülállóktól független dominancia-kapcsolatra nézve elérhető és zárt. A kívülállóktól független dominancia a dominanciának olyan szigorítása, ahol a deviáns koalíció a deviáció által nem érintett koalíciók kifizetését nem határozhatja meg. A legkisebb domináns halmaz egyértelmű, nem üres, és egybeesik a játék koalíció-strukturás magjával, ha az sem üres. A jellemzők ismeretetésén túl egy algoritmust is megadunk a legkisebb domináns halmaz kereséséhez.

**THE MINIMAL DOMINANT SET IS
A NON-EMPTY CORE-EXTENSION**

BY LÁSZLÓ Á. KÓCZY AND LUC LAUWERS

Abstract

A set of outcomes for a transferable utility game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is, with respect to an outsider-independent dominance relation, accessible (or admissible) and closed. This outsider-independent dominance relation is restrictive in the sense that a deviating coalition cannot determine the payoffs of those coalitions that are not involved in the deviation.

The minimal (for inclusion) dominant set is non-empty and for a game with a non-empty coalition structure core, the minimal dominant set returns this core. We provide an algorithm to find the minimal dominant set.

Keywords: Dynamic solution, absorbing set, core, non-emptiness.

1 Introduction

For a characteristic function form game there are two fundamental and strongly linked problems: (i) what coalitions will form, and (ii) how will the members of these coalitions distribute their total coalitional worth. We attempt to answer these questions. Following Harsányi (1974), we presuppose some bargaining process among the players. At first, one of the players proposes some outcome (a payoff vector augmented with a coalition structure). In case some coalition could gain by acting for themselves, it can reject this initial outcome and propose a second outcome. Of course, in order to be able to make a counter-proposal, the deviating coalition is a member of the new coalition structure and none of the players in the deviating coalition loses when moving towards the new outcome. We impose an additional condition that we call outsider-independence: a coalition C that belongs to the initial coalition structure and that does not contain a deviating player survives the deviation; the players in C stay together and keep their pre-deviation payoffs.

This contrasts with, for example, the approach by Sengupta and Sengupta (1994), Shenoy (1980, Section 5). They tackle the same problem without incorporating such an outsider-independence condition: the deviating coalition is allowed to determine the payoffs and the structure of *all* players. This seems unrealistic to us. In contrast, our approach is based on the observation that outsiders' payoffs are unaffected by the formation of the deviating coalition and hence outsiders do not necessarily notice the deviation until the new coalition structure is announced.

Once such a counter-proposal has popped up, another coalition may reject this counter-proposal in favor of a third outcome, and so forth. This bargaining process generates a dominating chain of outcomes. In case the game has a non-empty coalition structure core (Aumann and Drèze, 1975), the bargaining process enters this core after a finite number of steps (this is shown in Kóczy and Lauwers, 2003). Conclusion: the coalition structure core, if non-empty, is accessible.

Similarly to the core, the coalition structure core has an important shortcoming: non-emptiness is far from being guaranteed. The present paper tackles games with an empty set of undominated outcomes.

We impose three conditions upon a solution concept. *First*, we insist on accessibility: from each outcome there is a dominating chain that enters the solution. *Second*, the solution is closed for domination: each outcome that dominates an outcome in the solution also belongs to the solution. The intuition behind this axiom is straightforward. In case there are no “undominated outcomes”, there might exist “undominated sets” of outcomes. Such a set must be closed for outsider-independent domination. A collection of outcomes that combines accessibility and closedness is said to be a dominant set. And, *third*, from all the dominant sets, we only retain the minimal (with respect to inclusion) ones.

The following observation provides a further argument in favor of these three conditions: in case the game generates undominated outcomes, then the accessibility of the coalition structure core implies that this core is the unique minimal dominant set. Uniqueness and non-emptiness extends to arbitrary games:

THEOREM A. *Each characteristic function form game has exactly one minimal dominant set. Moreover, this minimal dominant set is non-empty.*

In other words, the minimal dominant set is a non-empty coalition structure core extension. On the one hand, the three conditions we impose upon a solution concept are strong enough to filter out the coalition structure core (in case it is non-empty), and on the other hand these conditions are weak enough to return a non-empty set of outcomes in case the game has an empty coalition structure core. As a matter of fact, the minimal dominant set meets Zhou's (1994) minimal qualifications for a solution concept: non-imposition with respect to the coalition structure¹ and non-emptiness.

¹In the framework of endogenous coalition formation, a solution concept “is not a priori defined for payoff vectors of a particular coalition structure, and it does not always contain payoff vectors of every coalition structure,” (Zhou, 1994, p513).

We close the discussion on Theorem A with an example. Consider a three player game with an empty core: singletons have a zero value, pairs have a value equal to 8, and the grand coalition has a value 9. The payoff vector $(4, 4, 0)$ supported by the coalition structure $(\{1, 2\}, \{3\})$ belongs to the minimal dominant set. This outcome, however, is not efficient: the total payoff in this vector amounts to 8, where the value 9 is obtainable. On the other hand, the efficient outcome $(3, 3, 3; \{1, 2, 3\})$ does not belong to the minimal dominant set. Hence, the minimal dominant set might contain inefficient outcomes and at the same time there might be efficient outcomes outside the minimal dominant set. Where the core selects those outcomes that satisfy efficiency and stability, these two properties are not so well linked as soon the core is empty (Section 5 returns to this issue).

Along the proof of Theorem A we come across the following properties of the outsider-independent domination relation. First, the set of outcomes that indirectly dominate an (initial) outcome is closed in the Euclidean topology. And, second:

THEOREM B. *There exists a natural number $\tau = \tau(n)$ such that for each game with n players and for all outcomes a and b in this game, we have that a indirectly dominates b if and only if there exists a dominating chain from b to a of length at most τ .*

As a consequence, the accessibility axiom can be sharpened: for each game the minimal dominant set can be reached via τ subsequent counter-proposals. This number τ can be imposed as a time-limit for the completion of the bargaining process.

Theorem B dramatically improves previous results on the accessibility of the core. We mention two of them. First, Wu (1977) has shown the existence of an infinite bargaining scheme that converges to the core and rephrased this result as “the core is globally stable”. Second, Sengupta and Sengupta (1996) construct for each imputation a sequence of dominating imputations that enters the core in finitely many steps. We extend these results to the coalition structure core and to the minimal dominant set. In addition, we provide an upper bound for the length of the dominating chains.

Finally, Theorem B implicitly provides directions on how to compute the minimal dominant set. The proof of Theorem B rests upon a stratification of the set of all imputations into a finite number of classes. Each class gathers imputations that we label *similar*. Apparently, the minimal dominant set coincides with the union of some of these classes. As such, the search for the minimal dominant set boils down to a finite problem. As an illustration, we retake the above three player game. Here, the set of outcomes is partitioned into 29 classes. First, there are 19 (non-empty) classes of efficient outcomes:

$$(x, \{1, 2, 3\}) \text{ with } x_1 + x_2 + x_3 = 9, \ x_i + x_j \bowtie_{ij}^1 8, \ x_k + x_l \bowtie_{kl}^2 9, \ x_m \geq 0,$$

where the indices i, j, k, l , and m all run over the set $\{1, 2, 3\}$ and where $\bowtie$ stands for either $<$ or $\geq$. Additional labels are used to distinguish different instances –which may be different inequalities– from each other.

Next, there are 9 classes in which one player is standing alone:

$(x; \{i, j\}, \{k\})$ with $\{i, j, k\} = \{1, 2, 3\}$, $x_i + x_j = 8$, $x_i \bowtie_i^1 8$, $x_j \bowtie_j^2 8$, and $x_k = 0$.

Finally, there is the zero-outcome: $(0; \{1\}, \{2\}, \{3\})$.

The minimal dominant set collects 26 of these classes: the (large) class

$(x, \{1, 2, 3\})$ with $x_1 + x_2 + x_3 = 9$, $x_1 + x_2 < 8$, $x_1 + x_3 < 8$, and $x_2 + x_3 < 8$,

and the zero-outcome are excluded from the minimal dominant set.

The next Section collects notation and definitions. Section 3 considers dominating chains, the length of such chains, and proves Theorem B. Section 4 defines the minimal dominant set and proves Theorem A. Section 5 lists some deficiencies and some properties of the minimal dominant set. An example indicates that the outsider-independency condition rightly prevents some outcomes (that belong to the solution of Sengupta and Sengupta, 1994) from entering the minimal dominant set. Section 6 returns to the computability of the minimal dominant set.

2 Preliminaries

Let $N = \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ be a set of n players. Non-empty subsets of N are called coalitions. A *coalition structure* is a set of pairwise disjoint coalitions so that their union is N and represents the breaking up of the grand coalition N . Let $\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{Q}$ be two coalition structures such that for each coalition C in $\mathcal{Q}$ we have that either C belongs to $\mathcal{P}$ or there exists a coalition in $\mathcal{P}$ that includes C , then $\mathcal{Q}$ is *finer* than $\mathcal{P}$ (and $\mathcal{P}$ is *coarser* than $\mathcal{Q}$). For a coalition structure $\mathcal{P} = \{C_1, C_2, \dots, C_m\}$ and a coalition C , the *partners' set* $P(C, \mathcal{P})$ of C in $\mathcal{P}$ is defined as the union of those coalitions in $\mathcal{P}$ that have a non-empty intersection with C . The complement $N \setminus P(C, \mathcal{P})$ is denoted by $O(C, \mathcal{P})$.

A characteristic function $v : 2^N \setminus \{\emptyset\} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ assigns a real value to each coalition. The pair (N, v) is said to be a transferable utility game in characteristic function form, in short, a game.

An *outcome* of a game (N, v) is a pair $(x, \mathcal{P})$ with x in $\mathbb{R}^n$ and $\mathcal{P}$ a coalition structure of N . The vector $x = (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n)$ lists the payoffs of each player and satisfies $\forall i \in N : x_i \geq v(\{i\})$ and $\forall C \in \mathcal{P} : x(C) = v(C)$, with $x(C) = \sum_{j \in C} x_j$. The first condition is known as individual rationality: player i will cooperate to form a coalition only if his payoff x_i exceeds the amount he obtains on his own. The second condition combines feasibility and the myopic behavior of the players, it states that each coalition in the coalition structure $\mathcal{P}$ allocates its value among its members. Outcomes with the same payoff vector are said to be *payoff equivalent*.

The set of all outcomes is denoted by $\Omega(N, v)$. The set $\Omega(N, v)$ is non-empty: it contains the outcome in which the grand coalition is split up in singletons.

In case the grand coalition forms, then an outcome is a pair $(x, \{N\})$, $x_i \geq v(\{i\})$, and $x(N) = \sum_{i \in N} x_i = v(N)$. As such, outcomes generalize imputations.

Now, we define the *outsider-independent* dominance relation. An interpretation and a discussion follows. Later on, we use the shorthand *o.i.-domination*.

Definition 2.1. Let (N, v) be a game and let $a = (x, \mathcal{P})$ and $b = (y, \mathcal{Q})$ be two outcomes. Then, outcome a outsider-independent dominates b by C , denoted by $b \xrightarrow{C} a$, if

C1: $x(C) > y(C)$ and for each i in C : $x_i \geq y_i$,

C2: $\mathcal{P}$ contains C ,

C3: (a) $\mathcal{P}$ contains all coalitions in $\mathcal{Q}$ that do not intersect C , and
(b) for each player i in $O(C, \mathcal{Q})$: $x_i = y_i$.

Coalition C is called the *deviating coalition*. We make an additional, simplifying assumption:

C4: in $\mathcal{P}$ the players in $P(C, \mathcal{P}) \setminus C$ form singletons.

Outcome a outsider-independently dominates b , if $\mathcal{P}$ contains a coalition C such that a outsider-independently dominates b by C , and we abbreviate this as a o.i.-dominates b or $b \longrightarrow a$.

Our definition is a restriction of widely used concepts of dominations: if only condition C1 is imposed we talk about *domination at the level of payoffs*; if conditions C1 and C2 are imposed, about *domination at the level of outcomes*. Condition C3 is referred to as the *outsider independence condition*.

This o.i.-domination relation can be interpreted in a dynamic way. Let $(y, \mathcal{Q}) \xrightarrow{C} (x, \mathcal{P})$ and consider $(y, \mathcal{Q})$ as the initial outcome. Note that the initial partition $\mathcal{Q}$ and the deviating coalition C completely determine the new partition $\mathcal{P}$. Also, the deviating coalition C enforces the new outcome $(x, \mathcal{P})$. Indeed, in order to obtain a higher total payoff, coalition C separates from its partners (and at least one member of C is strictly better off). The players in $P(C, \mathcal{Q}) \setminus C$ become ex-partners of C and fall apart in singletons. Finally, the *outsiders*, i.e. the players in $O(C, \mathcal{P}) = N \setminus P(C, \mathcal{Q})$, are left untouched.

The definition clearly indicates that o.i.-domination is more restrictive than domination at the level of outcomes, which was employed by Shenoy (1979) and Sengupta and Sengupta (1994) among others and where the deviating coalition is allowed to affect the payoffs of all the players and thus to ignore the behavior and the motivation of the outsiders. The imposition of the outsider independence condition removes these privileges.

Definition 2.1 also models a merger: the deviating coalition is the union of some of the coalitions in the initial coalition structure.

In case one is concerned with coalition formation processes, o.i.-dominance seems to be a natural and a straightforward extension of the domination relation at the level of payoffs. On the other hand, if outcome b is dominated by a at the level of payoffs, then there exists an outcome a' that o.i.-dominates b . Therefore, the set of o.i.-undominated outcomes coincides with the set of undominated outcomes. In other words, in the definition

of the coalition structure core (Aumann and Drèze, 1975), ‘not dominated’ can be replaced by ‘not o.i.-dominated’:

Definition 2.2. *Let (N, v) be a game. The coalition structure core $C(N, v)$ is the set of outcomes that are ‘not dominated’, i.e. outcomes $(x, \mathcal{P})$ with $x(S) \geq v(S)$ for each coalition $S \subseteq N$.*

The coalition structure core might contain payoff equivalent outcomes. Also, if ‘the’ core is non-empty (i.e. in case the grand coalition forms), then the coalition structure core includes the core.

3 Dominating chains

We introduce *sequential o.i.-domination* and we show that in order to check for this, one can concentrate on chains the length of which does not exceed some upperbound.

Definition 3.1. *Let $a, b \in \Omega$. Outcome a is said to be accessible from b (denoted by $b \rightarrow a$ or $a \leftarrow b$), if one of the following conditions holds*

- *a and b are payoff equivalent, or*
- *a sequentially o.i.-dominates b , i.e. there exists a natural number T and a sequence of outcomes $a_0 = b, a_1, \dots, a_{T-1}, a_T = a$ such that a_t o.i.-dominates a_{t-1} for $t = 1, 2, \dots, T$. The sequence $a_0 = b \rightarrow a_1 \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow a_{T-1} \rightarrow a_T = a$ is called an o.i.-dominating chain of length T .*

This accessibility relation $\rightarrow$ is the transitive and reflexive closure of the o.i.-domination relation $\rightarrow$.

Two different outcomes might be accessible from each other. E.g. payoff equivalent outcomes are accessible from each other; this refers to the implicit assumption that repartitioning involves no costs in case the payoff vector does not change.

The accessibility relation describes a possible succession of transitions from one outcome to another. An initial outcome is proposed and the players are allowed to deviate from it. We are interested in the outcomes that will appear at the *end* of a sequence of transitions. Some of the outcomes will definitely disappear, while others show up again and again. As such, the game is absorbed in (hopefully) a small set of outcomes. The following result gives a precise content to the expression ‘end of an o.i.-dominating chain’.

Theorem 3.2. *Let (N, v) be a game. Then there exists a natural number $\tau = \tau(n)$ such that for all outcomes a and b in $\Omega(N, v)$ we have that a is accessible from b if and only if there exists an o.i.-dominating chain from a to b of length at most τ .*

The *if*-part in the above statement (accessibility if there is a chain) is immediate. In order to prove the *only-if*-part, we need some additional preparations.

- First, the set $\Omega(N, v)$ of outcomes is partitioned such that two outcomes of the same class induce similar deviations,
- Second, the set N is partitioned according to the behavior of the players in an o.i.-dominating chain.

The finiteness of these operations is crucial in the proof of Theorem 3.2. We start the discussion with the partitioning of the set of outcomes.

Definition 3.3. *Let (N, v) be a game. Two outcomes $(x, \mathcal{P})$ and $(y, \mathcal{Q})$ are similar if they satisfy the following list of conditions:*

- $\mathcal{P} = \mathcal{Q}$,
- for each coalition C we have, $x(C) \geq v(C)$ if and only if $y(C) \geq v(C)$, and
- for each coalition C , for each coalition structure $\mathcal{C}$ of C , and for each D in $\mathcal{C}$, we have

$$x(D) - v(D) \geq v(C) - v(\mathcal{C}) \quad \text{if and only if} \quad y(D) - v(D) \geq v(C) - v(\mathcal{C}), \quad (1)$$

where $v(\mathcal{C}) = \sum_{E \in \mathcal{C}} v(E)$.

In this way the set $\Omega(N, v)$ of outcomes is partitioned into a finite number of classes. The number of classes in this partition depends upon the cardinality of N . Observe that each class is obtained as an intersection of linear inequalities and is, therefore, a convex set.

Definition 3.4. *Let (N, v) be a game and let*

$$b = (x_0, \mathcal{P}_0) \xrightarrow{D_1} (x_1, \mathcal{P}_1) \xrightarrow{D_2} \dots \xrightarrow{D_t} (x_t, \mathcal{P}_t) \xrightarrow{D_{t+1}} \dots \xrightarrow{D_T} (x_T, \mathcal{P}_T) = a,$$

be an o.i.-dominating chain from b to a . We interpret t as a time index.

For each $t = 0, 1, \dots, T-1$ we divide the set of players into two subsets:

- *The set W_t of winning players collects those players who, from t onwards, are either outsiders or deviators. Formally: i belongs to W_t if $i \in O(D_s, \mathcal{P}_{s-1}) \cup D_s$, for all $s = t+1, \dots, T$. From t onwards the payoff of a winning player cannot decrease.*
- *The set L_t of losing players collects those players who, at a certain point in time, are left behind as singletons. Formally: i belongs to L_t if there exists $s \geq t+1$ such that $i \in P(D_s, \mathcal{P}_{s-1}) \setminus D_s$. Let $\ell(t, i) \geq t+1$ denote the first time (after t) that player i is standing alone, i.e. $\{i\} \in \mathcal{Q}_{\ell(t, i)}$.*

Obviously, along the o.i.-dominating chain we have

$$W_0 \subseteq W_1 \subseteq \dots \subseteq W_{T-1} = O(D_T, \mathcal{P}_{T-1}) \cup D_T.$$

Indeed, once a player is winning, his status cannot change. As a consequence we obtain

$$L_0 \supseteq L_1 \supseteq \dots \supseteq L_{T-1} = P(D_T, \mathcal{P}_{T-1}) \setminus D_T.$$

Furthermore, at each moment t a losing player i with $\ell(t-1, i) = t$ *might* move up to the class W_t of winning players.

Since winners and losers are completely determined by the coalition structures and the deviating coalitions, this division of N into winning and losing players does not depend upon the individual payoffs.

Proof of Theorem 3.2 (Only-if part).

The key idea is that any chain from b to a longer than τ can be made shorter. We construct such a shorter chain. First, we locate two similar outcomes c and c' . Next, we trisect the chain $(b \rightarrow c, c \rightarrow c', c' \rightarrow a)$, we remove the middle part, and we reattach the head and the tail. Since the outcomes c and c' are not likely to be identical the tail of the chain must be modified; we keep the deviating coalitions and we adjust the outcomes along the tail.

We proceed in four steps. The first step is the surgical one: we locate two similar outcomes and we make the cuts; here we implicitly define the value of τ . In Step 2 we show that the first deviation in the tail of the original chain can be attached to the head. Then, the second deviation is attached (Step 3) and so forth (Step 4).

Step 1. Starting up the proof.

If the length of the o.i.-dominating chain from b to a is large enough (larger than τ), then there exist two outcomes $c = (y_0, \mathcal{Q}_0)$ and $c' = (z_0, \mathcal{Q})$ in the o.i.-dominating chain that (i) are similar and (ii) partition the players (winning versus losing) in the same way. Indeed, there are only a finite number of different classes of similar outcomes and there are only a finite number of ways to split up the finite set N of players into two subsets. We write $\mathcal{Q}_0$ instead of $\mathcal{Q}$ and we assume that $(y_0, \mathcal{Q}_0)$ comes later than $(z_0, \mathcal{Q}_0)$. Denote the sets of winning and losing players for the outcomes $(y_0, \mathcal{Q}_0)$ and $(z_0, \mathcal{Q}_0)$ by W_0 and L_0 . In sum, we have the following o.i.-dominating chain

$$b = (x_0, \mathcal{P}_0) \longrightarrow \dots \longrightarrow \overbrace{(z_0, \mathcal{Q}_0)}^{W_0, L_0} \longrightarrow \dots \longrightarrow \overbrace{(y_0, \mathcal{Q}_0)}^{W_0, L_0} \longrightarrow \dots \longrightarrow (x_m, \mathcal{P}_m) = a.$$

We rename the last part in this original o.i.-dominating chain and we indicate the deviating coalitions:

$$(x_0, \mathcal{P}_0) \longrightarrow \dots \longrightarrow \overbrace{(z_0, \mathcal{Q}_0)}^{W_0, L_0} \underbrace{\longrightarrow \dots \longrightarrow \overbrace{(y_0, \mathcal{Q}_0)}^{W_0, L_0}}_{\text{middle part}} \underbrace{\xrightarrow{C_1} (y_1, \mathcal{Q}_1) \xrightarrow{C_2} \dots \xrightarrow{C_T} (y_T, \mathcal{Q}_T)}_{y\text{-chain}}.$$

We show the existence of payoff vectors $z_1, z_2, \dots, z_T$ such that this initial chain from b to a (of length m) can be shortened to

$$(x_0, \mathcal{P}_0) \longrightarrow \dots \longrightarrow \overbrace{(z_0, \mathcal{Q}_0)}^{W_0, L_0} \underbrace{\xrightarrow{C_1} (z_1, \mathcal{Q}_1) \xrightarrow{C_2} \dots \xrightarrow{C_T} (z_T, \mathcal{Q}_T) = a}_{z\text{-chain}}.$$

Since the coalition structure $\mathcal{Q}_0$ and the deviating coalitions $C_1, C_2, \dots, C_T$ coincide along the initial y -chain and the new z -chain, both chains generate the same sets W_s and L_s of winning and of losing players, $s = 1, 2, \dots, T - 1$.

Along the z -chain, the payoffs of certain players are straightforward. Indeed, in the step $\mathcal{Q}_s \xrightarrow{C_{s+1}} \mathcal{Q}_{s+1}$, each player i in $P(C_{s+1}, \mathcal{Q}_s) \setminus C_{s+1}$ drops off as a singleton and obtains his stand alone value. Furthermore, the post-deviation payoff of an outsider (i.e. a player in $O(C_{s+1}, \mathcal{Q}_s)$) is equal to his pre-deviation payoff. Hence, it is sufficient to concentrate on the payoffs of the deviators.

Step 2. The first deviation: $\mathcal{Q}_0 \xrightarrow{C_1} \mathcal{Q}_1$.

The similarity of $(z_0, \mathcal{Q}_0)$ and $(y_0, \mathcal{Q}_0)$ implies that $z_0(C_1) < v(C_1)$. Hence coalition C_1 has an incentive to deviate. The payoff of a deviator depends upon the status of the deviating coalition:

1. C_1 is a subset of W_0 .

Then we define $z_{1,k} = y_{1,k}$ for each k in C_1 . This can be done because (i) player k in C_1 is winning (from $(z_0, \mathcal{Q}_0)$ onwards) such that $z_{0,k} \leq y_{1,k}$ and (ii) coalition C_1 is deviating such that $y_1(C_1) = v(C_1)$.

Also, the inclusion $C_1 \subset W_0$ implies that the players in C_1 glue together and will not be separated in subsequent steps.

2. C_1 intersects L_0 .

Then we allocate the surplus $v(C_1) - z_0(C_1)$ to those players who are the first to drop off as singletons in subsequent deviations (i.e. losing players k in C_1 with the smallest $\ell(1, k)$ -value). In other words, the payoff of such a player is *temporarily* increased and will fall back on his stand alone value later on.

The payoffs of the remaining players in C_1 stay at the pre-deviation level.

We close this step with the following observations. If player i moves up from L_0 to W_1 , then the singleton coalition $\{i\}$ belongs to $\mathcal{Q}_1$ and $z_{1,i} = y_{1,i} = v(\{i\})$. Players in W_0 either have their initial z_0 -payoff or obtained a y_1 -payoff.

Step 3. The second deviation: $\mathcal{Q}_1 \xrightarrow{C_2} \mathcal{Q}_2$.

Let us investigate the composition of the deviating coalition C_2 . We regard this deviation as a merger of a set $\mathcal{C}$ of (possibly singleton) coalitions in $\mathcal{Q}_1$ that pick up further players from other coalitions. Let D denote the set of these picked-up players.

We have to check whether coalition C_2 can improve upon $(z_1, \mathcal{Q}_1)$ by standing alone, i.e. $v(C_2) > z_1(C_2)$. In the above notation we have $\mathcal{C} \subset \mathcal{Q}_1$, and hence

$$z_1(C_2) = \sum_{C \in \mathcal{C}} v(C) + z_1(D). \quad (2)$$

We investigate the nature of a player in D . Such a player in D cannot have a *temporarily* high payoff. We show this by contradiction and we assume that a player j in D has a temporarily high payoff. Player j is, by construction, a future loser that belonged to C_1 . Since the surplus $v(C_1) - z_0(C_1)$ of the previous deviation was allocated to those losers

that are the *first* to drop off, coalition C_2 can only contain player j in case C_2 includes C_1 . Therefore, $j \in C_1 \in \mathcal{C}$ and j is not in D . A contradiction.

Conclude that each player in D was, in the previous step, either an outsider or a deviator. Now, we are able to specify the pre-deviation payoff $z_{1,i}$ of a player i in D :

- The payoff $z_{1,i}$ of an outsider is still at the z_0 -level.
- The payoff $z_{1,i}$ of a deviator also is at the z_0 -level. Indeed, in this case the deviating coalition C_1 is not included in C_2 . Only the payoffs of those players that are the first to left behind as singletons were temporarily increased. Obviously, player i belongs to $C_1 \cap C_2$ and his payoff is equal to $z_{0,i}$.

Therefore, we can rewrite Equation 2: $z_1(C_2) = \Sigma_{\mathcal{C}} v(C) + z_0(D)$.

Next, we look at the y -chain. In the step $\mathcal{Q}_1 \xrightarrow{C_2} \mathcal{Q}_2$ the same decomposition of C_2 appears. Because C_2 improves upon y_1 and because players in D are either outsiders or deviators when moving from y_0 to y_1 we have

$$v(C_2) = y_2(C_2) > y_1(C_2) = \Sigma_{\mathcal{C}} v(C) + y_1(D) \geq \Sigma_{\mathcal{C}} v(C) + y_0(D);$$

Now use the similarity of the outcomes $(y_0, \mathcal{Q}_0)$ and $(z_0, \mathcal{Q}_0)$ (Condition (1) in Definition 3.3) and conclude that C_2 indeed has an incentive to deviate:

$$v(C_2) > z_1(C_2) = \Sigma_{\mathcal{C}} v(C) + z_0(D).$$

The payoff vector z_2 is defined in the same way as z_1 . The payoff of a deviator depends upon the status of C_2 .

1. C_2 is a subset of W_1 .
Then a deviator either already belonged to W_0 or obtained in the previous step his stand alone value; in both cases the payoff of the deviator can be lifted to the y_2 -level.
2. C_2 intersects L_1 .
Then the payoff of a deviator is either equal to his pre-deviation payoff or is temporarily increased.

Step 4. The t -th deviation: $\mathcal{Q}_{t-1} \xrightarrow{C_t} \mathcal{Q}_t$.

The subsequent deviations by the coalitions $C_1, C_2, \dots, C_{t-1}$ are all executed and the payoff vectors $z_1, z_2, \dots, z_{t-1}$ are all defined. Again, we start with the decomposition of the deviating coalition C_t . Since players now have a longer history, the decomposition of C_t is more complicated.

In the outcome $(z_{t-1}, \mathcal{Q}_{t-1})$ we distinguish four types of players: players with a temporarily high payoff, players (that do not form a singleton coalition) with a payoff at the y_k -level with $k \leq t-1$, players having their stand alone payoff, and untouched players with a payoff still at the z_0 -level. By construction, these four types exhaust the set N of players. Indeed,

when a player leaves his z_0 -level, he either enters the y -level, or obtains a temporarily high payoff, or obtains his stand alone value.

Consider a player in C_t with a payoff at the y_k -level with $k \leq t-1$. By construction, a player can move up to the y_{t-1} -level only after joining a deviating coalition C_j that enters the set W_j of winners. Such a coalition C_j never breaks up. However, the coalition C_j can be picked up as a whole by a later deviating coalition. Let C_k be the latest deviating coalition that includes C_j and that is a subset of C_t (i.e. $C_j \subset C_k \subset C_t$). Let $\mathcal{C}_1$ collect these coalitions C_k . Note that two different coalitions in $\mathcal{C}_1$ must be disjoint. Hence each player in C_t with a payoff at the y -level is sheltered in some coalition in $\mathcal{C}_1$.

Now, consider a player in C_t , not yet sheltered by $\mathcal{C}_1$, with a temporarily high payoff. Then C_t must include the entire deviating coalition C_j (with $j < t$) which was at the basis of this temporarily high payoff. Indeed, the surplus of a deviation was (in case C_j contains future losers) allocated to those players that are the first to drop off. Hence, if such a future loser is present in C_t , then the drop off has not yet happened. The coalition C_j is still together and is included in some deviating coalition C_k which is a subset of C_t (again let k be as large as possible, $j \leq k < t-1$). Let $\mathcal{C}_2$ collect these coalitions C_k . Different coalitions in $\mathcal{C}_1 \cup \mathcal{C}_2$ are disjoint. Each player with a payoff at the y -level or with a temporarily high payoff is sheltered in some coalition in $\mathcal{C}_1 \cup \mathcal{C}_2$. Let S collect the remaining players in C_t with a payoff equal to their stand alone value. Such a player is been dropped off as a singleton coalition; later on such a player might become a winner in a deviating coalition that also contained losers. Finally, let the coalition D collect the remaining players in C_t . They have a payoff at the z_0 -level.

In contrast to Step 3, the coalitions in $\mathcal{C}_1, \mathcal{C}_2$ need not be present as coalitions in $\mathcal{Q}_{t-1}$, they are *included* in one of the coalitions in $\mathcal{Q}_{t-1}$. In conclusion: $z_{t-1}(C_t) = \Sigma_{\mathcal{C}_1} v(C) + \Sigma_{\mathcal{C}_2} v(C) + \Sigma_S v(\{i\}) + z_0(D)$.

We have to check whether $v(C_t) > z_{t-1}(C_t)$. Consider the same decomposition in the step $(y_{t-1}, \mathcal{Q}_{t-1}) \xrightarrow{C_t} (y_t, \mathcal{Q}_t)$. Since coalition C_t can improve upon y_{t-1} , we know $v(C_t) > \Sigma_{\mathcal{C}_1} v(C) + \Sigma_{\mathcal{C}_2} v(C) + y_{t-1}(S) + y_{t-1}(D)$. For each player k in D we have $y_{t-1,k} \geq y_{0,k}$. For each player k in S we have $y_{t-1,k} \geq v(\{k\})$. Hence, $v(C_t) > \Sigma_{\mathcal{C}_1} v(C) + \Sigma_{\mathcal{C}_2} v(C) + \Sigma_S v(\{k\}) + y_0(D)$. Use the similarity of the outcomes $(y_0, \mathcal{Q}_0)$ and $(z_0, \mathcal{Q}_0)$ (Condition (1) in Definition 3.3) and conclude that C_t indeed has an incentive to deviate.

The payoff $z_{t,k}$ with k in C_t depends upon the status of C_t and is lifted to the y_t -level ($C_t \subseteq W_{t-1}$), or is either equal to the pre-deviation payoff or is temporarily increased ($C_t \cap L_{t-1} \neq \emptyset$). $\square$

4 The minimal dominant set

Here we introduce dominant sets and show that *the* minimal dominant set is non-empty. Let (N, v) be a game and let $\Omega = \Omega(N, v)$ be the set of all outcomes.

Definition 4.1. A set $\Delta \subseteq \Omega$ of outcomes is said to be dominant if it satisfies

Accessibility: the set Δ is accessible from Ω , i.e. for each b in Ω there exists an a in Δ such that $b \rightarrow a$, and

Closure: the set Δ is closed for o.i.-domination, i.e. for each a in Ω and each b in Δ , if $b \rightarrow a$ then $a \in \Delta$.

For example, the set Ω of all outcomes is dominant. Furthermore, the complement $\Omega \setminus \Delta$ of a dominant set Δ is not dominant. The non-emptiness of the minimal dominant set will follow from the existence of outcomes that are maximal for the sequential o.i.-dominance relation $\rightarrow$.

Definition 4.2. Outcome a is maximal for $\rightarrow$ if for each outcome b in Ω that sequentially o.i.-dominates a , we have that a sequentially o.i.-dominates b .

In order to show the existence of a maximal outcome, we follow (Kalai and Schmeidler, 1977, Theorem 3) and use some standard arguments from topology. We embed the set Ω in the Euclidean space $\mathbb{R}^n$ by neglecting the coalition structures behind the outcomes. Formally, we study outcome vectors $x, y, \dots$ instead of outcomes $(x, \mathcal{P}), (y, \mathcal{Q}), \dots$. Observe that the set of all outcome vectors (i.e. the set Ω after neglecting the coalition structures) is compact. Furthermore, within the universe Ω we consider the relativization of the Euclidean topology to Ω . Theorem 3.2 implies the next *continuity* property.

Lemma 4.3. Let $a, b \in \Omega$. The set $\hat{a} = \{c \in \Omega : a \rightarrow c\}$ of outcomes that sequentially o.i.-dominate a is closed (in the Euclidean topology). In addition, if $a \rightarrow b$, then $\hat{a} \supset \hat{b}$.

Proof. First, let $A \subset \Omega$ be a closed set of outcomes. Observe that the set A_1 of outcomes that o.i.-dominate A (in one step) also is a closed set. According to Theorem 3.2 there exists a natural number τ such that

$$\hat{a} = \{c \in \Omega : \text{there is a chain from } a \text{ to } c \text{ of length smaller than } \tau\}.$$

Hence, $\hat{a}$ is the union of τ closed sets, and is therefore closed. The second statement (the finite intersection property along a chain) is obvious. $\square$

Lemma 4.4. The set Ω , equipped with the sequential o.i.-dominance relation, has at least one maximal outcome.

Proof. By Zorn's lemma it is sufficient to show that each chain in $(\Omega, \rightarrow)$ has an upper-bound. Hence, let A be a chain in Ω . In case the chain contains an outcome a such that $\hat{a} = \{a\}$, then a is a maximal element. Otherwise, the intersection $\bigcap_{a \in A} \hat{a}$ of closed sets is non-empty (use the finite intersection property of closed sets in the compact set Ω). Each outcome in this intersection is an upperbound for the chain A . $\square$

Now, we identify the minimal dominant set with the set of maximal outcomes.

Theorem 4.5. Let (N, v) be a game and let Ω be the set of outcomes. Then, the minimal dominant set coincides with the set of maximal outcomes and is therefore non-empty.

Proof. Let Δ be *some* minimal dominant set and let M collect the maximal outcomes.

First, let a be a maximal outcome. Because Δ satisfies accessibility, it contains an outcome b such that $a \twoheadrightarrow b$. The maximality of a implies that $b \twoheadrightarrow a$. Since Δ satisfies closure, a belongs to Δ . Conclusion: $M \subseteq \Delta$ and Δ is non-empty.

Next, suppose that a belongs to Δ and that b sequentially o.i.-dominates a . Then, either a sequentially o.i.-dominates b , or Δ is not a minimal o.i.-dominant set: outcome a and each outcome that is sequentially o.i.-dominated by a can be left out. Since Δ is assumed to be minimal, the outcome a must be maximal. Hence, $\Delta \subseteq M$. $\square$

Finally, consider a game (N, v) with a non-empty coalition structure core $C(N, v)$. As the coalition structure core collects the o.i.-undominated outcomes, it follows that the minimal dominant set Δ includes $C(N, v)$. As a matter of fact the equality $C(N, v) = \Delta$ holds:

Corollary 4.6. *Let (N, v) be a game. Then, the minimal dominant set is a non-empty coalition structure core extension.*

Proof. First, the minimal dominant set is non-empty (Theorem 4.5). Second, consider a game with a non-empty coalition structure core. The accessibility of the coalition structure core is proven in Kóczy and Lauwers (2003). Hence, the minimal dominant set coincides with the coalition structure core. $\square$

5 Properties

We discuss some deficiencies and we list some properties of the minimal dominant set. Consider a game (N, v) . Let Ω be the set of outcomes and let Δ be the minimal dominant set.

5.1 Dummy players

We start with the observation that an outcome in Δ might assign a positive payoff to a dummy player, i.e. a player i for which $v(\{i\}) = 0$ and $v(C \cup \{i\}) = v(C)$ for each coalition C . Indeed, consider a three player majority game augmented with two dummy players: $N = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5\}$, $v(C) = 2$ if the intersection $C \cap \{1, 2, 3\}$ contains at least two players, all other coalitions have a value equal to 0.

The outcome $(1, 1, 0, 0, 0; \{1, 2\}, \{3\}, \{4\}, \{5\})$ belongs to Δ and is o.i.-dominated by the outcome

$$a = (0, 1.2, 0.4, 0.4, 0; \{1\}, \{2, 3, 4\}, \{5\})$$

which allocates a positive amount to player 4. Since Δ is closed for o.i.-domination, outcome a belongs to Δ .

Sengupta and Sengupta (1994, Section 3.2) observe that this affliction is common to many solution concepts: the Aumann-Maschler set, the Mas-Collel bargaining set, the consistent

bargaining set of Dutta *et al.*, and the set of viable proposals by Sengupta and Sengupta all generate solutions for this game with a positive payoff for the dummy players.

An artificial way to circumvent this problem is to impose a stability condition upon the deviating coalitions. Call a coalition S *stable against splitting up* in case each proper partitioning $\mathcal{D}$ of S has a value that is strictly smaller than the worth of S , i.e. $v(\mathcal{D}) < v(S)$. In other words, a coalition will split up in case it can be partitioned without lowering its total worth. As such, a deviating coalition will never contain a dummy player and dummy players will end up in their stand alone position.

If one insists on the dummy player axiom (according to which a dummy player obtains a zero payoff), then one can impose this mentioned stability axiom on the deviating coalition. After such a modification, the minimal dominant set restricted to the non-dummy players coincides with the minimal dominant set of the game restricted to the non-dummy players, so insisting on the dummy axiom does not affect the properties of the minimal dominant set.

5.2 Efficiency

Next, we observe that the shortsightedness or myopia of the players may lead to inefficient coalition structures.

Definition 5.1. *Let (N, v) be a game and let S be some coalition. A coalition structure $\mathcal{C}$ of S is said to be efficient if the total payoff $v(\mathcal{C}) = \sum_{E \in \mathcal{C}} v(E)$ decreases when the coalition structure $\mathcal{C}$ is made finer or coarser.*

Efficiency combines stability against splitting up with stability against mergers, i.e. $\mathcal{C}$ does not contain coalitions A and B such that $v(A \cup B) > v(A) + v(B)$. The next example indicates that inefficient coalition structures might enter the minimal dominant set.

Example 5.2. *Repeat the three player game (N, v) with $v(\{i\}) = 0, v(\{i, j\}) = 8$, and $v(N) = 9$. The minimal dominant set is the union of two sets. The first one is the boundary of a triangle spanned by $(8, 0, 0), (0, 8, 0), (0, 0, 8)$:*

$$\Delta_1 = \{ (x_1, x_2, x_3; \{i, j\}, \{k\}) \mid \{i, j, k\} = \{1, 2, 3\} \ x_i + x_j = 8, \text{ and } x_k = 0 \}.$$

The second one is a part of a triangle spanned by $(9, 0, 0), (0, 9, 0), (0, 0, 9)$:

$$\Delta_2 = \{ (x_1, x_2, x_3; N) \mid x_1 + x_2 + x_3 = 9 \text{ and } \exists k \in N : x_k \leq 1 \}.$$

The outcomes in Δ_1 are inefficient. Coarsening the coalition structure $(\{i, j\}, \{k\})$ to N improves the value from 8 to 9. Furthermore, the efficient outcome $(3, 3, 3; N)$ does not belong to the minimal dominant set.

These observations raise a rather fundamental issue: the conflict between efficiency and undomination. Here we insisted on undomination. As a consequence, inefficient outcomes might enter and some efficient outcomes might leave the solution.

We do not regard this as a serious conceptual problem: we view the minimal dominant set as a *first* solution concept. In other words, outcomes outside the minimal dominant set certainly will not survive.² Hence, if one insists on efficiency, then one can select the efficient outcomes out of the minimal dominant set. Since (i) each inefficient outcome is o.i.-dominated by an efficient outcome and (ii) the minimal dominant set is closed for o.i.-domination, this restriction is non-empty. In addition, this restricted set of efficient outcomes still satisfies accessibility. In the example, Δ_2 collects the efficient outcomes.

5.3 Composed games

Finally, we study the behavior of the minimal dominant set in composed games. Let (N_1, v_1) and (N_2, v_2) be two games, with N_1 and N_2 disjoint. The juxtaposition of these games is the game (N, v) , with $N = N_1 \cup N_2$ and

$$v : 2^N \setminus \{\emptyset\} \longrightarrow \mathcal{R} : S \longmapsto v(S) = \begin{cases} v_1(S) & \text{if } S \subseteq N_1, \\ v_2(S) & \text{if } S \subseteq N_2, \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

In such a juxtaposition the restriction to one of the initial sets of players coincides with the corresponding initial game. On the other hand, cross-coalitions have a zero worth. Furthermore, in case $a_i = (x_i, \mathcal{P}_i)$ is an outcome of the game (N_i, v_i) , $i = 1, 2$, then the juxtaposition $a_1 \times a_2 = (x_1, x_2; \mathcal{P}_1 \cup \mathcal{P}_2)$ is an outcome of the game (N, v) .

The next proposition indicates that the minimal dominant set behaves well with respect to such composed games.

Proposition 5.3. *The minimal dominant set of the juxtaposition of two games coincides with the juxtaposition of the two minimal dominant sets.*

Proof. Let (N, v) be the juxtaposition of the games (N_1, v_1) and (N_2, v_2) . Let $(x_i, \mathcal{P}_i)$ be an outcome of the game (N_i, v_i) that is maximal for the sequential o.i.-domination relation, $i = 1, 2$. In other words, let $(x_i, \mathcal{P}_i)$ belong to $\Delta(N_i, v_i)$.

Obviously, the juxtaposition $(x_1, x_2; \mathcal{P}_1 \cup \mathcal{P}_2)$ is maximal. Hence, $\Delta(N, v)$ includes the juxtaposition of $\Delta(N_1, v_1)$ and $\Delta(N_2, v_2)$.

The inclusion $\Delta(N, v) \subseteq \Delta(N_1, v_1) \times \Delta(N_2, v_2)$ also is immediate. $\square$

Although this property seems natural, it illuminates some advantages of the minimal dominant set above other solution concepts. Consider the juxtaposition of a small game with an empty and a large game with a non-empty core. As each outcome of this game is dominated, the coalition structure core is empty. Nevertheless, the composed game contains *almost* stable outcomes. The minimal dominant set is able to trace this locally

²The literature on tournaments provides an analogue (Laslier, 1997). The top-cycle gathers the maximal elements of a tournament, and the top-cycle is considered as a starting point for further investigations: most tournament solutions are top-cycle selections.

stable behavior. As a matter of fact, each solution concept that does not incorporate an outsider-independency condition will allow a local instability to extend to the entire game. Furthermore, this property illustrates the implications of the *outsider-independence* assumption in the o.i.-dominance relation. Consider the following juxtaposition. Let $N = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5\}$ and let $v(\{1, 2\}) = v(\{1, 3\}) = v(\{2, 3\}) = v(\{4, 5\}) = 2$, all other coalitions have a zero value. The minimal dominant set of this game is equal to

$$\Delta = \{(x; \{i, j\}, \{k\}, \{4, 5\}) \mid \{i, j, k\} = \{1, 2, 3\}, x_i + x_j = x_4 + x_5 = 2, x_k = 0\}.$$

When the deviating coalition is allowed to intervene in the structure of the outsiders, the set of maximal elements does contain outcomes that are not plausible. For example, the outcome $a = (1, 1, 0, 0, 0; \{1, 2\}, \{3\}, \{4\}, \{5\})$ dominates in the sense of Sengupta and Sengupta (1994) the outcome $b = (1, 1, 0, 1, 1; \{1, 2\}, \{3\}, \{4, 5\})$. Indeed, start from b and consider a deviation by $\{2, 3\}$ that separates players 4 and 5, next consider a deviation by $\{1, 2\}$. This example shows that the set of viable proposals (i.e. the solution of Sengupta and Sengupta, 1994) does not satisfy the juxtaposition property.

6 The minimal dominant set is the union of classes of similar outcomes

We now focus on the computability of the minimal dominant set. Let (N, v) be a game and let Δ be its minimal dominant set. As it easy to calculate the coalition structure core and to check its emptiness, we assume that the coalition structure core of the game is empty.

Lemma 6.1. *Let a and b be two outcomes in Δ such that $a \rightarrow b$. Then, there exists an o.i.-dominating chain $a = (x_0, \mathcal{P}_0) \xrightarrow{C_1} (x_1, \mathcal{P}_1) \xrightarrow{C_2} \dots \xrightarrow{C_m} (x_m, \mathcal{P}_m) = b$, such that the set of winning players only contains outsiders, i.e. in the notation of Definition 3.4, $W_0 = \bigcap_{j=1}^k O(C_j, \mathcal{P}_{j-1})$.*

Proof. Since $a \rightarrow b$, there exists an o.i.-dominating chain π_{ab} from a to b . We explain how to modify this path in order to meet the statements in the lemma.

Suppose that player i gains in moving from a to b . As a consequence, in moving from b to a this player loses. For each o.i.-dominating chain π_{ba} from b to a (existence of such an o.i.-dominating chain is guaranteed since $a \in \Delta$ and $a \rightarrow b$) player i is a loser, i.e. $i \in L_0(\pi_{ba})$. Consider the composed path $\pi_{ab} \wedge \pi_{ba} \wedge \pi_{ab}$ from a to b . With respect to this path player i is a loser.

Next, suppose that player i is equally well off in a as in b but is not an outsider (i.e. at some stage k along the chain π_{ab} player i belongs to the deviating coalition). In other words, player i had the opportunity to improve his payoff, but along the path π_{ab} it just happens that he does not gain anything. Create a new path of length k in which i exploits this opportunity to raise his payoff and denote the new outcome (at stage k) by c . Hence, player i gains in moving from a to c . Again, for each o.i.-dominating chain π_{ca} from c to

a player i will lose (since $a \in \Delta$ and $a \twoheadrightarrow c$, such a path exists). With respect to the composed path $\pi_{ac} \wedge \pi_{ca} \wedge \pi_{ab}$ from a to b , player i is a loser.

Conclude the existence of a path in which, at the start, each player is either an outsider (throughout the whole path) or a loser. $\square$

Lemma 6.2. *Let a, b , and c be outcomes in Δ such that $a \twoheadrightarrow b$ and $a \twoheadrightarrow c$. Then, the smallest (for inclusion) set $O(a, b)$ of outsiders along all possible o.i.-dominating chains from a to b is well defined. Moreover, $O(a, b) = O(a, c)$.*

Proof. First, we show that if $O(a, b)$ (resp. $O(a, c)$) is a smallest set of outsiders along all possible paths from a to b (resp. c), then $O(a, b) = O(a, c)$. This is done by contradiction. Assume that $j \in O(a, b) \setminus O(a, c)$. Let π_{ab} and π_{ac} be two paths for which the corresponding sets of outsiders are exactly $O(a, b)$ and $O(a, c)$. Consider the composition $\pi'_{ab} = \pi_{ac} \wedge \pi_{ca} \wedge \pi_{ab}$ (again, note the existence of a path π_{ca}). Since j is not an outsider along π_{ac} , he is not an outsider along π'_{ab} . This contradicts with $O(a, b)$ being minimal.

Next, apply this result with $b = c$ to obtain that the smallest set $O(a, b)$ of outsiders along all possible paths from a to b is indeed well defined. $\square$

As a consequence of this lemma, the notation $O(a, b)$ can be shortened to $O(a)$. The set $O(a)$ is the smallest set of outsiders along any possible path from $a \in \Delta$ to any possible outcome that indirectly o.i.-dominates a . When deviating away from $a \in \Delta$, the players in $O(a)$ are ‘stable’ in the sense that they do not have any incentive to change their positions and payoffs.

Lemma 6.3. *Let a be an outcome in Δ and let b be similar to a . Then, $O(a) = O(b)$.*

Proof. By contradiction. Assume $j \in O(b) \setminus O(a)$. Since $j \notin O(a)$, there exists an outcome c such that (i) $a \twoheadrightarrow c$ and (ii) there exists a path from a to c such that player j belongs at some stage to the deviating coalition. As a and b are similar, they motivate the very same sequences of the initial and the subsequent deviations (cf. proof of Theorem 3.2). Hence, j cannot belong to $O(b)$. This contradicts the initial assumption. $\square$

The next lemma shows that when the outsiders are dropped, the similarity of two outcomes implies that they are both in or both outside the minimal dominant set (of the smaller game without the outsiders). Before stating the lemma, we want to observe that for an outcome $a = (x, \mathcal{P})$ in Δ , the set $O(a)$ of outsiders collects some of the coalitions in $\mathcal{P}$. Also, the restriction $a|_{N \setminus O(a)} = (x|_{N \setminus O(a)}, \mathcal{P}|_{N \setminus O(a)})$ can be interpreted as an outcome of the game restricted to the set $N \setminus O(a)$.

Lemma 6.4. *Let a and b be two outcomes and let $a \in \Delta$. Denote the restrictions of a and b to the set $N \setminus O(a)$ with a' and b' . If a' and b' are similar, then $a' \twoheadrightarrow b'$ and $b' \twoheadrightarrow a'$.*

Proof. Lemma 6.1 implies the existence of an o.i.-dominating chain

$$\pi' : a' = a_0 \xrightarrow{C_1} a_1 \xrightarrow{C_2} \dots \xrightarrow{C_m} a_m = a',$$

for which the set W_0 of winning players is empty. Along the lines of the proof of Theorem 3.2, we can construct a path with the same sequence of deviations $(C_1, C_2, \dots, C_m)$ from b' to a' . This proves $b' \rightarrow a'$.

Next, we use the same sequence of deviations again, and we modify the path π' towards a path from $a' = (x', \mathcal{P}')$ to $b' = (y', \mathcal{P}')$. Look at stage k where coalition C_k deviates and outcome a_k is formed. A member of the deviating coalition C_k may have the following backgrounds: (i) a singleton in $\mathcal{P}_{k-1}$, (ii) belonging to a coalition that breaks up, or (iii) belonging to a coalition C that is completely absorbed by C_k , i.e. $C \subset C_k$.

By individual rationality and the particular construction of paths where coalitional surpluses are allocated to the weakest players (i.e. players that are the first to be left behind as singletons), the players in case (i) and some of the players in case (ii) will cause no problem: they have a low payoff and raising this to the level of a' or b' does not create any further complication. When entire coalitions (case (iii)) or non-singleton coalitions (the remaining part of case (ii)) join C_k the players may have high payoffs. Nevertheless, going back to previous deviations we can guarantee that since the last time they have become singletons they do not accumulate a payoff too high. This can be assured unless $v(C) > y'(C)$. By the similarity of a' and b' this inequality implies $v(C) > x'(C)$. Then, however, the construction of the path from a' to a' would have failed. Therefore, the inequalities do not hold and the construction is feasible. $\square$

Now we state and prove the main result of this section.

Theorem 6.5. *The minimal dominant set coincides with the union of some of the classes of similar outcomes.*

Proof. Let $a = (x, \mathcal{P})$ be in Δ and let $b = (y, \mathcal{P})$ be an outcome similar to a . We have to prove that $b \in \Delta$. We distinguish two cases depending upon whether the set $O(a)$ is empty or not.

Case (i), $O(a) = \emptyset$.

Here, the theorem follows from the previous lemma.

Case (ii), $O(a) \neq \emptyset$.

Introduce the outcome $c = ((x|_{O(a)}, y|_{N \setminus O(a)}), \mathcal{P})$. The outcomes a and c coincide over $O(a)$. The previous lemma implies that c belongs to Δ .

Furthermore, b and c coincide over the set $N \setminus O(a)$ where all the deviations take place. Let d in Δ and π_{bd} be a path from b to d . We show the existence of a path from d to b . Let the deviations along the path π_{bd} work upon the outcome c and obtain a path $\pi_{cd'}$ from c to d' . Since c belongs to Δ , also d' belongs to Δ and there is a path $\pi_{d'c}$ from d' to c . Copy this path $\pi_{d'c}$ towards the starting point d and obtain a path from d to b . Conclude that b is maximal for the relation ' $\rightarrow$ '. Therefore, b belongs to Δ . $\square$

Hence, in order to determine the minimal dominant set it is sufficient to check the o.i.-domination relation on the finite number of classes of similar outcomes. As such the computation is reduced to a finite framework.

References

- AUMANN, R. J., AND J. H. DRÈZE (1975): “Cooperative games with Coalition Structures,” *International Journal of Game Theory*, 3, 217–237.
- HARSÁNYI, J. C. (1974): “An equilibrium point interpretation of stable sets,” *Management Science*, 20(11), 1472–1495.
- KALAI, E., AND D. SCHMEIDLER (1977): “An Admissible Set Occuring in Various Bargaining Situations,” *Journal of Economic Theory*, 14, 402–411.
- KÓCZY, L. Á., AND L. LAUWERS (2003): “The Coalition Structure Core is Accessible,” *Games and Economic Behavior*, *Forthcoming*. DOI information: 10.1016/j.geb.2003.06.006.
- LASLIER, J.-F. (1997): *Tournament Solutions and Majority Voting*. Springer, Berlin.
- SENGUPTA, A., AND K. SENGUPTA (1994): “Viable Proposals,” *International Economic Review*, 35(2), 347–359.
- (1996): “A Property of the Core,” *Games and Economic Behavior*, 12, 266–273.
- SHENOY, P. P. (1979): “On Coalition Formation: A Game-Theoretical Approach,” *International Journal of Game Theory*, 8(3), 133–164.
- (1980): “A Dynamic Solution Concept for Abstract Games,” *Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications*, 32(2), 151–169.
- WU, L. S.-Y. (1977): “A Dynamic Theory for the Class of Games with Nonempty Cores,” *SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics*, 32, 328–338.
- ZHOU, L. (1994): “A New Bargaining Set of an N -Person Game and Endogenous Coalition Formation,” *Games and Economic Behavior*, 6(3), 512–526.