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# A Precariously Balanced Policy

'In avoiding a similar fate, Your Highness, and our interests, were guided by God's wondrous wisdom', commented Councillor Dénes Bánffy when, in spring 1670, he reported to the prince on the suppression of the Upper-Hungarian rising and the Wesselényi movement.[78]78. Dénes Bánffy's letter to Transylvania's Prince Mihály Apafi, Bonchida, 9 May 1670, TMÁO IV, pp. 484-85. However, he was mistaken if he believed that a prudent policy of non-interference could shelter Transylvania from the consequences of the events in Hungary. As captain of Kolozsvár and military commander of the border regions, Bánffy was ideally placed to observe that the defeat of the pathetically weak anti-Habsburg movements would have a tangible impact on Transylvania. Royal Hungary's highest office, that of palatine, had not been filled after Wesselényi's death, and two high posts seemed to have been erased, for both the lord chief justice and the governor of Croatia were beheaded. To all appearances, the Kingdom of Hungary had ceased to be a political factor. The Prince of Transylvania, whose own autonomy was severely circumscribed, thus inherited responsibility for preserving what was left of Hungarian statehood.

{2-336.} On the eve of the rebellion's defeat, Ferenc Rákóczi I echoed the feelings of most Hungarians when he observed that 'there are no more remedies, we must cling to Transylvania'.[79]79. Ferenc Rákóczi I to Transylvania's Prince Mihály Apafi, Sárospatak, 9 May 1670, TMÁO IV, pp. 485. A few fugitives sought shelter with the Turks, but most of those suspected of rebellion fled to Transylvania, where they flooded into border settlements and besieged the prince's court with pleas for help and protection.

The small principality had to take on new and heavy burdens. István Thököly's son was among the more fortunate: after fleeing from Árva Castle and crossing Polish territory, the twelve-year-old Imre found comfortable refuge on his family's Transylvanian estates and a suitable activity at the college in Nagyenyed. But thousands of soldiers and noblemen, priests, old people, women, and children had to be provided with food and shelter at the Treasury's expense. The lesser nobles who had led the rebellion, István Petrőczy, Pál Szepessy, Ferenc Ispán, Menyhért Keczer, and Mihály Váy, did not abandon the cause; believing that their group embodied Hungary, they restlessly sought new opportunities for independent action. Thus, from early 1671 onwards, Transylvania had to contend with a new and volatile political factor: a mass of fugitive noblemen and soldiers who were joined by several thousand dismissed members of border-fort garrisons.

The domestic peace that had prevailed in the principality since 1664 also came under direct threat from the Habsburgs and Turks. Constantinople and Vienna knew about the supposedly secret alliance concluded between Transylvania and the Hungarian statesmen, and both great powers believed that it could work against their interests if the Hungarian exiles established a base in Transylvania. The Porte considered that the time had come to lay claim to some forty-nine villages in central Transylvania, on the grounds that they belonged to the domain of the Turkish-controlled Jenő Castle; meanwhile, the pasha of Várad put an earlier plan into action and occupied the Szamos valley as well as the salt mines. Emperor {2-337.} Leopold, for his part, charged that Apafi had flouted the terms of the Vasvár Treaty and demanded the prompt extradition of the exiles; troops from the imperial garrison at Szatmár raided the principality in pursuit of the fugitives.

Apafi's government tried to ward off this double threat by carefully balanced diplomatic manoeuvres. Thus Benedek Hedry, Transylvania's ambassador in Vienna, pressed for leniency with regard to the Hungarians, while his counterpart in Constantinople, László Baló, urged the Porte to give them support. The grand vizier, who was riding high after his capture of the eastern Mediterranean's key stronghold, Candia, brusquely rebuffed Baló; and all Hedry could obtain from Emperor Leopold were vague promises of international collaboration against the Turks. However, Apafi did manage to persuade the Porte to content itself with some border villages near Jenő, and Vienna to tacitly accept Transylvania's offer of refuge for the exiles. He owed these modest successes not only to the time-tested tactics of paying the tribute on time and sending generous gifts, but also to skilful exploitation of the Habsburgs' interests. Apafi sent an emissary to Lőcse to meet with János Rottal, who chaired a commission charged with investigating the Hungarian conspiracy; he warned that Transylvania's Catholics were disposed to make a common front with the Hungarian Protestants, and expressed a willingness to establish covert diplomatic relations with Vienna. The prince recommended Dénes Bánffy to the emperor, and charged him with the delicate task of acting as Transylvania's covert agent in Vienna. Whether clever or duplicitous, such tactics were common in contemporary diplomacy; state interests dictated expediency. Gyulafehérvár thus obtained useful information about the intentions of the Porte and fed the imperial court with disquieting reports about the Turks; and Apafi relied on his influence at the Porte to counter the efforts of Vienna's ambassador to obtain the extradition of the exiles.

{2-338.} In the meantime, Apafi quietly took steps to preserve Transylvania's autonomy. He reorganized border defences and consolidated the government's authority and finances. Efforts were made to influence European public opinion in favour of Transylvania, a case in point being the dissemination of a pamphlet, published in 1671, and titled Austriaca Austeritas. At one time, literary historians believed that it had been written by Miklós Bethlen, but the latter's correspondence revealed that he himself did not know who the author was. More recent investigations have ascertained that the pamphlet was penned by Mihály Szatmárnémeti, that the type-face betrayed a Kolozsvár printer, and that the publisher's name and place — Venetiis, Typis Fratrum Veracii, Constantini et Speracii — were pure invention. The work clearly reflected a Transylvanian perspective; it argued that Emperor Leopold's policies flouted divine laws and human rights, and thus perpetrated unlawful oppression.

In 1672, a series of events sorely tested Apafi's cautious balancing strategy. Ahmed Köprülü was intent on expanding Ottoman power to the north, and, in 1671, he had launched a campaign aimed at Poland. When his armies swept into Moldavia, Ukraine's neighbour, they found a state of near-anarchy. Moldavia's voivode, Gheorghe Duca, had bought his way to power back in 1668, and proceeded to recoup the expense by imposing heavy taxes. The villeins already had a hard time meeting the demands of landowners and clergy; the new tax impoverished them to such an extent that they refused to pay the costs of participation in the Turkish campaign. As a result, Moldavia was shaken in 1671–72 by an uprising of unprecedented proportions. A mass of villeins, soldiers, lesser boyars, and citizens assaulted Iaşi; they murdered rich boyars and Greeks, and expelled the voivode. When Köprülü's army arrived, it found the country ablaze and its population on the brink of starvation.

{2-339.} In 1672, the Porte did not require that Transylvania provide troops for the campaign. Ahmed Köprülü knew better than to bring unreliable troops into a country struck by famine, at a time when masses of Moldavians were fleeing west across the Carpathians into Transylvania. The grand vizier did demand 600 cartloads of food from Transylvania, and, in contradiction of his public statements, he tacitly encouraged the Hungarian exiles to attack, from the rear, the Habsburg emperor, who was allied with the Poles, and whose relations with France had deteriorated. Reluctant to take a major initiative on their own, the exiles requested, indeed demanded that Prince Apafi lend them his support.

Apafi's government judged that the situation did not warrant a clear commitment and persisted in the policy of playing off its opponents against each other. Claiming that Transylvania wished to defend Hungary and Protestantism, Apafi applied for assistance to the French king, the Prince-Elector of Brandenburg, and other European rulers. At a meeting in Torda, the exiles had chosen as their commander Mihály Teleki, Kővár's captain and a councillor to Apafi. On 3 September, the prince ordered him to lead an expedition into Hungary; then, ostensibly because the Estates disagreed, the order was rescinded. Nevertheless, when Teleki got wind of the exiles' successes in Upper-Hungary, notably in a battle at Enyicke, he decided to join the fray.

It was typical of Apafi's finely-nuanced strategy that Bánffy, who believed the moment had arrived to attack the Habsburgs, tried to persuade the Viennese court to realize that the Polish–Turkish war offered an ideal opportunity for a Habsburg attack on the Ottomans. He advised the court to pacify the Hungarians, warning that no matter how many troops the emperor sent to Hungary, they would not be able to secure a lasting peace, and that if Hungary was ground up between the two contending powers, it would end up like Greece. In a personal letter to the emperor, Bánffy voiced the hope that the latter would forego punitive measures and restore {2-340.} Hungary's freedom, so that the country can continue to serve his interests and those of Christendom.

Boldizsár Macskási bore similar instructions when he set off on 20 September to take up his post as Transylvania's titular ambassador in Vienna. He was expected to explain that although the exiles and Teleki had taken to arms without the prince's permission, Transylvania could not treat them as enemies and be insensitive to 'the Hungarian nation's growing distress, involving not only those who turned against Your Majesty in their deeds, words, or thought, but also womenfolk, young girls, an innocent community, including God's mother church, with many people suffering for the sins of the dead.' The emperor's power was far greater than that of the exiles, but he 'would not achieve a good outcome if he failed to appease the Hungarians'. A resort to force would only turn the country into a battlefield, making Hungary an easy prey for 'those [i.e. the Turks] who, from the start, had suffered much impediment from the Hungarians'.[80]80. EOE 15, pp. 297-98.

By the time Macskási reached Vienna, the exiles' offensive had suffered a setback at Batizfalva; on 20 September, Teleki was forced to flee with the remnants of his army, leaving one shoe on the marshy battlefield. The imperial army reaped another victory at Györke, on 26 October, effectively nullifying the exiles' early military successes. The Habsburg government suspended the Hungarian constitution and put a governor in charge of the kingdom; summary courts were set up to try Protestant pastors.

The fiasco served to sharpen political conflict within Transylvania. Resentful at the heavy burdens imposed on them, the feudal orders called the prince's councillors to account; Apafi, in turn, rejected all criticism directed at the central government. The exiles fell into discord: some of them wanted more material support from Transylvania, others demanded total autonomy. One of the exile leaders, Petrőczy, called for open alliance with the Turks; he escaped from a Transylvanian jail and sought refuge with the pasha {2-341.} of Várad. The pro-principality group of exiles chose as its leader the young Pál Wesselényi; he had married the daughter of the Székely captain-general, Pál Béldi, whose already great influence was thereby enhanced. Meanwhile, battles were raging in the borderlands. Bánffy rallied the troops and repelled the attacks launched by the pasha of Várad, then tried to maintain peace by negotiating a separate accord. Vienna, for its part, tried to compromise the prince by informing both the exiles and the Porte about his secret diplomatic initiatives. The domestic political balance collapsed. Teleki, Béldi, Miklós Bethlen, and most of the aristocracy joined forces to take military action against Dénes Bánffy and, after obtaining the prince's assent, took him prisoner. The diet, meeting in November 1674, condemned Bánffy to death and seized his property. Transylvania's chief councillor suffered an atrocious death at the hand of a clumsy executioner.

Historians have attributed Bánffy's demise to personal rivalries, and variously pinned the blame on Teleki, Béldi, or Miklós Bethlen. However, the political roots of that tragic event went deeper. There were signs as early as 1673 that Apafi's finely balanced policies had outlived their usefulness. On 11 November 1673, Poland's new king, Jan Sobieski, won a great victory over the Turks. Moldavia entered into an alliance with Poland. Sobieski, who, through his French wife, had close connections with the west, invited France, and Apafi as well, to act as peacemakers between Poland and the Porte. In early autumn 1674, a certain Colonel Beaumont arrived at Apafi's court bearing a proposal from Louis XIV. The French king, then at war with the Habsburg emperor, offered Apafi an alliance (and reportedly sent some money) in the hope that Transylvania and the exiles would openly turn against Vienna. Teleki seized the opportunity and, on 18 November, issued a proclamation through which the exiles learned of the prospect of French support.

It was not easy to break abruptly with the existing foreign policy strategy. Dénes Bánffy served as a convenient scapegoat: he {2-342.} was blamed for the balancing act, whereby Transylvania had sought rapprochement with both the Turks and the emperor. This was the major charge laid against Bánffy; the others — an extravagant lifestyle, authoritarianism, arrogance — could well have been directed at Transylvania's other aristocrats. The tragedy began to unfold when Bánffy failed to realize that the situation had changed. He tried, in increasingly haphazard fashion, to justify himself, and to rally his forces. Miklós Bethlen urged him to desist from armed resistance and leave the country, saying that 'this civil war can only bring our country to the brink of perdition', but in vain.[81]81. Miklós Bethlen to Dénes Bánffy, 16 November 1674, in Bethlen Miklós levelei, p. 269. The tumultuous years between 1657 and 1660 had not only left a memory of the depredations of Turks and the Tartars, but also imprinted on Transylvanians' consciousness a chronic fear of civil war. Apafi had developed an almost pathological dread of potential pretenders to his throne, and Bánffy counted as one of these: he was wealthy and had good contacts both in Vienna and at the Porte. There was no stopping the chain reaction of measures taken in an atmosphere of panic. In the 17th century, Transylvania was not the only country where a change in political direction occurred amidst bloodshed. However, the judgment against Bánffy also struck at his 16-year-old son, who was denied the education appropriate to his rank; and this blow against a defenceless youth would have fateful consequences for the country.