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# The Policy of Avoiding War

These events inspired a general fear that war would break out once again. Since the Porte was the most aggrieved party, yet chose to forgo punitive action, it deserves the greatest credit for preserving the peace. At the time of Rákóczi's election, Aga Mustafa had reached Transylvania's border, bearing the sultan's official letter of endorsement and the princely regalia for Bálint Homonnai. Zsigmond Rákóczi informed the emissary in a letter that he, and not Homonnai, had been elected, 'in accordance with the country's rights.'[4]4. TMÁO I, p. 64. What followed is not entirely clear; at the time, there was talk of bribery. The fact is that when Aga Mustafa reached his destination, it was Zsigmond Rákóczi's name that figured in the sultan's missive; Homonnai's name had been erased.

This peculiar procedure had no negative political consequences. With scarcely a protest, Constantinople acknowledged the shunting aside of its candidate and the election of Zsigmond Rákóczi. Rákóczi had anticipated severe reprisals and was prepared to make major concessions to forestall them. In the letter informing the grand vizier, Pasha Murad, that he had been elected by the Transylvanians in accordance with the latter's ancient freedoms, Rákóczi offered to reverse the greatest loss suffered by the Turks in the Fifteen Years' War: if the Porte suspended its support for Homonnai, he would return Lippa and Jenő. These key strongpoints had been seized by the Transylvanians during the war, and it is possible that Bocskai had already considered returning them to the Turks, for Rákóczi made reference to his predecessor in his significant offer.

The Porte's response was unexpectedly accommodating. Although Pasha Murad challenged the oft-cited right of free election {2-8.} on the grounds that 'by drawing swords, the Transylvanians had invalidated the sultan's formal endorsement,' Zsigmond Rákóczi was left on his throne. In essence, the grand vizier said that the Transylvanians could do as they wished, the main thing was to avoid war. He expressly rejected the offer of Lippa and Jenő, observing that 'all we expect of you is to be loyal to the mighty emperor.'[5]5. TMÁO I, pp. 68-71. The key to the political situation in 1607 probably lay in Murad's injunction, 'Do not provoke war.' Wishing above all to avoid war over the Principality of Transylvania, the Porte abandoned its candidate for the throne and even refused the offer to amend the terms of the Zsitvatorok peace treaty.

The policy of royal Hungary was also driven by the desire to avoid war. Until April 1607, Hungary's noble orders and the royal government persisted in championing Bálint Homonnai's candidacy and conducting negotiations with him. The emissaries of Archduke Matthias would urge him to 'make a deal' with Zsigmond Rákóczi and take over the principality, as did an assembly at Kassa of the counties of Upper Hungary. They tried to mediate between the two men, invoking their family links (Homonnai was Rákóczi's son-in-law), but neither prince nor pretender was prepared to settle the matter peacefully. Rákóczi clung to his new status, while Homonnai — who was barred from Transylvania — called for a radical solution.

Support for Homonnai waned when, in April 1607, Gábor Báthori proposed his own candidacy to Archduke Matthias. To win the throne, he undertook to preserve Roman Catholicism in Transylvania, and even held out the promise of his own conversion. The negotiations were conducted by the captain-general of Upper Hungary, Zsigmond Forgách, who was dazzled by Báthori's charisma. Forgách wrote to Matthias that Báthori was an exceptional young man, one whose natural gifts made him stand out among Hungarians, and strongly recommended that he be favored over Homonnai.

{2-9.} Thus, by April 1607, Gábor Báthori caught up with Homonnai in the race for an endorsement by Archduke Matthias' entourage. In the event, the contest was decided neither in Vienna nor in Constantinople, and not even in the highest political circles, but in the camps of the hajdús.