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# Alliance with Wesselényi's Movement

Zrínyi's death caused no break in the links between Transylvania and the Hungarian governing elite. As early as February 1665, Palatine Wesselényi sought reassurance by way of Teleki that he would not be 'forgotten' by Apafi. That spring, István Thököly visited Transylvania, and Apafi appointed his under-age son, Imre, to the post of lord lieutenant of Máramaros; meanwhile, Wesselényi took under his protection Teleki's estates in Békés and Bihar counties. In June 1665, István Vitnyédi presented the plan for an alliance linking the Hungarian Kingdom, Croatia, Transylvania, and the Romanian principalities to Grémonville, requesting the latter to secure the endorsement of Louis XIV; by then, Dénes Bánffy had reached Vienna, and it is likely that, in keeping with his mandate, he, too, held discussions with the French envoy.

{2-329.} Taking stock of the Habsburg–Ottoman accord, the leaders of royal Hungary and Transylvania moved in early 1666 toward even closer relations. The Hungarians sought Transylvania's help against the unbridled expansionism of the Turks and the Habsburgs' violations of Hungary's right to self-government. Although Apafi also kept in touch with the chairman of the War Council, Prince Lobkowitz, his main goal was to preserve Hungarian statehood, and he therefore strove to forge strong links with Hungary's politicians. Apafi was probably moved to take action by a letter, dated 6 February 1666, from Menyhért Keczer in Vienna, reporting that 'seven thousand Germans are preparing to escort Rákóczi to Transylvania' with the knowledge and help of the Turks.[71]71. Menyhért Keczer's letter to Mihály Teleki, 6 February 1666, in Teleki levelezése III, pp. 549-50. After lengthy preparations, Mihály Teleki and Miklós Bethlen set out at the end of April 1666 for Hungary. They held discussions with István Thököly at Késmárk, and with Wesselényi at his Murány residence. Teleki soon returned home, but Bethlen tarried in Hungary, ostensibly to ask a lady's hand in marriage. Meanwhile, Apafi was leading an army towards the western frontier, and he entrusted the conclusion of an agreement to Miklós Bethlen, who was an expert in French–Hungarian relations. Young Bethlen kept his chancellor father and Teleki informed about the favourable progress of the negotiations. His reports, written in code, addressed questions of such broad significance that it is likely the basic principles had been worked out much earlier, by Zrínyi's and Apafi's inner circle.

The negotiations at Murány, in late July 1666, focused on a draft agreement that encompassed a number of important commitments. The first was to preserve eternal peace and friendship between the two countries. The second, to form an offensive and defensive league which all ruling princes would swear to uphold. Third, the signatories should be free, if they so wished, to unite into a single country. In order to settle the problem of Ferenc Rákóczi with regard to the principality, they would urge him to renounce his claim to the princely throne, and to pay compensation to {2-330.} Transylvania, 'for he had pursued his ambitions by shedding Transylvanian blood and endangered that country's survival'. Fourth, Transylvania would apply the reimbursement of these debts — encompassing the Polish reparations and exported cannons as well as the Gabriel Bethlen foundation — to financing its army.

The principality undertook to give full diplomatic and other support to the Hungarians 'concerned' (interessatus). The fifth clause addressed longer-term objectives: 'Eventually, if the Tisza region was freed from the Turkish yoke [i.e. if the Tisza River came to form the boundary between the two countries], and if Temesvár and the two Vlach [Romanian] countries were taken as well, these lands should belong to Transylvania.' Pursuant to the strategy devised back in 1663, the negotiators counted on the support of France and proposed to include Moldavia and Wallachia in their alliance.

Yet this ambitious scheme came to naught. Indeed, events moved in the opposite direction. For one thing, Wesselényi's movement did not place much store by the Transylvanian connection. For another, the original anti-Turkish orientation was reversed.

By the time negotiations got under way at Murány, Vitnyédi had consulted Péter Zrínyi and again held discussions in Vienna with Grémonville. Miklós Bethlen, for his part, appeared to be losing faith in the prospect of French assistance: 'It seems to me, despite Vitnyédi's reassurances, that the French are procrastinating. [...] Bory says the French are playing delaying tactics, but I think everything depends on their peaceful relations with the English, which, in light of their earlier misfortunes, is a likely prospect. There is no need to negotiate about money with the French. If they provide funds to further our plans, I am promised that there will be no problem here about assigning a share to Transylvania. I will follow any new instructions. Vitnyédi keeps me informed about the French and encourages me to persevere; I expect him at any moment, and, in the meantime, I can keep pressing the French.'[72]72. Miklós Bethlen's letters to Prince Mihály Apafi and Mihály Teleki, Murány, 27 July 1666, in Bethlen Miklós levelei, pp. 141ff.

{2-331.} Now, more than ever, the presence of the Turks had to be taken into account. Out of immediate necessity, and to gain time, Hungary's politicians sought a separate accord with the Porte. They believed that Transylvania, under Turkish suzerainty, was in a less exposed situation than royal Hungary. However, Palatine Wesselényi ruled that they should negotiate with the Turks only indirectly, through the mediation of Transylvania's prince. Apafi and his advisers agreed to play this role, for they understood that the experience of irresistible Turkish attacks left Hungary's politicians with little choice but to negotiate with Constantinople. Indeed, the Transylvanians nurtured close relations with Wesselényi's movement in order to influence Hungarian policy; an added incentive was Vienna's well-known scheme to collaborate with the Porte in putting the young Rákóczi on the princely throne. Thus Bethlen stipulated that the Hungarians must first submit their terms for an accord with the Turks to Apafi, and that they must stand by their eventual commitments.[73]73. Miklós Bethlen's letter to Chancellor János Bethlen, 8 July 1666, in Bethlen Miklós levelei, p. 136. At the same time, neither party to the negotiations wanted to sever contact with the imperial court, and they agreed that Bánffy should keep in touch with Rottal.

On 27 August 1666, after the Transylvanian and Hungarian politicians had come to an agreement, Wesselényi could dispatch an envoy, with his instructions, on behalf of the Porte. The outlines of the agreement can be surmised from the letter of alliance that was drafted on 1 September 1668, at Keresztes, by Ferenc Nádasdy and Péter Zrínyi, and addressed to Apafi. Up to now, they wrote, 'we could not formally associate ourselves with His Highness Mihály Apafi, Prince of Transylvania, and his followers [because of the need for secrecy]. Therefore we swear by our Christian faith, on pain of foregoing the salvation of our souls, that we shall solemnly and faithfully abide by the alliance with the above-mentioned Prince of Transylvania; that we shall do nothing to imperil Transylvania or its prince; that we shall preserve the full confidentiality of these matters; that we shall refund all moneys expended in {2-332.} the past and future to the benefit of Hungary; and that we will do all we can to assist Transylvania and its prince.'[74]74. Letter of alliance from Lord Chief Justice Ferenc Nádasdy and Péter Zrínyi, Governor of Croatia, to Prince Mihály Apafi, Keresztúr, 1 September 1668, HHStA, Hungarica Specialia, Fasc. 311.

However, an accumulation of problems continued to strain the Transylvanian–Hungarian alliance. In fall 1666, and again in spring 1667, Apafi's envoy, László Baló, returned from the Porte with nothing but empty promises. The grand vizier gave only an evasive reply to the proposal from Palatine Wesselényi: the Turks were not prepared to breach the peace with the Habsburg emperor, and only after the capture of Crete would they entertain the possibility of assisting the Hungarians. Apafi's advisers diverged in their assessment of this response. Miklós Bethlen reminded Mihály Teleki — who was negotiating at Kővár with the Hungarians' envoy, Gábor Kende — not to lose sight of Transylvania's interests: 'I am far more fearful of driving [the Hungarians] to make a deal [with the Turks] than of deterring them with our caution [...] I recommend that you hide nothing from them [...] they must not rush into an ill-founded agreement.'[75]75. Miklós Bethlen to Mihály Teleki, Ebesfalva, 7 April 1667, in Bethlen Miklós levelei, p. 170. Apafi did not want to break off the negotiations, but he remained cautious and made sure that his point of view was clearly stated at the Kővár talks in August and September 1667: the Hungarians should make no move until Transylvania renewed its approach to the Porte.

Inczédy, the new ambassador, already on his way to the Porte, when his instructions had to be modified. Apafi's court had learned that Panajot, the chief interpreter at the Porte, informed Casanova, the imperial ambassador, of the Hungarian diplomatic feelers and of Transylvanian preparations for a campaign that posed a clear threat to Emperor Leopold. Thus Apafi had to contend with the possibility that the emperor would launch a punitive expedition, and he requested that the Porte allow him to make the necessary military preparations. The Porte delayed in complying, and, in the meantime, relations between Hungarian politicians and the principality took a turn for the worse. With the death of Palatine Wesselényi in spring 1667, his movement, bereft of its visionary {2-333.} leader, fell into disarray. Communications were intercepted by imperial agents. The Transylvanians sometimes failed to decipher the coded messages. Lacking a key to the cipher, Miklós Bethlen was left to guess at the meaning of Mihály Bory's report. Quoting from Vitnyédi's letter, he wrote: 'I think that his reference to Moldavian and Wallachian trade is meant to denote Turkish assistance, which he does not favour, and which, I must admit, I never liked either; when I was [at the Porte], their attitude was quite different.'[76]76. Miklós Bethlen to Mihály Teleki, Nagyteremi, 25 August 1667, in Teleki levelezése IV, p. 182.

For his part, Ferenc Rákóczi had been busy preparing his bid for the principality. In early 1668, he reached an understanding with the Protestant lesser nobility and, with the backing of his father-in-law, Péter Zrínyi, governor of Croatia, who had organized the whole network of the Transylvanian border fortresses, engaged in a series of military manoeuvres. He thus emerged as a dangerous rival to Apafi, and tensions rose between Transylvania and the Rákóczi–Zrínyi group. On the other hand, Lord Chief Justice Ferenc Nádasdy and the Lutheran nobles of Lower Hungary came to count more and more on Transylvania. Vitnyédi and Bory both bought houses in Transylvania in the event that they would need a safe haven. The confirmation by Nádasdy and Zrínyi of their alliance with Apafi could not attenuate the internal divisions and tensions. At the generally well-informed imperial court, the pro-French group suffered a defeat, and the preparations for a counter-attack or showdown only raised the level of anxiety in Transylvania.

Apafi and his governing circle sought to surmount the crisis by adopting a more flexible policy. 'We must stop chasing will-o'-the-wisps', said Apafi in early 1669, urging {2-334.} Hungarian politicians to choose between a Turkish- and western-oriented policy.[77]77. EOE 14, pp. 416-18. That spring, a delegation led by Councillor György Kapi travelled to Eperjes to confer with the emperor's representatives. Apafi, who felt he was not subject to the same obligations and constraints as Hungary's politicians, hoped that if the latter gave up their plan for an accord with the Turks, he might be able to engineer a settlement between them and Vienna, and thereby win for Transylvania the support of Emperor Leopold and other Christian rulers. However, his proposal did not interest the imperial commissioner, Rottal.

The news from the imperial court were ominous enough to drive Transylvania back to the Porte for help. In autumn 1669, Ferenc Ispán, a highly-respected representative of the dissidents in Upper Hungary, and István Czeglédi, a Calvinist pastor from Kassa, travelled to Transylvania with the express purpose of obtaining the prince's overt backing. The princely court was also awaiting the arrival of Péter Zrínyi, who had promised in late summer that he would come for direct talks with Apafi. That trip failed to materialize, probably because of a development that altered the balance of forces between the Christian camp and the Ottoman empire: the fortress of Candia (Iraklion), in Crete, had fallen to the Turks. Exhausted by a twenty-four-year-long struggle, during which it won praise but little aid from the Christian world, Venice proceeded to sign a peace treaty with the Porte in September 1669.

In the wake of these events, Dávid Rozsnyai set off for the Porte bearing secret instructions that had been drafted by Teleki and Bánffy. The Viennese court had got wind of the Hungarians' conspiracy, and the allies were in mortal peril. Apafi therefore requested that the sultan allow him to march on Hungary along with the forces of the Romanian principalities, back his enterprise with the Turkish garrisons, and permit Transylvania to give asylum to refugees from Hungary.

The fall of Candia raised great consternation in Europe. The Ottomans had gained control of trade in the eastern Mediterranean. Fearing a Turkish offensive, the Habsburg government dispatched its Transylvanian expert, Márton Kászoni, in late February 1670 to ask for Apafi's aid in quelling Hungarian dissidents. Apafi's court, for its part, was about to take the opposite course, and lend military {2-335.} support to the Hungarians who were preparing to resist the Austrians, when Dávid Rozsnyai arrived back from Crete with a depressing report. The grand vizier had reproached the Transylvanians for missing their opportunity in 1663 and rejected their requests. Rozsnyai further reported that, while he was in Crete, the grand vizier had received an emissary from Péter Zrínyi, one Captain Bukováczky, who offered the submission of Croatia and Upper-Hungary and urged that Apafi be replaced by Ferenc Rákóczi as prince of Transylvania. It remains unclear whether this report was based on fact or on a Turkish fabrication. In the spring of 1670, the dissidents in Upper-Hungary rose in arms against the Habsburgs. Intent on preserving what he could, Transylvania's prince looked on passively as the rebellion ran its brief course to defeat.