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# {3-682.} The 'Memorandum' Movement

The first issue of Tribuna, an up-to-date Romanian-language newspaper, appeared on 26 April 1884 in Nagyszeben. Published by Slavici and a group of politically unaffiliated young intellectuals, the paper adopted an unprecedentedly critical tone towards the government. However, its main target was the Romanian Moderate Party, founded a month earlier by Miron Românul, the archbishop of Nagyszeben, and Georghe Serb, a supreme court justice. Within eighteen months, this moderate party, which advocated unconditional acceptance of the Compromise and of union, had disintegrated, and its poorly-edited weekly, Viitorul, ceased publication. 'Afflicted with the disease of moderation, it expired,' commented Tribuna.[35]35. Quoted in S. Biró, 'Az erdélyi román értelmiség eszmevilága a XIX. században,' in Magyarok és románok II, ed. by J. Deér and L. Gáldi (Budapest, 1944), p. 173. The new orientation also served to redefine the tactic of passivism. Going beyond the traditional liberal practices of the national movement's leaders, who limited themselves to solemn protests and cultural activities, the innovators wanted to draw Hungary's Romanian masses into a campaign of nationalist grievances and induce a state of permanent political mobilization. They called this process 'revolutionization.' As Slavici wrote back in 1883, 'when one of the state's constituent elements challenges the law and refuses to submit to it, we call that situation revolutionary.'[36]36. Quoted in D. Vatamaniuc, Ioan Slavici şi lumea prin care a trecut (Bucharest, 1968), p. 260.

In a vigorous style similar to that of the leading newspapers in Budapest and Bucharest, Tribuna introduced Transylvania's Romanians to a new form of partisan journalism, one that was utterly intolerant of alternative views. The earlier style of publicism, loyal to the traditions of the Reform Era, gave way to a flood of articles that recast national consciousness into a militant, exclusive nationalism; the writers aimed to equip intellectuals and students with a solid ideology that also struck an emotional chord. They combined legalistic and historical rationales with an assessment of power relations that was reductionist and therefore capable {3-683.} of attracting mass readership. 'We are not going to investigate whether the Romanians' dissatisfaction is well-founded; there is no denying that it exists as an elementary calamity,'[37]37. Quoted in I. Slavici, Sbuciumări politice la români din Ungaria (Bucharest, 1911), p. 23. declared the paper in its inaugural issue. Initially, Tribuna acknowledged a need to create 'for both ourselves and our compatriots of other nationalities a tolerable modus vivendi.'[38]38. Ibid., and Românii din regatul ungar şi politica maghiară (Bucharest, 1982), p. 33. Barely six months later, the paper argued that 'if the Romanian nationality cannot be consolidated within the Hungarian state ... then we can only win our freedom by destroying this Hungarian state, and we have no choice but to fight for that goal; alliance with the enemies of the Hungarian ethnic group becomes an inherent necessity of our struggle.'[39]39. Tribuna, 26 September 1884, quoted in S. Biró, Az erdélyi román értelmiség, p. 171. By the time another year had passed, the paper was skirting disloyalty to the state by affirming that 'since the Hungarians were allowed to override our will and the Pragmatic Sanction to unify Transylvania, it is difficult to convince Romanians that they cannot follow suit and seek to unify Transylvania with another country against the Hungarians' will and despite the Pragmatic Sanction.'[40]40. Tribuna, 9 January 1886, quoted in ibid., p. 172.

The so-called Tribunists strove to lend new substance to the Romanians' sense of national unity. Their newspaper tried to adopt the literary language of Romania and proudly championed the cultural unity of Romanians on both sides of the Carpathians. They strengthened political ties with Romania, and while their consequent involvement in that country's party politics produced much internal discord, they succeeded in invigorating the political life Hungary's Romanians. The older party leaders and young Tribunists reached a compromise by which the latter obtained the posts of vice president and secretary in the party. In 1888, a press suit against the paper ended with the acquittal of several of the defendants, but the Kolozsvár common jury sentenced Slavici to a year's imprisonment; he continued to run the newspaper from his Vác prison cell, which he turned into a political headquarters. Soon after his release, Slavici became embroiled in intra-party quarrels and left for Romania, but he remained actively involved in Transylvanian affairs.

{3-684.} The relentless pressure of young Tribunists compelled the Romanian party to implement an earlier resolution and present to the monarch a comprehensive petition concerning the collective political grievances of his Romanian subjects. By now, the promoters of this initiative could draw on organized support in Bucharest, where, in 1891, Slavici and others had founded a society, the Liga Culturală, that was dedicated to the cause of Romanian cultural unity; half of its membership was made up of university students. The Liga established branch offices in Paris, Berlin, and Antwerpen to carry on propaganda activities. Further political stimulus came from the opposition Liberal Party, led by Dimitrie A. Sturdza, who, adopting a tactic not unknown in the Budapest parliament, sought to bring down the government by exploiting the issue of Transylvania's Romanians. The party endorsed, then took control of the Liga, which in 1891 issued a student manifesto.

Aimed at the youth of Europe, this pamphlet was disseminated in 15,000 copies, in French, German, and Italian, as well as in Romanian. After an introductory outline of the Romanians' past and their place in European history, the manifesto enumerated the national–cultural grievances that had arisen since 1867; one of its targets was a draft bill for making Hungarian language instruction mandatory in kindergartens — 'a criminal offense against national minorities and the spirit of the times.'[41]41. Iratok a nemzetiségi kérdés történetéhez Magyarországon a dualizmus korában 1867-1918, Vol. I (1867-1892), ed. by G. G. Kemény (Budapest, 1952), p. 813. Prompted by the authorities, and assisted by Gergely Moldován, an ethnic Romanian professor at Kolozsvár University and member of the government party, Hungarian university students drafted a response that did not lack substance but was, by its very nature, something of an apologia. In 1892, a counter-response, entitled Replica, was issued on behalf of Romanian students by Aurel C. Popovici, a medical student at Nagyszeben. This latest initiative drew the attention of some public figures and newspapers in Western Europe.

Both the Hungarian government and the Romanian National party were impressed by the public impact of pamphlets such as {3-685.} Replica. In 1893, a Kolozsvár court found Popovici guilty of subversion, and he fled abroad to escape punishment. At the Nagyszeben conference, Raţiu offered a positive assessment of the pamphlet war: 'Our grievances have been publicized all over Europe; all nations have taken note and consider them truthful and justified; it is not our fault if European public opinion has finally realized that something is rotten in this country.'[42]42. Quoted in Unirea Transilvaniei cu România, ed. by I. Popescu-Puţuri and A. Deac (Bucharest, 1972), p. 208. The conference ruled against further delay in submitting the long-planned memorandum, although the isse caused a split among the Romanian politicians. An 'anti-memorandum' faction, consisting mainly of former Banat activists grouped around Mocsonyi, feared a new setback and were only willing to endorse a carefully-prepared petition that had been invited by the government and the monarch. On the pretext of waiting for 'the right moment,' they opposed and later sabotaged the whole initiative. They were joined by a few Transylvanian notables, confirmed passivists from the Gazeta Transil-vaniei circle who remained imbued with the spirit of the 1863–65 assembly at Nagyszeben. The more numerous 'memorandist' group was led by Eugen Brote, a Tribunist who enjoyed the trust of Bucharest liberals, and included Gheorghe Pop de Băşeşti as well as Raţiu, who was always in favour of petitions. The delegates from Arad, traditionally at odds with people from the Banat, also endorsed the initiative; their principal spokesman was a fiery nationalist agitator, the Greek Orthodox theology teacher Vasile Mangra. When the inner leadership nevertheless decided to delay the petition and prepared to celebrate the reinstatement of Mocsonyi at the head of the party, Tribunists convened a select group of delegates and, with the device of a trial vote, won approval for 'immediate submission.' Raţiu became party leader, and a number of Tribunists were elected to the leadership, including Brote as well as Aurel C. Popovici.

In fact, the moment was ripe for a petition. With the government on the brink of collapse, Hungary was in the grip of election {3-686.} fever. A mood of resignation prevailed in the monarchy's leading circles, but Germany was in a phase of dynamic imperialism and reserved an important role for Romania in its Balkan strategy. In order to assure the success of the negotiations under way in 1891–92 on renewal of the secret treaty, the Germans gave in to the urgings of Romania's King Charles and his government and pressed Budapest to make concessions to the national minorities. In Romania, the idea of a 'conditional alliance' began to take hold; this tactic, as defined by Culture Minister Take Ionescu, aimed to obtain better treatment for the monarchy's Romanians in exchange for Romania's continued participation in the alliance. In January 1892, during talks with Prime Minister Szapáry in Budapest, King Charles requested an extension of the franchise in Transylvania and a stop to Magyarization as well as to the administrative harassment of cultural institutions. Szapáry refused to accommodate the first request, and, fearing the reaction of Apponyi and his circle, did not dare to assent to the others; his stand was endorsed by the emperor–king, Francis Joseph. King Charles thereupon encouraged the 'memorandists' to proceed with their plan.

The text of the lengthy petition reflected a compromise between activists who were prepared to negotiate, passivists who were adamantly opposed to the status quo, and Tribunists who pursued broader social interests. In assessing the situation of the Romanians, the petition focused on legislative and administrative issues and the impact of economic and cultural policies. The petition mirrored the ambivalent tactics of the Hungarian liberal opposition: it challenged the legitimacy of the Compromise, of unification, of the nationalities law — in short, of the whole system — yet also demanded the full application of certain laws issuing from that system. Transylvania's autonomy had been abrogated in 'blatant disregard of the Romanian people.'[43]43. Quoted in Kemény, Iratok, Vol. I, p. 827. Law XLIV (1868) was denounced on the grounds that 'only the title pays tribute to the grand principle of equal rights' and that, by introducing the notion of a political nation, the law openly challenged the national existence {3-687.} of non-Magyars.[44]44. Ibid., p. 831. The Romanians complained that electoral abuses and the higher property qualification in Transylvania prevented them from obtaining representation in proportion to their numbers. They deplored Transylvania's stricter press laws, the libel suits, and the discontinuance of the Nagyszeben grand jury. Agrarian policy came in for unprecedentedly sharp criticism; in addressing some of the issues left over from the abolition of villeinage, the policy favoured the treasury and landowners over the peasantry, and thus it must have been covertly designed to dispossess the Romanians. In the 1848–66 period, the Romanians had obtained some rights, but the system created in 1867 was designed to 'deprive us of all that the monarch had granted.'[45]45. Ibid., p. 844. Ever since 'it appropriated state power, the Hungarian element has concentrated exclusively on consolidating its national hegemony.'[46]46. Ibid., p. 827. The memorandum protested at the Magyarization of schools, the requirements for Hungarian language instruction, and the lack of Romanian universities and public secondary schools; on the other hand, it also complained that the state's method of subsidizing the Romanians' clergy eroded the Churches' autonomy. Since they were subject to official harassment and seldom given posts in the civil service, Romanian intellectuals were 'driven to the conclusion that they are regarded as aliens in their own country.'[47]47. Ibid., p. 833. The petition claimed that Romanians were denied freedom of assembly and association, and offended in their national pride by the activity of associations dedicated to Magyarization: 'We are provoked and insolently reviled on a daily basis.'[48]48. Ibid., p. 841.

The petition's basic postulate was that 'after twenty-five years of constitutional rule, the antagonisms are deeper than ever,' and Romanians 'can no longer trust the Budapest parliament or the Hungarian government.'[49]49. Ibid., p. 824. Change would come only if the monarch exercised his 'natural mediating role' to 'alter our country's system of government in a lawful manner and with due regard to all relevant factors.'[50]50. Ibid., p. 846.

{3-688.} In May 1892, on the eve of the twenty-fifth anniversary of Dualism, a delegation of 237 Romanians (including some peasants) journeyed to Vienna. Their purpose, in the ironic observation of the committee's secretary, was to bring charges against Hungary's king to the attention of the Austrian emperor — who were, of course, one and the same. Acting upon instructions from the government, the cabinet office advised them to approach the Hungarian minister who was seconded to the emperor–king. The minister refused to seek an audience with the monarch on their behalf, on the grounds that they had not gone through the proper channels, i.e. Budapest. The leader of the delegation, Raţiu, deposited a sealed envelope containing the memorandum in the cabinet office. It was forwarded unopened to Budapest, where the prime minister's office sent it back still unopened to the 'sender,' to Raţiu's home address. Thus the initiative's first phase, conducted according to traditional tactics for presenting grievances, ended in failure. The delegation toured Vienna, participated in a torchlight procession, was honoured with a sonorous welcoming address by the Christian Socialist Karl Lueger, and met with a few foreign journalists. None of this could compensate for the refusal of many Transylvanian Romanian leaders to back the initiative, nor for the fact that it was dismissed, even by some foreign observers, as 'begging for alms in the anteroom.'

Ironically, it was Hungary's government and Hungarian nationalism that rescued Romanian leaders from the awkward situation precipitated by the failure of the memorandum initiative. 'The stupid mistakes that we make,' observed a Romanian politician self-critically, 'are invariably topped by the stupidity of the Hungarians' response.'[51]51. V. Branişte, Amintiri din inchisoare. Insemnări contimporane şi autobiografice, ed. by A. Porţeanu (Bucharest, 1972), p. 188. Hungarian demonstrators damaged Raţiu's home at Torda, provoking a tremendous outcry in Romania. In mid-1892, the memorandum was published in Nagyszeben — 11,000 copies in Romanian, 2,000 in other languages — and disseminated with some help from the Liga Culturală. After some hesitation, the government yielded to the pressure of Hungarian nationalists and {3-689.} took punitive measures. State prosecutors in Kolozsvár launched an investigation into Brote's activities, and then, in May 1893, instituted proceedings against the signatories of the petition — the chairman, Raţiu, the vice-chairman, Gheorghe Pop, and the secretaries Vasile Lucaciu and Septimiu Albini — as well as against other leading figures who accepted responsibility for preparing it.

The preparations for a 'press suit involving the allegedly subversive dissemination of the memorandum' helped to divert public attention from the growing discord in Romanian circles. The Liga mounted public demonstrations in Romania and intensified its propaganda in Western Europe; thanks to the funds conveyed by the Liga's secretary to Nagyszeben, Tribuna, which had been shut down by the authorities, resumed publication in January 1894. In Bucharest, the opposition Liberal party tried to exploit the crisis and bring down the conservative government, charging that the latter had betrayed Transylvania's Romanians. Sturdza suggested that the national committee escape prosecution by emigrating and transferring its headquarters to Romania; from that base, 'they could promote their cause on the European level until the Hungarians are driven, by difficulties of their own making, to capitulate.'[52]52. Ioan Bianu's letter to Brote, 12 September 1893, quoted in Ş. Polverejan and N. Cordoş, Mişcarea memorandistă in documente (1885-1897) (Cluj, 1973), p. 224. In the event, Brote, a vice-chairman, sought refuge abroad, and later one of the secretaries followed suit. However, most of the leaders perceived that Sturdza was principally interested in obtaining 'within 48 hours the resignation of the conservative government,' and decided to stay in Transylvania.[53]53. V. Branişte, Amintiri, p. 210. Even Slavici, who visited Transylvania several times, failed to persuade them to emigrate. Raţiu acknowledged that such a step could help to turn the nationality question into 'a matter of serious debate among the members of the Triple Alliance. For I believe that the ten million non-Hungarians, who enjoy Romania's moral support, carry more weight with the Triple Alliance than the six million Hungarians, who are more likely to wreck than to strengthen the state.'[54]54. Raţiu's letter to Brote, 16 September 1893, quoted in I. Slavici, Sbuciumari, p. 43. Yet they refused to abandon their posts: 'What would be the reaction of the peasants, who {3-690.} are unaware of the complexities of foreign policy, if their leaders deserted to bask in admiration in Romania while the little people and the impecunious went to prison?'[55]55. Quoted in I. Georgescu, Dr. Ioan Raţiu. 50 de ani din luptele naţionale ale românilor ardeleni (Sibiu, 1928), p. 156.

Their determination was stiffened by King Charles and the conservative government in Bucharest, all of whom anticipated that Budapest would make concessions and amend the election law. After all, even 'the German emperor was pressing, unreservedly and with goodwill, for a favourable resolution of the Hungarian–Romanian dispute ... and it is hardly conceivable that the Hungarian government will not soon enter into negotiations even with certain elements of our party.'[56]56. Raţiu's letter to Gheorghe Pop de Băşeşti, 29 September 1893, quoted in Polverejan and Cordoş, Miscarea, p. 226. Raţiu, against whom charges were still pending, travelled in November to Bucharest, and thence to Budapest, where he had a rather unsatisfactory meeting with the interior minister. The latter demanded that the Romanians give up their 1881 program and offered only the prospect of eventual concessions. Meanwhile, Romania's press joined the debate over the comparative merits of emigration and staying put, sharpening the discord and causing much turmoil. Some later argued that 'Sturdza did more to demoralize us in a single year than Hungary's governments had done over fifty years.'[57]57. V. Branişte, Amintiri, p. 215.

A number of leading anti-memorandists agreed to join the Slovak and Serb lawyers for the defence, a fact that helped to cover up the divisions among Romanians. At a meeting called to plan the defence, there was much debate before committee members agreed to assume some responsibility for the circulation (as well as for the drafting) of the memorandum; at one point, Raţiu asked rhetorically if the lawyers were 'determined to send us to Szeged [signifying jail].'[58]58. Coriolan Brediceanu's letter Vincenţiu Babeş, 6 February 1894, quoted in Polverejan and Cordoş, Miscarea, p. 245. With this issue settled, the lawyers could prepare a unified defence and draft the massive submission that was required of defendants and their legal counsel.

Romanian and Hungarian nationalists at large were full of anticipation when the trial opened on 7 May 1894. To accommodate the large number of participants and spectators, the trial was {3-691.} convened in the great hall of the Redout. Both sides prepared for a great public drama. Raţiu and his companions were cheered at a succession of railway stations as they made their way to the trial, and a flood of telegrams wished them well. In the first few days of the trial, more than 3,000 (some sources say 25,000) sympathizers demonstrated in Kolozsvár, where two cavalry units and 1,600 infantrymen were held in readiness, but the authorities were more alarmed at the incidence of similar demonstrations in rural areas. The Romanian party opened a press office in Kolozsvár. Passing between rows of rural sympathizers, the defendants made a ceremonial entrance into a courtroom jammed with Hungarian and Romanian spectators as well as reporters from Budapest, Vienna, Bucharest, and even some western capitals. The trial progressed at a slow pace. There were protracted arguments over the language to be used by the defence counsels and for the court record; although the bench allowed the defendants to use their mother tongue, it demanded that the defence counsel speak in Hungarian, and this despite the fact that all three judges understood Romanian and that the substitute judge was an ethnic Romanian. The proceedings were not free of absurdity. When one of the defence lawyers was prevented by the bench from speaking in his native Romanian, another rose to protest and was allowed to deliver a tirade in that language. On another occasion, one of the defendants could find the right expressions only in Hungarian. The Hungarian spectators gradually lost interest, and their numbers dwindled; some jurors used the pretext of illness to stay away. The defendants fell out with their lawyers; on the fourth day, the latter withdrew, ostensibly in protest against the arbitrariness of the presiding judge.

The defendants were only partially successful in accomplishing their objective, which was to turn a routine libel case into a great political confrontation. The presiding judge refused their request that the Approbati, Compilati, the Pragmatic Sanction, the Corpus Juris, and census data be entered into the record and cited {3-692.} during the proceedings. They also failed to have the memorandum acknowledged and discussed as a 'dissertation on history and constitutional law.' After the chief prosecutor, Sándor Vita, had outlined the charges in a restrained and rather tedious address, Raţiu read out on behalf of the defendants an impressive speech that had been drafted by the party's secretary and a liberal politician in Bucharest. He declared that since 'both the legislature and the government had led us to form the firm conviction that we could not gain vindication of our rights,' he and his co-defendants had been delegated by the entire Romanian nation to plead in Vienna for the crown's protection against violations of these rights. If the régime now resorted to punitive action, it was precisely because the memorandum 'faithfully reflected the century-old sufferings and grievances of the Romanian people.' The Hungarian and Romanian nations had been 'locked in litigious conflict for a hundred years,' Raţiu went on, and 'there is another, higher court, a more enlightened and less prejudiced one, that will bring judgment: the jury of the cultured world, which one day will judge and condemn you with greater severity than this one can. If we are condemned in a spirit of impatience and by a racial fanaticism that has no equal in Europe, it will prove to the world that the Hungarians are a discordant element in the realm of civilization.'[59]59. The Hungarian text of Raţiu's address to the court on 25 May 1894 is found in Kemény, Iratok, Vol. II, pp. 253-4.

After seventeen days, on 25 May, the trial came to an end. By a solid majority, the jury acquitted four of the defendants but found the others guilty. The verdict was the outcome of a clash between two political approaches. The presiding judge, Baron Zsigmond Szentkereszty, found insufficient evidence for the charge that the defendants had questioned the validity and binding force of the basic law on union, and he therefore called for a new ruling from the jury. However, his judicial liberalism was outweighed by the determination of his colleagues to condemn the spirit manifested by the defendants and in the memorandum. They thereby satisfied not only Hungarian nationalists but also the Romanian national {3-693.} committee's wish for confrontation. The sentences were uncommonly harsh. Fourteen defendants were found guilty of incitement through the press and received prison sentences ranging from two to thirty months; Raţiu got two years, and the intransigent Lucaciu, who was regarded as the principal organizer, received — contrary to the advice of the presiding judge and of the prosecutor — the maximum sentence of five years in a state prison. The condemned men ignored Sturdza's argument that it was their 'patriotic and national duty' to 'transfer to Romania the headquarters of their campaign on behalf of the national survival of Romanians in Transylvania and Hungary.'[60]60. Georgescu, Dr. Ioan Raţiu, p. 154. In late July, after the appeals court had rejected their collective plea for a review, they presented themselves at prisons in Vác and Szeged to serve out their sentences.