###

# {1-601.} Transylvania in the Decade of Disintegration

King John ruled over a state with uncertain borders, and one that was beset with chronic domestic problems. Transylvania was no better equipped to strengthen central authority than the other counties that remained under King John's rule.

Although the new king had once served as Transylvania's voivode, this scarcely enhanced the province's role in the new situation. In 1526–27, during the transitional period of consolidation, Transylvania's three 'nations' readily accepted the new ruler and his government. The Saxon towns and the Székelys may have made some tentative overtures to the Habsburgs, but this was of no immediate consequence. Although Szapolyai transferred a few of his underlings from the voivode's chancellery to Buda — the onetime treasurer, Miklós Kőrösy, became the king's secretary — he left most of them in their former posts. Perhaps he wanted these trusted followers to keep an eye on Péter Perényi, the influential aristocrat whom he had appointed as voivode (1526–29). The fact is that Szapolyai's reform of the Transylvanian chancellery — in terms of which the secretary performed administrative functions, and the prothonotary, juridical functions — was preserved unaltered. There is no evidence that King John ever gave preference to the province; his policy was that of the unified Hungarian ruling elite, and he aimed to serve the interests of the whole country.

The impact of the king's campaigns on Transylvania in 1527–28 has already been noted. The resurgence of war in late 1528 also had repercussions beyond Királyhágó. Ferdinand I's efforts to impose his rule were no more effective here than elsewhere in Hungary. The agents of his envoy, Reicherstorffer, instituted a reign of terror in the Saxon towns to squash any sign of disobedience. They even threatened the royal judge at Szeben, Markus Pemflinger, who was unflinchingly loyal to the Habsburgs. Péter Perényi, who retained the post of voivode, could get along with neither {1-602.} the Saxons nor the province's nobility. To make matters worse, Ferdinand intended to settle German mercenaries in the province, with the cost to be borne by the local population. The only significant military action by Transylvanians against the party of King John, in the fall of 1528 near Lippa, had no lasting consequence.

By that time, Szapolyai had returned from Tarnów and taken under his control the roads linking Buda to Transylvania. Acting on instructions from the Ottomans, the Moldavian ruler Petru Rareş launched attacks on the Székelyföld. In May 1529, the count of Temes, Bálint Török, arrived with his troops to lend a hand to the Habsburg supporters, but on 22 June, at Földvár (near Brassó), he was defeated by the Moldavians. In a series of minor battles, and through negotiation, John I's governor (and, in 1530–34, voivode), István Báthori of Somlyó, put an end to the resistance of Ferdinand's followers. The majority of Székelys changed sides and rallied to King John at the time of the battle at Földvár. The forces of Báthori and of his Transylvanian lieutenant, Gotthárd Kun, compelled the towns of Gyulafehérvár, Kolozsvár, and Beszterce to pledge allegiance to King John. Only the Saxons stood by King Ferdinand, and in late 1529, they held out against an offensive launched from the two Romanian principalities. However, in the summer of 1530, a Hungarian-Romanian-Turkish force laid siege and obtained the surrender of Brassó, and Segesvár surrendered the following January, leaving Nagyszeben as the last locus of Saxon resistance. The last Transylvanian magnate to support the Habsburgs, István Maylád, rallied to King John in early 1532, but the Saxons of Szeben continued to hold out; only on 1 March 1536 did they finally offer allegiance to King John. After 1529, Ferdinand could do little to assist his supporters in Transylvania. His one major initiative, in January 1536, was an offensive directed at Szatmár and led by Kristóf Kávásy, the castellan of Huszt, and Boldizsár Tallóci Bánffy; the campaign did precipitate the death of Gotthárd Kun, but it ended in utter defeat.

{1-603.} In these protracted battles, the various social forces in Transylvania essentially neutralized each other. The war against the Saxons was led mainly by Transylvanian-Hungarian nobles loyal to King John. The Székelys wavered in their allegiance; since 1519–21, Szapolyai had not enjoyed much popularity among them, and some Székelys remained ever ready to turn against the Hungarian king. Although Transylvania was the part of onetime Hungary most remote from Vienna, and although its borders were relatively easy to defend, its society was too divided to allow the province to become a power-base for King John. The domestic troubles that beset Transylvania had a feudal character, yet in the end they culminated in a generally pro-Szapolyai orientation. This process was similar to that in other areas of Hungary, where feudal lords vied for local power. The pattern was revealed most vividly in a series of events that occurred in 1534, and which at the time were considered to be highly significant.

When, in 1528–29, King John attempted to restore his rule in Hungary, he found himself burdened by many liabilities: dependence on the Ottomans, a divided country, the unreliability of the political elite, and personal guilt at having miscalculated the balance of forces. His actions only deepened the divisions. On 25 December 1530, at a hastily convened diet in Buda (the same meeting that restored the right of free migration), he appointed as governor a Venetian-Turkish financier named Alvise (Lodovico) Gritti. The latter, a confidant of Grand Vizier Ibrahim, was a major supplier of the Turkish armies and a veteran of Hungarian-Turkish negotiations. The choice was probably driven by a mixture of motives. The king wanted to share his heavy burden of responsibility and hoped that the Italian would facilitate negotiation with the Sublime Porte. He also counted on the wealthy Gritti to contribute to the royal treasury and to lease and revive the faltering mining industry.

{1-604.} In the event, Gritti's ambitions surpassed the king's expectations. He wanted to become the master of Hungary, initially by drawing on the sultan's support, and then by playing off Vienna against the Porte. In the spring of 1534, after a longer stay in Istanbul that left him politically weakened, Gritti headed back to Hungary with a Turkish army. When he entered Transylvania at Brassó, those of King John's supporters who had been preparing to oppose Gritti took fright, and some of them defected to Ferdinand, but Transylvania remained generally calm.

This mood of apprehensive calm was soon disturbed by the governor, and even more by his Hungarian followers, notably Orbán Batthyány and János Dóczy. At their instigation, Imre Czibak, Bishop of Várad and one of King John's most respected and popular followers, was murdered on 12 August 1534 near Brassó.

The nobility of Transylvania and Bihar county reacted in fury. Czibak's nephew, Ferenc Patócsy, called for a popular rising. At this moment, the post of voivode was vacant; Báthori had died, and his associate Hieronym Łaski, appointed in 1532, had been imprisoned on charges of being in Gritti's camp. The feudal orders chose King John's faithful soldier, Gotthárd Kun, as captain general, and after some hesitation, he led an army to confront Gritti. Soldiers from all parts of Transylvania (except Szeben, still in opposition) rallied to his army, which encircled the advancing forces of Gritti at Medgyes. Gritti sent a plea for help to the Voivode of Moldavia, Peter (who, following his intervention in 1529, had acquired Csicsó, Bálványos, and Beszterce); instead, Peter shifted allegiance and joined the Hungarians who were besieging Gritti's camp.

King John was now in a dilemma. If he disowned his governor, he would invite the wrath of the Ottomans; but if he lent assistance to Gritti, he would enrage his own supporters. Upon reflection, he decided that discretion was the better part of valour. Accompanied by a small force of cavalry, he waited in Várad until, {1-605.} on September 28, the Hungarians overwhelmed the defenders of Medgyes, putting the governor and most of his Turkish troops to the sword.

These events in Transylvania promised to influence Hungary's future, for everyone thought that after Gritti's demise, the sultan and the grand vizier would sever ties with their Hungarian partisans. King John, for his part, expected the worst, and he sent emissaries to Emperor Charles V with an offer to relinquish the throne. But the danger did not materialize. At first, the sultan was disposed to investigate the fate of his questionably loyal subordinate, Gritti; but once the Grand Vizier Ibrahim had fallen from favour and been executed (15 March 1536), the matter was dropped. The significant consequences of the Medgyes affair lay elsewhere. First, Imre Czibak's bishopric was assigned to the Pauline friar Utiešenović, otherwise known as György Martinuzzi, or, simply, Friar György (György Fráter), who was to become Szapolyai's chief adviser. Second, it had become clear that the Emperor was not prepared to help Hungary against the Ottomans even if King John himself requested it. The latter's offer of resignation has been conditional on the provision by the empire of adequate garrisons for the country's key fortresses; but Charles V, embroiled in recurrent wars with the French, understandably refused to take on this responsibility. Negotiations with the imperial court came to an inconclusive end in the summer of 1536.

If Transylvanians played a leading role in the events of 1534, this did not reflect the emergence of a sense of regional identity. There were few signs of such consciousness over the preceding hundred years, and even as the country was torn apart, it would be years before such particularistic sentiments materialized. The disintegration of medieval Hungary gathered speed and reached a critical point in 1538. Much as in 1534, Transylvania would play a prominent role without determining the course of events.