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# {2-78.} Bethlen Loses the Hungarian Kingdom

The Battle of White Mountain caused great alarm, but the Czechs' defeat did not alter the military situation in Hungary. Of the 8,000 troops that Bethlen had dispatched to Prague, only 300 were lost in the battle; he continued his military campaign at home as if nothing had happened. However, the collapse of the Czech rebellion undermined Bethlen's already shaky political power. Most of Hungary's aristocrats were already disillusioned; after November 1620, their only question was, on what terms could they shift their loyalty back to the monarch that they had dethroned barely two months earlier? Bethlen cautioned them by evoking the Czech example: 'Your country will pay dearly if the emperor reimposes his rule by force; nobody should think of keeping cattle in Hungary, [for the Austrians] sold all the livestock of the [Czech] aristocrats and noblemen, and the many [Hungarian] aristocrats and noblemen who shirk their duty to fight should ponder the future that awaits them.'[50]50. Bethlen Gábor kiadatlan politikai levelei, p. 152.

Bethlen's prediction was confounded by events. There would be no replay of the Battle of White Mountain, and Ferdinand II would not have to resort to reprisals in Hungary.

When, in early January 1621, the diet was convened at Nagyszombat, it only served to demonstrate that Hungary's politicians had abandoned Bethlen. Few showed up, and many of them soon left the meeting. Bethlen had hoped that the diet would ratify measures to pursue the military campaign; instead, the mood of the meeting was reflected in rumors that Bethlen's closest associates were on the point of turning against him.

Meanwhile, the position adopted the previous autumn was reversed and negotiations were resumed with Ferdinand II. Driven by the pressure of public opinion, Bethlen himself took the initiative in December 1620. After several postponements, the talks began on January 25, 1621 at Hainburg, on Austria's eastern border. {2-79.} The Hungarian delegation consisted of the palatine Zsigmond Forgách and three other envoys, while Simon Péchi attended as Bethlen's personal representative. Ferdinand delegated Miklós Dallos, Archbishop of Pécs, and Miklós Esterházy. Also participating was a sizeable delegation, sent by France's Louis XIII, and headed by two experienced diplomats, the Prince d'Angoulęme and the Comte de Béthune. The French had been trying fruitlessly to resolve the Hungarian problem ever since the previous summer, and they came to Hainburg with great expectations.

It soon became evident that the two sides had a long way to go before they might come to terms. Péchi delivered a fine opening address vaunting the benefits of peace, but the conditions tabled by the opposing delegations left little prospect of a negotiated peace. It took immense effort on the part of the French to keep the talks going. Bethlen's and Ferdinand's envoys would periodically repair home for new instructions, but neither side proved able or willing to make concessions, and the sterile debate dragged on. However, in informal discussions, Forgách's team reached an understanding with Ferdinand's envoys; free from the constraints of their mandate, they could evoke with greater frankness the disposition to compromise that prevailed in the circles around Bethlen. In the presence of the French, Forgách reportedly blamed Bethlen's stubborn selfishness for the deadlock and proposed to go to Vienna to mediate between the feudal orders and the king. For the moment, he took no action, and in early April 1621 the negotiations were suspended.

Meanwhile, Bethlen pursued his military campaign with some success in the country's westernmost region, Transdanubia. His most memorable victory would come at Érsekújvár. In early April, the imperial forces laid siege to this important fortress, which guarded the mining towns; for two months, the garrison, commanded by Szaniszló Thurzó, put up a stiff resistance. A contemporary observer related that 'never had members of the Hungarian {2-80.} nation shown such valor as at Érsekújvár'.[51]51. Gergely Pethő, Rövid magyar krónika (Vienna, 1660), p. 129. On 21 July, after their renowned general, Count Charles Bonaventure Buquoi, had fallen in battle, the imperial forces withdrew.

The victory had little impact on Hungarian public opinion, for more and more of Bethlen's supporters were turning away from him. Forgách had rallied to the imperial forces at Érsekújvár, and died of a stroke. The most notable defection was that of György Széchy — one of the first to join Bethlen and, now, to desert him.

These tendencies became so marked that even the Porte felt compelled to intervene. In spring 1621, the new grand vizier, Pasha Hussein, addressed a letter of warning to Hungary's feudal orders. After reminding them that they had 'testified of their loyalty to the Sublime Porte and promised not to turn against it', he noted indignantly that 'reports from various sources' indicated 'the Hungarian nation might not be steadfast in its vow and convictions and may be betraying its chosen king'. He called upon them to clarify their intentions and warned of reprisals if they deserted the cause.[52]52. TMÁO, p. 293.

Far from helping Bethlen's cause, the threat emanating from the Porte only accelerated the disintegration of his state. When negotiations were resumed in autumn 1621, it was already obvious that he needed to secure peace at almost at any price. His closest supporter, Imre Thurzó, became the most active promoter of a settlement. Thurzó had made contact in the spring with Ferdinand II's confidant, Cardinal Dietrichstein, and he led the delegation to the talks that opened in October 1621 at Nikolsburg. It was a great loss for Hungarian political life when Thurzó fell victim to the epidemic that was decimating the region, but even this setback could not halt the process of peacemaking. He was replaced by Szaniszló Thurzó, who for two moths led the negotiations with Ferdinand II's delegation; the latter included only two Hungarians, Péter Pázmány and Miklós Esterházy. The peace treaty was signed on the last day of 1621.

{2-81.} The agreement required that Bethlen renounce the throne, surrender the Holy Crown, and forego further involvement in Hungary's governance. The grants of property made by Bethlen would retain their validity until the next diet; his grants of nobility, on the other hand, needed only to be documented at that same session. In return for promising not renew war against the king, Bethlen was granted the title of imperial prince as well as the principalities of Oppeln and Ratibor, which he could pass on to his nephew, István Bethlen. Seven counties — Szatmár, Szabolcs, Ugocsa, Bereg, Zemplén, Borsod, and Abaúj — would remain under his rule but be entitled to send delegates to the Hungarian diet. The peace treaty with the Turks would remain in effect. Bethlen would receive Munkács, Tokaj, Tarcal, Keresztúr, and Ecsed as his personal domains. The king would contribute 50,000 forint a year to the maintenance of frontier forts in the seven counties. Goods and labor could move freely between Hungary and Transylvania; lords who had property in both lands could reside wherever they wished. The prince would be allowed to purchase arms and employ craftsmen in royal Hungary. And should the Turks attack, the king and his allies would assist the prince.

Apart from the peace treaty, Ferdinand II signed an amnesty on 12 January 1622 for those who had rallied to Bethlen. The prince's envoys put it on record that they had originally wanted to include the issue of religion in the peace treaty, but gave up because they found firm opposition and did not want prolong the talks. With this, Bethlen's state was effectively abolished by its founders, who unconditionally placed themselves under the rule of Ferdinand. They had tried to set up a national kingdom, but since this proved unworkable in the form of a feudal quasi-republic, they abandoned the experiment. They could not accept Bethlen in the role of a powerful ruler. In the merciless formulation of Szaniszló Thurzó, Bethlen 'wanted to be our king, yet he is but a wandering bastard soul and knows full well that he could never become as noble as I and other patriots are by birth.'[53]53. Quoted in S. Szilágyi, I. Rákóczi György (Budapest, 1893), p. 97.

{2-82.} To be sure, their once and present ruler, Ferdinand II, came from a more distinguished family, one that had occupied the throne for some five centuries. Despite his bigotry, Ferdinand was an astute politician. He realized that after his great victory over the Czechs, he could afford to be more indulgent in Hungary. While Protestants fled from his Czech lands, Ferdinand appointed a Lutheran to be Hungary's palatine in the person of Szaniszló Thurzó. The latter reportedly had been promised the post back at Nikolsburg, and the appointment was made official at the Sopron diet in 1622. Miklós Esterházy, the leader of the Catholic party, had to content himself with the post of lord chief justice. Hungary's lords had free rein with regard to property matters: the much-disputed grants made by 'Hungary's elected king' could now be annulled. And they adopted a new tax that brought them financial benefit: three forints per household, instead of the 28 forints imposed by Gabriel Bethlen. Of Bethlen's tax, 22 forints had to be paid by the landowners; the new, three-forint tax was to be paid by the villeins. Moreover, and for the first time ever, the royal charter was entrenched in law. Thus the lords' short-lived adherence to Bethlen brought them no harmful consequences.

Nor would the country's ruling aristocrats take such a risk again. Transylvania's prince would twice attempt to regain the throne by force of arms, and twice the lords would refuse to back him.