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# Gabriel Bethlen Stops the War

The diet had acted decisively in thwarting the prince, but the situation remained tense. From the Turkish perspective, the Transylvanian opposition's initiative at the Porte came at a propitious moment. The events in the Romanian voivodeships had already signalled a more active Ottoman policy in the region, and now the Persian War took a turn that boded ill for Transylvania. The new grand vizier, Pasha Nasuh, abruptly halted the campaign in the fall of 1611 and took advantage of the armistice to conduct peace talks at Constantinople. These developments were all the more {2-31.} threatening for Transylvania because Nasuh was a fierce opponent of the peace accord regarding Hungary. At the time, he had been commander at Fülek, and he took it as a personal offence that this fortress, along with several others in Nógrád county, were surrendered by the Porte in the Treaty of Zsitvatorok. He had repeatedly protested to Ali, the pasha of Buda, who led the peace negotiations, and it took a firm order from the sultan to make him desist from retaliatory action. Now, in the summer of 1612, he was heading back from Persia to Constantinople. As grand vizier, he would enjoy wide latitude, and no one knew what were his plans regarding Hungary.

Amidst the gathering clouds of war, Gábor Báthori's overt intention of changing sides impelled the traditional pro-Turkish party in Transylvania to follow the Brassó-based opposition into action. A few months after Ghiczy's reported political successes, the group's most astute politician, Gabriel Bethlen, led fifty of his followers into Turkish exile.

Bethlen's departure could be construed as flight, for his relations with the prince, once close, had been severed. Earlier, his broad familiarity with the Turks had made him indispensable to Báthori. He rose even higher in the prince's esteem when he obtained the Porte's endorsement of the election. After Imrefi's death, Bethlen came to be regarded as the leading figure in the principality, although, being primarily a soldier, he was not appointed chancellor. But now that the prince had adopted a pro-Habsburg orientation, Bethlen's utility waned. Indeed, Bethlen's innate common sense made his presence a burden for Báthori.

When Bethlen advised prudence with regard to the Saxons, the prince indulged in petty insinuations that he was colluding with them. Relations between the two men grew tense, and the prince even toyed with the idea of having Gabriel Bethlen assassinated.

However, Bethlen's motives for leaving were more complex than concern for his personal safety or simple jealousy. The previously {2-32.} unthinkable notion that a new prince might be imposed by Turkish force sprang from Bethlen's mind. Back in 1603, when he urged that the Porte nominate a prince to Habsburg-dominated Transylvania, his well-wishers in Constantinople were prepared to give him the assignment, and his fellow émigrés reportedly favored the idea. Instead, he persuaded Bocskai to take on the task. But he balked at the prospect that Ghiczy might gain the throne by the same route, and proceeded to take preventive action. Bethlen had served three princes, and had been imprisoned by another; his long experience qualified him for leadership. He no doubt considered himself a better candidate than Ghiczy and, having gone into emigration, set about the slow and enervating task of winning the title.

Meanwhile, developments in Transylvania moved in the direction of alliance with the Habsburgs. Báthori exploited his victory over Brassó and Ghiczy to win the support of the feudal orders. On October 15, he had defeated the pretender and the latter's Saxon allies; there were many casualties, including the chief magistrate, Weiss, and the survivors pulled back behind Brassó's walls. The victory emboldened the prince: at the November meeting of the diet, he obtained the proscription of opposition leaders at home and abroad, including Bethlen. At his request, the diet appointed envoys charged with negotiating an alliance in Vienna; in accordance with the wish of the feudal orders, envoys were also dispatched to the Porte.

The mission to Matthias II, led by Farkas Kamuti, was first off the mark. Kamuti was not the most talented of the prince's councillors, but he probably bore no responsibility for the fact that, against the better judgement of the delegation, a secret codicil was added to the agreement. Although the negotiators had repeatedly raised objections, the prince finally agreed that Hungary's king should be referred to in the document as the 'Gracious Lord' of the principality. Having confirmed that neither he nor his successors would ever give assistance to the Turks in the event of an attack on {2-33.} the kingdom, Báthori assumed on behalf of Transylvania a risky obligation: in case the Turks 'try to curtail our liberties, we will resist with all our might, and if we are unable to stop them,' the principality would seek assistance from the king, his successors, and the kingdom 'against the Turks and their allies.'[19]19. Gooss, Staatsverträge, p. 420.

With this secret clause, Báthori achieved his objective of aligning Transylvania with the Habsburgs. However, the accord had no practical consequence, for the émigrés intervened to alter Transylvania's foreign orientation. While Báthori was engineering an alliance to meet the threat of the Porte, Gabriel Bethlen was busy organizing his return under Turkish escort.

Bethlen was familiar with the political workings of the Porte, and he moved with due care and circumspection. He knew that responsibility for different parts of the Ottoman empire was divided up among officials. Thus, upon leaving Transylvania, he called on several regional potentates before proceeding to Constantinople. His first stop was at Temesvár; he had already paid a long visit to the town, and was on good terms with the local commander, Pasha Zülfikar, whose advice on Transylvanian affairs carried much weight in Constantinople. His next encounter, at Kanizsa, was particularly rewarding: Pasha Skender, an ambitious soldier-politician, became a steadfast backer of Bethlen's plans. Finally, Bethlen visited the highest official in Ottoman-ruled Hungary, the governor of Buda. Since the governor was in close touch with Hungary's politicians, it is likely that Bethlen sought his advice on now to deal with the latter. It was during his stay in Buda that Bethlen sent a letter to the palatine explaining how Báthori's hostility had driven him into exile. Then he headed off to spend the winter in Belgrade, the empire's second military center. The town served as winter quarters for the Turkish forces in Europe, and the region's top military commanders would meet there with supervisory officials sent from Constantinople. These circumstances probably allowed Bethlen to hold many fruitful consultations.

{2-34.} After these preliminaries, Gabriel Bethlen travelled to Hadrianopolis (Drinápoly), where both the sultan and the grand vizier were momentarily in residence. Pasha Skender introduced Bethlen to Nasuh, and helped to obtain the grand vizier's assent to his plan. It is said that Bethlen resorted to a theatrical device — one made to measure for a folk legend — to draw the sultan's attention. As the sultan's procession was moving down the street, Bethlen allegedly caught the ruler's stirrup and delivered his request on the spot. In March 1613, the Ottoman Divan ruled that Gabriel Bethlen should become prince of Transylvania, and he duly received the princely regalia at the end of April. Senior Turkish officers and the two Romanian voivodes were assigned to escort him home.

It was not long before Gábor Báthori's emissaries made a belated appearance at the Porte. Although they had been appointed by the diet back in November 1612, the prince underestimated the threat and kept postponing their departure. They were sent off only after the conclusion of the agreement with Matthias II, and reached Constantinople on 22 May. They arrived too late to change the course of events. Nasuh even prevented them from handing over their gifts, lest they win over someone to Báthori's side. One of the envoys recorded with resignation that 'Gabriel Bethlen managed to obtain everything he wanted from the grand vizier.'[20]20. T. Borsos, Vásárhelytől a Fényes Portáig, ed. by L. Kócziány (Bucharest, 1972), p. 72.

The escort, commanded by Pasha Skender, set off in August. By early September, Pasha Oglu Ali Magyar, the Wallachian voivode Mihnea, and an advance guard of the Tartars had reached Transylvania. Three weeks later, Khan Girej arrived with the main Tartar army. On 3 October, Buda's Pasha Ali arrived in Gyulafehérvár. Thus, when, on 5 October, Gabriel Bethlen showed up with Skender's troops, Transylvania was overrun with soldiers who seemed to have no military task. Some 80,000 troops — probably the greatest concentration ever of Turkish and Tartar forces in Transylvania — had gathered to back Bethlen's claim. The country's fate was sealed.

{2-35.} Bethlen and his associates did not want to neglect the usual formalities, but this only served to underscore the principality's subjection. It was Skender who convoked the diet, writing to the feudal orders on 18 October: 'Everybody must go to Kolozsvár, and there, your excellencies must elect a prince for yourselves.' This was a new departure in Transylvania's history: never before had the principality's political leaders assembled on the order of a Turkish officer. Still, they did not tarry, for the pasha left no doubt about his intentions: 'If you do not come, you can rest assured that we will immediately turn our troops against you.'[21]21. Erdélyország Történetei Tára II, pp. 251-54. He gave five days' leeway for the election, and it proved to be sufficient. On 23 October, 1613, Gabriel Bethlen became Prince of Transylvania. A commoner recorded ironically: 'Out of fear, they freely elected him.'[22]22. 'Nagy Szabó Ferenc memoriáléja', in Erdélyi Történelmi Adatok I, ed. by I. Mikó (Kolozsvár, 1855), p. 115.

On Skender's instructions, they sent a sharply-worded letter of farewell to the ex-prince, Gábor Báthori. In it, they rehashed their grievances, faulted him for his treacherous flight and for his plan to break with the Porte, and evoked the looming threat: 'Since we face terrible devastation at the hands of such great armies, and fear this terminal threat, we will not delay or struggle against' Pasha Skender.[23]23. Erdélyország Történetei Tára II, p. 266.

It is not known whether Báthori, who had repaired to Várad, received this letter of discharge. In any case, his uncertainty was short-lived: four days after Bethlen's election, Báthori was murdered, reportedly by hajdús in the pay of Ghiczy. They disposed of the corpse in the Pece brook; only his faithful dog remained on watch. At the news of Báthori's death, the Turkish armies left Transylvania, looting along the way and leading off prisoners in chains. They left behind a country devastated and under the firm control of the Porte.

The style of governance in Transylvania underwent radical change. Báthori had been immoderate, irresponsible, and erratic; Bethlen introduced orderly and sensible administration. There was a striking contrast even in the appearance of the two men. Báthori {2-36.} gleamed like a steel blade. He drew attention by his slender build, facial animation, and engaging manner. Although Bethlen was only thirty-two, his stocky body was already stiff from the many wounds he had suffered. People were more repelled than attracted by his mien, dark, bearded, and with an untidy mop of hair. Yet his large and deep-set eyes revealed an extraordinary personality: even in portraits, his piercing look appears to size up the beholder. When they were in Báthori's presence, even his enemies were seduced by his magnetic charm, although the effect did not last when they left him. Bethlen aroused more lasting sentiments: respect rather than friendship among his intimates, abiding hatred among his enemies. He cared little about the opinion of others, and did not seek affective relations; he was thus able to collaborate with all others. By all accounts, he selected his associates on the basis of purely objective criteria.

Gabriel Bethlen's family had entered the political fray in Transylvania in support of Queen Isabella. His grandfather had been one of the leaders of Péter Petrovics's movement against Ferdinand in the 1550s. His father served Prince Zsigmond Báthori as councillor and chose a wife from a distinguished Székely family, the Lázárs. The Bethlens became one of Transylvania' most prominent and wealthy families. Gábor was 13 years old, and already an orphan, when he joined Zsigmond Báthori's court at Gyulafehérvár. Nothing is known about his education, and he left no record of the influences that shaped his talents, but his earlier career reveals two distinctive features of his personality. It is clear that he did not immediately impress onlookers with his talents; nothing was recorded by those who knew him before his Turkish exile. He does not figure in the chronicles of the turbulent era ending in Basta's depredations. People found nothing of interest in him: there is no gossip about him private correspondence, nor anecdotes that presage a glittering future.

{2-37.} Bethlen began to attract attention and emerge as an important figure when he followed Mózes Székely into exile. One of his peculiar traits now showed itself: he always excelled in the task at hand. He became the key negotiator with the Turkish authorities, and he organized Mózes Székely's military campaign in Transylvania in 1603. His skills were manifold, and he willingly took on all tasks. Bethlen knew how to reach out to people, whether on an individual basis or through written appeals to mobilize the many. He had a talent for quick assessment of people as well as of battlefields. He was a good military strategist and a decisive commander in the field. This versatility was perhaps his most striking feature.

The other trait was his utter objectivity. That is not to say that his plans were always rooted in realism in the modern sense of the term; he was as disposed to ignore realities as his contemporaries. Nor, particularly in diplomatic pursuits, did he cling to facts. His objectivity manifested itself in the fact that he did not allow secondary considerations to intrude in the realization of his goals. He identified the means of achieving these goals, and then applied the means without misgivings.

A case in point is his acquisition of the throne, which contrasted sharply with his predecessor's approach. Báthori resorted to every possible device to become prince. He lobbied in Transylvania, sought the backing of the Porte and of Matthias II, and finally used the hajdús. Bethlen, in contrast, did little to drum up support. He did not organize a party in Transylvania, and paid no heed to the king, to royal Hungary, or to domestic public opinion. He turned to the Porte, for he understood that was where Transylvania' fate would be determined. There is no evidence that he ever came to regret the devastation caused by the armies that propelled him to power or the forceful imposition of his election. He pragmatically acknowledged the momentarily unshakeable predominance of the Ottoman empire over Transylvania.

{2-38.} Despite his rational and sustained pro-Turkish stance, Bethlen failed to develop harmonious relations with Constantinople. Although he obtained an athname from the sultan endorsing Transylvania's right to freely elect its prince, it fell far short of a binding guarantee. The 'potent and magnificent' document provided that 'if a succession imposed itself in the principality,' the three nations had to elect one 'who had grown up among them' and was qualified to rule, whereupon the sultan would make him prince.[24]24. Erdélyi Történelmi Adatok II, ed. by I. Mikó (Kolozsvár, 1856), pp. 336-43. This formulation, which recurred in the letters of confirmation of many princes, offered no guarantee. Bethlen's athname reached Transylvania in August 1614, when it was ceremonially transmitted to the diet at Medgyes. It came at a price: in exchange for confirming Gabriel Bethlen as prince, the Porte demanded the transfer of Lippa and Jenő.

It thus befell on Bethlen to deliver what several of his predecessors had put on offer. Zsigmond Rákóczi's offer had been rejected outright; nor did Gábor Báthori have to return these important fortresses. But now, barely one month after the delivery of the athname, news came that Pasha Skender's forces were encamped on the border. After escorting Bethlen to the principality, he had been given a new mission: to retrieve the fortresses that had fallen into hands of the Transylvanians during the Fifteen Years' War.

Constantinople's demand was quite understandable. Its surrender of Lippa and Jenő not only caused damage to the Turks' prestige but also created a gap in the line of fortresses stretching from Belgrade through Temesvár, Lippa, and Jenő to Gyula. This line served as a military springboard against the kingdom as well as the eastern boundary of the Ottoman sphere of dominance. For a time, and despite the willingness of Transylvania's successive princes, the Porte was too intent on avoiding war in Hungary to reclaim the two fortresses. In the fall of 1614, a more active policy regarding the empire's western approaches spurred Constantinople to settle this outstanding issue. The Porte had consolidated its political {2-39.} influence over the two Romanian voivodeships and Transylvania without incurring reprisals from the other great powers in the region, Poland and the Habsburg realm, and thus it must have regarded the retrieval of Lippa and Jenő to be free of risk.

The claim put Bethlen in a quandary. Together with the two fortresses, vast territories had been freed from Turkish rule, encompassing the many Hungarians who paid taxes to Szolnok, Gyula, and Temesvár. Bethlen now had to decide whether to give up these areas as well. While the region's loss had dealt a blow to Turkish prestige, its return would bring far greater opprobrium on the prince. Never in Hungarian history had a ruler voluntarily given up fortresses to the Turks. Yet Bethlen could not afford to temporize and risk an attack by Skender's army.

In this critical situation, the prince engaged in tortuous manoeuvres. He initiated negotiations in Constantinople aiming at retraction of the Porte's demand; his good personal contacts must have encouraged him to believe that the cause was not hopeless. At the same time, he decided that, as a last resort, he would surrender one of the fortresses, Lippa. His choice was influenced by the fact that Lippa lay close to the imperial border, some 60 km from Temesvár; it represented the lesser loss in terms of tax-paying population and area. Since Skender's attack seemed imminent and could be forestalled only by concrete action, Bethlen prepared to hand over Lippa. The first Turkish troops were beginning to occupy the lower fortress when, in late October 1614, the Porte decreed that the transfer would be postponed. The delay was short-lived. When Nasuh, who had always backed Bethlen, fell from power, the surrender of Lippa became unavoidable.

In the increasingly oppressive political atmosphere, the diet decided in the spring of 1616 that 'in our desperate situation ... for the survival of our country and a secure peace ... we must redeem our country, ourselves, our wives and children from the ultimate threat by surrendering Lippa.'[25]25. EOE 6, p. 322. That did not quite settle the matter. {2-40.} Backed by the nobility in the district, the garrison refused to evacuate Lippa. They found further encouragement in the kingdom, where György Homonnai, a distant relative of Bálint Homonnai, was mustering to overthrow Bethlen. He had kept in touch with Lippa since the fall of 1614, and promised military assistance from Matthias II if the Turks tried to take the fortress by force.

In June 1616, Bethlen personally took on a task that his generals were unwilling to assume: he seized control of the fortress and evacuated its defenders. On the 14th, Lippa was transferred, together with its 'tax-paying district,' to the pasha of Temesvár. As a palliative, he would subsequently settle the garrison — with hajdú rights — in Vaja.

Homonnai's promises remained a dead letter: the loss of Lippa did not prompt Hungary's king to move against either Transylvania or the Porte. Matthias and the kingdom's feudal estates accepted without retaliation the expansion of the Turkish-dominated zone in Hungary. By the summer of 1616, this passivity caused little surprise. The events in Transylvania over the preceding three years had offered ample opportunity for intervention, yet the kingdom never chose to go to war.

Lippa's surrender represented a low point in the history of Transylvania. The event, following on the imposition of a prince by external force, seemed to confirm that the country had lost its last shred of independence and would be henceforth a pawn of the Porte.

Had Gabriel Bethlen died at this moment, he would have been remembered as one of the most sinister figures in the annals of Transylvania. Instead, he continued to reign for thirteen years and took his place in history among Transylvania's outstanding leaders.