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# The Constraints on Princely Policy

Reflecting on Transylvania's prospects, Apafi observed in a letter dated 5 January 1655 that 'should we perish, Hungary and Austria will perish as well'.[69]69. Prince Mihály Apafi's letter to Mihály Teleki, Kolozsvár, 5 January 1665, in Teleki levelezése III, p. 335. Indeed, in the period preceding the ratification of the Treaty of Vasvár, the European powers were much concerned by the uncertain fate of the principality.

According to Venice's ambassador, Sagredo, the principality's independence had been imperilled not by misfortune but by the ill-conceived policy of the Habsburgs. The international alliance could have blocked Turkish expansion; instead, the Treaty of Vasvár weakened Prince Apafi's power. That loss, opined Sagredo, would be fatal for the emperor and the whole German empire: in previous wars, Transylvania had been a key asset in the emperor's attempts to hold back the Turks, but now, there was nothing to prevent the grand vizier's army from advancing to the gates of Vienna.

Louis XIV, for his part, assessed Transylvania's situation in the context of the European balance of power and the conflict of interests between France and the Habsburgs. The king's judgement, as conveyed to his ambassador in Vienna, Jacques Grémonville, was that despite the unfavourable circumstances, the principality remained, along with Poland, a key factor in France's eastern strategy. Thus Louis XIV continued to speculate about an alliance with the Hungarian Kingdom, Croatia, Moldavia, and Wallachia, and he instructed Grémonville to persuade Apafi by way of Miklós Bethlen to break off negotiations with Rottal, the imperial commissioner.

{2-326.} Rottal's mission to Transylvania involved two objectives. The first was to overcome any reservations regarding ratification of the Vasvár Treaty; if the prince balked at tearing down the fortress of Székelyhid, the war could easily flare up again. The second was to secure from Apafi and the feudal orders a formal profession of allegiance to Emperor Leopold, as well as a guarantee that they would sever relations with Hungary's politicians.

Mihály Teleki represented Apafi at the talks, which opened at Szatmár on 24 November 1664. The prince's policy was dictated by two circumstances. The first was the threatening proximity and expansionist policy of the Turks. Evidence mounted day by day that the forces of the pasha of Várad were seeking to occupy as much of Transylvania as possible. Apafi therefore sought to obtain, through Rottal, that Transylvania's interests receive due weight in the Habsburg-Turkish settlement; specifically, that Transylvania's territorial losses be minimized in setting the new boundaries of Turkish conquest, and that the tribute payable to the Porte be reduced. In short, Apafi wanted to win the Habsburg empire's diplomatic protection vis-á-vis the Turks.

The second consideration, more remote and uncertain than the first, was that the participants in the anti-Ottoman alliance had not yet dismissed the option of war. The Hungarian chief justice, Ferenc Nádasdy, had gone to Rome, and the Transylvanians believed his mission was to secure the pope's agreement that Emperor Leopold I should break his promise to the Sultan, as well as to win assistance for a continuation of the holy war. The Transylvanians were also encouraged by reports that France was preparing for war against the Turks, and they anticipated a change in policy at the Viennese court following the sudden death of the privy council's chairman, Prince Porcia, who had been universally regarded as the chief opponent of an anti-Turkish campaign.

However, no concrete decision issued from the Szatmár negotiations. Despite strong domestic opposition, Apafi agreed to the {2-327.} demolition of the Székelyhíd fortress, on condition that Emperor Leopold promise in a letter of alliance that Transylvania's interests would be taken into account before the treaty was ratified. Rottal, for his part, demanded an unconditional declaration of allegiance. That is where matters stood when, on 25 March, Councillor Dénes Bánffy set off for Vienna.

Bánffy, who had a broad and well-informed appreciation of the balance of power in Europe, faced a tough challenge. He needed to obtain Emperor Leopold's agreement to an alliance with Transylvania, and he had to negotiate with Grémonville as well. On the one hand, he had to ascertain the prospects of an anti-Turkish campaign, and ensure that Transylvania would be part of such an enterprise. On the other hand, he was expected to persuade Leopold to protect the principality's interests in the process of ratifying the Treaty of Vasvár, and this by impressing on the emperor that the people of Transylvania 'had helped the Christian campaign over the past year'.[70]70. 'Fejedelmi titkos instructió Bánffy Dénes Erdély bécsi követe részére, 1665. március 25', Szádeczky-hagyaték, 11.

In the event, Bánffy arrived too late. The gift-laden boats of General Walter Leslie, the special envoy charged with ratifying the treaty, had departed down the Danube two weeks earlier. Apafi's tentative initiative to ally himself formally with Leopold had failed. The reasons for his failure lay less in the slow pace of Transylvanian policymaking, or in his lack of realism, than in the rapidly changing balance of power in east-central Europe.

The expansion of global trade after the Treaty of Westphalia was accompanied by major readjustments in the balance of power. The eastern half of the continent felt the repercussions of the contest between the western powers, and the latter all had to contend with the Turkish factor. Spain's Philip IV died in September 1665, leaving the throne to a sickly child-king and a weak regent in the person of the queen-mother. The Habsburg and Bourbon dynasties both sought to gain control of Spain, which played a key role in Mediterranean commerce, and their contest lasted into the next century. {2-328.} The Turks, meanwhile, redoubled their efforts to occupy Crete.

The ratification of the Vasvár Treaty in autumn 1665 dealt several heavy blows to Apafi's Transylvania. The emperor's representative had paid no heed to the principality's interests with regard to frontiers and the tribute. What is more, he had conveyed a recommendation from Leopold that the sultan replace the Calvinist Apafi with Ferenc Rákóczi I; after all, the sultan had earlier endorsed the latter's inherited claim to the princely throne with a formal decree and the symbolic trappings of office. The new initiative of the imperial court was all the more ominous since, in 1665, the Porte was turning decidedly cool towards Apafi. The Turks' list of grievances against the prince was growing longer: in addition to his hostile activities in 1663–64, he had granted political asylum to the wife of the banished voivode of Wallachia, nurtured cordial relations with Moldavia, and resorted to military force to resist Turkish expansion. It took prompt political action by the prince and his advisers to avert the danger.