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# The Habsburg War and the Separate Peace

The impulse for Rákóczi's other great foreign action also came from abroad. The rest of Europe took note of his election, and he was approached by various representatives of the anti-Habsburg coalition, but, for a long time, the prince stayed aloof. More than once, the Habsburgs' foes found themselves in a difficult situation and would have welcomed diversionary action in the east, but Rákóczi refused. After his victory in 1636 at Szalonta, the prince adopted a sharper tone toward the pro-Habsburg politicians of royal Hungary, without for all that giving any sign of preparing forceful action. Yet no one took his passive stance at face value, for it was assumed that, sooner or later, Gabriel Bethlen's successor would go to war. Vienna and the Hungarian leaders sent a succession of {2-123.} envoys on a variety of transparent pretexts to Transylvania to seek evidence of preparations for war. The goal of the anti-Habsburg camp was equally evident: its envoys, in Transylvania and at the Porte, sought to draw the prince into active engagement in the Thirty Years' War.

The suspicions of one camp and the urgings of the other finally prevailed over his immobility: in 1643, Rákóczi decided to go to war. In fact, it is a puzzle why he did not take this step earlier, for since 1638 his agenda had been clear of major tasks. Moreover, the circumstances had become uncommonly favorable, for, as was evident in the debates of the Pozsony diet, public opinion was at boiling point in royal Hungary. The political crisis was no less acute than twenty years earlier, when Rákóczi himself — then leader of the Protestant party — had called for aid from Transylvania's prince. The revolt in 1637 of the Portuguese against the Habsburgs would also have made Rákóczi's task easier if he had chosen that moment to follow in Gabriel Bethlen's footsteps.

But Rákóczi did not move after the conclusion of the diet in 1639, and he received no call from royal Hungary in 1643. Thus the references made in his proclamation of 17 February 1644 to the revolt in Portugal, the Catalan rising of 1639, and the harmful measures against Protestants enacted by the 1638 diet seem oddly out of date. That proclamation evoked memories of Gabriel Bethlen, who also claimed to be acting in defense of Protestantism when he moved to seek the throne of Hungary. However, the social context of the Catholic–Protestant conflict had changed since the days of the 'elected Hungarian king'. Bethlen's references to the perils facing Protestantism were clearly a call to arms against the rule of Ferdinand II, a Catholic king reigning over a predominantly Protestant country; the Habsburg ruler was the main cause of the Protestants's grievances. But now, in 1644, most members of the ruling class was Catholic, and their reconversion was inducing a similar process among their villeins. In contrast, most of the lesser {2-124.} nobility and of people in towns, market towns, and villages remained true to Protestantism; a survey, compiled in 1646 by the archbishop of Esztergom, indicated that there were over four thousand Protestant places of worship in Hungary.

In these circumstances, the Catholic–Protestant cleavage went clearly beyond a conflict between monarch and ruling class: it reflected divisions within the ruling class and between social strata. In 1644, the slogan of religious freedom for Protestants could no longer be identified with the goal of a national kingdom, for it had lost much of its mobilizing force. The hardship suffered by Protestants issued less from the monarch than from landowners and their agents, who were abusing of their power to convert the lower orders to Catholicism.

Nevertheless, György Rákóczi I seemed not to notice the altered situation and linked the cause of religious freedom to that of a national kingdom. He thereby deprived himself of the support of the kingdom's most powerful politicians, of those who had helped Bethlen to power. And without their support, there was no chance of dethroning the Habsburgs.

In the fall of 1643, the prince had concluded an alliance with Sweden, France, Holland, and their confederates, and, at least officially, it was this pact that led him to Hungary. The coalition's support consisted of having their envoys obtain the Porte's endorsement of Rákóczi's decision as well as Turkish military aid that would rise over the course of his campaign. Beyond this, France contributed some 200,000 thalers in the later stages of the war.

The war plans were coordinated with the Swedish supreme commander, Torstensson. During the preliminary talks, Torstensson was encamped in Moravia, but by the time the prince set out, the former had pulled back to deal with a Danish attack on Sweden in the Baltic. The Transylvanian army thus invaded Hungary without direct support from the coalition partners. It was reinforced by hajdús from royal Hungary, by troops from the two Romanian {2-125.} voivodeships, and by the Turkish garrisons in Hungary. Having set off in mid-February 1644, Rákóczi's troops made easy progress into the region of the Vág River; having suffered neglect amidst the more pressing priorities of the Thirty Years' War, Hungary's border forts put up little resistance. By early April, however, the invaders felt the full effect of the Swedes's withdrawal: imperial troops no longer needed on the Moravian front were marshalled to Hungary. Rákóczi suffered his first defeat on April 9, at Galgóc. The imperial forces pressed ahead across the Garam River and towards Léva, Szendrő, and Fülek. On May 27, they took Szerencs, an important administrative centre on the Rákóczis' Tokaj domain. Two weeks later, they laid siege to Kassa, the key stronghold in Upper Hungary.

This was when the balance finally tipped. Since the battle of Galgóc, the prince's army had been pulling back — in a tactical redeployment, according to their high command, but more likely out of fear of the enemy's superior force. At Kassa, it once again confronted the imperial army. With the aid of units from the peasant counties, Rákóczi managed to rout Esterházy's forces, but he came to realize that his ambitions could not be realized by force of arms alone.

Events proved him right. The end of the first round of peace talks found Rákóczi in a clearly disadvantageous military position. His losses now included Murány; István Csáky had brought reinforcements from Poland for the imperial army; and the Swedes were tied down by the Danes. Despite all this, in their negotiations with the palatine at Nagyszombat, the prince's emissaries obtained fulfilment of the movement's demands in the sphere of public interest. The clauses dealing with issues of religion were drafted in late January 1645. The first confirmed freedom of worship, 'including the use of churches, bells, and cemeteries'. The second specified that these rights applied equally to peasants. The third laid down that 'previously expelled' clergymen 'could be invited back, or {2-126.} their places filled by newly-appointed pastors'. The fourth clause provided that the diet would rule on the return of churches that had already been the subject of claims back in 1638, and that the churches seized during the present hostilities be returned forthwith. The other public interest proposals advanced by Rákóczi's negotiators were also incorporated in the draft treaty.[77]77. S. Szilágyi, ed., A linzi béke okirattára (Budapest, 1885), pp. 196-98. To be sure, the emissaries were guilty of some vague and inaccurate formulations, but this was not the reason for the curtailment of the talks. The negotiations at Nagyszombat were broken off on March 29 over the issue of the prince's personal demands.

It took another round of talks before agreement could be reached on the assignment of counties and domains to Rákóczi. Inaugurated in mid-June at Rimaszombat, this second phase coincided with a consolidation of the prince's power in Hungary. One week after the end of the Nagyszombat talks, a French envoy met with Rákóczi at Zboró; soon thereafter came news of Swedish victories. Although allied imperial forces also earned some successes in March 1645, it was clear that Ferdinand III would have to make concessions before Rákóczi linked up with the rapidly advancing Swedish forces.

It was not easy to reach a settlement, for the cession of counties encountered powerful opposition in Hungary. Once the leading opponent, Miklós Esterházy, had been withdrawn from the negotiations, it took barely two months to conclude a final agreement. This included the Nagyszombat clauses as well as further concessions to Rákóczi. He was given the seven counties with the stipulations of the Nikolsburg Treaty. Further, his sons (and not whoever would be his successor) were allowed to inherit Szabolcs and Szatmár counties. His sons' heirs could keep the castle of Szatmár as well as the market towns of Szatmár and Németi as long as a Rákóczi occupied the Transylvanian throne. The family also received perpetual title to Tokaj Castle, along with the market town of Tarcal and the vast dependent domains, as well as Ecsed, Nagybánya, Felsőbánya, and the domain of Regéc.

{2-127.} The concessions granted by Ferdinand III to make Rákóczi to desist were considerable, but they served the emperor's interests. A month before the agreement, Rákóczi's forces had linked up with the advancing Swedes, and the prince had sent his favorite son, Zsigmond, and his commander-in-chief, János Kemény, to assist the military operations in Moravia; as soon as the treaty was concluded, however, he recalled them. Ferdinand's diplomacy thus succeeded in breaking the alliance between Rákóczi and his western enemies.