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# The Thirty Years' War and the Anti-Habsburg League

Participation in the eastern conflict would have been a spectacular but self-limiting exercise for Bethlen. To be sure, warfare was the popular duty of 17th century rulers. But this enterprise did not bring the slightest promise of eliminating the eastern foe. The turbulence in the east may have reflected a weakening of the Ottoman grip, but it never threatened the Porte directly. On the other hand, most of Bethlen's contemporaries were convinced that the conflict emerging in the west would lead to the demise of the Habsburgs.

Things took a turn for the worse when, on 23 May, 1618, a meeting in Prague ended with three Habsburg officials being thrown into the moat of Hradčany Castle. The perpetrators had acted not in sudden anger but deliberately, reviving an old Czech custom: the public 'execution' was designed to bring long-simmering {2-61.} unrest to boiling point. In fact, the two Habsburg governors and a secretary suffered no serious injury; yet their defenestration had dramatic consequences, for it sparked off a revolt in the Czech lands. The revolt was mercilessly crushed, but it gave birth to a generalized war that shook Europe for thirty years.

It soon became clear that the conflict would not be limited to the Habsburgs and their Czech subjects. The rebels initially sought support from England, but failed. Holland, however, felt threatened by the Habsburgs, and did much to keep their forces tied down at a distance. When, in the course of the revolt, the Palatinate's Frederick was elected king, the Dutch provided him with financial assistance, and when he had to flee Bohemia, he took refuge in Holland. There, he was beyond the emperor's reach, but his splendid palatinate by the Neckar was invaded by mercenaries. The war thereby reached the German empire, and gradually encompassed the rest of Europe. The Habsburgs' fear for their imperial status and the many, cross-cutting conflicts in their domain produced a confusion of military fronts. The empire, which encompassed more than three hundred principalities, was riven by a multitude of political and religious animosities. Protestantism was pitted against Catholicism, which since the late 1500s had grown in strength and aggressiveness. Rivalry between the Lutherans and Calvinists prevented the consolidation of a united Protestant front. The reigning princes may have had a common desire for political independence, but they too were divided by political and religious rivalries. Thus neither religion nor political objectives could serve to forge cohesive camps; instead, what emerged was virtually a war of all against all, marked by a constant search for allies. That search brought results, for many countries had an interest in the disintegration of the German empire and in restricting the power of a Habsburg empire that stretched across central Europe.

The most promising ally against the Habsburg empire was France. French aspirations to great power status had undergone a {2-62.} revival since the beginning of the century, and the target was not only the Austrian Habsburgs but also the latter's natural ally, the Spanish Habsburgs. The prosperous Dutch republic was another potential ally; Holland's war of independence against the Spanish Habsburgs had ended in 1609 with an armistice, but the Dutch feared new reprisals. The anti-Habsburg camp included two other northern powers, Denmark and Sweden, which feared for their privileges in the flourishing Baltic trade. In addition, a few smaller principalities in Italy, long subordinated to Austrian rule, were eager to see a weakening of Habsburg power. And finally, there was Transylvania, which potentially could help to break the Habsburgs' grip on Hungary.

First and foremost among the emperor's potential allies was the Spanish branch of his family. Their mutual support arose not from family sentiment but from a common wish to preserve their dominion over much of Europe. Poland's primary enemies were Russia and the Turkish empire, but since Denmark and Sweden were its rivals in the Baltic trade, it was prepared to back the Habsburgs at the outset of the Thirty Years' War.

In that gigantic conflict, the Habsburg empire found itself opposed by the greater part of Europe. Vienna had to devote all its resources to this unequal contest. The first phase of the war ended with Ferdinand II's victory in Bohemia, but as the conflict spread, Vienna's financial and military burdens became increasingly onerous. The Habsburgs' difficulties were only aggravated by the notorious inefficiency of their administration. They waged war in a helter-skelter fashion, seldom looking beyond the needs of the moment. For all that, the Habsburg dynasty survived. The empire was considerably weakened by the war, but it did not suffer total defeat.

Bethlen immediately perceived the significance of the uprising in Prague. That event, wrote the prince to his brother-in-law, 'is a hundred times more important than Ziska's attack, especially if it {2-63.} draws the support of a ruling prince; and it is unimaginable that they would have started such a great enterprise if they lacked the means.'[39]39. Bethlen Gábor kiadatlan politikai levelei, ed. by S. Szilágyi (Budapest, 1879), p. 101. However, he would become actively involved only when it became clear that the Czechs were seeking international assistance. At first, the rebels asked only for the prince's help; and then, one of his diplomats, Marcu Cercel, conveyed their proposal for a personal union of Bohemia and Hungary. In a letter to his principal confidant in Hungary, György Rákóczi, Bethlen reported that 'the Czechs do not wish to be different in any way from the Hungarian nation, they are prepared to live and die together with the latter, and what is more, they undertake in their communication that if the Hungarian nation elects a king, they will elect him as well, for they want to have the same monarch.'[40]40. Bethlen Gábor ... levelei, p. 119.

The idea revived medieval as well as more recent traditions: the Czech-Hungarian personal union at the time of the great King Matthias (Hunyadi) and the Jagiellos, and, more significantly, the successes of the feudal alliances of 1608. When the Czechs rebelled against the Habsburgs, they evoked these precedents in the conviction that the memory lived on of the 'sacred and inviolable' alliances concluded between the feudal estates of Hungary, Austria, and Moravia with the support of the 'fondly remembered' Matthias II.[41]41. I. Katona, Historia critica XI. Ord. XXX (Buda, 1794), pp. 13-14. They were politically astute in this justification of their call for assistance: the reference to the late King Matthias II conjured up an image of legality that would appeal to representatives of the feudal orders who tended to shrink from radical innovation. Similarly, the notion of personal union revealed sound political calculation. This highest form of feudal confederation could well serve to unite and coordinate the anti-Habsburg efforts of the countries ruled by the dynasty.

In fact, Gabriel Bethlen was not an ideal royal candidate for the Czech rebels. To be sure, his dispatch of Cercel to Prague clearly signalled his willingness to join in the struggle. But, in the summer of 1619, there were only faint signs in Hungary of active opposition {2-64.} to Ferdinand II, and Bethlen's acquisition of the Hungarian crown was at best a remote possibility. The Czechs, on the other hand, were pressed for time and could scarcely mortgage their fate to eventual political developments in Hungary. Since cooperation with their neighbor did not promise to quickly resolve the problem, the Czechs turned to the alternative of a western alliance and elected as their king Frederick V of the Palatinate, one of the leading Protestants in the empire.

Informed only after the act was consummated in Prague, Bethlen felt deceived and professed to be deeply hurt at losing the Bohemian crown. But his innate common sense prevailed: in the face of a common enemy, he would have been foolish to let his policies be ruled by vanity. In January 1620, Bethlen concluded an alliance with Frederick, King of Bohemia. The full treaty, worked out in Prague that spring by the two rulers' representatives, enshrined a perpetual alliance between the feudal orders of the Czech crown lands, Austria, Hungary, and Transylvania. They were to convene a joint diet every five years and, in the intervals, maintain contact at the governmental level. They undertook to advise each other before going to war, and to coordinate their foreign and monetary policies. The treaty laid down the terms of mutual assistance in the ongoing war. And, finally, they agreed to dispatch a formal diplomatic mission to the Porte in order to conclude peace with the Turks.

That last clause gave rise to debate, for some of the allies were reluctant to accept such a precondition to the participation of Transylvania's prince. Ironically, this was the only clause that would be implemented. The decision was perfectly logical: for a hundred years, it had been customary to involve the Porte in any political challenge to the Austrian Habsburgs. In the event, the costly mission proved to be pointless, for the confederation of the Habsburgs' enemies was stillborn. Before it could begin to function, the imperial forces overwhelmed the allies at the Battle of {2-65.} White Mountain on 8 November 1620. Frederick's Czech kingdom collapsed, and so did the alliance. There followed a merciless hunt for Czech rebels.