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# {2-13.} Transylvania Preserves the Peace

The conclusions drawn by Rákóczi's contemporaries are eminently plausible. Rákóczi had clawed his way up from a comparatively low rank, and he was known to be eager to enrich himself; the preservation and expansion of his estates must have counted for much in his calculations. Yet it is scarcely conceivable that he had not considered the fate of his properties in Hungary when he was elected prince of Transylvania. He was not known as a rash and heedless man, and he must have decided before the election that this miraculous, crowning glory of his career warranted the risk of displeasing the king.

As prince, he did not curry favor in Vienna. Significantly, it was Rákóczi who informed Archduke Matthias about Basta's notorious, treasure-laden cart. In the letter refusing the archduke's offer of a governorship, he noted that the imperial commissioners had left the country impoverished, and that many people had to 'yoke their wives to the plough.'[7]7. EOE 5, p. 480.

In fact, by abdicating, Zsigmond Rákóczi only confirmed his princely qualities. Had he made the mistake of clinging to power, he would have incurred personal defeat and ruination for Transylvania. It is clear from Báthori's alliance with the hajdús that he was prepared to risk war in order to realize his ambitions. Rákóczi would have been blindly egotistic not to respond Báthori's challenge with the peaceful gesture of abdication.

Transylvanian politicians followed Rákóczi's example in trying to pacify the hotheaded Báthori. They were appalled when the newly-enthroned Báthori promptly prepared for war against the two Romanian voivodeships. The terms of his election bound him to preserve sound neighborly relations, and his predecessors' policies pointed in the same direction. Even Rákóczi, during his brief tenure, had worked to improve relations that had deteriorated in the chaos at the turn of the century. The long war had left Transylvania {2-14.} devastated, and it made no sense to provoke a conflict with its neighbors.

Despite all this, Báthori had been prince for barely a month when he sent his confidant, István Kendi, to assess the prospects for forceful action. Kendi sounded out Mihály Weiss, the highly-respected chief magistrate at Brassó and an expert on the voivodeships, on the possibility of deposing Wallachia's voivode, Radu Şerban. The learned Weiss advised against it, arguing that 'a secure peace is worth more than a hoped-for victory'.[8]8. 'Album Oltardinum' (DFGS, p. 39) His cautionary words reflected the Saxons' material interest in sustaining commercial relations with the voivodeships. However, the prince's man remained unconvinced.

Disregarding such sober advice, the prince secretly sent envoys to Moldavia. They succeeded in winning the support of the princess, Ieremia Movilă's politically astute widow, for the expulsion of Wallachia's voivode. However, in May 1608, Transylvania's princely council vetoed the plan and only allowed the prince to negotiate new alliances with the voivodeships. In a treaty signed on 18 July, 1608, Moldavia's 13-year-old voivode, Constantin, agreed to become Báthori's vassal and to pay an annual tribute of 8,000 forints. The Wallachian voivode, Radu Şerban, had handed his oath of fealty to Báthori's emissaries on 31 May.

The new treaties secured peace on Transylvania's borders, but they only accentuated the problem of the hajdús. It would have been simpler and less costly to keep them busy fighting against the voivodeships than to provide them with a permanent place of settlement. This process had barely begun when, thanks to external aid, a peaceful solution was found.

The assistance for Báthori came from an unexpected source. Archduke Matthias had long displayed an inexplicable indifference toward the hajdús, but now, in the spring of 1608, his attitude changed. Realizing that peaceful means would not suffice to make his brother, Emperor Rudolph, hand over power, he sought the military {2-15.} resources necessary for a more forceful approach. After the futile sacrifices of the Fifteen Years' War, he could not count on the nobility to rise in support of his ambitions. But the hajdú troops were there, ready as ever to take up arms. He believed that he could rally the hajdús as well as the kingdom's feudal orders to his new political strategy.

Archduke Matthias' new tack was prompted by the determined attitude of the Hungarian feudal estates and their allies, the Austrian estates. In his plot against Rudolph, he exploited the noble orders' attachment to the peace treaties of Vienna and Zsitvatorok. Abandoning the tactic he had pursued since 1606, the archduke presented himself as the defender of these treaties: on February 1, he concluded with the orders in royal Hungary and Austria an alliance dedicated to implementation of the two treaties. The alliance was clearly directed against Rudolph. The mobilization of the hajdús was the next logical step.

On 27 March, 1608, Matthias confirmed the rights obtained by the hajdús from Bocskai, and on April 19, he took 6,000 of them into his own service, leaving Báthori with only 3,000 hajdús. The solution of the hajdú problem thus became the joint concern of Matthias and Báthori.

Before the start of negotiations on their demands, the hajdús helped Matthias to realize his ambitions. They accounted for around a third of Matthias' army, which included troops of rebellious nobles in Hungary, Austria, and Moravia and from border forts. Matthias led these forces to Prague with the intention of imposing a compromise on Rudolph. Intent on avoiding war, emperor and archduke reached a negotiated settlement over the Habsburg domains. Rudolph retained his imperial title, as well as the Czech lands and Tyrol. He gave up the Hungarian crown, and thus opened the way for Archduke Matthias to become king of that land. But before the latter could make his move, he had to resolve the hajdú and Transylvanian problems.

{2-16.} Representatives of the prince and the archduke met to address these issues and had no trouble in concluding two agreements on 20 August, 1608. The first was a treaty of mutual assistance between royal Hungary and Transylvania. Transylvania's status was not contested, although the agreement contained a slightly ambiguous sentence: Báthori 'would not alienate Transylvania and the counties linked to it from the Crown but would maintain them in their present status and abide by all terms of the Vienna peace treaty.'[9]9. R. Gooss, Staatsverträge, p. 377.

Though it was not clear what the Crown had to do with Transylvania if both parties adhered to the Treaty of Vienna, the negotiators confirmed Báthori's title of prince. They also reached a unanimous decision concerning the hajdús: the latter, 'being now freemen' in the same sense as the Transylvanian Székelys, were obligated to 'serve the needs of Hungary and Transylvania.'[10]10. Gooss, Staatsverträge, p. 38.

Thus, by early autumn 1608, less than half a year after Gábor Báthori's election, tranquillity reigned on Transylvania's approaches. The prince had forged stable relations with both Royal Hungary and the two Romanian voivodeships.

Gabriel Bethlen travelled to Constantinople to secure the Porte's endorsement, and news of his success arrived in mid-August. He and the Porte's envoy reached Transylvania in late November, bringing with them the traditional requisites for enthronement: a flag, a sword, and the embellished document in which the sultan released Transylvania for three years from the obligation to pay tribute and confirmed Gábor Báthori as Prince of Transylvania.

Transylvania's feudal orders could rest content: although Báthori had resorted to the hajdús' threat to impose his rule, his first actions as prince did not jeopardize traditional Transylvanian interests. He began his rule in harmony with the will of the feudal orders.