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# {2-255.} On the Periphery of the Anti-Ottoman Alliance

When Wesselényi, Nádasdy, and Zrínyi, royal Hungary's highest dignitaries, prepared to resist the Turks, they included Transylvania in their plans. The principality had to be taken into account by virtue of its location, and because it had more diplomatic elbow room than royal Hungary, which was integrated into the Habsburg empire. Moreover, Transylvania had useful diplomatic experience that encompassed treaties with West European countries as well as with the Romanian principalities.

In autumn 1663, the Confederation of the Rhine held a conference at Regensburg on the diplomatic and strategic aspects of an offensive against the Turks. It is clear that, in drawing up their plans, the participants were counting not only on Venice, Poland, France, the Papal state, and Russia, but on Transylvania and the Romanian principalities as well.

There is only fragmentary evidence regarding Apafi's international contacts. In 1662, having succeeded to Gabriel Bethlen, he had made overtures to England by way of Winchelsea, the ambassador to the Porte; two years later, when he was already aware of the anti-Turk preparations, he asked England's queen to intercede on behalf of Transylvania. Transylvania was still ruled by János Kemény when, in 1661, Miklós Bethlen left on a mission to western Europe; when he returned from Paris in spring 1664, it was to Apafi that he delivered a letter from the minister of foreign affairs, Hugues de Lionne, and the man named to command the anti-Turkish operation, the Vicomte de Turenne. And since Apafi had confirmed Transylvania's alliance with the Romanian principalities, it is likely that he was instrumental in associating Voivode Ghica with the anti-Turk coalition.

The international coalition was brought together by Philip Johann, the archbishop of Mainz and head of the Confederation of the Rhine. In Hungary, the most vigorous proponent of the initiative {2-256.} was Miklós Zrínyi. By early 1664, it had become clear that the coalition would have to be led by Emperor Leopold I.

Given the Porte's suzerainty, it was unavoidable that Transylvania's prince would have to play a dangerous and exhausting double game. The grand vizier could be expected to punish Transylvania with a higher tribute after the collapse of his scheme to subject Hungary. On 28 January 1664, Apafi instructed his ambassador, István Naláczi, to inform the grand vizier that 'we are doing our utmost to obtain the submission of Hungary' but that he needed a letter from the sultan guaranteeing his country's liberties.[25]25. Instructio gener. Stephano Naláczi, ad supremum vezerium expeditio, data Anno 1664 die 28 Januarii. EOE 13, p. 281. He also requested that the grand vizier reduce Transylvania's tribute and put an end to the practice by which Transylvanian villages located at some distance from Turkish-held areas were included in the sultan's tax registers. Apafi's gambit was not without risks, for he was giving the grand vizier ammunition that could be used against him at the imperial court vis á vis Hungary's politicians. However, the prince knew that an anti-Turkish offensive was imminent, and he played for time. It was these great expectations that led him to forbid people in counties along the Szamos River to give in to the Turks' threats and pay obeisance. The prince warned that the leaders of towns and villages that kowtowed to the Turks would be 'impaled' by the captain of Kővár: 'True, it is not easy to exist in daily and nightly terror, but do not be disheartened by a little suffering, for we have reason to hope that God will soon brighten up our lives.'[26]26. Ebesfalva, 23 December 1663. EOE 13, p.278.

Developments in the early months of 1664 reinforced hopes for an early war of liberation from the Turkish yoke. In February, Márton Kászoni wrote to Mihály Teleki about General Hohenlohe's winter campaign with the armies of Zrínyi and the Confederation of the Rhine, a campaign that ended with the burning of the bridge at Eszék. Kászoni reported that Apafi's prestige was rising at the Viennese court, and that he himself had committed himself to the prince. He told Teleki about the emerging coalition under Emperor {2-257.} Leopold's leadership, and observed that his reader had no doubt heard about 'Zrínyi's strokes of good luck'.[27]27. Márton Kászoni to Mihály Teleki, Szatmár, 23 February 1664. EOE 13, p. 306.

Transylvania's prince also readied for war. Ostensibly, he was preparing to oppose the coalition and support Köprülü, who counted on Apafi's army as well as on those of the Romanian voivodes. In fact, he was coordinating his preparations with Hungary's politicians. In circumstances that remain unclear, the imperial garrisons mutinied at Székelyhíd and Kolozsvár, and these two strongholds — along with a thousand German troops — rallied to Apafi.

The initial western offensive had already achieved some successes when Apafi was formally notified by Emperor Leopold of the formation of a coalition, and invited to join it. In effect, the Habsburg emperor and king of Hungary had granted official recognition to the prince and his state, allowing Transylvania to participate as a full member of the alliance. But turning that possibility into reality would be a different matter.

The emperor agreed to cede Kolozsvár, but he requested the return of Székelyhíd and the names of Hungarian nobles who had promised allegiance to the Turks. Meanwhile, Apafi got wind that the Habsburgs and Turks were already negotiating secretly, behind the backs of the Hungarians and Transylvanians. He curtly advised the emperor that he had no knowledge of Hungarians who planned to submit to the Turks, and sent a cautionary message to the palatine. Nevertheless, thanks in part to the efforts of Mihály Teleki, Márton Kászoni, and the imperial commander at Szatmár, Cobb, the Habsburg–Transylvanian talks got under way. Apafi stipulated that when the emperor came to negotiate a peace treaty with the Turks, he should insist on the return of Várad. Meanwhile, an order arrived from Köprülü: Apafi must bring his army to Hungary.

'If we do not retrieve Várad, and if we lose Transylvania, there is no point in going to war,' concluded Miklós Zrínyi, back in the summer of 1663, in his famous pamphlet entitled Az török áfium ellen való orvosság [The Cure against the Turkish Poison].[28]28. Miklós Zrínyi, 'Az török áfium ellen való orvosság', ZMÖM I, p. 676. In the {2-258.} event, the international coalition included among its objectives the recovery of Várad, and it devised a three-pronged offensive: along the Danube, in southern Transdanubia (where the target was the fort of Kanizsa), and in the area of Várad.

In late May 1664, after lengthy preparations, the imperial and Hungarian armies launched their joint attack along a broad front near Várad. An early and important casualty was one of the Hungarian commanders, László Rákóczi, who, according to Kászoni, 'had not followed orders'.[29]29. Márton Kászoni's report to János Rottal, Szatmár, 4 June 1664. OL, Nlt, Fasc. 16. This offensive, along with the impending attack (which Cobb planned in concert with Apafi) on Kökényesd, led Köprülü to agree that the prince should not leave Transylvania. The coalition's offensive soon ran out of momentum. Concerned above all with protecting the interests of the dynasty and the aristocrats at court, Porcia did everything in his power to hinder the war effort; he favoured purely defensive measures and an early armistice.

For Apafi, the news were bad. For one thing, the emperor had delayed in giving the order to attack Kanizsa, and the siege, when it finally got under way, was broken by reinforcements sent by Köprülü. For another, Montecuccoli was appointed commander-in-chief. When Apafi heard that the Moldavian and Wallachian forces were pulling back from Léva in the direction of Transylvania, he sent ahead a courier 'to greet them'. Eventually it came to light that a large part of the voivodes' army lay dead on the battlefield at Zsarnóca; the imperial army's Captain Cobb reported to Montecuccoli on 23 August 1664 that the disaster had induced 'great lamentation in the two countries'.[30]30. Cobb's report to Montecuccoli, Szatmár, 29 August 1664. Kriegsarchiv, Montanarum Akten. In the meantime, a victory in the battle of Szentgotthárd reinforced the prevailing mood of optimism; 'We were most happy to hear of the double victory for Christendom,' wrote Apafi to court councillor János Rottal. Hopes seemed justified that after over a hundred years, Turkish domination over Hungary was coming to an end. On October 2, a few days after Apafi's envoy, Mihály Teleki, had set off for Vienna, István {2-259.} Székely arrived with the news from the commander-in-chief: 'The two emperors had made peace'.[31]31. Prince Mihály Apafi to János Rottal, Ex Castris Ludas, 29 August 1664. OL, Nlt, Fasc. 17.