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# János Kemény

Ákos Barcsai spent the siege of Várad at Mehmed Köprülü's side, for the grand vizier had promised that the prince's men could eventually take possession of the stronghold. In the event, the promise was not kept, and it was not the pro-Turkish prince's Transylvanian {2-236.} soldiers, but Turkish janissaries who marched into Transylvania's mightiest fortress. The Turkish cavalry swept through Várad's domain and beyond, into the counties of Bihar and Szabolcs-Szatmár, and down the Körös and Szamos river valleys into Transylvania's heartland, sacking villages and taking prisoners. The message was clear: the sultan's power was irresistible.

Várad's surviving defenders had yet to reach Kolozsvár when a few aristocrats and representatives of the three 'nations' agreed to unite forces in defence of Transylvania's statehood and seek external assistance by exploiting György Rákóczi II's connections with the leading aristocrats in royal Hungary. They entrusted this crucial diplomatic mission to the one man who enjoyed everyone's confidence: János Kemény, the former councillor of György Rákóczi II.

Kemény, then fifty-six, had been introduced to politics while serving as a page to Gabriel Bethlen. He knew Europe well; he had been to Berlin and Constantinople on diplomatic missions and conducted negotiations with the French, the Poles, the Swedes, and — without recourse to an interpreter — with the voivode of Wallachia. As commander-in-chief of Transylvania's army, he had participated in most of the campaigns in the 1640s and 1650s and was highly esteemed for his military abilities. Deep in his nervous system he carried the memories of the Polish fiasco and Tartar captivity. In 1652, in fulfilment of György Rákóczi II's wish, Kemény was named governor and assumed responsibility for Transylvania until the prince's son came of age. When diets were to choose a prince, his name always figured on the list of candidates. After Barcsai's election, the Turkish threat urged Kemény to withdraw with his family to the Kingdom of Hungary. The Transylvanian estates' envoys reached him at the camp at Rakamaz of an imperial general, Louis de Souches, who was idly observing the unfolding siege of Várad.

Kemény made thorough preparations before taking action. He reached an accord with exiled members of the Rákóczi party and {2-237.} with the palatine, Count Ferenc Wesselényi; lodged a request for help with the emperor; obtained assurances of support from the Saxons; and won over the nobles in the border counties. A rare demurral came from Baron Ádám Károlyi, an eminent aristocrat from the Partium who was serving as lord-lieutenant and captain general of Szatmár County: he warned that Kemény 'had no longer the power to snatch Transylvania from the Turks' jaws and bring back its golden age'.[4]4. Baron Ádám Károlyi's letter to János Rottal, Szatmár, 20 November 1660. OL, Vgy, 1899 - no. 35.

On 20 November 1660, János Kemény set off for Transylvania at the head of an army consisting of no more than a few thousand men. Confident of foreign support, he occupied Kővár Castle and issued a proclamation: he would, 'impose order and unity to serve the public interest'.[5]5. János Kemény's letter to an unknown person, November 1660. OL, Vgy, 1899 - no. 35. The diet met on New Year's Day 1661 at Szászrégen and voted unanimously to elect him prince. Impelled purely by a sense of mission and responsibility, Kemény accepted the dignity that, in his view, was 'a heavy burden even in happy times': 'Men should serve their country whether they hold high office or are but humble shepherds.'[6]6. János Kemény's letter to his wife, Anna Lónyay, Régen, 2 January 1661, in E. Tóth, Kemény János és Lónyay Anna levelezése (TT 1901), p. 200). The new prince had a vision, and he enjoyed the support of prominent politicians, including János Bethlen, the onetime commander of Cracow and former chancellor of Barcsai; Dénes Bánffy; Gábor and János Haller, who belonged to one of Transylvania's most distinguished aristocratic families; Ferenc Rhédey; Farkas Bethlen, who just turned twenty-two; and the equally young Mihály Teleki. The Székelys respected him for having been György Rákóczi II's general. Barcsai resigned and offered all possible assistance to his successor. Kemény found encouragement in this show of unity, but he was fully aware of the difficulties that lay ahead.

While Prince János proceeded to issue his first decrees, a meeting was convened on 13 January 1661 in Vienna by the emperor's chief minister, Prince Porcia, to consider a submission from royal Hungary's political leaders. The latter argued in their memorandum that the security of Hungary and, indeed, of Christendom {2-238.} was affected by the situation in Transylvania. Since Transylvania was historically part of the Hungarian kingdom, it was in the general interest to launch an offensive against the Turks; moreover, the pasha of Várad had seized lands that lay in royal Hungary, including the Rákóczi estates and the Partium, i.e the counties that had been annexed in the meantime to Transylvania. Finally, the memorandum cited Transylvanian politicians in affirming that if the imperial army in Upper Hungary helped, Transylvania's people would rise up against the Turks and the estates would stand united and determined alongside the Habsburg emperor in fighting their common 'natural enemy'. In the interest both of protecting Christendom and of 'retrieving the lost motherland', the emperor should rally other foreign powers under the flag of a crusade against the Turks.[7]7. Opinio, January 1661. OL, Elt, Pál nádor iratai, Vol. 91, no. 9321. Judging from some of the views expressed in the memorandum, it is likely that Palatine Wesselényi had conferred with leading Transylvanians at the Tokaj camp in autumn 1660. The previous summer, Porcia had rejected the idea of military aid for Várad on the grounds that this might jeopardize Habsburg interests in the west. Now, however, he had to contend with public opinion as well as diplomatic pressures, notably from the Venetian ambassador and the German principalities. At the Habsburg court, Porcia's supporters, the 'Spanish party', were outweighed by those who represented the views of the War Council and the Camera (Hofkammer): the Habsburg government could not afford to reject funds and troops that had been voted or promised. In any case, it was anticipated that the Turks would launch a new offensive.

This was the background to the eventual acceptance of the Hungarian war-plan. The attack would be directed at western Hungary. From his fortress, then under construction, Zrínyi would raid Turkish-held areas and lay siege to Kanizsa; meanwhile, the imperial forces would launch an offensive along the Danube. These combined operations were expected to draw the sultan's armies away from Transylvania. Military resources in the Partium and the {2-239.} counties of Upper Hungary were largely exhausted, and thus Palatine Wesselényi could muster only a small armed force in support of Transylvania's prince.

As János Kemény's Transylvanian supporters were well aware, military operations had begun in late winter in Croatia and Transdanubia. A sizeable force, led by the Habsburg general Raimondo Montecuccoli, was heading for Hungary with orders to attack Esztergom and lay siege to Buda. Meanwhile, Emperor Leopold instructed the garrisons in Upper Hungary to lend assistance to the prince.

Earlier memoir entitled Önéletírás ('Autobiography'), János Kemény had concluded that Transylvania could not afford to provoke the sultan. The letter sent by the palatine from Vienna on 22 March 1661 compelled him to reconsider convictions based on long and hard experience. Wesselényi informed him of the emergence of an international, anti-Ottoman coalition; it was now up to him, the Prince of Transylvania, to decide whether the long-awaited war should be launched. The palatine laid a heavy responsibility on Kemény: 'Rest assured that, for our part, we shall be resolute; you must do likewise.' He urged Kemény to send an envoy to the emperor, bearing an official message that Transylvania requested an attack on the Turks and fully backed the enterprise. Concluding his letter, Wesselényi promised that Dénes Bánffy would inform the prince about the plan's details.[8]8. Palatine Ferenc Wesselényi's letter to János Kemény, Vienna, 22 March 1661. OL, Wlt, Fasc. 8.

In reaching a decision, Kemény and his councillors knew that they were serving as catalysts for an epoch-making international offensive against the Turks. On 23 April 1661, the diet, meeting in Beszterce, declared that Transylvania was breaking with the Porte and placing herself under the protection of Hungary's king, the Habsburg emperor. The Transylvanians hoped for speedy assistance; the historic resolution was conveyed to Vienna by Mihály Teleki, the captain of Kővár, and the priest Márton Kászoni. When they reached the imperial capital, they did not know that they were too late.

{2-240.} Transylvania played only a small part in Mehmed Köprülü's overall strategy of conquest, but it was important for the grand vizier to keep the principality securely in the Ottoman orbit, and he could not tolerate a prince who favoured the Germans. Hardly had the diet issued its declaration before Tartar forces attacked the Székelyföld and Ali, the pasha of Temesvár, set out to subdue the Saxons. However, the grand vizier wanted to muster forces for the capture of Crete and wished to avoid war with the Habsburg Empire. The Porte's proposal was conveyed to Vienna by the ambassador of the Tartar khan. The terms, though painfully tough, were not without advantage for the Habsburg court; and the court was unsettled by the ominous predictions of Porcia, who feared for the future of the dynasty. At the end of May, a secret accord was concluded between Constantinople and Vienna. Emperor Leopold acknowledged the Turks' capture of Várad and their other recent conquests, promised to dismantle the new fortress at Zrínyi-Újvár, and withdrew his support from Prince János Kemény. The sultan, for his part, agreed to desist from action against royal Hungary and to halt the operations in Transylvania, where he would support the election of a new prince.

The parties to this agreement knew that success depended on secrecy. If news of the military campaign's cancellation leaked out, the Habsburg court would become the target of political criticism from the length and breadth of Europe; its authority and diplomatic credibility would be put in doubt, and the German princes might well turn hostile. The Porte, for its part, was sensitive to the shifting winds in Vienna and the domestic problems in Transylvania. Intent on forestalling any challenge to the Beszterce resolution, Kemény and his councillors had Ákos Barcsai, whom they suspected of harbouring pro-Turkish sympathies, seized and imprisoned; the former prince was then murdered in circumstances that are yet to be elucidated. Realizing that it would not be easy to find a suitable candidate, the Turks preferred to keep the agreement {2-241.} secret until the Transylvanian situation was stabilized with the election of a new prince.

Montecuccoli did not understand why his marching orders were modified, but he was a dutiful officer; reluctantly, he set course for Transylvania, struggling on the way with the problems of provisioning his troops. Meanwhile, Pasha Ali occupied the Székelyföld, surrounded the Saxon towns, and searched feverishly for a compliant prince-designate. Unaware of the Habsburg–Turkish pact, the rest of Europe awaited a great military confrontation in Transylvania. János Kemény stood on the western frontier with an army that had swollen to some ten thousand men. When, at the end of August, General Montecuccoli reached Goroszló with his exhausted but sizeable army, Kemény thought that the moment had come to marshal their combined forces against Pasha Ali.

However, Montecuccoli's orders were that he avoid engaging battle. He thus proceeded to Kolozsvár and, on the pretext that his troops needed a rest, settled down to await further developments. He did not have a long wait. On September 17, he learned that three days earlier, the diet had convened under Pasha Ali's threats and elected Mihály Apafi prince of Transylvania. Montecuccoli's Transylvanian mission thus came to an end. The next day, he began to pull out his army, leaving five hundred men in Kolozsvár and larger or smaller imperial garrisons in the fortresses at Kővár, Szamosújvár, Bethlen, Székelyhíd, Görgény, Déva, and Fogaras.

Unaware of the Habsburg–Turkish agreement, János Kemény tried to save what he could. In his public statements, he explained that supply problems had necessitated a tactical redeployment of the imperial forces; privately, he took at face value Montecuccoli's report that another, stronger imperial force was on its way. However, Kemény's own army began to disintegrate, and to keep its remnants together, he moved camp to Szatmár. That was were news reached him of a rising against the Turks in Csík.

{2-242.} In early January 1662, János Kemény led his army, which had been reinforced by Hungarian, Croatian, and German regiments, back into Transylvania on an expedition that was to prove fateful. His goal was to secure a stronghold in the Székelyföld. Along the way, Apafi's emissaries presented him with a proposal for a compromise and withdrawal. Without giving an answer, Kemény marched on toward the Székelyföld, taking along the envoys. Learning that the insurgents in Csík had been crushed by the Turks and Tartars, Kemény changed course for Segesvár, but Apafi got there first, and Mehmed Küchük, the beglerbey of Jenő, was on his way to aid the sultan's chosen prince. By now, it was Kemény who sought a negotiated solution, but he could not prevent Apafi's forces from joining up with Turks. Kemény's advisors counselled withdrawal, and János Bethlen urged that they seek help from the emperor. On 23 January 1662, the Turkish army surprised Kemény's troops waiting dispersed in the valleys near Nagyszőllős. The Hungarian cavalry, which had been hurriedly mustered for action by Kemény and Captain János Ebeni, was decimated by Mehmed Küchük's spahis. Amidst the confusion, Kemény fell off his horse and was either killed by a Turk or trampled to death by his fleeing troops. According to legend, Apafi arranged a secret burial, and his remains were never discovered.

Was Kemény a tragic hero or the victim of an ill-conceived policy? His conviction, that he was participating in a international military effort and serving the interests of Transylvania and the Hungarian Kingdom, was shared by some prominent politicians on both sides of the border. His resources were small, his army was poorly equipped and ill-trained, and his ill-informed staff was hardly a match for the diplomatic capabilities of the Turks and the Habsburgs. Kemény lacked the strength to gain time and sustain a protracted conflict.

Most of Transylvania's political elite managed to survive the Battle of Nagyszőllős. They drew contradictory conclusions from {2-243.} Kemény's tragic failure and went their separate ways. János Bethlen, Gábor Haller, and János Haller remained in Transylvania and rallied to Apafi. The others, trusting in the imminence of international action against the Turks or in the power of the emperor, withdrew to Hungary.