###

# {2-119.} Victory over the Turks

Rákóczi's first foreign involvement was precipitated by the actions of Hussein Nasuh, Buda's new governor and son of the fearsome grand vizier Pasha Nasuh. This uncommonly ambitious politician obtained the governorship of the Hungarian province in 1635. He was well-acquainted with György Rákóczi I, for he had been the bearer of the sultan's decree endorsing the latter's accession to the throne. At the time, the new prince had embraced the well-born Turk in a formal ritual of friendship.

Yet Hussein Nasuh's appointment in Buda worked against the interests of Rákóczi, for the governor's hostile intrigues disturbed his good relations with the Porte. Nasuh's behavior owed in part to subjective factors: the prince allegedly failed to cultivate his 'friendship' with appropriate intensity and material gifts. But the main reason was that young Nasuh fell in with a small coterie of wilful provincial officials who were intent on shaping political relations in the region independently of the Porte's policies. Indeed, they tended to act contrary to the policy of the moment in Constantinople. Their tool was the elderly István Bethlen, who, appalled at the treason charges brought against his son-in-law, Dávid Zólyomi, and then against his son, Péter, went in 1635 to seek support in Buda. Mózes Székely Jr. had already made the same journey, with the same objective, but István Bethlen arrived at an opportune moment, for the new governor, Hussein Nasuh, gave him full support. And so it came to pass that just when Transylvanian diplomacy persuaded the Porte to withhold aid from Székely and imprison him in the notorious Jedicule, Buda chose to back the former prince and the new pretender.

At first, it looked as if Rákóczi could defuse this threat. He extracted a promise from Pasha Bejram, the grand vizier's deputy, then on assignment in Persia, that István Bethlen would — like Mózes Székely — be taken from Buda and kept in captivity to prevent {2-120.} him from pursuing his plot. However, in a fit of obstinacy, Hussein Nasuh chose to ignore these instructions and persisted in backing Bethlen. Their joint efforts finally bore fruit: the Porte decided the leave the matter up to the divan of Turkish officials in Hungary. And that council, whose members were all opponents of the sultan's inner circle, ruled in favor of István Bethlen.

György Rákóczi I was thus compelled to gird for battle. Back in February 1626, when he was apprised of Bethlen's flight, he had convened the diet, which duly declared that 'although we are as reluctant to take up arms against our mighty emperor as we are to jump into the fire, [we are ready to go to war against the Turks who support Bethlen] for the sake of our beloved country's freedom, the survival of our wives and children, and the preservation of Your Highness's honor, dignity, and princely status.'[75]75. EOE 9, p. 461. Although Rákóczi had no choice, many disagreed with his decision. When he inquired in Vienna about the prospect of imperial assistance, both of Hungary's political leaders counselled against war. The palatine Miklós Esterházy, who was normally ready to adopt a belligerent attitude towards the Turks, feared the consequences for Transylvania; and Péter Pázmány, the archbishop of Esztergom, considered war to be a last resort. Rákóczi did not back down, and events proved him right, for — by ruse more than by direct force — he managed to defeat the Turkish forces that escorted István Bethlen.

The chance agent of Rákóczi's success was Jakab Győri, a hajdú officer who had spent time in Turkish captivity and was proficient in the language of the enemy. His moment came at Szalonta, after the first Transylvanian-Turkish encounter ended in mutual withdrawal. That night, he showed up at the Turkish camp with three hundred armed men and 'talked himself' into being admitted to 'where the pashas and beys were conferring with István Bethlen'. Seeing the latter's astonishment, he decided on quick action. Dividing his men into two groups, he gave instructions that {2-121.} at the sound of a drum, 'they should beat the drums, scream fearsomely ... cry out Jesus, Jesus ... and fire off their guns, while remaining in their positions until further orders'.[76]76. Szalárdi, p. 177. The trick worked. Believing that they had been surrounded by a superior force, the Turks scattered in all directions. So many died that even weeks later richly-garbed corpses could be found in the nearby marshes, and those captured were traded as slaves for several years.

Thus Rákóczi prevailed in the confrontation that had been forced on him. For the first time in over thirty years, a Transylvanian prince had defeated the Turks, or at least put them to rout. He owed his success neither to superior power, nor to the assistance of other foes of the Turks, but to the simple fact that he had confronted a few politicians rather than the full might of Constantinople. His opponents had acted without the Porte's endorsement in backing Bethlen, and neither the Porte nor Transylvania wished to alter their well-established relationship.

Previously, such a situation would have been unimaginable, for the imperial administrators had strictly followed the instructions coming from Constantinople. In fact, Hussein Nasuh and his associates had not deceived their superiors or acted without informing the Porte. On the contrary, they had been given free rein to take sides in the conflict between Rákóczi and Bethlen. Had a similar problem arisen ten years earlier, the provincial officials would have offered advice and perhaps tried to influence the viziers who counselled the sultan, but they would have been bound by the latter's instructions. However, the reign of Murad IV was marked by a peculiar change in the political process: unable to manage a multiplicity of problems, the sultan's confidants proceeded to have many independent-minded officials murdered while allowing others unprecedented freedom of action. The latter could make their own decisions, and the central authorities would either back them or simply let them carry on.

{2-122.} In the case of the conflict with György Rákóczi I, the Porte did not budge. To be sure, a scapegoat was found in the person of Temesvár's governor, Pasha Bekir, who was duly beheaded; but such executions were commonplace at Murad's court. The younger Nasuh was relieved of his governorship at Buda and transferred to Vidin, where he became governor of Silistra. His career would survive yet another miscarried scheme. When, in 1637, conflict erupted between Matei Basarab, the voivode of Wallachia, and Moldavia's voivode, Vasile Lupu, Hussein Nasuh backed the latter, his long-time protege. In the end, he had to accept that Matei, who was backed by György Rákóczi I, would remain in office. On this occasion, Hussein was recalled to Constantinople, and subsequently appointed governor of Erzerum.

The only one to benefit from this turbulence, which persisted for several years, was Rákóczi. In repelling István Bethlen and his allies, and in backing Matei Basarab, he was actually following a course that coincided with the interests of the Porte, yet he became widely known as a scourge of the Turks.