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# The Crisis of Power and György Rákóczi's Triumph

When Rákóczi and the Hajdús joined forces, Transylvania's feudal orders found themselves between two threats: a claimant to the throne approaching from abroad, and a new ruler who was preparing to impose changes yet unclear. Katalin's foolishness was about to provoke a political crisis. Gabriel Bethlen's widow was not destined to be good ruler; she had been indifferent to her husband's welfare, and now became a listless successor. Bethlen had warned her in his will, and probably earlier as well, that 'perhaps no other consort of a reigning prince has ever been elected.'[65]65. A fejedelem, with an introduction by L. Makkai (Erdély öröksége IV, p. 130) He was right, but Transylvania's only elected princess did not appreciate her exceptional status and had little yen to govern. Bethlen had urged Katalin not to look down on her supporters, but to show them esteem and earn their affection. In the event, everything she did seemed calculated to offend the Transylvanians. She made no pretence at mourning her husband, and she ignored — to the point of rudeness — the advice of her brother-in-law, whom Gabriel Bethlen had appointed governor to assist her. She even resorted to murder: a famous physician, Scultetus, was killed on her orders because she suspected him of trying get the throne for István Bethlen.

Katalin was all the more solicitous in fulfilling the wishes of her long-time lover, István Csáky. Youthful, distinguished, and elegant, he probably had no trouble in seducing the young wife of a sick old man. Csáky and his followers harbored a plan to bring the principality back under Habsburg rule. This led to the faintly absurd situation that at the very moment when Gustavus Adolphus joined in the Thirty Years' War and reversed the emperor's fortunes, his sister-in-law Katalin became the willing agent of Ferdinand II's {2-104.} influence in Transylvania. The plan came to naught for lack of significant support in the principality. However, the reports about Rákóczi's activities and the poisonous atmosphere generated by Katalin were enough to make Transylvania's politicians seek a quick solution. Perceiving a double threat, they rallied around István Bethlen in the hope that the governor's famously good relations with the Turks might preserve peace in the country. Worn down by these pressures, Katalin of Brandenburg abdicated on September 28, whereupon the lords elected as their ruling prince the brother of Gabriel Bethlen.

By then, an exultant György Rákóczi was on his way to Transylvania at the head of the hajdú army. The news of István Bethlen's election did not halt the advance of the pretender and his followers. Nor was Rákóczi deterred by the warnings that reached him from Palatine Esterházy and the new prince. The younger István Bethlen, captain of Várad, had rallied to Rákóczi, and he was now dispatched to meet with his friend Pasha Muharrem, the commander of Szolnok; the two men proceeded to Buda in order to win the Turkish governor's support for Rákóczi.

The country teetered on the brink of war. The hajdús were ready for action and could count on the backing of some 20,000 Turkish troops; on the other side, the palatine was mustering the nobles from the counties of Upper Hungary. Transylvania was also readying for war. The diet authorized István Bethlen to draw upon the principality's last military reserves.

Yet the political crisis did not lead to war. Esterházy needed royal assent before taking military action, and Ferdinand II would not risk war in Hungary, for he was in the midst of a struggle with his opponents at the imperial council in Regensburg. Since the majority of Hungary's politicians also opposed action by the palatine, the kingdom's official policy was to preserve the peace. On the other side, both the prince and Rákóczi shrank from a violent confrontation and its unpredictable consequences. Since the two men {2-105.} enjoyed roughly equal support at the Porte, neither could foretell which way the Turks would swing. István Bethlen Jr. lobbied among his father's friends at the Porte on behalf of Rákóczi, but, in 1629–30, the leading posts changed hands both in Constantinople and in the provinces, and neither Rákóczi nor the prince were acquainted with the new Turkish officials. In these circumstances, they were reluctant to trust to the fortunes of war.

György Rákóczi did make a threatening move: in mid-October, he led an army of some 7,000 men to the border of Transylvania with the aim of forcing István Bethlen to negotiate. At a meeting on October 23, the two men concluded an armistice and agreed that, within six weeks, the Transylvanian diet should choose between them.

Bethlen and Rákóczi both worked hard to win public support, and the diet duly convened in late November. Yet the choice could hardly be called an election, for it came to be made by the onetime princess, who had received two contradictory firmans from the sultan: one edict ordered the election of István Bethlen, the other of György Rákóczi. Noting that neither of the two men aimed to modify Transylvania's relations with the Ottoman empire, the Porte decided to let Katalin choose which firman to submit to the diet. Since István Csáky's scheme was not opportune, and since she despised her brother-in-law, Katalin proceeded to have Rákóczi elected by the diet.

The election took place on December 1, 1630. The call Rákóczi had hoped for reached him two days later in Várad, and he set off for the enthronement, soon to be followed by Pasha Muharrem and an emissary of the deputy grand vizier. The latter were present when Rákóczi took the oath of office on December 24. A few months later, the new prince severed relations with his former allies, the hajdús from Upper Hungary, without having satisfied any of their demands.

{2-106.} Once elected, Rákóczi lost interest in the seven counties. Zólyomi and his followers tried to spark off a war, but they could not persuade him to take action against the kingdom. The palatine, Miklós Esterházy, did his bit to provoke a confrontation. Although negotiations regarding settlement of the hajdús were under way, he stationed troops in forts around the hajdú towns, ostensibly in preparation for an attack; his supporters, including young noblemen from as far away as Transdanubia, mustered in the earthworks at Rakamaz. Yet the palatine took no offensive action. Instead, Dávid Zólyomi and István Bethlen seized the opportunity and sent the rather reluctant hajdús into battle. They promised the latter that 'each will get his due reward' and evoked the likely consequence of defeat: 'You can be sure that your towns and homes, in the fields and at river-mouths, will be the first to be blown away by the winds of war'. Reportedly, the hajdús were incited with slogans dating from the wars of independence — 'for God's respect, for our homeland, our survival, our loved ones'.[66]66. Szalárdi, p. 135.

After putting Kálló to the torch, the hajdús laid siege to Ramakaz. The hajdú infantrymen were pitted against well-armed troops who disposed of artillery, and hundreds fell in the terrible, five-hour long battle. In the end, the defenders of Rakamaz were put to rout. Many died while trying to flee by boat on the high waters of the Tisza; apart from other troops, forty noblemen were taken captive by Zólyomi's army. Prisoners and spoils were displayed in triumph before Prince György Rákóczi I at Várad. News of this great battle reached distant lands, yet there would be no follow-up. Royal Hungary remained committed to peace and failed to retaliate; and the Transylvanians did not exploit the victory, for Rákóczi refused to go to war for the sake of the seven counties. Thus the initiative taken by István Bethlen Jr. proved to be futile. Rákóczi could not be persuaded to pursue Gabriel Bethlen's goals. The hajdús had to content themselves with a solemn confirmation of the liberties they had obtained from Bocskai.

{2-107.} György Rákóczi I and Ferdinand II sealed their first peace accord on 3 April 1631. The prince undertook 'never to incite the Hajdús' in royal Hungary and to have Transylvania's hajdús 'loosen and eventually break their links and alliances' with their comrades across the border. The king, in return, promised not to interfere with Rákóczi either on his domains in Hungary or in the Transylvanian principality.[67]67. Gooss, Staatsverträge, p. 655.

Having no further need for the rather uncontrollable hajdús, Rákóczi did not hesitate in breaking with them. Their aspirations, which were endorsed by Zólyomi and his followers, went far beyond Rákóczi's own designs. Miklós Esterházy observed that 'these young men expect nothing from Rákóczi, and I think that their dissidence is creating problems for the prince; they maintain their links with the hajdús and are obviously up to no good.'[68]68. Esterházy Miklós munkái, ed. by F. Toldy (Pest, 1852), p. 200. Rákóczi did not want to rule 'in accordance with their whims' and had no compunction about concluding a peace treaty.