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# The Hopes of Politicians in the Kingdom

Rákóczi's interventions in the voivodeships greatly enhanced his prestige. His court at Gyulafehérvár became a focal point of East European diplomacy, drawing not only Romanian envoys but also Poles, Turks, Tartars, and Cossacks. All were anxious to learn how he would intervene in the Polish war, but Rákóczi played his cards {2-137.} close to the chest. In the spring of 1655, he sent emissaries to Sweden, England, and Holland in order to find out what political links were being forged between these countries. This initiative clearly signalled that he was planning to get involved. In an interview with Oxenstierna, the youthful Swedish chancellor, Rákóczi's envoy observed playfully that his well-armed master only lacked an opponent; but when the chancellor inquired how the prince would react to a Swedish–Polish war, he got an evasive answer.

In the summer of 1655, after a Swedish expeditionary force had landed in Poland, György Rákóczi II mediated between Sultan Mehmed IV and King Charles X. Concurrently, he pursued his ambition of obtaining the Polish throne for his family, sounding out the beleaguered Jan Casimir regarding the terms on which the latter might adopt his youngest son, Ferenc Rákóczi. This left Jan Casimir with the hope that Rákóczi would become his ally. Yet, in 1656, as the war in Poland ground on, Rákóczi told Swedish emissaries that he would intervene on their side if, after the anticipated victory, he would get the Polish crown.

Although royal Hungary was not directly affected by the events in the Polish sphere, many of its politicians were observing Rákóczi's preparations with growing enthusiasm. The most prominent aristocrats looked in expectation to Transylvania's prince as the country's saviour. Not long before, the same men had greeted the campaign of György Rákóczi I with hostility, or at least indifference; led by Miklós Esterházy, they had rejected any solution issuing from Transylvania. In a political outlook conditioned by the Thirty Years' War, they had looked to the powerful Habsburg dynasty, with its considerable resources in the west, to resolve Hungary's domestic problems and expel the Turks. They believed that once peace was restored in the west, the monarch would turn his attention to Hungary.

The aftermath of the Treaty of Westphalia induced disillusionment in their ranks. The long-awaited offensive against the Turks {2-138.} failed to materialize, and the recall and demobilization of imperial troops signalled a lasting peace. Thus Ferdinand III did not live up to the Hungarians' expectations, and the strategy identified with Miklós Esterházy lost all credibility. It was around this time that György Rákóczi I's younger son, Zsigmond, transferred his permanent residence to Sárospatak, in royal Hungary. Although the move was meant to symbolize peaceful relations between the Habsburg and the Rákóczi dynasties, his arrival only brought the political mood closer to eruption.

Zsigmond Rákóczi was an outstanding politician, and he had drawn the right conclusions from his father's military campaigns when he made his entrance in Hungarian politics. He perceived that the link between Protestantism and opposition to the Habsburgs, valid for half a century, had lost its actuality. If he wanted to marshall the Hungarians to throw off the 'Austrian yoke', he would have to set aside the question of religion, for 'taking stock of their present circumstances, many people would be ready to help if religious denomination was not raised as an issue'.[82]82. TT 1891, pp. 218-19.

This bold conclusion underpinned Zsigmond's policy. His first initiative in Hungary, in 1649, was to instruct his family's delegates to the diet to back Pál Pálffy, a Catholic, for the post of palatine. This unexpected choice served him well, for it facilitated contact with Hungary's political elite; Pálffy had been the acknowledged leader of Esterházy's party ever since the latter's death in 1645, but the group only reneged on its traditional loyalty to the Habsburgs after it had suffered its great disappointment. In the midst of an unexpected domestic political crisis in the fall of 1651, Pál Pálffy advised Zsigmond Rákóczi he was ready to back the latter's anti-Habsburg plan, if necessary by force of arms. Hungarian politics thus took one of its most crucial turns in the turbulent 17th century. Zsigmond would not have the opportunity to implement his plan; the likeable and young yet mature politician died in February 1652.

{2-139.} With Zsigmond gone, it seemed natural enough that Pálffy's successor as party leader, Miklós Zrínyi, would focus political attention on György Rákóczi II. Zrínyi, the country's most distinguished aristocrat, was ideally qualified to propagate the notion that Transylvania could be the agent of Hungary's deliverance. He wrote, 'May God grant that, thanks to Transylvania's prince, a brighter day will come for the poor Hungarians.'[83]83. ZMÖM II, Letter No. 234. By the time György Rákóczi II had successfully concluded his interventions in the Romanian voivodeships and begun to prepare for action in Poland, Hungarians of all qualities were looking forward to his coming: the aristocratic political elite, the lesser nobles who followed their lead, the people in the market towns, and perhaps even the peasantry.

Miklós Zrínyi outlined his ideas regarding a national kingdom in a monograph on King Matthias. Gabriel Bethlen had been deluged by the petty demands of the feudal orders; Zrínyi tried to lay the groundwork for György Rákóczi II's accession to the throne by persuading his fellows that they would have to make material sacrifices in order to unify the country. He cited historical and biblical precedents in evoking the strong-handed rule of the great kings of yore. The rebelliousness induced by such rule was senseless: 'Look at what King Saul did when his subjects turned disobedient'. He concluded that 'fear was a useful tool to subdue evildoers, and Hungarians would be fortunate if they found another king like Matthias, for a good monarch can undo the harm done to their liberties'.[84]84. ZMÖM I, p. 149.

By the time of Rákóczi's campaign in Poland, Zrínyi was corresponding with the prince about the concrete terms of the latter's kingship. These would have been similar to the terms on which Gabriel Bethlen was elected: with respect to the Ottoman empire, the Kingdom of Hungary would become vassal state of Transylvania. In the turbulent year 1657, it was pointless to anticipate anything more than this.