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# The Barcaság Manifesto

In spring 1703, Ferenc Rákóczi was preparing to return from Poland, and one of the first to record this fact was György Vizaknai Bereck, a doctor in Kolozsvár. Over the past few years, there had been numerous covert attempts to organize resistance to the Habsburgs. From Máramaros County down to Hunyad and Zaránd counties, support for the opposition movement came from many social strata: villeins and soldiers, groups of riflemen and guardsmen shorn of the liberties they had gained through military service, impoverished free Székelys, merchants as well as people from the suburbs. The various opposition groups may have spoken different languages, and belonged to different religions, but they had a common goal. Armenian and Turkish merchants acted as their messengers. The catalysts were representative members of the intelligentsia of the times: priests, schoolmasters, students, professors, estate stewards, and town clerks. One noteworthy leader of the resistance in Máramaros County was a Romanian, Grigore Pintea (or Pintye in Hungarian).

The strongest opposition movement emerged in the Székelyföld. In early 1702, the Gubernium got wind of an incipient rebellion by Székelys and ordered an investigation. The inquiry failed to uncover any evidence, but, on 15 August, at Válaszút, Kuruc insurgents fought a pitched battle with imperial guards from Kolozsvár.

Despite the absence of leaders from the lesser nobility and the feudal estates, the resistance movement soon extended over much of Transylvania. However, social divisions prevented it from mustering {2-399.} the kind of unity shown by the organized outlaws (szegénylegények) who had set off an uprising in Hungary, at Tiszahát. The anti-Habsburg movement included iron workers from Torockó, Székely villeins and soldiers, peasant soldiers from the Kővár district, and gold-washers from Gyulafehérvár, but each group had its own particular reason joining the struggle. This un-questionably popular movement was more differentiated in its motivation than its counterpart in Hungary proper. It was fed by popular bitterness at feudal burdens, rising taxes, military oppression, corrupt officials, abuses by noble officers and officials, the weakness of the state, imperial economic policy, and constant humiliation.

As early as 1700, Rákóczi and his followers had sought to forge links with Transylvania's aristocrats. Nor did the Tiszahát uprising go unnoticed in Transylvania. However, when Rákóczi and Bercsényi, still in Poland, were making plans for an offensive, they expected that Thököly would become prince of Transylvania. There is no evidence that the Transylvanian movements were inspired by a broad political strategy that took account of the Hungarian movement and counted on Polish and French assistance. Following the change in the principality's constitutional status, the Transylvanian nobles who had supported Thököly found themselves isolated from the society at large. When former Thököly officers slipped into the country to organize an opposition movement, their recruits came from the lower social estates. Most Transylvanians yearned for change, but comparatively few were drawn to the ideology of the Thököly rebellion; indeed, particularly in the Székelyföld, there was marked antagonism to the onetime 'Kuruc king'. In 1702 and spring 1703, there was no leading figure in Transylvania ready to propose of comprehensive opposition program, nor a social stratum prepared to weld the disparate groups into a national movement. On the contrary, the nobles tended to withdraw to castles and towns, and even their passive resistance occasionally earned them reprisals.

{2-400.} Word of Rákóczi's manifesto, issued on 6 May 1703 at Brezán (Brzeźany), soon reached Transylvania. In September, the chairman of the Cameratica Commissio concluded — rather hyperbolically — that since Rákóczi had 'promised freedom of religion and the liberation of villeins', some '40,000 men were awaiting his arrival'.[121]121. Á. Várkonyi, Rákóczi, p. 40.

The goal was to restore Hungary's independence and, at least in autumn 1703, Transylvania was of secondary importance in Rákóczi's strategy. He was not prepared to carry the war to the former principality. Thus Transylvania was excluded from the war in the early months of the campaign, and could not — even to the extent of its severely constrained autonomy — link up with the struggle in the Hungarian kingdom, all of which entailed long-term consequences for the country. In Hungary, a common political will, and a determination to regain statehood became manifest in the first weeks of the war; Transylvania, meanwhile, was engulfed by anarchy and anti-feudal passions. A plethora of sources confirm the journal entry of György Czegei Wass: 'Mainly in the winter, but in the fall as well, an army of peasants launched attacks in Transylvania, driving away the lords' and aristocrats' livestock, looting, wrecking manor houses, and causing immense damage.'[122]122. MHH-S 35, p. 374.

The opposition movements expended most of their energy in local battles. Still, the scattered and isolated uprisings, which, in border areas, were joined by Kuruc regiments from Hungary, did produce some significant military successes. The rebels occupied Somlyó and Abrudbánya, gained control of Máramaros County, and surrounded Kővár Castle. Nagybánya, too, was captured by the Transylvanian 'outlaws' ahead of the arrival of Rákóczi's troops. Insurgents prevailed in the battles of Brád and Szentbenedek; on 11 November 1703, at Bonchida, they routed some, and won over others among the Székely regiments that had been dispatched to reinforce Kolozsvár's imperial garrison. Rabutin, meanwhile, had led an army of 8,000–10,000 men from Brassó to Kővár, but, finding {2-401.} himself isolated from the main war zone in Hungary, withdrew to Szeben.

Representatives of the Transylvanian state's governing bodies — the lord lieutenants of the counties and chief officials of széks and towns — were summoned by Rabutin to appear on 15 November in Szeben, there to join the Gubernium in formally condemning the Hungarian war of independence. At a time when one imperial garrison after another rallied to Rákóczi and notables all over Transylvania were joining the rebels, the aristocrats found themselves virtually captive in Szeben. The town became overcrowded and short of food; defenceless against Rabutin' intimidation, the captives were overcome by despair and a sense of impotence. First the servants, then young noblemen, and eventually even prominent aristocrats sought to escape from this hellhole.

Despite the urgings of the War Council, General Rabutin was slow to mount a counter-offensive. Being financially strapped, he raised 'donations' of 30,000 forints from Governor Bánffy and Treasurer Apor, 20,000 forints — part of it in silverware and jewels — from Chancellor Miklós Bethlen, and ten thousand forints each from other aristocrats. Then Rabutin sent off the captains-general of the széks to raise local troops in aid of the imperial regiments battling against the Kuruc rebels. The captain of Aranyosszék, István Thoroczkai, was made captive by his own troops near Kolozsvár. A dozen aristocrats, including Lőrinc Pekry, lord lieutenant of Fehér County, were seized at Balázsfalva by one of Thököly's former officers, István Guthi. The captain of Kővár, the younger Mihály Teleki, sought to safeguard his personal freedom and was the only aristocrat who disregarded Rabutin's order to go to Szeben, but even he could not escape his fate. In January 1704, after a long siege, he surrendered the castle to Colonel Mihály Kos. Refusing to face realities, Rabutin dispatched Count Mihály Mikes, a member of the Gubernium and captain-general of Háromszék, to suppress the rebellion in his district by applying the 'high political {2-402.} principle of divide et impera'; Mikes was disarmed by Székely insurgents and sent to Rákóczi under the guard of soldiers who had escaped from Kolozsvár.[123]123. OL, GT, LCRH F 43, I, p. 147.

Rákóczi waited until 29 November 1703 before issuing his first proclamation to Transylvania. The open letter, addressed to 'all those, from the upper, middle, and lower estates who bear arms or are capable of bearing arms', was designed to invigorate the opposition movement and win military support for Rákóczi.[124]124. OSzK Kézirattár, Fol. Hung. 1389, Fasc. 31, fol. 298. His messages to the Saxons and to the 'Vlach nation' indicated that Rákóczi counted on these ethnic groups as well, and was aware of their particular interests. In fall 1703, at a time when he had yet to devise plans for Transylvania's political reorganization, Rákóczi dispatched Pál Orosz to give 'direction' to the Transylvanian fighters.

Short on equipment, undisciplined, and lacking both suitable central leadership and a coherent policy, the insurgents could not withstand the counter-offensive launched by the imperial regiments. Colonel Tige's forces routed the rebels who were preparing to liberate Gyulafehérvár, then pursued their punitive campaign through the villages of the Maros Valley all the way to the Székelyföld, where, on 28 January 1704, at Holdvilág, they defeated the Székely regiments.

When, in early 1704, Rákóczi's western offensive ground to a halt, and the prospect of winning international recognition for the new Hungarian state grew dimmer, he effected a fundamental change in his policy regarding Transylvania. He appointed General István Thoroczkay commander-in-chief of the Transylvanian forces, and Count Mihály Teleki chief economic administrator. Their mission — apart from their specific functions — was to impose on Transylvania the authority of the new Hungarian state. From this time onwards, Rákóczi would distribute his more important decrees to the Transylvanian authorities as well. Transylvania's counties and széks were advised of the issue of new copper coinage; and the establishment, then liquidation of a salt monopoly encompassed Transylvania as well as Hungary proper.

{2-403.} Rákóczi's policy of integrating Transylvania ran into severe difficulties. His Catholic family enjoyed little political support in the principality. Mihály Apafi II was backed by a small but resilient group that received encouragement from Vienna. But Thököly's party, together with a strong and tenacious pro-Turkish party, grew in numbers; the prospect of independent statehood was a powerful incentive, and Thököly seemed destined to lead the principality.

The Porte declared in spring 1704 that it was ready to allow Thököly, living in exile in Nikomedia, to go home. To pave the way for his return, Transylvania's sent ahead Colonel Miklós Orlay with a contingent of some 500–700 men. They crossed the border at Dobra, and within a few days their numbers swelled into the thousands as they continued their irresistible advance. Orlay took Branyicska, Kolc Castle, Szászváros, and reached the princely capital of Gyulafehérvár ahead of General Thoroczkai. Meanwhile, a new and powerful uprising broke out in Háromszék and Csík. An armed force that had been marshalled by Mihály Heller and other notables surrounded Brassó. Their 'Barcaság Manifesto', issued on 14 March, offered the period's first comprehensive political program for Transylvania: 'We urge and beg, indeed, insist that all true sons of the country, from whatever nation, rally to our just cause and take up arms against our common enemy, and lose no time in saving our poor country from total destruction.'[125]125. OL, Rlt, III. oszt., XXXV. cs., No. 63. The manifesto called upon the nobility, the several estates, and townspeople to join on the basis of their common interests and create an independent state.

However, the Székelys lacked the strength to unite all anti-Habsburg forces behind the Barcaság program. The troops fighting under the flags of Rákóczi and of Thököly turned against each other. When Thoroczkai and his army of 5,000 reached Gyulafehérvár, Orlay suddenly expired; suspecting that he had been poisoned, the Thököly regiments dispersed. Thoroczkai, for his part, did not feel strong enough to confront the imperial forces, and {2-404.} Colonel Tige met little opposition as he continued his advance from one village to another. The imperial troops put Enyed to the torch and massacred its inhabitants, not sparing even students and pregnant women. The Székely insurgents reached the outskirts of Brassó, but they were routed by Colonel Graven's forces on 13 April 1704, at Feketehalom.

In spring 1704, while Transylvania fell prey to the punitive campaigns of the imperial regiments and to the roaming remnants of the Kuruc army, there appeared a variety of new political programs. In a pamphlet written in Szeben, and published in Holland under the title Columba Noe (Noah's Dove Bearing an Olive Branch), Chancellor Miklós Bethlen argued that Transylvania should keep its distance from both the Habsburg dynasty and Rákóczi. By paying tribute and with the backing of the Protestant countries in the west, Transylvania should make itself independent of both Turks and Habsburgs. Circumstances did not favour realization of this plan, although its fundamental premise, that Transylvania could help to preserve the balance of power in Europe, was appropriated by Rákóczi. Bethlen paid a heavy price for his initiative: Rabutin had him put in irons and taken from Szeben to Vienna, where he spent most of his remaining days in captivity. Transylvania's aristocrats also relied on purely hypothetical programs to solve the country's problems: their submissions to the imperial court and to the archbishop of Kalocsa, Pál Széchényi, bore the titles Planctus agonisantis Transylvaniae and Iam-iam expirantis Transylvaniae gemitus, and were based on the terms of the Diploma Leopoldinum.

However, support was growing in Transylvania for unified action, and for Rákóczi's party as well. More and more people came to the conclusion that the only way to settle Transylvania's status was to make Rákóczi prince. First the Székelys, then the counties of Torda, Kolozs, and Doboka sent emissaries to Hungary 'with the country's solemn proposal that Rákóczi follow his predecessors' example and take possession of Transylvania.'[126]126. V. Csutak, 'Háromszék felkelése a Rákóczi-szabadságharc elején,' A sepsiszentgyörgyi ev. ref. kollégium értesítője 1906/7 (Sepsiszent-györgy, 1907), p. 36.