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# 'Transylvania in Agony'

'Much as the sky cannot hold back its dew, and the sun its light and brilliance, but must share these gifts with the earth,' so does the emperor's grace and favour fall upon his chosen subjects.[115]115. V. Bíró, Apor István, p. 27. This typically baroque formulation, found in the letter of nobility granted to Count István Apor in 1696, aptly summed up the Habsburgs' social policy. Transylvania' aristocrats were justified in believing that, with the expulsion of the Turks, their prospects were better than ever. Aristocrats leased the right to collect taxes from the Treasury, and the Societas Arendatoria (1687–1698) brought them good returns. Lőrinc Pekry, once jailed because of his support for {2-390.} Thököly, converted to Catholicism and got back his confiscated property with compensation. He was named captain of Kapornak, then governor (bán) of Szörény and captain-in-chief of Székelyudvarhely, and received the title of imperial councillor; his loyalty was rewarded by the title of baron, then count. Imre Jósika's case was not unique: charged with responsibility for supplying the imperial troops, he earned grants of property and, in 1698, a barony.

However, by the end of the 1690s, it was becoming increasingly clear that Transylvania's prosperity was superficial, and dark clouds were gathering on the economic horizon. As the country integrated into the Habsburg empire, it found itself shouldering a double burden. There were, on the one hand, residual obligations, arising from the Turkish war, to provide food, transportation, and housing for an army exhausted and dehumanized by ten years of fighting; and, on the other hand, the Habsburg government's preparations for peace, which included developing Transylvania into the empire's southeastern, military stronghold. Rabutin's appointment as commander-in-chief was accompanied by instructions to consolidate military rule. An army of 20,000 was stationed in the country, and the Treasury launched a major construction program. A great fortification was erected at Szeben, construction began in several regions on military storehouses and bakeries, and forts in the Székelyföld were rebuilt. Many regions, devastated by war, seemed condemned to backwardness; and Transylvania was feeling the effects of the severe economic measures prompted by the empire's growing financial problems.

Probably as a result of this cumulation of burdens, the Habsburg government's policy of trying replenish an empty treasury from domestic sources had catastrophic consequences for Transylvania. The unbridled attempts of court aristocrats and noble officers to maximize their profit from the building programs only added to the problem.

{2-391.} For Transylvania, as for Hungary, the amount of the tax levy was determined by the Hofkammer (court treasury). Payable in cash, it amounted, in 1698, to one million forints. The levy was reduced somewhat, to 800,000 forints in 1700, 600,000 in 1701, and 800,000 in 1703, but, with the addition of arrears, the actual sum payable never fell below the original level; even in 1703, it stood at over one million forints. The Székelys' share was 22,000 Rhenish florins in 1692, and 100,000 in 1703. In addition to the cash tax, the country had to provide a 'portion', i.e. payments in kind — food, transportation, housing, and labour services — for the army. The value of this additional payment cannot be estimated in cash terms, but it is clear that the total tax burden on the population had reached a historic high.

These levies were wholly unrealistic in terms of the country's economic capacity, and their harmful impact was aggravated by some particular circumstances. Transylvania's tax system was not designed to distribute the burden according to the economic strength of different social groups. A small stratum of aristocrats, noble officials, and other privileged groups was exempt from taxation; the rest of the population was subject to the tax, but at varying rates. The inequities sharpened the conflicts between the feudal estates and the various regions of the country. There was ample opportunity for abuse, and the stronger had little difficulty in transferring some of their tax burden to the poorer and weaker strata. The provincial high commission charged with tax collection applied unprecedentedly harsh measures. It would routinely resort to military force and invoke the principle of collective responsibility. If a villein was unable to pay his taxes, he was seized, and if his relatives or neighbours could not pay for him, he was 'sold' into service for ten years to a new landowner. Members of the lesser nobility were equally at risk: if one did not have enough livestock to cover the amount of the tax, he would be bound to the person who put up the money for him.

{2-392.} The payment of taxes in cash presupposed a lively commercial environment, with much exchange of goods and commodities. However, the Habsburg government relied increasingly on foreign loans and sundry transactions to pay for military and diplomatic ventures, for the sprawling bureaucracy, and for the glittering court, and, in the process, the lower social estates lost much of their ability to generate a cash income. Transylvania's already weak monetary system took a turn for the worse. Whenever they could, soldiers paid with vouchers instead of cash. Like other officials, imperial army officers were exempted from paying customs duty, and they tried to monopolize both local and foreign trade. Transylvania's obligation to provide loading and shipping services was passed on to the local population, and often in such way as to profit private interests.

The Treasury set about managing the country's resources in accordance with the interests of the empire. The mercury mines at Zalatna were shut down so that mines in the Tyrol would have less competition. In 1695, government refused to allow a group of Transylvanian aristocrats to establish a joint stock company for trading in cattle. Meanwhile, the emperor sent letters of support to aristocrats in Hungary who launched lawsuits to recover their property in Transylvania. A new company was given the monopoly of the salt trade; it was named Palatino-Transilvanica Societas, after the palatine, Prince Pál Esterházy, but its capital was provided by the chief agent at the Habsburg court, Samuel Oppenheimer. The Máramaros salt mines belonging to Mihály Apafi II, who was interned in Vienna, were taken over in 1701 by the Treasury. The price of salt rose from one to five forints, and the decisions of the Committee for Salt Affairs gave rise to immeasurable difficulties. At the turn of the century, Transylvania suffered severe shortages of grain and meat; the cost of living soared, and famine threatened. The government was not able to accommodate the peculiarities of Transylvania's industrial sector. In 1702, it enacted customs regulations {2-393.} that effectively isolated the country from its historic markets; by prohibiting the importation of cloth, leather, and the chemicals required for the processing of leather and wool, it crippled the local industries.

The constraints on currency flows, which would have caused problems even in a more developed and less heavily taxed country, led to sever distortions in the Transylvanian economy. As cash became scarce, aristocrats, army officers, and entrepreneurs would lend money at usurious rates to people who could not otherwise meet the demands of the tax collectors. The creditors would often demand that the borrower commit himself to perpetual villeinage, and it became general practice for debtors to work off the interest due. Counties and urban communities would assume socage commitments on top of the interest. In the absence of effective oversight, people who held key economic and political posts found it uncommonly easy to enrich themselves. A case in point is that of Mihály Száva, the commissioner of the treasury stores at Gyulafehérvár. He bought grain from impoverished producers at a low price, and made a considerable profit reselling it to the army. Meanwhile, he compelled the grain carters to work on his own estates, 'sometimes for such long stints that these poor men, tiring of their misery, stole back their oxen and fled, leaving their carts behind.'[116]116. Records of testimony regarding the corrupt practices of Mihály Száva, OL, GP 1699. Száva failed to have the flour properly sifted and sold the bran for personal profit. He had the bakery and ovens constructed from second-hand bricks and carved stones from the palace, then submitted bills for new building material.

The poorer social strata suffered most from the false prosperity, but eventually the entire country, including the landowners, was affected. In 1699, a Cameratica Commissio was despatched to Transylvania to terminate the leases held by aristocrats on treasury property. Income from socage dwindled, and eventually socage obligations became unenforceable. The landowners reacted by developing their manorial farms and establishing new allodia. To {2-394.} compensate for the general shortage of manpower, they used all possible means to bind their workers to perpetual villeinage, and were merciless in imposing ever higher labour obligations.

There were also signs of change in the industrial activities of aristocrats and landowners. The war and the consequent boom in military construction projects brought them little benefit, for the Treasury normally paid not in cash, but by vouchers. Thus the unpaid labour of villeins became an even more valuable asset. Migrant Romanian villeins were allowed to establish a village at Zalánpatak on condition that they cut firewood for Sámuel Kálnoki's glass-blowing barn, provide unpaid labour for four weeks each year, mow hay and harvest crops, and accept the status of 'bound villeins'. In return, Kálnoki, who was the royal chief magistrate of Háromszék, exempted them from paying taxes.

Thus villeins, former soldiers, and lesser nobles were driven into double subjection, and when one of them tried to resist, his entire community would suffer the consequences. The scale of emigration rose rapidly in the 1690s. People 'staggered off to foreign countries', to Moldavia, Wallachia, or Poland.[117]117. Á. Várkonyi, Rákóczi, p. 28. Many migrated to the Hungarian Great Plain, recently liberated from Turkish rule. The number of abandoned plots multiplied; in 1689–90, close to a third of the plots in Transylvania were deserted. The number of 'gates' — the tax base — declined at the same time that the aggregate tax burden grew heavier. The number of livestock plummeted, while that of the landless poor increased in all regions. Transylvanian society's economic reserves were reaching a terminal state of depletion. Towns lost their communal possessions and sank deeply into debt. There were reports of craftsmen going bankrupt, emigrating, or committing suicide.

The soldier who is stationed in such an economically depressed country is himself in need, and he will not be choosy about his methods. There was much brutality involved in the collection of taxes and military supplies. Transylvania's Hungarian, {2-395.} Romanian, and Székely villeins, its townspeople, former soldiers, and lesser nobles suffered the pain and humiliation of beatings and imprisonment; glowing coals were applied to their bare stomachs, to the soles of their feet and the palms of their hands. 'I was tortured, hands tied behind my back, merely because I could not pay my 'portion" on the spot', said one victim; another was beaten until he 'bled through his nose and mouth'; others were 'assaulted and mocked by drunken German soldiers'; still others complained that soldiers 'demanded money for everything and engaged in thievery'.[118]118. Székely oklevéltár VII. 69, 109-110; XVIII. 387-88. There were thousands of incidents throughout Transylvania similar to the one related by a villein from the Fogaras district: 'I had draught oxen, but they were so overworked that I had to sell them, and have none left; because of all this dreadful business, I had to sell my other cattle, and even my inheritance.'[119]119. OL, GP 1699/377, 1701/161, 1703/9.

Tiring of their privations, two imperial regiments rebelled in 1698 and threatened to join the Turks. Stewards and foremen did not dare to circulate among the villeins, and the imperial commissioners sent to appoint new municipal officials lived in fear of their lives. There were more and more reports of rising tensions between the aristocracy and lower social strata, between the imperial army and administration, and the country. The social consensus disintegrated, the state became impotent, and anarchy spread. Members of the ruling groups were well aware of these problems, and sought various remedies. The Gubernium, along with municipal and county administrators, turned to Vienna for help but received only empty promises. The narrow-minded General Rabutin tried to cover up his own sense of insecurity by resorting to more and more brutal measures, provoking serious disorders.

Lőrinc Pekry's belief that calm could be restored was based on a similarly narrow outlook. He suggested that the most restless 'nation', the Székelys, be marshalled into imperial regiments and transferred to other parts of the empire. When the proposal leaked out, the public was so outraged that some time would pass before {2-396.} Pekry, armed with a safe-conduct from the emperor, dared to return to Transylvania. The royal chief magistrate of Szeben, Count János Harteneck, sought to expand the Saxons' privileges at the expense of the other two 'nations'. He thus aggravated the social tensions until his private misdemeanours gave his sworn enemy, Rabutin, an excuse to have him beheaded.

More comprehensive and long-term plans were devised at the two poles of state power. Chancellor Miklós Bethlen pressed for social reforms that built on the legacy of the modern principality: a more rational policy toward villeins, and a contribution to the public purse from the privileged classes. Although, in 1702, the diet did transfer a quarter of the villeins' tax burden to the landowners, Bethlen had neither his peers' undivided support nor the administrative means to implement his plans. At the other pole, the Habsburg government was most concerned with liquidating the institutional remnants of the principality. The Cameratica Commissio took over the functions of the treasury and became the country's highest governing authority. To pave the way for an income tax, it launched an unprecedentedly comprehensive survey of the financial means of everyone subject to taxation. The measure provoked fierce opposition in all sectors of Transylvanian society. Count Ehrenreich Seeau, the third chairman within three years of the Cameratica Commissio, summed up the situation: 'The main problem is that Transylvanians hate the Germans, and they are only interested getting rid of the latter's yoke.'[120]120. DFGS II, 1840, pp. 302-9.