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# The Balázsfalva Agreement and the Fogaras Declaration

In fall 1686, after the Turks had surrendered at Buda, Prince Apafi wrote to the King of Poland: 'We are more than pleased at the success of Christian arms, for it heralds our liberation from the Turkish yoke, [but we fear that victory] may curtail the freedom of some Christian denominations'.[98]98. EOE 19, p. 65. In these changing circumstances, Transylvanian leaders took diplomatic initiatives to safeguard the principality's interests. Apafi contacted the King of Poland as well as the Prince-Elector of Brandenburg and the Marquis de Béthune, and he sent a letter to Louis XIV; but of all the members of the Holy League, Poland was the country whose protection he courted most assiduously. From Frederick William he sought protection for the Protestant religion; from the King of France, he hoped to obtain guarantees — based on the Treaty of Nijmegen — of Transylvania's statehood.

Apafi's envoys were still on their way when a letter arrived conveying Emperor Leopold's wish that his army, exhausted after the long siege of Buda, spend the winter at rest in Transylvania. With Máramaros County occupied by the forces of Colonel Veterani, and the western counties by General Caraffa, the principality felt under threat. Bands of soldiers — Labanc (pro-Habsburg Hungarian), Turkish, German, and pro-Thököly — were rampaging through the Körös river valleys, while Turks were raiding the principality from Moldavia and the southwest.

{2-368.} The prince, aided by a committee and a forty-strong council, tried to negotiate his way out of the crisis. A gift of 2000 gold pieces and six horses — a considerable bribe even by the standards of the Porte — drew General Caraffa to the bargaining table. Over the winter of 1686–87, the government expended close to two million forints in cash, grain, and livestock in order to shelter at least part of Transylvania from the devastation of winter quartering and to contribute to the cost of the anti-Turk war.

In the event, the imperial forces disregarded the understanding, and not only the northwest, but other regions as well fell prey to the depredations of the hungry soldiery. The agreements proved worthless, and Caraffa continued to make threatening demands: 'I am not interested in the emperor or the court; I do as I wish. Neither the emperor nor the court will punish me for trying to supply His Majesty's troops; on the contrary, when they hear of it, they will be full of praise for Count Caraffa.'[99]99. Report of András Naláczi and Zsigmond Bálinthit, AOT II, p. 106. The envoys, sent by Apafi to Eperjes to bargain for terms less onerous than the 10,000 'portions' and provisions for four regiments demanded by Caraffa, travelled on to Vienna to seek redress, and news reached Transylvania that 'Caraffa had seized some thirty nobles at Eperjes.'[100]100. Report of Sámuel Kálnoki, AOT II, p. 114. Meanwhile, the army led by the grand vizier to recapture Buda was annihilated at Nagyharsány. In fall 1687, Charles, Duke of Lorraine, entered Transylvania at the head of the victorious allied forces.

There were two reasons why the main, imperial army was ordered into Transylvania. First, the Hungarian kingdom was too devastated to feed the troops. Second, the War Council was pursuing a deliberate military and political strategy aimed at bringing Transylvania under Habsburg control. The Pozsony diet had endorsed the hereditary right of the Habsburg dynasty to the Crown of Saint Stephen, and Emperor Leopold wanted to secure all of historic Hungary before notifying other European rulers of this change in the constitution.

{2-369.} Apafi's court soberly concluded that it would be suicidal to confront an imperial force of some 40,000 men. The Duke of Lorraine proceeded to occupy Somlyó, Kolozsvár, and Szamosújvár, and was heading for Szeben when he was intercepted by Apafi's envoys. The prince proposed to negotiate on the basis of the 1686 treaty. The Duke of Lorraine was an outstanding soldier, more concerned with the welfare of his troops than with dynastic interests, and he signed at Balázsfalva an agreement congruent with the treaty of 28 June 1686. Transylvania once again salvaged its statehood, but at immense cost: 700,000 German florins, as well as all the food and fodder required by the army for the duration of the winter. Although the harvest was good that year, the quantities committed represented a crushing burden; 66,000 köböl (over 200,000 cubic metres) of wheat, 40,000 quintals of meat, 7,000 40-litre barrels of wine, 120,000 köböl of oats, 144,000 quintals of hay, and 480,000 bales of straw. In return, Duke Charles guaranteed that the emperor would respect the principality's independence: 'No one would interfere with the government [of the prince and his successors], and no one would lay claim to revenues of the diet, the prince, towns, castles, salt-ports, gold and silver mines, nor to those generated by the thirtieth tax and customs duties'.[101]101. AOT III, p. 185. Freedom of religion and commerce would be preserved; soldiers quartered in the principality would not abuse of the civilian population, 'nor force villeins to do unpaid work, nor rape the women'.[102]102. Ibid. It was repeatedly stressed in the agreement that the country could only meet its commitments to provide foodstuffs and fodder if peace and order were maintained.

However, the Transylvanians did not take into account the fact that Charles wished to exploit the occupation of their country to boost his political status in Vienna, where his party was facing severe difficulties. Pursuant to the agreement, Szeben was handed over to the duke, and when the latter moved into that Saxon stronghold, he had coins minted with the inscription Capta Transylvania {2-370.} to commemorate the military occupation of the country. The victorious commander then departed from Transylvania, leaving in charge General Scherffenberg, who was seconded by generals Veterani and Starhemberg; and these men were concerned only with the welfare of their soldiers.

Faced with growing evidence of military rule, Miklós Bethlen addressed a memorandum to the emperor, urging him to prevent the troops from devastating a flourishing country. The memorandum, which was headed Moribunda Transylvania, began by evoking the opening reference in Zrínyi's Az török áfium ellen való orvosság to King Croesus's deaf son, who was driven to speak up by the sight of a dagger designed to murder his father; the mortal danger facing his homeland impelled Bethlen, like Zrínyi before him, to raise his voice in protest.

The dynastic party in Vienna held the political clauses of the Balázsfalva Agreement to be unacceptable. General Caraffa, who had successfully brought about the capitulation of Munkács, was charged in early 1688 with settling Transylvania's status in accordance with the spirit of the constitutional amendment enacted by the diet at Pozsony. Transylvania's newly military commander moved into the princely residence at Szeben, where was joined by his new secretary, Dániel Absolon; the latter, who had served as a diplomat for the prince, and then for Thököly, had offered his services to Caraffa at the time of the fall of Munkács. Caraffa lived up to the fearful reputation that had preceded him in Transylvania. Ignorant of local conditions, indifferent to the traditions of Transylvanian statehood, Caraffa tried to impose patently unfeasible reforms. He convoked council members one by one for discussions, and treated Mihály Teleki with exceptional courtesy, though that did not stop him from confiscating the Teleki manor house along with the property of other aristocrats and noblemen. Miklós Bethlen, who had a strong dislike for Teleki, recorded that 'by resorting to these separate interviews, juxta aliud: divide et impera, {2-371.} [Caraffa] induced a dreadful diffidence, particularly in Teleki, who came to fear everyone, and me above all; thus Caraffa achieved in rem et intentionem suam felicissime.'[103]103. Bethlen önéletírása I, p. 377.

Transylvania's leaders, councillors and feudal representatives, put up little opposition. On 9 May 1688, having voted down all contrary proposals, they signed the Fogaras Declaration: Transylvania would rejoin Hungary and trade the Porte's suzerainty for that of Leopold I, Emperor and King of Hungary, and of his heir, Joseph I, in accordance with the rulings of the Pozsony diet. Imperial troops could garrison the fortresses of the principality, which would pay Vienna a tax of 700,000 forints. They still wished to preserve Transylvania's statehood on the terms of the Balázsfalva Agreement, but the emperor's ordinance only promised to preserve freedom of religion and to keep the troops under control. In the event, Leopold did nothing to implement these promises. Anna Bornemissza, who had shared the task of government with the prince, became profoundly depressed at the ruin of her family and country, and she died soon after the Fogaras Declaration.

Social groups adopted a variety of protective postures. Many villeins and Székelys chose an ancient defensive tactic and withdrew to the mountains. Nagybánya, Brassó, and Beszterce chose open resistance. Caraffa sent Veterani with a force of 3,000 men to Brassó while ordering Mihály Teleki to take similar punitive action with Transylvanian troops. The people of Brassó, led by a Saxon goldsmith, Gáspár Kreutz, made it known that they would rather die than open their gates to the imperial guards, and they set up cannons on the town walls. The unequal battle ended with Brassó's surrender, and the united resistance of the townspeople was undermined by Caraffa's tested tactics. Claiming to act for the prince, Boldizsár Macskási chaired a martial law court composed of selected citizens and government delegates. His verdict, as Mihály Cserei records, was exceptionally severe, for 'the poor wretches' heads were put on stakes.'[104]104. Cserei históriája, p. 211. Miklós Bethlen's proposal, that landowners {2-372.} pay half of the 280-forint tax imposed on each household, was voted down at the 1689 meeting of the diet at Segesvár; the army was thereupon charged with collecting the tax. In spring 1690, a pamphlet authored by one Johann Flämitzer claimed that Austria, which had taken over Transylvania by right of jus armorum, was the Messiah of the principality, and that the ongoing process of constitutional reform obviated any recourse to force.