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# The Early Stages

In the critical period following the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand at Sarajevo, Hungary's prime minister was initially alone in stubbornly opposing a war with Serbia. Fearing for the equilibrium of the Dualist system, Tisza did not want the monarchy to be enlarged by the annexation of southern Slav territory. His opposition was also driven by the fear that Transylvania might be invaded. From the outset, Tisza regarded Romania's military power as a threat to Hungary, and he tried to frighten the advocates of war by speculating — disingenuously — that a Romanian attack might prompt Transylvania's Romanians to rebel. He believed that it was inopportune to launch a war at a time 'when we have just about lost Romania, and without compensation.'[88]88. Tisza's memorandum, quoted in Magyarország története, 7, pp. 1086-7. In mid-July, Tisza gave in to German pressure and stopped arguing against war; without demanding a quid pro quo, Germany had guaranteed that Romania would remain neutral, and the German General Staff promised the dispatch of 40,000 troops to defend Transylvania's borders.

The decision in favour of war activated an 'emergency law' that allowed, in turn, for a series of exceptional measures. On July 20, air traffic was prohibited over an area reaching from southern Hungary to Lupény. On July 26, a state of emergency was decreed in the entire region between Serbia and Galicia, including Transylvania; restrictions were imposed on border traffic and on the right of assembly, the counties' administrative authority was curtailed, jury courts were suspended, and accelerated criminal procedures were introduced. Press censorship was imposed nationwide, {3-733.} as was the monitoring of mail, wire, and telephone communications. Horses and vehicles were requisitioned for military use, and the mass mobilization began of men of military age; their families were 'compensated' at the rate of 57 to 70 fillérs per day, depending on the district. The country was progressively put on a war footing, and much of the economy came under state control. The emergency measures encompassed compulsory delivery, product distribution centres, rationing, price controls, the designation of certain enterprises as war industries, and the allocation of manpower. In 1915, a modest economic boom materialized thanks to military production, a good crop, and the assignment of prisoners of war to supplement the labour force. The expansionary effects were felt in Transylvania's industrial sector as well.

Though nominally an ally, the Romanian kingdom found itself in an awkward situation and initially remained neutral. Situated between two great powers, Romanians felt most threatened by the growing military strength of Russia. At the same time, it was clear that only the victory of the Entente, an alliance that included Russia, could bring about the realization of their greatest national ambitions. Political realism dictated that the Romanians keep their military force intact and stay out of the war as long as possible. When war broke out, the Entente and the Central Powers began to vie for Romania's active support, and Transylvania became a token of wartime diplomacy.

Romanian politicians who sympathized with the Central Powers mobilized their contacts in Vienna and Berlin to exert pressure on Budapest: their calculation was that if the Hungarian government granted significant concessions to Transylvania's Romanians, Romania would find it easier to join battle on the side of the Central Powers. As early as August 1914, Tisza was urged by the Romanian consul in Berlin to make some friendly gestures towards his country's Romanians. In September, Bucharest urged that Transylvania be made autonomous and that part of Bukovina {3-734.} be ceded to Romania. The German ambassador held talks with conservative Romanian politicians on the question of Transylvania; King Charles told him that Russia had promised Transylvania to the Romanians and would obtain French and British backing for such a transfer. The king, who felt drawn towards Germany, wanted to prevent Romania from turning against Austria–Hungary; in some desperation, he suggested that German troops be stationed in Transylvania and that Bulgaria be 'stirred up.'

Meanwhile, the Germans stepped up their pressure on Tisza; they claimed that they had joined the war only out of loyalty and 'expected Austria–Hungary to take account of our well-founded wishes and do its utmost to facilitate the prospects of our victory in this life-and-death struggle.'[89]89. Telegram from Germany's foreign ministry to military headquarters, 13 September 1914, PA AA Bonn, Österreich 104, Bd. 13. Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg personally urged Tisza to make concessions. Romania's Liberal prime minister, Brătianu, was more cautious; adopting a wait-and-see tactic, he played down the issue of Hungarian concessions. (He refused Germany's offer of Bessarabia on the grounds that Russia could take it back at any time.) Tisza, on the other hand, considered that Romania's attitude would be contingent on the outcome of the war; concessions would be superfluous if the Central Powers won, and worthless if they lost. Realizing that Bucharest's proposals were no more than trial balloons, Tisza allowed that he would be willing to discuss concessions as soon as Romania's government made a binding promise of military cooperation. However, not everyone shared his views, or realized that, in Bucharest, only the conservatives favoured active support for the Central Powers, while Brătianu wanted Austro–Hungarian concessions in exchange for Romania's provisional neutrality.

On 1 October 1914, Russia concluded an agreement with Romania promising that the latter's neutrality would be rewarded with the annexation of Transylvania and southern Bukovina. Pressed from all sides, Tisza told the crown council on September 12 that he might be willing to make some significant concessions. {3-735.} The following day, he convoked Mihali, Maniu, and Vaida-Voevod, and promised them that if the 'whole Romanian race' rallied to the defence of the monarchy, he would extend language rights, revise Apponyi's educational laws, and create more Romanian electoral districts. Vaida agreed and did not even ask for guarantees. Maniu, however, was so non-committal that Tisza courteously brought the meeting to a close.

In late September, both Bucharest and Berlin came up with new schemes. The Romanians proposed that, by common agreement, Romanian troops be stationed in Transylvania and Bukovina to help forestall a Russian attack. Needless to say, Tisza firmly rejected this option. The German and Austrian ambassadors in Bucharest held talks with Vaida, Vlad, and Goldiş, and concluded that the latter were 'utterly devoted to the emperor;' together, they drafted a list of demands that the Germans communicated to Budapest. These included the appointment of ethnic Romanians to a cabinet post and as the lords lieutenant of several counties, the creation of a comprehensive Romanian school system and a Romanian university, and the allocation to Romanians of forty constituencies.[90]90. Telegram from Bussche, Germany's ambassador to Bucharest, 18 October 1914, PA AA Bonn, Österreich 104. Bd. 13. A 2720. The German foreign ministry was well-briefed on the history of the Romanian national movement in Transylvania. Aurel C. Popovici sent the Germans numerous recommendations as well as the voluminous documentation generated by the prewar negotiations with Tisza. The German ambassador to Bucharest believed — as did Germany's chancellor — that 'Hungary is responsible for the anti-German orientation of public opinion in Romania, and Count Tisza must give way while there is still time.'[91]91. Ibid. But Tisza would not budge from the conditions set down during his prewar negotiations with the Romanian leaders. In order to keep Romania's ruling circles in a state of uncertainty, and to delay a decision on their part, he broadened slightly the scope of the concessions he had promised earlier. He continued to hope that Hungary could resolve the problem without major sacrifice.

{3-736.} The Hungarian public had no knowledge of these diplomatic activities. However, an exchange of letters between Tisza and the archbishop of Nagyszeben, was made public on 8 November 1914. This revealed that, back in September, Tisza had acknowledged the loyalty and patriotic sacrifice of the Hungarian state's Romanian subjects, and had promised to broaden the rights of nationalities. Press suits were suspended, the monarch amnestied Romanians sentenced for political offences, and the government issued a decree authorizing display of the Romanian tricolour. These measures had little impact in Romania, but they displeased Hungarian nationalists; Apponyi openly expressed his disapproval. The reaction among Transylvania's Romanians was mixed: political moderates did not dare to seize the proffered hand, while radicals considered that the measures fell short of their minimum demands. In an interview published in Az Újság, Maniu invited Tisza to present a more detailed proposal for institutional guarantees of the national rights of Romanians; so far, he said, Tisza had not promised enough to 'make our national existence secure.'[92]92. Az Újság, 16 November 1914, quoted in Desăvîrşirea unificării, p. 122. The Romanian national committee held back from commenting on the government's concessions; back in August, its newspaper had warned committee members 'who felt an irresistible urge to issue political declarations or statements to indicate that they are expressing their personal opinion; since the Romanian National Party's committee is not able to convene, no one is entitled to make declarations on behalf of the Romanian people.'[93]93. Românul, 12 August 1914, quoted in Desăvîrşirea unificării, p. 118.

In fact, the diplomatic contest for Romania's support had a positive effect on the situation of Transylvania's Romanians. Apart from the noted measures, the government took pains — particularly after late 1914 — to avoid provoking the ire of the minority. It even postponed the prosecution of Goga and Lucaciu, who were clearly hostile to the régime and had 'escaped' to Romania. State prosecutors were instructed to 'interfere as little as possible with the Romanian-language press.'[94]94. J. Galántai, Magyarország az első világháborúban (Budapest, 1974), p. 195. Thus, ironically, the government {3-737.} facilitated the survival of the National party's newspaper, Românul, which the editors had been planning to close down — because of censorship — at the end of 1914. Some time later, the authorities suspended prosecution of a suspected spy, and Justice Minister János Sándor promised to forego such judicial initiatives.

Although relations became more tense in 1915 between Romania and the Central Powers, negotiations went on over the Transylvanian question. There were successes as well as setbacks on the eastern front, but Germany remained keen to obtain Romania's support and continued to urge the Hungarians to make concessions. When their armies broke through at Gorlice, the Germans considered that 'the historical moment had come when the Romanians might be persuaded to cooperate.'[95]95. O. Czernin, Im Weltkriege (Berlin, 1919), p. 127. Vienna was more flexible on the issue of concessions than Budapest, but the German ambassador was advised that 'the emperor, Tisza, and Burian are immovable.'[96]96. Report of Tschirschky, Germany's ambassador to Vienna, 28 May 1915, PA AA Bonn, Geh. III, Geh. Journ. No. 10, Botschaft Wien, Ganz geheime Sachen. Yet Berlin did not desist from its plans. In May and June, Mathias Erzberger visited Budapest and Vienna, and he conferred with Romanian leaders about a federalization of the monarchy. It was anticipated that if an agreement materialized, a few Transylvanian-Romanian politicians would tour Romania and try to undermine popular support for the Entente. Tisza steadfastly rejected such experiments, and he travelled to Berlin on June 17 to register his opposition.

A momentary improvement in the military situation and Bulgaria's entry into war helped to relieve the pressure on the Hungarian government. Romanian papers were scolded for not reporting on various public declarations of loyalty. The most determined opponent, Maniu, was sent to the front, and the police were given greater license to preserve order. In March 1916, the National party's newspaper, Românul, was closed down.

In the meantime, Transylvania remained without military protection. In late 1914, the chief of the general staff, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, had begun to assemble a Transylvanian army {3-738.} group, but the units were soon dispatched to the Russian front, and the same thing happened in 1915 with the 70th border-guard division. Thus, by 1916, the gendarmerie was virtually alone in patrolling Transylvania's borders.