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# Hungary in 1618–1619

When Gabriel Bethlen went to war against Ferdinand II, he did so as part of an international alliance. Transylvania's western foe lay close at hand, in the Hungarian kingdom of the Habsburgs. Regardless of the evolution of international politics, Hungarians welcomed the prospect of intervention. Events surrounding the election of Ferdinand II on 18 May, 1618 helped to pave the way.

The election occurred amidst much turbulence, for the feudal orders in their majority raised both practical and principled objections to Ferdinand's accession to the Hungarian throne. For one thing, they objected to his nomination. They considered that the imposition of the archduke, while in accordance with the Habsburg rules of succession, infringed their right to freely elect their king. The confirmation of Ferdinand as crown prince while Matthias II was still alive created the dangerous impression that they had accepted the 'perpetual' entitlement of the Habsburgs to the Hungarian crown. For another thing, they had a personal objection to Ferdinand. At the time of his election, he was almost forty-one, and, from his seat at Gratz, had been ruling over his family's hereditary provinces for 18 years. His style of governance was well known and made Hungary's political elite deeply apprehensive. With the support of the Catholic Church, Ferdinand had imposed absolutistic rule over the Styrian provinces, and the Hungarians feared that he would apply this tested model in their country.

If Ferdinand was nevertheless elected, it was largely thanks to clever tactics that played upon the electors' sentiments and to the rationale so brilliantly formulated by Péter Pázmány. This excellent politician understood his fellow nobles better than anyone, and {2-66.} knew the arguments that would win them over. These were, in summary, that the country lacked the strength to rid itself of foreign domination and restore its unity; and that it was therefore necessary to choose a Habsburg king, for only that dynasty had the resources to expel the Turks. The diet allowed itself to be persuaded.

Just as the electoral agitation had calmed down, and as Hungary's politicians prepared to address problems that had been neglected for five years, there arrived an emissary of the Czech rebels. Passions were stirred up once again as he evoked the feudal confederation and Bocskai's war of independence. In the end, the Hungarians kept their distance from the murky plots in Prague and reaffirmed their support for Ferdinand II. The new palatine, Zsigmond Forgách, had the emissary seized and delivered to suffer the emperor's revenge.

It was obvious, however, that the lull in the debates over Hungary's future was only temporary and would not last beyond the anticipated death of the elderly and ailing emperor-king, Matthias II. Ferdinand himself seemed unaware of the looming threat. At a time when the hereditary provinces were turning against him, and when the Czechs compelled Moravia to join them in an attack directed at Vienna, Ferdinand seemed disposed to provoke a clash with the Hungarian estates. On 29 March, 1619, only nine days after the death of Matthias II, Ferdinand convoked a session of the diet. While the estates were in session, they seemed to justify Ferdinand's complacency, for they still steered clear of the Bohemian–Moravian–Austrian feudal alliance. To be sure, amidst much sterile debate, some displayed support for the option of assisting the Czechs, but not enough to merit a visit by Ferdinand II to Pozsony. He was content to have his case made by the expert tactician, Péter Pázmány, and by the palatine, Forgách. The two men persuaded the diet to forego any support for the Czechs and to offer, instead, to mediate in the affair. In June 1619, when the armies of the Bohemian–Moravian–Austrian feudal alliance {2-67.} reached Vienna, the Hungarians sent a delegation to their commander, Matej Thurn. The latter unequivocally rejected the Hungarians' proposal that he negotiate with the emperor. The initiative nevertheless brought some results. Szaniszló Thurzó, who led the delegation into the camp, secretly informed the rebels that their movement enjoyed some support in Hungary.

Another member of the Hungarian opposition, György Rákóczi — the son of the onetime prince of Transylvania — approached Bethlen while the diet was meeting in Pozsony. The Rákóczi family was represented at Pozsony by his brother, who no doubt kept him abreast of developments. Thus György learned that the diet was almost equally divided between Ferdinand's supporters and opponents with respect to issues of foreign policy and religion. It was this balance of forces that led to a compromise favoring mediation; and the same circumstance explained why, after heated debates, the diet took no decision favoring either Catholics or Protestants. In August, the diet suspended its session re infecta, without having completed its tasks, indeed, without having drafted a single bill.

Rákóczi's appeal to Bethlen had the result of upsetting this equilibrium. On 18 August, 1619, Bethlen sent off messages that he was prepared to fight, 'respectful of God, for our nation's liberty.'[42]42. Bethlen Gábor kiadatlan politikai levelei, pp. 118-119. He thus bolstered the position of his co-religionists, the Calvinists; and by launching a military campaign against the king, he emboldened the opposition.