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# Commerce

Miklós Bethlen often affirmed that commerce was central to the acquisition of wealth. His own experience testified to an enterprising spirit. When he married an impecunious girl, his stepmother held back his inheritance, and he had no more than 25 forints. However, he sold the gold cups received as a wedding present 'for {2-290.} six hundred or seven hundred forints, with which I bought wine to start an inn; God blessed the enterprise, for it became one of my goldmines. The other was wheat; when it was cheap, I increased the output a hundred, sometimes a thousand fold [and] made a considerable profit on it.'[54]54. Bethlen önéletírása I, pp. 235-36.

Almost all landowners engaged in some form of commerce. Chancellor János Bethlen had servants buy up cattle and drive them to Vienna. Mihály Teleki traded regularly in horses, salt, as well as in the wine obtained as feudal dues and bought at a low, imposed price. István Apor traded in oxen and wine, selling the one in Vienna and the other in Wallachia. György Czegei Wass tended his vineyards, fish ponds, and apiaries with a view to turning a profit on the market. The transport of grain was the main activity of Pál Béldi's market towns, Kézdivásárhely and Bereck, and, in 1675, Béldi ruled that they could not cart anyone else's grain until they had shipped, free of charge, his own 3500 cubic meters of grain to Moldavia.

The profit-hungry aristocrats were disposed to crush all commercial competitors, but they faced two powerful opponents: the Treasury and the urban merchants. The latter category encompassed the so-called Greek trading companies (which included Hungarians and Saxons as well as merchants of other nationalities), the Compania Graeca of Szeben and Brassó, as well as Armenian traders and the Compania Orientalis.

The conflict of interest between state and private commerce developed in a rather complex fashion. In those critical times when the principality was gripped by war and the threat of annihilation, the interests of government, aristocrats, and landowners naturally converged, and the state's commercial monopolies met with general acceptance and even active support. In the summer of 1662, the diet, at its meeting in Kolozsvár, ordered landowners to provide villeins — or pay carters — to transport the Treasury salt destined for Turkish tribute to river ports; they would otherwise incur a 200 {2-291.} forint fine. The Treasury preserved its exclusive right to export salt, mercury, copper, honey, wax, leather, and wine; exercised its preemptive right to buy up fine cloth and aba cloth; and kept tight control of the export trade to Wallachia and Moldavia. In its other commercial policies, the state showed some flexibility. There were various measures taken to promote domestic trade, and commercial privileges were liberally granted in exchange for loans or other services.

The urgent need to revive domestic and foreign trade after a long period of war-induced paralysis also served to delay a clash between the commercial interests of the state, the aristocracy, and the merchant class. Road traffic returned to normal and rivers — the country's most important commercial arteries — once again swarmed with rafts and boats. Some traditional fairs came to life again, although the country had lost one of its most important market towns, Várad, and Kolozsvár's fairs declined due to the town's new status as a border stronghold. On the other hand, the fairs at Brassó and Marosvásárhely grew in importance, drawing buyers and sellers, Székelys, Saxons, Romanians, and Armenians, from a wide area. The principality's revenues from the salt trade rose between 1664 and 1680 from 40,000 to 120,000 forints. Its revenue from the thirtieth tax was also on the increase; in Törcsvár, it rose from 4,000 forints in 1664 to over 6,000 forints in 1668 and 20,000 forints in 1680. As commercial activity increased, so did the number of people engaged in transporting goods. Particularly in the less fertile regions and in the suburbs of industrial towns, a growing number of people turned to cartage or rafting to earn a living.

Over time, as the volume of commerce grew, the tensions between the various commercial interests became more acute. Earlier, the state had intervened to resolve differences between the Compania Graeca on the one hand, and Armenian traders as well as the Jewish merchants in Fehérvár on the other; now, the state's own commercial interests came into play. The conflict between the state {2-292.} power and landowners — aristocrats and noblemen — intent on maximizing their share of the market was sparked off by the 'Greek companies'. A grouping of wealthy entrepreneurs, the Greek company of Szeben and Brassó, acted as an agent for the English Levant Company and had links with many commercial enterprises in the Balkans. The group had considerable turnover and capital assets; its loans and money-changing activities helped the principality to recover from the economic crisis of 1657–60, and the state would continue to draw on the group's financial assistance. Thus Apafi would not only defend but actively favour the Greek companies, which in 1672 were able to preserve their privileges against the Compania Orientalis. The latter had to agree to a higher tax before winning Apafi's permission to trade in Polish, German, Viennese, Venetian, and Turkish goods, and then, only from its Fehérvár warehouse. However, once the domestic economy had recovered its health, the accommodation, born of necessity, between the several commercial groups began to break down. János Páter, president of the Brassó group, leased the Csík iron works and, in 1674, obtained the privilege of marketing a share of Transylvania's salt.

In a preface that touched on the development of commercial conflict, Miklós Bethlen opined that 'anyone with brains and a real soul will note and deplore the spread of the Greeks' power in our homeland.'[55]55. Ibid., pp. 265-66. Protests at the Greeks' trading privileges and demands for restrictive measures came from the commercial stratum of 'native sons', the counties, the Székely districts, and sundry notables. Ostensibly, the government's response was no different from that in countries with a more developed and competitive commercial system: 'Offer your goods at a lower price, and we will buy from you instead of from the Greeks.' But the reality of Transylvanian commerce was more complex. Over time, leading politician-aristocrats secured a place for themselves in the Greek trading companies. The latter's main defender in the princely council {2-293.} was Mihály Teleki. The second wife of Chancellor János Bethlen transacted business with the 'Greek' András Horváth, who had leased the thirtieths tax. János Páter's salt lease was endorsed by such notables as Dénes Bánffy, László Székely, and Mihály Teleki. At the same time, according to Bethlen, Teleki would incite the feudal orders and burghers against the Greeks. Such behaviour was common wherever a court aristocracy impinged on the process of government.

By the end of the 1670s, an increasingly large share of commercial profits was passing into the hands of the aristocracy. The members of the 'minting society' of Enyed still covered a broad social spectrum. They included János Bethlen, an aristocrat; Gáspár Kornis, a civil servant; János Páter, an entrepreneur; and the goldsmith János Jó. In contrast, when a company was founded in 1680 to monopolize the cattle trade with Hungary and Wallachia, it seems that its directors — who each put up a share capital of 8700 forints — were all aristocrats. So were István Apor, Miklós Bethlen, and the other directors who put up 500 forints each to establish a Transylvanian company trading in sheep and honey; they counted on the state's backing to maximize their profits in this important market. Evidence suggests that Transylvania's wealth was becoming concentrated in comparatively few hands.