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# {2-166.} The Székelys

Beginning in the mid-1500s, a succession of princes had alternately abrogated and reinstated the traditional liberties of the Székelys, but the latter entered the new century on an upswing, for their privileges had the backing of Transylvania's ruler when peace was restored. By then, however, the substance of Székely liberties had changed. All Székelys were still exempt from regular state taxes, but the previously generalized right and duty to military service no longer applied to those who had become villeins. The practical consequence was that Székely notables treated domestic social questions as their own affair and considered state regulations to be inapplicable to their villeins.

Paradoxically, the feudal privileges of the free Székelys came to encompass their villeins, who thus enjoyed a comparatively advantageous status. To be sure, the special taxes that were periodically imposed were no longer payable by the whole 'nation', but only by the villeins. But if this left them at a disadvantage compared to the free Székelys, their burden was still considerably lighter than that of other Transylvanian villeins. For instance, in 1616, when they had to contribute to the Turkish tribute, the rate was 11 forints for every ten Székely villeins, compared to 19 forints for ten villeins elsewhere in Transylvania. Moreover, the Székely villeins were linked only to their landlord; their villein status was not entered on official registers. Since it was in the landowners' interest to minimize their villeins' tax burden, they probably did their best to keep the latter off the rolls when the prince's officials came around to lay the ground for a special imposition. At any rate, the emergency taxes imposed in 1616 were not fully paid even as late as 1622, and it is not likely that the prince's collectors were at fault.

Under these circumstances, Székelys were not at all averse to assuming the status of villeins. According to a 1614 survey, 60 percent {2-167.} of the 'headbound' (fejekötött) people in Marosszék allowed that they had freely chosen to become villeins. The reasons they gave included the fear of war, poverty, famine, and disease. Some 134 of the 514 'headbound' villeins — a remarkably high proportion — testified that they had put themselves under a landowner's authority to escape insecurity. Thus a peculiar contrast emerged in the early 1700s between county peasants, who had to be forced or given tax inducements to resume their prewar status of villein, and Székely peasants who were not particularly attached to their freedom. It has been estimated that by 1620, some 20,000 Székely heads of household were in some form of villein status; their number was equivalent to roughly 20 percent of the villeins in the counties.

The exemption from taxes of this large number of people meant a considerable loss to the exchequer. Yet when the prince launched an attack on Székely serfdom, it was less for this reason than because it deprived Transylvania's army of its best recruits. Apart from the standing army of 4,000–5,000 men, the Székelys were the most readily mobilizable force; the Székely contingent, numbering around 10,000, could be mustered ready for action within probably no more than a week. Their mobilization required little expenditure, for they were required to bring their own weapons and, in some cases, food supply.

The Székelys' distinctive military capability was also of immense value to the prince. Their light cavalry was of little use in sieges, but it was all the more effective in the field, notably in support of more heavily armed troops. Charles X, King of Sweden, one of the best military men of the age, came to appreciate the Székelys' prowess when he entered into alliance with György Rákóczi I; some ten years after the event, in the course of a discussion with Transylvania's ambassador, he would twice inquire about the Székelys. The growth in the number of Székely villeins deprived this widely-hailed military force of as many potential {2-168.} recruits. Yet the prince's attempt to reverse this trend was marked by a curious ambivalence.

The distinctive feature of traditional Székely villeinage — its exemption from military service and regular taxation — was not challenged. This restraint is probably explained by an attachment to feudal norms and a realistic appraisal of the situation. By the early 1600s, the stratification of Székely society was obvious to any observer; villeins had become an essential part of that society, and they lacked the financial means to serve as soldiers. Pursuant to Gabriel Bethlen's first instructions, the diet ruled in 1619 that 'no Székely who serves under the colors may be taken as a villein, sold, or otherwise bound'.[89]89. EOE 7, p. 517. 'Székelys who had been turned into villeins' after the 1614 diet were to be taken away from their masters. Sources do not reveal what measures were taken to enforce the law, but they could not have been very effective, for, in 1622, the diet issued a new ruling that only those who had been in the status prior to the rule of the voivode Mihai could be classified as 'ancient villeins'. With regard to the others, neither administrative measures nor compulsion had succeeded in returning them to free Székely status. Thus Bethlen had chosen an apparently foolproof approach: apart from the 'ancient villeins', all Székelys who declared themselves villeins, and therefore exempt from military service, were to be registered as taxpayers and made subject to normal taxation. Thus, from 1623 onwards, most Székely villeins would regularly pay taxes.

The new burden amounted at the time to around two forints a year. Although this sum did not represent great purchasing power (it would buy a woman's urban-style fur coat), it was nevertheless difficult to raise for a villein. To be sure, a master craftsman could easily earn it in four days, and an apprentice in ten days at the most. But, for most peasants, it was a formidable sum. They did not normally deal in cash, and when the need arose, they had to make several trips to the town market to sell agricultural produce at the very {2-169.} low prevailing price. And even if they managed to raise the money, there was no guarantee that the tax collector would accept their devalued copper coins. More solid currency was beyond the reach of most peasants. With the imposition of this heavy burden, the Székely villeins found themselves in the same situation as their fellows in other parts of Transylvania.

A full assessment of the Székely villeins' material circumstances must take into account their manorial dues. Unfortunately, there is no hard data on this aspect of their lives, and its very absence indicates that the peasantry in the Székelyföld did not reside on large estates, for such estates normally generated voluminous records. Indeed, in 1614, close to 80 percent of Székely landowners had only one to three villeins. Székelys who had acquired noble status did so on the basis of property acquired in the counties. Thus hardly any information has survived concerning the operation of small and medium-sized estates in the Székelyföld. Literary references and the extemporaneous notes found in the margin of calendars offer a highly variegated picture of the villeins' life on such estates.

Large estates offered villeins the advantages of distance from the manor and well-established socage rules, but the Székelys lacked such protection. Their burdens would vary according to the whims and needs of their landlords. Thus the villeins on small estates were subjected to a different form of exploitation. Owners of large estates would determine the level of compulsory deliveries on the basis of a plot, and independently of the villein's abilities; in contrast, the master of one or two villeins would calculate their burden in full knowledge of their capabilities.

Thus the villein's dependence was psychologically more burdensome on a small estate than in the impersonal environment of a more sizeable domain. This aspect is particularly salient in the case of the Székelys, for their shared liberties were of recent memory and not set in a mythical past, and the shift to villein status was a {2-170.} palpable humiliation. However, such considerations could not impede the transformation of Székely society. The imposition of state tax may have slowed down the numerical growth of 'Székelys turned into villeins', but it did not halt the process. Meanwhile, the government's refusal to allow any change in the 1623 rosters induced a new phenomenon among free Székelys: migration.

Once comparatively rare, migration became common after 1622, to the point that the 1638 diet called for the return of 'fugitives from the Székelyföld in the counties'.[90]90. EOE 10, p. 139. Enforcement was a different matter: these Székelys were not villeins, and thus there were no landowners to institute repatriation proceedings. More-over, the state had no power in the matter, since it had never seemed necessary to enact restrictions on the Székelys' right to migrate. Their privileges had kept them in Székelyföld, but when these were trimmed, Székely society began to disintegrate.

Although the causes of this disintegration were specific to the Székelys, the process was congruent with the general pattern of social change elsewhere in Transylvania. There, too, a transformation that had begun in the Middle Ages came to an end by the close of the 16th century. In the counties, it was manifested in the reconsolidation of villeinage. In the case of the Székelys, a society based on clans underwent a primary stratification and, for the first time, incorporated villeinage. The turmoil at the turn of the century disrupted both new social structures. When peace brought a return to normalcy, these structures underwent further change: in the counties, the system of villeinage became more rigid, while, among the remaining free Székelys, there occurred a second process of stratification. This latter process was influenced by the repeated applications of state power. The Székelys had preserved an outdated social structure, and external forces threatened to undermine the very basis of their society.

Although the same state that induced this disintegration attempted to prevent Székelys from migrating, nothing could stop {2-171.} the social dynamics that had been unleashed. The state experimented with administrative measures, then, in 1636, confirmed the rights of free Székelys by suspending all claims to the Székelys' common property. Since the early 1500s, the property of Székelys convicted of disloyalty had reverted to the prince; in 1636, György Rákóczi I ruled that such lands henceforth would remain in the hands of the free Székelys. The new measure soon brought tangible consequences. Sabbatarianism had made deep inroads in the Székelyföld, and when, in 1638, members of the sect were subjected to legal pursuits, their lands were redistributed among free Székelys. None of this altered the burdens of military service. In 1648, the diet resorted to threats to make free Székelys live up to this traditional right and obligation; if a conscripted Székely 'does not rally to the flag, he will be considered eo facto convictus, and princes may punish him with death'.[91]91. EOE 10. p. 481. The threat never materialized, for within a year the Székelys got György Rákóczi II to repeal the measure; even so, it revealed that the right to military service, once regarded as a privilege, had turned into a heavy burden for the Székelys.

The young prince seemed to acknowledge the change, for he avoided resorting to force. Instead of prohibiting migration, he allowed Székelys to sell land to people who did not belong to their 'nation'. He even experimented with an enlargement of their privileges. His Székely mounted riflemen of Székely origin were all granted 'lófő freedom' (lófő being an old Székely rank of nobility). In the event, the impact of these measures was largely nullified by the new disaster that befell Transylvania in 1658.