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# {2-41.} The Prince and the Feudal Orders

Bethlen would have to exploit his political skills to the utmost, for the challenges to princely power that emerged at the time of his election were greater than ever before. At its first session, the diet imposed restrictions such as might have been expected after a successful war of liberation: to restrain the prince's powers, it codified the modern doctrine of the Calvinist Reformation.

Evoking the bitter experience of the recent past, the diet laid down that 'since many ruling princes have abused of their office and its authority, readily resorting to unlawful acts and improper measures,' it was necessary to impose preventive regulations. The diet therefore empowered certain public bodies and office-holders — the 'keyed' (kolcsos) towns, the prince's council, the 'Székely and other' captains, and the 'officials,' i.e. the 'magistracy' (a concept used by Calvin) — to act against a prince who broke his oath.[26]26. EOE 6, pp.359-60.

Transylvania's feudal orders applied this novel concept in defence of their long standing lawful privileges. The diet's list of the beneficiaries encompassed all of the country's orders: 'gentlemen, nobles, market-towns and walled towns, Székelys and Saxons.'[27]27. EOE 6, p. 359. The diet did differentiate between nobles and citizens with respect to these privileges. Transylvania's civil estate, like the Saxons, was distinguished from the others by its essentially feudal privileges.

The Saxon towns followed suit in elaborating the ideological basis of their opposition to the prince, and it was as backward-looking as that of the nobility. The notion of a social contract was evoked by the contention that 'no one can hold the office of ruling prince without [the consent of his] subjects.' However, in confronting Bethlen, the Saxons wanted to renew 'their ancestors' union' in order to 'preserve their wonderful and precious liberties.'[28]28. EOE 6, p. 390. Their opposition was rooted in Bethlen's failure to respect privileges, dating from the Middle Ages, according to which even {2-42.} a ruling prince needed the municipal council's permission to sojourn in a Saxon town; the autonomy of Szeben, which had been annulled by Gábor Báthori, was not restored by Bethlen.

The Saxons thus redirected their resistance from one prince to another; indeed, the hostility of all estates sprang from a reaction to Báthori's excesses. This goes a long way toward explaining why the opposition to Bethlen was modern in form but medieval in substance. Báthori had been a tyrant, and not merely a heavy-handed ruler; his aggressiveness and arbitrariness towards all drove Transylvanians to detest princely power. Thus Gabriel Bethlen found himself in an anomalous situation: instead of receiving credit for Báthori's removal and being hailed as a liberator, he had to bear the consequences of his inept predecessor's actions.

It would not have been surprising if Bethlen had perpetuated this dismal pattern by resorting to force to break the self-centred opposition movement induced by his tyrannical predecessor. But, whereas Báthori had been a mere dilettante, Bethlen proved to be an expert at politics. The erratic posturing of the former made way for the latter's deliberate entrenchment of princely power.

Bethlen took the first steps in this direction at the diet that elected him. Presenting himself before the dignitaries assembled by Skender, he requested that the proscription imposed after his flight in November 1612 be lifted. Then he withdrew, signifying thereby that he understood he had no right to be present as long as the proscription stood. The courtesy may have seemed superfluous, since he was backed by massive armed force, but it was characteristic of Bethlen that he should make the gesture. With this bow, he indicated to the deeply humiliated assembly that he would not abuse of his success. And he was true to his word. Once the Turkish-Tartar troops had departed in accordance with his agreement with the Porte, Bethlen would show great forbearance in his quest for popular support.

{2-43.} The settlement of the Saxon problem was the most urgent task, for their opposition threatened to splinter the union of the three 'nations.' They refused to take an oath of loyalty to Bethlen; in December 1613, representatives of the Saxon towns bound themselves to withhold their allegiance pending the return of Szeben.

Instead of meeting force with force, Bethlen tried to negotiate. At first, he requested that the town allow him and his retinue to reside there during the first winter of his rule. When Szeben, with the support of the Saxon nation, refused, he yielded. He ceded back the town on 17 February 1614, and left the next day. That did not settle the matter: when Bethlen convoked his first diet to gather in another great Saxon town, Segesvár, the municipal council refused to host the meeting. In the end, the estates did meet in the Szászföld, but only in the lesser town of Medgyes.

It seems that Bethlen considered this feeble concession of the Saxons as a conciliatory gesture. At this first session of the diet, in February-March 1614, he made an attempt to reduce the scope of Saxon autonomy. His aim was to regulate the functioning of the three nations' union by confirming that since this union was supposed to represent the 'sacred unity of the three nations in defence of our homeland's survival,' it implied the sharing of burdens.[29]29. EOE 6, p. 405. The estates, and first and foremost the Saxons, were cool to this proposal. The Saxons refused to codify either the admittance within their walls of Hungarians and Székelys in case of emergency or the establishment of a common treasury.

Taking note of the estates' reluctance, Bethlen seemingly gave in, but he continued to pursue his goal. While reform of the union would have led to a diminution of the estates' feudal privileges, Bethlen's goal was more to change the balance of power between the prince and the ruling classes. Thus, as an alternative, he could try to expand his princely powers — without provoking the estates — to the maximum possible extent. And so he did: instead of seeking confrontation, he proceeded to circumvent the opposition {2-44.} and consolidate the powers of the prince. He took advantage of some peculiarities of Transylvanian society, which facilitated his task, because the respective rights of estates and prince in the government of Transylvania were scarcely regulated even by custom.

There were various options open to him, but Bethlen tackled the transformation of the structure of power with the same single-mindedness and disregard for secondary issues that he had applied in his quest for the throne. He brought two modifications to the system of governance. One involved the institutional structure: he marginalized the diet. The other was of economic character: he acquired financial resources that were independent of the feudal orders. The cumulative result of these changes was to curtail the estates' supervision of princely power.

The most remarkable feature of the Transylvanian diet was its composition. By the end of the 16th century, there had developed in royal Hungary and most other countries a political elite, issuing from the ruling class, that took a regular and active part in legislative activity. There were only faint traces of this tendency in Transylvania.

In the Hungarian kingdom, customary law, reinforced by statutes enacted in 1608, specified the composition of the diet. Certain members of the Catholic church hierarchy participated ex officio; all adult, male members of the aristocracy had the right to participate; the towns and counties elected their representatives; and some high state officials were also invited. In such a diet, the great majority of the members — in fact, all except the officials named by the monarch — could participate in decision-making free of the ruler's will.

In Transylvania, by contrast, the prince nominated the majority of the participants in the diet. To be sure, by the end of the 16th century, there had emerged an informal ruling elite of families, members of which were customarily invited; but these families had nowhere near the power and status that distinguished the magnate {2-45.} class in Hungary. When one of their members received an invitation (regalis), he was bound comply; but no one had the absolute right to participate in the diet. Apart from these 'regalists', invited at the prince's discretion, the diet would include the prince's appointed councillors, the judges and other officials of the princely court of justice, the senior officials of the Székely and Hungarian administrations, and the delegates of Saxon and Hungarian towns. The latter generally held elected office in the towns, and thus might be considered to have been elected indirectly to the diet; but this fact was of little significance, for the prince freely chose which towns should send representatives, and which not. For all practical purposes, the composition of the Transylvanian diet depended on the ruler's will.

Bethlen took full advantage of this practice. Although he did not ignore the ruling elite that had emerged since the time of King Stephen Báthori — and which included his own family — he progressively restricted the circle of people who participated in the diet. There is insufficient data to present a comprehensive list of participants, but a comparison of two surveys clearly reveals this tendency. The diet that met in May 1615 had 62 participants; nine years later, in July 1624, there were only 32. In the first instance, there were fourteen representatives (indirectly elected) of the towns, and in the second, only eight. All categories of participants fell in number; and, at both diets, some two thirds of the participants had been selected directly by Bethlen.

Clearly, assemblies so composed were susceptible to the prince's influence. Even so, the prince would seek to avoid confronting the diet by exploiting the feudal lack of clear prescription. Since the convening of diets was not regulated by either custom or law, he radically reduced the frequency. In the period preceding his reign, between 1605 and 1613, this varied between two and eight per year. At first, Bethlen would convoke five diets each year. The number fell to two per year between 1617 and 1622, except in {2-46.} 1619, when only one diet was convened; and, from 1623 onwards, he would stick to one per year. Obviously, the number of issues debated in the assemblies declined commensurately, and Bethlen made sure that the diminution would be not only quantitative but qualitative as well, the smaller number of topics being also of lesser importance.

At the outset of Bethlen's rule, the diet debated a wide range of issues, with foreign affairs weighing somewhat heavier in the balance than domestic matters. The assembly would deal with the reception of foreign emissaries, instructions for Transylvania's envoys, and relations with the Porte. The problem of Lippa and the military expedition to Moldavia that had been demanded by the Porte were discussed at a succession of meetings, almost as if Bethlen dared not take any decision without the diet's consent. The surrender of Lippa was voted by the diet. In domestic affairs, issues included, first and foremost, taxation, as well as religion, relations between Transylvania's 'nations,' and preventive measures against 'vagabonds' (i.e., aiming to tighten up the system of serfdom).

In 1619, the situation changed. That spring, there was an important debate on the judiciary, but the fall meeting was cancelled. Previously, the diet had debated for weeks over minor military matters; yet the diet was not even informed about the launching of a military campaign — together-with Czech rebels — in Hungary. Henceforth, foreign affairs would not figure on the agenda of Bethlen's diets. In home affairs, following the judicial reform, there would be little legislation of comparable importance. For six years, until May 1625, the only issues that produced significant debate were a religious clause and, in 1622, the taxation of the Székelys; in addition, the diet codified the foundation of a college at Gyulafehérvár and the right of serfs' children to free schooling, but these matters had been essentially settled by the time they reached the assembly.

{2-47.} In the meantime, Transylvania' external relations had been altered, and Bethlen had reorganized the domestic economy and monetary system, all without the involvement of the diet. The estates occasionally debated the monetary reforms, but only after these had come into effect, and usually in order to request that the new currency be accepted for taxes. For, over these six years, taxation was just about the only issue that Bethlen chose to bring before his personally-selected diet. Otherwise, he bypassed the estates in conducting the affairs of state, and in generating the resources necessary for the functioning of a modern principality.