László Garai

Theoretical Psychology
Vygotskian Writings

Теоретическая психология
Выготскианские тексты

CONTENTS

Interview with Laszlo Garai on the  Activity Theory of Alexis Leontiev and his own  Theory of Social Identity as referred to the  Meta-Theory of Lev Vygotsky
Towards a social psychology of personality: Development and current perspectives of a school  of social psychology in Hungary
Marxian personality psychology
The Principle of Social Relations and the Principle of Activity
Another crisis in the psychology: A possible motive for the Vygotsky-boom
Vygotskian implications: On the meaning and its brain

DERIVED THEORETICAL FEATURES – 
ПРОИЗВОДНЫЕ ТЕОРЕТИЧЕСКИЕ ОЧЕРКИ
PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY
A dialogue about man, his gene pool and eccentricity
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
Social identity: Cognitive dissonance or paradox?
ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY
Identity Economics
How outstanding am I?
PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS
Theses on Human Capital
Determining economic activity  in a post-capitalist system
Is a rational socio-economic system possible?
Why is bureaucratic control over economy not that rational?
PSYCHOLOGY OF BOLSHEVIK-TYPE SYSTEMS
The bureaucratic state governed by an illegal movement
The paradoxes of the Bolshevik-type psycho-social structure in economy

ТЕОРЕТИЧЕСКАЯ ПСИХОЛОГИЯ
O психологическом стaтусе деятельности и социaльного отношения
Eщё один кризис в психологии!
O значении и его мозговом аппарате
Вaсилий Дaвыдов и судьбы нaшей теории
Вaсилий Дaвыдов и судьбы нaшей теории
Диада Выготского и четвериада Рубинштейна

Journal of Russian and East European Psychology, vol. 50, no. 1, January–February 2012, pp. 50–64.

Interview with Laszlo Garai on the 
Activity Theory of Alexis Leontiev and his own 
Theory of Social Identity as referred to the 
Meta-Theory of Lev Vygotsky

Academician V. Lektorsky, who has been the editor-in-chief of Voprosy filosofii, a journal of the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences, since 1987, and the new editor-in-chief who is replacing him just at this time, V. Pruzhinin, conducted a joint interview with the Hungarian scientist László Garai, a theoretical psychologist and researcher in problems of social and economic psychology.

Academician Lektorsky: Professor Garai, Your psychological research has always had a clearly expressed philosophical meaning. It is no accident that we have published your writings in our journal.1 Allow us to ask you a few questions, the answers to which may be of interest to readers of Voprosy filosofii.
You were influenced by the cultural-historical theory of L.S. Vygotsky and the psychological theory of activity of A.N. Leontiev. Today interest in the activity approach has been revived among both our psychologists and philosophers. Some link the activity approach to philosophical constructivism. What do you think about the prospects for the cultural-historical theory and the theory of activity in psychology and, more broadly, in the human sciences?
Professor Garai: These prospects stem from the fact that psychology, ever since it split off from philosophy in the nineteenth century, has investigated problems that are multiaspected. Rubinstein, for example, based on Marxism before it got violated, cited the aspect of activity, the aspect of objectness, the aspect of community, and the aspect of historicity. Psychology itself, however, was only interested in one of these aspects at a time. At first it was the object: how we sense it, how our memory imprints and retains it, etc. Then came new times, and behaviorism, with its exclusive interest in activity, became the mainstream of psychology. Behavior, after all, is activity; except it is a kind such that, in order to study it, the object does not exist. The object has been reduced to a single point, which is occupied by a stimulus rather than an object. And incidentally, when behaviorism found itself removed from its mainstream status, to which cognitivism had been assigned, the exclusive focus was again on the object, which was ostensibly reflected by the consciousness without the participation of any activity. So the theory of activity of Leontiev, Galperin, and Luria actually discovered for our science not activity as such, but activity mediated by an object, and, in turn, activity that mediates an object. Thus, instead of single-aspect psychologies, a psychology was invented that organically synthesizes two of the four Rubinstein aspects.
Of course, one might think that two instead of four is a step back. But the point is that Rubinstein derived from Marx’s writings not merely a methodology for an integrated psychology (“merely” – yet after all, he accomplished a great feat in doing this), and Leontiev and his associates worked out specific procedures for experiments that applied the theory of activity to various fields. Single-aspect psychologies had very narrow capabilities: within these frameworks it was not possible to explain even such phenomena as attention or memory, although attention and memory had been the oldest topics of the new science as it emerged in the 1860s. The psychologists of those years (and some to this day) applied the principle of reflection to both topics. According to this, if a contemplated object whose properties are reflected through sensation or perception is distinguished somehow from its space-time surroundings, this distinct image is reflected in attention. Memory, meanwhile, ostensibly reflects the association of objects with one another in space-time. So we psychologists began to truly understand attention when its single-aspect interpretation was replaced by the concept of the theory of activity on the orientational basis of activity.
The fate of the psychology of memory developed in a more unfortunate way, since the theory of activity was only able to rescue it to a lesser degree. For the simple reason that memory is unquestionably associated with the aspect of historicity, and today we already know that it is also intimately associated with the aspect of community, the theory of activity regarding this pair of aspects is not doing anything like the research that has been done regarding the first pair...
Pruzhinin: May I interrupt you? I would like you to focus on your original theory of identity. How does it tie in with this tradition?
Professor Garai: When I became acquainted with Leontiev’s theory of activity, I discovered a curious contradiction. Both community and historicity were predefined for the theory as a self-evident definition of everything that was investigated, but they themselves were never investigated as problems. The experiments of thee theory of activity always focus on the fact that a specific individual confronts a specific object. Needless to say, the latter has a background, and this cultural background, at least as long as the focus is on an individual child, is mediated for him by the company of another individual. But is that all there is to the aspect of historicity and the aspect of community? And even if it is, how are they related to each other?
In the late 1960s (when I was interning in Leontiev’s department, and immediately afterward was invited under a Keldysh grant to the Institute of the History of Natural Science and Technology of the USSR Academy of Sciences, where I did research in the Scientific Discoveries Sector) I began to deal with these issues. Under Leontiev I did an experiment (the first social-psychological one in the history of the Psychology Division),2 in which it turned out that involuntary memory worked significantly more efficiently when it was supporting the activity of any of my coworkers, associates, or comrades in the joint activity than when it was providing an orientational foundation for my own activity.
By that time Henri Tajfel had already issued his appeal “for a more social socialGL1 psychology.” He pointed out to us that our test subject did not come to our laboratory out of a vacuum but as a representative of the place that he actually occupied in an actual social structure, and that society had been predefined for him, accordingly, not in the form of another isolated individual but in the structure off their relationship. There is likewise more to historicity than to the history of the objectification of production and the passive presence of that history in de-objectifying activity. Freud allowed us to understand that in the course of a biographical history there is often a reversion not only to stages of that individual history that were already traversed but also to archaic points in the generic history of humankind (see, e.g., the Oedipus complex). At the same time, Tajfel’s social psychology and Freud’s anthropological psychology, as I ventured to point out earlier, are mutually exclusive, just like behaviorism and cognitivism.
So I set myself the goal of copying the methodological feat of the creators of the synthesis that emerged from the theory of object-based activity, and in this manner to create a methodology on a parallel track for the synthesis of this other pair of psychologies. And then, out of this synthetic methodology, to work out procedures for research efforts and for applied psychological research, as Leontiev, Gal’perin, Luria, Davydov, and hence their coworkers, did in their time and for their scientific purposes.
Social identity for us is different from how it is generally represented by the scientific and laymen’s idea regarding it. For these ideas, social identity is an internal cultural-biological certainty: whether I am a Hungarian or a Russian, Eastern Orthodox or Muslim, a man or a woman, a black person or a white one. Here social identity is depicted perhaps even as a cultural definition, but in any case as the same kind of definition as it is in nature to be a dog or a turtle, to be carbon or ammonium hydroxide: in any of these instances an internal property of the individual units will determine how each of them will react to random events in the environment. Nothing like this is found in our theory, for which social identity is determined not by people’s property but by relationships.
Relationships like similarity and difference. I will show in a brief example what I mean:
Let us assume that we are living in Germany in the early 1930s; I am a German proletarian, so I am, without question, a carrier of the sociological property or definition of a German, and equally so the property of a proletarian. Can the social identity of a German or a proletarian be ascribed to me? This will depend on how my relationships with others evolve and how all of us interpret these relationships. Assume that Peter is also a German, but a bourgeois, and Paul is also a proletarian, but a Jew. Here we have shadings and similarities and differences both with Peter and with Paul. So then social categorization transforms these contradictory shadings into categorical unambiguousness. I categorically exaggerate my similarity to either Peter or Paul and, accordingly, my difference from the other, and what draws me together with the latter and would separate me from the former is simultaneously understated. So this categorization results in the identity of “workers of all countries,” or, in terms of our example, the identity of Germans who represent and, accordingly, represent to themselves “ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer” (a single people, a single empire, a single leader). From what is predetermined sociologically, the categorization produces social identity, and social categorization holds sway in the background of history, in this case in the background of the Führer’s accession with a Nazi dictatorship.
Pruzhinin: May I interrupt you with a question? This is what I’d like to ask you: you have written about the crisis in psychology in regard to its split into research, how should I put it, of a natural-scientific perhaps, and hermeneutic nature. Can we assume that this split is been overcome today? This is why I am asking: this question takes us back to Vygotsky. He has a work about the crisis in psychology, but his followers, as they evolved during the Soviet period, focused on activity, which they understood more as a material, labor-related kind. Does this provide a way out of the crisis? Did this emphasis precisely on the material, labor-related aspect of activity not lead to an even more vigorous confrontation between physiological psychology and, so to speak, hermeneutic psychology, which, incidentally, we have today. Tell us, how do you see it?
Professor Garai: Unfortunately, I can only agree with what was already implied in your question as an answer to it. This is indeed the case.
The point is that, as a faithful heir of enlightenment, I thought: if psychology is suffering from something, in this case from the fact that it is split into a natural hemi-science and a historical hemi-science, then as soon as a remedy for this illness is offered, the patient will grab at it with both hands. But I did not take into account that the psychologist is not predefined as an abstract being. He received a behaviorist education at a university, and his confrere was molded at another university as a cognitivist. They have lived half of their professional lives, and they did not wish to know about each other. It turns out that I was wrong to expect them to be happy at the news I am giving them that there is a possibility of becoming reunited under the umbrella of Vygotsky’s theory ... Which to them means starting everything from scratch.
During the 1970s I revisited the Maison des Sciences de l’Homme in Paris on a business trip. At that time it had a sector on social psychology, and a young scientist was working in that sector who was a follower of Freudianism according to Lacan and Marxism according to Althusser. That is, to be more precise, he was on the staff of that institute’s sector since he had set up an interinstitute group of like-minded colleagues and he was doing his research work within this framework. I swear by the midnight star, to use Lermontov’s words: all of them (eight to ten people) were brilliantly gifted, and the same must be said of the institute group (approximately the same number). I learned a great deal from them, in particular during an hours-long discussion after my paper. They had ordered up the paper about my aforementioned experiment, and they in turn granted my request: for the social psychologists to invite psychoanalysts as well, and for the latter to accept the invitation. Ultimately, the audience accepted from the report, as many people put it, “almost everything.” Each of the sides expressed puzzlement on only two points. One half of the audience “did not understand” why I had introduced the “infamous” unconscious into my experiment through involuntary memory, although I had to know that the unconscious was inaccessible for experimentation, since it, the unconscious, was nothing more than a myth. The other half of the audience was puzzled as to why the devil I needed the infamous procedure of experimentation when I had to know, as a marxien (don’t forget that in those days – the few years before 1968 and the few years after it – almost all intellectuals of more or less good quality in Europe were more or less followers of Marx and declared themselves and one another to be marxian/marxien,3 in order thereby to distinguish them from the Marxists in the manner of the agitprop departments of the central committees of Communist parties), that experimentation in the so-called social sciences served only to disguise the fact that they were not sciences but bourgeois ideology (sic!). And the two halves of the audience agreed that only when I mentioned the theory of activity, then they declared in full accord that, while retaining their entire friendship and fondness for Laszlo, they considered it impermissible in the last third of the twentieth century to bring into a scientific discussion the infamous “reflection” of so-called objective reality and the infamous conditioned-reflex response by means of behavior, which, they went on, for some reason I called activity.
I am exaggerating very little here.4 And at the same time I am not being ironic in the least when I say that while I was among these Parisian psychologists I got to know colleagues who were brilliantly gifted. They had simply reached the limit of the framework in which a psychologist cultivating his plot of partitioned psychology can think. Regarding the future of our science I am still optimistic, not because a third of a century has passed since the above-mentioned incident. Time may not change anything. The same goes for space. Thirty years after that Paris affair I presented a paper in Moscow. The paper was about the same thing: how Vygotsky’s theory, in particular his idea of the equivalence between tools and signs, contributes to the creation of a synthesis of psychologiesGL2, and the audience was recruited from adherents of activity theory. In Paris the psychoanalytic group was obviously thinking about me this way: since he’s a marxien, he’s also a freudien. And when they formulated for themselves that I was pushing social psychology to them and, in addition, activity theory, one of them, but in front of everyone and on behalf of everyone, asked me point-blank: “Proprement parlant, qu’est-ce que tu veux de nous, Laszlo?” In Moscow, thirty years later, as soon as we moved on from my paper to comments from the audience, an attractive woman stood up and, with the consent of the rest of the audience, asked me point-blank: “What, strictly speaking, do you want from us, Mr. Garai?” Disregarding the stylistic difference in how I was addressed, the two questions were absolutely identical. And hence their motivations were as well.
If I am still optimistic about the future of our science, it is because psychology has been given not only an opportunity to get rid of its partitions. It has also been assigned the necessity of carrying out this historical scientific procedure.
The point is that if, just as for Hamlet, “The time is out of joint” for us as well, then I should note that in this case it is not the Danish prince who is confronted by “cursed spite,” and “to set it right” psychology must act. Just take the example of international conflicts. They have traditionally been handled by states, and in order to cope with this task, while they have resorted from time to time to psychology, they did not need it: they maintained an army without it, they manifested their intelligence-gathering interest in the army of a potential or actual adversary without it, and they knew, basically, how to identify each soldier in terms of whether they belonged to our or to the enemy’s army. But how does one manage without psychology where potential wars, or wars that suddenly break out, are waged by suicide terrorists? By people who do not wear their fascist or American, Polish, Swedish or Tatar-Mongol uniforms, but dress like us, eat like us, live in the same cities as us, are students at the same universities, are viewers of the same television programs, travel in the same subways and the same planes as us – but for another purpose. How do we figure out that purpose, how do we foresee its implementation, how do we ensure the survival of our society without the assistance of psychology? But how can our science begin to solve this problem without being born? Without being born as a science. A synthetic science that is synthesized from its components.
Pruzhinin: Professor Garai, in connection with the question about the prospects for psychology another that is very relevant today comes up: about the status of applied psychological research. You are the founder of economic psychology in Hungary. I have a question in this regard about the specific nature of your theory in terms of its difference from decision theory. Applied topics in psychology assume certain general theoretical foundations. So what do you think is the general theoretical conceptual foundation today of psychology, of modern psychology? What performs the integrative functions today that were previously performed by so-called general psychology? Perhaps cultural-historical psychology?
Professor Garai: You are putting a very important question. As in the past,5 to this day I have no doubt that it is cultural-historical psychology that put forth a needed integrative idea when it made a case in favor of equivalence, or at least mutual causality, between tool and symbol. Tools are undoubtedly associated with man’s object-based activity. Symbols, meanwhile (if we advance along the path with Vygotsky from the famous knot in the handkerchief to language and speech), become historically embedded in structures, the paradigm of which is the structure of language; which in every act of communication reproduces this history. Aleksei Alekseevich Leontiev declared that such an act of communication is nothing other than a variation of acts of activity. Frankly, his views on this point were shared by nearly all the adherents of activity theory.
To a certain degree one can understand this approach. After all, what makes an utterance within communication similar to objectifying activity is the fact that the object-product also retains its activity history. But only in a condensed form. Subsequent activity initiated by a tool does not reproduce the activity’s prehistory that engendered this tool: a Paganini does not act at all like a Stradivarius. When we apply language in our speech, we behave, on the contrary, precisely this way: we imitate our ancestors who created the language with their verbal practice. True, while Paganini does not replicate Stradivari’s activity, later Stradivaris specifically emulated their brilliant predecessor. In doing so, however, they compressed the emulated activity as much as possible. Previous searches and delusions are not replicated. We exercise in various acts of activity and cram information about an object, but when we have already assimilated what we needed, we no longer insist on the prehistory of this knowledge. For rational reasons we condense it.
But when the issue concerns acts of activity or an exchange of symbols of various kinds of cultural structures, then, conversely, we actively resist condensing, which is so reasonable in object-based activity. When we interact in the field of cultural history, we reproduce with nearly eidetic precision all of history, we ritually replicate it, we play out the Passions of Christ with his crucifixion, death and the subsequent mourning and burial of Jesus’s body...
The treatment of ritual is the highest personification of man’s historicity. I will stipulate right off that we assign this importance not to reproduction of the ritual but to the treatment of this cultural legacy, which in addition to playing out the rituals includes their, so to speak, establishment, as well as, if that is the outcome, their rejection. This stipulation makes it possible to identify a highly important relationship: the treatment of ritual makes manageable the contacts that unite certain individuals into small or large groups, with certain groups demarcated from others. It is enough to realize that one variety of the treatment of ritual is the given of cultural history in which we see the most powerful means precisely of such social functioning, regarding which L. Wittgenstein, with good reason, came up with the term “language game.” In this connection it is interesting to cite a find by Margit Köcski, who has been my coauthor more than once. She was studying the social-psychological development of children’s speech, and while observing the development of the children we have in common she discovered that from the earliest age the children took a liking to language rituals: if, purely by a chance, a brief dialogue occurred between a child and some family member, the child insisted endlessly on playing out a repetition of the model. So I cannot agree with those who maintain that communication is nothing more than a variant of activity.
On the contrary, if we assume methodologically that there is mutual causality between tool and symbol, then psychology can look for Vygotsky’s dyad in every phenomenon, without exception, of the world under its purview.
Here is an example of what I mean. This example is not my find but comes from the anthropologist Marshall Sahlins. Somewhere he writes about ancient agriculture, the nature of which necessitated that the father cooperate with the son, but, he notes, it was not the nature of agriculture that necessitated that precisely the father and son cooperate rather than the mother’s brother and the sister’s son or Don Quixote and Sancho Panza. So (and this is no longer Sahlins’s conclusion but mine) in the first necessity the tool aspect is manifested, while in the second necessity it is the aspect of the symbol. And these two aspects are predefined each time in their mutual causality in Vygotsky’s dyad.
And thus we have arrived at the other half of your multipart question: you asked me about the specific nature of the theory in economic psychology that I developed. Well, this theory was constructed entirely on Vygotsky’s dyad. The mainstream of economic psychology is interested exclusively, so to speak, in Sahlins’s first necessity: How do they cooperate there? No matter who cooperated with whom. To be fair, I must state right off that in the context of this necessity the mainstream is interested not only (and even not so much) in the technological aspect of the matter but in the financial aspect as well. During the 1990s a Nobel Prize was twice awarded to scientists who, it is true, were not developing economic psychology but economics, for the fact that they discovered the world of transaction costs. These are the costs by which I ensure that a potential collaborator, no matter who, cooperates not with just anybody, but specifically with me. In the world of transaction costs, money is the mediating factor, as it is in the market itself. So then, my theory in economic psychology asserts that, in addition to money, social identity can also be such a mediating factor. While money ensures that the cooperation is not just with anyone but with me, social identity ensures that the collaborator will turn out to be not just anyone but precisely potential collaborators of my choosing. Figuratively speaking, I’ll put it in terms of the earlier, highly simplified example: I am counting on cooperating with Peter, since he is also a “German,” or, accordingly, with Paul, because he is also a “proletarian.” Here social identity acts like a twin to money. In the matter of mediating cooperation social identity and, accordingly, money can mutually buy out each other: our brother the “German”/“proletarian” may agree more eagerly to cooperate with me, and this way I can save a portion of the transaction costs – conversely, in order to circumvent the embargo imposed on cooperation with me, it may cost me quite a lot of extra money.”6
Lektorsky: You apply your original psychological theory of identity to many different worlds as an explanatory theory. Today a number of researchers, both internationally and in our country, maintain that the problem of identity, as it was understood in the past, has lost meaning, because modern man’s identity is being eroded. Some speak of multiple identities, while others even say that identity is disappearing altogether. What do you think in this regard?
Professor Garai: I do not believe the declarations that the concept of identity per se is obsolete, and here is why. The first Nobel Prize in economics in our new century was awarded a scientific discovery according to which the market functions properly (i.e. by selecting the most profitable of all possible options) only to the extent that the social identity of the persons operating in the market is clearly designated for one another. Absent this condition, that is, if the market bears in mind only monetary relationships (at one pole, a commodity belonging to no matter whom; at the other, money belonging to no matter whom), such a market makes, contrary to expectation, a counterselection: it provides for the sale only of the lowest grade of commodity, while the highest grade of commodity drops out of the market.7
The problem is not that the concept of identity per se is obsolete but that its interpretation as a property, and as one that is predefined, is out of date. Earlier we already discussed what factors prompted me to orient myself more in the direction of relationships rather than property. These factors were mostly psychological. Now we can also take into account (I would even say: we cannot avoid taking into account) the testimony of economic scholars as well: the trio awarded the Nobel Prize, of a liberal persuasion, note with satisfaction that the functioning of the labor market depends relatively little on whether it is a black or a white person who is offering his services; on the contrary, they are disconcerted by their own observation that the functioning of the market depends heavily on whether it is a black person or someone indeterminate who is applying (e.g. on the phone) for a job. Here is the difference: whether I am specifically a black or a white person is a matter of identity as property; on the other hand, whether I am a black person or someone indeterminate, here the question concerns identity as relationship. In point of fact, what is disappearing outright is not identity per se but ready-made, mass-produced identity as property. And at that, eroding identity (or multi-identity) is a starting point for the creative molding of identity as relationship. The less defined a predetermined identity is, the more it calls for categorization.
In 2003 I published the book Identity Economics,8 which examines how the macroworld of mass reproduction handles social categorization for social identity. Two years later I published another book, The Multiple Identities of József Attila9: A Study in the Psychology of Creativity, which examined the same thing in the microworld of creativity.
The macroworld of mass reproduction and the microworld of creativity are two worlds that are absolutely opposite to each other. To deal with both, and within a period of two years to boot, is probably a matter of either brilliance or cheating. I myself am convinced, without false modesty or justifying myself, that for such an accomplishment there is no need either to be a genius or to expose oneself as a cheater. Back in 1931 Kurt Lewin formulated his appeal to psychology to emulate physics, which had replaced its Aristotelian way of thinking, applying one theory to celestial bodies and another to earthly ones, a third to falling bodies, and a fourth to airborne ones, with the Galilean method, which brings its worlds to a common denominator of interpretation.
For a very long time psychology not only did not find but did not even look for this common denominator, it rather tended to push Lewin’s comment out of its scientific consciousness. That is why it came to a dead end (sometime between its 1966 Congress in Moscow and its 1976 Congress in Paris) and remained there for quite a while. Meanwhile, my study of such different worlds led me to the conclusion that social identity is that searched-for common denominator. Again, such a find does not require particular genius. It is enough to bear in mind that in the macroworld of mass reproduction the focus is on the mass reproduction of tools, while in the microworld of creativity it is on the creation of symbols.10
So Vygotsky’s dyad is clear.11 Embodying the entire legacy of Rubinstein’s tetrad: both the object with activity and the aspect of history with the aspect of society.

Notes

1. “Istoricheskii materialism i problema lichnosti,” Voprosy filosofii, 1968, No. 9, pp. 19-30.
“Eshche odin krizis v psikhologii! Vozmozhnaia prichina shumnogo uspekha idei L.S. Vygotskogo” (co-author: Margit Köcski), Voprosy filosofii, 1997, No. 4, pp. 86-96.
“Netipichny akademik,” Voprosy filosofii, 2005, No. 1, pp. 67-69.
2. “La regulation communicative de la relation sociale et le devenir conscient des contenus de mémoire.” In J. Janousek, ed., Experimental Social Psychology: Papers and Reports from the International Conference on Social Psychology (Institute of Psychology, Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, Prague, 1969).
3. Or at least marxisant (gravitating toward Marxism).
4. Cf. Chadwick-Jones, J. “The Debate Between Michel Plon and Morton Deutsch: Some Related Comments,” European Journal of Social Psychology, Vol. 6, Issue 1, pp. 129-137.
5. See “Eshche odin krizis v psikhologii! Vozmozhnaia prichina shumnogo uspekha idei L.S. Vygotskogo” (co-author: Margit Köcski), Voprosy filosofii, 1997, No. 4, pp. 86-96.
6. Economic psychology has worked out a special calculation for the reciprocal conversion of monetary costs and social identity (see Garai, L. “The Price of Excellence.” In Inquiries Into the Nature and Causes of Behavior. Proceedings of the XXIV Annual Colloquium of the International Association for Research in Economic Psychology, 1999, pp. 750-759.
7. “Behavioral Macroeconomic and Macroeconomic Behavior.” Nobel Prize Lecture of George A. Akerlof (December 8, 2001). http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2001/akerlof-lecture.html. Another laureate in the same area showed that the impetus that can be observed nowadays toward second, third and more diplomas is attributable not to a desire for extra knowledge but to the forced signaling of social identity in the labor market.
8. Identity Economics: An Alternative Economic Psychology. 
Available at www.staff.u-szeged.hu/~garai/Identity_Economics.htm
9. Attila József was a great Hungarian poet (1905-1937). Cf. Garai, L. “The Case of Attila Jozsef: A Reply to Gustav Jahoda,” New Ideas in Psychology, 1988, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 213-217.
10. The just-mentioned Attila József, in addition to being a great poet, was also a brilliant theorist of cultural-historical social studies, and advanced a theory, in particular, that a creator, by creating a work of literary fiction, at the same time creates a new symbol and thereby re-creates the integrity of the language that he used.
11. In reality the formula of Vygotsky’s dyad is more complex than is presented here, since both of its factors are taken into account by Vygotsky together with, accordingly, their addendum: the sign together with its meaning, tool, that ultraperipheral organ of the organism with a central controlling, nervous apparatus. Thus, the dyad of sign and tool is supplemented by Vygotsky’s own dyad of meaning and its brain apparatus (see Garai, L. “O znachenii i ego mozgovom apparate,” Kul’turno-istoricheskaia psikhologiia, No. 2, 2010).
GL1. Sic! Not a typographical error!

Towards a social psychology of personality:
Development and current perspectives of a school 
of social psychology in Hungary
Points of departure: Dilemmas of a Marxian psychology
In 1970 there was organized in the Institute for Psychology of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences a team-work with the scientific project of elaborating a psychological meta-theory that would be equally close to natural and to historical sciences.
The scientific program of the Department has its antecedents dating back to the 1960s. That period in Hungary was marked by a stabilization process of the socialist system combined with radical tendencies towards economic and social reforms.
Those rapid advances in society gave rise to many practical problems which, however, presupposed the answers to theoretical questions as well: What had the social reality of the preceding era been? What was the reformed society to be like? Does the direction of progress depend on free choice or on necessity independent of man?
Whether of a pragmatic, empirical, theoretical or axiological character, the questions were not raised separately nor were they addressed to any specific area of intellectual life: answers to these unspoken but challenging questions, whatever their source, were commonly – sometimes publicly – expected to be provided by the “humanities”.
No such body of integrated knowledge really existed. But within the individual disciplines, separately reawakening or even reviving in the 1960s, the necessity for an integration of knowledge was felt in order to cope with the questions of that period. Moreover, the possibility for an integration of knowledge existed. As concerns the humanities it emerged in the course of events which Lukács called the renaissance of Marxism. Through this process, first of all, a wider circle of readers in Hungary gained access to those classic works (Marx, 1953 and 1963) which provided a theoretical-methodological groundwork to transcend the antagonistic approaches of Naturwissenschaft (sciences of nature) versus Geisteswissenschaft (sciences of the mind) which had provoked a scientific cleavage. Marx surmounted the problem by taking production, instead of nature or mind, as his starting point (Lukacs, 1973), production being just as much determined by spatio-temporal dimensions as nature, and just as creative as mind.
Had it not been for such an integrative principle, the humanities could not have progressed, despite both the desire for integration and the need to solve current practical problems. Rather, such attempts would have remained trapped within the traditional boundaries of “Naturwissenschaft” or “Geisteswissenschaft”, and would have been constrained forever to attempts to derive culture from human nature, or to trace everyday behavioral patterns back to man’s mind. This would have perpetuated the split between “explanatory” and “descriptive” human sciences.
Thus in the 1960s, when the need was more clearly felt in Hungarian society for the development “in Marxian terms” of various branches of the humanities, including psychology, it became more and more apparent that this need was identical with the one that urged psychology to make its findings available for integration by other disciplines, while itself developing the capacity to integrate research results from other disciplines.
The fact that there was a real need for a Marxian psychology, i. e. for a psychology capable of integration with the other humanities, is best demonstrated by the fact that there were representatives of other fields who attempted to anticipate the development of such a psychology as long as none had yet been elaborated (cf. e.g. Lukacs, 1963, vol. 2, Chapter 11).
However, the elaboration of a Marxian psychology could have offered psychology much more than the mere possibility of integration with the rest of the humanities. Psychology is in a unique position, for the “bisecting line” of the humanities cuts across psychology and divides it into a ‘scientific” (`Naturwissenschaft”) and a “humanistic” (“Geisteswissenschaft”) part, i.e. an “explanatory” and a “descriptive” psychology, the integration of which is in itself a longstanding problem. Now, Marx’s anthropological approach, which surpasses the two antagonistic approaches by stressing the principle of production, is especially promising in view of curing psychology’s innate schizophrenia.
To achieve integration, however, it will not suffice merely to add Marxian theses on the one hand, and psychological facts and interpretations on the other. In order to obtain a real degree of integration, the non-psychological, production-centered conceptual framework must be translated into terms appropriate for use in psychology. These new conceptual tools can then be used to interpret the available data and facts as well as to orientate further research.
Such was precisely the research strategy of the Vygotsky school which had its renaissance in the 1960s. It exercised a direct influence on the early phase of the work at the Department of Personality Psychology. Vygotsky’s basic argument was that man in his activity utilizes as psychic tools signs that are psychic products of his previous activity. These signs constitute a special i.e. psychic category of “means of production” i.e. they are means which have been derived as a product of production. Later, especially during the decade of the school’s renaissance, Vygotsky’s colleagues (Leontiev, Galperin, Luriya, Elkonin and others) extended their investigations from the sector of human activity producing and using psychic signs to the whole of activity oriented to real objects and made the general proposition that the phylogenesis and the ontogenesis of psychism take place in object-oriented activity (Leontiev, 1969).
However, the theory that was built around this general thesis contained a contradiction concerning the genesis of motivation. A motive was understood as an originally inner need objectified in some outer object, while the term object-oriented activity referred to a life process directed towards such a motivating object. But where then does a motive itself take its origin? It cannot be from activity itself since the latter, according to the theory, would already presuppose the existence of some motive. Hence if it is correct to argue that activity is organized by an originally inner need objectified as a motive, then there must be at least one psychic factor which cannot originate in object-oriented activity.
It is this theoretical contradiction which the hypothesis of the specifically human fundamental need has been posited to resolve, adopting the Marxian strategy of drawing on a production-centered conceptual framework (Garai, 1962a, b, c; 1966a, b; 1966b; Eros and Garai, 1974). According to this hypothesis, a need, on either the human or the subhuman level, does not have to become objectified as motive in order to be able to organize an activity, since a need through the process of phylogenesis develops from the beginning as a need for object-oriented activity, evolving from those purely inner biological tendencies already given at the level of cells and directed towards the functions of nutrition, reproduction, the regeneration of injured living structure and the isolation of intruding alien materials. This means that a need manifests itself as drive, inhibition, reward or punishment in various phases of such an object-oriented activity that has its structure determined according to the prevalent features of the given stage of phylogenesis (Garai, 1968, 1969b, pp. 119-134, and 160-168; Garai and Köcski, 1975).
Thus, the human character of a fundamental need is determined by the structure of activity specific to the human level of phylogenesis. The activity characteristic of the human species is work activity. The hypothesis of the specifically human fundamental need suggests that man, as a result of his phylogenetic development and an ontogenetic process of maturation, possesses a need for some kind of activity, composed on the model of the structure of work activity, that is, consisting of the following phases: (1) appropriation: turning products of others” past activities into means for the individual’s future activity; (2) setting a new goal, which is an elaboration of tensions that appear between the already appropriated objects; (3) attaining the goal by producing some new object not existing previously; (4) alienation: a process that presents the product of the individual as a means to be used by others in their future activities (Garai, 1969b, pp. 178-200).
This hypothesis in itself presented a possibility of synthetizing various, sometimes contradictory psychological theories of motivation. For example, Lewin states that when a person has made a decision, the resulting intention will become a quasi-need for him and will maintain an inner tension until the decision has been carried out, regardless of whether it is kept in the focus of consciousness or not. Freud, on the other hand, speaks of “forgetting” certain intentions, i.e. purposefully expunging them from consciousness. Now, the hypothesis of the specifically human fundamental need explains that intentional actions have their special ways of fitting into man’s activity structure, and the fact of whether this adaptation happens to take place in a goal-fulfilling phase, or, on the contrary, in an alienating phase will determine whether the intention works according to Lewin’s or to Freud’s scheme. The hypothesis characterizes certain (mental) tactics, which were in part discovered empirically by social-psychological investigations of cognitive dissonance and in part by clinical psychoanalytical study of defense mechanisms, as fictitious manifestations of the specifically human need.
However, at this point of the development of the theory it became clear that such a level of abstraction overlooked a very important aspect of motivation.
In our approach, the existence of a specifically human need was taken for granted as an anthropological fact, one which motivates every normal individual to perform the successive phases of activity discussed above, with no more variation than permitted by the given stage of ontogenesis (Garai, 1969b, pp. 134-142). However, it is often found that there is a considerable variation in the way in which certain social expectations, concerning one phase or another, are met by different individuals. Some may feel that the activity which conforms to expectations is incited by their own inner motivation, whereas others regard the same activity as the result of some external pressure. There are some whose inner attitude corresponds to external expectations, yet the attitude does not become a motive of behaviour; finally, some do not at all, either in thought or in action, fulfill the given expectations.
Variation is even greater when the activities in question are not regulated by any explicit or implicit social expectations. Some people make scientific discoveries or produce technical inventions, others create works of art or lead a life that elevates them to acts of great moral value. They may attract followers who develop the discovery into a scientific school, the invention into an industrial enterprise, the work of art into culture, and the individual moral deed into a mass movement. Some will still be found who retain their passive attitude towards historical processes until a social expectation becomes clearly formulated.
How is this variation to be explained? It could seem natural to resort to a typological analysis to answer this question addressed to personality psychology. However, the approach which was adopted for the research program of the Department of Personality Psychology was essentially different. The methodological principle which led to rejecting the typological approach was found in Lewin (1935, pp. 41-90), who maintains that the modern, Galilean mode of thinking requires psychology to refrain from sorting the objects studied into different classes in which they would fall under different laws. The typological approach in psychology is a remnant of this abnegated “Aristotelian” way of thinking, which, in order to cover phenomena that are beyond the reach of the general psychological laws, designs other, independent laws instead of homogenizing “with respect to the validity of law” the world psychology investigates.
An important point to add to Lewin’s concept of homogenization was elaborated within the framework of the specifically human need hypothesis: individual motives and social determinants were not opposed to each other as biological needs to be described by natural laws, and cultural norms to be described by laws of the mind. One pole, the need of the individual, was represented as directed towards an activity modeled after the structure of work, while the other pole, the social determinant, was shown as a tension in the historical process of production (Garai, 1969b, pp. 81-111).
Work and production are two aspects, one individual and one social, of the same process. The same homogenization principle was also applied to the above-mentioned problem of variation, and resulted in the interpretation that the different responses of different individuals to the tensions arising in the historical process of production depended on the positions occupied in the total social structure of the relations of production.
The specifically human need hypothesis made just such a statement of this interconnection. The task of a Marxian psychology to render the production-centered conceptual framework adaptable was not carried further by means of this approach than to where the fundamental theoretical work of the Vygotsky school extended. Its work was in fact limited to the aspect of production as work activity and left the problems of production as a relation of property unexplored. While expounding the specifically human need hypothesis, the related contradiction of the theory can only be mentioned (cf. Garai b, 1969).
Since the question here concerned the mediation between social determinants and individual motives, a Marxian and therefore production-centered psychological investigation of human motivation could not be carried further unless the verbally stated interconnection was also made conceptually adaptable for psychological purposes.

Lines of orientation of research
The first period of work was by necessity characterized by a broad range of extensive inquiry. This also followed from the deliberate way of organizing the team so as to include representatives of different areas of psychology, namely theoretical psychology (Garai, 1969a), developmentaly psychology (Járó, 1973, 1975a, b, c, d; Járó et al., 1975), social psychology (Garai, 1969b), psychology of art (Erős, 1972, 1973), and neuro-psychology (Keleti, 1970; Köcski, 1969a, 1969b, 1971, 1972, 1974). The advantage of this composition was that the members of the team could combine their diverse stocks of knowledge in the study of the complex problematic of personality.
The orientation of the team started with seminars on readings of the literature in personality psychology in the strict sense. The typological approach being excluded from the team’s range of interest for reasons presented above, attention was concentrated on dynamic theories of personality. The major part of Lewin’s field theory and the following two of Freud’s propositions were integrated into the team’s principles of approach: (1) All the psychic and somatic manifestations of the individual should be taken as symbols and decoded with reference to the positions occupied in a system of relationships (which in Freud is the Oedipal triangle; see Garai and Köcski, 1978, Köcski and Garai, 1978); (2) Development is not something that merely happens to the individual, but a process to which the personality allocates much of its motivational energies either in an attempt to promote or to hinder that process in order to break up or preserve the actual relationship structures.
The next phase in elaborating fundamentals was dominated by efforts to select a certain body of material from social psychology that could be integrated into personality psychology. As a consequence of Garai’s study visit to France in 1971 and his participation in the general meeting and conference of the European Association of Experimental Social Psychology in 1972, the Department became acquainted with the theoretical and methodological critique which Western European social psychologists were applying to the American tradition of the discipline, as well as to their own pre-1968 work. This critique had a decisive influence on the views of the Department (cf. Garai, 1972c), due to a large extent to the contrast with the background against which it was perceived, namely that of a general lack of critique characteristic of social psychology in Hungary at that time. It was especially at the first Hungarian Social Psychological Conference in 1972 that this contrast was quite clearly noticed by the Department, thus setting the tone of members” contributions to the conference where their “harsh” opinions inevitably roused general objection and resulted in their complete isolation.
Besides surveying different branches of psychology, the Department examined other approaches which could be integrated into a theory of personality psychology. Though this study was meant to concentrate the multifarious research orientations, it in fact extended the field of inquiry to areas outside psychology.
Work was directed first to embrace the approach of philosophical anthropology and other philosophical domains that had implications for the study of personality. An important point to add to the views of the Department was found in Sève’s conception (1969) suggesting that the activity of personality depends on extrinsic motivation that can only be understood by virtue of those spatial and mainly temporal structures that are determined by the existing relationships of production. (For a critical analysis of Sève’s book, see Erős, 1972). Studying Marx’s Grundrisse and expounding its psychological implications resulted in the construction of a production-centered psychology of personality which was initially elaborated in economic-philosophical categories only. An examination of Kant’s thoughts in the Critique of practical reason led to an investigation of the logical patterns that organize the cognitions rationalizing a person’s decisions. This work eventually led to awareness of the categorization paradox (Garai, 1976b).
In the search for theoretical synthesis, the Department examined the possibilities offered by mathematical systems theory. Attention was focused on the structure that characterizes the systems studied by this theory as opposed to that of cybernetic systems. These mathematical systems turned out to have special formal mechanisms which, unlike cybernetic feedback and information, provide for development and not for equilibrium in systems (Garai, 1971, 1973a). These mathematical systems turned out to have special formal mechanisms which, unlike cybernetic feedback and information, provide for development and not for equilibrium in systems (Garai, 1971, 1973a). In their search for synthesis, the Department members also turned to philosophy of science and examined the way in which other sciences, especially physics and biology, had found the means to encourage processes of integration during periods of crisis. Further, concrete investigations were made to find out to what extent the different psychological theories, which are the most concerned with personality can be fitted together into one logical system. This work in particular and, in general the entire activity of the Department, was favourably influenced by a Marxian group of French psychologists (Pécheux, Plon, Poitou and others) whose critique of social psychology is based on Lacan’s version of psychoanalysis.
These “meta-scientific” studies also had a direct bearing on one important area of the problematic which the Department was going to explore. It was postulated that in the objective process of the development of productive forces there emerge certain tasks which are in the spirit of the time with no one in particular being responsible for having formulated them; and these tasks, mediated by the specifically human fundamental need, have a motivating impact on persons occupying certain positions in the social structure. The hypothesis was put forward, together with an attempt to demonstrate it, in a paper analyzing János Bolyai’s discovery of non-Euclidean geometry (Garai, 1970). This paper, presented at the 13th International Congress on the History of Science, argued for the hypothesis by analyzing a remarkable fact: the two thousand year old geometrical problem had been solved at the beginning of the 19th century simultaneously but independently by the Hungarian mathematician J. Bolyai and the Russian mathematician Lobatchevski.

Experimental designs
Experimental work, started in 1971, was based on the theoretical-methodological team work presented above. At that time the underlying assumptions of the production-centered psychology of personality were as follows:
1) Development of personality takes place in the course of a process during which the person retains or changes his place in a social structure. Retaining or changing place does not happen gradually but passes through conflicts arising from time to time, obliging the person to make clear-cut decisions for either conservation or change.
2) Development of personality is an integral part of the process of historical progress where the social structure mentioned in paragraph (1) is either preserved or subjected to change. The conservation or change of the social structure is not gradual: it occurs in social crises in which clear-cut decisions are made for the conservation or revolutionary change of the structure.
3) Preservation or change of the individual’s place within the social structure is not a mere result of external social intervention to move or maintain the individual. A person is motivated to change or retain his place by the specifically human fundamental need which is essentially a need for development. But this development itself is mediated by the series of acts of retaining or changing place within the social structure.
4) Conservation or change of the structure of society is not an outcome of what certain groups of individuals happen to want: it occurs by historical necessity, independent of any person’s will. It is a necessity of economic nature which depends on the production of the means of production. In certain historical periods it is served by the conservation of the structure of the relations of production whereas in other periods by a radical change in those relations.
5) The process of development of personality and that of social progress are interconnected. When the individual decides whether he is to preserve or to change his place in the social structure, this is at the same time a contribution to deciding whether the social structure should change or remain the same. Also, when historical events give rise to either stability or changes in the social structure, the positions that may be taken in it will stabilize or change accordingly. 
6) The decision which in a given period a person makes concerning the question, arising in an historical context, of preserving or changing the social structure, is determined by that person’s position in the social structure in question i.e. his class position.
The basic assumption for the experiments was that the self-development of the personality through crises and decisions can be grasped by analyzing behavior in conflict situations of decision.
Analysis was centred on two aspects of decision-making behavior: (1) What is it that the decision evokes or inhibits the memory of from among whatever has been stored and arranged into structures in memory throughout life? (2) What kind of a permanent mark does the decision produce, which may then prove decisive for the rest of the person’s life?
As regards the first of these questions, experiments were conducted by Garai (1969a) with undergraduate students in Moscow. A replication of the experiment with a control group of Budapest undergraduates, using Hungarian versions of the experimental devices, produced evidence to support the original results, showing that in situations of decision, life history memories (personal memory) can act as determinants even without the person becoming aware of them. Moreover, only those memories become conscious that play a part in organizing the social relationships of the person through the decision.
In another experiment, high school pupils were given a passage of surrealist prose, that is the kind of literature in which the sentences are not connected to one another to form a story or a logical train of thought but seem to follow loosely, “making no sense”, but still somehow holding together. The different groups were asked to retell the passage after having made various evaluative decisions concerning the text. These experiments reinforced the presupposition that recalling hidden structures of a text was markedly affected by the kind of value dimension – beautiful/ugly, tragic/idyllic, comic/elegiac or sublime/base – along which the decision was made.
For the second aspect of decision-making behavior, mentioned above, the presupposition was that the specifically human fundamental need becomes a motive by virtue of a decision alone. That is, choice is not determined by previously existing preferences and aversions but, on the contrary, the direction of the choice determined by the fundamental need will shape the preferences and aversions which then consistently determine further activities. Since such a hypothesis finds ample support in the rich fund of empirical evidence gathered through experiments in the theory of cognitive dissonance, the Department did not look for renewed experimental proof of the existence of such an inverse relationship. Instead, the attempt was made to specify whether the relationship itself could be considered as a specifically human characteristic and to what extent it was justified to suppose that the relationship was present throughout phylogenesis but at the human level appeared with essentially different qualitative features.
In order to settle this question, the members of the Department designed an experiment. It was expected that by observing the behavior of animals in a maze with one single crossing point, they could see if the first (random) choice at the crossing determined later preferences of direction or not. However, after the preparatory experiments to check various conditions of reinforcement, the work had to be suspended due to lack of suitable equipment.
After a relatively long time an experimental methodology using a modification of the game “Monopoly” was finally set forth as a tool of an essentially production-centered psychological approach to the problem of decision. The game itself was unknown to the subjects, high school pupils, and the only modification was the insertion in the instructions, comprising the smallest possible number of formal rules, of one saying that among the four subjects playing at one time the leader “plays as he likes while the rest should all play accordingly and consistently”. The instructions identified the leader according to a criterion dependent on the progress of the game, and it characterized a player for a period of several steps. (The designation “leader” was not used). The steps in the first part of the game involve certain decisions simulating economic activities purchasing sites, building houses, etc. In the experiment, according to the instructions, the “leader” had the privilege of deciding what he was going to buy and on what terms. His power was limited only by the instruction to be “consistent”, while the rest of the players” power depended on how they interpreted the deliberately vague instruction to play “according to what the leader does”. All subjects had to give reasons for each of their decisions.
The experiment was designed to model the rationalization of decisions and to use the model in exploring to what extent it depends on the position of who decides, and on the actual phase of the game, whether the rationalization concerns this position and phase only or is claimed to cover all positions and the whole of the game. After testing in 1973, the method was ready for application.

Crisis and social categorization
By 1973, the Department of Personality Psychology had completed the process of formulating its theoretical assumptions and methodological ideas. Paradoxically, this resulted in a state of crisis.
Garai’s visit to France in 1973 had a catalytic effect in recognizing the crisis itself. The visit had been planned to be a follow-up of the one two years earlier. At that time, in 1971, the associates of the Laboratory of Social Psychology of the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes had taken much interest in the theoretical assumptions of the Hungarian team, and a suggestion had been made to test them in comparative studies to be undertaken by the two scientific institutions embedded in different social structures. In 1973, however, when the experimental methodology based on “Monopoly” was proposed as a research tool, the associates of the Frenech Laboratory qualified the idea as a “typical manoeuvre of bourgeois ideology” and this was by no means only the opinion of Marxians.
The objection proved justifiable on the basis of the argument that follows. The totality-oriented assumptions of the theory are related to the question of whether a kind of social structure should survive or not, whereas the experimental method, by the very requirement of repeatability of the experiment, implies an a priori decision in favour of the survival of this structure (cf. Adorno et al, 1976) and it represents this pre-experimental, extra-scientific, ideological procedure as if it had become scientifically verified by the experiment.
The Department had to face a dilemma: (1) Either one could go on with the further elaboration of a production-centered psychology which originally had been developed in order to answer the questions raised by the social praxis of the sixties. Such a psychological theory, however, cannot apply the traditional procedures of scientific verification but is, instead, obliged to find the justification of its approach in the social praxis of the seventies; (2) Or, one could return to purely psychological theories, geared to traditional procedures of verification.
During his stay in France, Garai was asked to prepare a contribution to a special issue of a UNESCO journal on the crises in psychology and psychiatry. In this article (Garai, 1973b), he attempted to delimit the areas of competence of pure psychology and psychotechnics (a field detached from political practice and ideological theory). It was found that, while psychology and psychotechnics are capable of dealing with the development of the various abilities and even with developing them, these disciplines are not competent in questions of needs.
In the light of this conclusion, the Department was faced by the alternative of either carrying on with the production-centered study of needs, thus giving up all expectations of psychological verification, or having recourse to purely psychological procedures, thus abandoning any illusion of apprehending the phenomena of needs and motivation.
In order to understand this grave situation better, it should be mentioned that the very reason for setting up the Department at the Institute of Psychology had been a desire to investigate the needs of personality, that is, human motivation.
In the first part of the crisis period, the activities at the Department bifurcated. One group investigated the possibilities of nonexperimental methods (questionnaires, sociometry) of pure and applied psychology. Another group examined ways of conceptualizing in pure psychology in order to see which of the phenomena tackled in the period prior to the crisis (conflict, decision, rationalization, personal memory, etc.) could be described by these means.
This period of work was characterized by mutual hostility and repeated exchange of derogatory opinions. Indeed, what happened at that time was that the points of identity and of difference in opinion which had always existed among the members of the Department became sharpened by the crisis and, losing all nuances were elaborated into downright, categorical identities or categorical differences. When, in search of new possibilities of conceptualization, the members eventually considered the uses to which the concept of social categorization might be put, this concept turned out to be suitable first, in a purely psychological non-production-centered approach for describing other crisis situations analogous to that within the Department. Following this discovery, “social categorization” became the central term of conceptualization.
Naturally, the concept underwent some modification of meaning in comparison to the way it has been used, following Tajfel, in the social psychological literature (cf. Garai, 1976). The most important difference was that the Department’s works also contained reference to the type of social categorization which does not presuppose the conscious activity of the self since, on the contrary, it is even a precondition for the development of the consciously acting self (Köcski, 1976). Consequently, social categorization is also recognizable at the sub-human level, mainly in the way certain individuals of a species occupy a part of the living space as their own territory and keep others of the same species away. It is considered to be a higher-order manifestation of social categorization when, within the category thus established, a structure develops in the assemblage in which a given position, e.g. that of flock leader, is steadily occupied by one individual to the exclusion of all others.
In both cases categorization is mediated by some kind of signalization. Along with a category forming within the population, or a narrow category within the broader one, there appears a set of signals (motor, vocal, postural, secretory, vaso-motor, pigmentary or still others) which signifies that the individual belongs to the category in question (cf. Köcski and Garai, 1975).
Complementing the methods of developmental psychology (Járó, 1975a), in which she had displayed such great expertise, Járó (1973), with the assistance of Veres, elaborated complex methods, combining various social psychological techniques, for use in field investigations related to the development of social abilities on the one hand, and to the social factors of psychic development on the other. These methods seemed suitable for an initial approach not production-centred, but purely psychological to the type of phenomena that had been in the foreground of the Department’s interest in the earlier period.
It was in an atmosphere of prolonged crisis that the preparations for the European Conference on Social Psychology in 1974 at Visegrád were made. Prior to the Conference, the Department had discussed Garai’s and Erős’ papers. As a contribution to the theme “The social psychology of social change” which he had proposed placing on the agenda, Garai made an attempt to present the production-centered theory under the title “Is Social change motivated?” (Garai, 1974). The subject chosen by Erős was a characteristic expression of the fundamental problem of the Department, an interior problem, but one which all humanistic studies starting in the sixties and continuing in the seventies had to face: what are critical questions about society destined to become, once they are integrated in social research based on the methodological groundwork of “abstract empiricism” and “middle range theory”. (See Erős, 1974, who illustrates this point in an analysis of The authoritarian personality).

The paradigm of the relations of property
According to one of the assumptions of the production-centered theory of personality (see above), social formations make progress through crises, in the course of which personality also develops.
At the lowest ebb of its crisis, the Department of Personality Psychology might have realized (which it did not, however, since this kind of realization is apt to take place only retrospectively) that it had made some progress in a purely psychological conceptualization social categorization and categorizational signification and in elaborating a purely psychological method, combining developmental and social psychological methods.
The crisis had not come to an end, however, as became explicit during the periodic thematic discussions held in the Department: none of the members wished to give up motivation research, nor to put up with the professional-ideological illusions which a purely psychological research on motivations would have imposed upon them.
The production-centered theory of personality considered the motivated development of personality in its relation to crisis and revolutionary transformations of social totality. At the same time, the Department involved in a crisis of its own microsocial formation, undertook its transformation in a way which resulted in development. While running the field investigations which had been launched at that time (see below), the Department members were also confronted by microsocial forms in which as a rule they found that, if their accumulating crisis failed to erupt, development of the personality might stagnate or that an evolving but prolonged crisis might lead to self-destruction and ultimately to suicide, while the resolution of the crisis could bring about the development of the personality. It was thus with reference to microsocial forms that a hypothesis was set forth suggesting that the realization of these possibilities did not depend on what typological characteristics mediate as “inner conditions” the external effect of the “social environment” in a given person. The earlier conception was that the mediating position was that “held by the person in the global social structure of the relations of production”, in particular, with respect to belonging to the class of the propertied or the propertyless. It was vital for the prospects of a production-centered study of personality that microsocial forms and the processes that take place within them should be describable by the paradigm of relations of property.
The model, whose possible application to microsocial relationships is being examined, shows the following relationship, revealed by Marx’s production-centered philosophy of history historical materialism: possession of certain means of production ensures certain positions in the global social structure, positions permitting ruling this structure by political and ideological means; the aim of such a rule is essentially to maintain the very structure in which precisely the possession of the means of production is what reinforces the dominant position. This is a paradoxical formation, whose principle of organization is determined by those who occupy dominant positions and who in turn are determined to occupy dominant positions by the principle of organization itself. An investigation into the question of whether such paradoxical formations are to be found in microsocial relationships as well leads at first to the result that there are only paradoxical formations since this principle of organization proves in a first analysis to be that which serves to perform social categorizations which, then, is characterized by the categorization paradox (Garai, 1976b; 1977a; Erős and Garai, 1978). This is so because the subject who performs the categorization belongs to the object he categorizes, and at the same time is only detached from it as a result of this categorization (as “we” or “I”).
After closer investigation, it turned out that within all formations (groups, roles) which in social psychology have traditionally been regarded as possessing their given principles of organization, independently of the persons composing them, a dominant position exists which in fact determines the principles of organization. Thus, for example; the principle of organization of a role relationship like that between doctor and patient is determined from the position of the doctor: it is always here that is decided what the criteria are for being doctor or patient (Garai, 1975).
The perspectives of the motivated development of the personality are mediated by the position a person occupies in the structure analyzed by the paradigm of property relations during the given historical phase (consolidated, pre-crisis, in crisis, or consolidating after crisis) of the microsocial formation (Járó, 1975a; Járó and Veres, 1976a and 1976b).
The possibilities offered by a paradigmatic approach to the relations of property resolved the dilemma of a “production-centered, approach” vs. “concrete research” and also the crisis that stemmed from it.
Thus came to an end the period in the work of the Department of Personality Psychology during which its principal task had been to promote the assimilation of the non (or not mainly) psychological set of production-centered concepts into psychology. This effort had specifically concerned the problem areas not tackled by the Vygotsky school.

Research in progress
1. Empirical and case studies
Within the framework of the Department, Járó, Keleti, Köcski and Veres have mainly been engaged in empirical case investigations. They have made it possible to scrutinize systematically, and trace back to actual psychological phenomena, the abstract statements of the production-centered psychology of personality by making use, on the one hand, of the new features and conceptual tools of the theory (such as social categorization, the paradigm of property relations, self-qualifying paradoxes) and, on the other, by applying the methodological results and the experience gained in earlier empirical research, mostly in schools (Járó and Veres, 1976a). As a matter of fact, the goal set for empirical research had been, even previously, more comprehensive than simply planning and elaborating suitable technical-methodological devices. In order that the theory concentrating on the laws of development could ultimately apply to any person and under the circumstances of any social formation, empirical research set as a goal to delineate the area of validity and to specify the need for supplementary conceptualization with respect to the phenomena outside that area.
The investigations made by this group are connected by a set of hypotheses concerning the concrete social and individual criteria of the development of personality. Each of them focuses on different aspects and periods of development and reflects upon the generally formulated question: What are the conditions and events that permit us to state that a person develops?
The members of the group made a creative attempt to answer the question by a joint application of the principles of production-centered psychology so that they could refer to concrete individuals chosen as subjects. The starting point for their analysis was that according to the hypothesis of the specifically human fundamental need, the motivation for development the need for setting a goal is held to be valid for every individual under certain social conditions, this motivation being a supraindividual and extrapsychic factor. It was also postulated that the conditions of the force of the motivation can be described with the help of the property relations paradigm. Within the various social formations, one of these objective conditions is the position from which the goal of the common activity can be determined, and the other is the nature of the historical period, which determines whether the goal is set from the dominant position (stabilization) or whether there is a chance to determine the goals for the forces of the new order, formerly in a position of dependence (revolution).
The theoretical conclusion reached at this point by the empirical research group was that personality development is not a general human process, one of anthropological validity but is attained exclusively by those holding the positions which, at the time of the investigation, bear the historically mature tendencies of development. From this it follows that the objective factors making the development of the personality possible can be shown by analyzing the historical movement of the social formation providing the framework of development, and the positions held within it.
The social categorization hypothesis is concerned with the subjective conditions of the development of personality. This hypothesis is not only an attempt to answer the philosophical question of how it is possible for man to experience as his own subjective free will what in fact is objectively, i.e. economically, necessary. At the same time it offers a theoretical possibility to investigate psychologically how a person in his concrete historical-social situation makes his decision concerning the alternatives of development emerging before him.
The hypothesis also provides the basis for a description of the semiotic devices and processes through which the person carries out his decision with reference to himself and to his environment. Decisions with respect to categorization may either stabilize the social system or provoke a crisis within it according to the concrete historical situation and the position occupied in the system of relationships.
The above ideas have been developed by Járó, thus summarizing the principles of a production-centered psychology in a unified model of development (Járó, 1975a). The central concept of the model is the episode of self-definition, which can either take in the historical moment in which the alternative of development appears or the structure of the social system of relationships (the dominant, mediating, dependent; and marginal positions). The episode of self definition is a historically and postionally structured situation of choice which will serve as a frame of reference for interpreting decisions about categorization (Járó and Veres, 1976a).
The production-centered model of ontogenesis necessarily had to face the criteria and range also of phenomena of “non-development” while describing the periods of development and systems of relationships in the social forms serving as frames for ontogenesis dependence relations in stable periods and of the inner mechanism of personality (rationalization) (Járó, 1975a; Járó and Veres, 1976b).
The various empirical case studies under way in the Department permit analysis of different aspects of social categorization among the social formations actually canalizing development, thus bringing different stages of ontogenesis under investigation. The following themes are addressed:
1) Emergence of categorial signalization in the early phase of ontogenesis, in the course of the differentiation of “I” and “others” (Köcski, 1976, 1977; Garai and Köcski, 1976, 1978; Köcski and Garai, 1978).
2) Positional differences in the categorization of high-school pupils occupying various positions in the system of relationships within the class (Járó and Veres, 1975; Veres, Járó and Erős, 1975a; Járó and Veres, 1976a, 1976b; Veres, 1976a).
3) Categorizational mediation of the change of social stratum in young workers coming to town from the country. Possibilities for influencing the categorization by cultural means (Veres, 1975, 1976, 1977a, 1977b).
4) Deficient social and generational categorization as a cause of suicide in the period of growing up (Keleti, 1976a, 1976b).
Work on these themes has, of course, attained different levels of conceptualization and of exploration of facts. Currently, all the investigations conducted by members of this group are case studies or structurally oriented field research since earlier attempts at experiments failed and were abandoned.
Empirical work within the production-centered-psychological approach, whether carried out by recording observations in life situations as in a diary, or by interviews, questionnaires or unfinished stories, is always so designed as to isolate the episodes of self-definition from the natural flow of complex events, and to allow positional and semiotic analyses by comparing the signs used by the persons with the objective structure of the situation.
Recent field studies have used a production-centered psychological approach, not only as a device of cognition but of social praxis as well: our studies in a high school and in a workers’ hostel introduced the method of social psychological and personality-psychological “catalysis” aiming at establishing the groups” self-reflection.

2. Theoretical-methodological research
Part of the work in the Department is done by independent methods of theory construction and methodological critique of theories, which is a type of tool that has also appeared in other sciences (physics, biology) at a given stage of their development.
The aim of this work is to develop a personality psychology independent of general psychology· (cf. Garai, 1968; 1969b, pp. 142-164; 1970). The task falls into two phases: (1) integrating the individual psychological (from psychoanalysis, developmental psychology, personality dynamics) with the social psychological stock of facts and interpretive materials that refer to personality; (2)establishing a synthesis of this independent personality psychology and general psychology. In both phases Lewin’s principle of homogenization (see above) is instrumental. Work in the first of these phases is more advanced. The validity of some social psychological theories was tested and a synthesis of the theory of cognitive dissonance and that of social categorization has been arrived at (Garai, 1977a: 1977c; 1977d; Erős and Garai, 1978). As a result of the examination of the social psychological theory of conflicts and of the ideological critique directed against it (see the Deutsch/Plon debate in the European Journal of Social Psychology (1974), the conclusion was that one of the two parties opposed in a conflict will determine the structural frames within which the conflict can be “acted out”, but the other party may depending on the historical state of the macro- or the micro-social formation extend the conflict from the level connected with its object (object-level) to the level of the structural framework that determines it (meta-level), positing his own principles of organization in opposition to the principle of organization fixed in the existing structure. Through the extension of the conflict to two levels, the formation enters a crisis for which only a radical solution is possible (Garai and Erős, 1976; Garai, 1977).
In a paper belonging to the second phase of this work, Garai (1978) showed that all attempts to understand the whole of mental activity in terms of brain functioning alone lead by necessity to leaving aside those phenomena which have their origin in social or personality factors (such as, for example, the meaning of environmental “stimuli”). At the same time, he pointed out that taking these phenomena into consideration leads to a sort of dualism. As a solution for this dilemma Garai suggested that the territorial mechanisms of supraindividual organization, rather than brain functioning, be regarded as the prime mechanism of these phenomena.
These theoretical activities were supported by a methodological critique of various social psychological and individual psychological theories. It primarily consisted in criticizing the conceptions of society and of personality implied by the different theories, within the framework of the history of ideas and of the critique of ideologies. The first systematic attempt in this direction was made by Erős in his previously mentioned paper presented at the Visegrád conference (Erős, 1974). In his later studies (1975, 1976a, 1976b, 1977a, 1977b; see also Garai and Erős, 1976; Erős and Garai, 1978) he further developed this type of analysis, also making use of the complex historical material that he had collected during his stay in the United States (1976).
One crucial theme of the historical and ideological-critical studies was the rise of American social psychology and the process in its development by which it ceased to be a “social prophesy” committed to reforms, and became a sort of “social technology” a technique of mass manipulation (see Erős, 1977b; Erős and Garai, 1978).
Another central question was related to critical social theory, born in the Europe of the thirties and oriented towards an empirical social psychology, as seen especially in the case of the Freudo-Marxists (Reich, Fromm) and the theorists of the Frankfurt School (Adorno, Horkheimer). Two aspects of critical theory are to be noted here. First, because they are good examples of the consistent critique of the ideological preconceptions of psychology as well as of the social sciences in general (see Adorno et al, 1976, especially Adorno’s writings), and second, because they demonstrate that the ideas of critical theory are themselves not free from certain lapses into ideological functions. This double aspect is best revealed in Adorno’s and his associates” work, The Authoritarian-personality, which is in some respects critical theorists’ greatest achievement in social psychology. Nonetheless, the implicit contradictions of this work have furnished possibilities for its “positivist reinterpretation” and in this way for its adaptation to the main trends of American social psychology. (On the set of contradictions in this work and the process of reinterpretation, see Erős, 1977b).
Some preliminary results of research in progress in the Department of Personality Psychology were presented in 1977 at the session commemorating the 75th anniversary of the creation of the Institute of Psychology of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (see Erős, 1978; Garai and Köcski, 1978; Járó and Veres, 1978).

Notes

1. The term, the humanities is traditionally used in Hungary (as well as in other Central European countries) to denote the historical and social sciences as opposed to the exact sciences.
2. Of the members of the Department, Garai took part in the work of the International Organizing Committee of the Conference, and Erős participated in the preparatory work.

Marxian personality psychology
A psychological meta-theory deriving its assumptions from Marx’s materialist philosophy of history and applied to the historical development and social relations of personality. Its philosophical basis, historical materialism, unlike other materialist philosophies, takes neither nature nor the spirit as its principle. Its starting point is production, which is just as much defined by spatio-temporal dimensions as is nature. and just as creative as is mind.
S. Rubinstein (1959) derived four principles from this philosophy. These principles were to be applied both to a Marxian activity psychology and to personality psychology. They are:
(1) the principle of objectivity – mental phenomena refer to objects in the space-time of the material world;
(2) the principle of activity – mental dispositions develop in the activity they regulate;
(3) the principle of historicity – mental states bear the marks of their history; and
(4) the principle of sociality – mental characteristics are socially determined.
None of these principles, considered separately, is characteristic of a Marxian psychology. It is their combination which is specific to the psychological meta-theory derived from historical materialism. This combination is brought about by a specific interpretation of each principle:
l. Object is conceived as manufactured by an activity of man and, reciprocally, is claimed to be an “inorganic body” of man in producing together that activity (Marx: Economic and philosophical manuscripts).
2. Activity is pictured as a necessary everyday cycle of production and reproduction. The cycle is interrupted .occasionally by moments of free creation of new values that are introduced to be reproduced by subsequent necessary everyday cycles of activity.
3. History is conceived as composed of autonomous human acts restricted by social laws. These social laws are actualized by the autonomous acts of others.
4. Society is pictured as based upon relations of object appropriation and as establishing property relations (Marx: Grundrisse).
Rubinstein did not apply his four principles in their entirety. He considered the personality as an internal mediator of external determinants and as originating from other external determinants internalized in the past. According to his metaphor the personality of a man is his “socially determined nature”. This pattern is highly typical of allegedly Marxian personality psychologies. The personality psychology outlined by Rubinstein turned out to be an amalgam of a social cognitivism and a social behaviorism. It describes the emergence of a personality by the notion of socialization and the social functioning of a personality is described in terms of attitude. For the proximate but not identical central notion of set in Uznadze’s theory, of social interaction, of communication. etc. None of these points alone is particularly characteristic of a Marxian approach.
In other cases the application of some of the above principles in isolation from others results in a kind of psychoanalytic personality theory. The central problem of a marxizing personality theory of psychoanalysis is the interdependence of the personality structure and the structure of society. For W. Reich the structure of a repressive society determines an authoritarian personality structure through sexual repression in family education. E. Fromm claims that it is the structure of a competitive society based on private property that by frustrating a need for secure relationships with others, fixes the personality on a dependent level as “escaping from freedom”.
A. Jozsef states that the distortion of the personalities of both the capitalist and the worker is determined by the fundamental distortion of the capitalist society. The society is both the subject and the object of both production (that is in the process of production reproduces itself) and socialization. On the other hand, the person as worker is only the subject of production and the object of the socialization, as opposed to the person as capitalist being only the subject of socialization and merely the object of the production. This produces neurotic personalities of either a mere social object with only technical intercourse and no orgasm or a mere social subject with only impotent libido.
In contrast to the above considerations for H. Marcuse it is not the structure of an actually given social relation (e.g. between capitalists and workers in a capitalist society) that more or less distorts the structure of a personality and still less does it depend on how repressive or liberal is that social relation. It is civilization which is opposed as such to Eros and transforms it by repression into aggression.
A group of followers of Lacan and Althusser (Bruno et al., 1973) hold that besides nature the only reality is discourse and its structure. There exists a strict distinction between the discourse of the subject and that of other while there are no principles regulating that distinction on the level of a meta-language. The meta-level relation of proper discourse and the personality distorted by it both are but an ideology. The ideology is the discourse produced by a dominating place in the discourse structure but this ideology presents itself either as corresponding to an objective reality or as a mere subjective belief system of individual selves that may be opposed by that of others.
It was in controversy with such theories as well as the humanistic philosophy (Garaudy) going back to the early Marx that Lucien Sève (1969) advanced his psychological meta-theory of personality. He rejected the basic thesis of the theories of Reich, Marcuse and so on sketched above.
That here is an alienation of the personality distorted by empirically given social relations from its intrinsic specifically human generic essence (Gattungswesen) given in advance of any social relations. Nevertheless he argued that there is an essence of human personality. It is neither intrinsic nor given in advance but is borne by the historically developed totality of production relation. Furthermore, it is neither generic nor intimately characteristic of a given individual but the totality of production relations of is in a special way addressed to each xxxnt the particularities (i.e. classes) of that totality. For example. the human essence that characterizes a worker in a capitalist society as a personality is defined by the relations in which his personal power is reproduced as a concrete use value producing abstract exchange value for the capitalist and, at the same time, as an abstract exchange value producing concrete use value for the worker himself.
L. Garai and his team (1979) tried to extend the validity of such a production-centered approach to those aspects of the historical development and social relationship of personality which are not directly connected with production as such.
For that purpose they adopted L. Vygotsky’s idea (19xxx8) of analysing a mental context according to a paradigm derived from an economic context. Vygotsky’s basic argument was that man utilizes as psychic tools signs that are psychic products of his previous activity and as such constitute a special (i. e. mental) category of means of production brought into being as products of production. A. Leontiev (1969) set out from a psychology describing man’s activity as oriented to such an object taken both as a means and a product and attempted to derive from it a personality psychology that describes the agent of that activity with his characteristic hierarchy of motives.
Garai took personality psychology as independent of activity psychology which has a special mental context to be analysed according to a paradigm obtained from another economic context. i. e. that of class relations (Garai 1977). The main paradigmatic point of class relations is claimed to be the representation of the common law of different classes by only one of them. Neither the detention of personality differences nor finding out general law xxs of the functioning of personalities is supposed to interest Marxian personality psychology. It investigates how during its development a personality establishes its differences and similarities according to or in contrast with a common pattern represented by someone with reference to whom the personality also has to distinguish or identify itself. At the beginning the elaboration of nuances of identities and differences of individuals with regard to a social situation into categorical identities and differences (see SOCIAL CATEGORIZATION) is not presented by a series of conscious acts but takes place by means of an elaboration of physical entities such as sex, height or color as well as all kinds of body activity into signs. These entities unconsciously symbolize by the identities and differences of their structures. the simultaneously elaborated identities and differences of social structures (Kocski and Garai 197xxxxx). The emergence of the conscious self is then mediated by the confrontation between the personality’s self-definition and general laws represented by others.
A further point to be stressed by a Marxian personality psychology is related to the economic fact that the part of the physical world produced by men as means of production may be expropriated by a class that becomes, by virtue of its property, the class representing the common pattern for all the classes. This has implications for personality development: (1) the above mental elaboration of physical entities into signs that mediate the unconscious mental elaboration of the personality’s social world is pre-formed by the property relations of that social world; (2) so is the emergence of the conscious self since it is mediated by the confrontation of the personality’s (unconscious) self definition with that property-related common pattern. Thus, it is stated that personality development in a socialization process depends upon the individual’s privileged or under-privileged position with regard to the property relations interpreted either in a strict economic sense or paradigmatically. The main paradigmatic point of property relations is that the property-condition of occupying the position privileged to frame a law or pattern of socially approved personality is established by that law itself (Garai 1977). Those in an under-privileged position can ensure their personality development only by introducing radical changes into their self-establishing social world.
Personality development is not conceived by Marxian personality psychology as a joint effect of biological maturation and a social shaping process which a passive individual would be submitted to. Instead, it is represented as the result of an individual’s activity organized according to the paradigm of the work activity: the need-motivated reproduction cycles are interrupted by life crises which may provoke creative inventions and these become patterns to be reproduced in renewed cycles by the force of a specifically human need for a need-free activity.
The production-centered meta-theory of Marxian personality psychology is the same as that applied in Marxian activity psychology. Hence there is a real possibility of basing an integrated psychology on this meta-theory instead of reproducing the traditional distinction between a “scientific” (Naturwissenschaftliche) and a “humanistic” (geisteswissenschaftliche) psychology.

Bibliography

Althusser, Louis 1969: Freud and Lacan. New left review 55. 49-65.
Bruno, Pierre et al. 1973: La psychologie sociale: une utopie en crise. la Nouvelle Critique 62. 72-78: 64. 21-28.
Fromm. Erich 1973: Marx’s Concept of man. New York, F. Ungar.
Garai, László 1977: Conflict and the economical paradigm. Dialectics and humanism 2. 47-58. et al. 1974: Towards a social psychology of personality: Development and current perspectives of a school of social psychology in Hungary. Social Science Information  18. 1. 137-66.
József, Attila 1972: Hegel, Marx, Freud. Action poétique 49. 68-75.
Köcski, Margit and Garai, László 1978: Les débuts de la catégorisation sociale et les manifestations verbales. Une étude longitudinale 4. 3-30.
Leontiew, Alexei: Problems of mental development. Joint Publications Research Service, Washington, 1969
Marcuse, Herbert 1972: Eros and civilisation. New York, Random House.
Reich, Wilhelm 1970: The mass psychology of fascism. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Rubinstein. Sergei 1959: Principles and ways of mental development [In Russian]. Moscow: Publishing House of Soviet Academy of Sciences.
Lucien Sève: Marxisme et la théorie de la personnalité. Paris: Editions Sociales.
Vygotsky. Lev, 1962: Thought and language. Cambridge: MIT Press 1978;: Mind in society. The development of higher psychological processes. Cambridge. Mass.: Harvard University Press.

The Principle of Social Relations and the Principle of Activity
Discussion of whether external factors or internal genetic factors determine progress in a person’s mental development runs like a red herring throughout the history of psychology.
In foreign, especially American, psychology of the ‘40s and ‘50s, when behaviorism reigned, it seemed that the environmentalists had finally carried the day. The mid-’60s, however, witnessed a revival of nativist ideas, which seeped through the logical “cracks” in the theory of learning. For example, Miller counted how many reinforcements would be necessary to shield all possible correct propositions 2-60 words long from grammatical errors. It was found that a person would need 103 reinforcements per second throughout his life to acquire, through training techniques, the competence to speak correctly in terms of grammar.
Continuing in the same vein, Chomsky concluded that a person must acquire competence “on the basis of the finite and random experience associated with language to reproduce and understand an infinite number of new propositions” [34. P. 7]. This competence is a language acquisition device that itself is not acquired, but innate.2
Chomsky’s ideas spread rapidly, as did the ideas propounded somewhat later by Jensen [43], who found that the IQs of children were correlated so closely with the IQs of their parents that 80% of intelligence could be considered hereditary. Since this correlation is the same for blacks and for whites, the proponents of these ideas postulated that the 15%-20% difference in favor of whites found between the IQs of the two populations must be explained by differences in hereditary factors, not by different living and learning conditions.
The resurgence of nativism has not been as prominent in the specialized literature of the socialist countries. Nevertheless, a similar shift in emphasis is evident in the latest revival of the two-factor theory (see, for example, [18]; see also the critique of this theory by Luria [19]). This theory counterposes an innate biological factor not to external influences in general, but only to the external influences of the “social environment.”

The inconsistency of the concept of “social environment”
In the scientific literature the “social environment” is interpreted either as a factor mediating the relationship between a person’s internal and external worlds or as a special part of the external world. When it is seen as a mediating link, the “social environment” serves as a concrete vehicle of general sociocultural (in particular, speech) experience. The social environment viewed in this way is often identified with a person’s “microclimate” (for the child this is the narrow circle of close adults), and serves as a model for the person, who becomes like it through imitation or other forms of social learning.
According to the postulates of general psychology, objects stand counterposed to the person. Their interaction, through which the person learns, can be mediated by another person, through his messages and instructions. If as a result of successful learning the messages and instructions of the teacher have been assimilated by the learner, the teacher can be excluded from the situation.
Child psychologists (W. Pryer, W. Stern) and linguists concerned with the learning of speech and language (A. I. Gvozdev [6]) have pointed out that sentences that cannot be acquired by a child without the intervention of an adult because their meaning changes in the very act of “assimilation” are also exceptions. These are turns of phrase containing what, in the Anglo-Saxon literature on linguistics, is called a shifter, or in French, a deictique (e.g., a personal pronoun). According to the observations of these authors, if a child learns these phrases or locutions in same way as he learns those that are based on the name objects, he will, for a time, apply the personal pronouns your, etc., to himself and, correspondingly, the first personal pronouns to other people. Some authors (A. I. Gvozdev and others) have observed that in addition to personal pronouns, are other key words that function in the same way: a child for example, use the expression Take! in a way that is contrary to its meaning, i.e., meaning give when he asks for an object.
In our opinion, such relations in a discursive situation are not the exception, but the rule.
Following French linguists and psycholinguists [28] (see their psychogenetic interpretation in Bruner [31]), we us term discourse to refer to a kind of communication in which the statements of each of the interlocutors are determined position they occupy in a social structure, not just by the o about which they are speaking. The primary function of the symbols used in discourse as such is not labeling objects, but categorizing people with respect to the particular social situation correspondingly, categorizing social situations with respect to the particular person.
The concept of discourse enables us to analyze speech sequences that would be absurd without it (for example, “This is mine?”-”No, it is mine.”). Compare this, for instance, with meaningless sequences of a nondiscursive nature: “This is a table?”-”No, this is a table.” In the first sequence, in contrast to the second, the positions occupied by the interlocutors social structure must be taken into account. Hence, the other (teaching) person is not eliminated in the process of learning speech even after it has been completed since he is the vehicle of that conjugate position that thereafter must be taken into account.
The concept of “social environment” is often used in the sense of a unique part of the external world, as in the terminology of behaviorism. This interpretation3 is fashionable in the literature and is gaining currency in our countries as although it suffers from an irreparable defect. To be sure, this defect is latent because by “society” the totality of individuals is meant. In such a conception, a “particular person” (or at least a subjective factor) and “other people” representing his “objective” social environment can be distinguished from one another; we can then study how the person adapts to the social environment or how he manipulates it through social skills through social learning.
Such questions are common to all theories of learning regardless of whether it is objects interacting with an individual subject e as the elements in the environment or whether the latter are human beings.
However, this latent defect in interpreting the social environment as part of the external world immediately becomes patent as IS we begin to regard ‘society” not as a totality of individuals but as a totality of relations among them (Marx). Then, even applied to the simplest relations (for example, of the type Is power over B”), the question of whether they are part of the internal or the external world of the particular person loses its g. If this is not taken into account and an attempt is made to situate social relations in either the internal world or the external world, we end up with a logical confusion of the type that, for example, from the following statement by Tajfel and co-authors: “Intergroup behavior is possible only if one first a the aspect of the social environment that is important particular relation, using any social criterion for demarcating from `them,’ the in-group from the out-group” [51. P. 151].
According to the authors of this statement, social categorization is done by the “I” of the given person; and since the “I” is .y part of the group “we,” which the above postulate situates in the environment, i.e., the external world, we find that the “I,” being part of a part of its external environment, is outside itself (see L. Garai [41]).
Adhering to the concept “social environment” has hindered the potential development of contemporary currents in psychology, particularly the theory of social categorization discussed above (see [29,30,47,49,50,51,52] and, especially, [48], in which the latest achievements are summarized), which stresses not individuals, but the relations among them. These contemporary currents are attempting, whether they realize it or not, to offer a new approach to the old problem we have outlined above. We have indicated how nativism emerges from the inability of environmentalism to explain mental development (in particular, in the child’s development of speech).4
Theories that define society as a totality of relations can help to rescue psychological interpretations from the closed circle of “nativism or environmentalism.” These theories go beyond the general logic of opposites according to which all that is not present a priori in the individual organism comes from without and all that is not assimilated from the external environment necessarily is latent within. If a social relation is part of neither a person’s internal nor external world, the mental product that results from such a relation cannot, in the strict sense, be attributed either to external factors (and learning) or to internal, genetic factors (and maturation).
Let us clarify this with an example. In socialization a child must adapt not to society in general, but to a specific social structure, let us say, to a two-child family. But the structure of a two-child family is created by the fact that the child became the second child in it. His existence and the concrete events of this existence define the concrete tasks of socialization. For example, the task of “defending oneself” against the jealousy of a brother two years older would not arise if the child himself did not provoke that jealousy (even if only by the fact of his very existence). But to be, for example, a second child, or to be a child of the same sex as the older sib, is neither an internal genetic property nor an external stimulus. Since an attainment in mental development can be determined by the very fact of being, for instance, a second child of the same sex as the first child in the family, it cannot be considered as being present from the outset or as being the result of acquisition.

The theory of activity and the problem of social factors
The “discovery” of the social relation did not first enable psychology to go beyond the logic common to nativism and environmentalism. This possibility also exists in the psychological theory of activity.
Activity, in the conception of A. N. Leont’ev [11-14] and P. Ya. Gal’perin [2,3], is not a function of some strictly internal mental or physiological mechanism, but a process organized by objects in the external environment. On the other hand, an object is not a source of strictly external, physical or cultural, influences on the organism: only that aspect of only that factor of the external world that may be included in the structure of an activity at a particular stage of phylogeny and ontogeny can function as an object.
Thus, object-related activity is not the manifestation of a priori internal genetic properties of the organism or an effect of external influences of the environment. Nor is it a “dialectic” unity of these two factors.
Leont’ev has written:
...The principal distinction underlying classic Cartesian-Lockean psychology, a distinction between the external world, the world of extension to which external material activity belongs, on the one hand, and the world of internal phenomena and processes of consciousness, on the other, must yield its place to another distinction: between objective reality and its idealized, transformed forms (verwandelte Formen), on the one hand, and, on the other, the activity of the subject, which includes both external and internal processes. But this means that the split of activity into two parts or aspects, presumed to belong to two completely different spheres, is eliminated. [14. Pp. 99-100]
Both possibilities of surmounting the logic common to both nativism and environmentalism were present in Vygotsky’s theory [1] of the development of thought and language. He related the origin of thought to the development of object-related activity, but the origin of language to the development of social relations, demonstrating that these two genetic roots were independent of one another in phylogeny, but were mutually dependent on one another in ontogeny (for more details on this, see L. Garai [40. Pp. 112-42]). The representatives of Vygotsky’s school went on successfully to develop the psychology of object-related activity, and its relationship to the psychology of social relations was assumed to be self-evident. 5
Thus, in developing the general theory of activity, Leont’ev stressed that the activity of a particular person is always part of a system of social relations and does not exist independently of those social relations. In society man does not simply find external conditions to which he must adapt his activity; social relations themselves contain the motives and the goals of human activity, its means, and its methods. Leont’ev pointed out:
Marx’s discovery, a discovery that was radical for psychological theory, was that consciousness is not the manifestation of some cosmic capacity of the human brain...but the product of those special, i.e., social, relations into which people enter... Furthermore, the processes generated by those relations posit objects in the form of subjective images in the human brain, i.e., in the form of consciousness. [14. P. 31-Emphasis added.]
Leont’ev ascribed major importance to the circumstance that “a person’s relation” to the objective world around him is mediated by his relations to people, in particular, the relations of the child to the world of objects is initially always mediated by the actions of an adult.
The possibilities of development of the higher mental functions of a human being are defined by the place, independent of him, he occupies in the system of social relations. Theoretical postulates regarding the significance of a person’s involvement in social relations are generally accepted by Soviet psychologists, but these relations themselves have rarely been the object of specific psychological studies.
A considerable number of attempts have been made in the last decade to reconceptualize the social relation as a psychological problem that had to be resolved once and for all to overcome the barrier posed by the logic common to nativism and environmentalism. The key concept in these attempts for Soviet psychology has been the concept of communication.
This concept was first developed in the sphere of activity, i.e., it was conceptualized as a variety of object-related activity: “Communication, like all activity, is objective. The subject or object of the activity of communication is another person, a partner in joint activity” [15. P. 237].
But we must regard as somewhat exaggerated Leont’ev’s assertion that ‘soviet psychologists are agreed in their conception of communication as a type of activity” [10. P. 112]. This, in our view, is difficult to bring into accord with, say, the following statement by B. F. Lomov, quoted in the above-cited article by Leont’ev [10. P. 107] :
The actual material life-style of a person, which determines his mental makeup, is not totally exhausted by his object-related practical activity, which is only one aspect of the life-style or behavior of a person in the broad sense. Another aspect is communication as a specific form of interaction of a person with other people. [16. P. 18]
And further we read:
The concept of “activity” comprises only one aspect of man’s social being: subject-object relations ... but is the material life of a person, his being, completely and wholly defined by the system of subject-object relations? Evidently not. A person’s social being includes not only his relations to the objective world (the natural world and the world created by mankind) but also his relation to people with whom he is in direct or mediated contact... In his individual development, a person acquires what mankind has accumulated not only in the process of activity but also in the process of communication, in which the system of subject-subject relations is formed, developed, and expressed. [17. Pp. 125-26 Emphasis added.]
Thus, Lomov supports the position that communication is not a variety of activity, but exists parallel with it on an equal footing. The argument in this regard is interesting: social being is not exhausted by the system of subject-object relations, i.e., relations to the world of objects, but also includes relations of “this person” (to people) (persons other than “this person”), i.e., subject-subject relations. But is it valid to identify the object with things, but “this (individual) person” and other (individual) “people” with the subject? We think not.
Let us look at the definition given in the [Philosophical encyclopedia]: “Object-that which stands counterposed to the subject, toward which the object-related practical and cognitive activity of the latter is directed” [23. P. 123]. According to this definition, since it is not the world of objects, but “people” that stand counterposed to the subject, these people will also be an object toward which “the object-related practical and cognitive activity of the latter will be directed.”
On the other hand, subject is defined as follows: ‘subject-the vehicle of object-related practical activity and cognition (the individual or social group), a source of activeness directed toward the object” [23. P. 154]. According to this definition, “other people” can function as a subject with regard to “this person,” but only when they, as a “social group,” function together as a ‘source of activeness directed toward the object.”
But whether or not “other people” are counter-posed as an object to “this person” or form a general collective subject with him, the question of the subject may still merely be one of a “relative” concept. This means that in speaking about the subject, it is necessary to indicate the factor with regard to which the individual or social group alone can function as a subject. This may be an object that (according to the above definitions) is the target of the activity (object-related practical or cognitive) of the particular subject. The concept of communication fits completely into such a conceptualization since communication is not a fundamentally new factor in terms of activity.
There is also another way to conceptualize the concept of the subject, and it truly does go beyond (as Lomov requires) the categorical framework of the theory of activity, although this second possibility will require focusing on the ‘subject-predicate” relation rather than on ‘subject-object” interaction.
A predicate is what is ascribed to the subject in a logical statement. A property (in particular, a social property) characterizing the subject in itself (for example, “Ivan is Russian”) may be ascribed; or a relation (in particular, a social relation) characterizing two or more subjects relative to one another (for example, “Ivan is subordinate to Andrei” or “Ivan thinks Andrei is Anna’s husband”) may be ascribed.
We should observe that the subject-predicate relation is an element of philosophical (logical), not psychological, conceptualization. This comment also applies to subject-object interaction. Nonetheless, we are familiar with such a psychological conceptualization of a philosophical theory (namely, the one we find in the works of Karl Marx) of subject-object interaction, which appears in the theory of object-related activity.
A research team working at the Institute of Psychology of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in the ‘70s undertook the task of working out a psychological conceptualization of the philosophical theory (implicit in the works of Marx) of the ‘subject-predicate” relation, and thus to devise a psychological theory of the development of the individual social relation, conceiving of it as a an extrapolation of activity theory in Vygotsky’s conceptual system (for more details of this undertaking see [42]).
Let us attempt in general outline to show how a theory of the social relation that complements the theory of activity can help to overcome the flawed logic common to both nativism and environmentalism.

Social relation and social categorization
A social relation is frequently understood to be an emotional normative relation (or attitude) of “this person” (I, the self) to “other persons” and to material or intellectual objects pertaining to the person in some way (V. N. Myasishchev [20,21]). This conception is quite satisfactory within the framework of ‘subject-object” interaction, but adds nothing to its psychological conceptualization (although this is sometimes claimed). On the contrary, an emotional normative attitude receives a scientific explanation (not simply a phenomenological description) only in the theory of activity, which conceptualizes ‘subject-object” interaction in psychological terms (see Leont’ev’s theory of personal sense).
Our understanding of a social relation, as we have pointed out above, is based not on ‘subject-object interaction,” but on a ‘subject-predicate” relation. The relation is that of some predicate to some subject (or a subject to a predicate).
This definition does not mean, as may appear at first glance, that a relation is derivative from a logical operation in which the act of relating takes place. The act of relating a predicate to a subject or a subject to a predicate can take place not only in logical propositions (for example, “Ivan is subordinate to Andrei,” etc.) but in any active or passive expression of the subject (e.g., in the fact that Ivan behaves as if he is subordinate to Andrei, and also in the fact that people treat Ivan as if he were subordinate to Andrei). At first glance it may appear that if we have the concepts “Ivan’s behavior” and “dealing with Ivan,” we come, in a roundabout way, to that activity (in which Ivan then figures either as a subject or an object) we rejected as an all-embracing principle. Actually, this is not so. The fact of being subordinate to someone is not a psychological, but a sociological, fact. This sociological relation may be expressed in an activity that, in terms of its psychological determinants, is independent of that relation. The relation itself acquires psychological significance only if it is subjected to a special psychological process called social categorization.
The prehistory of the concept of “social categorization” goes back, strictly speaking, to gestalt psychology, i.e., to the discovery that in some cases perception distorts a shape presented to our contemplation in such a way that we disregard it-for example, certain aberrations in some typical shape.
Later, Tajfel & Wilkes [52] found that perceptual distortion that disregards nuances takes place not just in the field of attraction of typical shapes: it can also be produced artificially when shapes differing in nuances are divided into two groups and each of these groups is marked by some symbol. If, for example, line segments increasing geometrically in length (i.e., uniformly for perception) are divided into two groups and the shorter are marked, say, by the letter A and the longer by the letter B, perception distorts the length of the segments so arranged, minimizing the differences between the length of lines belonging to the same group and exaggerating considerably the small difference between the longest of the short segments and the shortest of the long segments. This distortion of a perceptual image is, of course, not a conscious process, but takes place spontaneously if different symbols are applied to environmental factors to separate them into categories and hence combine them into different groups.
Social categorization takes place in this process in a spontaneous way, not by means of some conscious act of thought. It is a special case of the above-described act in which small differences, receptivity to which a person either minimizes or exaggerates, exist not between factors in the environment, but between factors constituting a system of which the person doing the active categorization is himself a part (see Garai [41]). Tajfel argues:
The substantial difference between judgments applied to physical and social stimuli lies in the fact that in the latter case, categorizations are often related to differences in values...This interaction between socially derivative value differentials, on the one hand, and the cognitive “mechanics” of categorization, on the other, becomes especially notable in all social divisions between “us” and “them,” i.e., in all social categorizations in which distinctions are made between a person’s own group and external groups that are compared with it. [49. P. 62]
Moreover, in social categorization specific symbols are used to allocate factors to different categories. In an original experiment [51], symbols with regard to which categorization of two groups was carried out were constructed by the subjects’ arranging abstract pictures in order of their preference. They had initially been told that some pictures had been painted by Klee and others by Kandinsky. After this arranging, the experimenter described some of the randomly chosen subjects as “people preferring Klee” and others as “people preferring Kandinsky.” Under the influence of such labels, which had no preliminary value for the subjects, the tendency to minimize the differences within the categories and to exaggerate differences between categories showed up both in perception and in the subjects’ behavior.
Thus, by social category we mean a real similarity among socially important factors to which a mental aspect is attributed by application of some symbol of social categorization. At the same time, the difference between these factors and those to which other symbols are applied is accentuated.

Categorization of social situations in time
As we have seen, “socially important factors” may be different people participating in the same social situation. At the psychological level, the act of social categorization then stresses the real similarity or differences among these people in terms of the particular social situation.
But these factors are organized also in time: diverse social situations alternate in the biography of the same person.
If roles are ascribed in a specific scene to actors each of whom then performs his role in achieving his goals, these factors, taken together, characterize the specific social situation.
These four characteristics rarely vary all at the same time in a person’s life activity, but neither remain they all collectively constant for a long time. A person deals with variations in some characteristics while other characteristics of a social situation persist unchanged through social categorization. Here, too, categorization takes place by some social situations’ being combined through symbols, often themselves insignificant, into one category, diminishing or even eliminating for the mind the actual differences perceived among them and, at the same time, exaggerating to the categorical level their actual differences relative to other life situations.
In our opinion, personality, as part of the subject matter of psychology, is, in the mentally processed biography of the individual, manifested as a system of successive alterations in social situations. By dint of this processing, the personality is able to preserve its self-identity psychologically despite factual changes in some characteristics of these social situations. The same categorical process enables the personality to become psychologically different even when some characteristics of the social situation are in fact retained.
In his current life circumstances, a person finds all the characteristics of a situation objectively determined. For scenes and actors (when a situation has already been created), this is evidently more or less easily understood. But in terms of the goals of activity and role ascription, we are more inclined to consider them not as objectively given, since our everyday experience shows that each person voluntarily poses for himself his own goal (in the worst of cases, he fails to fulfill it); but actors can “negotiate” over role ascription (some may even refuse a role, foreseeing the hopelessness of any “transaction”).
Despite the evidence of everyday experience, Freud [24,25] considered both the goal of activity and the distribution of roles in a social situation to be objectively determined. He believed that a person’s sexual instinct (the libido) and, later, death instinct were objective (i.e., independent of consciousness) determinants of goals. Freud also thought that the distribution of roles in the Oedipus triangle was an objective determinant inasmuch as in this role ascription there could be no “negotiations” about who played the role of the father, the role of the mother, and the role of the son, respectively (this was rigorously controlled by the objective system of cultural prohibitions).
In our opinion, the discovery that the goal of activity and the distribution of roles in a social situation are objectively determined can be divorced from Freud’s formulation of this discovery. An indication that this separation does not touch the essence of the discovery is that Freud himself made this distinction when he included the death instinct among his determinants of goals and transferred the level determining role distribution from the father to the superego. But this did not modify his position that the goal of activity and role distribution in a current situation are objectively determined by something. Freud’s successors, from Adler [27] to Lacan [45], have at various times endeavored to redetermine this “something,” leaving the assumption that it was an objective determinant untouched.
We should also point out that the notion that the “forces of production from without, and the instincts within,” to use the words of the Hungarian poet and philosopher Attila Jozsef, must also be ranked among the objective determinants of the goals of ractivity. Some of the latest programs stress that it is necessary to rank both “production relations” and the Oedipus triangle among the objective determinants of role distribution in a social situation (see [37]).
Thus, Freud thought that all the characteristic features of a social situation were objectively determined. Situations differ in nuances from one another with regard to these objectively determined characteristics. The subsequent mental processing of this de facto difference, given in nuances, raises its status to that of a categorical difference or reduces it to categorical similarity. This makes symbols applied to different situations different, and symbols applied to similar situations similar.
A psychological mechanism of the first is, for example, repression, which prevents the person from reproducing the content of consciousness or performing a behavioral act that is necessary for him in the current situation, but is part of a situation different from it: in this case, the inhibited manifestation designates a categorical difference among situations. Similar situations are, on the contrary, symbolized by a content of consciousness or an act of behavior elicited from the requisites of a similar situation by a mechanism of compulsive repetition, despite the goals of the current situation. Freud [24] described people for whom all human affairs always ended in the same way: do-gooders who always managed to offend the recipients of their bounty, however much they might differ from one another; others who many times throughout their lives extolled someone to themselves, and perhaps even publicly, as an authority, but soon rejected that authority themselves and replaced it with another; those in love, for whom all tender relations passed through the same phases, and always wound up the same way; etc.
Freud’s discovery in this regard is ultimately that all of a person’s physical displays and phenomena of consciousness should be interpreted as special symbols, and that the key to this interpretation is given in the similarities and differences between the present social situation and past social situations of the same person, who makes these similarities and differences categorical by means of such symbols. The social categorization of different people relative to the same social situation also takes place by means of such symbols.
In our view, the flaw in Freud’s theory derives from his making this [symbolic] aspect an absolute. If this is disregarded, another aspect is also raised to the status of an absolute, namely, one in which physical manifestations function merely as activity, and the phenomena of consciousness are only the guiding substrate of this activity. Yet both display the already present properties of subject and object and do not create new ones by relating a predicate to the subject. To clarify the ontogeny of psychological structures, the significance of the first aspect must be taken into account (see Kocski & Garai [44] and, especially, Kocski’s dissertation [7]), just as the role of the aspect of activity must be taken into account to explain the continued production of mental phenomena.
The flawed logic common to both nativism and environmentalism can be overcome only by a synthesis of the principle of activity and the principle of social relation. We must restore this synthesis as it exists in the works of Vygotsky. For this, it is important for investigation of the psychological problems of social relations to overcome their lag relative to investigation of the psychological problems of activity.

Notes

1. Jerome Bruner [32], citing this calculation, ironically notes that this figure may seem a little inflated, in which case one could choose a rate ten times less: 102 reinforcements per second.
2. N. Chomsky’s theory of the innate basis of language was first clearly formulated in 1957 [33]. See also [35,36].
3. For the elaboration of the conceptual apparatus of social behaviorism, see G. H. Mead [46] and [8]. Especially interesting is his teaching that between the self and significant others there occurs symbolic interaction, that is, interpersonal communication. In this mutual flow of beliefs, the self is constituted, a conception that is often encountered in modern thinking about communication.
4. It is well known that early environmentalism (for example, early behaviorism), in its turn, stemmed from the inability of nativistic theories to explain the plasticity of animal behavior.
5. See the chapter “Relations of the personality-Self-evident or a problem?” in Garay [40. Pp. 142-59]. See also [4,5,22,38,42].

References

1. Vygotsky, L. S. [Thought and language]. Moscow and Leningrad, 1934. 324 pp.
2. Gal’perin, P. Ya. [Development of research in the formation of mental acts]. In [Psychological science in the USSR]. Moscow: APN RSFSR, 1959. Vol. 1, pp. 441-69.
SOCIAL RELATIONS AND ACTIVITY 67
3. Gal’perin, P. Ya. [Introduction to psychology]. Moscow: MGU, 1976. 150 pp.
4. Garai, L. [A historical materialist approach to the problem of specifically human needs]. Yop. Psikhol., 1966, No. 3, pp. 61-73.
5. Garai, L. [Historical materialism and the personality]. Yop. Filosof., 1969, No. 8, pp. 19-30.
6. Gvozdev, A. N. [Problems in the study of children’s speech]. Moscow, 1961. 472 pp.
7. Kocski, M. [Position in a social situation and child mental development (A longitudinal study)]. Candidate’s dissertation. Moscow: MGU, 1981. 200 pp.
8. Kon, I. S., & Shalin, D. I. [The world and the problem of the human self]. Yop. Filosof., 1969, No. 12, pp. 85-96.
9. Leont’ev, A. A. [The psychology of communication]. Tartu, 1974. 220 pp.
10. Leont’ev, A. N. [Communication as a topic of psychological study]. In [Methodological problems of social psychology]. Moscow: “Nauka” Publishers, 1975: Pp. 106-124.
11. Leont’ev, A. N. [Problems of mental development]. Moscow: “Mysl”‘ Publishers, 1965. 573 pp.
12. Leont’ev, A. N. [The problems of activity in psychology]. Yop. Filosof., 1972, No. 9, pp. 95-109.
13. Leont’ev, A. N. [Activity and consciousness]. Yop. Filosof., 1972, No. 12, pp. 129-40.
14. Leont’ev, A. N. [Activity. Consciousness. Personality]. Moscow: Politizdat, 1975. 304 pp.
15. Lisina, M. I. [Communication of children with adults in the first seven years of life]. In [Problems of general, developmental, and educational psychology]. Moscow, 1978. Pp. 237-53.
16. Lomov, B. F. [The present state and long-term prospects of development of psychology in the USSR in light of the decisions of the 24th Congress of the CPSU]. Yop. Psikhol., 1971, No. 5, pp. 3-19.
17. Lomov, B. F. [Communication as a problem of general psychology]. In [Methodological problems of social psychology]. Moscow, 1975. Pp. 124-36.
18. Lomov, B. F. [The relationship between the social and the biological as a methodological problem of psychology]. Yop. Filosof., 1976, No. 4, pp. 83-95.
19. Luria, A. R. [The place of psychology among the social and biological sciences]. Yop. Filosof., 1977, No. 9, pp. 68-76.
20. Myasishchev, V. M. [The personality and neuroses]. Moscow, 1960. 426 pp.
21. Myasishchev, V. M. [Fundamental problems in and current status of the psychology of human relations]. In [Psychological science in the USSR]. Moscow, 1960. Vol. 2, pp. 110-26.
22. Peteri, V. [Studies of the problems of the personality]. Yop. Filosof., 1971, No. 3, pp. 183-86.

Another crisis in the psychology:
A possible motive for the Vygotsky-boom

Deals with disintegration of the psychology to a science based on experimentation according to the positivistic methodology of natural sciences, and another one founded on interpretation according to the hermeneutic methodology of historical sciences. Considers the possibilities to reintegrate the psychology by a Vygotskian methodology that would deal with signs and tools as functioning within the same structure.
key words: hermeneutic vs positivistic methodology; historical vs natural sciences; Vygotsky, Leontiev; signs and tools

A psychologist in Hungary today does not necessarily want to be acknowledged for what he does as a scientist; actually, the number of those who fancy themselves artists or magicians is growing. On the other hand, those of us who make a point of our theoretical or practical work being of a scientific nature are willing to consider psychology a natural science. Indeed, how could something be scientific if not in the same way as physics, chemistry, biology are?
But how could it be thought otherwise, when in our university studies the foundations of our major are laid by anatomy, physiology, ethology, and we graduate without having had to learn a bit of sociology, linguistics, economics, or history as areas relevant to our special subject. True, some time earlier a subject called Cultural History and Anthropology was introduced in psychologist training at Budapest University, for example, but a more recent reform swept if out of the curriculum.
On the other hand, why on earth should we burden our special training with material seemingly belonging to general culture, if we are firmly convinced that psychology is a natural science – if a science at all. Or, why should we add to a study of such border areas of our science as psycho-physiology, psycho-physics, pharmaco-psychology, the study of such border-disciplines as economic psychology, political psychology, the social psychology of macro-systems in general, the psychology of history or philosophic psychology?
Now, this kind of reasoning in which the arguments mutually validate each other is not only known to be discussed in chapters on logical error in textbooks of logic. It is also evident that the vicious circle is the most unfailing means to get an idea fixed. It comes as no surprise then, that when some thirty years ago I studied the profession, my generation was trained the same in psychology as a natural science.

Two international congresses of psychology: headliner and crisis
This generation began after 1956, actually at the same time as the revival of Hungarian psychology, which had to be revived because in 50s the psychology was considered “an idealistic pseudo-science in the service of imperialistic interests”. Now, for our generation it was self-evident that once this stamp had been removed, we were eager to demonstrate that ours was just as genuine a science as were physics, chemistry or biology, that it studied as real a material system as those natural sciences, and that practical application of scientific knowledge in this domain was as profitable for society as in the rest of the natural sciences.
Thus, we were eager to see these expectations to be clearly substantiated by the 18th International Congress of Psychology held in Moscow in 1966. The congress whose weight was due to the prestige of the great generation of Soviet psychologists (Luria, Galperin, and congress chairman Leontiev) and the attendance of Piaget and Neal Miller who gave plenary lectures, and of Berlyne, Broadbent, Festinger, Fraisse, Grey Walter, Moreno, and Pribram, was clearly focused on brain research. By way of illustrating the expectations that dominated not only our consciousness but even, so to speak, our unconscious, we must mention three lectures that produced, as I remember it, the greatest sensation:
In his plenary lecture Neal Miller reported of experiments in which the functioning of internal organs controlled by the vegetative nervous system had been modified, contrary to a long tradition, by instrumental conditional reflexes. For instance, in an experiment a water-supplying machine was started by the functioning of the salivary glands in one group of thirsty dogs, while in the another group of them the same device was started by the lack of saliva secretion. Thus, in the former group the animals learnt to salivate a lot, but – unlike in the classical experiments of Pavlov – not because water got into their mouths thereby activating the unconditional reflex of saliva secretion, but in order to get water in their mouths. In the latter group, the animals learnt in the same way to moderate their saliva secretion. Since at that time a great role in forming mentally controlled achievements was attributed to instrumental learning operating with the relation between ends and means, and not cause and effect, we listened to Miller’s lecture as a forecast of an issue by which the functioning of internal organs controlled by the vegetative nervous system will turn into a mentally controlled performance.
Even greater a sensation was produced at the session chaired by Pribram by papers on what had been recorded by the special literature as the “learning transfer via cannibalism”. When planarians swallowed their fellows in which the experimenting psychologist had previously developed some conditional reflex, they acquired some of the knowledge of their mates in that the reflex at issue was easier (and the opposite reflex was harder) to develop in them than either in the original learner or in those cannibalistic specimens which had swallowed their untrained fellows (they being the control group for testing the original experiment).
The third headliner of the congress reported an experiment dealing with a topic for the social sciences by way of a natural science. It could be considered a natural antecedent of the social power relations in which, in a group of animals, interaction among certain individuals results in selection of a leader of that group. Delgado implanted a microelectrode in the brain of such a leader and, by means of that electrode, was able to control the targeted area’s tone that produced just that force necessary for behaviour that ensured leadership. Then one of those subordinated to the leader was taught how to handle a wave-emitting gadget by means of which an impulse could be transmitted to the implanted electrode and, by changing the leader’s cerebral tone, tame the leader’s behaviour. The whole audience probably agreed in 1966 in Moscow with this paper’s conclusion about the possibility of changing the social order of an entire group – and not just of animals. Most of those who attended the Congress became convinced that the natural sciences could thus direct humanity, as Delgado put it in his monograph’s title, Toward a psycho-civilized society.
In such an atmosphere of the Moscow congress it was then no wonder that in his lecture (which became a real social happening of the congress) Moreno declared that attracting and repelling, likes and dislikes were similar to the tendencies manifest in chemical double decomposition, and that by optimizing those relations’ micro-structure the macro-structure of society would be harmonized.
In any case, on behalf of several participants of the International Congress of Psychology in Moscow, I can safely declare that we returned home in genuine euphoria, and that this elation had an intellectual cast: our certainty that psychology was on the right track, the track that had earlier seen running the trains of physics, chemistry or biology and of many other branches of natural science from which psychology differed, if at all, only in the greater degree of complexity of its subject-matter. To quote Pribram, who expressed this feeling of euphoria in his closing address: “It was a truly historic congress. I am confident that future generations, when talking of this event, will declare that here in Moscow we were witnesses to psychology having developed fully as an experimental science.”
In light of this, it indeed came as a surprise that, ten years later, another international congress, the 21st, was opened by Paul Fraisse in Paris with an address whose first sentence was: “The field of psychology is in a state of crisis.”
The ten years separating the two congresses had been devoted to professional work dominated both in research, teaching and applied areas of psychology by the certainty we carried away from Moscow. And now we listened to the Congress president stating: “The crisis is more than a paroxysm of growth, however, because it is theory that is really at stake. We are in fact in the midst of a scientific revolution and in Kuhn’s terminology, we are working our way toward a new paradigm.” Fraisse claimed the search for the new paradigm was progressing in a direction in which behaviour would be but the raw material of research, man becoming its real subject.
Doubts whether the positivistic method of natural science is suitable for comprehensive study of man are not new. Known are the considerations which prompted Dilthey, for example, to oppose a geisteswissenschaftliche to a naturwissenschaftliche psychology. One of the crucially important considerations was expressed by Dilthey as follows: “The first precondition for a possible Geisteswissenschaft is that I myself am a historical being, that the person who researches history is identical with the one who makes it.”
I assign fundamental importance to this consideration because, for example, Gadamer derives from it that the experience of the social world cannot be converted into a science by the inductive method of natural sciences.

Psychologists are human, too
The condition under which the inductive method of natural science can be applied to an object is that it be separable from the subject who conducts the examination. But if Dilthey is right, the object of historical research is not an object of this kind.
An ornithologist can study birds with an inductive method because he is not a bird himself: no matter what – correct or incorrect – statements he makes about birds, They will never change a single characteristic of any bird. Radically different is the situation in which “the person who researches history is identical with the one who makes it.” When under such circumstances the one who researches history makes some statement about those who make history, it can no longer be claimed that this does not change any characteristic of any history-maker, for there does exist one (i.e. the researcher of history, who is, at the same time, a history-maker) who has one characteristic (i.e. making or not making a statement about history-makers), that has thus been changed.
Of course, the researcher of history does not include himself in the object of research; and if this is a methodologically conscious reservation, not a result of the researcher’s ignorance, it is a justified procedure. But this is not the case in the natural sciences, in which it is not a question of interpretation whether the ornithologist, for instance, belongs to the class of the studied birds or not. Here, on the other hand, we have at issue a science in which the frames of the inductive elaboration of experiences are always determined by interpretation.
That psychology is in some way related to such interpretative sciences as well as to the natural sciences, that is what is claimed by Dilthey (and since then by many other theoreticians). This link is claimed not to be a secondary or accessory one. As a matter of fact, Dilthey’s above cited consideration is effective even if its conclusion is turned around: it may be claimed not only that those who research history are identical with the ones who make it, but also that history-makers are at the same time history-investigators. For the object of psychology is man in reciprocal interaction with others (and not just with the natural environment); man who, on the one hand, makes history with each of his steps whose precedents he keeps a record of and, on the other, researches history at the same time, in that he does not react to the steps of others as to any natural “stimulus” to which a preliminary learning process has conditioned the response, but by interpreting them in light of the precedents of their prehistory, the traditions of their interactions.
According to the description by the Palo Alto school, interaction between A and B can be schematized as follows:
A’s message to B contains a metacommunicative instruction on how to interpret it;
B perceives the instruction by interpreting the message, thus the instruction affects the interpretation depending on the interpretation itself; B’s response also contains a meta-communicative instruction on how to interpret it, e. g., how to sever those moments that are to be ascribed to the circumstances of the interaction from those for which B assumes responsibility;
A, for his part, perceives this instruction by interpreting B’s message, but when interpreting the message, he will be influenced not only by this message mediated by his interpretation, but also by the prehistory of the current stage of their interaction: that A remembers what his former message was in his interpretation – this complex of co-effective factors will then determine A’s counterreply;
B will again react to it according to a similarly complex set of factors, but perceiving the new message will also depend on the interpretation of rules created by the prehistory of the interaction: If this is your answer to my reply, then that will be mine to yours, etc.
Thus the interaction by which those involved in it make history implies in each of its steps an interpretative manoeuvering by which they research history.
The ultimate stake of this manoeuvering is to define what functions each of us shall fulfil within our interaction: Am I, for instance, the principal of the on-going process or merely its agent? When in marriage therapy the wife tells the therapist she cannot help raising her voice in despair whenever her husband comes home late at night as drunk as a fish, and the husband tells the therapist that he cannot help drinking a glass or two in his despair when his wife keeps shouting at him at the top of her voice – then both of them interpret their interaction as if both of them were but its agent. In another sort of competition, both parties interpret themselves as the principal of the interaction: at an ironic point in their book Watzlawick, Beavin and Jackson illustrate this by interpreting the manoeuvering of the experimental white rat which might express the events of the experiment this thus: “I have successfully conditioned the experimenting psychologist to give me something to eat whenever I push the pedal.”
This bit of irony derives its earnestness derived from the fact that according to the philosophy of the Palo Alto school a sort of game is played between experimenter and experimentee in which the psychologist is a player just as the experimental subject is, though the former tries to describe this latter as a natural scientist describes his object. When doing so, the experimenter as well as the experimentee do interpret the events and thereby manoeuver for managing to turn the other into the object of the processes to be induced in the experiment.
“How hypnotist and subject manoeuver each other?” – Haley asks in the title of a chapter of one of his books, describing actually not only the hypnotizer’s manoeuvering but in more general terms games psychologists (be they psychoanalysts or practitioners of, say, short-psychotherapy) play with their patients.
One may argue that the psychotherapist is involved in the state of affairs he is dealing with by practically interfering with it, while the research psychologist, contrary to him, merely observes matters with a purely theoretical interest from the outside. However, Haley’s description of the psychotherapist’s attitude is weirdly similar to how one could describe that of the research[ing] psychologist’s on the basis of one’s experiences:
According to Haley’s arguing, the theories of hypnosis focuses on the individual, though this phenomenon is entirely linked to the relation. When Messmer evoked the hypnotic trance by means of his magnets it was quite comprehensible that the theory meant to explain the effect of the magnetism upon humans and didn’t bother itself too much about the relation of the patients to Messmer. But later when suggestion got into the focus of the research work, one would have supposed the moment had come for a shift toward an investigation into the relations between those giving and those receiving suggestions. But the subject of research kept being the individual and suggestion was depicted the same way as the magnet used to be: like a thing in itself influencing the individual, independently of his relations.
Thus the same is true for the research psychologist. When in 1966 (note that it is the same year in which the psychology as a natural science celebrated its apotheosis at the Moscow International Congress) Rosenthal was publishing his psychological experiments whose object was the psychological experiment itself, it could no longer be denied that in the behavioral sciences a considerable part of the facts produced in the style of natural scientific experiments were laboratory artifacts. What this is due to are the implications discussed by Haley in the above quoted passage: when the psychologist thinks he as the subject of experimentation is manipulating the object of experimentation in the way a natural scientist does, he is, instead, involved in a game in which both players – the experimenter as well as the experimentee – interpret the events and thereby manoeuver for managing to turn the other into the object of the processes to be induced in the experiment.
When the psychologist succeeds, the rest of the experiment may well be like a natural scientific investigation, and the produced research result may accordingly have a degree of reliability. Nevertheless, the manoeuvering phase does differentiate a research of this kind from a natural science investigation that succeeds in experimentation without such a preparatory, interpretative phase.
For a long time psychology failed to notice the necessity of this manoeuvering, interpretative preparation; this feature justifies the critical revision of psychology’s experimental results achieved without such methodological reflection.
At the beginning of his book Rosenthal gives a long list of cases in which both scholars of natural and of behavioural sciences fall victim to psychosocial issues operating on them, when e. g. they fail to recognize facts that contradict their hypotheses, or fancy the perception with a greater certainty of the happening of the factual event they expect whereas in reality it only occurs with a certain degree of probability. Another group of the cases of distortion listed by Rosenthal include the misinterpretation of correctly observed facts, and in some cases distortion derives from some intention propelled by this or that motive (ambition, colleague’s jealousy, assistant’s over-zeal, etc.).
However, what may happen to a researcher in psychology is not only what he has in common with the natural science researcher when they lack submitting themselves to the impact of his object of research. Actually, the research psychologist may also (unconsciously but actively) submit his study object to his own influence, and may then observe that object only as operating under that influence.
This feature markedly distinguishes psychology from natural sciences in which it would be absurd to suppose any similar responsiveness of the observed object. Unlike a human being, a celestial or earthly body doesn’t change its speed or acceleration depending on the sex, age, skin colour or religion of the scientist it encounters. An observed natural process does not react, even unconsciously, to the observer’s reactions to that process but an observed mental process does. It would hardly happen that, say, a double decomposition would be stronger or weaker depending on the extent to which the acid and base chosen as its medium would want involuntarily to further the scholar’s cause, or contrarily, to foil his expectations; or on the extent to which they would like to act in the experiment similarly or differently from the way the scholar would presumably act in their place; or again, on the extent to which the acid, for example, would want to pass itself off as the base.
On the other hand, we know from Rosenthal’s book that such and similar distortions are quite “natural” when behaviour is the studied object. Thus, we must realize how far from a truly natural science experiment a psychological experiment is.
Since the time when, with the spread of psychosocial experimentation, the research psychologist was forced to deal consciously with these special methodological problems, it has been noted that an ever-growing part of the peculiar tricks of experimentation are related to the preparatory phase. These are, specifically, the techniques of manoeuvering by means of which the experiment leader manages to subject individuals to his experiment. It is beyond the scope of this paper to explicate how alien to the methodological logic of research in natural sciences is, for example, the social psychology’s routine methodological trick of employing confederates of the experimenter. Whereas in the natural sciences the research techniques is meant to separate the subject of the investigation from its object, that trick in social psychology aims to incorporate the subject in the object – via participation of the confederates in the experiment as if they were among its real subjects. Just imagine the methodological absurdity in natural sciences of, for example, a bacteriologist placing his assistant in the bacterium culture under the microscope.
Does anybody know whether Fraisse, in opening the Paris Congress made the above-quoted statement concerning the new crisis in psychology and the need to shift its paradigm from studying behaviour to investigating man, was aware of the complications linked to the fact that the psychologist is human too?
As a matter of fact, if psychology fails to investigate its object – be it man or behaviour – according to the norms of natural science, it does not follow that psychological research cannot be scientific: it is perhaps scientific by the norms of some other science. That is why it is unfortunate if a psychologist finishes his professional training without learning that the procedural pattern of historical science, linguistic science, literary science, legal science or any other “moral” science might apply to examination of certain questions in psychology just as that of the natural sciences applies to other questions. And it is unfortunate if, consequently, he has no chance of learning that from these two half-sciences the construct of a unified logic of psychology cannot be built by having the logic of one half be denied by the logic of the other.
A well known procedure in this denial is when psychology concedes that beside studying the individual in relation to his natural environment, he must also be examined as faced with his social environment. The moment history is postulated as a social environment, the assumption is tacitly made that the world of history is as external to the person as the world of nature. Thus, it is assumed that the same positivistic method of investigation can be applied to both system of reference as equally separated from man.
On the other hand, it would not be more fortunate if the matrix were imposed upon psychology, cultivated as a natural science, by the logic of the new tendencies of historical sciences: within such a matrix no insights of that scientific psychology concerning links between mental phenomena, on the one hand, and the survival strategies of the living organism, on the other, would survive.

The discovery of an alternative?
Now, there is some evidence that world psychology has left behind the phase in which it tried to prove its integrity through the logical imperialism of one or the other hemi-science and has become receptive to alternative attempts aimed at harmonizing the logics of the two half-sciences.
One such attempt is Vygotsky’s cultural-historical theory. “It is neither a wholly natural scientific, biological psychology interested only in the emerging events and their causes, nor is it a wholly cultural, hermeneutic venture concerned exclusively with the interpretation of meanings and with motives of human deeds,” one can read in New Ideas in Psychology, in a study that discovered, 55 years after Vygotsky’s death, his new ideas in psychology.
Last year an international Vygotsky society was set up, and on this occasion, Amsterdam Vrije Universiteit organized a Vygotsky forum whose participants sought an explanation to the fact that (while in his native country Vygotsky fell victim to the past-erasing rage) this scholar is becoming fashionable among the academic scholars of psychology in Western Europe and especially the United States. The extent to which it is so is even embarrassing, inasmuch as, for instance, in just one year four international conferences have highlighted Vygotsky’s work without mentioning each other, and on one of these conferences the participants set up another international Vygotsky society practically simultaneously with the Amsterdam move, two, in this case, being somehow less, than one.
Anyhow, at the Amsterdam forum it was generally admitted that the somewhat latish move of spotting Vygotsky and bringing him into fashion seem to be related to what the J. Shotter’s above cited paper calls our attention to: that Vygotsky’s cultural-historical theory carries the promise of a synthesis between the two psychological hemi-sciences by studying the factors of mental life as signs and tools at the same time.
The logical implications of such a theoretical construction for combining two hemi-psychologies could be summarized as follows:
The tool fits into the natural determination series of psychosomatic interaction between organism and environment. Instead of becoming the object of a direct activity, such a tool gets integrated like a prosthesis in the acting system which directly perceives and manipulates its environment through this tool as if through a transparent medium. The activity directed at the object is unambiguously determined by the nature of the system integrating the prosthesis into itself and that of its environment, all independently of the tool.
The sign, by contrast, is the direct object of an activity that is concerned with its interpretation. The sign mediates between the parties only depending on how each of those parties interprets it in an interaction referred to the background of their common or different cultures.
For the Vygotsky theory, mediating factors of this latter kind are tools at the same time, as well as the former type mediating factors are also signs.
Much as the Vygotsky school had implications of a synthesis the logic of natural sciences and that of historical sciences it could not avoid the fate of a psychology of that historical period: that of its “hemispheres” that was liable to the first logic got elaborated with Leontiev’s activity theory. Leontiev considered the sign as tools, i. e. as completely transparent when it operates as mediating factor. No interpretation is needed, according to his theory, for decoding sign’s meaning since it is objectively given in the activity structure as relation between its ends and means. Though Leontiev made a clear distinction between meaning and personal sense, he did not consider any necessity of interpretation for the latter either, the personal sense being equally taken as objectively given in the structure of activity as a relation between its ends and motives.
On the other hand, however Leontiev applied entirely the logic of natural sciences to the psychology his doctrine is an integral part of a theory whose outlook was formulated by Vygotsky in the following words:
“The mental nature of man represents a totality of social relations transferred inside the person, into his functioning. Higher mental functions (e.g., word function) earlier used to be distributed between people, then became the functioning of the person himself. Earlier, psychologists tried to trace social factors back to individual ones. They studied individual reactions found in laboratories and then tried to find how persons’ reaction changed in a collective setting. Contrary to Piaget we assume that the development proceeds not towards socialization but towards the transformation of social relations in mental functions. Earlier, it used to be supposed that the individual has a function in a finished, semi-finished or embryonic form, and in the community it gets developed, combined, increased, enriched or, just the opposite, inhibited, repressed, etc. Nowadays, we may substantiate the assumption that, as regards higher mental functions, it is just the very reverse. Functions originally merge in the community, in the form of children’s relations, then become persons’ mental functions. In particular, earlier it was held that each child is competent to think, argue, demonstrate, substantiate his assumption; the collision of such thinkings allegedly generates discussion. But matters stand differently. The investigations proved that discussions generate thinking.”
Activity in Vygotsky’s theory treats its object as is explained also in psychology by the logic of natural sciences, but the subject of the activity is formed by a social game whose rules cannot be understood unless another logic, that of historical sciences is adopted by this science.
The international Vygotsky boom seems to be motivated by psychology’s “unconscious desire” to recover his unity without being compelled to sacrifice for it either the insights developed by psychology as a natural science, or those whose development was that long obstructed by such a science.

REFERENCES

[1] Physical Control of the mind: Toward a psycho-civilized society (Harper & Row, Publishers, New York, Evanston and London, 1969).
[2] XXIe Congress International de Psychology – XXIst International Congress of Psychology: Acts/Proceedings. Prises Universitaire de France. Paris, 1978.
[3] Dilthey, W.: Gesammelte Schriften. VII. p. 278.
[4] Gadamer, H.-G.: Wahrheit und Methode. J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) Tübingen, 1975.
[5] Sluzki, C. E. and Ransom, D. C. (eds.), 1976: DOUBLE BIND: The foundation of the communicational approach to the family (Grune & Stratton. New York, London, San Francisco).
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[8] Rosenthal, R.: Experimenter effects in behavioural research. Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York, 1966. (Enlarged edition: Irvington Publisher, Inc., New York, 1976
[9] Rosenthal, R. and Rosnow R. L. (eds.): Artifact in behavioural research. Academic Press, New York, 1969.
[10] Rosenthal, R. and Jacobson, L.: Pygmalion in the classroom. Holt, Rihenhart and Winston, New York, 1968.
[11] Aronson, E. and Linder, D.: Gain and loss of esteem as determinants of interpersonal attractiveness. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. 1965. 156-172.
[12] Garai, L., Erős, F., Járó, K. Köcski, M. and Veres, S.: Towards a Social Psychology of Personality: Development and Current Perspectives of a School of Social Psychology in Hungary. Social Science Information. 1979/1. pp. 137-166.
[13] Lukacs, G.: Zur Ontologie des gesellschaftlichen Seins. Die Arbeit. Luchterhand, Neuwied Darmstadt, 1973.
[14] Marx, K.: Economic and philosophical manuscripts of 1944. In: Fromm, E., Marx’ concept of man. F. Ungar, New York, 1963.
[15] Marx, K.: Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen öconomie (English translation: London, 1973)
[16] Rubinstein. S.: Principles and ways of mental development [In Russian]. Moscow: Publishing House of Soviet Academy of Sciences, 1959.
[17] G[arai], L.: Marxian Personality Psychology. In: Harré-Lamb (eds.), The Encyclopedic Dictionary of Psychology, Basil Blackwell Publisher. 364-366.
[18] Eros, F.: Personality Dynamics and Social Existence, by L. Garai. European Journal of Social Psychology. 4/3. [1974]. 369-379.
[19] Shotter, J.: Vygotsky’s psychology: Joint activity in a developmental zone. New Ideas in Psychology. Vol. 7 (1989), No.2.
[20] Leontiew, Alexei: Problems of mental development. Joint Publications Research Service, Washington, 1969.
[21] Garai, L.: A psychosocial essay on identity [in Hungarian]. T-Twins Editor. Budapest, 1993. 231 pp.
[22] Garai, L. and Kocski, M.: On the mental status of activity and social relation: To the question of continuity between the theories of Vygotsky and Leontiev [in Russian]. Psikhologitchesky Zhurnal, 11:5. (1990) 17-26.

Vygotskian implications:
On the meaning and its brain

Abstract: About a basic dilemma of Vygotsky’s theory: How superior mental phenomena may be treated as functionning of both brain structures and meaning structures at the same time while latters are of an inter-individual character as opposed to the intra-individual character of the formers. Arguments are derived from various sources (Vygotsky school’s theory of functional organs, Gibson’s ecological theory of perception, ethology’s empirical data about territorial behaviour of populations and Szentágothai’s model of organizing neuronal modules) for transcending mainstream considerations based exclusively on individual organism both by going beyond the individual (toward a supra-individual structure) and beyond the organism (toward an extra-organismic one). The paper presents for the K. Popper’s “World 3’ a possible monistic interpretation that derives not merely meanings but their logical structures as well from the functioning of supra-individual economic structures instead of that of the individual’s brain structures. A keynote paper I had originally presented at the International Conference dedicated to the 100th anniversary of Lev Vygotsky (“The Cultural-Historical Approach: Progress in Human Sciences and education”; Moscow, 21–24 October, 1996) and subsequently adapted for a publication.
key words: Vygotsky; brain; meaning; functional organs; brain models: Szentagothai vs Eccles; transcending individual organism; K. Popper’s “World 3’

Once Vygotsky said that “psychoanalysis has no conscious theoretical system, but, the same manner as that character of Molière, without suspecting the thing in all his life spoke in prose, Freud the scientist did produce a system: by introducing a new term, making it consistent with his other terms, describing a new fact, reaching a new conclusion – he went on building at the same time, inch by inch his system”.
The same has to be said on Vygotsky himself with this difference that he has not, like Freud, 83 but 38 years for adjusting the elements of his theory into a system. This fact, together with that other that since his death the psychological science had almost twice as many years for “describing new facts, reaching new conclusions”, must motivate us for examining against the background of these facts and conclusions how different constituents of his theory and implications of such constituents may be brought into harmony.
Vygotsky in his writings of 1930s time and again argues, in particular, for the most important role of meaning (znachenie), sense field (smyslovoie polie) in transformation of the perception and the activity into a specifically human dealing with objects and, consequently, in producing superior performances as compared with inferior ones.
Another thesis of Vygotsky postulates that the localization of superior functions in brain structures must be as important a scientific question as that of inferior functions. Therefore he considers worth praising brain researchers for introducing meaning-like concepts into the brain research.
Now, on one hand, the brain is an intraindividual extrapsychic mechanism that may well be linked with the intraindividual psychic phenomena the general psychology normally studies, but, on the other hand, meaning must be considered an interindividual phenomenon.
Vygotsky was completely aware of this interindividual character of meaning that he linked to the speech and interpreted as being at the same time obobshchenie and obshchenie. However, the question is, how this interindividual psychic phenomenon can be linked to that intraindividual extrapsychic mechanism.

Philosophical considerations and brain models
To what extent is it difficult to put these two points together is to be seen on the instance of Karl Popper’s philosophical theory as applied in John Eccles’ brain research.
In the Karl Popper’s ontology the world of meanings and of the logic structure of their interrelations has been considered as an intersubjective, interindividual world that is completely detached from the subjective world of our individual conscious experiences. This latter has been conceived by Popper as equally detached from the complete material world. The material world (including the human brain and man-made objects) is considered in that ontology as a World 1, paralleled with the World 2 of conscious phenomena (including in addition to direct environmental and intraorganizational experiences memories, thoughts, and even the self, as the subject of all these experiences) and the World 3 of meanings interacting with those other worlds.
When investigating about the ontological status of the “World 3”, Karl Popper pointed out that it includes together with contents of meanings also the forms of their interrelations. This latters are considered by Popper to be pre-eminently “World 3” entities. He conceded that meanings may be embodied in such “World 1” objects that come to exist as objectivations of human activity; but as regards logical, mathematical or other interrelations he precludes such a possibility, insisting that they exist nowhere but in the “World 3”.
Not even in the “World 2”, contrary to a rather widespread error in psychological thought: such relations cannot be reduced to processes of individual consciousness or to their products stored in individual memory. It is why the subjective consciousness of an individual may investigate upon them, find contradictions and look for their solution, i.e., have the same activity with them as with “World 1” objects that are self-evidently detached from that consciously subjective world.

The brain model of John Eccles.
Now, at the Sixteenth World Congress of Philosophy, at a specially organized by philosophers, brain researchers, and psychologists symposium on interrelation between brain and experiences, whether conscious or unconscious, Eccles had the opportunity of presenting his brain model correlated with Popper’s philosophical model of those three interacting worlds. And Popper’s co-author labelled his theory dualist interactionalism: the “World 3” had been completely missing from it. It is worth seeing his arguing in some details: Eccles (and in their jointly written book Popper as well) rejects the theory of epiphenomenalism, according to which there is nothing but a reciprocal influence between the brain and the external world and if in the meantime some phenomena of awareness and self-awareness happen to arise, this would allegedly be nothing but an epiphenomenon that would have no effect whatever on the reciprocating process. On the contrary, Eccles claims that the self-reliant “World 2” of awareness and self-awareness itself establishes a reciprocating relationship with the “World 1” of the brain (for its part, interacting with the external reality) – hence the designation “dualist interactionalism.” Now, if in the meantime some phenomena of a “World 3” of interrelated to each other meanings happen to arise, this would, Eccles suggests, be nothing but an epiphenomenon that would have no effect whatever on that reciprocating process between “World 2” and “World 1”. Epiphenomenalism survived; it merely moved up one level within the system of interconnections.
From the point of view of this “World 3” epiphenomenalism, it is worthwhile to look at the arguments that prompted Eccles to reject a “World 2”-related epiphenomenalism. The argument originated with Popper, who, in his chapters of the book they jointly wrote, pointed out that:
“From a Darwinian point of view, we must consider the survival value of mental processes... Darwinists must look at “soul” – i.e., mental processes and our ability to form mental actions and reactions as a bodily organ that developed under the pressure of natural selection... The Darwinist point of view must be this: consciousness and, in general, mental processes must be viewed (and, if possible, explained) as the results of development in the course of natural selection.”
“World 2”‘s phenomena develop in tandem with the increase in the brain’s complexity, Eccles speculated at the World Congress of Philosophy; and yet, according to the theory of evolution only those structures and processes develop in the course of natural selection that contribute significantly to survival. If “World 2” is impotent, then the theory of evolution cannot explain its development.
As a matter of fact, we must consider exactly the same logic as applicable also to the “World 3” of interindividual phenomena.
In his presentation, Eccles (staying within the first two “Worlds”) summarized what was known of the brain’s fine-grained mechanisms at the time of the World Congress of Philosophy: what we know of the location of nerve cells, and of their connection with each other. He pointed out that the mechanism revealed by brain research is not adapted for transforming physical stimuli put in from the environment into mental phenomena manifesting themselves at the output of the system (in purposeful behavior, speech). Consequently, we must assume either that conscious phenomena do not exist even at the output of the central nervous system; or that they already exist at its input. And the first assumption is rejected by Eccles on the basis of the above Darwinian considerations.
Therefore, Eccles’s final conclusion at the World Congress of Philosophy was that “the self conscious mind” a priori exists as a “World 2”, and that a part of the cortex’s operating units (of the 2 million modules, each one respectively constructed of some 5,000 nerve cells) form a “liaison brain” that serves as a window from the “World 1” to the “World 2”.

The logic of natural sciences.
Theoretical conclusions of Eccles (and of most other brain researchers) are supported by a logic that all natural sciences inherited from classic mechanics. “From earlier theories we have taken over the idea of corpuscles, together with the scientific vocabulary based on it” – pointed out the Nobel-prize winner Schrödinger, adding: “This concept is not correct. It constantly prompts our thinking to seek explanations that obviously make no sense at all. Its thought structure contains elements that do not exist in real corpuscles.” Of all natural sciences, it was physics that first deviated from this logic, when, following its series of crises around the turn of the century, it presented the concept that “everything – absolutely everything – is corpuscle and field at the same time. All matter has its continuous structure, represented by a field, as well as its discrete structure, represented by a corpuscle.”
Returning to our problem, here the “explanations that obviously make no sense at all”, search for which is prompted by the corpuscle-oriented logic of our thinking, are related to the question: How does the state of a spatially delimited individual body influences the states of other bodies that are detached from the former – a neuron other nerve cells, a module of neurons other modules, a precise part of the nervous system its other parts, or the integer nervous system other bodily organs? Now, the answer made out by a “corpuscular logic” is that spatially defined bodies only interact to the extent that they enter into spatial contact along their circumferences.
It was this very logic that has always been applied, in particular, for understanding meaning although for such a logic this latter has always remained enigmatic. Since the controversy between Platon and Antisthenis it has been hard to settle whether meaning is located within the spatially delimited bodies of individual things, or it exists as an idea detached from every one at them. It is still more hard to say whether, while an individual organism gets into contact with an external individual object, meaning will or will not be transferred into the organism from the thing (where, as it has just been pointed out, one was unable to say whether meaning was inherent).
Finally, it is the least possible at all to decide whether meaning has a mental impact only when it finds its way into an individual organism. “Corpuscular logic” tries to cope with meaning by transforming it into familiarity: as if meaning would have been transferred from the thing into the organism and by now fixed in one of its parts that is, in principle, identifiable as responsible for the memory of this organism. On the other hand, one may not a priori discard the possibility that meaning may have a mental impact even when detached from all individual organisms being located in a supraindividual system of language, culture etc. (just the same way as it “in itself” is perhaps detached from all individual things).
If “corpuscular logic” does take into consideration this latter possibility, nevertheless it imposes its own terms upon the facts. First of all, it represents language as a store of particular corpuscules (i. e. a priori given labels), that would carry meanings (also supposed to be given a priori) the way real things would be expected by the “corpuscular logic” to do. Again, such a logic may only conceive the way meaning carried by a linguistic label becomes a psychic factor if that linguistic label, being contacted by an individual, turns from external into internal factor: finds, through some coding process, a corpuscular vehicle located in a theoretically well identifiable locus in the individual body. According such a logic, without getting into an, at least, indirect connection with the individual body the fact that language includes meanings would be psychologically just as irrelevant as is that other fact of things being given in this individual body’s environment before setting up their contact.

The brain model of John Szentagothai.
The reason for which Eccles has not dealt with such (and any other) kind of “World 3” problems and the one for which he made the above statement about the brain’s structure being not adapted for transforming physical stimuli put in from the environment into mental phenomena manifesting themselves at the output of the brain, relies on the same “corpuscular logic”.
While this logic forced Eccles to search after answers to questions which, according to Schrödinger’s reasoning, are incorrectly put, J. Szentagothai reached entirely different theoretical conclusions when starting from the same facts (discovered in part by Eccles’ research). Although the model he proposed for the structure and operation of the cerebral cortex acknowledges the cortex to be “a wonderfully precise neurological machine with a genetically defined “set of wires”,” he admits that “superimposed on this is an... intermittent and mutually symmetrical (quasi-random) system of connections.” According to the first part of this description, therefore, the cortex has a corpuscle-type structure; the second part, however, reveals a structure similar to one of a field: states are defined in it, but the constellation of corpuscles realizing each of these states gets organized only afterwards, as a “dynamic pattern” of a quasi-random system of connections.
What Szentagothai suggests is this: Even though we cannot consider the brain’s precisely wired structure as a mechanism whose operation would yield a mental phenomenon, such a result can indeed be produced by a brain that we view as a dynamic pattern emerging in the course of its operation.

The functional system
In order to explain the formation of dynamic patterns, we should explain how pieces, none of which in themselves produce a dynamic pattern, can create an organ whose function leads to the appearance of that pattern, even though the connection of those pieces cannot be ensured by a “precise and genetically determined system of wiring”. Szentagothai provides an impressive description which deals, however, with phenoma alone, without really explaining the formation itself of superstructures. He illustrates his point with the stereoscopic perception of paired images used by B. Julesz. Respectively, before the right and left eyes of his experimental subjects, Julesz placed scatterings of dots. One of these was randomly generated by computer; another was derived from the first set, now assumed to be a collection of points belonging to a three-dimensional configuration, visible to the left eye; and yet another was composed of dots belonging to the same configuration visible to the right eye. When viewing with both eyes, it took about 8 seconds to transform the random scatterings into an orderly three-dimensional image. Szentagothai considers it the fact of a dynamic pattern’ emerging that “anyone who formed if only once (!!) such a pattern, i.e., envisioned their three-dimensional form, may revisualize these shapes within a fraction of a second even after months, without knowing which of the once-seen patterns he will be shown. In other words, if one’s brain even once arranged two entirely meaningless scatterings into the sole possible orderly pattern, [...] then it may re-create this within a few moments.”
At the opposite end from describing the phenomenon, we find cybernetic speculations on the mechanism. These indicate formal preconditions for organizing a functional system. It is about the organization of such a superstructure that not only performs a new functionning that would represent by its integrity something more than just a sum of functionning of partial structures: the new organization imposes even to these very partial structures a deviation from their original functionning. According to Anokhin’s formal analysis, any functional system must be made up of constructs whose operation fits the following sequence: afferent synthesis of stimuli entering the system; making a decision on the basis of this synthesis; storing the decision thus made; instruction to act; reporting back on the outcome of action; pairing the report with the already stored decision; and, if necessary, correction in accordance with the result of the comparison.
By Anokhin’s analysis and other similar cybernetic arguments, such functions’ are posited as developing their own organs which target some external factor in the system’s environment in such a way as to synchronize its own state with the state of that target.
In the course of synchronization, changes occur in the system’s state, too, and one of those changes, possibly the most important may well be the development of that very integer superstructure, made up of partial structures whose operation, even when summed up, could not alter the factor of environment to the extent required for synchronization. In other words, altering the factor of environmental factor at issue will be achieved by the newly organized functional system.
On the other hand, organizing the functional system will be the performance of that environmental factor: until this latter emerges, requiring the operation of a superstructure that exists at that moment only in its partial structures, the components of this future superstructure has remained in their unintegrated arrangements, ready for various uses, but unsuitable for functioning in a critical manner.
If we consider the organization and the operation of a functional system as the sequences of the same performance, then we can say about this performance that its organ is an integer superstructure to which both the system that is actually operating and the environmental factors that formerly organized the system out of its partial structures do belong.
From taking into consideration a superstructure that contains both a system and certain factors of its environment we may be inhibited by “the idea of corpuscles that we have taken over from earlier theories and the scientific vocabulary based on it,” concerning which I have already cited Schrödinger’s criticism. The “thought structure containing elements that do not exist in real corpuscles” suggests for a system that its parts are made a priori operational by their spatial connection, and for a factor of environment that it can perform any operation relevant to the system only after having established with it a spatial connection.
This evidence is contradicted by the revelation that the structures’ spatial connection (“their precise wiring”) does not in itself turn them into an operational unit, but this functional system (as the Szentagothai’s model suggests it and shows by the Julesz’ demonstration) must first emerge as a “dynamic pattern” from random connections built on that precise wiring. If this is the case, however, then it would not be absurd to suppose that a functional system can be organized from random relationships that are built only partly on spatial connection.
Such a random relationship exists between all levels of biological organizations and their respective environment. If we do follow Schrödinger in rejecting the logic that would distinguish between a corpuscle considered relevant to a precise function and others that would be considered as being merely its conditions if a connection gets established with them, then we may conceive those structures of allegedly different kind as one superstructure. Thus, for example, when a cell group for its functionning needs a precise tone distribution between cells, then a second cell group that would regulate that tone distribution would not be considered by such a logic to be an external circumstance, but describes the whole functionning as a function of a superstructure that includes both the cell group whose tone is regulated and the cell group performing the regulation.
Such a logic, however, must face the contingency that for the superstructure that is now described as the very organ of the function at issue similar observations can be made. Szentagothai points out for moduls constructed from neurons, “we cannot exclude the possibility that these “superstructures” of neighboring, or conventionally connected, neuron networks gives rise to newer “super-superstructures” of a higher hierarchy.” The same interrelation must be established for all levels of biological organizations.
However, what actually has always happened until now was that at one point or another this logic yielded, in further interpretation, to the logic that does distinguish a corpuscle allegedly relevant to the function at issue and those supposed to influence the process according to whether or not they get in connection with the “appropriate” body. Already the interrelations of the central nervous system and the periphery were often interpreted according to the traditional thinking: according to it, the functionning of the central nervous system would be influenced by the periphery as far as stimuli from the latter would be put in by a “precise wiring”, and then this central system (even if it is conceived according to the new logic) would influence the periphery by stimuli put out. In other cases, the logical shift occurs in the interpretation of the interaction between the nervous system as a whole and the organs it regulates. But anyhow it takes place not later then at the moment of focusing scientific interest on the interaction between the individual organism and its environment.
It occurred that for the psychology the basic system of reference in scientific observation has been fixed on the level of individual organism. For biology such a stage has been but transitory which once replaced description in terms of cells only to yield (or share), just in the present period, its position to a molecular biology, on the one hand, and to a population biology, on the other.
Psychology’s fixation to the individual organism as reference must be due to its philosophical heritage. It was psychology enframed by philosophy that stated that consciousness refers, on one hand, to an object reflected by it and, on the other, to the individual subject of that consciousness. This philosophical legacy was combined with the new orientation of a psychology emancipating itself from the philosophy by means of turning to the biology, which, at the time just happened to be engaged in describing phenomena at the organism level.
Thus, the Self, the individual subject of consciousness has assumed a material substratum in the individual organism. At the same time, another potential heritage from the philosophy, the one given in doctrine about a supraindividual Spirit, was lost for the psychology, because of a lack of appropriate biological frame of reference.
Yet, if meaning is indeed an interindividual mental phenomenon, as it has been observed above, it must have something to do with issues of a supraindividual Spirit. Thus, conclusions of Popper about a “World 3” might be avoided only in such a way that would be similar to that of Szentagothai’s reasoning about “World 2” issues referred to functional “super-superstructures”.
Only this time the functional “super-superstructures” have to transcend the individual organism.

Conceptions about organizations transcending individual organism
Now I am going to present scientific essays at conceiving functional organizations that transcend individual organism and may be referred to mental phenomena.

The theory of an object-oriented activity.
The Anokhin’s description of the functional system relies, after all, exclusively on structures within the body; environmental structures are considered only as sources of afferentation and reafferentation.
The activity theory of Leont’iev, Luria, Zaporozhets and others transcends this model. It considers functions whose organ is composed not only of the sections of the central nervous system but also of the most various (nervous, somatic, vegetative) structures of the entire individual body; and inasmuch as psychic functions are concerned the individual’s object-oriented activity is considered that must be organized by its tools. Since this theory (as a Vygotskian one) has claimed that those tools are, at the same time, signs, i.e. entities historically produced by a culture, this conception enables the theory to refer the human mind to two frames simultaneously: by considering it as one produced by the functionning of both individual brain structures and inter-individual cultural structures.
But if we have a theory about the same functionning of, on one hand, internal and, on the other, external structures, it implies a theory about a functionning of the same superstructure composed of both structures inside of an individual organism and the ones outside of it, inside of its environment. According to such a theory when the function organizing its organ is an object-oriented activity, the structure thus produced does transcend the individual organism.

Gibson’s ecological perception theory.
When comparing this theory with his earlier position, Gibson describes the change in his view this way: “[...] at the time, I based my explanation of vision on the retinal image; now, on the other hand, my starting point is what I call an ambient optic array. My present conviction is that we must approach the problem of perception in an ecological way.” This change was brought about because he realized that vision could not be explained by the manner in which proximate stimuli affect the retina, since perception could remain constant even if the stimuli change. Gibson analyzes four instances in which perception remains unchanged in spite of varying stimuli: (1) change in lighting, (2) relocation on the part of observer, (3) changes in the sampling of the ambient optic array, and (4) a permanence prevailing in the face of local changes.”
The Gibson school do not accept either the explanation offered by the Gestalt psychology, since that theory holds out (as an alternative to the retinal image changing in response to the environment’s proximate stimuli) a form appearing on a frontal flat surface (a wallboard, screen, or sheet of paper placed opposite the observer), which an individual corrects in accordance with innate pregnant patterns. Gibson does make the difference between such an abstract geometric space in which alone do such forms exist and a natural environment in which representatives of a given species find themselves nestled.
Gibson’s conclusion is that one is not able to explain the meaningful perception by an animal of its environment if considering only how (e.g., nervous system) structures given within that animal’s individual body effect that psychic performance without taking into consideration how the structures of the environment afford that performance. Any psychic performance is determined by the mutual compatibility between affordances and effectivities. According to the definition by Gibson, “the affordance of anything is a specific combination of the properties of its substance and its surfaces taken with reference to an animal”. This definition got completed with the one given by Turvey & Shaw to what they consider as a twin concept within the Gibsonian theory: “The effectivity of any living thing is a specific combination of the functions of its tissues and organs taken with reference to an environment”
The authors add to these twin definitions that animal with its effectivity structure and environment with its affordance structure are totally symmetrical factors of psychic performances: “By this conception an [...] environment is defined as a set of affordances or an affordance structure [... and] an animal is defined as a set of effectivities or an effectivity structure [...]. An econiche is an affordance description of Environment in reference to a particular species; a species is an effectivity description of Life in reference to a particular econiche. And we may schematize the affordance and effectivity conceptions in the following way, in accordance with the compatibility logic:
An environmental event or situation X affords an activity Y to an animal Z if and only if certain mutual compatibility relations between X and Z obtain [...].
An animal Z can effect an activity Y on an environmental event or situation X if and only if certain mutual compatibility relations between X and Z obtain [...].”

Territorial behavior.
Ethology use this term to describe a series of events by which a part of an animal or human population demarcates a part of its environment and gets, reciprocally, demarcated by it. This behavior by marking with some sign the part in question of the environment turns it into a territory, while those performing this behavior expose themselves to some marking that turns the part in question of the population a well-identified group. From that moment on that demarcated territory and this demarcated group are ordered to each other by the territorial behavior: the individuals thus marked cannot leave the territory they marked for more than a well defined distance and/or time period, and outsiders cannot approach it closer than a critical distance. If the latter do so, they provoke a fighting activity in those defending their territory.
As far as the territory is already demarcated by the group and the group by the territory, staying inside or outside the borderline of a territory and, similarly, belonging or not to a given group elicits categorically different disposition in an individual for a precise (e.g., fighting or mating) activity.
Such a change in being disposed or indisposed to perform a precise activity in accordance with the actual state of territorial organization is well demonstrated by the fighting behavior of the stickleback (Gasterosteus aculeatus) preparing to mate. The power relations of fighting change according to whether the individual fish is inside or outside its own territory when involved in fighting. According to Konrad Lorenz’s observations, the combativeness of a stickleback is in inverse relationship with the given distance between him and his nest; in his own nest, he is a fierce fighter, but the farther he swims away from his headquarter, the less he is motivated to attack. When two male stickleback meets, we can quite accurately predict the outcome of their fight: the fish that is farther from his nest is the one that will take flight, Lorenz claims, adding that near to his own nest even the smallest can dispose of the largest enemy.
One could (though traditionally does not) put it in Gibsonian terms and say that the territorial behavior intervenes in the distribution of affordances to the environment and in that of effectivities to the animal population. The key factor of such a redistribution is a marking activity, an imposition of signs upon a part of the environment transformed by this means into a territory and, parallelly, upon a part of the animal population transformed by this means into a group.
Signs when attached not to a part of an environment but to that of a population may the same way change the disposition of performing a precise activity as territorial signs do. E.g., male individuals of certain species mark by a particular biochemical substance the female during mating so as to indispose other males from mating with that female, even if impregnation was not effective. Likewise, the issue of a fighting may impose postural signs upon winners and loosers and the display of such a posture may determine a rather lasting hierarchical organization without being challenged by newer behavioral trials.
Thus, neither the group which effects the demarcation of a territory nor this territory which affords the demarcation of that group is prefabricated, both are produced by the territorial behavior. In my conception the direct product of affordances and effectivities would not be, as Gibsonians claim, activities but functional “super-superstructures” that do transcend individual organism.

Toward a theory of structures producing meanings
Such kind of combining the above three theoretical discoveries – about an object-oriented functionning, the mutually coordinated affordance and effectivity structures, and territorial organization of groups – would enable us to discern a structure that could be the organ of dealing with meanings. Yet, such a synthesis would be by no means an easy theoretical performance, considering that
1. territorial behavior as conceived by ethology has nothing to do with a historico-cultural dimension;
2. object-oriented activity as conceived by Leont’iev’s activity theory has not either much to do with a territorial and group dimension;
3. for the ecological framework of perception neither a historical nor a social dimension is conceived by the Gibsonians.
However, such a synthesis cannot be spared if we are to deal with meanings because this latter’s historico-cultural dimension and socio-territorial dimension are equally essential.
Vygotsky emphasised the necessity to reckon with the social aspect of meaning because he considered meaning to be (to put it in terms of his above cited juxtaposition) not only obobshchenie (generalization) but obshchenie (communication) as well. It was meant that this latter represents the interindividual dimension against that earlier supposed to be an intraindividual performance.
We do know the argument of Vygotsky for intraindividual performances being developed from interindividual ones. In this sense (in terms referred to the ZPD) generalization, too, would have to have its psychosocial origin.
However, at the present time it is known that the social dimension of this performance is still more essential:
Recent observations about the ontogenesis of human consciousness support the assumption on semantic values being originated from social categorization. It turned out that a child can earlier elaborate some shades of similarities and differences into categorical similarity between certain factors and their categorical difference from others if he himself is one of these factors than in case all those factors are but objects given in the child’s environment. Early social categorization does not take place as a conscious act of thinking: it is mediated by an unconscious process of semiosis in which the child’s diffuse vocal, motor, postural, vaso-motor or other somatic manifestations get shaped as signifiers that are attached to parallelly shaped social categories as their signified factors so that similar factors should be symbolized by similar, and different ones by different signifiers.
The social categories thus created represent similarities or differences not simply between individuals as such. The individuals are dealt with as occupying definite positions in one or another of social structures transcending individual organism; those structures are organized along objects that get assigned to certain individuals while detached from others in a kind of territorial behavior. With reference to this territorial behavior, the child identifies him/herself with some individuals and, at the same time, categorically distinguishes from others. Based on social categories thus created and on the mental operations with them there emerges the logical apparatus that enables the child to structure the same way the external topological space of objects correlated with that social space and, hence, to perform operations with the meanings of those objects.
The more organic role an attribute of an object plays in acts of social categorization, the earlier a child will learn to logically deal with their attribute.
Thus for instance, an 18-20 month old child is capable of distributing similar objects among him/her and others, and then distinguishing each of them on the attribute of their belonging to one person or to another. The same child is unable to differentiate or identify objects on the attribute of their colours before the age of three (or even, according to some authors, 4 or 5).
Piaget’s classic investigations have resulted that it is not until a child has spent some years in school that s/he acquires the skill to handle abstract quantitative relations like equal, greater or smaller length, capacity etc., undisturbed by corollary attributes. However, Doise, Mugny and Perret-Clermont have recorded similar performances at pre-school ages, having modified the original conditions of the experiment by connecting the quantitative relations in question to the organization of social relations among children. For example, the children were led to discover the constantly equal quantity of liquids in differently shaped receptacles by having the task to distribute the liquid – that happened to be very appreciated by children – among themselves in equal portions.
In a field experiment with my own daughter she presented at 4;8 a rather complicated performance of projection of a three-dimensional geometrical structure onto a plane and then transforming that projection. The child was sitting in a bus that passed on the embankment under a bridge through a tunnel made to avoid level-crossing of the bridge and the embankment. Her three-year-old sister exclaimed: “Hey, what a long tunnel!”, upon which the elder girl declared with a contempt that “it would have been long if we hade gone like this” (she used her hand to mark the direction perpendicular to the way the bus was running, that actually was not the direction of the tunnel but that of the bridge), “but then”, she went on, “we should have destroyed the tunnel”. The mother of the children were staying that time abroad and, a couple of day later, the elder girl was “writing a letter” to her, i.e., informing her in various drawings about what happened in the family during the mother’s absence. So I asked the girl to “draw how we passed through that tunnel” and, thus, she made a drawing of the vertical cross-section of the tunnel and represented the path of our bus in it by a point. Then, following another instruction of the same style, she drew once more the same cross-section with an imaginary path through which the bus would have destroyed the tunnel. The high achievement in this experiment was due to the fact that the girl was transforming the structure of a space in which she herself was included in a certain position.
These considerations may give a new look at a feature at which Karl Popper pointed out. When investigating about the ontological status of a “World 3” Popper, though conceded the existence of such “World 1” objects that come to exist as objectivations of human activity and, as such, embody entities belonging to “World 3”, he considered, however, these factors by no means exhausting the “World 3” that includes with contents of meanings their form, too. Logical and, among them, for instance mathematical relations do not exist embodied in “World 1” things and processes, nor can their existence be traced back, consequently, to (e.g., brain) structures and their functioning within individual organisms. What is more important, contradicting a rather widespread error in psychological thought: neither can such relations be reduced to processes of individual consciousness nor to their products stored in individual memory.
What is, then, the ontological status of these forms, that makes it possible, e. g., for the subjective consciousness of an individual to make discoveries upon them like finding contradictions that must have existed there (where? – that is a crucial question for Popper) proceeding any awareness of them and, after identifying them as problems, to find out their solutions.
Now, in this paper two assumptions has been advanced that would enable us to accept Popper’s question without accepting his answer to it: the first, about links between operations with logical categories, meanings, on one hand, and formation of social categories, social identities, on the other; and the second, about this psychic performance being based on an extra-psychic super-structure transcending individual organism (by shifting both from the organism to a structure incorporating also environmental factors and from the individual to a supraindividual formation).
As far as these two assumptions do stand we may derive logical structures and operations from real social structures and operations inside that organization transcending individual organism.
The interindividual character at issue of these structures and operations might by no means be reduced to those referred in Vygotsky’s texts to the ZPD. These structures and operations must not be established with (e.g., adult) persons who would necessarily be more advanced in their development in order to get the child developed: interaction between children may as well develop each of them as the one which an adult does. On the other hand, the interindividual structures and operations do not necessarily disappear after the intraindividual faculty has developed.
We started from a contradiction between various ideas of Lev Vygotsky’s theory and by solving that we arrived to another contradiction.
Yet, contradictions are considered within the philosophical framework of Vygotsky’s theory the main motive of further development of a system, are not they?

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* The author is Research Adviser, Institute for Psychology, The Hungarian Academy of Sciences, P.O.B. 398, H-1394 Budapest, Hungary. Fax: (361) 34-20-514. E-mail: garai@orange.okt.cogpsyphy.hu

DERIVED THEORETICAL FEATURES –
ПРОИЗВОДНЫЕ ТЕОРЕТИЧЕСКИЕ ОЧЕРКИ

PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY

A dialogue about man, his gene pool and eccentricity

Man: May I be the first to speak?
Scientist: Certainly.
Man: To avoid a misunderstanding, notably that the author may have deliberately used a logical implication by casting me in the role of man and both of you in that of the scholars. I think that this simply means that the author does not know or to be more polite, cannot use the logical rules of classification. He may have meant to imply that I am merely a man while you are scholarly a men. Now I think the excellent poet and philosopher Attila Jozsef said of this very “merely a man” in one of his poems: “man is not yet great, but fancies he is, and so he is eccentric.” 
If you scholars allow me to use such non-scientific terms, my generation, those born between 1933 and 1937 have incorporated in their genes like an overdose of radiation what the eccentricity of imagined greatness meant. But what did Attila Jozsef build his optimism on that made him say: “man is not yet great”? Can we believe him when he also says in another poem: “I have faith, for, unlike our forefathers, we get no longer impaled.?”
If so, those who outlived him by a let alone seven years can no more share his faith, and those who may have seen their trust revived by the historical changes of a later period must have gained new experiences from the terrorism against the background of forced calm in the 70s as well as from the resurrection of certain practices, if not in Europe, in certain parts of the world, which historical memory buried in its deepest layers together with impaling: in Cambodia mountains have been constructed out of human heads, in Iran women have been ordered to veil their faces with black.
My question, then, is whether science has any grounds other than the assurance of changing historical experience to persuade me that man, though not yet great, is going to be one day? That his eccentricities are similar to those of a three year old’s first defiant phase when he is able to do something alone and thus wants to do everything alone in order to learn a lot of things; or to the adolescent who tests himself with his eccentricities to see if he is personally accompanied by Attila Jozsef’s “mind and love”?
Scientist: Attila Jozsef like so many other artists expresses the desires and anxieties of many of us, probably far better than the relevant branch of natural science called psychology ever could. But from the aspect of objective truth art must not be taken seriously. However captivating the poet’s image expressing the lightness of the summer atmosphere may be: “with silver gayness the birch-tree shakes a whiff of wind”. From a scientific viewpoint it is an absurd statement as normally the wind shakes the tree and not vice versa. Well, similar is the case with the poetic image referring to the greatness of man.
Contrary to what Attila Jozsef would suggest if he offered what he does as science and not as poetry, the truth is that, should I presume that “man is great”, I have no reason to add he is “already great” for he has been of the same dimension for over a hundred thousand years; similarly, if my subjective opinion is that “man is not great”, I may not add as an objective prediction that he is “not yet great”, for we have no reason whatever to believe that he will change his dimension for the next hundred thousand years either.
Man: I no longer understand a word of this. Does this mean that natural science has made a new Copernican about-turn discovering that the course man has taken from the stone axe to the cybernetic automaton so that we might believe that he would proceed along the same line, well, that this course is just as much an illusion of our everyday consciousness as is the one that the sun seems to revolve around the earth? Will you enlighten me, please?
Scientist: I am afraid I misunderstood you. For a split second I had the impression that you were talking about the greatness and eccentricity of man and not of technology.
Man: Indeed, does not man create technology?
Scientist: The more I reflect on this puzzling question, the more readily I have to acknowledge that it cannot be otherwise.
Man: Can technology which is developing at such an accelerated rate have been created by man who has remained unchanged for the last hundred thousand years and seems likely to remain so for the next hundred thousand?
Scientist: Look, it is the philosopher you have to ask about the logical links between various things. As for me, I have only put my facts down on this round table. And if you place your facts next to mine on the table, I will acknowledge that there is more than one fact placed on the round table of knowledge. Just as one my assume that there must be more than one thing existing side by side in the sphere of the universe.
Philosopher: If the fact of which your knowledge or belief in has just been revealed to us does exist in the universe.
Scientist: Do you doubt it? That becomes a philosopher. But I can prove what I have posited, notably that man’s most important traits have not changed significantly since the Homo sapiens came into being.
Philosopher: I am curious to hear how you will verify this less weighty part of your former statement.
Scientist: Well, then. The clearest way for the traits of the human species to change during the course of history and for these changes to accumulate in a given direction is to have each individual hand down to their offspring the qualities they have acquired during their individual existence. This would mean that one generation could grow up standing on the shoulders of the previous one, so to speak, and man would keep growing visibly greater as regards many of his valuable traits. We know now, however, that acquired qualities are not inherited. Another way to accumulate the valuable qualities of the representatives of the human species at the expense of the worthless ones would be through the mechanism of selection. What the selection would need to be able to ensure this bias towards valuable qualities is that during the subsequent millennia the conditions of existence should consistently allow /or should allow more and more/ that the chance to reproduce for specimens with worthless qualities it should be optimum. Now, if you look at history from this aspect you will find that it fails to create the conditions for selection of this kind, and fails increasingly to do so. Firstly, it levels off the differences between the conditions of existence by organizing on a social scale protection from natural catastrophes /e.g. epidemics/ or other dangers which are harmful to man, which would more likely hit those individuals who lack the valuable qualities necessary for survival. Secondly, should there be some unequal distribution of the conditions of existence within the levelling-off tendency, the value judgement concerning this differentiation would still change from one historical period to the next, and beside, the historical periods with their relatively constant system of values prevail for an every shortening length of time, whereas, artificial selection needs more time to accumulate the highly evaluated qualities in man’s genes than a mere lifetime which is given in the most recent age, or the 150-200 years that was the duration of the bourgeois value system or for that matter, the one and a half millennia of the feudal system of values.
Philosopher: Is it wrong for man to be able to enforce the values of equality and freedom he has chosen himself? For example, that of equality in levelling off the conditions of existence, and that of freedom of refusing to tolerate for an ever shorter time that the system of values chosen by his forefather should dominate him?
Scientist: If I exercise the right of the onlooker to applaud or boo the “performance” staged by nature on the basis of nature’s “script”, then I must say that quite the contrary, I do rather like that things are happening to man as they are. All I wanted to point out is that the price to pay for this is that man who undergoing these things is born today with exactly the same qualities as, say, a hundred thousand years ago.
Man: And in a hundred thousand years’ time? Or a thousand? Or at least a hundred? To be quite frank the latter dimension interests me far more.
Philosopher: Indeed, the weightier part of your statement – that man won’t be greater in the future either – is still to be explained.
Scientist: I think it follows logically from what we said of his history so far. Yet there is something we have overlooked: mutation. Mutation is a sudden durable change in the genetic material in response to an external stimulus? When it occurs at random, in a natural way, it is nearly always an adverse modification and thee low viability of the mutant luckily kills it before it can reproduce itself. Very rarely, however, a modification may take place resulting in a mutant that is more viable under the altered conditions of existence than the normal specimens of the species. In this case, the mutant begins to multiply, thereby laying the foundations of the evolution of a new species. As a matter of fact, it was mutation among the primates that produced man himself with his new specific properties: his faculties of thinking, speaking, social organization and work. Subsequent mutations in man have mostly been determinal with a very few that have worked. I only left these unmentioned because they made man simply more various but not “greater”.
But if in future – and as things stand today it will be in the foreseeable future – man has to bring about pre-planned mutations in an artificial way, he will have an instrument to develop such traits for himself that will really make him “greater”.
Man: This explanation does not lack spirit, and may also require love /after all, the new qualities have to be reproduced/, yet I don’t think this is what Attila Jozsef had in mind when he declared that “man is not yet great”.
Scientist: That’s right. This is why I said that man as Attila Jozsef explains him won’t change his dimension for another hundred thousand years either.
Philosopher: It was the logical consistency of your whole train of thought that fascinated me most, /while you modestly denied being competent in the question of the logical connection of phenomena/. For a man who has been begotten by natural chance and delivered to life by natural necessity will also in future be forced to copy the accidentally produced patterns of the mutant faculties of thinking, speaking, socialization and work – this logical.
Scientist: Not at all. In future, just as he did in the past, man will also act out the reproduced and reproducible patterns, that is, he will think, speak organize society and, last but not least, work.
Man: Through which everything under the sun may change, mayn’t it, except man himself.
Scientist: What man actually passes down to the next generation is a loose form that is filled in by a wide variety of contents by the environment. So man as the joint result of these two factors – inheritance and environmental effect – is more readily seen as something highly changeable. If you add that due to recessive inheritance not only the environmentally produced contents of the individual but also the inherited patterns may differ from those of the immediate ancestors’, one can admit that natural science is really hard put to demonstrate from beneath all these secondary components that which has preserved unchanged the essence of Homo sapiens ever since the species began.
Philosopher: Your reasoning has enthralled me with the elegance of its logic itself is only a form, consequently, it applies that it can be filled in with a wide variety of contents: false and true alike. You, for one, have filled it in with false – or erratic – content, to keep to the polite traditions of round table conferences.
Scientist: If you would kindly explain this is detail, I should be only too happy to learn from it.
Philosopher: You have doubled my enthusiasm!
Your reasoning fascinated me first and foremost with the elegance with which you consistently separated man’s essence from what it is manifest in, as well as the qualities of the whole human species from those of individuals. Your consistency in differentiating these twice two things has been so impressive that I would not be surprised to be interrupted by you warning me that it was a single differentiation you made: by pointing out the essence of man in its abstract purity you separated the constant qualities of the human species from the individual variants at the same time, and by demonstrating how the environmental stimuli, recessive inheritance and occasional accidental mutations affect the qualities of man, you marked off the human appearances from the essence that is manifest in man. From the human essence that is, which is then just as identical with the stable qualities of the human species as is its manifestation with the individual variants. These two correspondences are so obvious that mere mention of them makes the text redundant.
Why I have nonetheless brought up this pair of truths is because they belong to the false truisms of everyday consciousness that may totally mislead science.
Man: Totally – if this is not only one of the superlatives that intellectuals are prone to use than it must mean that the right orientation tends towards the diametrical opposite of this pair of correspondences. In other words: man’s essence should be identical with the individual traits, while the stable qualities of the species are mere appearances. It is an odd assumption.
Philosopher: Well, mine, if you like, is even stranger. I am convinced that man’s essence is identical with his individual acts, while the so-called “quality” is none other than the way the individual act appears in his ideological consciousness.
Scientist: In order for us to be able to evaluate this really peculiar statement, let me make sure that I understood it properly: what you say is said, isn’t it, of the qualities of the individual in the spirit of such social psychological theories as cognitive dissonance and attribution theory which claim that personality traits as such do not exist but are the instruments of consciousness for the subsequent evaluation of the individual act with the halo of which consciousness adduces rational causes for an act. If this is so, I can understand your statement even though I can’t accept it. But if you think, which is totally absurd assumption and I only mention it to prevent any subsequent misunderstanding – well, if you should think that even those qualities of Homo sapiens the genetic carriers of which inherent in every normal human being and which are slowly becoming know to us, are also mere products of our consciousness with the help of which we “explain away” as it were our acts, well.
Philosopher: God forbid that I should deny such traits of Homo sapiens as the specific build of the male and female organisms. Neither would I question that X /by which I do not mean a chromosome but a specific though unspecified individual/ does have traits, for example the pattern of the skin on his fingertips by which he can be differentiated from all the other specimens of Homo sapiens and at the same time he can be identified with himself from the time of his birth /or even earlier/ to his death /or later/. Finally I maintain that in addition to such universal and such individual traits man has some other existent traits capable of objective investigation with the help of the instruments of natural science, which characterize many individuals in the same way but differentiate them from other groups of individuals within the species, I mean traits like blood group or skin colour. Now, if I were decide whether any of the above kinds of qualities are essential or superficial, I would be at loss: the assumption that claims that man’s essence is being “a two-legged, featherless animal” appears just as nonsensical to me as the one that claims to find the essence of X’s personality in the curves of his fingerprint. It would be too easy to demonstrate my ideas with theories that operate not with universal or individual traits, but with particular ones such as skin colour.
Basically different is the case with traits in connection with which the question of essence and appearance can be raised adequately. These traits are always the inner disposition of outward behaviour, the formulation of which gives the answer to the question: Why did X do what he did?

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

Social identity: Cognitive dissonance or paradox?

Abstract – Cognitive dissonance is considered as emerging between the social identity of persons and that of their acts. An analysis is made of the paradoxical consequences of a double bind: Those who are A are supposed not to do B and are also supposed not to think that those who are A would be allowed to do B. The Cohen-Rosenberg controversy is presented here, revised on this basis, and illustrated by the two authors’ experiments. It is claimed that the psychosocial aspect of social identity is complemented by its socioeconomic aspect. Indeed, the valuation of an identity is always a judgment of the extent to which this model should be reproduced. The more tolerant or the more ruthless manner of imposing value models of social identity is determined by socioeconomic factors On the other hand, the socioeconomic positions may be specified by psychosocial factors. The psychoeconomic connection in social identity is accentuated in post-capitalist societies, turning human faculties and needs into factors to be produced and reproduced by the economic system.

Some social psychologists consider that the question of social identity “is nothing but that of modes of organization for a given individual of his representations of himself and of the group to which he belongs” (Zavalloni, 1973, p. 245). For others (see, for example, Sarbin & Allen, 1969) it is what the individual does from his position in the social structure that defines his identity, rather than what he thinks about it when comparing himself to his group.
These latter could argue that one has a social identity of, for example, a working person when he regularly carries out an activity in working and in claiming the remuneration for it, rather than because of a representation that he has of himself or others have of him. And, similarly, it is not being considered as a hedonist person that identifies someone socially as such, but his acting freely and in eventually assuming the necessary pecuniary sacrifice for it.
But what about the identity of someone who works (for example, whitewashing a fence) and assumes a sacrifice for this activity! Or the identity of that other who acts freely (in playing, for example, football) and claims the remuneration for this very activity?
Although these questions sound absurd, however, we know the story (imaginary, but too real) of Tom Sawyer who led his playmates to pay in order to have the pleasure to whitewash a fence. Now, was the social identity of these children that of a working person when, on that hot Saturday afternoon, bathing in the river would have been a much more attractive activity?
And we know, too, of the famous Hungarian football captain of the team of the “belle epoque” to whom people credit the saying “Good pay, good play, bad pay, bad play”. Does this mean that this sportsman had the social identity of a hedonist player when, at a time of austere amateurism, he claimed a remuneration in proportion to the work carried out?
Looking for indicators of social identity, one may start by preferring acts to representations. But one soon realizes that it is the representation of an act rather than the act itself that is the matter here, since one cannot identify socially a person committing an act without identifying socially the act committed by this person. Is whitewashing a fence necessarily work, and playing football a pleasure? Yet, the act of a representation here may be the act itself in question.
If one plays football and is paid for this activity, the cognitions referring to these two facts will be in dissonance that is considered by cognitive dissonance theory responsible for creating in the individual’s mind a tension that is more or less painful and that can be reduced only by modifying one of the cognitions to the point where it becomes consistent with the other, for example, by modifying the social identity of the activity in order to present it as work. It is the same for the case where one accomplishes a job in whitewashing the fence and lets oneself be led at the same time to pay for doing this activity.
This supposition has been tested repeatedly in laboratory experiments. Deci (1975) gave riddles to students to solve, one group being paid for this activity while another was not. During breaks, those not paid could not resist going on with the puzzle solving, while those paid rested after their work. In another experiment, nursery school children lost their interest in toy A when promised to be “rewarded” for playing with it by permission to play with toy B, and vice versa.
At this point, the question arises concerning the nature of the cognitive field which determines that two cognitions are consistent or dissonant. In this classic form of the cognitive dissonance theory, Festinger (1957) did not raise this question, proposing simply that the dissonance between cognitions A and B emerges if A implies psychologically non-B. Later, he specified the conditions necessary for creating dissonance between two cognitions: “Whenever one has an information or a belief that, taken alone, ought to push one not to commit an act, this information or belief is dissonant with the fact that one has actually committed this act” (Festinger, 1963, p. 18).
But, how can an idea incite one to commit an act? What does “implies psychologically” mean ? To take a classic example, if one thinks that all human beings are mortal and that Socrates is a human being, one finds oneself brought by these two ideas to have yet a third one: Socrates is mortal. If, in spite of this incitement, one thinks that Socrates is immortal, this produces a cognitive dissonance that has the form of a logical error. But he who works and at the same time pays for the pleasure of working commits no logical error, and neither does someone who plays and is paid for playing.
Strictly speaking, in this case of a paid player (as opposed to the person paying/07 the pleasure of working) there should not be any cognitive dissonance, according to the above Festinger formula. If one has the information or the belief of being paid for play, one should not be pushed at all by this to not do the activity. We shall examine this curious matter later on.
To bring us nearer to an answer, Aronson reformulated the theory (Aronson & Mettee, 1968; Nel et al., 1969; Aronson et al., 1975; Aronson, 1976). According to his suggestions, the information or belief which would push me not to commit an act is the cognition of my social identity incompatible with such an act. Aronson takes into consideration more general dimensions of social identity, such as reason and honesty.
If I have the cognition A, “One makes me pay for work done by myself’, and the cognition B, “I bring about this activity”, it is not necessary that A psychologically implies non-B. It is therefore not necessary that a cognitive dissonance emerge between A and B. On the contrary, if I hold the cognition A, “I am a reasonable person”, and the cognition B, “I work and, more, I pay to work”, then the dissonance becomes inevitable, since a person whose identity is described by A cannot commit an act the corresponding identity of which is defined by B.
According to the idea that cognitive dissonance can emerge between the definition of the social identity of the act and that of its author has been revealed as very important in explaining certain apparent irregularities of this phenomenon. In the beginning, one supposed, for example, that to believe X and to say non-X was susceptible in itself to introducing the dissonance. However, to explain this statement sufficiently in everyday life, the reward or punishment dimension has been mentioned: getting the former or avoiding the latter would provide an external justification compensating for the tension of the dissonance.
Lacking such a justification, the tension would tend to be reduced by bringing the afflicted subject to believe what he said. This hypothesis (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959) has been confirmed by many experiments dealing with forced compliance for a contra-attitudinal advocacy. When the reward or punishment received in these experiments is just enough to force the subject to plead against his attitudes, he is pushed to believe what he said. But when the punishment or reward is larger, the tendency of the subject to believe what he said is weakened. However, there are as many experiments that disprove this hypothesis demonstrating that the liability of the subjects to adjust their beliefs to their words is directly proportional to the importance of the reward or punishment in question.
Now, neither an inverse nor a direct proportionality between the amount of the reward or punishment and the tendency to adapt the thought to the word is given, first, for the simple reason that one may not feel at all the necessity of co-ordinating one’s thought and one’s words. Once again, it is not between a cognition A, “I believe X”, and a cognition B, “I say non-%’, that the cognitive dissonance manifests itself, but between the cognition A, “I am honest”, and the cognition B, “While believing X, I lead others to believe non-X”. It is for this reason, in experiments during which the experimental manipulations prevented the subject from defining his social identity in conformity with A (see, for example, Aronson 8r Mettee, 1968) or that of his act in conformity with B (Nel et al., 1969), that the “normal” display of cognitive dissonance is then perturbed.
Being among the most general dimensions of social identity, honesty and reason are still socially concrete. “To be reasonable” amounts to this: “To choose the most advantageous alternative”. And “to be honest” amounts to “not to prevent others from choosing, in conformity with established rules, their most advantageous alternative”. This means, in the last analysis, that honesty and reason turn out to be characteristics of the middle class in a capitalistic society. (Without examining this statement in more detail let us only consider intuitively the difference between such a “reason” or “honesty,” on the one hand, and that of Brutus or of a Petrograd proletarian in 1917.)
Now, if it is true that the cognitions “I believe X” and “I say, convincingly, non- X” demonstrate a cognitive dissonance only because a cognition defines their relation for the acting person by socially defining this person, it is also true that the dissonance between the cognitions defining the social identity of the act on the one side (“In believing X I lead others to believe non-X”) and that of the acting person on the other side (“I am honest”) exists only by a supplementary cognition defining, so to speak, the social identity of the social identity itself  (“Honest people do not lead others into error”).
Thus, the complete formula for cognitive dissonance is as follows:
1. I am A;
2. I do B;
3. A does not do B,
where A is any social category and B is any relevant social act. “Any” means that the formula can convey even contents as concrete as this:
1. I am an authentic Moslem;
2. I drink wine;
3. An authentic Moslem does not drink wine.
For all kinds of concrete incarnations of the above three-piece formula, there exist three types of reducing cognitive dissonance adjusted to each of the above items, respectively, and re-defining social identity.
Type 1. Realize that one is no more (or that one has never been) A. I am no longer an authentic Moslem since I drank wine. I am not honest because I pleaded, to convince others, that the police had their reasons to have penetrated the university campus and to have killed four supposed demonstrators, at the same time being convinced that no reason could exist for such disgrace (Cohen, 1962). The cognitive consistency is recovered, but at the price of losing social identity, a price too high for the counterpart, such that one pays only at exceptional moments of individual and/or social identity crisis.
Type 2. Reinterpret B. This is the sphere par excellence for reducing cognitive dissonance. It wasn’t wine, but vodka that I drank, consequently, I can still consider myself an authentic Moslem. It wasn’t work I did, but an amusement, so I can keep considering myself reasonable when I paid to have the pleasure of whitewashing the fence, or honest in being remunerated for playing football, since it wasn’t for play, but labour. And it is the same for honesty in a situation of arguments contrary to attitudes: if I believe what I say, then I do not mislead others in error by intention, consequently, I can maintain my identity of an honest person.
Actually, relations at this point are more complicated. Besides conditions concerning the form, honesty, and in the same way, reason or any other social quality, also has criteria related to the content. For honesty, formal criteria are given if one does not say what one does not think. The question of content criteria still remains as to whether this very thought is compatible with honesty.
In this context, we have to re-examine the famous controversy between Cohen (1962) and Rosenberg (1965). Cohen invited his subjects to justify the murderous intervention of the police force during a demonstration on the Yale Campus. As far as honesty is implicated, this social identity of a person is lost in any case, since he starts pleading justification of the intervention, either because of a form of bringing other people to believe something important that is not believed by the person himself, or by the content of really holding such a belief.
Thus, for this experience, there is no possibility of reducing a cognitive dissonance referred precisely to this social identity.
On the other hand, the form of arguing against one’s own convictions is incompatible with the social identity of a reasonable person as well, while this time the same content (an advocacy for police intervention) is not particularly inconsistent with that identity. Now, it is exactly for the cognitive dissonance referred to the social identity of a reasonable person that it holds true that the more the reward is guaranteed or the punishment prevented by this very act, the more the pains of a cognitive dissonance are compensated. If one advocates against his own beliefs one runs a risk of losing his identity of a reasonable person, but to do so for an ample reward or for an escape from a painful punishment is just the strategy depicting somebody as really reasonable. Thus, it is by no means surprising that Cohen found an inverse ratio between the size of reward/punishment, on the one hand, and the willingness of someone, driven by a cognitive dissonance, to adjust his beliefs to his words, on the other.
As to Rosenberg’s experiment, the above two factors were related to each other quite differently. This time, subjects had been invited to advocate very unpopular arrangements of the University authorities concerning the University’s football team. As to the honesty matter, this time it has the same form condition: to believe whatever is said. However, as regards the content conditions, nobody is prevented from being an honest person only because he does believe, in conformity with what he has said, that a University’s football team could be restricted by authorities (while in Cohen’s experiment everybody was prevented from it by the content of his belief about the National Guard’s murderous act).
Thus, in this experiment, there does exist the possibility of reducing the dissonance between two cognitions – “I am an honest person” and “1 believe X while having others believe non-X” – by the modification of this latter cognition.
We should remember that the greater the dissonance is, the more powerful is the drive to perform these modifications. That is the point where the reward/punishment matter intervenes. As far as the identity of a reasonable person is concerned (as in Cohen’s experiment) the former serves as a direct index of the latter: the more profitable the freely chosen act turns out to be the more reasonable the person manifests himself by this choice. Now, the opposite is true when the dissonance concerns the identity of an honest person: the more profitable a dishonest act is the more dishonest it is. For this reason, the better paid Rosenberg’s honest subjects were (as opposed to Cohen’s reasonable subjects), the greater was their experienced cognitive dissonance and, for this reason, their willingness to adjust their beliefs to the statements they had previously made.
That was what Rosenberg actually found: he started his experiment in order to falsify cognitive dissonance theory and re-establish the explanation of facts by behaviorism. It is highly symptomatic that the whole cognitive dissonance theory, being interested exclusively in the formal aspect of its phenomena, tried to parry the conclusions of his experiment. If, however, contents of social identity are taken into consideration, Rosenberg’s attempted falsification turns out to be a powerful verification of this theory.
It is the same fixation of this theory (originating from that of Lewin which in turn derives from that of “Gestalt”) on mere form that may be held responsible for the way in which it treats the above three-piece formula in type 3. It is at this point that it would be the most promising to attack, since it is this cognition in the three-piece formula which is undermined the most directly by cognitive dissonance. This is the case because, in spite of what this form pretends, there appears an A (namely me, I who am A) who does do B. Why consider that an orthodox Moslem does not drink wine if there is one (me) who does do it? If it is about the natural identity of objects one has no reticence in proceeding this way:
While having the belief (3) “The glasses of a given set do not break”, the evidence
(1) “This concrete glass belongs to that given set”, and the empirical experience
(2) “This concrete glass is broken”, one can be brought to adjust his belief (3) rather than his evidence (1) to his experience (2).
It is therefore surprising that cognitive dissonance theory does not take into consideration this way of reducing the dissonance. Why not reduce dissonance of, for example, a dishonest act by concluding that “Some honest people do lead others into error”. It is as if the cognitive psychologist said “Those who deliberately deceive others are in fact dishonest people”, or “He who acts against his own interest is really unreasonable”. Actually, it is not said, to the degree that this implication seems evident. Still, the same theory argued since the beginning with empirically observed data of subjects who neglect the most real facts of nature (such as, for example, a connection between lung cancer and the use of tobacco, or a danger of earthquakes in the area where one lives). Would the facts of social identity be more real than those of nature and, at that, of such a life importance?
Far from that, the facts of nature cannot be modified by cognitions: to go back to the preceding example, to class or not class an object among glasses of a set to notice or not notice that it breaks, modifies in no way the fact of belonging or not belonging to the glasses of this set nor that of being or not being fragile. On the contrary, it is true, as formulated by Georg Lukacs (1976), that consciousness has an ontologica1 status in the society, meaning for our present study that cognitions that reflect facts of social identity are also facts of this identity.
Thus, one carries out actions, among them socially relevant ones such as deceiving others or revealing the truth to them, drinking or not drinking wine, etc. At the same time, one may happen to think about what has been done and its social meaning, but those acts of thinking are themselves acts, too, and as such they may, like any other act, be relevant for one’s social identity. Namely, bringing an action against item 3 of cognitive dissonance is an act of thinking that is the most relevant for this matter. Thinking one may commit dishonest acts and still deserve honour is another dishonest act. Can someone who drinks wine consider himself an authentic Moslem? Certainly not, since he does something that is prohibited by Islam. Next, may someone who still considers him as an authentic Moslem be considered as an authentic Moslem. Certainly not, since he thinks something that makes nothing of the sacred interdicts of Islam.
To be fixed, the criterion of belonging to a category of social identity must be set at two levels at the same time: one of socially relevant facts and another meta-level of representations of these facts that are also socially relevant facts.
Let us go back to the above three-piece formula for cognitive dissonance. We have seen that item 2 introduces an ambiguity in identity representation. From item 3 I can conclude that “I am not A since I do B” (being given that A does not do B). At the same time, from item 1, I can conclude that “A can do B since I do B” (being given that I am A). This ambiguity could introduce arbitrariness into the definition of social identity which would be from now on a matter of consideration.
Let us consider, for example the following statement of Tajfel (1981): “We shall adopt a concept of ‘group’ identical to the definition of ‘nation’ proposed by the historian Emerson (1960) when he wrote: ‘The simplest statement that can be made about a nation is that it is a body of people who feel that they are a nation; and it may be that when all the hive-spun analysis is concluded this will be the ultimate statement as well’ (p. 102).” (pp. 229-230).
What is particularly appreciated by Tajfel in this “definition” is that by it, “members of a national group are considered as such when they categorize themselves with a high degree of consensus in the appropriate manner, and are consensually categorized in the same manner by others. His statement is essentially a social psychological one: it is not concerned with the historical, political, social, and economic events which may have led to the social consensus now defining who is ‘in’ and who is ‘out’. But there is no doubt that these events were crucial in the establishment of the nature of this consensus, and equally true that the consensus, once established, represents those social psychological aspects of social reality which interact with the social, political and economic events determining the present and the future fate of the group and of its relations with other groups” (Ibid).
However, it is undecided whether such a type of social, political and economic events incites someone to draw a conclusion from item 3 or, on the contrary, from item 1. Let us suppose that events in a population are marked for a long historical period by cooperation. For this reason will a group be formed (being given the principle according to which those helping each other are at one with each other)? Or, for the same reason will there be formed a large consensus about the mutual dependency producing mutual hate (being given the experience shared by everyone of a frustration by the impossibility of going without others)?
Now, if one would venture to reduce dissonance by type 3, this would make the dissonance reappear at a meta-level:
1. I am A;
4. I think that A can do B;
5. A does not think that A can do B.
The attempts to reduce the meta-level cognitive dissonance (that is superimposed upon the one represented in the formula given earlier by the modification of each of the cognitions would produce a very particular configuration.
For the configuration concerning item 1, we saw above that modification signifies the definition of one’s social identity. The superimposition of this second three-piece formula on the first adds a constraint to that of abandoning one’s identity because of what one does: the constraint to abandon it because of what one thinks. I must recognize that I am no longer an authentic Moslem because I drank wine, but if in spite of it I claim identity of an authentic Moslem it means I consider violable the inviolable principles of Islam that imposes upon me a second constraint to give up my authentic Moslem identity. In the same way, while having committed a dishonest act, one can only claim the identity of an honest person if he is, in accordance with this dishonest thought, dishonest. It is this very double bind (cf. Watzlawick et al., 1967) that brings those who are subjected to it to an identity crisis ending eventually in a modification of the represented identity.
If, furthermore, it was item 4 that one tried to modify, we would regain item 3 and the original dissonance founded on it. Finally, the modification of item 5 would bring us to an infinite regression: to think act B compatible with the social category A, then to think that act of thought compatible with membership in this category, then to think the same thing of the second act of thought, etc.
This double bind is that of an ideology. For as far as it is concerned, the arbitrariness described above cannot exist any more. The induction from a fact can only proceed toward the definition of social identity as if their relationship was also given as a fact. (Let us remember what was said above: “Those who deliberately deceive others are in fact dishonest people”; or “He who acts against his own interest is really unreasonable”.)
True enough, here it is the real social identity that is concerned, in the sense that it is independent of judgments (“true” or “false”) concerning this identity. However, the reality of social identity is different from the facts of natural identity. The way in which nature treats natural identity can be observed by ethological phenomena, such as the proximity or distance keeping behavior of animals (Hall, 1969). The critical distance depends, besides the present activity, on what one could call the natural social identity of fellows. Animals, in the conditions associated with a certain type of activity (feeding, mating, migration, fighting, etc.) let themselves be approached or seek the proximity of a certain category of equals while at the same time keeping a distance from those who do not belong to this category. Supraindividual formations of this nature are organized and made possible by a system of signals produced by individuals.
However, the criterion by which they signify individuals belonging to social categories arises from the genetic program of the species. Thus, once established, categorial limits will be respected unanimously by each individual of the population, independently of each individual’s categorial belonging.
On the contrary, the criteria of the social identity of man are imposed only upon those who set a value on that identity (on the beginning of the definition of social identity, see Kocski & Garai, 1978). Thus, if it seems evident to us that someone who uses illegitimate means to keep others from taking into account their own legitimate interests is dishonest, this is by no means a reflection of natural criteria of belonging to the category of honest people. It is merely the proof of our intention to belong to that category: to be honest one must think in a precise way about what one must do to be honest. On the other hand, if we simply take notice of the criteria of a Moslem identity without finding it evident that a wine drinker cannot have it, it is one proof that we have no intention of identifying ourselves as Moslems.

The social relevance of a psychosocial identity
The claim to have a given social identity imposes the criterion of considering certain criteria as indispensable for belonging to this category, with such evidence that is not contested even by those who lack these criteria. This can be illustrated by the phenomenon of the sinner’s remorse. A sinner is someone lacking acts that serve as criteria of belonging to a social category valued ideologically and, for this reason, finding himself excluded by those who legitimately belong there. The sinner, smitten with remorse, excludes himself and by doing so, together with authentic representatives of this category, shows that he belongs to it, too. Sinners who repent are highly valorized by ideological categories because it is this paradox of their social identity that perhaps best distinguishes social identity from natural identity (in which, let us remember, none can show his belonging to a category without producing what is considered as its signs).
So far, the matter in question is about really lacking acts that are the criteria of a claimed social identity and, consequently, finding himself enclosed in a paradoxical dilemma: whether to claim the social identity in question and, in this way, add to a lack on the object level another on the meta-level’(i.e. add to acting inadequately thinking inadequately on that act), or, to punish by excluding himself from the community of that social identity and, thus, redeem the lack at the object level by this fervour at the meta-level.
Another type of paradox of social categorization, quite different from the previous one as to its structure, is that of confession of non-committed crimes. The whole generation of people committed to the left-wing cause has made efforts to find out the horrific secret of social psychological drives of those accusers of the Moscow (see Medvediev, 1972), Budapest (Savarius [Szasz], 1963) and Prague trials (London, 1976) who displayed compliance with the violent demand of confessing merely imagine acts of high treason supposedly committed against the Communist Party in order to display their intransigent devotion to this party. The matter is that the very act of insisting on not having done anything against the Party would constitute the act itself against the Party, as far as the Party is identified with the directives issued by its leaders and when these latter prescribe precisely the confession of non committed acts against the Party. (For other aspects of paradoxes of social identity see Garai, 1977, 1981, 1983, 1985; Garai & Eros, 1976; Garai et al., 1979.)
With the paradoxical definition of social identity, social reproduction is at stake. In each society there exist cultural (both technical and moral) models of well defined social identity with a high reproduction rate, while differently identified models have a more or less lower chance to dispose of material conditions of their reproduction. There exists a correspondence between the socio-economic identity defined by the distribution of these material conditions of social reproduction between social categories, on the one hand, and the psychosocial identity defining the attribution of more or less value to social categories, on the other.
Socio-economic identity endows psycho-social identity with an energetic aspect defining to what extent social categories in a given historical period of a given society are or are not able to tolerate each other’s existence or being included in a given (familial, friendly, club, work etc.) setting, individual cases . of belonging to both categories, etc. On the other hand, the psycho-social identity endows the socio-economic one with an informational aspect that defines what kind of social (economic, national, religious, cultural etc.) categories are included in and excluded from the disposition of material means of reproduction.
Now, this two-way determination becomes accessible for investigation as far as the two level organization of relations and its paradoxes are taken into consideration. Thus, for example, investigations about intergroup relations (such as the Bogardus survey), taking into consideration only the object level of really existing, socio-economically created interaction of groups, had almost no psycho-social character. When Sheriff (1966) got interested in the matter of this latter character he created artificially this aspect by means of an experimental manipulation of such formal components of the meta-level as co-operation and competition. On the contrary, Tajfel (1981, pp. 228-253 and 268-287) discovered that the real social context imposes upon an experiment not only an object level of the real socio-economic membership groups of its subjects, but also a meta-level of their willingness to establish psycho-social groups of any kind and categorically exaggerate the internal similarities and external differences of both the pre-existing and the newly established groups.
The same is true for the opposite form of the above relations. There is probably not much possibility of demonstrating that a psycho-socially founded category becomes a socio-economically relevant one (claiming, for example, that such-and-such psycho-social group becomes the dominant class). Nevertheless, we know the investigation of Voslensky (1980) about the Nomenklatura. The Nomenklatura is a set of key positions interrelated with each other in the social structure of “really existing socialism” and a set of people who can exclusively occupy these positions. Now, the author provides the richest picture of a psycho-social game regulating the matter of who occupies which position, and he succeeds in outlining how this game regulates the socio-economic structure of a society because both the latter’s object level and its meta-level are concerned with a paradox introduced by the former. The nature of this paradox is as follows:
Those in more central positions subsequently define the rules of the game according to which they are previously elected, or members are subsequently elected for more central positions entitling them to define previously the rules of this game. In such a system social identity once defined by psycho-social means is reproduced according to socio-economic ends.
But taking into account the paradoxical structure of social identity we may advance toward a psycho-economic theory comprehending both psycho-social definition and socio-economic reproduction of patterns of social identity.

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Garai L. (1985) Price or social identity? Determining economic activity in a post-capitalist system. In H. Brandstatter & E. Kirchler (Eds), Economic psychology. Linz: Rudolf Trauner Verlag.
Garai L. & Eros F. (1976) Marx’ social theory and the concept of man in social psychology. Studia Psychologica, 1, 5-10.
Garai L., Erős F., Járó K., Köcski M. & Veres S. (1979) Toward a social psychology of personality: Development and current perspectives of a school of social psychology in Hungary. Social Science Information, 18, 137-166.
Hall R. T. (1969) The hidden dimension. New York: Anchor Books.
Kocski M. & Garai L. (1978) Les debuts de la categorisation sociale et les manifestations verbales: Une etude longitudinale. Langage et Société, 18, 137-166 London A. (1976) L’aveu. Paris: Gallimard.
Lukacs G. (1976) A társadalmi lét ontologiájáról. Budapest Magvető.
Medvediev R. (1972) Let history judge. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Nel E., Helmreich R. & Aronson E. (1969) Opinion change in the advocate as a function of the persuasibility of his audience: A clarification of the meaning of dissonance. Journal of Personality Social Psychology, 12, 117-124.
L. Garai Nuttin J. M. (1975) The illusion of attitude change. New York: Academic Press.
Rosenberg M. J. (1965) When dissonance fails: On eliminating apprehension from attitude measurement. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1, 2842.
Sarbin T. R. & Allen V. L. (1969) Role theory. In G. Lindsey & E. Aronson (Eds), Handbook of social psychology, 2nd ed. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Savarius V. [Szasz B.] (1963) Volontaires pour l’echafaud. Paris: Gallimard.
Sherif M. (1966) Group conflict and cooperation: Their social psychology. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Tajfel H. (1981) Human groups and social categories. Studies in social psychology. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
Voslensky H. (1980) Nomenklature. Wien: Fritz Molden.
Watzlawick P., Beavin J. H. &Jackson D. D. (1967) Pathologies and paradoxes. New York: W. W. Norton.
Zavalloni M. (1973) L’identite psychosociale: Un concept a la recherche d’une science. In S. Moscovici (ed.), Introduction a la psychologie sociale, vol. 2. Paris: Fayard.

ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY

Identity Economics
An Alternative Economic Psychology
[In Hungarian]
Tas Editor, 2006. 294 pp.

	
The antecedents of this monograph are four editions of the one entitled Foundation of an Economic Psychology that has been published [in Hungarian] by the Hungarian Economic Society in 1990 and reprinted (in 1992) for teaching purposes by the Budapest Economic University. Its second, redacted edition has been published by the Attila Jozsef University (General Economic Psychology, 1996 [reprinted: 1997]). The third, enlarged and redacted edition: Attila Jozsef University Press, 1997 [reprinted: 1997]. The fourth edition: The human potential as capital: An approach by the economic psychology. “Aula” Economic University Press, 1998 [reprinted: 1999, 2000, 2001; an illegal reprint misentitled The human capital as potential: 2002]).
The mainstream psychology is based on a methodological individualism. The proposed monograph presents an alternative to that academism by approaching economic psychology (as well as some features of political psychology, socio-psycho-linguistics etc.) from the aspect of social interaction and social identity, as linked both to micro- and to macroeconomic issues.

I. General Economic Psychology
The economic psychology is claimed by the monograph to have emerged as a science about psychologic phenomena turned into economic factors during a historical period labeled as second modernization and facing the necessity of producing human resources at the cost of consuming material resources.
The FIRST CHAPTER “The Economic Psychology Approach” presents an axiomatic model of the economic man and some contemporary reason for which the real economic activity does not correspond to that model. The psychology of behaviorism that corresponds to the “economic man’ model and three alternative psychologies (that of cognitive psychology, of psycho-analysis and the social psychology) are presented in some details. They are comparatively examined in their capacity to explain market and organizational economic activity of men. The problem of needs of an “economic man” is evoked and a theory of specifically human basic need is proposed as a solution to that problem; the structure of the hypothesized need corresponds to that of a specifically human activity defined along both technical and social criteria.
The SECOND CHAPTER “Mediating Economic Transactions: The Psycho-Social Identity” makes a distinction between two kinds of psychologic phenomena turned into economic factors: technical dispositions of mastering things’ attributes and social dispositions of mastering persons’ relations. It states that unlike the material production depending only on technical attributes of both producing and produced factors, the modern human production is determined also by the factors’ social relations. These latters are dealt in terms of psychosocial identity that is presented as the key-concept of the economic psychology.
Psychosocial identity is considered to be produced by an elaboration of not attributes (whether psychological characteristics of a person or sociological characteristics of his status) but relations. This elaboration is the social categorization. It is from the early childhood on mediated by an unconscious process of semiosis in which the child’s diffuse vocal, motor, postural, vaso-motor or other somatic, as well as developing behavioral, verbal, intellectual and affective manifestations get shaped as signifying factors that are attached to simultaneously shaped social categories as their signified factors so that similar identity factors should be symbolized by similar, and different ones by different symbols. In grown-up people this mechanism is a powerful one for diverting their economic behavior from the rationality norms of economic man: this behavior’s acts get a symbolic value and, thus, their destiny is strongly influenced by that of social identity they symbolize. At the same time, objects of the economic behavior get allocated, according to a territorial mechanism, to one or another social category (whether it is represented by a large or small group or just one person); the possession enables owner(s) to and, respectively, disables others from well-defined economic activities.

II. Special Economic Psychology
The second volume is a sample of application of the general economic psychology’s above findings to various issues of both market and organization behavior.
The THIRD CHAPTER “Managing Material and Human Resources” deals with the economic psychology of manufacturing and purchasing goods, marketing and financing activity, management and development transactions, organizational and socializational behavior. Information management and knowledge economy are dealt with in more details, as approached by economic psychology. In contrast to economics, economic psychology does not consider information management as a merely control process but as one of the real processes in that system; on the other hand, in contrast to psychology, the economic psychology considers the knowledge economy a social and not an individual performance, the monograph argues. While the social identity is considered to be the main factor mediating between individual and social matters, as well as between control and real processes, it is argued that at the same time it creates a new duality: between information and knowledge, on one hand, identity itself and the deed investing someone with that identity. This duality becomes consummate in that of contemporary universities with their bifurcation of the knowledge supply and the diploma supply.
The FOURTH CHAPTER “Managing Human Resources: The Second Modernization”. The modernization is defined as a generalized tendency of artificial intervention by the socio-economic system into natural processes in order to manufacture conditions that are necessary for its own functioning. During a first period, in the 18-19th century the modernization meant, on one hand, manufacturing the material factors the system depended on, and, on the other, making the system independent of the human phenomena that had not been produced by itself. However, from the end of the 19th century onwards the actual socio-economic system’s running has no longer been independent of the faculties and needs effective in the population, hence a second modernization imposed upon the socio-economic system the necessity of manufacturing (and not only exploiting) human (and not only material) conditions of its functioning.
This necessity is analyzed in terms of human capital invested either by one of the interested parties (whether the one supplying the human potential or the one demanding it) or the state. Possession relations of human capital are analyzed in details, since the capital invested by the state into the formation of a person’s potential will be organically integrated in his body and mind, and will be inseparable from the physical and mental faculties that were originally given to him.
In the aspect of manufacturing human conditions are investigated the totalitarian states. They are claimed to directly apply the strategies of the 19-century large scale material processing industry in establishing a large scale human processing industry in 20th century. It deals with that human condition, too, that is represented by the social identity marked by either competition or monopoly, a perfect (i.e. e., not disturbed by any monopoly) competition being as important a condition for a market economic system as is a perfect (i.e. e., not disturbed by any competition) monopoly for a planned economic organization.
Paradoxical consequences of such a human processing industry are evoked. When the relations of either competition or monopoly are concerned, the intact juxtaposition of both of them without any bias is nothing but their competition. On the other hand, when either the competition gets eradicated from a socio-economic system (considering the necessities of a planned organization, as is the case for the Bolshevik type totalitarian state), or the monopoly gets extirpated (in order to fit the needs of a market, as in case of a Fascist, a national-socialist kind totalitarian state), the manufactured product is straight a monopoly.
However, the main difference between two types of totalitarian states is dealt with in terms of difference between issues of that human processing industry: those of a fascist type are claimed to establish a large scale industry for peoples attributes, while in Bolshevik type totalitarian societies their relations, too, get manufactured.
The FIFTH CHAPTER “The Bolshevik-Type Version of the Second Modernization”. Bolshevik type societies, instead of being investigated from either an ideological or a politological aspect, are approached, too, by the economic psychology. For such an approach, both structure and functioning of those societies are tested from the point of view of a human capital economy within the frame of the second modernization.
The second modernization’s basic dilemma is presented: the more highly qualified human potential is involved the larger and larger amount of capital is required for its manufacturing – and, at the same time, the larger and larger autonomy is required for that human potential’s running. As far as the required capital is ensured by the involvement of the State the autonomy turns out to be in short supply, but if the aspect of the autonomy makes the state get out from the human business by charging the costs of human development to the individual’s account then capital will be scarce.
Therefore the organizing principle of these societies are not only bureaucracy setting social power to the office a person incidentally occupies but also charisma that sets it directly to the person as referred to his record. Being originated from 20th century’s radical anti-bureaucratic (illegal) mass movements, the charisma provides not only a leader but the whole headquarter of the revolutionary movement and even the whole party as its vanguard with a social power independently from anyone’s office. On the other hand, as far as this collective charisma is concerned, in Bolshevik-type structures the person gets (and loses) his glamour by being invested with (and, resp., dismissed from) a charisma just like with (from) an office: in order to get the social identity that is independent from any appointment one has to be appointed. This procedure of bureaucratically appointing someone to a collective charisma gets institutionalized in the Nomenklatura that links to each other the status of the functionary and the identity of the commissar. Such features of the Bolshevik type social structures, together with a self-establishing machinery of the democratic centralism for the identity of those belonging to the Bolshevik type Party are claimed by the monograph to be psycho-economic devices for keeping in operation a peculiar processing industry whose final mass-product was, for a totalitarian state supplying the capital needed, a rather peculiar version of the autonomy needed: the complicity of the system’s victims. Both the functioning and crash of the Bolshevik type system are analyzed from the point of view of a paradoxical self-establishing psychosocial effect (as opposed to a self-undermining paradoxical effect of the fascist type totalitarian states’ functioning).
Treating the Bolshevik-type organizations’ structural dualism (that used to be best known as a “state and party leadership”) leads on to the closing SIXTH CHAPTER “From the Post-Bolshevik Structures toward an Information-Processing Large-Scale Industry”. The Bolshevik-type twin-features are compared to the twin-structures of the information-processing (e.g., to the duality of the information’s bearer and its place value). The Bolshevik-type structure that is made up of concentric circles is studied as an information processing device in which information may travel exclusively in centripetal and centrifugal directions while its path is strictly blocked between the neighboring but separate peripheral units of each ring (e.g. the primary party organizations). In such a structure the center has a perfect control over the totality of the output informations; hence, this center is enabled to provide 1., the perfect protection of data; 2., the total control of addressees and 3., a virtual periphery set up around any of the concentric rings which can at any moment be substituted by the center for the real one (it is the function of the Ministry of Truth in Orwell’s 1984).
In this closing chapter of the monograph psycho-economical conditions of an information economics are analyzed. The economic psychology
in contrast to economics, does not consider information processing as a merely control process but as one of the real processes in that system; and
in contrast to psychology, it considers information processing a social and not an individual performance,
the monograph argues. Psycho-economical peculiarities of information’s property relations, as well as appropriation and alienation operations are analyzed within modern information management. The social identity processed by social categorization is considered the main factor mediating between social and individual issues, as well as between control and real processes.
A new general tendency of materializing that social categorization in societies’ new splitting in an elite and a mass is critically analyzed as a kind of a radical settling of the second modernization’s basic dilemma: this time both the capital required for manufacturing a highly qualified human potential and the autonomy that is required for its running get focused on the side of the elite, while on the side of the mass there is both factor’s lack. This asymmetry of identities within organization is paralleled by the monograph to markets with asymmetric information (Akerlof–Spence–Stiglitz).

The structure of the monograph
1. The Economic Psycho-Sociology Approach
1.1. Modeling Economic Behavior
1.1.1. The Market Behavior
1.1.2. The Organization Behavior
1.2.  The Apport of the Psychology
1.2.1.  Behaviorism
1.2.2. Cognitivism
1.2.3. Social psychology
1.2.4.  Psychoanalysis
1.2.5.  A Synthesis: Is It Possible?

2. Mediating Economic Transactions: The Social Identity
2.1. The Antecedents of Social Identity in Ethology: The Territorial and the Signifying Behavior
2.1.1. The Human Specificity of Social Identity
2.2. Elaborating Social Identity
2.2.1. Substantial and Formal Identity
2.2.1.1. Social Status
2.2.1.2. Formal Features
2.2.1.2.1. Similarity and Differences
2.2.1.2.2. Competition and Ranking
2.2.2. Social Categorization
2.2.2.1. Symbolizing Social Categorization
2.2.2.2. Criteria of the Social Identity
2.2.2.3. Being Disposed vs. Indisposed by the Identity
2.2.2.4. The Taboo
2.2.3. Social Categorization and Social Listing
2.2.3.1. Attributes and Relations
2.2.3.2. „An”-type Identity and „The”-type Identity
2.3. Elaborating the Economic Identity
2.3.1. The Paradoxical Nature of Economic Behavior
2.3.2. Property Rights and Identity
2.3.2.1. Property
2.3.2.2. Office
2.3.2.3. Competency and Competence
2.3.2.4. Capital and Networking Capital
2.3.3. Economic Psychology of Outstanding Social Identity
2.3.2.1. Measuring Value of Outstanding Social Identity (VOSI)
2.3.2.2. Racer’s costs and profits: Converting Money into VOSI and vice versa
2.3.2.2.1. Investing into VOSI
2.3.2.2.2. Return from VOSI
2.3.2.2.3. Asymmetric Market and Outstanding Social Identity
2.3.2.3. Applying VOSI in Human Resource Management

3. Managing Human Resources: The Second Modernization
3.1. The Modernization: Manufacturing Resources
3.1.1. The First Periode of Modernization: Manufacturing Material Resources and Independency from Human Resources
3.1.2. The Second Modernization: Manufacturing Human Resources
3.2. A Plant for the Large Scale Manufacturing of Human Resources: the Totalitarian State
3.3. The Human Potential as Capital
3.3.1. Investing and Profiting
3.3.2. Three Principal Questions of Human Capital
3.3.2.1. Who Should Be the Investor in Human Capital
3.3.2.2. Who Profits from Running the Human Capital?
3.3.2.3. Who is the Owner of the Human Potential?
3.4. A Rather Strange Manufactured Product: The Relation

4. The Bolshevik-Type Version of The Second Modernization
4.1. (Bolshevik (= Majority): A Relational Identity
4.2. Manufacturing Substantial vs Formal Identity
4.3. The Bureaucratic State Governed by an Illegal Movement: Soviet-Type societies and Bolshevik-Type Parties
4.3.1. Office and Charisma
4.3.1.1. A Collective Charisma
4.3.1.2. Official and Commissary
4.3.1.3. The Nomenklatura
4.3.2. A Large Scale Manufacturing of Relations
4.3.2.1. Why crushed it down?

5. A Dilemma for the Post-Socialist Period’s Economy: Knowledge-Based or Identity-Based?
5.1. Manufacturing Knowledge and Skill
5.2. Manufacturing Identity and Qualification
5.3. Know-How or Diploma?
5.3.1. Distant Teaching and Diploma Mills
	
	Key words: social identity; social categorization; identity markers; document;  Behaviorism vs. Cognitive Psychology; Psychoanalysis vs. Social Psychology; psychosocial relations vs. attributes; market behavior vs. organizational economic behavior; money vs. social status; second modernization; human resources processing; human capital; Bolshevik type vs. fascist type totalitarian societies; information management
	
Chapters of the monograph and some further texts related to its topics and available in non-Hungarian
To the first chapter: The Economic Psychology Approach
Problems of specifically human needs.
French version: Recherches Internationales: Psychologie. 1966/9. (51). 42-60.
Russian version: Voprosy Psikhologii. 1966/3. 61-73.
Spanish version In: A. Luria, A. Massucco Costa, R. Zazzo and B. Teplov: Problemática científica de la psicología actual. Editorial Orbelus. Buenos Aires, 1968. 63-85)
Interpretation of needs in foreign language psychology and the question of motives of a scientific activity [in Russian]. In: M. Iaroshevsky (ed.): Problems of the scientific creativity in the contemporary psychology, “Nauka” Publisher [Publishing house of the Soviet Academy of Sciences]. Moscow, 1971. 224-233.
Hypothesis on the Motivation of Scientific Creativity. XIII International Congress of the History of Science. USSR, Moscow, August 18-24, 1971. “Nauka” Publisher [Publishing house of the Soviet Academy of Sciences], Moscow, 1971. 224-233.
An invited lecture to the Congress’ symposium “On the personality of the scientist in the history of science”. Applying the theory presented by the Personality dynamics to the analysis of parallel discoveries of Bolyai and Lobachevsky it argues for the individual creative idea being determined by the social history even in the most abstract mathematics.
Strength and Weakness of Psychological Science. International Social Science Journal. 25. (1973). 447-460. French version: La puissance et l’impuissance de la science psychologique. Revue Internationale des Sciences Sociales. 25 (1973). 491-504.
The destiny of the contemporary psychological science is considered by the paper on the background of the socio-economic system’s necessity of manufacturing (and not only exploiting) human (and not only material) conditions of its functioning (second modernization hypothesis). A technological application of this science (in cultivating skills) is compared to its ideological application (in cultivating attitudes).
Conflict and the Economic Paradigm. Dialectics and Humanism. 2. (1977). 47-58.
Class conflicts are represented at two levels simultaneously: at an object-level about the distribution of resources and at a meta-level about the rules of dealing with conflicts of object-level. The paper argues for all macro- and micro-social conflicts in the society being constructed according to this paradigm.
Marx’ Social Theory and the Concept of Man in Social Psychology. (Co-author: Ferenc Eros) Studia Psychologica. 20/1. (1978). 5-10.
Towards a Social Psychology of Personality: Development and Current Perspectives of a School of Social Psychology in Hungary (Co-authors: F. Eros, K. Jaro, M. Kocski and S. Veres). Social Science Information. 18/1. (1979). 137-166.
Report on the research work of the authors’ team in ‘70s in the Institute for Psychology of Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Main arguments of a production-centered meta-theory as opposed to the both naturalistic and spiritualistic one and of a theory elaborated by that team in a Vygotskian frame of reference.
Paradoxes of the social categorization [in French]. Recherches de Psychologie Sociale. 3. (1981). 131-141. (Comments of R. Pagès: Recherches de Psychologie Sociale. 3. [1981]. 143-151)
Marxian Personality Psychology. In: Harré-Lamb (eds.): The Encyclopedic Dictionary of Psychology. Basil Blackwell Publisher. 1983. 364-366.
Toward a psycho-economic theory of social identity [in French]. Recherches Sociologiques. 1984. 313-335.
Social Identity: Cognitive Dissonance or Paradox? New Ideas in Psychology. 4:3. (1986) 311-322. (Comments: G. Jahoda. New Ideas in Psychology. 6:2. [1988] 211-212. Reply: The case of Attila József: A reply to Gustav Jahoda. New Ideas in Psychology. 6:2. [1988] 213-217.
Determining economic activity in a post-capitalist system. Journal of Economic Psychology. 8. [1987] 77-90.)
Contends that the main tendency of (both planned and market) post-capitalist system is considered to be the production of personal (and not only material) conditions of functioning of that system. That includes not only production of technical disposition to master things but also that of social disposition to master (or, at least, be superior to) other persons. These are as important organizing factors for an economic system producing its personal conditions as are value in use and value in exchange for the one producing its material conditions. Typical cases are cited when the economic activity is not determined by the price of the item produced by it, but, rather, by the social identity of the producing person.
To the psychology of economic rationality. In: Understanding economic behavior. 12th Annual Colloquium of IAREP, the International Association for Research in Economic Psychology. Handelhøjskolen I Århus, 1987. Vol. I. 29-41.
Argues for the impossibility of deriving rationality criteria from substantionally given human needs. Instead, it proposes a Lewin-type formal approach to the structure of human activity whose ends, whatever they are, become quasi-need and determine the value of other objects becoming means or barriers, depending on their position in that field. For the specifically human activity taking into consideration a further factor structuring the field is proposed: taboos. Thus, the formal rationality criterion is: gaining ends in spite of barriers that are surmounted by means got in spite of taboos.
Why bureaucratic control over economy is not that rational? Paper presented to the 13th Annual Colloquium of IAREP [International Association for Research in Economic Psychology] (Louvain, 1988).
While production of material resources is determined only by technical attributes of both producing and produced factors, effects of production by a modern socio-economic system of its personal resources depends on those factors social relations as well. Bureaucracy is considered as a power of mastering the production of personal resources through the institutionalization of these relations.
Foundation of an economic psychology. In: T. Tyszka and P. Gasparsky [eds]: Homo Oeconomicus: Presuppositions & Facts. Proceedings of the 14th IAREP Annual Colloquium. International Association for Research in Economic Psychology. September 24-27, 1989. Kazimierz Dolny, Poland. 333-346.
Claims that the “human nature” in various socio-economic systems is different: 1. In a strict market economy it is close to the one described by the notion of “homo oeconomicus” and scientifically investigated by a behaviorist psychology: in any choice situation the individual chooses what s/he has preferred the most. 2. In an economic system shifting from the strict market toward a mixed economy the agents’ “nature” comes much closer to what the cognitivistic psychology considers as such: the individual starts to prefer what s/he has previously chosen. 3. In a strictly planned economy the human content expressed by the economic behavior corresponds to the description by the psychoanalysis: individuals instead of consciously making choices unconsciously consent to being chosen by a supra-individual system that is hold by the “father” but interiorized by the super-ego of the “sons”. 4. Finally, for an economic system that is shifting from this strict planning toward a mixed economy instead of agents’ “nature” we have their “culture” described by the social psychology: there turns out not to be any valid possibility of establishing an order of preference among them.
Another crisis in the psychology: A possible motive for the Vygotsky-boom (co-author: M. Kocski). Journal of Russian and East-European Psychology. 33:1. [1994] 82-94. – Full text. Italian version: Ancora una crisi nella psicologia: una possibile spiegazione per il “boom” di Vygotskij. Studi di Psicologia dell’Educazione. 1994/1-2-3. 141-150. Enlarged Russian version: Voprosy Filosofii. 1997/4. 86-96. – Full text
Vygotskian implications: On the meaning and its brain. A keynote paper. In: Mezhdunarodnaia konferentsiia “Kul’turno-istorichesky podkhod: Razvitiie gumanitarnykh nauk I obrazovaniia”. Proceedings. Rossiiskaia Akademiia obrazovaniia i Rossiisky Gosudarstvenny gumanitarny universitet. Moskva, 21-24 oktiabria 1996. No. 3. – Full text. Russian version: In: Subject, Cognition, Activity: Dedicated to V. A. Lektorsky’s 70th anniversary. Moscow: Canon+, 2002. 590-612.
Vassily Davydov and vicissitudes of our theory [in Russian]. Bulletin of the International Association “Developmental Education”. 5. 20-26. – Full text
To the second chapter: Mediating Economic Transactions – The Psycho-Social Identity
Conflict and the Economic Paradigm. Dialectics and Humanism. 2. (1977). 47-58.
Class conflicts are represented at two levels simultaneously: at an object-level about the distribution of resources and at a meta-level about the rules of dealing with conflicts of object-level. The paper argues for all macro- and micro-social conflicts in the society being constructed according to this paradigm.
Paradoxes of the social categorization [in French]. Recherches de Psychologie Sociale. 3. (1981). 131-141. (Comments of R. Pagès: Recherches de Psychologie Sociale. 3. [1981]. 143-151)
Toward a psycho-economic theory of social identity [in French]. Recherches Sociologiques. 1984. 313-335.
Social Identity: Cognitive Dissonance or Paradox? New Ideas in Psychology. 4:3. (1986) 311-322. Comments: G. Jahoda. New Ideas in Psychology. 6:2. [1988] 211-212. Reply: The case of Attila József: A reply to Gustav Jahoda. New Ideas in Psychology. 6:2. [1988] 213-217.
On the cognitive dissonance as emerging between the social identity of persons and that of their acts. Paradoxical consequences of the two identities’ double bind are analyzed: without doing A no one may pretend to the identity B and without being subjected to this law no one may pretend to the identity B either.
The principle of social relations and the principle of activity (co-author: M. Köcski). Soviet Psychology. 1989/4. 50-69.
The brain and the mechanism of psychosocial phenomena. Journal of Russian and East-European Psychology. 1994/6. 71-91.
An attempt at the solution of dilemma: How psychosocial phenomena being of an inter-individual character may have their organ while the brain has an intra-individual character. The paper argues for mainstream considerations based exclusively on individual organism being transcended both by going beyond the individual (toward a supra-individual structure) and beyond the organism (toward an extra-organismic one). Author derives his arguments from various sources: Vygotsky school’s theory of functional organs, Gibson’s ecological theory of perception, ethology’s empirical data about territorial behavior of populations and Szentágothai’s model of organizing neuronal modules. The paper presents for the K. Popper’s “World 3’ a possible monistic interpretation that derives meanings from the functioning of supra-individual economic structures instead of the individual’s brain structures. An enlarged version of the full text
The price of excellence. Inquiries into the Nature and Causes of Behavior. Proceedings of the XXIV. Annual Colloquium of the International Association for Research in Economic Psychology. Belgirate, 1999. 750-759. – Full text
To the third chapter: Managing Material and Human Resources
Hypothesis on the Motivation of Scientific Creativity. XIII International Congress of the History of Science. USSR, Moscow, August 18-24, 1971. “Nauka” Publisher [Publishing house of the Soviet Academy of Sciences], Moscow, 1971. 224-233.
Interpretation of needs in foreign language psychology and the question of motives of a scientific activity [in Russian]. In: M. Iaroshevsky (ed.): Problems of the scientific creativity in the contemporary psychology, “Nauka” Publisher [Publishing house of the Soviet Acad. of Sciences]. Moscow, 1971. 224-233.
Towards an economic psychology of consumption. Trends in world economy, 70. Consumption and development: economic, social and technical aspects. (1992) 35-43.
The paper argues for the main motive of the purchase being not of biologic (i.e. referred to a need satisfaction) but of social (signifying social identity) character. This latter represents not only ends for the purchase but means as well that legitimates, together with the payment, the claim for an article, and especially on a seller’s market.
To the fourth chapter: Managing Human Resources: The Second Modernization
Determining economic activity in a post-capitalist system. Journal of Economic Psychology. 8. [1987] 77-90.)
Contends that the main tendency of (both planned and market) post-capitalist system is considered to be the production of personal (and not only material) conditions of functioning of that system. That includes not only production of technical disposition to master things but also that of social disposition to master (or, at least, be superior to) other persons. These are as important organizing factors for an economic system producing its personal conditions as are value in use and value in exchange for the one producing its material conditions. Typical cases are cited when the economic activity is not determined by the price of the item produced by it, but, rather, by the social identity of the person producing it.
To the fifth chapter: The Bolshevik-Type Version of the Second Modernization
Why bureaucratic control over economy is not that rational? Paper presented to the 13th Annual Colloquium of IAREP [International Association for Research in Economic Psychology] (Louvain, 1988).
While production of material resources is determined only by technical attributes of both producing and produced factors, effects of production by a modern socio-economic system of its personal resources depends on those factors social relations as well. Bureaucracy is considered as a power of mastering the production of personal resources through the institutionalization of these relations.
The Bureaucratic State Governed by an Illegal Movement: Soviet-Type societies and Bolshevik-Type Parties. Political Psychology. 10:1. (1991) 165-179.
Soviet type societies evolve the universe of their ideological appearances in relation not to matter as in a capitalist society (according to Marx: reification) but to persons. Traditional Marxian criticism of such an ideology claims persons in Soviet type societies to be but personifications of positions in a bureaucratic structure. The paper argues that the organizing principle of these societies is not bureaucracy but charisma originated from 20th century’s radical anti-bureaucratic mass movements. The social power that is set not to the positions persons occupy but to persons directly gets provided in those societies’ structures not only to a charismatic leader but to the whole headquarter, the whole party as a van of the revolutionary movement and even the whole revolutionary movement. The paper analyzes the paradoxical structure of that collective charisma: the person gets (and loses) his glamour that is independent from his office by being invested with (and, resp., dismissed from) it just like with (from) an office. Democratic centralism is described as the principle of such a paradoxical organization where the “Centrum” gets its social power by being put in its charisma by a “Demos” being put in its one by that social power. The connection of such a paradoxical structure with the mass-production of social relations is analyzed.
The Bolshevik-type psycho-economic system: An essay on a paradoxical psychologic structure in economy. Paper presented to joint meeting of IAREP [International Association for Research in Economic Psychology] and SASE [Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics]. (Stockholm, 1991).
About the political system’s shift in Hungary: Considerations of a social psychologist [in Russian]. Vengersky Meridian. 1991/1. 69-79.
The Bolshevik-type psycho-economic system: An essay on a paradoxical psychologic structure in economy [in Russian]. POLIS 1993/1. 72-76.
To the sixth chapter
About the notion of information in the research on living systems [in Russian]. In: Philosophical questions of biology. “Nauka” Publisher [Publishing house of the Soviet Academy of Sciences], Moscow. 1973.
Theses on Human Capital. Full text

How outstanding am I?
A MEASURE FOR SOCIAL COMPARISON WITHIN ORGANIZATIONS

Prof. Laszlo Garai DSc. 
Dept of Economic Psychology, 
University of Szeged, Hungary	Dr. Margit K. Köcski CSc
Research Team Influent
University of Debrecen, Hungary	

Abstract. In modern (whether small, large and nation-wide or global) organizations man has a prime interest in bearing an outstanding social identity based on a favourably selected status. The more excellent is one’s social identity, the greater his/her chance to obtain, at a definite cost, an economic benefit (access to a scarce resource or to an advantageous transaction). Both money and an outstanding social status are required for an economic chance.
This paper deals with a calculation device for converting the values of these mediating factors into each other: the measure of outstanding social identity (MOSI). It applies the same logic by which the information theory calculates the value of the news about an occurrence that might have been expected with a well-definable probability. The probability at issue for calculating values of outstanding social identity (VOSI) is the one to be estimated in advance for getting an outstanding status in the organization and for this p probability the value is calculated as the logarithm of the invert of p. This device for calculating the VOSI enables complementary calculation of, e.g., additioning, averaging etc. values.
The MOSI is presented in the paper, among other use, as applied to optimize human resources management.

HOW OUTSTANDING AM I?
A MEASURE FOR SOCIAL COMPARISON WITHIN ORGANIZATIONS

Prof. Laszlo Garai DSc. 
Dept of Economic Psychology, 
University of Szeged, Hungary	Dr. Margit K. Köcski CSc
Research Team Influent
University of Debrecen, Hungary	

The economic psychology of excellence
In the 1950s and 1960s economists, sociologists, psychologists and philosophers described, independently of each other and using different terms, the phenomenon of craving for status. They claimed that this motivation might become just as much a passion for man in the modern age as the craving for money used to be for those living in the 17-19th centuries, in that period of classical capitalist formation.
The change is also manifest in the fact that while the former passion prompted to the accumulation of money, the latter one may well encourage the spending of money not even earned, but borrowed. The latter, however, does not bring pleasure through the consumption of the goods in line with their utility value, but through the fact that the goods acquired, or the money spent on them, symbolize status. For a time it was customary to describe this period as the period of a consumer society, and to speak (with a degree of social criticism and ideological disapproval) of the craving for status symbols and conspicuous consumption. In connection with this, it was emphasized that in his consumption man was being guided less and less by the rational goal of achieving the greatest possible joy for the lowest possible cost, or the highest possible profit by the smallest possible inconvenience, and more and more by what was required by his position in society. One’s guiding criteria for purchasing were instead based on what was required by his/her position in society. It seems that the 20th century man had an important interest in acquiring a somehow excellent social identity based on a favourably selected status.
When individuals, groups, states, and groups of states spend money on keeping up their social status and their identity within that status their motive for this is not an aristocratic or snobbish zeal. Instead, it may be rather rational: the endeavour to be among those with access to scarce resources, or to be enabled to participate in some kind of advantageous transaction. The more advantageous the status of a candidate in society among those competing for a transaction, and the more excellent his social identity in regard to others, the lower the transaction costs will be for him/her. For this reason it might make sense to spend money (or, in more general terms, invest money, goods, time, chance to take on the venture) on increasing excellence. The only question is, how much money etc. is reasonable to be spent on how important an increase in the excellence of one’s identity.
The present study tends to contribute to giving this question a possibly exact answer.
*
If money spent symbolizes status, then it could be that the acquisition of money grips modern man not because of his earlier passion for chasing it, but because acquired money can also symbolize status. Activity is motivated primarily not by the difference perceptible between costs and profits, but increasingly by the difference between our net income and that of others.
When in the conditions of so-called socialism those urging economic reforms argued that the money incentive needed to be put in the service of social goals, they were actually speaking about the motivating power of the craving for status when they insisted that incomes of people (who were in theory equal) needed to reflect unequal performance to a better extent. The matter is, that higher performance does not invariably mean more performance of a quantitatively measurable kind. The performance of an astronaut is perceived to be greater than that of an abattoir worker, or that of a housewife, although the first produces nothing measurable in the material sense, while the last-mentioned provides her services over a seven-day working week, the merit of which can be recorded materially. However, in the record of merit our intuition is guided, it seems, not by this, but by unconscious consideration of which performance is the more excellent. This is why one may find it in order for an astronaut to receive remuneration higher than that of, say, a butcher decades after his performance, while the housewife, who often continues her work until the end of her life, receives neither a salary, nor a pension.
But remuneration can be on a higher level without the payment of additional money: all organizations establish a system of benefits whereby some employees are favoured against the rest, the staff as a whole against those outside the organization, regular customers against occasional ones, and even the totality of customers is favoured against the whole population from which they emerge, etc. Among the benefits are those whose utility can be measured in money: grantees among the employees, and to a lesser degree all employees of the organization may, in addition to their regular salary, be enabled to use items of the organization’s movable and immovable property free of charge or at a concessionary rate; they may have access to services paid for by the organization wholly or in part; regular customers might be given discounts when using services offered by the organization, etc. However, the intuition we use when bearing in mind the value of remuneration seems to be guided not primarily by considerations connected to its size in terms of money, but by a weighing of how distinguishing the benefit bestowed actually is.
Higher-level performances, therefore, can be rewarded through higher-level pay not only in that more is produced according to the paradigm of material effectiveness, more is paid for it but also through remunerating a distinguished performance in a distinguishing way. As a matter of fact, what is measured is no longer the merit of the things produced, but that of the person doing the producing. Behind a distinguished performance our intuition suspects a combination of technical powers that is distinguished, too, by virtue of its rarity, just as behind the distinguishing remuneration it suspects a person’s distinguished social power. In such a case, remuneration by its distinguishing power symbolizes status and, thus, drives people through the craving for status, even when these people seem obsessed by a craving for money.
Around the time of the political and social changeover in Hungary, family groups or friends in voluntary enterprises within companies and in small private businesses sometimes drove themselves at an inhuman pace not only to maintain their standards of living or to be able to purchase goods quite beyond the reach of the industrial proletariat and workers in the catering industry, but at least as much as to show how well they were getting on. For them and for others too, how well they were doing was expressed in money or in conspicuous goods obtainable with it. But it was not the absolute amount that mattered, but its distinguishing character. Just as refrigerators or cars were not (as they had been earlier) suitable for demonstrating how far one had got, so in itself an enormous income would not have been sufficient incentive to mobilize such energy, if everyone had been able to work with colleagues selected by themselves in voluntary enterprises within companies, or in a small-scale independent enterprise.
The same passion was described by Kornai as the inner compulsion for expansion, when, at a time when the now-collapsed socialist system was still capable of operating, he sought an answer to the following question: “What prompts a manager of a company under socialism to make investments or to accumulate capital when he has no interest in any profit made?” The most important element was, in his view, that “the manager identifies with his own position. For such a manager there would always be a basis for comparison, in the light of which his unit would appear outdated or inferior. [...] Managers felt a professional rivalry in the best sense of the word. They wanted to augment their own professional prestige [...]. This could be accompanied by motives perhaps less noble, but nevertheless understandable from the human point of view. With the growth of a company or public institution came an increase in the power and social standing of its manager, and, together with this, consciousness of his own importance. Directing 10,000 people feels much better than directing 5000. Greater power can bring greater material recognition, more pay, bonuses and privileges, depending on the system of incentives in force.”
More exactly, what motivates managers in such cases is not so much the absolute size of the unit under one’s direction or the absolute degree of that unit’s expansion, rather the extent to which those index-numbers rank the person or his/her organization as compared to others. Kornai concedes: “If someone was appointed, let’s say, rector of one of the biggest universities in the country, or was made responsible for the protection of all the country’s historic monuments, or was entrusted with care of the country’s water supplies, then no increasing of either his salary, authority, or power would result from his being able to secure 20 per cent greater investment for his sphere of activity.” However “the compulsion for expansion manifests itself at every level of the economic hierarchy: from the leader of a brigade consisting of a few workers to a minister directing hundreds of thousands or millions of people. When the distribution of investment resources is on the agenda, all fight so that our brigade, our company, our ministry gets the most investment possible.”
A smaller monetary increase might be accompanied by a more powerful increase in status. On other occasions a person might simply give up the idea of getting more money, because, when the possibility arises, he favours an increase in status instead. On the other hand, sometimes a person might give up a modestly paying but excellence conferring office and be ready to accept the lower status of competing with others on an equal basis, if doing so holds the promise of higher income in the future.
*
Is it possible in such a case to calculate the increase in a status someone must achieve to offset loss of money, or how much of a decline in status he should accept for monetary gain? Can an increase, or decrease, in status be measured at all? Can a twofold, tenfold, or fiftyfold increase or decrease in status be compared with a simultaneously occurring decrease or increase in money, in order to establish whether someone has made a good or bad move when linking one to the other?
I am going to present a
Measure of Outstanding Social Identity
(MOSI) which makes it possible to calculate the value of outstanding social identity (VOSI) of a well-defined social status and the social identity one may get by it.
The measure of outstanding social identity applies the same logic by which the information theory calculates the value of the news about an occurrence that could be expected with a p probability: as it is well-known this value is equalled to the logarithm of the invert of p. Reference books on information theory point out that “when we want to express quantity of information [...] in numbers, we deliberately and consciously ignore the content and significance of that information”. Thus, “the answer to the question ‘Do you like cheese, young lady?’ [may] contain [the same quantity] of information as does the answer given to the question ‘Would you like to be my wife, young lady?’, although the content and significance of the two answers are obviously entirely different.”
As regards the VOSI, the same relation is valid. Certainly, the value of attaining a favourably selected social position or avoiding a negatively chosen one is as high as the stake it involves. Clearly, if a negatively chosen position is such that it affects one in ten people disadvantageously, then the value of “That’s not me, but someone else” will be different, depending on whether someone is about to hide in the next round of the “Hide and Seek” game, or a commanding officer is decimating his unit. However, the VOSI depends not on the substance of the stake, it is based on nothing but the formal relations. The excellence is a surplus value gotten by the comparison: when one gets off with a negative selection that would have affected not one in ten, but two, five, or nine; or when s/he is selected to the more favourable not out of two but of ten or a thousand candidates, or perhaps of total ten million population of Hungary. The rapport may be stated as follows:
the smaller the pre-estimated probability of belonging to a favourable social position within a population, the greater the value attached to actually getting that identity.	

Formula 1     Let it be
N – the population;
a- – the number of those in the population whose position is inferior to mine
a = N-a- – a value complementing the previous one, i. e., the number of those whose position is not inferior to mine
pa = a/N – the probability for anybody in the population to be among this favourably distinguished part; hence
qa = 1/pa = N/a.
Finally, the VOSI of my position may be calculated as log10qa.
According to this formula in the above decimation case: N = 10 and a- = 1; hence, the number of those whose position is not inferior to mine: a = 9; thus pa = 9/10; its inverse: qa = 10/9; finally, the VOSI of my position is: 0,046.
My VOSI may be defined by my position in various ranks. For instance, if in a population of N = 1000 I am the first then
a- = 999
a = 1
pa = 1/1000
qa = 1000
consequently, the E-value of my position equals log101000 = 3.
By force of the same first place in a group of N = 10:
a- = 9
a = 1
pa = 1/10
qa = 10
thus, my E-value is: log1010= 1.
If in the same population I take not the first, but the second place, then the corresponding calculation is:
N = 10
a = 2
pa = 2/10
qa = 5
hence, the excellence-value is: log105 = 0,7.
What happens, however, if I am neither first, nor second, but share with someone else first and second places? This position must be somehow more excellent than a second place occupied alone, but less excellent than a non-shared first place. How can these connections be reckoned with?
The index number expressing the difference can also be calculated in such a way that the position is evaluated not only in relation to those on top, but also in the opposite direction, to those at the bottom of the population. For this, the procedure to be employed is similar to that of Formula 1 above:
Formula 2     It is to be settled by
N – the population
b- – the number of those in the population whose position is superior to mine;
b = N-b- – a value complementing the previous one, i. e., the number of those whose position is not superior to mine
pb = b/N – the previous probability for anybody in the population to be among this unfavourably distinguished part; hence the inverse of pb:
qb = 1/pb = N/b.
Thus, a stigmatizing value of my position may be calculated as log10qb.
The stigmatizing value of being the first equals, of course, 0. For the 2nd place in a group of N = 10:
b- = 1
b = 9
pb = 9/10
qb = 1/pb = 10/9
log1010/9 = 0,046
By force of the same second place in a population of N = 1000:
b- = 1
b = 999
pb = 999/1000
qb = 1/pb = 1000/999
log1000/999 = 0,000435
Formula 3    Finally, the summed up value of my position may be obtained by deducting the stigmatizing value from the distinguishing value: log10qa – log10qb.
This formula then may be applied to our above problem of distinguishing from the E-value of both a first and a second place that of the shared with someone else first and second places: the value log10b – log10a equals, respectively:
1. place: log1010 – log101 = 1 – 0 = 1
2. place: log109 – log102 = 0,95 – 0,30 = 0,65
shared: log1010 – log102 = 1 – 0,30 = 0,70
The medium value for the shared position is resulted from its a value being equal to that of the second place and the b value to that of the first one.

Calculation and intuition.
It is worth to compare values obtained by the application of the MOSI with those expected intuitively. Let’s calculate, e. g., the value of the shared 2-4. place in a group of N = 10, then the same value for a population of N = 1000, comparing those values with those of both the preceding (1. place) and the following (5. place) position:

	N = 10	N = 1000	
1. place	1	3	
shared 2-3-4. Place	0,35	2,40	
5. place	0,08	2,30	

The difference 3 – 2,40 – 2,30 what we get for the values in N = 1000 is much more moderate than the one 1 – 0,35 – 0,08 for the values in N = 10. And this is what would be expected by our intuition, the 5th place when N = 1000 being almost as distinguished a position as the shared 2-3-4th place, while when N = 10 the difference between the quite mediocre 5th place and the shared 2-3-4th one that is closer to the top must be more significant.
However, economic psychologists have known for quite a time that there may be also a divergence between what is implied by the economic rationality as calculated by a mathematical formula and the psychological intuition.
Such divergence has already been described by Bernoulli in the St. Petersburg paradox. Allais took this a step further by describing the paradox named after him. According to this, psychological intuition diverges not only from economic rationality, but also from a psychological rationality, which would mean that the divergence from a mathematically calculated result could itself be calculated mathematically.
The basis for the latter calculation would be the expectation that psychological intuition is consistent. In contrast, Allais found that the consistency assumed by Bernoulli and his followers does not exist; our intuition diverges from the rational differently in the direct vicinity of full certainty (where it prefers profit occurring at a greater level of probability even when the aggregate sum of all the positive cases is smaller) than in the domain that is far from certainty (where greater profits are preferred, despite the fact that the aggregate is decreased by the small probability of occurrence).
The measure of outstanding social identity to be discussed in this paper aims to give an approximation of such a divergence of second degree: from a degree rationally expected for a divergence from rational calculations. For this reason we attempt to trace deviant intuition with subsequent corrections.
A difficulty is, for example, that the differences resulting from the comparisons of the positions at the bottom end of a ranking within a group as calculated in the way given above is not in accord with the estimates stemming from our intuition. Namely, for such a calculation a population would be symmetrical, where differences between the rankings at the top of the scale should correspond to those at the bottom: in a group of N = 10, for instance, where the values of the first and second place equal, as we have seen it, 1 and 0,65, respectively, the values for the last and the second last place would similarly be calculated as -1 and -0,65 though for our intuition the difference between these places is smaller. In fact it is more so in a population of N = 1000 where for our intuition there is almost no difference between being placed as 999th or as 1000th.
Hence, a correction has to be done to the calculated symmetry, and the larger the population in question the most powerful must be that correction. For such a correction we divide the stigmatizing value by logN+1 (that is, by 2 if N=10, by 4 in the case N=1000 etc.). Thus, the corrected formula is:
logpa – logpb/(logN+1)
Unfortunately, this formula is more complicated than the simplified one we have employed up till now; on the other hand, it is worth looking at the following table and seeing the values obtained so far for the two populations examined.

Position	N = 10	N = 1000	
1. place	1	3	
shared 1-2. place	0,7	2,7	
2. place	0,68	2,7	
shared 2-4. place	0,375	2,4	
5. place	0,19	2,3	
second last place	-0,30	-0,67	
last place	-0,50	-0,75	

In the figures indicating values we may get rid of a good deal of unwieldy decimal fractions by multiplying all of them (arbitrarily but consistently) by 100:

Position	N = 10	N = 1000	
1. place	100	300	
shared 1-2. place	70	270	
2. place	68	270	
shared 2-4. place	37,5	240	
5. place	19	230	
second last place	-30	-67,5	
last place	-50	-75	

The competitor’s costs and profit
Can the MOSI be used, then, in a calculation by economic psychology to determine in dollars, Euros or Hungarian forints the price of excellence if somebody comes first in a group of ten or shares the second and third place with someone else in a population of a thousand?
We must admit that our method is not adapted for such calculations: it can reckon with social identity only insofar as it is a relation, thus, also the value of an identity may meaningfully be calculated only as related to the one of another identity.
Can then the MOSI be employed to calculate the sum of money worth paying for promotion from 9th place to 7th place in a group of a hundred queuing up for something?
It depends. The MOSI is adapted to reckon with those relations as related to their historical antecedents.
E.g., if previously I have got to the 9th place from the 13th one, then it may be calculated that thereby my E-value got increased from 87 to 103, that is, by 16 point. Suppose that the work, money etc. I invested in this performance amounted to 400. These antecedents altogether (and nothing but these) define for me (and for nobody else but me) the “dues” for 1 point of E-value increment as equalling to 25. Thus, we can answer the above question: the E-value of the 7th place being 115, i. e., larger by 12 point than the 9th place, the monetary equivalent of this promotion on such a background of its prehistory proves to be 300.
When using the MOSI, it should be taken into account that among competitors, a missed effort results not only in the lack of a rise in status, but also in a lowering of status compared to competitors who in the meantime have made their own efforts.
If in the previously evoked case I miss efforts to be done for acceding to the 7th place, its alternative will be not the getting bogged down at the 9th place but a slipping back in relation with those others who do compete. If such an issue ranked me only at the next place to the background, i.e., to the 98,6 points 10th place, it would change the price of getting to the 7th place, and for two reasons. First of all, because my past investment of 400 points in the performance of getting ahead from the 13th place turned out to improve my E-value not by 16, but only by 11,6 points (from 87 to 98,6), thus, the equivalent of a one point improvement proves to be 34,5 instead of 25 points. And, secondly, when my efforts being done, as compared with their not being done, provides me the 7th place instead of the 10th and not the 9th place thereby provides me a 16,4 and not just 12 points growth in the E-value. The summed up issue of this double shift is that the rise in status at stake equals to 566 and not just 300 points. It follows from the above that in neglecting to make an effort we pay not only by failing to get on, but also by losing the position we have already acquired. This raises the question of how much it is worth when this does not occur and when we can maintain the position we have.
The measure of outstanding social identity is suitable not only for rational calculation concerning status and money, but also for predicting decisions regarding these as they occur in reality. This is proved by everyday experience and experiments in economic psychology alike.
In an (unfinished) experiment each participant received 1000 token dollars and had to register out of a price list items that s/he intended to spend the money on firstly, secondly, thirdly etc. Some commodities were chosen only by three persons (out of 100 participants of the experiment), others by 41 people. Each of the subjects got a summarized feed back from this choice of the population, but this feed back was forged at a precise point: each subject got informed as if the item s/he put at the head of his/her list would be chosen by the first choice of 49 people.
Following this procedure the subjects were given the information that a token warehouse, which they can enter only one at a time, contains enough stock for a hundred people to spend their money, but that there are only three of each type of item [8]. Thus, the order of the customers’ entry to the warehouse was rendered crucial from the point of view of purchasing: only the first three shoppers could be sure that they could get the goods they wanted.
After being provided with this information, the subjects were given the opportunity to buy their place in the queue, too, from their 1000 $ spending money: a computer ranked the shoppers according to the sum of money they offered for the places. Shoppers could improve their positions by increasing their bid, while similar offers by competitors diminished the effectiveness of these increased bids.
In the first round of the sale 20 out of the 100 subjects put 100 points, almost as round a sum, 50 and 150 points was put by 10 people each. In this round the first place would be procured by 170 points, but those two persons who bade 160 points would get a shared 2-3rd place, while the above 10 people with their 150 points shared the 4-13th place, thus, the prices being almost the same while the places were quite different. Hence, a pressure was very strong for bettering the person’s offer in order to better his/her place or prevent him/herself from being pushed more in the background by others’ overbidding. At the same time, low bids got still lower, since those getting for their 30-40 dollars last places realized that they may have it for (almost) nothing as well.
In the meantime the sale was restricted by the fact that the more a shopper spent on securing full choice for his money, the less money he would have to buy the goods he had freely chosen.
Instructions given to the subjects indicated the rule whereby the final outcome of the game would be fixed by the computer at the moment when no more shared places existed between the players. When this finally occurred through the raising and lowering of bids, it was very interesting to see that the ratios between the bids closely corresponded to those proportions calculable on the basis of the measure of outstanding social identity.

PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS

Theses on Human Capital
Prof. Laszlo GARAI, Dr. Acad. Sc.

1. 	After World War I fundamental changes occurred in the economic status of human faculties and needs.
2. 	Before that shift, during the great – the 19th – century of its history the Capitalist economic system might have afforded to consider only the material conditions of its running As to its human conditions, effective mechanisms provided the system’s functioning with a maximal independence from them: the machine in a large scale industry set free the production from the producing faculties of the population; while the accumulation process gets its liberty from the population’s need to consume due to the capital’s property relations.
3. 	As far as the system’s functioning still kept, however, some subjection to human conditions, they were trivial, hence not created, but merely extracted by the economic system. Thus, both the practice and the mentality of the system were that of exploitation: human resources were treated as something that is available independently from any economical efforts, as if the profit that could be produced from it would be gratis, not brought in as the interest from a capital invested into human.
4. 	Material conditions were managed by the Capitalist economic system correspondingly to the modernization paradigm: by artificial intervention into natural processes.
5. 	On the other hand, the modern dealing with material conditions was ensured by investing capital that got increased when the product of that manufacturing process was marketed.
6. 	This was so even when the investor into the manufacturing of an essential condition (e.g., into the development of networks of transport or public utilities) was not some private person or company but the state: such processes were financed not necessarily from the citizens’ taxes, but to an increasing extent from an investment which became profitable when the state started to charge money for the use of the given infrastructure.
7. 	As far as for the system’s functioning some human conditions were, however, still needed, they were trivial, hence, unlike material conditions, not manufactured, but merely extracted by the economic system. Thus, both the practice and the mentality of the system were that of exploitation [1]: human resources were treated as something that is available independently from any economical efforts, as if the profit that could be produced from it would be gratis, not brought in as the interest from a capital invested into human.
8. 	The mechanisms that enabled the economic system during the 19th century to leave human conditions out of consideration had discontinued by the end of that century to be effective.
9. 	Since this switch the Capitalist economic system, its run being no longer independent from human conditions, has got under the necessity to provide them for itself the same way as it did with the material conditions, i. e., by manufacturing them. From this time on, the practice of modernization evoked in Theses 5 and 6 is replaced by that of a second modernization which, together with the material conditions of the economic system’s functioning, will manufacture the human conditions, too.
10. 	From this time on, the capital and work invested in cultivating faculties are as productive as investments into developing machinery.
11. 	In the period of the second modernization, any human potential will yield profit only if the costs required to its production, allocation, maintenance, running and renewal are really assigned – and this assignation will no longer be prescribed by pious moral imperatives (well-known to be either hypocritic or impotent in the ninetieth century), but by solid business calculations.
12. 	In the light of these business calculations, one may no longer hold the formerly evident assumption that costs assigned to the human would withhold resources from the accumulation and put them to the credit of the consumption – instead, human assignations will only regroup resources from one side of account to another: “A sizable portion of what is termed consumption means nothing but investment into the human capital”, Theodore W. Schultz argues.
13. 	For such an approach, expenditures on education has to be booked among the production costs for the human potential, health expenditures will appear as maintenance costs, housing and transport allowances as costs for the allocation of the latter, cultural expenditures as costs for the running of these specific capital assets, and expenditures related to the management of unemployment will be regarded as amortization costs for the human potential considered as fixed capital.
14. 	A key issue in human capital related calculations is to define who should be the investor: be it the household of the individual whose skills are developed by the investment; be it the enterprise who intends to apply the trained knowledge, or be it the state.
15. 	When the investor is the state, a misinterpretation may be generated by the fact that by this expenditure a kind of providence is at issue. Nevertheless, this is not some Divine or humanistic kind of providence, but rather the pragmatism of the good craftsman, who provides for tools before he would start working.
16. 	During the second modernization, in competition with the material and energy economy an information management comes to the front; in that information management the qualified man is as important a device as the lathe for the material or the power plant for the energy economy.
17. 	It is immanent in the nature of information management that its factors become effective in it not by each one’s atributs but by their relations to each other.
	A particular person develops its communication potential only if the correlated potential is similarly developed in other people as well: nobody ever may have a capacity to communicate with others, e.g., in writing or in some foreign language if there is nobody in his environment who has the corresponding capacity to communicate in writing or in that foreign language. Besides, the communicated information, too, gets its meaning only against its background, in correlation with it.
18. 	By force of the previous Thesis, for an information management not only personal attributes of individuals become economic factors but also their social interrelations: equality and unequality, exclusivity and commonness, solidarity and struggle for survival. Thus, what used to be traditionally factors of a merely moral universe that was detached from the world of economy are turned by the second modernization into factors for this very economic universe.
19. 	By force of the Theses 15 and 16 the output of the information management is determined not only by the input but to a not (or not significantly) less extent by externalities as well. As regards such kind of processes, the natural attitude is what the economic psychology calls free-riding. Hence, the expenses of cultivating faculties according to norms of the information management may only up to a rather limited extent be charged by market measures to the individual’s account.
20. 	These inputs and their outputs can be managed rather in an organization which has the power to lay a charge, impose certain share of risks to the related individuals and counter-balance it not exclusively in the market way. Such an organization can be, for example, the state.
21. 	What was put in Thesis 5 about state investment into infrastructural development will also be true for the human expenditures administered by the state: the investment into the human capital will not necessarily be financed from the citizens’ taxes, but in various possible forms of a profitable business enterprise.
22. 	However, if the investor into the human capital is the state (and so when it is a company) the question of Thesis 12 will be supplemented by another one: Who profits from the employment of the human potential produced by that investment?
23. 	This question is related to its twin question formerly evoked by the Thesis 12 by an intermediating third question: who is the owner of the produced human potential?
24. 	The issue of ownership has to be raised with particular emphasis because the capital invested by the state or by a company into the formation of a person’s potential will be organically integrated in his body and mind, and will be inseparable from the physical and mental faculties that were originally given to him. Now, property means, first of all, power of disposing, hence the question is put for the human potential whether this indecomposable neoformation is dominantly disposed by the bearer of the endowments or by the owner of the money invested into its qualification.
25. 	The questions raised in Theses 12 and 20 are supplemented by a further one: who profits from the human potential’s employment?
26. The correspondence of the answers to the three questions is only an abstract possibility. Two formulations are known in which this abstract possibility is realized:
	if the interested person invests his own savings into the development of his own skills and abilities it is he himself who disposes over his own developed potentials, and it is he himself who gains the profit of the accumulated capital;
	if the totalitarian state invests into the human capital it does it in such a way that it has total control over the manufactured human potential, and thereby ensures for itself recovering with profit its money tied up in living persons.
27. 	The more highly qualified human potential is involved the larger and larger amount of capital is required for its manufacturing – and, at the same time, the larger and larger autonomy is required for that human potential’s running. This antinomy represents the basic dilemma of the second modernization: as far as the required capital is ensured by the involvement of a totalitarian State the autonomy turns out to be in short supply – but if the aspect of the autonomy makes the State get out from the human business by charging the costs of human development to the individual’s account then capital will be scarce (if only by virtue of ).
28. 	Both success and failure of both versions of the socialism have been linked to attempting to resolve that basic dilemma.
29. 	In its successful period the socialism
	by its Bolshevik version constructed a psycho-economic structure that kept in operation (by joining in the Nomenklatura the status of the official and that of the commissary and by running a self-establishing machinery of the democratic centralism) a peculiar processing industry whose final mass-product was a rather peculiar version of the autonomy (the victim’s complicity); and
	by its social democrat version it dealt with the antinomy by adjusting the modernization’s interest and the socialist values in promoting in a capitalist State the labour power as capital: the welfare State succeeded in the optimal distribution of the capital’s enlarged reproduction among the multiplied material and the equally multiplied human capital.
30. The period of the socialism’s failure came about because
	from the Bolshevik version everything but factors directly and plainly serving the consolidation of power got extinct or eroded;
	the welfare State, being an investor into human capital without being its owner or beneficiary (cf. Theses 12, 20 and 21), turned out to be unable to function indeed (as it has been stated in the ) as a profitable business enterprise and this experience reiterated the accusation that here again (contrary to what is stated in ), resources are withheld from accumulation.
31. 	The failure of these socialist attempts established a claim for the neo-liberal renaissance, although those attempts merely catalysed a trend that has not been originated from them but from the compulsion referred at by the Thesis 8.
32. 	However, the authentically spontaneous functioning of a capitalist market aimed at by that claim seems to supply a radical disposal of the dilemma: societies’ new splitting in an élite and a mass at this end of the 20th century. On the side of the élite there is focused both the capital required for the manufacturing of a highly qualified human potential and the autonomy that is required for its running (cf. Thesis 24), and on the side of the mass there is both factor’s lack.
33. 	In this context George Soros’ warning is particularly pertinent: “The main enemy of the open society... is no longer the communist, but the capitalist threat”
34. 	The warning is pertinent in spite of (or just because) the fact that the new split does not replicates the one that split the middle class during 19th century into an élite and a mass. This latter was then compelled to participate in the production of assets from the consumption of which it was eliminated (just from this discrepancy Marx used to deduce his prognosis about a proletariat that is forced by it to overthrow its basis, the capitalist system). By the new split of the society the unformed mass is just as well eliminated from the production as from the consumption.
35. 	The new split is a particular way for the second modernization to manifest the force of its tendency for making the schooling a conditio sine qua non of the production.
36. 	This unprecedented elimination of the unskilled mass from the economy would be enabled by the transformation of the material economy that leaved much room for the employment of unskilled work into an information management (cf. Thesis 14) demanding much less but qualified human resources.

Determining economic activity in a post-capitalist system
László GARAI
Institute of Psychology of Hungarian Academy of Sciences

The activity is a rather peculiar kind of commodity: one may be willing to do it as a work against a wage or to pay a cost against the favour of doing it as a game. The paper argues that the change of neither the positive nor the negative price of the activity determines in an unambiguous way demand and supply of this commodity: when the inconvenience of an activity and its profit or the pleasure of an activity and its cost are balanced a choice is taking place the issue of which is determined by the person’s psychosocial identity as symbolized – positively or negatively – by that activity. The unmotivated choice evokes a cognitive dissonance and by this means the price of the activity turns out to be effective psychologically and not economically.
The main tendency of (both planned and market) post-capitalist system is considered to be the production of personal (and not only material) conditions of functioning of that system. That includes not only production of technical disposition to master things but also that of social disposition to master (or, at least, be superior to) other persons. These are as important an organizing factors for an economic system producing its personal conditions as are value in use and value in exchange for the one producing its material conditions.
Typical cases are cited when the economic activity is not determined by the price of the thing produced by it, but, rather, by the social identity of the person producing it.

A Marxian philosopher – the Hungarian Attila József – argued in 1932 discussing chances of a planning system for the necessity of an etatic collectivization of working people that he considered the main part of the totality of means of production to be collectivized. At the same time J. Hayek and other economists stated that planning is impossible unless the state treats individuals as if they were means and not subjects of production. They maintained that if the individual as a subject chooses what to produce (what occupation to pursue, for example) and also what to consume (what to spend his disposable income on), this double choice will drop a grain of sand – an element of unforeseeable and uncontrollable chance – into the cog-wheel of the planning system.
This truth is easy to verify.
In theory, planning can be assumed to be capable of reckoning with the consumers’ needs and production capacities, making sure that in a certain period the society should have approximately so much capacity, say, for fruit production that may meet the consumers’ demands for fruit. Now, free choice intervenes and distorts this harmony so that fancy spurs fruit consumers to satisfy two-thirds of their needs, for example, with water melon, while the fruit producers feel like utilizing two-thirds of their capacity in, say, the cashew plantations. The harmony between fruit production and fruit consumption as established by the economic means is to no avail: for psychological reasons there will be twice as many cashew nuts and twice as few water melons as required.
In order to secure the planned harmony, the state as the subject of planning is forced to designate, according to some criterion, 1. the privileged category of water melon consumers, or 2. those obliged to produce water melon (or both), and also to enforce through effective measures both the acceptance of the criterion and of the attendant bans and regulations.
Whereas – the reasoning continues – the same achievement, namely the coordination of the consumers’ demands as a concrete manifestation of need and of the producers’ inclination as a concrete manifestation of capacity can be secured by the market instead of by planning without having even those individuals who are left out of the privileged circle or those who found themselves inside the handicapped category to degrade from being the subjects of economic activity into its means. This in turn can be effected by the mediation of the supply-and-demand mechanism in that the overproduction of cashew nuts would reduce their price while the overconsumption of water melons would push up the price of the latter. Then those whose preference for water melon is the weakest would tell themselves: “After all, water melon is not that much better than cashew nuts that I should stick to it now that there is such a big price difference.” At the same time those whose negative preference for water melon production is the weakest would realize: “Water melon production is after all not so much of a nuisance that I should be reluctant to deal with it with the wage difference being as large as it is.” And this price fluctuation would go on until the reorientation of the consumers’ demand and the producers’ willingness reached a point where equilibrium could be established.
Only, the psychological factor – the one that motivates selection, for example – infects the system of market economy, too, with a fundamental insecurity.

A commodity without effective price
So that the market system could function in the above manner, every commodity must have an effective price, one whose reduction would indeed effectively reduce its supply and increase the demand for it. Every commodity, that is not only every product but also that most peculiar of commodities: activity. Its peculiarity lies in the fact that unlike the product which I pass on in exchange for money when I supply it and take into possession in return for money when I demand it, the activity is always exerted by me, whether I supply it or demand it. Also, the activity that I am paid for as work, and the activity for which I am to pay as entertainment are identical as to their physical appearance but antithetical as to their psychological and economic substance.
Be that as it may, in a commodity-producing society work is only done when it is remunerated, and if this price decreases the willingness to undertake the disagreeableness of the activity for that much money must also decrease. On the other hand, we are willing to continue with the entertainment even if we are made to pay its price, but if this price decreases the demand to enjoy the agreeableness of this activity must increase.
When neither the number of those who are willing to supply the work-type activity nor the relevant length of time decreases with a drop in the price of this activity, then this activity will no longer have an effective price. Similar is the case when neither the number of those who fail to resist the temptation of the entertainment-type of activity nor the length of time increases with a decrease in the price of this activity.
Most probably the lower limit of the effective price is over 0: it is presumable that there will be a price above 0 for which no one will be willing to do a certain job or at which a certain entertainment will reach saturation level so that further price cuts can no longer reduce the all-social time spent on the former and increase the time spent on the latter. What is even more likely, however, is that the price turned into the negative – that is, when the person doing the work is got to pay tribute or the one supplying the entertainment is awarded a bonus – cannot be the effective determinant of supply-and-demand.
Nevertheless, both phenomena exist: I described the former as the Tom Sawyer effect and the latter as the Captain Puskas effect in other papers.
It is about the story of Tom Sawyer who passed on the job of whitewashing the fence that was a punishment inflicted upon him to others whom he even got to pay tribute to him – and this fact alone turned work into entertainment. Just as entertainment becomes work the very moment it is paid for – as is depicted by a statement attributed by the Hungarian people to the captain of the famous football team of the “belle epoque” Puskás Öcsi who allegedly reposted to a criticism: “Good pay: good play – bad pay: bad play”. One can glean sociopsychological experiments to bear out the existence of both the TS and the CP effects with the authority of science (see e.g. Deci, 1975; Lepper and Deci, 1975).
Thus a rather odd function is produced for activity. It reveals that if we are paid a sufficiently high price, the supply of a particular activity will be high enough: we shall pursue this activity in large numbers and/or for a considerable length of time because although it is disagreeable it is worthwhile as it is gainful; conversely, if we are made to pay not too high a sum for the very same activity, the demand will be sufficiently high: we shall pursue this activity in large numbers and/or for a considerable length of time, because although it is a little costly, it is worth it as it is very agreeable.
And how does this function – too odd to be one either of supply or of demand – behave between this two points?
No less oddly.
If one is paid a sufficiently high price, one will go on with the work according to the above, for although disagreeable, the gain it yields is higher. On the other hand, commonsense would predict that if one is not paid a high enough price one will not continue the work, for although still profitable its disagreeableness is greater. What happens, however, halfway between these two points where gain and disagreeableness are just balanced?
Commonsense and closely related behaviorism can only repeat Buridan’s answer who, as we well know, declared that his ass would starve to death between two equally appetizing bunches of hay placed at equal distances from him as he was incapable of making a choice. The cognitive dissonance theory provides a fundamentally different answer.
According to this theory if the equilibrium of a cognitive system is upset by the emergence of an X factor, the equilibrium can be restored not only by a behavior which entails that what is X no longer exists (as is claimed by behaviorism) but also through a change in a cognition which entails that what exists is no longer X. For instance, in a choice situation the balance can be upset if out of all the stakes the one I choose as the end is not larger than that which I must sacrifice as the means (e.g. the chosen gainfulness is not bigger than the sacrificed agreeableness, or vice versa). In order to restore the balance it is not necessary that this kind of interrelation of the stakes should not exist – it is sufficient that what exists should not be this kind of interrelation of the stakes. In other words, it is not necessary that the person should choose what previously represents a larger value for him and sacrifice the smaller value; it is sufficient that what the person chooses should be more valuable and what he sacrifices should be less valuable for him subsequently.
Several laboratory and field experiments reveal that what a subject chooses in a decision-making situation will subsequently be overestimated and what he sacrifices in the process will be underestimated by him. (See for examples Aronson, 1976, and, especially, Poitou, 1974, who considers situations ideologically evoking individual’s freedom as crucial in what he states to be the mere illusion of cognitive dissonance).
Whenever a stalemate among the consciously deliberated motives brings about the situation of Buridan’s ass, certain unconsciously working factors emerge which stimulate the individual to choose, without a preconsidered motive, what he will subsequently justify to himself.
One such factor exerting a powerful unconscious effect is the imitation built into social identity. It has nothing to do with the physiological reflex of yawning when a witness to a yawn feels the urge to yawn himself. The reflex in question is the one that makes sure that in addition to the fact that observer can class those behaving in a specific way in the same social category (if, for instance, they grow cashew nuts they can be ranked among the cashew-nut growers as opposed to the water melon producers even though X of them might be of the same age, sex, religion as Y of the other category), those who belong to a distinct social category imitate each other as to the behavior that is characteristic of the category.
So do, for example, the physicians who keep treating patients beyond the point from where this activity is no longer more profitable for them than it is disagreeable (exhausting, nerve-wrecking etc.). This is the point where cognitive dissonance enters and the upset cognitive balance may be restored by the person subsequently evaluating the activity exerted even for less gain as something that is not so disagreeable that it could not be recompensed by this reduced gain.
Imitation built into social identity may also be negative: often a person refrains from an activity lest he should become similar to the representatives of the social category of which this activity is typical. If, for instance, you are reluctant – just because you are not a window-cleaner – to clean hospital windows even if it earned you more gain than it is disagreeable, then cognitive dissonance will emerge again, resetting the tilted cognitive balance so that you subsequently judge the activity you did not undertake as something so disagreeable that even that much gain would be too little to remunerate it.
So when it comes about that the price of an activity-as-commodity – for example medical treatment – gradually decreases against a background of a gradual increase in the price paid for another activity, for example window-cleaning, what happens is not that individuals, completely independently from each other, give up the activity one by one recognizing that it is now less profitable than it is disagreeable and that it is more lucrative to earn their living by the other activity, whereas exactly this would be the precondition for the price to be an effective regulator of supply (and demand) in the activity-as-commodity.
What indeed happens when the gain obtainable through, e. g., medical treatment decreases is that it challenges the individuals one by one to face a real choice. Even if each of them decided to give up this activity, it would not be the realization of the related interest, but a choice, for just as much interest is vested in continuing the activity, it being equally profitable and tiring at this point. The persons facing a choice however – although individually their activity burdens them to different extent, thus the decrease of the recompense challenges them to face the choice in different moments – keep (perhaps unconsciously) their identity in mind with reference to one another, as, for instance, doctors, and not window-cleaners. It follows characteristically that the imitation, whether positive or negative, built into this very social identity will swing them off the dead center of the deliberation of Buridan’s ass: the person goes on doctoring like the other doctors do, instead of cleaning hospital windows for higher pay. On the other hand, the activity which one get engaged in even for less money will subsequently be reinterpreted as less disagreeable, while the one refused in spite of more money will subsequently be felt more disagreeable.
Naturally, the above outlined cognitive process cannot take the form of reasoning in which the person, aware of the self-deception, would try to persuade himself that something is not so disagreeable (or is much more agreeable) than he has expected. Anyhow, when the social identity exerts its effect via conscious deliberation and not an unconscious – positive or negative – imitation, it never results in cognitive dissonance.
If this is the case, the person consciously reviews not only whether the activity is agreeable or disagreeable, gainful or costly, but also weighs its social significance, and his interest which he consequently realizes may make him continue the activity even though he is aware it is less profitable for him than it is burdensome, or less agreeable than it is expensive, for he is aware that this is his duty to his social identity (“noblesse oblige”).
Such calculations originated from a sense of duty may play a role in questions related to production as well as to consumption, e.g. when I consume cashew nuts not because it is more agreeable or less expensive for me than the water melon but because I owe that to my social status. This phenomenon is usually labelled with ideological disapproval as “prestige consumption,” seeking “status symbols” and something that is generally typical of “consumer society.”
In sum: a decrease in the price paid for an activity does not necessarily entail a decrease in supply. When instead the number of those decrease who consider this activity so disagreeable that they feel forced to decrease its supply, then this price is psychologically but not economically effective.

The mind: epiphenomenon or factor?
From this it follows that the mental constituent infuses a fundamental uncertainty not only into the planning system but into the market system, too.
This in turn gives rise to the exigency that the economic system, whether regulating itself by the market or by planning, must apply a method of some sort to handle the mental constituent. Those automatisms which are used to make production independent from the producer, and in general the material connections of economic life from the connections of the acting persons’ mind no longer function.
In my previous papers (see, e.g.: Strength and weakness of psychological science. Int. Soc. Sc. J. 25. 1973) I have presented the following aspects of the change in which the mental constituent was transformed from an epiphenomenon into a factor of the economic process:
In the first century of large-scale mechanized industry the operation of the machine needed abstract effort and abstract control. By the end of the last century, however, technical development had introduced mechanical equipment in the operation of which the abstract effort had to give way to speed, while abstract control got replaced by the coordination between reading various dials and operating several controlling gears. Technical development simultaneously resulted in an increase in both the speed and the complexity of mechanical equipment: due to increased complexity the machine operator needed more and more time to respond optimally, while due to the increasing speed he had less and less time to react quickly. Those persons who could coordinate these requirements working against each other had to be specifically produced.
In relation to this necessity there is a tendency both in the planning and in the market systems in that the proportion in the society of those who are not involved in the production of material factors but in the production, maintenance and administration of the personal conditions necessary to production is on the increase.
The rate of those working in non-material services rose from 27.6% to 30.2% of the population of the United States between 1969 and 1980, exceeding the rate of those employed in industry which dropped from 34.2% to 29.4%. This tendency is even more pronounced in Sweden where during the same period the former index rose from 24.0% to 34.7% while the latter dropped from 39.8% to 31.4%. Though at a slower pace, the tendency is gravitating in this direction in France, the FRG, Japan and the United Kingdom among others (Labour force statistics 1969-1980. OECD. Paris, 1982.)
As the personal conditions of the education which produces these personal conditions, of the medical care which maintains them, of all kind of services in general, of the administration of public and private organizations in which these services operate must also be produced, maintained and administered, a chain reaction is generated in that the rate of those who take part in the post-capitalist social system of labor division as suppliers of activity and not producers of things, is increasing at an ever growing pace. Consequently, a larger and larger portion of money payments is rendered for activity, that specific commodity of which we have already discovered that whether it has an effective price or not depends on sociopsychological conditions.
Interestingly enough, this chain reaction is usually considered – if at all – from its technical aspect only, accordingly to the paradigm of the material production where one can put out more products with a machine than without one, and if the product happens to be the machine itself one can produce still more machines with it later, etc.
The transfer of this outlook from large capitalist industry to the society is aptly illustrated by Zola’s Vérité in which Marc the teacher brings up his children just as most of his pupils to become teachers, who in turn educate their children and most of their pupils to become teachers after Marc’s example, and these will do the same again. So when Marc, having lived to the age of a patriarch, stays awhile at the end of the novel in the circle of his children, grandchildren, great-grand and great-great-grandchildren as well as his own pupils and those two, three, four removes away from him, he can be content that his life was not in vain because – behold – the whole society has changed.
In actual fact, however, one can experience every day in the practice of pedagogy – even as a parent – that the same technique works with varying efficiency depending on who applies it and to whom: whether father lectures to his son or teacher to his pupils; whether a parent drives his offspring toward the right path with a slap in the face or an elder brother does the same to a younger; whether a mother pleads with her daughter or the latter with a girlfriend; whether an instructor tries to enforce discipline or a gang leader.
The necessity of the direct production, maintenance and administration of the sociopsychological condition in post-capitalist formations in order that either the price or the plan directive should be effective is all the less avoidable because upon the above mentioned technical process in that the independence of the material relations of economy from the mental context of the persons involved ceases to exist, a social process is superimposed which gravitates in the same direction:
Producing the personal conditions of production required investment of capital just as much as the production of material conditions did. Already Adam Smith ranked among the components of fixed capital “acquired and useful skills of citizens” pointing out that as the person has to be sustained during his bringing up, training and apprenticeship, the acquisition of these skills always implies real costs; these costs are, as it were, capital fixed and realized in his person. These skills, Smith stated, constitute part of the wealth of the person who has acquired them and just as much of the society to which he belongs. The improved skill of the worker may be regarded from the same angle as a machine which makes work easier and shorter, and although it requires certain expenses, it refunds them with a profit.
The condition of this refund is that the person who invested should have disposal over the product, whether it is a machine or a worker. Only, when the product is manpower, the body and mind of the worker, the capital invested into his training becomes incorporated in his skills inseparably from what is “inherently” there, thus, the investor can only dispose of the capital if he has total disposal over the body and mind of the worker.
On the other hand, we know that according to the formula of capitalism the worker disposes of his labor power freely. To extend this premise to the developing post-capitalist formation would mean that he would be the one who disposes of the capital organically incorporated in his labor power, too. This in turn would render the fate of the invested capital to be highly uncertain for there exists a contradiction in which one may detect the basic antagonism of all post-capitalist formations: notably that the more highly qualified the manpower, the larger the capital to be invested into its production and the more uncertain the fate of the invested capital due to the autonomy which the manpower lays claim to.

The failure of totalitarian states
This dilemma emerges when the characteristic feature of classical capitalism, namely that the capital and the labor force are separated from each other and that capital simply purchases and consumes the labor force but does not produce it, is done away with.
The first solution to the dilemma in world history is what Attila József formulated in his thesis quoted at the head of this paper: together with an etatic expropriation of the means of production, in general, the state carries out that of working people, too, for the capital goods to be expropriated are by then incorporated in the working ability of these individuals. Attila József theoretically formulated what was then already (and still) the existing practice of a post-capitalist formation.
This practice solves the dilemma in favour of capital, similarly to the one pursued by other post-capitalist formations without having established the planning system for lack of expropriating the means of production by the state. As is well known, in the present period there are several countries where the state has intervened in the relation between capital and labor under conditions that can be characterized by the above dilemma although the means of production are privately owned and the market system is in effect. This intervention by the fascistic totalitarian state, too, tries to bias the solution of the dilemma in favour of capital by allowing for a supervision of the labor force which provides guarantees for capital to recover with a profit the costs of “human investment”
The totalitarian state, irrespective of which variant is realized – whether the one with planning or the one with the market system – restricts to a minimum the individual’s possibility to choose. But the individual’s decisions, as has been seen, are the stumbling block for the efficiency either of the plan directives or the price.
In addition, the totalitarian state offers complementary guarantees for the owner of capital (whether of private or state property) in case individual decisions should happen to be made: it manipulates social identity which we defined earlier in this paper as the determinant mediated by positive or negative imitation of real choices made in the balanced situation of Buridan’s ass when changed circumstance will not result in a changed behavior but in an altered experience of an unchanged behavior. The totalitarian state manipulates social identity either by extending the social category the individual belongs to such an extent that the totality of the society the state controls could be squeezed into it, or by reducing the individual’s social category to such an extent that he finds himself totally alone in it, face to face with the authoritarian leader who can decide at any moment who of the atomized individuals should belong together and who should be the enemy.
The totalitarian state, e.g. the Third Reich, attempts to achieve the former with by the familiar method of treating that section of society which falls outside the chosen category as something to be totally annihilated.
The latter effect is presented in Ervin Sinko’s The novel of a novel, the diary of the author’s long journey in Stalin’s empire (in 1935-l937), describing a totalitarian state where the atomization of society, which in the classical capitalist economy was only a tendency – analyzed by Marxists and the most passionately hated by communists – reached its perfection.
However, the totalitarian state has proved incapable of producing the psychological conditions necessary for the operation of either the planning or the market system for two interrelated reasons.
The first is that the above dilemma entails another twin dilemma on the end opposite to that of the labor force in the scale of the post-capitalist social structure. What happens here is this: the position that in the classical capitalist formation is occupied by the capitalist entrepreneur is split into two: those who have capital may lack the enterprise to invest it into ventures promising profit, whereas those who have a knack for taking optimal risks may not have anything to risk.
Capital assets and enterprise – material and personal condition, respectively, of the operation of this economic system – must be brought together. But in what structure? In one where the capital employs the entrepreneur (manager) as it employs the worker and disposes of both? or in one where the entrepreneur takes up a loan, pays for the use of the capital as he pays for the use of the land, but he disposes of both?
The dilemma of the material and personal condition is decided by the totalitarian state, whether built on planning or the market system, again in favor of capital. Enterprise is a disposition which means that someone has a different idea from everybody else’s, without a preliminary directive, to boot; and what could be the arch enemy of the totalitarian state if not the citizen who has original and spontaneous ideas, and, especially, if he even acts upon them.
Above we saw how the totalitarian state provides capital with guarantees that the “human investment” will be recovered, so this time it is the capital that guarantees for the totalitarian state that the spontaneity of the enterprising person it employs will not exceed the strict limits marked out by the technical directives of capital, and if he should still do so, it will employ another person’s originality in his place. It is important that in this respect private capital, where surviving, can provide the totalitarian state with the same guarantees as capital that is handled by the state where there is state property. It is just as important to note that in the former case in the market system and in the latter with planning the same observation can soon be made: the enterprising spirit is missing. That type, more exactly, the bearer of which would be such a person to whom there and then would occur a different idea from all others’ without preliminary directives where and when the technical directives prescribe it, and in whose place anyone who may at any moment be put in his place would have an original idea in the same way.
In his book The pyramid climbers (Fawcett World Library. N.Y., 1964) Vance Packard cites some findings of an opinion-poll conducted by Nation’s Business to find out what the new claims of managers are, which brought out that the new claim number one is: Be a creative conformist.
The Palo Alto school has done a detailed investigation into the pathogenic paradox of prescribing spontaneity (see e.g.: Watzlawick, Beavin and Jackson: Pragmatics of human communication. NY: Norton, 1967; and Watzlawick, Weakland and Fisch: Change. Principles of problem formation and problem resolution. NY: Norton, 1974). The paradox of social similarity and difference that is very closely related to that of vulgar originality has been investigated in my paper entitled Les paradoxes de la catégorisation sociale (Recherches de Psychologie Sociale, 198l. pp.l3l-l4l; see also Pages: Les paradoxes classificatoires de Garai: espace de repérage et d’affectation. Ibid.,143-151)
The other reason why the totalitarian state has failed to create the psychological conditions necessary for the operation of the economic system is that it can only set about tackling the task of producing the personal conditions according to that logic which the post-capitalist system inherited from the capitalist formation and according to which the latter produced the material conditions of its operation.
According to this logic a person carries his properties just as a thing does, and these properties can be changed in the same way as those of a thing can. If something or someone does not fit a goal it can only be adjusted to it by a larger or smaller cost. The larger the distance between the actual state of the thing or that of the person and the goal, the larger the necessary input. Whenever I know the technology of producing a thing or a person bearing a property a and that of producing a bearer of the property b I have only to combine two technologies in order to produce something or someone that bears both properties. Nothing can me prevent from changing over from the prototype to mass-producing the model by the hundred, thousand or million. If the input has produced the expected output, new inputs may multiply the outputs. The costs of production are calculable, and it can be determined whether the production is more economical if those to be involved in the technological process are previously selected, if all the people are worked upon without selection and everyone is trained as long as necessary, or perhaps if after a certain period of time the waste is eliminated from among the unselected lot of individuals.
And the worst of these arguments, and of the logic they are all based on whether in the planning or the market system, is not that when you examine it consistently you inevitably end up with the formula of the death or labor camp, thus, they are loathsome from a moral point of view, but that they are no use from a purely pragmatic viewpoint, too, because they neglect the most significant aspect of producing the personal condition:
The personal condition complementing the material condition of production is not necessarily present or absent as a material feature of the persons but may also manifest its existence or lack as personal interrelation. The classic experiment of Elton Mayo (The human problems of an industrial civilization. Macmillan, N.Y., 1933) has demonstrated that the disposition of a group of women workers to increase their productivity both when their working conditions were improved and when they were deteriorating was due to the fact that the management distinguished them by its exceptional interest. This, clearly, is not one of the material conditions of work like lighting, temperature, ventilation of the workshop; neither is it a material trait of persons like the IQ, reaction time or fingerprint.
If it was something like one of the material conditions of work, management could ensure it as soon as its interest in what the key working condition for productivity was had been satisfied, whereas what happens is that as soon as this interest is satisfied, it ceases to exist, although this very interest is the looked-for condition itself. If, on the other hand, the factor at issue were one of properties beared by the person like a thing bears its features, it would only be a question of input and efficient technology to form this useful quality in each member of the production unit. In actual fact, however, if really could be carried out, that each and every worker without exception became subject to exceptional interest, then none of them would have any more this “property” which, however, so basically determined their disposition to production.
There are two methodologies to produce the personal properties necessary for production: l. selective quality exchange when those who possess the particular property are selected from the existing staff and the rest are replaced by those selected from the population according to this property; 2. retraining each member of the existing staff until the required property has been developed. It can be presumed that if the property in question is, say, the sense of absolute pitch, it is more practicable to apply the first paradigm, and if it is, say, competence in BASIC, then the second. It can however be easily understood that neither of these psychotechnical procedures will help provide the personal condition in the above example (to be the target of exceptional interest by the management).
Let us now come back to that personal disposition which, as has been shown above, is just as indispensable a condition of the operation of the post-capitalist economic system as it is missing under the relations of the totalitarian state: namely, enterprise. Try to imagine that someone decides to produce this condition (the disposition of a person to have original ideas spontaneously) according to the logic of material production as outlined above. It is not hard to see that the more sophisticated the organization producing this spontaneity is, the less it will be possible to produce spontaneity in this technological process. Also, that the larger the output capacity of the organization which is supposed to produce the originality of the person is, the less it is capable of producing originality.
The emerging need of the production system to re-establish the split position of the capitalist entrepreneur and the failure of the totalitarian state to produce or select under the dominance of capital the spirit of enterprise as a material property necessarily leads to the only possible attempt that a person should emerge who has different ideas from the rest of the people without directives in such a way that he does not jeopardize the totalitarian state: and this person is the authoritarian leader in whom the totalitarian state is incarnated.

Alternatives to the totalitarian state
When the totalitarian states collapsed, the “natural” or “logical” alternative was the democratic state formation which treated persons as sovereign beings and not raw materials of transformation by this or that norm, or objects that such transformations produce for capital.
The “nature” and “logic” that became manifest in this change were, however, those of the totalitarian state for which, as we have seen, the personal conditions of the operation of the economic system can only be produced as things, so the handling of persons as things cannot be got rid of unless the question of producing the personal condition is radically removed from the agenda. So the economic considerations could in no other way be raised than in relation to the production and allocation of material conditions. As if the sole question had been how to make production and allocation more reasonable: by a planning that controls the volume of the value-in-use of things, or by the market that does the same with their value-in-exchange.
While for both economic systems the criterion of economic rationality is a kind of material efficiency (the increasing volume of the produced value-in-use, or the accumulating value-in-exchange) it is a global tendency that the number of those employed in industry and agriculture, that is in the production of material goods, is continuously decreasing: in the most advanced private capital economies by the early 80s less then 50% of the total labour force was employed in this areas.
In the most advanced capitalist countries this rate was below half the total labour force by 1969 and further dwindled by 1980: in the USA from 38.9% to 33%, in the UK from 46.9% to 39.4%, in Sweden from 48.3% to 37%. In the FRG, France and Japan this rate fell below 50% by the beginning of the ‘80s. (Labour force statistics 1969-1980. OECD. Paris, 1982.)
And whereas the application of the paradigm of measuring material efficiency in the areas of material services has at least a use in that the merits of the individual can be measured in order that society could accommodate to them the equitable remuneration of the individual, in the spheres of non-material services (for whose changing rate in modern society see note at p. 6) the measure of material efficiency cannot be applied at all. It can be calculated how much larger the merit of transmitting l0 million kwh electric power or cubic meters natural gas to the consumer, of loading and unloading l0 thousand wagons, distributing l0 mugs of draft beer is than 2 million kwh or cubic meters, 2 thousand wagons or 2 mugs of beer. This calculation, however, cannot be applied to non-material services for their stakes always include interpersonal relations which, as has been pointed out, do not obey the logic that operates with the things’ properties.
To verify the general validity of the above argument let us take as our example a representative of non-material services such as the boxing coach. Let us suppose that he is in charge of ten boxers of the same weight category whom he drills to encounter opponents fighting in various styles. Using the paradigm of material efficiency one could calculate how much smaller the merit of a coach is if he achieves the same result with only two athletes, let alone the case when he does it with only one boxer. Only, there is no chance of drilling two boxers in a realistic setting to perform against opponents fighting in various styles, while a single boxer cannot be trained even to hold his ground against a fighting opponent (for the sake of illustration we disregarded the possibility of the coach entering the ring).
It is becoming more widely recognized in various branches of non-material services that relations of this type must be reckoned with. The attitude of the Palo Alto school toward psychotherapy is not to find the cause of a psychic disorder in some internal property of the patient or in the material conditions of his environment, but in the interpersonal relations within a social structure (e.g. family): in that the patient differs from the others, or contrarily, wants to resemble several people at the same time who are dissimilar; in that he heavily depends on others, or conversely, keeps others tightly under control, etc. In this way, if the illness as a material state of the patient is eliminated without altering the particular relationship, it happens more than once that another person falls ill within the given structure (see Watzlawick, Beavin and Jackson: Op. cit.; Watzlawick, Weakland and Fisch: Op. cit.) Ironically, this relation may be conserved by the fact that someone has made consistently for years his therapeutic efforts aiming change; at other times the therapist’s mere entering with the intention to heal the ill into the pathogenic relationship is enough to really change it. Neither of these cases are such that the merit of the person supplying the non-material service could be measured by the paradigm of material efficiency.
It appears as if the psychological “irrationalism” corresponds to an economic “irrationalism”: the activity has no effective price, and also only a dwindling ratio of it has such material product that would have a price corresponding to its real value; what is more, it allows for the merit of the individual who exerts the activity to be measured and recompensed according to the paradigm of material efficiency to an ever decreasing extent.
Nevertheless, there exist two interpretations of this tendency in that an ever growing proportion of the total labour force is not employed in areas producing material conditions of production. One may interpret it as if in various countries an ever increasing ratio of the GNP were used as the material condition of consumption and not of production. But personally I would argue for the following interpretation: this growing rate produces the personal, and not material, condition of production.
The rationality of producing the personal condition cannot be evaluated according to the logic of producing material conditions. If one cannot establish for non-material services how much input results in how much output by using the material standard measure, then not only the above outlined dilemma (whether the capital itself or the produced labour power will dispose of the product when the capital is invested into producing a labour power?) remains unsolved. Similarly unanswered will be the following traditional question: if the capital employs wage work to produce this special product, namely labour power, in what proportion is the produced value shared by capital and the producing labour power? A third unsettled question is what the economic relationship is like between the labour power that produces and the labour power that is produced (between those teaching, curing, directing and those being taught, cured, directed, etc).
These three questions refer to the very basic relations of modern organizations of education, health care, administration, in general, public service organizations. These are the relations between the organization’s clients, employees and those who dispose of the means of human investment.
To characterize the economic relations between these factors is theoretically impossible in the categories of material efficiency. It is theoretically impossible to establish how much material value is represented by the labour force produced by education within a definite period of time, or by the labour force saved by medical treatment, or the labour force pushed to (or prevented from) operation by the administration. Consequently, it is theoretically impossible to calculate how much the labour power of those doing the education, healing, administration, etc. is worth.
These calculations cannot be replaced by the knowledge that the annual Hungarian state expenditure on a university student is Ft 66 741, on a student in a technical secondary school Ft 22 515, in a vocational school Ft 16 732, in a grammar school Ft l4 577, in elementary school Ft l0 536, for the actual question is how much more (or perhaps less) output this much input produces.
Therefore, as a result, the only possible point of departure for establishing the equitable wage for this kind of work is to consider how much the pay is by which the supply and demand of services is just balanced.
This is, however, rendered impossible by the fact that this type of activity has no effective price.

The measure of production of human resources
An activity can be determined not only by its utility expressed either in the value-in-use it has produced or by the value-in-exchange expressed in the price paid for the activity. It can also be determined by the satisfaction which is also two-sided: from the manifestation of the person’s technical dispositions in his activity which masters things, and from the display by the person of his social dispositions in his belonging to social categories which master other persons.
In the latter case the stake that effectively motivates the person’s decisions is not money but status.
Vance Packard was among the first to describe the phenomenon of seeking for status (The Status Seekers. Penguin Books Ltd.) which seems to be becoming just as general a passion of the man of the modern age as seeking for money used to be for people living under the conditions of a classical capitalist formation. This change is also evident in the fact that while the old craving spurred one to procure the money, this new passion may prompt you to spend the money you, eventually, have not yet got but only borrowed, and the kick you get is not out of consuming the commodity thus purchased according to its value-in-use but out of the spent for it money symbolizing status.
But money raised can symbolize status, too. On such occasions, what we are interested in the first place is not between expenses and income (for instance, between the inconvenience of an activity and the reward for it) but by the difference between our income and others’ income.
In his classic experiment Tajfel has found that – depending on the context of social reality – the subject may be prepared to regard the difference between the income of the “ingroup” and an “outgroup” as more important than the absolute size of the income of his own group even if the two “groups” were formed along such a negligible dimension as the outcome of a manipulated test “showing” which of two painters, Klee and Kandinsky, the subject allegedly prefers and which one the other supposed subjects, whom he knows only by their initials throughout the experiment, do. (Human groups and social categories. Studies in social psychology. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge etc., 198l; see esp. pp. 268-287).
It has often been suggested as one of the tasks to be done in connection with the economic reform in Hungary that the levelling policy should be replaced by payments better adjusted to unequal performances. One must realize that this “egalitarianism” has never meant equally allocated pay and additional benefits of l0 million Hungarians, and also that an efficiency wage will never mean keeping in evidence how much each and every of the 10 million performances, which are incommensurable for qualitative reasons, is worth to the society: in both cases we are dealing with spontaneous or deliberately set up social categories within each of which organizations attempt to establish some equality and between them an inequality. Now, we ourselves do the same when, according to established or just being established social categories (that may be, but may not be the same as those kept in evidence by the organization), we exaggerate our similarities and differences, respectively, and, thus, we find that it is just to have as much salary as X has but it is unjust that Y’s is as much too; when we find it natural that we earn three times less than K but immoral that L has a salary of Ft 5,500 against our 5,000.
When we say that remuneration must be equitably adjusted to performance, we have to take this into consideration:
The performance expresses the person’s technical disposition: the richer the variety of skills the person is in possession of, the higher performance he is capable of, in general. Remuneration, on the other hand, expresses his social disposition: the higher a status the person’s social identity has, the higher his pay, as a rule.
But a higher performance is not necessarily quantitatively measurable as greater performance: one feels that the performance of an astronaut is higher than that of a slaughterhouse butcher whose in turn is higher than that of the housewife, although the first does not produce anything that could be measured materially, while the third provides her services during a seven-day workweek and her merit can be calculated materially as well. It seems however that when one is considering merit, one’s intuition is led not by this but by the unconscious consideration of which performance is more distinguishing: this is why one regards it as appropriate that the astronaut even decades after his exploit may get a higher pay than the butcher, while the housewife who often continues her services right up to the end of her pensionable age does not get either pay or pension.
Neither is the only way for remuneration to be advantageous when it is expressed in more money: every organization develops its system of favoritism according to which a part of the staff is favored as against the whole, the whole staff as against those not belonging to the organization; the regular customers are favored as against the whole clientele, the latter as against the entire population from where they are recruited, etc. True enough the advantages include some whose utility can be computed in money: above their regular salary, the favorably treated members but, to a lesser extent, every employee of the organization can use the objects of the organization’s movable and immovable property free or at reduced price, or can get services paid for them fully or partly by the organization; for the regular customer some of the services of the organization are available at a reduced price, etc. It seems however that our intuition which keeps track of the value of remuneration is not basically guided by the consideration of how much it amounts to in terms of money but how distinguishing the procured favor is.
Thus, it is not only the larger remuneration paid for the larger performance in terms of material efficiency that can adapt reward to the merit: a person distinguishing himself by his performance may get equally distinguished by his recompensation. In this case it is no longer the produced thing but the merit of the producing person that is measured: underlying a performance to be distinguished our intuition guess a specific combination of technical dispositions which distinguishes due to its rarity the person who bears it and, in the same way, behind the recompense which distinguishes the person we guess his distinguished social disposition.
The recompense you keep in evidence by its distinguishing force symbolizes status; it drives people by their passion to seek status even if outwardly they seem to be money-seekers: the fraternal or family team of small enterprises, that reappeared recently or was newly created within etatic large enterprises in Hungary, whip themselves to work at an inhuman pace not only in order that they can maintain their living standard or gain access to commodities that they could not even dream of when they were industrial proletarians or employees in public services, but to show how far they can get when it is all up to them.
How far indeed they have got is for them and for the others best expressed in the material value measured by the money or goods he can obtain and show off. Not, however, by its absolute size but by its distinguishing force: the fridge or car, par example, that were in Hungary in the early 60s the most fashionable status symbols are no longer suitable to show where you have arrived.
As a rule, higher pay symbolizes higher status. That the motivating effect of the remuneration in question here is, however, that which it exerts via the seeking for status is clearly revealed by the paradoxical effect of underpayment upon the productivity of the referred to social category. It is revealing of the kind of mechanism that works hear that a representative of the underpaid category or an underpaid person within any category often proudly complains: “Where would you find another idiot like me doing this job for this money?” This is to express his paradoxical claim that if the exclusivity of his performance is not acknowledged by a pay that would be equally exclusive, at least the exclusivity of that other performance should be recognized that he overworks even being underpaid.
Kornai in his book of the planning system (The shortage. Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó. Budapest, 1980. In Hungarian) describes the same passion labelling it the “internal pressure for expansion” when he seeks an answer to the question that is crucial for the economic psychology of this system: “What may drive the socialist business leader to invest and accumulate real capital when he is not interested in the profit?”
The most important element, he finds, is that “the leader gets identified with his job.” A leader like this “can always find a basis for comparison against which his department seems to be outdated and poor. This induces the executive to experience professional jealousy in the nice sense of the word. He would like to increase his professional prestige. To this some less noble but completely understandable human motives may, or may not, be added. Parallel with the growth of the company or institution grows the power, the social prestige of the leader and together with this his sense of his own importance. To direct ten thousand people is a greater thing than to guide five thousand, most people believe. The larger power may entail a larger salary and bonus, as well as more privileges.” (pp. 204-205).
The key word here is the one I italicized.
Let us imagine a state of affairs in which Hungary would be divided into administrative units of 5 000 people each. Now, let take a change that would double the population of each unit. In this case no arguments could be adduced to verify that the leaders of the administrative units would feel a greater thing to direct ten thousand people than to guide five thousand.
True enough, Kornai declares: “When someone has become the rector of one of the country’s largest universities, or is responsible for the conservation of all the monuments in the country, or is in charge of the water supply of the whole nation, neither his salary, nor his prestige or power will rise if he manages to obtain 20% more investment for his domain.” But then he himself recognizes that “the interior pressure for expansion is manifest at every level of the economic hierarchy: the head of a few-man-strong brigade to the minister in charge of hundreds of thousands or millions. When it comes to the distribution of the appropriation for investment every one of them fights so that our brigade, our enterprise, our ministry should get as large a share as possible.” (p. 206).
Another thought experiment may lead us to realize that what motivates the leader in cases like this is not so much the expansion of the unit he is in charge of as gauged by the material yardstick as the distinguishing nature of the possibility of this expansion:
Which business leader would meet with the greatest degree of approval from his staff and himself? The one who gets the adequate share of the investment appropriated for a nationwide development of 20%? The one who alone manages to clinch a 2% expansion possibility out of all the 100 economic units applying? Or the one who despite a nationwide freeze on investment which is strictly binding for 9999 out of 10 000 economic units still procures the investment necessary for an 0.2% expansion?
Comparing this psychological factor to such economic ones as the necessarily strained nature of the economic plan and the tendency of socialist enterprises to stockpile, Kornai points out that, as compared with the latter, “the interior pressure for expansion is even more momentous because its effect upon the operation of the system is more pronounced” (ibidem), and especially its effect in producing shortage, what he considers the most essential phenomenon of a planning system.
To attach such a great importance to a psychological factor in the operation of an economic system must be surprising for the logic manifest both in reasoning either in favor of the market or the planning system. Yet it very logically fits the basic feature of post-capitalist economic systems which the present paper has described: notably that they have to produce their personal conditions just as the classical capitalist formation had to produce all the material conditions for its operation.
The training of personal conditions in service organizations of various types is a process at whose idealized beginning one finds completely untrained, thus in their role interchangeable, persons while at its idealized end one finds persons who are irreplaceable in the role for which they have been specifically trained, or which has been shaped to fit the trained specificity of the person. One can therefore accept it as an idealized tendency that the status which indicates how irreplaceable the incumbent of a specific role within the organization is the measure that shows how far the person has progressed in being trained as the personal condition of the operation of the economic system.

Is a rational socio-economic system possible?

In 1922 Max Weber (1964) claimed the bureaucracy to be, according to all experience, the most rational form of domination for both the master and those mastered; the “bureaucratization” or “dilettantization” of management Weber considered to be the only alternatives to choose from, bureaucracy having the overwhelming superiority the source of which is professional competence made completely indispensable by modern technology applied in the production of goods and by economy as a whole, irrespective of the fact whether it is organized in the capitalist or socialist manner; this latter solution, Weber went on, would imply an enormous increase in professional bureaucracy if it should aspire at the same technical performance.
Today we can infer from the experience accumulated since 1922 that the “socialist solution” did imply an enormous increase in bureaucracy. No one would, however, associate this tendency with the most rational form and with the performances of modern technology. Quite the contrary.

What has happened?
At around the same time as Weber made his statement, Schumpeter (1971) pointed out that capitalism was transforming so obviously into something else that he considered not the fact itself, merely its interpretation to be a point of contention: whether what capitalism transformed into after World War I and the ensuing revolutions and counter-revolutions was socialism or not Schumpeter considered only a matter of taste and terminology (pp. 41-43).
In my earlier investigations (Garai, 1987a) I was led to the conclusion that the essence of this transformation is: the 19th century classic capitalist socio-economic system produced the material factors it depended on and made itself independent of the human phenomena which had not been produced by it. On the other hand, from the turn of the century onwards running the socio-economic system was no longer independent of the faculties and needs effective in the population and, consequently, it faced the necessity of manufacturing also its own human conditions.

The case of the economic rationality itself
Is man reasonable? Are his economic preferences reasonable?
It is obvious that when playing, one does not choose an option which requires the smallest possible effort or promises the largest possible amount of useful products, hence his activity cannot be qualified economically reasonable. The same must be true to the case when he wants to make A happy or to alleviate the misery of B, so he presents A or helps B not with goods of lowest possible value and not requires the highest possible price for it (he may even actively avoid situations in which the beneficiary wishes to pay for the gift or help). It hardly needs any explanation how economically irrational the behaviour reported in growing number as vandalism is: when one destroys material values without using the destroyed structures as base materials for constructing new goods and without facing the necessity of destroying them as obstacles to his endeavour or as amplifiers of concurrent endeavours. The purely economic irrationality of continuing wars when stalemated, of running embargo lists, etc., go beyond the everyday “pathology” of any individual behavior.
May the psychologist faced with cases like these assume that man by force of his rational nature adopts this kind of behavior only as a roundabout way through the mediation of which the final output will of higher value than the total input? Behaviourist psychology did try to put the matter in these terms. By contrast, cognitive psychology describes man not so much as a rational but as a rationalizing being: not one who creates by all means larger output from smaller input, but who will subsequently consider what he has produced more valuable than the price he paid was.
Anyhow, rationalizing practices are promoted by the fact that in many cases input and output cannot be unambiguously correlated. The extent of individual effort and that of the satisfaction of a need are subjective dimensions, one can easily establish between them the relation to his taste. If we want to judge objectively the rationality of this relation we encounter questions hard to tackle. It is obviously reasonable to increase threefold the work done if it results in a fourfold increasing of produced goods; and it is obviously unreasonable to accomplish this multiplication of work if it results only in a twofold multiplication of the pay. But does the unreasonability of this latter feature get changed if getting at all involved in a job implies such a social devaluation that is independent from the exact quantity of that work done?
The computation of marginal cost and profit seems to provide an answer, but only at the expense of giving up all normative considerations on the economic rationality and regarding the choice of each particular individual as reasonable: one who is willing to spend some marginal cost in hope of certain marginal profit is seen as rational, whether he measures his cost and profit by the volume of goods, that of money, the length of time spent on the activity or that of run in a social evaluation hierarchy. And one who is unwilling to do so is also reasonable from his point of view.
In order to judge the rationality of this very viewpoint, one would first of all need an objective measure against which the decisions of individuals concerning marginal cost and profit could be compared to define, e. g., what is the real extent of the extra cost or the extra profit that corresponds to a given surplus of a given activity.
Such an objective measure would be all the more necessary as both behaviourist psychology in positing rational behavior and cognitive psychology in positing rationalizing practices start from one and the same attitude in people. It goes (without any obligatory awareness of it) something like this: “I’d be a crazy fool if I did an activity that I feel more burdensome than profitable”. From this point onward one may reason alternatively. For a behaviourist-type thinking: as I am no fool, given a burdensome activity I refuse to go on with it. And for a cognitivist-type thinking: as I am pursuing an activity, I won’t feel it that burdensome in order not to take myself for a fool.
Is there really an objective measure the application of which might decide in each particular case whether I really feel a certain activity burdensome or I actually take pleasure in another?

Specific human basic need
One could come closer to the distinction of “real” and “fictive” feelings, if he was able to class human needs into “natural” and “artificial”, or “normal” and “abnormal” categories. This would enable us to assume that if the positive or negative feeling we reckon with in a decision about marginal cost and profit concerns, e. g., subsistence, than taking it into account is rational, if however it concerns, e. g., drug abuse, it is only a subsequent rationalizing of a previously formed practice.
In the introduction to my monograph (Garai, 1969) on the specificity of human needs I discussed in detail how arbitrary the result of classifying the factors that inwardly determine humane behavior in terms of such differentiation is. This differentiation is opposed to the anthropological fact that Marx wrote about that production does not only provide material for the need, but also provides the need for the material, it does not only produces an object for the subject, but also a subject for the object. By force of this anthropological fact it is in principle impossible to make a distinction between what every “normal” person needs “by his nature” and what he developed in himself in an “abnormal” way or he was “manipulated” to have as a need.
In a Stalinian period this arbitrariness had more grave consequences when it was the basis of a practice of economic planning in which a central power was to have seen to the “normal” needs of the members of society. Departing from this the plan was expected to define production which was meant to satisfy this “normal” need to a growing extent and, on a final view, in its totality. This basic ideology was closely related to the practice of the central power of that period of seeing to what it deemed “abnormal” among the needs of the individuals and get them eliminated.
Jean Baudrillard (1982) argued that man has no biological needs at all. The so-called primary needs that are alleged to strictly determine consumption required for satisfying them, as well as the secondary needs allegedly defined by culture in such a way that satisfying them is up to the individuals, are both merely ideological alibis of a consumption whose primary function is to hide, or conversely, to emphasize by means of consumed goods the social differences between the class having and the one excluded from power in production. Consumption is determined by production and production, in turn, means first of all the production of surplus. Thus, Baudrillard states, what actually happens is not what is believed to happen on the basis of ideological appearances, namely, that the members of society consume the biologically indispensable subsistence minimum and what remains becomes distributed as surplus. He asserts that each society produces according to its structure a surplus as allowance of some positions in the structures and what remains extra will be the necessary consumption accorded to other positions of the structure as a “strictly determined subsistence minimum”.
This context may include both that a part of society should not be reproduced but left to perish, or even actively eliminated, and that the non-optional “subsistence minimum” should also include goods without the consumption of which biological existence can be sustained but a human, that is social, existence relevant to the given social structure cannot. “Today the subsistence minimum is the standard package, the prescribed minimum consumption. Below this, man is asocial – and is the loss of status, the social non-existence less grievous than starving?” (Baudrillard, 1982; p.86). This is how the refrigerator, the car, the washing machine and the TV set got included in the “index of conformity and prestige” in the west-European type societies in the sixties. Baudrillard means by index a list implying a moral command. This prescribes a well defined usage towards all the articles put on the index: for instance, refraining from reading books on the Index or destroying them; or, in our case, the purchase of commodities on the index. Thus, the object which one gets hold of and uses as such and not as a practical technical gadget, will be a “franchise, a token of special recognition, legitimating” (Baudrillard, 1982; p. 45.).
Having conceded to the impossibility of defining generally specific human needs (i. e., what differentiates all men from all animals in this respect and at the same time likens all men to one another) as regards their material, I made an attempt in my above-mentioned monograph to identify them by the form that is manifest in each instance of human need.
The form, in accordance with Leontiev’s (1983) theory, I found in the structure of activity. Leontiev assumes that during the phylogeny the psychically controlled activity becomes more and more complex and this fact is only reflected by the development of the structure of the psychic performance of controlling it. I have based on Leontiev’s hypothesis a further assumption on the genetically specific basic need: at each specific philogenetic level the run of an activity structured according to that very level is needed.
Thus, even at the bottom level of phylogeny instead of postulating several needs urging man to consume various materials indispensable for subsistence it would be more appropriate to consider an only basic need aimed at the activity of procuring such materials. This need starts to mobilize when the animal identifies by means of some signs one or another of these materials present in its environment and then the ant or bee, for instance, begins its collecting activity even if its organism is actually saturated with this very material. Accordingly, the satisfaction of the need is not the result of incorporating the material in the organism but the successful running of the activity that puts the individual in possession of the object containing the material.
At further levels of the phylogeny of animals the objects determining the activity structure include, in addition to the goal to be attained, the obstacle that blocks its run toward that goal and later the tool that helps overcome the obstacle blocking the path of the activity moving towards its goal.
Man’s activity inherits all these structuring factors. Kurt Lewin has discovered and his team verified in several experiments that whenever the intention of an activity presents itself in a person, it operates like a need as long as it is active. This quasi-need is an inner tension that drives to a definite activity and in the field of this activity it marks certain objects as goals for the activity, others as its obstacles or tools, respectively. It follows from Lewin’s theory that in order to understand what a person feels and does one must know, not what is the material that corresponds to his/her real need, but what is the form that corresponds to his quasi-need. Someone’s intention to get bread for living and another person’s to get a concert ticket may be driven by their decision to identical behavior (e. g. queuing up, if the obstacle in the way to attain their goal is the gulf between supply and demand).
Human activity turns out to be structured in such a way that in addition to the inherited goal, obstacle and tool it includes a fourth structuring factor: taboo. Taboo is basically a ban to use something as a tool to overcome the obstacle in the way of the activity moving towards its goal, even if the factor in question were otherwise technically adequate. The impact of the taboo is most frequently connected with property relations: the technically adequate tool is as such coordinated to another position, so its use by people occupying the given position is prohibited by taboo. In this sense taboo is complemented by Baudrillard’s social allowance (prestation sociale) which have people feel pressure to get certain objects without needing them as technical tools, merely because they are allowed to possess these objects while others are not.
Thus, taboo becomes one of the structuring factors of human activity. Hence, what is needed for the man’s genetically specific basic need is the run of an activity making for his goals, overcoming the obstacles of this advancement, getting tools for it and, finally, mastering taboos on prerequisites of this activity.
Lewin’s theory specifies the formal correlations of such a need in a time interval when the goal is already set but is not yet attained. Neither before setting nor after attaining the goal exists the inner tension which as quasi-need qualifies certain objects in the activity field as goal, obstacle or tool, respectively.
As regards taboo, Lewin mistakenly places it in the same category as the obstacle when points out that a person’s manoeuvring room is delimited by the domains of inaccessible activities, such as shooting down an enemy or doing an activity beyond his capacities. But the obstacle that limits man’s possibility of pursuing an activity beyond his capacities. and the taboo that limits his freedom to shot down his enemy are not of equal quality. The former disable us to attain the goal, while the latter disables us to set it at all.
The hypothesis of the specific human basic need (SHBN) assumes, in addition to Lewin’s quasi-need urging for the attainment of a set goal, another inner tension that emerges when man has attained his goal but not set a new one yet. This tension may also be conceived as a quasi-need that is satisfied by the setting of newer and newer goals. Setting new goals occurs in the wake of social changes which repeatedly reveal that the customary allowances and taboos no longer suffice to orientate man unambiguously in his activities. Taboos therefore have a major role in the emergence of new goals.

The specific human basic need and economic rationality
Let us take an infinitely schematized example to illustrate the above argument. When applying this example I claim by no means, of course, to demonstrate how the psycho-economic processes it is referred to run their course. It is only meant to illustrate at an abstract level the relation in that the attainment of the goal of enlarged reproduction results in a product to which the taboo fixing the old relations of distributions refers ambiguously, and this is what arouses the new tension that is, in turn, reduced when one makes the situation unambiguous again by setting a new goal.
Let us assume that at the end of a production cycle the product worth $100 is distributed between the capitalist and two workers so that the former gets $80, the latter $10 each. If this state of affaires prevails for a longer period of time over several cycles, then it will appear to both parties to belong to the normal, natural order of things that |1| 80% of the product is taboo for the workers and 20% for the capitalist; and |2| a capitalist’s allowance is 8 times as much as a worker’s. These two “rules of game” are, in fact, the formulation of one and the same rule in two sets of terms: that of the taboo and that of the allowance. If this arrangement of distribution gives room for the enlargement of production, this latter’s dimensions will, however, remain for some time below the threshold value which is indispensable for the change to be perceived. So the change may remain unnoticed, for example, when the capitalist employed twice as many workers producing by means of proportionately enlarged material conditions of production $200. Then, according to one interpretation of distribution order, 20% of this remains taboo for the capitalist and the residue of $160 he will claim as his normal allowance. The workers, on the other hand, will continue to observe it as a natural way of distribution that they are allowed 8 times less than the capitalist is. Under the new circumstances this rate is established when they regard the $130 remaining after the deduction of their slightly less than $17 each as taboo for them. Thus, in this schematized example one party claims nearly $30 more as his allowance than what the other party regards as taboo for him. Before either side notices that things have changed.
When the actors of production do realize the change, they will set new goals to their activities in the gap between taboo and allowance: either one will set for his activity the goal to prevent the change for it is disadvantageous; or else he will set the goal to promote the change actively for it is favourable. The hypothesis of the specific human basic need spells out that it is the SHBN that drives people, according to its purely formal relations and not one determined by the required materials, to such setting goals, as well as to attaining them.
Now, what determines whether one sets as his goal the prevention or promotion of the perceived change? It seems to be only too obvious that his interests must be decisive, and those from a Marxian position may precise that the relevant interests of individuals are determined by the class they belong to: whether they belong to the class for which the change is favourable or to the one for which it is disadvantageous.
Considering the desirability of change in terms of class interests, the following inferences can be drawn from the above example: If the status quo ensures that 80% of the output be the allowance of the capitalist but the on-going change threatens that nearly $30 of the amount calculated may be distributed among the workers, then this will make the workers interested in the change and the capitalist counter-interested.
The same conception may, however, be applied to the same case in an opposite way: If the state of affairs only places for the workers the eightfold of their wage under taboo and the on-going change threatens that the capitalist may increase his income calculated accordingly by some $30 to the detriment of the workers, then this will make the capitalist interested in the change and the workers counter-interested.
In addition to the instances schematized above in which one of two antagonistic social categories, animated by one and the same ideology, is interested and the other is counter-interested in some change, the history produces from time to time its inverse: those categories, animated by antagonistic ideologies, manifest themselves as equally interested or equally counter-interested in the outlined change. This latter was the case, e. g., in the inter-war period when both the communist and the fascist ideologies animated movements for the radical transformation of society. It is only too probable that in the actual history of socialist countries their utmost rigidity may be understood if we take into consideration that opposed in them to each other social categories animated by opposed to each other ideologies may equally turned against social changes.
In other writings (Garai 1985, 1985a) I discussed some observations stating that the inner tension of the Lewinian form when one tries to get the set goal and the reality closer to each other may be reduced either by a rational practice that brings reality closer to the set goal or by rationalizing practices of bringing the set goal closer to reality. And it has turned out now that the tension of this other form of proceeding from the attained goal toward setting a new one may equally be reduced either by a goal of promoting or by that of reversing those changes already set off.
This doubles the dilemmas of SHBN. Can it be decided which tendency represents rational practice and which represents rationalizing practices? As long as operationalizing a Yes answer has not been achieved, we can assert that the SHBN as an anthropolical fact does not seem to drive more to a rational behaviour than to a rationalizing cognition.
Hence, no economic system can count on rationality as given anthropologically and if it needs such a human condition for its operation, it must produce it by a planed intervention in spontaneous behavioural processes.

Why is bureaucratic control over economy not that rational?
László Garai
Institute for Psychology, Hungarian Academy of Sciences

Likewise but also otherwise. In fact, to understand and handle this otherness is what calls for economic psychology.
In the course of producing the material conditions we get accustomed to the applied means’ power depending on nothing but their technical properties. In the production of personal conditions, however, the means’ power is mediated by their social relations.
This mediation intervenes even into the simplest material factors’ power over personal factors. For example, whether pork is suitable as an instrument to contribute to the subsistence of a human organism is determined by the chemical properties of the foodstuff in question and by the biological properties of that other material factor represented by the individual human organism. But whether this material is food at all for some persons depends on how these personal factors are defined by the system of their social relations: if, for instance, a person is identified by his everyday social practice as a member of a Judaic or Moslem religious community pork cannot be identified as food for him/her. And for lack of such a social identification, the appropriate technical power cannot be exerted. What is more, should this material stuff at issue get into the organism of such an individual, it might as well generate the most serious symptoms of poisoning without any appropriate technical power for this effect. Such a context explains the power of various ancient and modern fetishes that a material factor even without appropriate technical properties may exert an effect solely by virtue of the position it occupies in the system of social relations: we know, e. g., that Marx attributed to such a correlation the effect exerted in the capitalist society by things working as commodity, money, capital, etc. on persons working as agents in the economic processes.
If the power of a thing over a person may be ricocheted by the position the person and the material factor occupy in the social structure in relation to each other, this is far more likely to happen when the power over a personal factor is exercised not by a material but by another personal factor. It is common experience that a technique functions with varying efficiency depending on the social identity of the person who applies it and the one it is applied to: whether father lectures to his son or teacher to his pupils; whether a parent drives his offspring toward the right path with a slap in the face or an elder brother does the same to a younger; whether a mother pleads with her daughter or the latter with a girlfriend; whether an unknown outsider invites a person of the opposite sex to strip to the skin or an unknown white coat doctor.
Now, from a psychosocial point of view we might interpret the bureaucracy’s system of relations as the institutionalization of such relations: it assigns definite powers to a position in a social structure, but to a person (whether s/he bears or not technical properties needed for exercising those powers) only to the extent to which s/he legitimately occupies the position in question. Thus, those psychosocial interrelations are institutionalized by the bureaucracy that mediate the power of producing personal conditions. Therefore, while we can see that Max Weber’s reasoning about the bureaucracy creating the conditions of a rational management and the predictability of the mass scale production and allocation of material conditions does not seem to hold true of socialism, we have to consider whether it is not precisely the needs of managing the mass scale production and allocation of personal conditions that could be blamed for the extensive bureaucratization of society.
The following relation should also be considered in this context:
If it is important in the economic process in which personal factor produces personal factor that the producing person can only exert his/her power through the mediation of his/her social relations, then it is just as important that the produced person’s power be directly set to him/her as his/her technical property. But how could we fit the two aspects to each other?
In the post-capitalist era we can notice the repeated emergence of tendencies that – in an explicit or implicit, aware or unaware way – oppose themselves to bureaucracy. Despite all their differences that are sometimes mutually exclusive they have in common the attempt to set power to persons directly, independently of the positions occupied by each of them respectively.
This tendency manifests itself, e. g., in the radical mass movements of various orientation after World War I: it was not accidental that these movements produced everywhere the charismatic leader who proved to the combatants of the movement that one does not need to occupy any social position in order to have an increasing social power. Indeed, when, e. g., Gandhi resigned in 1934 of his post as party chief, it did not reduce at all his social power; neither was the position of head of government they occupied the source of their enormous social power for Lenin, or, on the other hand, for Hitler and Mussolini.
Similarly to the leader, the whole headquarters staff of a radical mass movement may acquire charisma, and also this collective charisma sets directly to its bearer a social power. Thus, a set of powers comes to be assigned to a group of persons in such a way that both the bearers of charisma and those under the effect of the charisma find it legitimate no matter who is the person and which is the power set concretely to each other.
In the same way, a whole political party may gain collective charisma in a revolution this party is the vanguard of. At the beginning, the members of the charismatic collective exercise the overthrown and sized power not as functionaries but commissaries. What happens is not that some party members begin to replace former functionaries in the positions of the bureaucratic structure in order to obtain the powers set to that position, but that one or another party member gets direct commission to exercise a certain power.
Later, of course, when the new power gets stabilized as state power, the principle of bureaucracy gains ascendancy: those commissioned to exercise certain powers become gradually appointed to positions with those powers as their functions. What’s more, with the development of the party apparatus the principle of bureaucracy also penetrates into the party: e. g. five years after the Russian revolution 15,325 functionaries were active in the apparatus of the party, and another 15 years later only at the intermediate level there were about three times as many party functionaries.
In respect of the above formulated question of economic psychology, i.e. how to fit the two aspects of producing the personal factor, it is far more significant that while the collective charisma directly sets power to a person, the collective charisma itself starts to be set to its bearer by appointment.
To gain access to charisma by appointment when charisma by definition sets power to a person without appointment would provide a social structure with the property of a paradox. Nevertheless it is worthwhile to admit that this paradoxical structure has emerged. Let us adduce some facts:
In May 1923 the C(b)PSU had 386,000 members who had made themselves Bolsheviks during their underground activity, the revolution and civil war and the social power they had at that time was provided them by this past record. Now, within a year the above number grew by more than 90%, and only in the four months following Lenin’s death 240,000 people were, upon Stalin’s initiative, appointed communists without any corresponding past record.
And then they inaugurated Stalin in his personal charisma. By appointment! Thus, the social power of having a social power independently of appointment became dependent of appointment. That Stalin’s case was an exemplary case of the operating of this paradox (see Garai, 1984) got crystal clear from Bukharin’s reply to a western sympathiser who wanted to find out how it was possible that with all those bright and excellent personages in the revolutionary central committee of the Bolshevik Party, the mediocre Stalin was chosen for the top. Not much before his arrest Bukharin answered: “It was not he personally that we placed our trust in but the man whom the party honoured with its trust.”
Thus in this structure the charisma of the leader is not borne in his own person but (in the last resort) the party appoints him to this individual charisma; the very party whose members partake of the collective charisma not on account of their past record of participation in a collective history but (in the last resort) get their appointment to party membership from that very leader. Now, the leader can be replaced by a collective leadership at one end (Politburo, Secretariat, etc.), while at the other end party membership may get reduced to the party apparatus; what does not change at all in this process is the perfectly efficient paradoxical feedback mechanism between the two ends.
Any attempt that tries to comprehend either the working of this mechanism or the principle of this working, democratic centralism, in terms of the categories of bureaucracy will lead to a blind alley.
The legitimacy of a bureaucracy – be it organized centralistically or democratically – is guaranteed by the fact that powers are exercised by those whose position imply this function. If they were placed in their position by the will of the people, then the definition of who belongs to the people is given incontestably and independently of them; if, on the other hand, they were placed in their position by a central will, it is given again incontestably and independently of them who belongs to the centre. It may happen in both cases that bureaucracy detaches itself from the ultimate source of its legitimacy, but this step will not be within its legitimate powers assigned as a function to its position.
The paradox that one would have legitimate powers to designate and replace the legitimation base of those powers is made possible and necessary, too, by the fact that powers keep not being set to a position but to the subject of a now institutional collective charisma. The mode of linking is determined by the nomenklatura.
The nomenklatura is a list, on one hand, of a set of powers and, on the other hand, of a group of people. Any of those powers may be set to anyone of these people and it makes no difference to them how exactly the actual distribution happens. What does matter is not the question of what is, in bureaucratic terms, the position one is appointed to, but the question to which nomenklatura the powers belong the exercise of which is legitimized by that appointment: to the central one which links a larger set of powers to a smaller group of people; or to a local one by which a smaller set of powers is allocated to a larger group of people.
Voslensky in his work on Nomenklatura (1980) states that the bureaucratic structure of the state, party, large scale enterprises, etc. is only a surface manifestation of the deep-lying structure of Soviet-type societies that turns out to be defined by nomenklatura (the same way as the deep structure of capitalist societies is determined by capital, i. e., Marx points out, not by the thing but by the relation). Now, for those who can only think in terms of producing and allocating the material conditions, these two systems of relations are not distinguishable since both are equally exterior as referred to such an economy.
On the other hand, if one apply the viewpoint of economic psychology that takes into consideration also producing and allocating, by a post-capitalist economic system, the personal conditions of its functioning, there appears the possibility to distinguish these two kinds of relations and to comprehend their connexions in Soviet-type societies based on those connexions (and that might be called for that reason nomenklaturist societies, much rather than, as we have got accustomed to calling them, socialist societies).

References

Garai, L., 1984: Vers une théorie psycho-économique de l’identité sociale. Recherches Sociologique. 25:2-3. 313-335.
Garai, L., 1987a: Determining economic activity in a post-capitalist system. Journal of Economic Psychology. 8. 77-90.
Garai, L., 1987b: To the psychology of economic rationality. In: Understanding economic behaviour. 12th Annual Colloquium of IAREP, the International Association for Research in Economic Psychology.  ‎Handelshøjskolen i Århus, 1987. Vol. I. 29-41.
Schumpeter, J., 1971: The instability of capitalism. In: Rosenbert, N. (ed.): The economics of technological change. N. Y.
Voslensky, 1980: La Nomenklatura. “Le livre de poche”, 5672. Pierre Belfond.
Weber, M., 1964: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. I. Kiepenhauer und Witsch, Köln-Berlin.

PSYCHOLOGY OF BOLSHEVIK-TYPE SYSTEMS

The bureaucratic state governed by an illegal movement
Soviet-type societies and Bolshevik-type parties

Abstract: A psychosocial study on structure and functioning of Bolshevik-type parties and Soviet-type societies. These societies (identifying themselves most frequently as those of “really existing socialism”) evolve their world of appearances, contrary to what has been discovered by Marx for the one in a capitalist society, emerged in relation not to matter (reification) but to persons. Traditional Marxian criticism of such an ideology claims persons in Soviet-type societies to be but personifications of positions in a bureaucratic structure. The paper argues that the organizing principle of these societies is not bureaucracy but charisma originated from 20th century’s radical ant bureaucratic (illegitimate) mass movements providing not only a charismatic leader but the whole headquarter and even the Party as an avantgarde with a social power that is set not to the position the person occupies but to persons directly, independently from positions occupied by each of them respectively. The paper analyzes the paradoxical structure of that collective charisma: to this social power that is independent from nomination in Soviet-type societies persons get nominated. Democratic centralism is described as the principle of such a paradoxical organization where the “Centrum” gets its social power by being put in its charisma by a “Demos” being put in its one by that social power.

Appearance and criticism
Marx developed a method for the critique of ideologies to reduce the appearances of a society to its substantial relations. The starting point of his method was his recognition that the substance of society’s network of connections is in its relations. Accordingly, when an ideological consciousness attributes the cause of some social effect to the properties of some matter, the task is to find the relations underlying this property.
Such a virtual property is the price of a commodity the rise and drop of which seems to be able to exert disastrous effects on society. In Marx’s view, however, price is not such a property of a commodity that could be traced back to the inside of the thing by some testing method; the effect is produced by the relations that exist among the producers of goods in a community of commodity production.
In the rare historic moments when in a Soviet-type society the Marxist-Leninist ideological leadership happened to tolerate social science research based on Marx’ methodology, hence including a radical critique of ideology and society, attempts were made to carry out investigations looking behind the appearances in these societies connected to the properties of things. All these attempts produced as a result was establishing facts of the capitalist social relations’ survival in the Soviet-type society, together with the appearance of their material forms. E. g. it appears to be a property of productive equipment both before and after the nationalizations that it is capable of producing more value than was used to produce it. By Marx’ method, however, it could be shown that the socially effective relation in this performance both before and after the nationalizations is the same, namely: the producers produced with tools that were not disposed of by them but by others.
This procedure did not lead to specific discoveries about “really existing socialism”, except perhaps that no specific discoveries are either possible or necessary since the “really existing socialism” is: capitalism.
We must note, however, that in regard to their ideological appearances, capitalism and socialism do differ from each other. The world of appearances in a capitalist society emerged in relation to matter, while that of a Soviet-type society to persons.
Thus, Nedd Ludd’s followers were convinced that the source of all evil was the machine that brought ruin to masses of people and had to be destroyed so that man might survive. On the other hand, at the outset of the 20th century, all the European and North American progressives advocated fully convinced that the source of all good was the machine that liberates man from the slavery of work.
Lenin’s followers, in turn, professed with just as much conviction that the source of all good was: Stalin, and then later, within socialism the source of all evil was: Stalin.
It seems then that a theory which provides a critique of the ideological appearances of a Soviet-type society and which aims at an understanding of the true deep structure of that society must be able to orient itself in the world of appearances related to the properties of persons and not matter.

The personality cult genuinely and the socialism?
After the Twentieth Congress, when the practice of deriving all the features of socialism from the features of Stalin’s person was first criticized, this feature of socialism was also derived from the personal features of Stalin. The cult of a person, it was claimed, was utterly strange to the substance of socialism since socialism emerged independently of the good or bad intentions of persons, responding instead to the necessity of matter.
It is noteworthy that today, when the commonplace of blaming all the gradually exposed shortcomings of an entire era on Stalin’s personal characteristics is criticized, the argument goes on to warn that we shouldn’t forget about Stalin’s environment either, i.e. about other persons’ (like Beria, Molotov, Voroshilov)... personal characteristics.
The domination of appearances related to personal properties did not apply to the cult of Stalin alone, even in his time. How seriously that period took Stalin’s motto “It all depends on the cadres” is proved by the enormous effort made to produce on a mass scale suitable (for Stalin) cadres.
And this work which was aimed at transforming human nature, was not in the least confined to the cadres upon whom things did indeed depend at one time or other. This society-wide effort set as its target the most private property of each and every person: his conviction. This is what is borne out by the unprecedented control exercised in centralized societies over all uttered or written words, since such societies attribute to the word the omnipotent power of influencing human will. This point is crucial because socialism throughout its history has derived consequences from intentions. It works either by concluding from good intentions to good consequences or by attributing bad intentions to bad consequences.
One outcome of this attitude is the certainty that if a revolution overthrows the status quo in the name of socialism, the result of this historic deed will be the socialism. Even if the revolution that breaks out in one country is not followed by a Marxian global revolution, then what in this country emerged as a result of socialist intentions will be socialism.
On the other hand, bad intentions are blamed for the tarrying of global revolution: the cause of revolution would be betrayed, e.g., by social democratic leaders with bad intentions. Later the circle of those with hostile, treacherous intentions keeps widening: while the central bureaucracy not only declares that a future consequence (whatever it may be) shall be socialism, but also predefines by a planning what exactly shall be realized, then it attributes all the deficiencies of realization to the consequences of hostile, saboteuring intentions. When agriculture declines because the resources of its development are channelled into forced industrialization, this consequence of the socialist intention is itself regarded as socialist; when the same decline results from an invasion of Colorado beetles, then the non-socialist intention underlying this obviously non-socialist consequence is searched out and found in the Titoist imperialists who must have planted the pestiferous insects. A stylistic parody of this turn of mind is Sartre’s comment that the construction of the Budapest subway system was interrupted by the counterrevolutionary soil of the Hungarian capital (in the mid-fifties it turned out that the technology used for constructing the Moscow Underground begun could not be used in Budapest in a soil rich in hot springs).

Bureaucracy?
Now, if we want to apply a Marxian critical theoretical analysis to the surface of the above ideological appearances what relations could be found beneath them?
Whenever the time comes in a Soviet-type society to criticize the system, the thought of Milovan Djilas is invariably brought up according to which persons to whom the above appearances are referred have no social impact as a function of their personal qualities. In fact, in this system social power is not exerted by persons at all, but is assigned by bureaucracy to a position in the social structure and is attached to the individual only insomuch as he legitimately occupies a given position. Thus, among other things, disposition over the means of production is not attached to a person as a possibility mediated by his owning these means privately; instead, it is attached to positions of various levels in economic management through the mediation of which the powers of an economic injunction can be borne by any person who happens to be legitimately in the given position.
This hypothesis – that the deep structure of a Soviet-type society is determined by the system of bureaucratic relations – is seemingly reinforced by Max Weber’s 1922 statement that the organization of a socialist economic life “would only entail the enormous increase in the professional bureaucracy”. At the same time, Weber also noted that bureaucracy as an all-pervasive tendency was produced “not only by capitalism, but principally and undeniably by it’ because it needed a rational, predictable management technique for the running of large enterprises. In the final analysis, Weber states, “the economy, irrespective of the fact whether it is organized in the capitalist or socialist manner, ...would only mean the enormous increase in the professional bureaucracy,” if socialism aspires to the same level of technical performance as capitalism.
If Weber were right in considering the bureaucracy a common characteristic of both socialism and capitalism, it wouldn’t be very fruitful to identify the deep structure of a socialist (as opposed to a capitalist) society with bureaucracy. The real situation is quite the contrary.

Charisma and appointment
One common feature shared by several diverse mass movements of the 20th century is the tendency toward anti-bureaucracy. Explicitly or implicitly, wittingly or unwittingly, such movements oppose the bureaucratic principle which claims that social power is not the person’s who exerts it but belongs instead to the position the person occupies in society.
Despite many and sometimes mutually exclusive differences, these mass movements have in common the attempt to set power to persons directly and independently of the positions occupied by each of those persons, respectively. The tendency is apparent, for instance, in the charismatic leader who derives his social power from the very anti-bureaucracy, anti-state movement and not from the bureaucratic state authority.
It would be hard, for example, to conceive of Lenin’s powers as a function of his position as head of government in the new Soviet state organized after the revolution, or to derive those powers from the fact that he was one of members of the Bureau of the Party’s Central Committee. Although I shall return to the peculiar nature of Stalin’s charisma later; but let it be noted here that it too cannot be derived from his being the head of the Party apparatus (secretary general). In non-communist mass movements as well, we find that the social power of the person is independent of the position he takes; e. g. after 1934 Ghandi did not occupy any position either in his Party or, after the proclamation of India’s independence, in the state.
In the historical process in which the anti-state movement overthrows and seizes power in various countries, the movement itself is not only the medium of the leader’s charisma but is also the subject of a sort of collective charisma.
Even more pronouncedly becomes the subject of a collective charisma the Party that leads the movement and still more the Party’s headquarters staff. It is to be noted that the collective charisma also sets directly to its bearer a social power. This is done in such a way that the wider the circle of the carriers of the collective charisma, the narrower the set of powers assigned to this group of people. It is also important to note, however, that both the bearers of the charisma and those under its influence may find such power legitimate, no matter how the powers are distributed among persons in the group that bears those powers.
At the beginning after the victory of a revolutionary movement the members of the charismatic collective exercise the power they have seized not as functionaries but as commissaries. What happens is not that some Party members begin to replace former functionaries in the positions of the bureaucratic structure in order to obtain the powers set to those positions, but that one or another Party member gets direct commission to exercise a certain power.
Later, of course, when the new power stabilizes as state power, the principle of bureaucracy gains ascendancy: those commissioned to exercise certain powers become gradually appointed to positions with those powers as their functions. What’s more, with the development of the Party apparatus the principle of bureaucracy also penetrates into the Party: e. g. five years after the Russian revolution 15,325 functionaries were active in the apparatus of the Party, and another fifteen years later there were about three times as many Party functionaries at the intermediate level alone.
Far more important is that while the collective charisma sets social powers to persons directly, independently from appointment, however these persons start to get installed into that collective charisma by appointment. Invest someone by appointment with power that is independent from appointment – this paradoxical social structure did emerged during the Bolshevik history.
In May 1923 the C(b)PSU had 386,000 members who had made themselves Bolsheviks during their underground activity, revolution and civil war and the social power they had at that time was provided them by this past record. Now, within a year the above number grew by more than 90%, and only in the four months following Lenin’s death 240,000 people were, upon Stalin’s initiative, appointed communists without any corresponding past record.
In 1930 69% of the secretaries of the Central Committees of the Soviet republics and of the regional Party committees had been Party members since before the revolution and thus carried personally the collective charisma of the old Bolshevik guard. Nine years later 80.5% of those invested with this charisma had become Party members after Lenin’s death in 1924.
The tragically grotesque reverse of the paradox of being inaugurated into the charisma by appointment was the fact that the members of the old guard were “dismissed” from the collective charisma of which they had partaken on account of their past record, while they were at the same time “appointed” to the position of “the enemy of the people”.
When we view the cult of leader’s personality in the light of this, it can be asserted that Stalin also obtained his personal charisma by appointment. The paradox that having social power independently of appointment itself has become dependent on appointment is lucidly illustrated by Bukharin’s reply to a western sympathizer who wanted to find out how it was possible that with all those bright and excellent personages in the revolutionary central committee of the Bolshevik Party, the mediocre Stalin was chosen for the top. Not much before his arrest Bukharin answered: “It was not he personally that we placed our trust in, but the man whom the Party honored with its trust.”
Thus in this structure the leader’s charisma does not irradiate from the depths of his own personality but from the Party’s appointment of him to this individual charisma. On the other hand, this is the very Party whose members partake of collective charisma not on account of their past record of participation in a collective history, but because they owe their appointment to Party membership from that very leader.
The leader can be replaced by a collective leadership (Politburo, Secretariat; see below), at one end, while at the other end Party membership may get reduced to the Party apparatus; what does not change at all in this process is the perfectly efficient paradoxical feedback mechanism between the two ends.
The principle of such a feedback of structuring and functioning of Bolshevik-type parties is that of democratic centralism.

Democratic centralism
The same manner as one often tries to understand Soviet-type societies in terms of bureaucracy, it seems to be the more appropriate term for understanding Bolshevik-type parties with its apparatus in luxuriant growth. However, any attempt that tries to comprehend this organization in such terms will lead to a blind alley.
The feedback in a bureaucratic system – be it centrally or democratically organized – concerns the latter’s functioning and not structuring. If those whose position imply a function were appointed to that position by the will of a “Centrum”, it is given incontestably and independently of them who belongs to that centre; if, on the other hand, they were elected to their position by the “Demos”, then the definition of who belongs to the people is given again incontestably and independently of them. It may happen in both cases that bureaucracy detaches itself from the ultimate source of its legitimacy, but this step is apparently illegal: it falls necessarily outside the scope of power assigned as its legitimate function.
On the other hand, in the system of democratic centralism, the most important legitimate function assigned to a position within the Party apparatus is “to decide in personnel questions”, that is, to manage the practical problem of appointing or dismissing the subject of the collective charisma. The fundamental question in an organization of this structure is who constitutes the “Centrum” and who belong to the “Demos”. By the time the “Demos” gets in a position where it can have its will asserted democratically in the election of the “Centrum”, its composition can be changed in such a way by the apparatus, by virtue of its legitimate right to expel from and admit to its membership that the new composition will elect that “Centrum” which the apparatus, by its legitimate power, has previously nominated. Whether elected by the membership or appointed by the Party committee at the relevant level, the Party apparatus has the legitimate means to guarantee the conditions of its power for a practically unlimited length of time, at least in periods without radical shocks.
The Party apparatus does not always take such strongly marked steps as it did in Cuba. According to a well known doctrine, a socialist revolution is always the deed of the Communist Party, still the empirically given Communist Party headed by Blas Roca at that time condemned the revolution as petty bourgeois adventurism. Six years after the victory of the revolution this latter’s headquarter headed by Fidel Castro replaced the whole Communist Party by a new one that was to hold its first congress only some ten years later. Nevertheless, hereafter the validity of the above doctrine was ensured: from that moment on the revolution had been the deed of this communist Party.
The Czechoslovak Party apparatus only dismissed a single Party congress: the first XIVth Congress held on 22 August 1968 in Vysočany was replaced by the second XIVth Congress. And the Party was purged of 500,000 people in the absence of whose potential votes to the opposite, the Party apparatus could go on exercising its powers legitimately including its right to expel 500,000 people from the Party whose potential votes might have stripped this power of legitimacy.
That less far-reaching practice of dismissing the old Politburo and Central Committee by the new secretary general for the very first years of his office is worth while mentioning only because it may seem us as trivial as dismissing in any bureaucratic system the staff of the previous superior by the succeeding one, although the Politburo and the Central Committee is by no means a staff for the secretary general who is subordinate to them.
On the other hand the apparatus to whom the secretary general is indeed superordinate are able to dismiss him as they really did with Khroushtchev in the Soviet or Dubček in the Czechoslovak Party, thereby forestalling the possibility of their taking any measures concerning that apparatus. In the absence of such measures, their dismissal continued to be a legitimate exercising of their powers.
The paradox of having the legitimate power to appoint or dismiss the basis of legitimation for this power is made possible and necessary by the fact that the powers are not set to positions but to the subject of the collective charisma institutionalized at the level of state-administration by the one-party system.

A detour into social psychology
It is an important precondition of any organization to have greater coherence between its parts than between any of these parts and the environment of the organization.
Tajfel (1981) states social psychology uses a kind of group concept for which “members of a group are considered as such when they categorize themselves with a high degree of consensus in the appropriate manner and are consensually categorized in the same manner by others”. He adds that social psychology “is not concerned with the historical, political, social and economic events which may have led to the social consensus now defining who is »in« and who is »out«“, and he also points out that while “there is no doubt that these events were crucial in the establishment of the nature of this consensus; and is equally true that the consensus once established represents those social psychological aspect of social reality which interact with the social, political and economic events determining the present and the future fate of the group and of its relations with other groups” (pp. 229-230).
Regarding the social psychological processes of consensus, the form by which the members of a group belong together and separate themselves from those outside the group might become more important than the substance of the economic, political, ideological and cultural events that carry the form. That is why it can often be observed that people invariably overemphasize their new attachments and detachments by overemphasizing shared similarities and, respectively, dissimilarities of what they do, say, think or feel, or the way how they do it.
But, paradoxically, the formal structure of relations also belongs to the substance that it gives form to:
If the members of a group believe they have some feature in common with each other, this common belief itself suffices to create community among them. If, on the other hand, they share the consideration of not sharing anything, this common belief leaves them less reason to have it.
One can imagine a group in which some will tolerate no one with intentions different from the common will, while others will opt for the possibility of divergence. In such cases the mere utterance of these conflicting standpoints immediately changes the material reality to which they refer: the mere expression of the first claim against the second immediately puts into force this other position (as the divergence turns out to be possible), while the fact itself that the second position may also be uttered invalidates its opposite (as there is someone who does represent an intention deviating from the common will).
Those paradoxical social structurings – in which the relation of a set of factors is included in this very set – establish or undermine themselves, thus the logic that looks for external foundations underlying the existence of social phenomena and external mines under their abolition in order to understand them is inadequate.

The unknown secret of a well-known organization
It is a well-known historical fact that the Bolshevik-type parties make a point of the disciplined unity of their members and their pronounced disunity even with those whose position on crucial questions may differ only slightly from that of the Party; it is also an open secret that it uses skillfully the political weapon of striking and disrupting alliances –. shuttling between unity and disunity – in relation to its allies.
When surveying the historical manifestations of the strategy and tactics of unity and disunity within Bolshevik-type parties and around them, one begins to feel that these processes are generated by those who, to put it in Tajfel’s terms quoted above, attach greater importance to the form than to the substance of economic, political, ideological and cultural events: a Bolshevik-type party often attaches less significance to the substance of what members do, say, feel or think as compared to the form by which the fact in question resembles what other Party members (or of them, for instance the followers of Stalin) do, say, think or feel, and differ from what others (including, e. g. Trotsky’s followers within the Party) do, say, think or feel.
To understand rightly the relations organized by Bolshevik-type parties we have to take into account their paradoxical structure. The history of these parties often demonstrates that unity and disunity are defined in reference to such factors the most important of which is the relation of unity and disunity itself. In a party organized on the basis of democratic centralism there must be disciplined unity concerning the requirement that in the Party there must be disciplined unity; at the same time, the Bolshevik-type party always makes efforts to impose disunity to those elements of society from whose totality the Party maintains its disunity.
Usually this tendency of accentuating both its own unity and its adversaries’ disunity is considered only from a sociotechnical point of view, i.e. from that of practicability for a political organization to unify itself and disunify adversaries. However, in case of this type of Party there is a much more profound effect of defining people’s social identity, while the above paradoxes by which social structures establish or undermine themselves are applied. Namely, social identity of those belonging to a Bolshevik-type party turns out to establish itself while the identity of those opposed to that party gets undermined.
Let us consider a continuum of four categories of people: +Be with extreme Bolshevik, +Bm with moderate Bolshevik, -Bm with moderate non-Bolshevik and -Be with extreme non-Bolshevik attitudes. All things considered, the position of +Bm may be as close to that of -Bm (whose is non-Bolshevik, but moderate) as to the one of +Be (Bolshevik, but extremist). And, similarly, the position of -Bm may be as distant from that of +Bm (though moderate, but Bolshevik) as from the position of -Be (although non-Bolshevik, but extremist). A Bolshevik-type organization of relations on that continuum means 1., the accentuation of the unity between +Be and +Bm; 2., sharpening of the disunity between +Bm and -Bm; 3., the suggestion to -Be and -Bm to accentuate their disunity; 4., and the unity between -Bm and +Bm.
Now, the way these four categories of people elaborate their social identity, as referred to their social relations, effectively changes these relations and thus strengthens or weakens the merits of the choice for identity. And namely, strengthens the Bolshevik side of the above continuum and weakens its non-Bolshevik side:
When both extremist and moderate Bolsheviks state their unity the unity in this statement strengthen what they state. On the other hand, the unity of both extremist and moderate non-Bolsheviks in claiming their disunity weaken the relation they are claiming. And as to the relations of two moderate categories, the more the non-Bolsheviks insist on their unity while that of Bolsheviks keeps accentuating their disunity, the more they manifest a disunity and not unity.
An organization that evolves on the basis of some properties’ substance does not necessarily fix the relations’ form in which the bearers of these substantial properties can interact with each other and with the bearers of some other properties. Of course, it is useful for a political organization to be united and to prevent its opposition from forming their own unity. Yet some form of unity is already derived from the fact that members are uniformly workers, for example, and some disunity with others is ensured by the latter not being workers. That would remain unchanged even if the latter gathered in a party of their own, or factions emerged within the former’s party.
Quite different is the case with a party which defines its internal unity and the disunity with the external world not in terms of some substance but in terms of this very form of unity and disunity. Such a party can only distinguish between its own organization and those outside it by accentuating the former’s unity and the latters’ disunity.
It follows from this paradoxical organization that the Bolshevik-type party can tolerate neither those outside the Party forming their own unity (setting up a party besides the Party) nor those within the Party disrupting unity (members aligning themselves by factions): none of these developments would allow for the differentiation between the two formally defined poles.
Within the unity of the Party, the pattern of disunity characterizing the relationship between the Party and those outside it is repeated: the “Centrum” defined by democratic centralism is disunited within the Party from the “Demos” in the same way as the Party is separated from those outside the Party. The “Centrum”, as the bearer of formal unity, is disunited from the “Demos”, which is formally disunited: local Party units get disunited from one another and no relationship can be established between them unless mediated by the “Centrum”.
The pattern of disunity is further repeated within the “Centrum”: the Politburo preserves its unity against the larger Central Committee just as the latter separates itself from the whole membership.
Yeltsin’s memorable faux pas is illuminating in this regard. The first secretary of the Moscow Party committee addressed the plenary meeting of the Central Committee as substitute member of the Politburo without preliminarily thrashing out with the Politburo his highly critical comments on the organizational and personal constraints on perestroika. Thus, in breaching Politburo discipline by divulging secrets to those outside the Politburo, he violated the same structure as a Party member would in breaching Party discipline by releasing Party secrets to outsiders; in the structure of democratic centralism both are seen as cardinal offenses.
In such an organization the inner circle always has power over the outer circle. The pledge of former’s power is, however, resignation from this power in favor of a still more inner circle. For in none of the circles is the position of power differentiated from powerless positions by a definite substance; one cannot say that the power is lodged with the workers, or the bureaucrats, or the managers; one cannot say that power belongs to those whom the army or the security forces obey, who have capital or who have knowledge, who can use the tools of propaganda, who have college degrees or a past record in the workers’ movement The only criterion of a power position is formal: it is the position characterized by unity – in contrast to the powerless position of those disunited from one another. Those who relinquish power on behalf of a still more inner circle demonstrate that they have adopted the position of unity. The position of power, that is.
That explains the exceptional discipline which is characteristic of all circles of power. Those expelled from the innermost circles almost never protest or argue against the expulsion: they do not set up a “true” Politburo, a “true” Central Committee, a “true” Party in opposition to the “false” or “treacherous” Politburo, CC or Party. Should they do so, their acts would immediately reveal that they were not in a position of unity but of disunity. The position of powerlessness, that is.
“We cannot be right unless with, or through the Party”, Trotsky wrote.
For a psychologist, the history of the communist movement is the history of the persons who remained loyal to the Party that expelled them.
This disciplined solidarity with the innermost circles usually remained unchanged even when someone was banished not only from Party leadership or Party membership, but also from among the normal citizens into the world of convicts or forced labour camps, or even from the world of the living.
Savarius recalled a meeting in the anteroom of Rakosi in 1954. He was waiting for his turn to be received by Rakosi when Janos Kadar left Rakosi’s office. Both he and Savarius had just been released from prison; both were aware of this fact and of Rakosi’s responsibility for their imprisonment. But Kadar started telling Savarius how genuinely indignant Rakosi became when he just learned from Kadar how badly certain comrades were treated.
One of the greatest mysteries for the twentieth-century progressive social thinking is why the victims of Stalin’s great terror, who were brought to court openly at a time when they had no longer any hope of a personal future offered heavily damning testimonies against themselves. But, the mystery is resolved when we realize that, in fact, these communists, forced into a tragic situation, confessed to being traitors to the Party in order to manifest their loyalty to it: when they were instructed by the Party to confess to disuniting acts against it, had they declared never having committed any would have been the very disuniting act.

The Nomenklatura
The true secret of the deep structure of a Soviet-type society is that the organization of democratic centralism – in which the inner circle has power over the outer circle under the condition that the former relinquishes power in favour of a still more inner circle – eventually encompasses the entire society.
It is to be remembered at this point that the relation between the inner and outer circles of the structure of a Soviet-type society is not identical with the relations between the upper and lower levels of a bureaucratic hierarchy. The inner circles house the subject of a collective charisma institutionalized for the entire society, while the outer circles house the medium of that charisma.
The charisma assigns some social power directly to a person, while the collective charisma assigns a set of powers to a set of people. This relation is materialized in the nomenklatura which contains both the stock of powers that are set directly to persons in the more inner or more peripheral circles, and the list of persons to whom they are set. Voslensky argues in an excellent book that the relations materialized in the Nomenklatura are the class relations that determine the deep structure of a Soviet-type society.
The first historically decisive development with relevance to the future emergence of the Nomenklatura as a class was the emergence of the category of the professional revolutionist in the course of the rise of a Bolshevik-type party. Viewed in purely economic terms, the persons belonging to this category subsisted differently from any of the three basic classes of the capitalist society: they did not live by either the profit of their capital, the rent of their land or the wages for their labour. The nature of their subsistence was similar to that of the bureaucrat’s in the sense that they obtained it through activities concerning the State status quo; only, while the bureaucrat’s activity was aimed at preserving the status quo, the professional revolutionist’s was aimed at overthrowing it.
The second historically decisive development was the emergence of the organizing principle of democratic centralism, which provided the professional revolutionist with immense independence through, and partly against, the membership of the party organization he had helped to develop. How this principle acts was seen above.
At the time of the Russian Revolution the resulting organization was a mere tool even with all its immense independence and operativeness, and there was perfect consensus between the professional revolutionists and the Party membership as to the goal in view of which it could be judged to what extent the functioning of the organization was authentic and to what extent it wasn’t.
The third historically decisive development was the replacement of the Party membership, determined by the substance of a revolutionary socialism, by one that was determined solely by the form of democratic centralism connecting that membership with the old guard of professional revolutionists. This replacement was in part made necessary by the civil war that killed a large section of the authentic Party membership, and in part it was realized by Stalin’s initiative to appoint a new membership to the collective charisma of the Bolshevik party.
Finally, the fourth historically decisive development was the great terror of the years after Kirov’s murder, by which Stalin carried out the same replacement, now at that place of the structure which had so far been taken by the Leninian staff of the professional revolutionists. As a result of a sequence of bloody personnel changes, the new structure made sure no one could lay claim to certain power on truly substantional grounds (e. g. with reference to the fact that his past record testifies to his being really a revolutionist, an authentic Marxist, etc.).
As a consequence of the Stalinian transformation, the position of the structure developed by and for the professional revolutionists still was taken by people
a) whose social power was not the function of their position but assigned to their persons directly by a collective charisma,
b) to which they were, nevertheless, inaugurated as to a post
c) by “democratic” decisions made possible or impossible by the preliminary decisions of “centralism”, in social psychological games played in the forms of “unity” and “disunity”, while
d) for both the “Centrum” and the “Demos” this power structure becomes the end, while functioning in terms of the original value (socialism) the means.

And now?
In the light of the above we can better understand what is currently happening in Soviet-type societies and their Bolshevik-type parties.
We are to see two points now: one surprising and one preventing from a quite possible mistake.
What surprises most witnesses of developments in Soviet-type societies is the rapid disintegration of the Bolshevik-type party, while, at the same time, quick shifts of this tendency are guided (at least in Soviet Union and in Hungary, and at least in the beginning, but for a rather considerable period of time) by this very Party.
In the Soviet Union in a little over 5 years Gorbachev has succeeded if not to change, at least to query the totality of the 73 years of the Soviet history, including the Lenin’s revolution itself: all this in an empire where throughout those 73 years no querying was allowed even if referred to a trivial aspect of the system.
And in Hungary (though on a much smaller scale) in less than 2 years the Bolshevik-type party has had it in its power
to change at once the large majority of the Central Committee and the Politburo staff and the person of the secretary general (Kádár to Grósz);
to shift in the ideological judgment about very important items of the recent political history (1956: from “counter-revolution” to “popular insurrection”);
3. It has given up three fundamental doctrines and the social practice corresponding to these doctrines:
a. By renouncing the principle of democratic centralism the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party at its last Congress (1989, October) demolished its own organizational edifice based on that principle and set up a new one comprising not 800 thousands members of primary organizations in all economic, administrative, cultural and other offices throughout the country as earlier, only 50 thousands people organized the non-Bolshevik way of any parliamentary party.
b. By dropping the dogma of the Party being the vanguard of the proletarian class and of the whole society this latter was given (still by a decision of the Central Committee of the Party) the possibility to freely elect a new Parliament with a large (almost 90%) non-Communist majority.
c. By giving up the dogma of the dictatorship of the proletariat no protection of this class against prejudicial consequences (e. g., unemployment) of a certain economic development prevented any more steps to be taken to such a development.
Traditionally, normal political organisations are established by outside forces, and thus they may be eliminated in an organized way only by other outside forces. On the other hand, if an organization is destroyed from inside the revolutionary processes are either spontaneous and not organized or organized by another organization opposed to the one of the establishment.
An organizational suicide became realizable only through the perfectly efficient paradoxical feedback mechanism which I have described here. What has occurred is nothing but another manifestation of democratic centralism – this time, however, entirely reversed in functioning.
*
Now, as to a quite possible mistake: it is about the end of the communism. Thoughts aiming at this conclusion consider communism as a political establishment and its ideological spirit. In this sense communism seems indeed to come to an end.

The paradoxes of the Bolshevik-type psycho-social structure in economy
László Garai
Institute for Psychology, Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Budapest, Hungary

Abstract: The paper deals with the social psychology of competition versus monopoly as referred to the 20th century second modernization.
This latter’s main difference is made with the 19th century first modernization in manufacturing not only material but also human factors of the actual socio-economic system’s functioning. It is stated that unlike the material production depending only on technical attributes of both producing and produced factors, the modern human production is determined also by the factors’ social relations.
Those of competition versus monopoly are considered as psycho-social conditions for an optimal functionning of a market vs planned economic system. Totalitarian states are pictured as factories for the mass-production of a perfect competition with the complete eradication (by the fascist or national socialist type totalitarian states) of monopolistic factors versus those for the mass-production of a perfect monopoly with the complete eradication (by the Bolshevik type totalitarian states) of competitive factors in the society.

Research antecedents
This paper is going to deal with the society Schumpeter meant when in a writing of the post-World War I period (1922) he stated that capitalism was transforming so obviously into something else that he considered not the fact itself, merely its interpretation, to be a point of contention: whether what capitalism transformed into after the war and the subsequent revolutions and counter-revolutions was socialism or not Schumpeter considered only a matter of taste and terminology (pp. 41-43).
To eschew this “matter of taste and terminology”, when I started studying this radically transformed system whether of market, planned or mixed character I labelled it post-capitalism. In my earlier investigations (Garai, 1987, 1988, 1991a) I was led to the conclusion that the essence of this transformation is the transition from the first, 19th century phase of the modernization to the 20th century second modernization.
I understand by modernization the tendency according to which the society intervenes artificially into natural processes in order to provide itself with conditions of its own functioning. Those earlier studies revealed that during the first modernization period the socio-economic system dealt with its material and human conditions differently: by producing the material factors it depended on, on one hand, and by making itself independent of the human phenomena which had not been produced by it. Now, from the turn of the century onwards running the socio-economic system was no longer independent of the faculties and needs acting in the population and, consequently, it faced the necessity of manufacturing also its own human conditions.

Three classes
When one starts to examine how during the second modernization this necessity has been dealt with, the first statement he can make is about a technology the state in various countries introduced practically simultaneously in the period starting with World War I. The technology in question tried to apply to handling people the same logic of a large scale mass production in processing industry the economic organizations of the previous century successfully used in handling things.
The logic of processing industry ranges things into three classes: the class of useful things complying with the aims of man is opposed to the class of harmful things countering man’s aims; between them is the class of raw materials, whose originally neutral attributes can be turned useful upon a useful effect and harmful upon a harmful one. Processing industry exposes raw materials to useful effects and, at the same time, in order to protect these materials against harmful effects it tries to narrow the spectrum of these latters’ causes by the most effective procedure, i.e. by eradicating harmful things themselves.
The same way, the state whose ambition was boosted in World War I ranges persons into three classes: the class of those who make themselves useful as means for the state’s most exalted ends; those who subject themselves as malleable raw materials to the educational ambitions of the former class; finally, the class of harmful people who traverse the above ends of the state. As this latter class, misusing the malleability of the human raw material, would win over a part of it to their side, therefore the most effective procedure against them is considered to be their extermination.
This practice and the relevant ideology have perfected itself in the totalitarian state. But the date of its birth is not 1933, when the national socialists assumed power in Germany; or 1922, when in Italy the fascists did so; nor is it 1917 when the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia. The totalitarian state was born in 1914 when, in various states simultaneously, the still traditional power fulfilled a no longer traditional task: from the raw material represented by civil persons who had been set to “live and let live” the mobilization order produced on a large scale this useful product represented by soldiers. Further on, the totalitarian states inherited this ready-made tool to be used for their goals, and, in addition, also inherited the “know how” to operate with almost unlimited efficiency large scale works in this peculiar processing industry in which the tools, raw materials and pestiferous factors are all human beings.
At first glance one would conclude that the Bolshevik-type society was the survivor of this totalitarian state formation: it made use of the products and the “know how” produced by the two-act World War for forty years after them, and now, with a delay of a whole epoch, it follows its ideological antagonist to the sink of history.
When, however, we consistently apply the viewpoint of economic psychology instead of an ideological approach, we shall discover yet another implication.

A peculiar commodity: the relation
There exists such a difference between things and persons, which makes it impossible to simply apply the logic of handling one of these categories to handling the other one. The point is that things can, while persons cannot unambiguously be by their attributes classified into one of the above-mentioned three groups. Regarding persons, when we try to trace down their attributes in order to explain social phenomena their causes turn out to be relations instead. For instance, someone in majority exerts his influence differently from someone in minority (Moscovici, 1976).
Relations have a logic that is quite different from that of attributes. That gets particularly evident if we compare how does that logic work when one wants to define his/her social identity in terms of attributes or relations, respectively.
Let us see, e. g., the attribute of a fine crop of hair which, if necessary, may clearly differentiate my social category from that of bald-heads. In this case the attribute and the social category are somehow interrelated: if I want to switch over to the other social category I may be compelled to give up my attribute and assume that of the other group. On the other hand, if I want to exchange my attribute for theirs I have to accept that the moment I shave my head close, as a result, I will belong in some way among the bald-heads.
A well-known tendency is connected with this relation: as soon as a markedly different attribute (e.g., skin color) is noticed on someone s/he is made susceptible to be classed in a social category detached from the category of those who noticed the difference. And, on the other hand, when a group of people defines their social identity as categorically different from that of others, they are willing to develop also an attribute that is just as different (cf. the skin-heads).
Completely different is the case when two social categories differentiate themselves along some relations and not attributes. Unlike attributes, the value that characterizes a person in terms of a relation can be detached from the social category to which the person belongs. E.g., I may belong to those who are the majority in some regard, the other group being the minority. It is then possible that I change groups without ceasing to be a majority person, for my very joining may have changed the other group from minority to majority status. Or it may also happen that I become a minority person without changing groups, if some of my fellow-members shifted their group.
Therefore, when a totalitarian state tries to apply the same logic to persons’ relations by which the traditional processing industry handles the things’ attributes, then everything turns upside down.
So far, the authors of folk-poetry of jokes have taken a greater interest in this upside-down situation than those who should reckon with it for some serious matter. When, for instance, we want to get rid of a harmful effect of a certain attribute, the technology of exterminating the very last specimen of the things carrying this attribute guarantees 100% success. This is turned inside out by the following joke applying the technology to relations instead of attributes: “Are there cannibals among you, gentlemen?”, the missionary asks the natives. “No, sir”, their spokesman replies. “We ate the last one yesterday.”
This paradox turning things upside down, however, immediately assumes a serious countenance when we realize that the basic psycho-socio-economic problem the second modernization has to deal with is just connected to relations. The point is that
THE OPTIMUM FUNCTIONING OF A MARKET ECONOMY REQUIRES THE RELATION OF PERFECT COMPETITION, I. E. ONE THAT NO MONOPOLY OF ANY OF THE ECONOMIC ACTORS RESTRAINS.	
And, on the other hand,
THE OPTIMUM FUNCTIONING OF A PLANNED ECONOMY REQUIRES THE RELATION OF PERFECT MONOPOLY OF THE PLANNING AUTHORITY, I. E. ONE NOT RESTRAINED BY THE COMPETITION OF OTHERS.	
Now, in fact, the actual psycho-socio-economic relations by the early 20th century it became manifest that competition and monopoly do constrain each other and, thus, for the optimum running of either a market or a planned economy various totalitarian states of the second modernization period by the peculiar processing industry they run have to transform these ambiguous relations into an unambiguous one (either competition, or monopoly).
As to this processing industry whose raw material is the above ambiguous relation, two paradoxical statements have to be done. According to the first one
THE COEXISTENCE OF COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY IS ITSELF A COMPETITION,	
between interests in competition and interests in the monopoly. On the other hand, if this ambiguous relation as a raw material gets successfully processed, than the exclusiveness of either of the two relations turns out to be the final product. But
BOTH THE EXCLUSIVENESS OF MONOPOLY OVER COMPETITION AND THE EXCLUSIVENESS OF COMPETITION OVER MONOPOLY IMPLY MONOPOLY.	
Whenever in the 20th century the human processing industry functions by the principle of the market, it only intervenes in the spontaneous events to protect the market from the monopoly and guarantee the undisturbed competition. And by this very intervention the competition between monopoly and competition got changed for the monopoly of the competition. This was the main trend in the development of that kind of totalitarian states which had been represented by the fascist Italy and the national-socialist Germany.
With this type of totalitarian states it is customary to state that contrary to Bolshevik-type totalitarian states, their economic development does not break off but continues uninterrupted after the collapse of the political regime, because allegedly these systems have not undermined the market, the basis of economy.
But there is more to it than that. These totalitarian states tried to process their raw material in such a way that the market should be ensured the personal condition of perfect competition (as was expressed by such elements of their propaganda as the promotion of dangerous living, the cult of heroes), while those factors of the economic life get eradicated which is believed to be carriers of monopolies (Jewish businessmen, trade unions, etc.)
“Are there cannibals among you, gentlemen?’ – “No, sir, we ate the last one yesterday.” The paradox of the joke I quoted above is dead serious: in order to eradicate monopoly, the fascist and national socialist totalitarian state made itself the possessor of an unprecedented power monopoly.
The determination of the totalitarian state to shape human raw material failed in the case of fascist, national-socialist totalitarian states not because the technology of processing has been morally abject but because of the above logical absurdities as a result of which the system itself undermined its existence.
In this regard, completely different was the Bolshevik-type society. This difference is not the one that the dominant ideologies of both types of totalitarian state kept in evidence as something exaggerated to cosmic proportions (which shows another facet of their similarities).
The boundaries of differing were determined by the fundamental similarity that both types of totalitarian state were organized by extending the successful technology of processing industry from things to persons, while again both used that double heritage of the world war: soldiers produced from civilians and the know-how of such a processing.
What does differentiate the Bolshevik-type society within these boundaries is that here the human processing technology, when applied to make ambiguous relations unambiguous, is practiced in the interest of planning, in order to protect it from the competition and guarantee the undisturbed monopoly of the planning authorities.
The human processing technology has in any case a paradoxical effect turning intentions upside down. But
A FASCIST-TYPE STATE IN ORDER TO GET THE MARKET PROVIDED WITH THE COMPETITION ERADICATES COMPETITION AND PROTECTED FROM MONOPOLY CREATES MONOPOLY	
while
A BOLSHEVIK TYPE STATE IN ORDER TO GET THE PLAN PROTECTED FROM THE COMPETITION ERADICATES COMPETITION AND PROVIDED WITH THE MONOPOLY CREATES MONOPOLY	
By the first paradoxical connection the social structure that is to be built undermines itself, while by the second paradoxical connection it establishes itself. The difference between the two kinds of paradoxical social structure is especially important to keep in evidence in order to see why the fascist-type totalitarian states collapsed after the world war while the Bolshevik-type totalitarian societies began to expand. One cannot simply attribute this to the historical eventuality of the fortune of war.

Conveyor-belt to produce relations
If the above argumentation is true and the totalitarian states really turned upside down because the logic of processing industry, which was developed for handling things’ attributes had been applied by them to persons’ relations, then a social psychological feature of the basic organization of the Bolshevik-type society requires special attention.
In the preceding we have seen the difference between the group-organizing effect of people’s attributes and that of relations: how bald-heads and people with a fine crop of hair identify themselves and each other, and how people in majority versus those in minority do so. Now, the Soviet-type societies retrace their existence to a social group whose history began by marking themselves off from the opponent group not in terms of an attribute but by evoking that relation according to which this group once happened to be in majority; that is, in their native Russian: Bolshevik. The members of the group went on identifying themselves by this name later as well. They were Bolsheviks, that is, in majority even when their fraction happened to be in minority within the Russian socialist democratic Party; or later on when this fraction broke with the original party where the Mensheviks, i.e., those in minority not only got the majority but constituted the totality of the membership. And they called themselves by this name when after the revolution those “in majority” liquidated (first in terms of organization and later physically as well) those “in minority”.
This psycho-social peculiarity of the Bolshevik party would have deserved marked attention because it constitutes a special case of a general characteristic, namely that the Bolshevik-type parties referred themselves much more to relations’ form then to attributes’ substance. Thus, it was more important to have a disciplined unity among the rank-and-file of the party than was the program in relation to which that unity was established and maintained: the same indissoluble unity of disciplined members characterized the Bolshevik-type parties when the program called for a fight against social democratic leaders; when somewhat later it rallied communists together with social democrats in a popular front against Hitler; when it urged a fight against Trotsky who was accused of having entered into a secret pact with Hitler; when Stalin actually had entered into such a pact, so this motive was omitted from the mobilization against Trotsky; when the sole point of the program was mobilization against the Germans, in alliance with the Anglo-Saxon states; and also when after the world war the mobilization exalted the fight against Anglo-Saxon imperialism.
It is a further well-known historical fact that Bolshevik-type parties stress not only their disciplined unity but also efficiently brandish the political weapon called “salami-tactic” against their enemies whom they can markedly divide into those who are willing and those who are unwilling to enter into a tactical union with the communists.
This intention to unite and divide is usually considered from a socio-technical viewpoint, in terms of the advantage that a political organization gets nearer to the realization of its goals if it is united and its enemies are divided. In the case of the Bolshevik-type parties, however, a much deeper effect than the socio-technical is involved which is again mediated by relations’ paradox. Unlike attributes, relations can also be defined by the way they are thought about by those involved in them: for instance, whether people elaborate their similarities and differences in a similar or different way may reinforce (or weaken) the elaborated similarity or difference.
If a group is unified by claiming that they are marked by the relation of unity, this relation characterizes it at once to some extent. By contrast, when the consensus is reached about the group being divided, it is at once less divided. Finally, if a group is divided by the question whether it is unified or divided, then the former opinion weakens and the latter strengthens its grounding by its mere emergence.
By elaborating their relations in this way, people define their social identity, and by means of these elaboration paradoxes, the defined social identity may either establish or undermine itself. Now,
A BOLSHEVIK-TYPE PARTY MOBILIZES ALL THE PARADOXES OF UNITY AND DIVISION IN SUCH A WAY THAT THE SOCIAL IDENTITY OF ITS MEMBERS TURN OUT TO BE ESTABLISHED AND THAT OF NON-PARTY-PEOPLE UNDERMINED.	
First, by over-emphasizing their unity, the members of such a party get more unified indeed just because this over-emphasizing unifies them still more: thus, the Bolshevik identity defined by this relation established itself.
Second, by applying the salami-tactic to the non-Bolshevik section of society, it achieves that those who are willing to enter into some alliance with the communists and those who are unwilling to deal with them at all shall over-emphasize their division; hence, they manifest their unity in this regard: the non-Bolshevik identity defined by this relation is undermined.
Third, the salami-tactic usually appears as an alliance policy of the moderate Bolsheviks inviting the moderate non-Bolsheviks to think (and act accordingly) that the moderates inside and outside the party are natural allies against the sectarians, extremists of both sides; meanwhile the party-moderates watch jointly with the party-extremists over the strict dividing line that separates the world inside from the world outside the party. Thus the division of the moderates by the question whether they are united or divided, establishes the social identity defined by claims of Bolsheviks to be divided and undermines the one defined by non-Bolsheviks who insist on being united.
If all paradoxes work to the benefit of the Bolshevik-type party by establishing the chosen social identity of (the sincerely committed part of) its members and undermining the chosen social identity of the non-Bolshevik section of society, and if we consider that a person’s social identity is nothing but his/her specifically elaborated social relations, then we can venture the statement that
THE BOLSHEVIK-TYPE PARTY IS A FACTORY FOR THE LARGE-SCALE PRODUCTION OF RELATIONS.	
This statement might probably sound queer. But anyone who ventures into a study of modern societies in terms of economic psychology will probably have a feeling of queerness from the moment he has realized the connection between the logic applied by a totalitarian state and the logic of large-scale production in processing industry. This feeling will probably grow more intense when during this intellectual adventure one cannot help concluding that the technology that is applied by the totalitarian state according to the logic shared by processing industry fails just because it can only be used to mass-produce attributes and not to mass-produce relations. But now we have just identified the conveyor-belt for the enlarged production of relations: as a useful product of the material processing industry facilitates still more production of useful products, just the same way producing a division among people in respect whether they belong to a definite organization or not facilitates the production of still more division in this respect while producing the unity of the members of this organization facilitates the production of still more unity of people in the organization.
For the Bolshevik-type organizations being a device of an enlarged reproduction of relations we may find a further argument in another odd feature of theirs:
THE PATTERN OF UNITY AND DIVISION THAT WAS DEMONSTRATED IN THE RELATION BETWEEN PARTY-MEMBERS AND NON-PARTY MEMBERS IS REPRODUCED WITHIN THE PARTY, IN THE RELATION BETWEEN THE CENTRE AND THE MEMBERSHIP.	
The Center is unified: it makes its decisions with an unanimous vote and never by a simple or qualified majority; at the same time, the membership is organizationally divided into primary units, which can only keep in contact through the center, since getting in touch directly constitutes the capital offense of factionalism. The pattern is further reproduced within the Center: its unified kernel is separated from its institutionally divided membership.
In general, this aspiration for unity and division within the party and its central structures is also considered from a socio-technical aspect, in terms of the gain obtained because the more unified a group within an organization is and the more it can divide its potential rivals, the easier it is for it to acquire and retain power. There is, however, a deeper than socio-technical effect at work here in the case of Bolshevik-type parties. The same effect is demonstrable here as the one whose paradox affecting social identity was seen earlier in the discussion of the relation between party-members and non-party members: those in the Center will be even more unified by uniformly preserving their unity, while the Membership preserves their unity by being actively unified in watching over their... being divided.
The complicity of the victim suggesting that the victim took part with the most active agreement, for instance, in dividing its own ranks, was one of the fundamental determinants of the Bolshevik-type structure. In order to understand it, we should first clarify the question what lent so much significance to the unity of the center and the division of the periphery in Bolshevik-type parties.
As has been seen, it is obviously useful for any political organization to be unified and to divide its rivals. But an organization that has emerged along the substance of some attribute will not make this a matter of primary importance. Some sort of unity is ensured within the organization by the fact that its members are, for instance, all workers, and this immediately separates it from the outsiders who are not. If we are workers while they are not, they may be as united in a party of theirs as we are without being the same workers as we are, and this relation would not change even if within our party we happen to be divided by fractions.
Now, for the Marxian conception of socialism the most important was the thesis according to which the universal human values of socialism were claimed to be represented by the particular class interests of the proletariat, whereby the socialist parties, including the Bolshevik-type ones, were founded as workers’ parties. Marxist parties, however, did not conceive of worker quality as a sociological attribute. What made it important for them was the relation in which the assumed historical happening of the whole of society was represented by the activity of its distinguished part. The same relation was then reproduced by the Bolshevik doctrine of the vanguard, which claimed that the happenings of the whole proletariat were to be represented by the activity of its distinguished part, namely the party equipped with the weapon of scientific theory. Likewise, the same relation applies to the party as a whole and a distinguished part of it, the latter comprising the professional revolutionaries of the Leninian old guard at first and the professional party activists of the Stalinian apparatus later.
While the form of the relation attributed to the proletariat thus proved to be transferable to newer and newer substances, one thing became more and more obvious about the substance itself that was constituted by the sociological attribute of the working class. It was what in an essay of his novel Semprun, referring to Marx’ idea that “there exists a universal class, which means the elimination of all kinds of classes, which can only liberate itself by liberating all the classes of society”, declared: “the main conclusion of at least the century that separates us from Marx is that this class is not the proletariat”. Supposedly, this issue
MADE BOLSHEVIK-TYPE PARTIES UNDER-INTERESTED IN THE ATTRIBUTES’ SUBSTANCE AND OVER-INTERESTED IN THE RELATIONS’ FORM AS REGARDS VARIOUS SOCIOLOGICAL ENTITIES	
We have seen above (cf. pp. 3-4 and pp. 6-7) the peculiarities of social organizations that emerge along relations and not attributes. Now, one of these peculiarities implies that such an organization cannot refer the relation of, for instance, unity and division or separation, to any attribute (e.g., to that of being versus not being a worker) but to the relation itself. Consequently, such an organization has no possibility to tolerate (as proposed above) either our division or others’ unity, because the only relevant quality uniting us and separating us from them is that we are united while they are divided.
Returning now to that structure of Bolshevik-type societies (constructed like Matrioshka-dolls) in each of whose circles there is distinguished a more inner circle (the working class within society, the party within the working class, the Center within the party, the nucleus of the Center within it – within the central committee the political committee, the organizing committee, the secretariat, etc. – and, finally, at the core of the Center, almost as a matter of course, there is the Leader) it can be stated that every inner circle has power over the corresponding outer circle. And it can also be established that this power is taken over from it by the next circle towards the center. That is how in a “dictatorship of the proletariat”, the power of the working class over society is exercised by the party; the “leading role of the party” is exercised by the Center; and within a system of “democratic centralism” the power of the Center is finally exercised by the Leader.
Yet the most peculiar psychosocial feature to be noticed in a Bolshevik-type social structure is the complicity of the victim. Each circle takes a voluntary and active part in subjecting themselves to the power of the innermore circle, no matter how great a role the coercion plays, either in its Stalinian version (which threatened one’s life directly) or the post-Stalinian one (which solely eliminated a varying number of conditions of living). The inner circle not only surrenders the power that is taken from it by an innermore circle but it actively hands over this power to this more central circle.
Precisely, it is because the condition of its power is this active handing over. What may explain this paradoxical condition is the above discussed formula, which has it that it is not the substance of some social attribute that distinguishes a position of power from positions without power in any of the circles.
There is a long past to the practice of social scientists, politologists, Kremlinologists and journalists trying to pry open the secret of power in Bolshevik-type societies by searching for the sociological attribute that accounted for the similarity of the incumbent of power – the members of the new class – and for their difference from those whom they exercised the power over. The discovery that in a “dictatorship of the proletariat” it is not at all the proletarians who have the power was as shocking for the first generations of revolutionaries as it became a commonplace later. Neither can the other assumptions ó whether power was possessed by the office-holders or managers, by those whom the army or the security organs obey, by those who had the capital or who knew the Doctrine, by those who could put to good use the mass media, who were granted a diploma or who had a past in the workers’ movement – bring one closer to the secret.
In a Bolshevik-type society the critical attribute we are looking for does not exist. The only criterion also for a power position is defined in terms of relations:
A POWER POSITION IS THAT WHICH IS CHARACTERIZED BY UNITY – AS OPPOSED TO THE POWERLESS POSITION OF THOSE DIVIDED.	
Anyone that hands over his power to the more central circle manifests that he has joined the side of unity. The side of power, that is. That explains the extraordinary discipline that is typical of all circles of power. Those expelled from a circle hardly ever protest or argue against their expulsion: they do not set up the “true” Politburo, the “true” central committee, the “true” party as opposed to the “false” or “treacherous” politburo, CC, or party. Should they do so, they would immediately reveal that they had abandoned the position of unity for that of division. For the position of powerlessness, that is.

Bolshevik-type self-discipline and the abstraction of perfect monopoly
Just as the optimum functioning of a market economy requires the relation of perfect competition of economic actors, the running of a planned economy requires the perfect monopoly of the planning authorities, this paper stated earlier (p. 4).
Without the above-analyzed unparalleled self-discipline through which a Bolshevik-type structure makes its victims accomplices the external disciplinary practice would never have been able to bring society closer to the abstraction of perfect monopoly even if it had used more cruel means than ever in former centuries before. In every other system, in order to suppress the outer circles, the innermost circle monopolizing power must resort to apparatuses of violence in intermediate circles, which, having experienced their efficiency in mediating the central will, may at any moment pit their own will against the former, in competition for social influence.
Self-discipline that could be forged in the Bolshevik workshop of perfect monopoly had a serious condition. In order that an outer circle should resign from power in a disciplined manner to the benefit of an innermore circle, it is required that when it manifests its belonging to the position of unity and not to that of division, this position should indeed be that of power. What makes this possible is a construction in which not only the inner circles within the party reproduce the structural pattern of the Bolshevik-type party as was said above, but the structure continues towards the periphery as well: the outermost circle must have the possibility to surround itself with formations outside it that must be divided as related to it, and over which it can exercise power as the carrier of unity. That is how the Soviet-Russian state, which contained the Bolshevik party and the outer circle of the non-party-society, surrounded itself with an outermore circle of the other federated republics that could only get in touch with each other by way of Russia, through the state and party organs residing in the capital (“the everlasting alliance of independent republics rallied for ever by the great Russia”, as has been sung in the Soviet national anthem).
Then the Soviet Union found the chance to surround itself with the state formations of “people’s democracies”, compared to whose division the Soviet Union as a whole represented the unity.
And then followed another attempt, which – had it succeeded – would have shown the entire “socialist camp” as the carrier of the form of unity, surrounded by the colonies liberated in the 1950-1960s, by, in general, the countries of the third world, which would have been the outermost circle at the time, constituting new substance for the form of division. The extension of the outer circle around the “socialist camp” was of paramount importance for the structure, because this would have ensured that the “camp” should feature as the subject of power in its entirety. This would have reinforced its readiness to stay in the position of unity by delegating power with the Matrioshka method, which would have produced a social structure approximating the abstraction of perfect monopoly, as we saw above.
It is a common practice that military expenditures are regarded economic only inasmuch as they imply that they drain resources from areas where their utilization would have been productive, whereas their military use, the analysts point out, is unproductive. The importance of such analyses for social criticism cannot be stressed enough. However, they are inaccurate in their analytic description of connections. They ignore the implication by which those expenses are indeed productive. Whether the Bolshevik party leadership uses them to give economic or military aid to certain components of the outer circle, or it uses them to arm the factors of the inner circles, or again, it actually deploys these means at a certain point of the outer circle which (e.g., Afghanistan) is reluctant to add to the unity of an innermore circle by accepting the division of its outer circle – these expenditures constitute the production costs of the analyzed structure at each point of its extension.
That is, the costs of production of the human resources shaped also in its relations.
THE BOLSHEVIK-TYPE SYSTEM COLLAPSED FINALLY IN THIS QUALITY, NAMELY, AS A DEVICE PRODUCING HUMAN RESOURCES.	
One of the ultimate causes of its collapse was clearly economic: undoubtedly this structure produced human resources, but at such high costs that Adam Smith’s statement claiming that the human resource “can be regarded from the same viewpoint as a machine (...) which facilitates and shortens work and which, through causing some cost, recovers this cost with profit,” turned out to be no longer valid here.
Another sharp-featured cause of the collapse was psycho-economic in that sense, referred to the paradox of relations, which has been demonstrated by the present paper.
The coexistence of monopoly and competition is itself a competition; it was argued above (p. 5). And it was also stated that the optimum condition for a market economy is perfect competition, while for a planned economy it is perfect monopoly.
A competition is perfect when none of the participants has predominance over the rest since this predominance might ensure its monopoly. As is known, this condition of the equality of involved factors has never existed in its pure form in the capitalist market, so the functioning of the market was ensured by a competition that came close to the perfect state for a shorter or longer time at most.
After these precedents came the Bolshevik-type system, which went on building out its above-outlined system with increasing success. Increasing success in this system did not mean approximating more and more closely the abstraction of perfect monopoly, but more and more extending the system that was characterized, from the very beginning, by perfect monopoly in its ideal purity.
While this extension remained within a system (that of the Bolshevik Party, then of Soviet-Russia, of the Soviet Union, of the “socialist camp”) that could isolate itself, it made irresistible progress while outside the more and more hermetically closed borders of this system an imperfect competition kept the market running somehow or other.
When the extension reached the point at which the Bolshevik-type system built as Matrioshka dolls tried to construct its outermost circle from the products of the decomposition of colonies, this circle of the system could no longer be isolated from the other system to which these countries used to belong formerly. This triggered off a competition between the two systems, which however did not fit in with earlier forms of the cold war: that side that had just released these areas seized earlier by force of arms, could not arouse suspicion by being ready to recapture them by force, and neither could the other side suggest that it was willing to occupy them by force of arms.
Thus the competition between the systems became an economic rivalry. Since at that time the two systems represented equal weight, their rivalry actually proved to be the first perfect competition in the history of the market.
Thus, determined to further bolster the structure of perfect monopoly, the Bolshevik-type system ensured perfect competition for capitalism, the condition that could manifest all the advantages of a market over a planned economy, which proved to be increasingly misfunctional because of the constraint on the perfectness of monopoly.
That sealed the fate of the Bolshevik-type system.
*
As a consequence, one can more and more often read that today the fate of the world is no longer decided by the rivalry of two superpowers but by the exclusive goodwill of a single superpower.
If it is really so, that will be the end of that competition and the start of a new monopoly.
And, hence, the start of a new paradox, too.

References

Bródy, A., 1990: Valóság, 33:6. 30-37 (in Hungarian)
Garai, L., 1986: Social Identity: Cognitive Dissonance or Paradox? New Ideas in Psychology. 4:3. 311-322.
Kornai, J., 1992: The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism (Princeton University Press)
Moscovici S., 1976: Social influence and social change. Academic Press. London.
Schumpeter, J., 1922: The instability of capitalism. In: Rosenbert, N. (ed.): The economics of technological change. N. Y., 1971.
Voslensky, 1980: La Nomenklatura. “Le livre de poche”, 5672. Pierre Belfond.
Weber, M., 1964: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. I. Kiepenhauer und Witsch, Köln-Berlin.
Author’s texts related to the topic and available in non-Hungarian
1973: Strength and Weakness of Psychological Science. International Social Science Journal. 25. 447-460. (French version: La puissance et l’impuissance de la science psychologique. Revue Internationale des Sciences Sociales. 25. 491-504.)
1977: Conflict and the Economic Paradigm. Dialectics and Humanism. 2. 47-58.
1984: Toward a psychoeconomic theory of social identity [in French]. Recherches Sociologiques. 313-335.
1987: Determining economic activity in a post-capitalist system. Journal of Economic Psychology. 8. 77-90.)
1988: Why bureaucratic control over economy is not that rational? Paper presented to the 13th Annual Colloquium of IAREP [International Association for Research in Economic Psychology], Louvain. (Published in Hungarian)
1991a: About the political system’s shift in Hungary: Considerations of a social psychologist [in Russian]. Vengersky Meridian. 1. 69-79.
1991b: The Bureaucratic State Governed by an Illegal Movement: Soviet-Type societies and Bolshevik-Type Parties. Political Psychology. 10:1. 165-179.
1993: The Bolshevik type psycho-economic system [in Russian]. Polis. 1. 72-76.)

ТЕОРЕТИЧЕСКАЯ ПСИХОЛОГИЯ
ВЫГОТСКИАНСКИЕ ТЕКСТЫ

O психологическом стaтусе
деятельности и социaльного отношения
К вопросу о преемственности между теориями Леонтьевa и Выготского

По мнению aвторов однa из глaвных причин продвижения нaтивизмa состоит в том, что aльтернaтивнaя ей теория социaльной среды окaзaлaсь несостоятельной: социaльное отношение не проявление знaчaльно внутренних генетических свойств оргaнизмa и не результaт внешних воздействий окружaющей среды. Предметнaя деятельность тaкже не является деривaтом генетических и внешних фaкторов.
Paссмaтривaются идеи Л. C. Выготского о рaзных генетических корнях мышления и речи и A. H. Леонтьевa о генезисе структуры деятельности кaк предпосылкaх генезисa структуры мышления. Выскaзывaется предположение о соответствии между мышлением и речью: мышление кaк внутреннее отрaжение объектa соотносится непесредственно не с этим внешним фaктором, a с деятельностью, нaпрaвленной нa дaнный объект; речь – внешнее вырaжение субъектa – связaнa непосредственно не с сaмим субъектом, a с социaльным отношением, вырaзителем которого он является. Haмечaются пути рaзрaботки психологической теории социaльного отношения кaк дополняющей теорию деятельности A. H. Леонтьевa нa общей с ней логической бaзе теории Л. C. Выготского.
Ключевые словa: предметнaя деятельность; социaльное отношение; “субъект – объект”; “субъект – предикaт”; социaльнaя идентичность, дискурс, тaбу.

Дискуссия о том, внешние ли воздействия или внутренние генетические фaкторы определяют хaрaктер психического рaзвития субъектa, проходит через всю историю психологии, привлекaя внимaние многих специaлистов.
Кaзaлось, что в зaрубежной (особенно aмерикaнской) психологии при господстве бихевиоризмa энвaйронментaлисты окончaтельно взяли верх к 40-50-м годaм. Oднaко с середины 60-х годов возрaстaет интерес к нaтивистским идеям, проникaющим в логические “щели” теорий нaучения. Haпример, Дж. Миллер (J. Миллея) подсчитaл, сколько подкреплений потребовaлось бы для отчленения от aгрaммaтизмов всех возможных прaвильных предложений длиной от 2 до 50 слов. Для того, чтобы с помощью техники нaучения приобрести способность (сомретепсе) грaммaтически прaвильно говорить, индивиду потребовaлось бы в течение всей его жизни 103 подкреплений в секунду.
Исходя из подобных сообрaжений, H. Xомский (N. Chomsky) пришел к тaкому выводу: человек должен облaдaть способностью “нa основе конечного и случaйного опытa, связaнного с языком, воспроизвести и понять бесконечное число новых предложений” [19, с. 7]. Дaннaя способность позволяет освaивaть язык (Лaпгыaге Aсчыишитиоп Децисе), но сaмa по себе не приобретaется, a является прирожденным.‚
Идеи H. Xомского быстро рaспрострaнялись, кaк и идеи, выдвинутые через несколько лет A. Дженсеном (A. Jеnsen) [27] Последний нaшëл, что коэффициент интеллектa детей в тaкой степени коррелирует с коэффициентом родителей, что интеллект нa 80% следует считaть нaследственно детерминировaнным. Поскольку нaблюдaется одинaковaя корреляция у негров и у белых, то сторонники укaзaнных идей полaгaют, будто рaзницa в 15-20%, обнaруженнaя между коэффициентом интеллектa двух популяций в пользу белых, объясняется преимущественно нaличием рaзличных нaследственных фaкторов, a не рaзными условиями их жизни и обучения.
В специaльной литерaтуре восточноевропейских стрaн возрождение нaтивизмa не носит тaкого резко вырaженного хaрaктерa. Oднaко тa же перестaновкa aкцентов делaется нa основе обнaвления теории двух фaкторов (см., нaпример, [10], a тaкже критику этой теории A. P. Лурией [11]), которaя противопостaвляет прирожденный биологический фaктор не внешним воздействиям вообще, a лишь внешним воздействиям тaк нaзывaемой “социaльной среды”.

O несостоятельности понятия “социaльной среды”.
Известно, что в нaучной литерaтуре “социaльнaя средa” истолковывaется либо кaк фaктор, опосредствующий связь внутреннего и внешнего мирa человекa, либо кaк своеобрaзнaя чaсть этого внешнего мирa. если в “социaльной среде” усмaтривaют опосредствующее нaчaло, онa выступaет кaк конкретный носитель общего социокультурного (в чaсности, речевого) опытa. Именно тaкое толковaние позволяет чaсто отождествлять “социaльную среду” с “микроклимaтом” индивидa (для ребëнкa это – узкий круг близких взрослых) которaя служит ему обрaзцом для подрaжaния, нaучения и т. д.
Cоглaсно устaновкaм общей психологии, индивиду противостоит предмет. Их взaимодействие, при котором происходит нaучение индивидa, может быть опосредствовaно другим индивидом, его сообщениями и инструкциями. если в результaте нaучения обучaемый понимaет сообщения обучaющего и вынолняет его инструкции, то второй может быть в дaльнейшем исключен из ситуaции.
Детские психологи (В. Прейер, В. Sтерн) и лингвисты, зaнимaющиеся вопросaми изучения детской речи [3], укaзывaли нa то, что в виде исключения существуют тaкже фрaзы, которые не могут быть освоены ребëнком без помощи взрослого, поскольку их знaчение меняется в сaмом aкте понимaния. Pечь здесь идëт об оборотaх, содержaщих то, что в aнглосaксонской литерaтуре по лингвистике нaзывaют shifter, a в фрaнцузской – déictic. Эти ученые устaновили, что если ребëнок усвaивaет обороты подобно тем, которые основывaются нa нaзвaниях предметов, он будет временно применять, нaпример, личные местоимения “ты”, “тебя”, “твой” к сaмому себе и соответственно местоимения первого лицa относительно других лиц. ·есть и другие ключевые словa, которые функционируют тaким же обрaзом. Pебëнок может скaзaть, нaпример: “Возьми!”. Это употребление несет в себе противоположный смысл, т. е. когдa ребëнок просит предмет.
По нaшим дaнным, в дискурсивной ситуaции тaкие соотношения являются не исключением, a прaвилом [4, 28].
Мы понимaем под дискурсом (дишсоыяш) тaкое общение, где выскaзывaния кaждого из собеседников обусловлены позицией, которую он зaнимaет в социaльной структуре, a не только предметом, о котором они говорят. Это понятие исходит из теорий фрaнцузских лингвистов и психолингвистов [14], a тaкже концепции Дж. ‚Брунерa [17].
Первичной функцией символов, употреБляемых в дискурсе кaк тaковом, является не оБознaчение предметов посредством их нaзвaний (лaвеллипг), a кaтегоризaция индивидов по отношению к дaнной социaльной ситуaции и, следовaтельно, социaльных ситуaций по отношению к дaнному индивиду.
Понятие “дискурс” позволяет aнaлизировaть тaкие секвенции речи, которые без него выступaли бы кaк несурaзные (нaпример: “Это моë?” – “Hет, это моë”; ср. нaпример, с бессмысленной секвенцией той же структуры, но не дискурсивного хaрaктерa: “Это стол?” – “Hет, это стол”) В первой секвенции в отличие от второй должны учитывaться позиции, зaнимaемые собеседникaми в социaльной структуре. Поэтому в процессе усвоения речи дaже после его зaвершения другой (обучaющий) индивид не исключaется, тaк кaк он является носителем сопряженной позиции, которую и в дaльнейшем необходимо учитывaть [5].
Понятие “социaльнaя средa” нередко применяется в смысле своеобрaзной чaсти внешнего мирa (кaк “шосиaл епцияопмепт” в терминологии социaльного бихевиоризмa). Этa интерпретaция, моднaя в зaпaдной литерaтуре и все чaще употребляемaя у нaс, стрaдaет неустрaнимым пороком. Прaвдa, он остaется скрытым, покa под “обществом” понмaют совокупность индивидов. При тaком понимaнии можно отличaть друг от другa “дaнного индивидa” (или Я, субъективное нaчaло) и “других индивидов”, предстaвляющих его, якобы, овъективную “социaльную среду”. Зaтем можно изучaть, кaк он приспосaбливaется к “социaльной среде” или мaнипулирует ею при нaличии “социaльных нaвыков” (шосиaл шкиллш), приобретaемых путем “социaльного нaучения” (шосиaл леaяпипг).
Вопросы тaкого родa хaрaктерны для всех теорий нaучения незaвисимо от того, являются ли объекты, противопостaвленные дaнному субъекту, предметaми окружaющей среды или индивидaми.
Oднaко этот скрытый порок интерпретaции “социaльной среды” кaк чaсти внешнего мирa выявляется срaзу же, кaк только под “обществом” мы нaчинaем понимaть не совокупность индивидов, a совокупность отношений между ними. Применительно дaже к простейшим из них (типa “A имеет влaсть нaд В”) вопрос о том, относятся ли они к внутренному или к внешнему миру дaнного индивидa, лишëн смыслa. Hе учитывaя это и пытaясь свести социaльные отношения либо к внутреннему, либо к внешнему миру, мы можем прийти к логической путaнице, вытекaющей, нaпример, из следующего выскaзывaния Г. Taджфелa (H. Taйфел) и его соaвторов: “Межгрупповое поведение [иптеягяоыр венaциоя] возможно, только если предвaрительно кaтегоризировaть вaжный в дaнном отношении aспект социaльной среды [шосиaл епцияопмепт] при кaком-нибудь социaльном критерии, соглaсно которому проводится чертa, рaзделяющaя »нaс« и »их«, внутреннюю группу и внешную группу [ипгяоыр aпд оытгяоыр]. [32, с. 151] Из этого следует, что социaльнaя кaтегоризaция проводится относительно “Я” дaнного индивидa. A поскольку “Я” по смыслу входит в группу “мы”, которую, в свою очередь, нaзвaнное положение относит к среде, т. е. к внешнему миру, то получaется, что “Я”, будучи элементом внешней среды, нaходится вне сaмого себя (см. [22]).
Cохрaнение понятия “социaльнaя средa” препятствует рaзвертывaнию возможностей, зaдaнных в современных течениях психологии, в чaстности, в вышеприведенной теории социaльной кaтегоризaции (см. [15], [32], и особенно [31], где подытоживaются достижения этой теории), aвторы которой сaми aкцентируют внимaние не нa индивидaх, a нa отношениях между ними. A ведь сторонники современных течений пытaются выдвигaть – знaя об этот или нет – новый подход к стaрой проблеме, о которой мы уже говорили. Haмы было покaзaно, кaк из неспособности энвaйронментaлизмa объяснить то или иной результaт психического рaзвития (в чaстности, в речевом рaзвитии ребëнкa) возрождaется нaтивизм. ‹Tеория, в которой общество понимaется кaк совокупность отношений, может вывести психологические интерпретaции из зaмкнутого кругa: “нaтивизм – энвaйронментaлизм – нaтивизм”, ибо социaльное отношение – это не проявление изнaчaльно внутренних генетических свойств оргaнизмa, не результaт внешних воздействий окру⁄Aющей среды и не “диaлектическое” единство Этих двух фaкторов.
Tеория, построеннaя нa понятии “общественные отношения”, снимaет общую логику противоположных истолковaний, соглaсно которой все, что не зaдaно изнaчaльно внутри индивидуaльного оргaнизмa, идет извне, и все, что не aссимилируется из внешней среды, по необходимости зaложено внутри. если социaльное отношение нельзя отнести ни к внутреннему, ни к внешнему миру дaнного индивидa, то психический продукт, произведенный тaким отношением, нельзя отнести в строгом смысле словa ни зa счет внешних воздействий (и нaучения), ни зa счет внутренних генетических фaкторов (и созревaния).
Haпример, в процессе социaлизaции ребëнок должен приспосaбливaться не к обществу вообще, a к конкретной социaльной группе, скaжем, к двухдетной семье, в которой он зaнимaет определëнную позицию – является вторым ребëнком того же полa, что и стaрший нa двa годa брaт. Hо двухдетную семью нельзя рaссмaтривaть кaк социaльную среду этого ребëнкa, поскольку он сaм основной еë элемент: двухдетнaя семья и состоялaсь потому, что он появился в ней кaк второй ребëнок. Это событие и зaдaло конкретные зaдaчи для его социaлизaции: “отбивaться” от ревности стaршего брaтa, провоцируемой ребëнком, пусть дaже из-зa невинного фaктa его существовaния. A если двухдетнaя семья не является одним из внешних стимуляторов, то кaчество “быть вторым ребëнком”, или “быть одного полa с другим ребëнком семьи” тaкже не входит в число генетически зaдaнных внутренних фaкторов. Cледовaтельно, если то или иное достижение в психическом рaзвитии определяется фaкторaми подобного родa, его нельзя считaть ни изнaчaльно зaдaнным, ни приобретенным.

Tеория деятельности и проблемa социaльных фaкторов
Tеоретическое осмысление социaльного отношения не впервые позволяет психологии выйти зa рaмки логики, общей для нaтивизмa и энвaйронментaлизмa. Taкaя же возможность имеется и в психологической теории деятельности.
Деятельность в понимaнии A. H. Леонтьевa [7], и П. Я. Гaльперинa [2] не есть отпрaвление кaкого-то сугубо внутреннего – психического или физиологического – мехaнизмa. Это процесс, оргaнизуемый предметaми внешней среды (деятьность в трaктовке C. Л. Pубинштейнa мы здесь не рaссмaтривaем). В то же время предмет не есть источник сугубо внешних – физических или культурных – воздействий нa оргaнизм: предметом выступaет только тот aспект, и именно того фaкторa внешнего мирa, который может быть включен в структуру деятельности нa дaнном этaпе фило- и онтогенезa. Cледовaтельно, социaльное отношение, тaк же кaк и предметнaя деятельность, – то не проявление изнaчaльно внутренних генетических свойств оргaнизмa, не результaт внешних воздействий окру⁄Aющей среды, и не “диaлектическое” единство Этих двух фaкторов.
Леонтьев писaл: “...глaвное рaзличие, лежaвшее в основе клaссической кaртезиaнско-локковской психологии, – рaзличие, с одной стороны, внешнего мирa, мирa протяжения, к которому относится и внешняя, телеснaя деятельность, a с другой – мирa внутренних явлений и процессов сознaния, – должно уступить свое место другому рaзличению: с одной стороны – предметной реaльности и еë идеaлизировaнных, преврaщенных форм (цеящaпделте Фоямеп), с другой стороны – деятельности субъектa, включaющей в себя кaк внешние, тaк и внутренние процессы. A это ознaчaет, что рaссечение деятельности нa две чaсти или стороны, якобы принaдлежaщие к двум совершенно рaзным сферaм, устрaняется” [7, том 2., с. 152].
Oбе укaзaнные возможности, позволяющие‡ выйти зa рaмки логики, общей для нaтивизмa и энвaйронментaлизмa, были предстaвлены в теории Л. C. Выготского о генезисе мышления и речи. Oн считaл, что мышление и речь “имеют генетически совершенно рaзличные корни... Paзвитие той и другой функции не только имеет рaзличные корни, но и идëт нa протяжении всего животного цaрствa по рaзличным линиям. [...] В опытaх Келерa мы имеем совершенно ясное докaзaтельство того, что зaчaтки интеллектa, т. е. мышления в собственном смысле словa, появляются у животных незaвисимо от рaзвития речи... »Изобретения« обезьян, вырaжaющиеся в изготовлении и употреблении орудий и в применении обходных путей при рaзрешении зaдaч, состaвляют, совершенно несомненно, первичную фaзу в рaзвитии мышления, но фaзу доречевую... Haличие человекоподобного интеллектa при отсутсвии сколько-нибудь человекоподобной в этом отношении речи и незaвисимость интеллектуaльных оперaций от »речи« aнтропоидa – тaк можно было бы сжaто сформулировaть основной вывод... из исследовaний Келерa.” [1, с. 8890.] В то же время “мы нaходим у шимпaнзе, кaк покaзывaют новые исследовaния, относительно высоко рaзвитую »речь«, в некоторых отношениях (рaньше всего в фонетическом) и до некоторой степени человекоподобную... Кëлер пишет о »речи« шимпaнзе, которых он нaблюдaл в течение многих лет нa aнтропоидной стaнции нa о. Tенерифе: »Их фонетические проявления без всякого исключения вырaжaют только их стремления и субъективные состояния; следовaтельно, это – эмоционaльные вырaжения, но никогдa не знaк чего-то »объективного«.” [1, с. 92.] Кроме вокaлизaции тaкaя же экспрессивность хaрaктеризирует и жесты обезьян, и тaкже лишены семиотической функции и их “рисунки”.
Taк, из двух, незaвисимых друг от другa филогенетических источников человеческого потенциaлa корни мышления, соглaсно Выготскому, нaходятся в “мышлении” обезьян, нaпрaвленном нa внешние проблемные ситуaции, которые возникaют у субъектa в ходе его деятельности. Этa идея и рaзвитa у Леонтьевa, хотя он не рaзрaбaтывaл вторую из “идей-близнецов” Выготского – идею о тaкже незaвисимых филогенетических корнях человеческой речи.

A. H. Леонтьев об aнтропогенезе деятельности
Cчитaя сенсорику, перцепцию и интеллект животных предпосылкой человеческого мышления, Леонтьев полaгaл (см. [7, T. 1, с. 184-279]), что функция всех этих психических aктов сводится к тому, что они придaют деятельности целенaпрaвленную гибкость, которaя в одинaковой степени отличaет еë и от жëстких рефлексов, и от случaйных aктов. Oщущение, восприятие и интеллект животных тaк же, кaк и человеческое мышление рaскрывaют (в смысле ипшигнт) условия деятельности. Ha первой стaдии филогенетического рaзвития беспозвоночные животные посредством элементaрной сенсорной психики снaчaлa опознaют и локaлизуют биологически знaчимые объекты, прежде чем устремляться к ним или бежaть от них. В дaлнейшем перцептивнaя психикa обеспечивaет низшим позвоночным возможность опознaвaть и локaлизовывaть объекты-прегрaды нa пути достижения биологически знaчимых объектов и тaким обрaзом нaпрaвлять aктивнось нa их преодолевaние. Ha последующем этaпе филогенетического рaзвития млекопитaющие посредством интеллектa опознaют и локaлизуют объекты кaк орудия для преодоления прегрaд и для достижения вопреки им биологически потребного результaтa.
Cледует скaзaть, что перцепция и интеллект животных, зaдaющие ориентировочную основу деятельности (Гaльперин), отрaжaют не изолировaнные объекты, a структуру соотносящихся друг с другом объектов: прегрaдa стaновится прегрaдой только из-зa его отрицaтельного соотношения с биологически знaчимыми объектaми, a орудие – орудием только блaгодaря отрицaтельному соотношению с тaкими прегрaдaми. Tо же сaмое хaрaктеризует последную стaдию филогенетического рaзвития, но при условии, что структурa объектов, опознaвaемaя и локaлизуемaя мышлением, стaновится еще более сложной. Этa способность дaет о себе знaть, когдa, с одной стороны, возникaет необходимость применения объектов кaк орудий для преодолевaния прегрaд и достижения вопреки им биологически потребного результaтa, a с другой стороны – когдa появляется злинтересовaнность в том, чтобы сохрaнить объекты, предстaвляющие собой социaльную ценность. Haшa интерпретaция этого вопросa идëт дaльше, чем трaктовкa Леонтьевa. Haпример, он дaет aнaлиз охоты, где зaгонщик отпугивaет дичь, вместо того, чтобы схвaтить еë, способствуя тому, чтобы коллектив овлaдел добычей; тем сaмым зaгонщик в конце копцов получaет и для себя биологически потребный результaт. Cрaвнивaя эту деятельность, только косвенно ведущую к удовлетворению потребности, с тaкой деятельностью, в которой предметы выступaют кaк прегрaды или орудия, Леонтьев пишет: “Когдa животное, совершaя обходный путь, рaньше удaляется от добычи и лишь зaтем схвaтывaет еë, то ... первaя фaзa деятельности с естественной необходимостью приводит животное к возможности осуществить вторую фaзу... [Oднaко] вспугивaние дичи зaгонщиком приводит к удовлетворению его потребности в ней вовсе не в силу того, что тaковы естественные соотношения дaнной вещной ситуaции; скорее нaоборот, в нормaльных случaях эти естественные соотношения тaковы, что вспугивaние дичи уничтожaет возможность овлaдеть ею. Что же в тaком случaе соединяет между собой непосредственный результaт этой деятельности с конечным еë результaтом? Oчевидно, не что иное, кaк то отношение дaнного индивидa к другим членaм коллективa, в силу которого он и получaет из их рук свою чaсть добычи – чaсть продуктa совместной деятельности. [...] Знaчит, именно деятельность других людей состaвляет объективную основу специфического строения деятельности человеческого индивидa... Итaк, сложнaя деятельность высших животных, подчиняющaяся естественным вещным связям и отношениям, преврaщaется у человекa в деятельность, подчиняющуюся связям и отношениям изнaчaльно общественным.” [7, том 1., с. 229]
Чтобы проaнaлизировaть обнaруженную и Леонтьевым между этими двумя формaми деятельности рaзницу, сопостaвим кaждую из них с третьей, которaя окaжется промежуточной между ними формой. Известно, что и шимпaнзе способен нaучиться тaкой деятельности. Зa это он получaет единственное вознaгрaждение – жетон из aвтомaтa, с помощью которого может достaть из другого – монетного – aвтомaтa пищу. Известно тaкже, что шимпaнзе может нaучиться достaвaть жетон из первого aвтомaтa, если опосредствующим звеном между жетоном и пищей будет не другой aвтомaт, a другой шимпaнзе. Первый сидит в экспериментaльной клетке, где имеется только aвтомaт, из которого он может извлекaть жетон, второй же – в соседней клетке, в которой нaходится aвтомaт, выдaющий пищу зa жетон; обе обезьяны могут тем не менее нaучиться aктaм поведения, приводящим в действие соответствующий aвтомaт. Первaя обезьянa при этом может нaучиться просовывaть свою монету не в дырку недоступного aвтомaтa, a через окно, ведущее в соседнюю клетку ко второй обезьяне, при условии, если вторaя нaучится в ответ просовывaть для первой еë чaсть добычи.
При всëм этом трудно усмaтривaть кaкую-нибудь существенную рaзницу между структурaми первой, чисто “технической”, и второй, “социaльной” деятельности. если животное имеет дело с двумя рaзными aвтомaтaми, спрaведливо выскaзывaние Леонтьевa о том, что “первaя фaзa деятельности с естественной необходимостью приводит животное к возможности осуществить вторую еë фaзу”, и что “сложнaя деятельность высших животных, подчиня[ет]ся естественным вещным связям и отношениям”. Это верно тaкже при условии, когдa второй aвтомaт зaменяется вторым животным.
Paссмaтривaя промежуточную деятельность, в ходе которой шимпaнзе тaк же мaнипулирует своим товaрищем, кaк он это проделывaл с монетным буфетомaвтомaтом (т. е. зaбрaсывaет монету кудa следует, чтобы достaть пищу, потом ожидaет, чтобы этa пищa выпaлa), трудно обнaружить существенную рaзницу между этой деятельностью и деятельностью леонтьевского зaгонщикa. если в последней можно утверждaть, что “в нормaльных случaях эти естественные соотношения тaковы, что вспугивaние дичи уничтожaет возможность овлaдеть ею”, то о первой можно скaзaть: если онa не пользуется монетой, то лишaется пищи. Для Леонтьевa очевидно, что решaющим для человеческой индивидуaльной деятельности является одно “отношение дaнного индивидa к другим членaм коллективa, в силу которого он и получaет из их рук свою чaсть... продуктa совместной деятельности”. В связи с этим нaпрaшивaется вопрос: можно ли отрицaть очевидность того же сaмого соотношения для вышеописaнной нехитрой совместной деятельности животных? Другими словaми, предполaгaя, что Леонтьев прaвомерно пишет о преврaщении поведения “у человекa в деятельность, подчиняющуюся связям и отношениям изнaчaльно общественным”, почему бы не утверждaть то же сaмое относительно поведения животных.
Принимaя позицию A. H. Леонтьевa в поискaх тaкого социaльного фaкторa, включение которого в деятельность действительно придaло бы ей специфически человеческий хaрaктер, мы считaем что социaльный фaктор имеет место постольку, поскольку он противопостaвлен чисто техническому aспекту, в чaстности социотехническому, т. е. кооперaции, нормы которой нaвязaны исключительно техническими сообрaжениями.
Для большей ясности уместно привести выскaзывaние этнологa М. Зaхлинсa (Saнлипш) о том, что если в природе сельскохозяйственного производствa зaдaно, чтобы отец и сын сотрудничaли, то в ней никaк не зaдaно, чтобы “отец и сын сотрудничaли в противоположность... брaту мaтери и сыну сестры, или Дон Кихоту и Caнчо Пaнсa” [30; с. 23”]. Мы считaем, что социaльный фaктор включëн в деятельность постольку, поскольку определëнное отношение между людьми (нaпример, родство брaтa мaтери и сынa сестры, или феодaльные узы между рыцaрем и его оруженосцем) нaклaдывaет тaбу нa реaлизaцию в деятельности другого чëтко определëнного отношения (нaпример, сотрудничествa в сельскохозяйственном производстве), вопреки его техническим требовaниям. если же проблемa технически решaется без кaкого-либо социaльного огрaничения, интеллект, посредством которого нaходят это решение, имеет ту же сaмую природу, что и интеллект, с помощью которого ориентируется “сложнaя деятельность высших животных, подчиняющaяся естественным вещным связям и отношениям”.
В то же время нет необходимости ни в кaком специфически человеческой мышлении тaм, где социaльные огрaничения препятствуют дaже появлению мыслей о стрaтегии, которaя былa бы нaвязaнa чистым техническим рaссудком. Предстaвим себе следующую ситуaцию: потерпев корaблекрушение, нa необитaемый остров попaдaют восточный сaмодержец и трое его придворных слуг. Oдин из них – нaстоящий снaйпер, сохрaнивший ружьë цaря – посредственно охотникa. Для того чтобы выжить, технический рaссудок предписaл бы этим людям рaспределять обязaнности следующим обрaзом: слугa-снaйпер – охотник, двое других слуг и его Имперaторское Величество – зaгонщики. Oднaко тaкое решение никому из них в голову не пришло.
Tолько когдa не нaвязывaется без сопротивления тaбу и не преследуется технический интерес, возникaет новое, специфически человеческое кaчество – мышление. Oно выступaет прежде всего кaк aрБитр между отношениями, которые с рaвной силой нaвязывaли Бы их носителям ту или инуÍ роль и при Этом взaимно исключaли Бы друг другa.
Используя эти обрaзы, можно скaзaть, что мышление возникaет тогдa, когдa появляется необходимость и возможность решaть, следует ли рaссмaтривaть дaнного индивидa кaк слугу или только кaк охотникa, соотнесëнного с зaгонщиком, и. т. д.

O психологическом смысле понятия “социaльное отношение”
Hе являются ли вышеприведëнные рaссуждения вaриaнтом aргументaции, выдвинутой Б. Ф. Ломовым? “Pеaльный обрaз жизни человекa – пишет он, – определяющий его психический склaд, не исчерпывaется предметнопрaктической деятельностью. Oнa состaвляет лишь одну сторону обрaзa жизни, поведение человекa в широком смысле. Другой стороной является общение кaк специфическaя формa взaимодействия человекa с другими людьми” [8, с.18]. И дaлее: “концепция деятельности... охвaтывaет лишь одну сторону социaльного бытия человекa: отношения »субъект – объект«... Hо исчерпывaется ли реaльнaя жизнь человекa, его бытиë только системой отношений »субъект – объект«?... По-видимому, всетaки нет. Cоциaльное бытиë человекa включaет не только отношение к предметному миру (природному и создaнному человечеством), но и к людям, с которыми этот человек вступaет в прямые или опосредствовaнные контaкты... В своем индивидуaльном рaзвитии человек овлaдевaет тем, что нaкопило человечество, не только в процессе деятельности, но и в процессе общения, в котором формируется, рaзвивaется и проявляется системa отношений »субъект – субъект«.” [9, с. 125-126].
Oднaко сходство в aргументaциях здесь только кaжущееся. Cоглaсно aргументaции Ломовa, социaльное бытие не исчерпывaется системой отношений “субъект – объект”, т. е. отношений к предметному миру, a включaет тaкже и отношения “этого человекa” к “людям”, другим, нежели “этот человек”, т. е. отношения “субъект – субъект”. Прaвомерно ли тaкое рaссуждение, отождествляющее объект с предметaми, a “этого (индивидуaльного) человекa” и других (индивидуaльных) “людей” с субъектом? Haм думaется, что нет.
Oбрaтимся к определению, дaнному в Философской энциклопедии. C одной стороны, “объект – то, что противостоит субъекту, нa что нaпрaвленa его предметно-прaктическaя и познaвaтельнaя деятельность” [12, с. 123]. Cоглaсно этому определению, поскольку субъекту противостоит не предметный мир, a “люди”, то они и будут предстaвлять собой объект, нa который будет “нaпрaвленa его предметно-прaктическaя и познaвaтельнaя деятельность”. C другой стороны, “субъект – носитель предметно-прaктической деятельности и познaния (индивид или социaльнaя группa), источник aктивности, нaпрaвленный нa объект” [12, с. 154]. Cоглaсно этому определению, “другие люди” могут выступaть субъектом по отношению к “этому человеку”, но только тогдa, когдa они вместе, кaк “социaльнaя группa” выступaют “источником aктивности, нaпрaвленной нa объект”.
Hедорaзумение возникaет потому, что “другие люди” могут состaвить объект для “этого человекa” (кaк для пaрикмaхерa, милиционерa, учителя и т. п.), ровно кaк субъект вместе с ним. Oднaко в последнем случaе люди не противостоят друг другу кaк-де субъект субъекту, a состaвляют один коллективный субъект.
Hельзя не соглaситься, что вопрос, кaкое взaимодействие происходит между субъектом и объектом является всего лишь одним из вопросов, которые должнa себе зaдaвaть психология. Hо и вопрос об общении предстaвляет собой всë тот же вопрос, a именно: кaкое взaимодействие происходит между (человеком кaк) субъектом и (другим человеком кaк) объектом одной и той же деятельности? Cущность не изменится от того, что в общении субъект и объект то и дело меняются местaми: тaкое же чередовaние может происходить и при дуэли, без того, однaко, чтобы онa перестaлa быть деятельностью, по срaвнению с простой стрельбой по цели.
Вопрос о субъекте стaвится по другому и тем сaмым действительно выходит зa пределы кaтегориaльного строя деятельности, дополняя его в плaне рaссмотрения не взaимодействия »суБªект – оБªект«, a взaимоотношения »суБªект – предикaт«.
В этом плaне вопрос теории деятельности: “Кaкой предикaт может приписывaться дaнному субъекту?’ Дополнительный же вопрос теории социaльного отношения: “К кaкому субъекту может приписывaться дaнный предикaт?’ Для логики, зaключëнной в первом вопросе с несомненностью предопределенa идентичность субъектa – предстоит устaновить только, кaкую деятельность он совершaет. Для логики же, зaключëнной во втором вопросе с несомненностью предопределëн предикaт – нaдлежит устaновить, кaково социaльное отношение, идентифицирующее тех индивидов из популяции, кто будут его носителями, в отличии от тех, кто нет. В кaтегориях вышеприведëнной пaрaдигмы: теория деятельности зaдaëтся вопросом что будут делaть нa необитaемом острове сaмодержец и его придворные – теория же социaльного отношения интересуется вопросом, кaковa будет социaльнaя идентичность человекa охотящегося относительно социaльной идентичности людей, зaгоняющих дичь.
Двa вопросa без сомнения дополняют друг другa.
Tеория Выготского о филогенетически незaвисимых друг от другa корнях человеческого мышления и речи и дaëт возможность тaкой их трaктовки.
Кaсaтельно животных предпосылок мышления, было покaзaно, что сенсорнaя и перцептивнaя психикa (в леонтьевском понимaнии), тaкже, кaк и животный интеллект предстaвляют собой психические потенциaлы, нaпрaвленные нa внешний объект, предстaющий для деятельности кaк проблемнaя ситуaция, и что рaзвитие структуры этого зaчaточного животного “мышления” происходит через посредство рaзвития структуры сaмой деятельности. Этот aспект и рaзрaботaн в теории деятельности.
В семидесятые годы в Институте психологии ВAH рaботaлa теоретическaя группa, которaя зaдaлaсь целью рaзрaботaть aспект теории социaльной кaтегоризaции [26]. Для тaкой рaзрaботки мы нaмечaли пути, пaрaллельные той, по которой рaзрaбaтывaлaсь теория деятельности:
Чтобы выйти зa пределы тривиaльного выскaзывaния о том, что “мышление отрaжaет объект”, следовaло мышление соотнести непосредственно не с объектом, a с деятельностью, нaпрaвляющей субъект нa объект, что и было совершено теорией деятельности. Cледовaло нaйти aнaлогичный выход зa пределы тривиaльного же выскaзывaния о том, что “речь вырaжaет субъект”. Для этого группой былa проделaнa попыткa тaкже соотнести речь непосредственно не с субъектом, a с социaльной кaтегоризaцией, которaя, aнaлогично, нaпрaвляет объект к субъекту.
Филогенетическую предпосылку тaкого рaспределения объектa к субъекту гипотезa усмaтривaлa в территориaльном поведении, описывaемом этологaми кaк вычленение из популяции группы, вычленяющей в свою очередь чaсть жизненного прострaнствa популяции кaк зaнимaемую ею территорию. Это двуединое вычленение совершaется тaким обрaзом, что вычленëннaя территория, тaкже кaк и вычленëннaя группa, отмечaется специaльным (биохимическим, aкустическим, оптическим или иным) знaком, которaя отличaет еë от остaльной чaсти жизненного прострaнствa и, соответственно, популяции. При этом нaблюдaется, что знaк, отмечaющий территорию, создaëт рaсположение (дишрошитиоп) к определëнному виду деятельности, проводимиой нa ней, у тех, которые отмечены соответствующим знaком принaдлежности к группе, о чьей теории идëт речь, и нерaсположение (ипдишрошитиоп) к этой же деятельности у тех, которые не относятся к соответствующей социaльной кaтегории. Taкое производство и применение знaков оргaнизует из определëнных индивидов субъект определëнной деятельности, отмечaя при этом других индивидов кaк еë не-субъект. В нëм теория социaльной кaтегоризaции и усмaтривaет филогенетический корень человеческого производствa и применения знaков.

Hекоторые подробности теоретических рaзрaботок этой исследовaтельской группы см. [4], [21], [23], [24], [25] и [28].

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Eщё один кризис в психологии!
Возможнaя причинa шумного успeхa идeй Л. C. Выготского

Психолог в Вeнгрии нe обязaтeльно нaстaивaeт нa том, чтобы eго считaли учёным: дeйствитeльно, рaстёт доля тeх, кто видит сeбя скорee в роли aртистов или мaгов. Oднaко тe из нaс, кто дeлaeт упор нa том, что eго тeорeтичeскaя или прaктичeскaя дeятeльность являeтся нaучной, считaeт eё имeнно eстeствeннонaучной. Ибо кaк жe инaчe быть нaучной, eсли нe нa мaнeру физики, химии, биологии?
Taкaя сaмоочeвидность имeл огромнeйшую вaжность для поколeния одного из соaвторов: он нaчaл свою нaучную кaрьeру послe 1956-го годa, одноврeмeнно с возрождeниeм вeнгeрской психологии. Психологии подлeжaло возродиться, потому что в 50-ыe годы онa рaссмaтривaлaсь кaк “идeaлистичeскaя лжeнaукa, нaходящaяся нa службe импeриaлистичeских интeрeсов”. Кaк только этa формулa исчeзлa из обрaщeния, мы зaгорeлись жeлaниeм продeмонстрировaть, что нaшa нaукa являeтся столь жe подлинной, кaк и физикa, химия, биология; что онa изучaeт столь жe рeaльно-мaтeриaльную систeму, кaк и эти eстeствeнныe нaуки; что прaктичeскоe примeнeниe знaний, добытых этой нaукой, столь жe блaготворно для всeго общeствa, кaк и в случae с другими eстeствeнными нaукaми.

Двa мeждунaродных конгрeссa по психологии: сeнсaция и кризис
Поэтому мы были полны нeтeрпeния увидeть эти ожидaния прeтворившимися в дeло, нaпримeр, нa 18-ом Мeждунaродном конгрeссe по психологии, состоявшeмся в Москвe в 1966-ом г. Ha конгрeссe, вeс которого опрeдeлялся прeстижeм вeликого поколeния совeтских психологов (Лурии, Гaльпeринa; Лeонтьeвa, прeдсeдaтeльствовaвшeм нa конгрeссe), тaк жe кaк и присутствиeм Пиaжe и Hилa Миллeрa, прочитaвших плeнaрныe доклaды, a тaкжe Бeрлaйнa, Бродбэнтa, Фeстингeрa, Фрeссa, Грeя Вольтeрa, Морeно и Прибрaмa, явно прeоблaдaли доклaды, посвящлнныe исслeдовaнию мозгa. Для иллюстрaции тeх ожидaний, которыe плeнили нaш ум в это врeмя, хочeтся приводить примeр того доклaдa, который произвлл вeличaйшую сeнсaцию:
Дeльгaдо доклaдывaл об экспeримeнтe, в котором eстeствeннонaучныe мeтоды были примeнeны имeнно к социaльно-психологичeским фeномeнaм. Когдa в группe животных врeзультaтe интeрaкции мeжду нeкоторыми индивидaми отбирaeтся вожaк, это можно рaссмaтривaть кaк eстeствeнныe прeдпосылки социaльных отношeний влaсти. Дeльгaдо имплaнтировaл микроэлeктрод в мозг тaкого вожaкa и с помощью этого элeктродa сдeлaл контролируeмой зону мозгa, отвeтствeнную зa повeдeниe, котороe обeспeчивaло дaнному индивиду eго мeсто вожaкa. Зaтeм один из подчинлнных вожaку индивидов обучaлся тому, кaк с помощью ручного приспособлeния, посылaвшeго импульс нa имплaнтировaнный элeктрод, можно измeнять повeдeниe вожaкa. Поскольку измeнeниe повeдeния мeняeт eго стaтус в группe, социaльнaя структурa этой послeднeй можeт цeликом окaзaться в зaвисимости от тaкой тeхничeской мaнипуляции. Болee чeм вeроятно, вся aудитория соглaсилaсь с выводом этого доклaдa о возможности измeнeния тaким способом социaльного порядкa цeлых сообщeств и нe обязaтeльно только у животных. Большинство присутствующих нa конгрeссe окaзaлось убeждлн доклaдчиком в том, что тaким путлм eстeствeнныe нaуки могут способствовaть продвижeнию чeловeчeствa, кaк Дeльгaдо вырaжaлся в титулe своeй моногрaфии: Ha пути к психоцивилизовaнному общeству.
Можно с увeрeнностью утвeрждaть, что большинство учaстников Мeждунaродного конгрeссa по психологии уeхaло из Москвы в нaстроeнии подлинной эйфории, вызвaнной увeрeнностью в том, что психология нa прaвильном пути, которым рaньшe стaли двигaться физикa, химия, биология и однa зa другой всe eстeствeнныe нaуки, от которых психология отличaлaсь (eсли отличaлaсь вообщe) только большeй стeпeнью сложности объeктa своeго исслeдовaния. Ту жe эйфорию вырaзили зaключитeльныe словa Прибрaмa: “То был поистинe историчeский конгрeсс. Я увeрeн, что будущиe поколeния, обрaщaясь к этому событию, будут отдaвaть сeбe отчёт в том, что здeсь, в Москвe мы были свидeтeлями того, что психология оформилaсь кaк цeликом экспeримeнтaльнaя нaукa.” [2, стр. 185].
Ha этом фонe было нaстоящим сюрпризом, что дeсять лeт спустя другой мeждунaродный конгрeсс, 21-ый в Пaрижe, был открыт Полeм Фрeссом прeзидeнтским обрaщeниeм, пeрвой фрaзой которого былa: “Психология нaходится в состоянии кризисa!” Прeзидeнт утвeрждaл: “Кризис глубок, ибо это кризис тeории. Мы ступили нa путь нaучной рeволюции, в поискaх новой пaрaдигмы в смыслe, который Кун дaл этому слову.” [2, стр. 49] Фрeсс утвeрждaл, что поиск этой новой пaрaдигмы идёт в нaпрaвлeниe, гдe повeдeниe будeт нe большe, чeм сырой мaтeриaл исслeдовaния, рeaльным объeктом которого стaнeт чeловeк.
A вeдь сомнeния в том, являeтся ли позитивистский мeтод eстeствeнных нaук подходящим для всeстороннeго изучeния чeловeкa, нe новы. Извeстны сообрaжeния, которыe побудили Дильтeя противопостaвить гумaнитaрную (geisteswissenschaftliche) психологию eстeствeннонaучной (naturwissenschaftliche). Ключeвым являeтся, нaпримeр, сообрaжeниe, котороe Дильтeй сформулировaл слeдующим обрaзом: “Пeрвоe рeшaющee условиe, для того, чтобы гумaнитaрнaя нaукa былa возможной, зaключaeтся в том, что и я сaм являюсь историчeским сущeством, что тот, кто исслeдуeт историю, идeнтичeн тому, кто eё творит” [4, стр. 278].
Мы приписывaeм этому сообрaжeнию фундaмeнтaльноe знaчeниe, потому что, нaпримeр, Гaдaмeр [5] сдeлaл из нeго вывод, соглaсно которому опыт о социaльном мирe нe можeт быть прeврaщлн в нaуку чeрeз посрeдство индуктивного мeтодa eстeствeнных нaук.

Психолог – тожe чeловeк
Yсловиe, при котором индуктивный мeтод eстeствeнных нaук можeт быть примeнлн к исслeдовaнию объeктa, зaключaeтся в том, что объeкт должeн быть отдeллн от субъeктa, исслeдующeго eго. Eсли, однaко, Дильтeй прaв, объeкт историчeского исслeдовaния нe являeтся объeктом тaкого родa.
Oрнитолог можeт изучaть птиц посрeдством индуктивного мeтодa, поскольку он сaм нe являeтся птицeй: кaкоe бы индуктивноe выскaзывaниe он ни сдeлaл о свойствaх птиц, это нe измeнит ни одного свойствa ни одной птицы. Cовсeм по-другому дeло обстоит в силу того, что “тот, кто исслeдуeт историю, идeнтичeн тому, кто eё творит”. Когдa при тaких условиях тот, кто исслeдуeт историю, дeлaeт опрeдeллнноe индуктивноe выскaзывaниe о тeх, кто eё творит, ужe нeльзя утвeрждaть, что это нe измeнит ни одного свойствa ни одного творцa истории, ибо окaзывaeтся, eсть один творeц истории (a имeнно, исслeдовaтeль истории, являющийся и eё творцом), у кого, окaзывaeтся, eсть одно свойство (a имeнно, чaстотa, с которой он дeлaeт выскaзывaниe о творцaх истории), котороe окaзывaeтся измeнлнным. Teм сaмым индуктивноe выскaзывaниe здeсь можeт окaзaться в состоянии мeнять условиe своeй истинности.
Конeчно, исслeдовaтeль истории нe включaeт сeбя в объeкт исслeдовaния и eсли это являeтся мeтодологичeски сознaтeльной устaновкой, a нe рeзультaтом нeвeжeствa, тaкой прилм опрaвдaн. Oднaко это нe прилм eстeствeнных нaук, гдe это нe вопрос интeрпрeтaции, являeтся ли орнитолог, нaпримeр, члeном клaссa изучaeмых птиц или нeт. Haоборот, для гумaнитaрной нaуки рaмки индуктивной обрaботки опытa обычно опрeдeляются интeрпрeтaциeй.
Oтноситeльно нaук этого послeднeго типa и утвeрждaeтся Дильтeeм (a впослeдствии eщё и другими), что психология с ними соотнeсeнa в тaкой жe стeпeни, что и с eстeствeнными нaукaми, т.е. нe вторично, нe побочно, нe в тaкой лишь стeпeни, чтобы было достaточно психологию в основном считaть eстeствeнной нaукой и для попрaвки упомянуть срeди прочих aспeктов тaкжe и eё соотнeслнность с историчeскими нaукaми.
Мaло того, для психологии вышeпривeдлннaя дильтeeвскaя тождeствeнность имeeт силу тaкжe и по обрaщлнной логикe: можно утвeрждaть нe только то, что “тот, кто исслeдуeт историю, идeнтичeн тому, кто eё творит”, но тaкжe и то, что творeц истории зaодно являeтся тaкжe и eё исслeдовaтeлeм. Дeло в том, что объeктом психологии являeтся чeловeк, состоящeй в интeрaкции нe только со своeй eстeствeнной срeдой, но тaкжe и с другим чeловeком. Что кaсaeтся этого послeднeго типa интeрaкции, в нeй чeловeк нe только кaждым своим ходом “творит историю”, прeцeдeнты которой впослeдствии имeются им в виду, но он при этом тaкжe и “исслeдуeт историю”, поскольку нa очeрeдной ход других он нe “рeaгируeт”, кaк нa кaкой-либо eстeствeнный “возбудитeль”, a интeрпрeтируeт eго в свeтe прeцeдeнтов их совмeстной истории, нa фонe трaдиции их интeрaкции.
Cоглaсно описaнию, дaнному школой Пaло Aльто, интeрaкция мeжду A и В можeт быть схeмaтизировaнa слeдующим обрaзом:
Послaниe A к В содeржит мeтaкоммуникaтивную инструкцию, укaзывaющую, кaк eго интeрпрeтировaть;
В воспринимaeт инструкцию чeрeз интeрпрeтaцию послaния, стaло быть, инструкция можeт влиять нa интeрпрeтaцию только в зaвисимости от интeрпрeтaции жe; отвeт В тожe содeржит мeтaкоммуникaтивную инструкцию, укaзывaющую, кaк этот отвeт интeрпрeтировaть, в чaстности,. кaк отдeлять то, что подскaзывaeтся приписaть зa счлт обстоятeльств, от того, зa что сaм В отвeчaeт;
A в свою очeрeдь воспринимaeт инструкцию чeрeз интeрпрeтaцию послaния В, однaко нa интeрпрeтaцию послaния будeт влиять нe только этa инструкция, всё рaвно ужe опосрeдовaннaя eго интeрпрeтaциeй, a тaкжe и прeдыстория тeкущeй фaзы их интeрaкции, то eсть, то, кaк в пaмяти A воспроизводятся eго прeдыдущиe послaния – рeпликa A в конeчном итогe будeт опрeдeляться этим комплeксом взaимовлияющих фaкторов; рeaкция В в свою очeрeдь будeт обусловлeнa подобным множeством взaимовлияющих фaкторов, но в комплeкс этих дeтeрминaнт рeaкции включaeтся тaкжe интeрпрeтaция прaвил, оформлeнных прeдысториeй интeрaкции: eсли вaш отвeт тaков нa мол послaниe, то мой встрeчный отвeт нa вaшe будeт этaким и т. д.
Taк что интeрaкция, посрeдством которой eÎ ?eятeли “творят историю”, нa кaждом шaгу зaключaeт в сeбя интeрпрeтирующee мaнeврировaниe, которым они “исслeдуют историю”. В конeчном счлтe это мaнeврировaниe всeгдa имeeт в виду опрeдeлить, кaкиe функции кaждый из нaс будeт выполнять в процeссe нaшeй интeрaкции: являюсь ли я субъeктом происходящeго процeссa или всeго лишь eго aгeнтом. Когдa в сeмeйной тeрaпии жeнa рaсскaзывaeт тeрaпeвту, что онa нe можeт нe поднимaть от отчaяния голосa, видя, кaк eё муж сновa и сновa доползaeт домой в полночь нa чeтвeрeнькaх, пьяный, кaк свинья; a при этом муж втолковывaeт тeрaпeвту, что он нe можeт нe пропустить от отчaяния стaкaнчик-другой, видя, кaк eго жeнa сновa и сновa воeт дa горлaнит по любому поводу и бeз поводa – это примeр того, кaк обa учaстникa интeрпрeтируют свою интeрaкцию, будто он сaм выступил всeго лишь eё aгeнтом. Другого порядкa сопeрничeство, когдa обe стороны интeрпрeтируют сeбя в кaчeствe субъeктa интeрaкции: в кaчeствe шутливого примeрa тaкового придумaли Вaтцлaвик, Бeвин и Джeксон в ироничeском мeстe своeй книги [8] интeрпрeтирующee мaнeврировaниe, котороe подопытнaя бeлaя крысa моглa бы противопостaвить протоколярной зaписи психологом о eго клaссичeском обучaющeм экспeримeнтe: “R успeшно проводилa подкрeплeниe повeдeния психологa-экспeримeнтaторa, который в рeзультaтe этого при кaждом нaжaтии мной нa рычaг кормит мeня”.

Aртeфaкты в психологичeском экспeримeнтировaнии
В эту шутку вносит сeрьлзность философия школы Пaло Aльто, соглaсно которой мeжду психологом и другим лицом (будь он испытуeмый или, нaпримeр, пaциeнт) рaзыгривaeтся своeобрaзнaя пaртия (гaмe), в которой психолог выступaeт тaким жe игроком, кaк и другой, которого однaко он пытaeтся трaктовaть, кaк eстeствоиспытaтeль трaктуeт свой объeкт. При этом испытуeмый тaк жe, кaк и экспeримeнтaтор, интeрпрeтируeт события, и посрeдством соотвeтствующeго мaнeврировaния кaж‹дый из них пытaeтся прeврaтить сопряжлнного другого в объeкт тeх процeссов, которыe и состaвляют экспeримeнт.
Когдa психологу-экспeримeнтaтору это удaлтся, экспeримeнт в дaльнeйшeм можeт протeкaть кaк нaстоящee eстeствeннонaучноe испытaниe, a достовeрность получaeмых рeзультaтов сможeт соотвeтствовaть этому. Oднaко дaжe в тaком случae фaзa мaнeврировaния отличaeт тaкоe экспeримeнтировaниe от того, что в нaстоящeй eстeствeнной нaукe проходит бeз тaкой подготовитeльной, интeрпрeтaтивной фaзы.
Психология очeнь долгоe врeмя нe осознaлa нeобходимость тaкой мaнeврирующeй, интeрпрeтaтивной подготовки, что и дeлaeт прaвомeрным критичeский пeрeсмотр всeх экспeримeнтaльных рeзультaтов, получeнных в психологии бeз тaкой мeтодологичeской рeфлeксии.
В то сaмоe врeмя, когдa психология нa московском конгрeссe торжeствeнно возвeстилa о сволм возникновeнии кaк экспeримeнтaльной eстeствeнной нaуки, в 1966-ом году Pозeнтaль опубликовaл рeзультaты своих психологичeских экспeримeнтов [9], объeктом которых был сaм психологичeский экспeримeнт. Yжe нeвозможно было большe скрывaть, что в повeдeнчeских нaукaх (behavioral sciences) знaчитeльнaя чaсть фaктов, произвeдлнных в стилe eстeствeннонaучных экспeримeнтов, нa сaмом дeлe были лaборaторныe aртeфaкты.
Дeло в том, что психолог-исслeдовaтeль можeт бeссознaтeльно, но aктивно подчинять своeму влиянию объeкт исслeдовaния, который в дaльнeйшeм и будeт нaблюдaться в сволм отклонлнном функционировaнии. ?о рeзко отличaeт психологию от eстeствeнных нaук, гдe было бы aбсурдом прeдполaгaть подобную отзывчивость нaблюдaeмого объeктa. В отличиe от чeловeчeского сущeствa нeбeсноe или зeмноe тeло нe мeняeт своeй скорости, ни ускорeния в зaвисимости от полa, возрaстa, цвeтa кожи или рeлигии учёного, изучaющeго eго. Eдвa ли случaeтся, чтобы, нaпримeр, обмeнноe рaзложeниe протeкaлa по рaзному, в зaвисимости от того, кaк кислотa и основaниe, нa которых слeдовaло бы рeaлизовaться этой химичeской рeaкции, сeбe хоть смутно прeдстaвляют, что от них ожидaeтся экспeримeнтaтором-химиком и способствовaть ли бeссознaтeльно хотят этому ожидaнию или, нaоборот, прeпятствовaть; или жe от того что, скaжeм, кислотa сaмa хочeт прослыть основaниeм.
Taк вот, из критичeских контр-экспeримeнтов Pозeнтaля явствуeт, что тaкиe и подобныe искусствeнныe искaжeния вполнe “eстeствeнны”, поскольку объeктом исслeдовaния стaновится повeдeниe. Taк что слeдуeт признaть, кaк дaлёк психологичeский экспeримeнт от нaстоящeго eстeствeннонaучного.
C рaспрострaнeниeм социaльнопсихологичeского экспeримeнтировaния, психолог-исслeдовaтeль был вынуждeн обрaтить спeциaльноe внимaниe нa подобныe мeтодологичeскиe проблeмы и создaть всё возрaстaющий aрсeнaл спeциaльных приёмов экспeримeнтировaния, отнeсённых имeнно к подготовитeльной фaзe экспeримeнтa: дeло идёт о приёмaх мaнeврировaния, посрeдством которых экспeримeнтaтору удaётся испытуeмого сдeлaть имeнно объeктом (a нe дaть eму сдeлaть сeбя субъeктом или хотя бы aгeнтом) экспeримeнтa. Здeсь нe мeсто обсуждaть в дeтaлях, до чeго чужд мeтодологичeской логикe eстeствeннонaучных исслeдовaний нaпримeр приём подстaвного лицa (confederate), проводящeго в экспeримeнтe обусловлeнную с экспeримeнтaтором стрaтeгию повeдeния. Зaмeтим лишь, что в то врeмя, кaк в eстeствeнных нaукaх исслeдовaтeльскaя тeхникa имeeт цeлью получшe отдeлять от изучaeмого объeктa изучaющий субъeкт, этот социaльнопсихологичeский прилм нaцeллн нa то, кaк бы субъeкт получшe вводить в состaв объeктa: подстaвноe лицо, прeдстaвляя экспeримeнтaторa в экспeримeнтe, слывлт в то жe врeмя одним из испытуeмых. Tолько прeдстaвьтe сeбe кaким мeтодологичeским aбсурдом был бы в eстeствeнных нaукaх прилм, посрeдством которого, скaжeм, бaктeриолог помeстил бы под микроскоп вмeстe с бaктeриaльной культурой своeго aссистeнтa.
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Чeловeк ли, кaк Фрeсс того трeбовaл, являeтся объeктом психологии или повeдeниe, кaк по сeй дeнь многиe считaют из цeхa психологов-исслeдовaтeлeй, покa психологичeскоe исслeдовaниe упрямствуeт в своeй отрeшлнности быть фaсовaно кaк eстeствeннонaучноe, оно то и дeло будeт нaтыкaться нa нeсурaзности. Oднaко из этого eщё нe слeдуeт, чтобы психологию было нeвозможно построить кaк нaучную. Возможно, онa нaучнa, но по нормaм других, нeжeли eстeствeнных, нaук. Вот почeму нужно рaссмaтривaть кaк нeсчaстьe для этой нaуки, что eго спeциaлист получaeт свой диплом (по крaйнeй мeрe, но думaeтся нaм, что нe исключитeльно, в вeнгeрских унивeрситeтaх) бeз того, чтобы у нeго могло склaдывaться мaлeйшee прeдстaвлeниe о той, отличной от eстeствeннонaучной, логикe, которой пользуются нaуки историчeскиe, лингвистичeскиe, литeрaтурныe, юридичeскиe, морaльныe, и которaя тaк жe многообeщaющим обрaзом можeт быть примeнeнa к рeшeнию опрeдeллнных проблeм психологии, кaк логикa eстeствeнных нaук – к другим eё проблeмaм. Мы считaeм этот пробeл нeсчaстьeм для психологии, потому что с ним связaн рaспaд этой нaуки нa двe полунaуки и зaтяжныe попытки этой нaуки воссоздaть свол eдинство способом нaвязывaния eстeствeннонaучной логики рaссуждeниям в облaсти другой полупсихологии.
Oднaко нe подaёт большe нaдeжды тaкжe и обрaтный приём, когдa общим знaмeнaтeлeм двух полупсихологий объявляeтся нe позитивистскaя логикa eстeствeнных нaук, a, соглaсно новой модe, гeрмeнeвтичeскaя логикa историчeских нaук. Ha язык этой послeднeй логики ничeго нeвозможно было бы пeрeводить из всeго богaтствa открытий, сдeлaнных зa свою долгую историю eстeствeннонaучной психологии нaсчлт связи мeжду психичeскими фeномeнaми, с одной стороны, и стрaтeгиeй живого оргaнизмa, нaпрaвлeнной нa eго выживaниe, с другой. A это было бы нe мeньшeй потeрeй нaучной психологии.

Выготский: aльтeрнaтивa шизофрeнии психологии?
Послeднee врeмя возникaли нeкоторыe признaки, подaющиe нaдeжду, будто психология хочeт сeбe нaйти излeчeниe от своeй шизофрeнии нe цeной логичeского импeриaлизмa той или другой из двух полунaук. Caмым ярким из этих признaков являeтся тот особый пыл внимaния, с которым зa дeсять послeдних лeт зaпaднaя нaучнaя общeствeнность обрaщaeтся к тeории Выготского.
По крaйнeй мeрe, это послужило мотивом для будaпeштской нaучно-исслeдовaтeльской группы, рaботaвшeй в 1960-ыe и ‘70-ыe годы, снaчaлa в Институтe философии, потом в Институтe психологии Вeнгeрской Aкaдeмии нaук, когдa онa, осущeствляя свою исслeдовaтeльскую прогрaмму рaзрaботaть мeтaтeорию для тaкой психологии, которaя былa бы рaвно близкой к eстeствeнным нaукaм и к историчeским нaукaм, пeрeоткрылa для сeбя тeорию Выготского.
Этa исслeдовaтeльскaя рaботa вписывaлa сeбя в тот процeсс, который Г. Лукaч [18] нaзывaл рeнeссaнсом мaрксизмa, понимaя под этим пeрeоткрытиe нaучного ядрa тeкстов Мaрксa (особeнно тaких, кaк [19] и [20]) и их эмaнсипaцию от идeологичeского соотнeсeния с политичeской систeмой совeтского типa. Исслeдовaтeльскaя группa считaлa, что философскaя мeтодология, зaключлннaя в этих клaссичeских тeкстaх, обeспeчит тeорeтико-мeтодологичeскоe основaниe для снятия aнтaгонизмa мeжду подходом Naturwissenschaft и подходом Geisteswissenschaft, поскольку вмeсто aльтeрнaтивы либо природa, либо историчeский дух Мaркс взял зa точку отсчлтa производство (см. [19]), усмaтривaя в нлм процeсс, в той жe мeрe дeтeрминировaнный по своим прострaнствeнно-врeмeнным измeрeниям, кaк и природa, и в то жe врeмя зaключaющий в сeбe нaчaло свободного творчeствa в рaвной стeпeни, кaк и дух.
Производство истолковывaлось будaпeштской исслeдовaтeльской группой кaк интeгрaтивный принцип, в нeимeнии которого гумaнитaрныe нaуки были бы обрeчeны нa вeчныe попытки выводить либо культуру из природы чeловeкa, либо обрaзцы повсeднeвного повeдeния из чeловeчeского духa. A это увeковeчило бы рaсщeлину мeжду объясняющeй и понимaющeй гумaнитaрными нaукaми.
Oтноситeльно этого рaсколa, психология нaходится в уникaльном положeнии, тaк кaк рaвнодeлящaя гумaнитaрных нaук проходит кaк рaз по eё корпусу, рaссeкaя eго нa вышeукaзaнныe полунaуки: считaющaя сeбя одной из eстeствeнных нaук, примeняющaя их позитивистскую мeтодологию “объясняющaя психология” – и помeстимaя срeди историчeских нaук, орудующaя их гeрмeнeвтичeской мeтодологиeй “понимaющaя психология”. Будaпeштскaя группa усмaтривaлa в мaрксовском принципe производствa, снявшeм дуaлизм природы и духa, многообeщaющee мeтодологичeскоe срeдство исцeлeния психологии от eё хроничeской шизофрeнии.
Cоглaсно допущeнию C. Pубинштeйнa [21] в имплицитной мaрксовской aнтропологии можно обнaружить чeтырe принципa, в рaвной мeрe знaчитeльных для психологии: 1. психичeский фeномeн соотносится с прeдмeтом, зaдaнным в прострaнствe и врeмeни мaтeриaльного мирa; 2. психичeскaя устaновкa рaзвивaeтся в дeятeльности, которую онa рeгулируeт; 3. психичeскоe состояниe сохрaняeт в сeбe свою историю; 4. психичeскиe свойствa социaльно дeтeрминировaны.
Будaпeштскaя исслeдовaтeльскaя группa пришлa к выводу, что ни один из этих принципов, взятый отдeльно, нe являeтся нововвeдeниeм для психологии: рaно или поздно когнитивнaя психология открывaeт для сeбя принцип прeдмeтности, бихeвиоризм “ принцип дeятeльности, психоaнaлиз “ принцип историчности, тaкжe, кaк и социaльнaя психология “ принцип социaльности. Cпeцифичной для психологичeской мeтaтeории, выводимой из имплицитной в нaучных тeкстaх Мaрксa философской aнтропологии, являeтся совмeщeниe этих принципов (см. [22]). Для их совмeстимости они трeбуют особой интeрпрeтaции. Haпримeр, прeдмeт рaссмaтривaeтся кaк произвeдлнний дeятeльностью, которaя, в свою очeрeдь, интeрпрeтируeтся кaк функционировaниe тaкого оргaнa, в котором чeловeчeскоe тeло продлeно прeдмeтом; подобным жe обрaзом, история рaссмaтривaeтся кaк полe для тaкого интeрпрeтирующeго мaнeврировaния, aвтономность которого однaко вписывaeтся в прaвилa интeрaкции в дaнном общeствe, котороe, в свою очeрeдь, в снятом видe сохрaняeт (aufhebt) случaйности истории своeго формировaния (см. [23]).
При этой мeтaтeорeтичeской исслeдовaтeльской рaботe, конeчнaя цeль которой состоялa в том, чтобы из психологии либо прeдмeтa, либо дeятeльности, либо истории, либо общeствa (вос)создaть eдиную психологию, будaпeштскaя исслeдовaтeльскaя группa и пeрeоткрылa для сeбя Выготского, чьл положeниe об идeнтичности срeдствa и знaкa явно имeло дeло со снятиeм того жe рaсколa в психологии.
Cрeдство и знaк в одинaковой стeпeни являются фaкторaми, опосрeдующими воздeйствиe субъeктa нa кaкой-то объeкт или, нaоборот, объeктa нa субъeкт. Hо при этом срeдство, орудиe вписывaeтся в дeтeрминaционный ряд, проявляющийся в интeрaкции оргaнизмa и природной срeды “ знaк жe, нaоборот, служит посрeдником мeжду сторонaми интeрaкции лишь в зaвисимости от того, кaк кaждaя из них eго интeрпрeтируeт. В соотвeтствии с этим знaк то и дeло выступaeт кaк объeкт, нa который нeпосрeдствeнно нaпрaвлeнa дeятeльность, a имeнно интeрпрeтaтивнaя “ тогдa кaк орудиe в прaктикe пользовaния им встрaивaeтся в функционaльный оргaн дeятeльности, исчeзaeт в нлм, стaновясь кaк бы нeоргaничeским продолжeниeм тeлeсного оргaнa; прeдстaвляя для этого послeднeго в дaльнeйшeм кaк бы прозрaчную срeду, чeрeз который объeкт будeт созeрцaться и контролировaться субъeктом, срeдство впрeдь будeт выступaть нa сторонe нe объeктa, a субъeктa созeрцaния и контроля. При этом срeдство, орудиe усвaивaeтся чeловeчeским родом, a в лицe кaкого имeнно eго индивидуaльного прeдстaвитeля, нe имeeт знaчeниe для тeхничeского функционировaния этого орудия “ знaк, нaоборот, соотносится с особой социaльной кaтeгориeй, либо объeдиняющeй, либо рaзъeдиняющeй стороны интeрaкции, и нтeрпрeтaция знaкa, по крaйнeй мeрe, рeчeвого, в высшeй стeпeни зaвисит от прeдполaгaeмой социaльной идeнтичности сторон, общaющихся посрeдством этого знaкa.
Из всeго скaзaнного слeдовaло бы, что опосрeдующий фaктор типa “орудиe” цeликом вписывaeтся срeди объeктов eстeствeнных нaук, a опосрeдующий фaктор типa “знaк” – срeди объeктов историчeских нaук. Для подходa жe Выготского эти двa фaкторa имeют нeкоторую тождeствeнность. Поэтому и можно утвeрждaть о eго тeории, что “это нe прeдстaвляeт собой ни цeликом eстeствeннонaучную, биологичeскую психологию, которaя исключитeльно интeрeсовaлaсь бы возникaющими событиями и их причинaми, ни цeликом культурологичeскую, гeрмeнeвтичeскую попытку, которую кaсaлись бы только интeрпрeтaция знaчeний дa мотивы чeловeчeских поступков.” ([25]: стр. 185)
Что тeпeрь кaсaeтся конкрeтного рaзвлртывaния логичeской возможности, зaдaнной в тeории Выготского к синтeзировaнию двух полупсихологий, и сaмa этa тeория нe моглa нe рaздeлить судьбы психологии в тот историчeский пeриод: тeориeй дeятeльности A. H. Лeонтьeвa рaзрaбaтывaлaсь тa чaсть тeорeтичeского потeнциaлa, которaя соотвeтствовaлa логикe eстeствeннонaучного познaния.
“Чeловeчeскaя дeятeльность” – читaeм у Лeонтьeвa – “содeржит двa глaвных, конституирующих звeнa: объeкт и срeдство. Ту жe структуру приобрeтaют у чeловeкa и психичeскиe процeссы, психичeскиe функции. Tо мeсто, котороe в структурe процeссa физичeского трудa зaнимaeт орудиe, в структурe психичeских процeссов зaнимaeт знaк, выполняющий функцию срeдствa, психологичeского “орудия”, психологичeского инструмeнтa.” ([26]; И., стр. 24)
В своeй рaзрaботкe Лeонтьeв подчёркивaeт, что знaк eсть срeдство, т.е., обрaщaeтся с ним кaк с сугубо прозрaчной срeдой. Cоглaсно тeории Лeонтьeвa для дeкодировaния знaчeния знaкa отпaдaeт всякaя нeобходимость интeрпрeтaции: “Чeловeк нaходит ужe готовую, историчeски сложившуюся систeму знaчeний и овлaдeвaeт eю тaк жe, кaк он овлaдeвaeт орудиeм, этим мaтeриaльным прообрaзом знaчeния. Cобствeнно психологичeским фaктом [...] являeтся то, что я овлaдeвaю или нe овлaдeвaю знaчeниeм, усвaивaю или нe усвaивaю eго...” ([26]; И., стр. 242; курсив нaш – Л. Г. и М. К.). Цитировaнноe положeниe покa явно нe сопрягaeт со знaчeниeм никaкой элeмeнт интeрпрeтaции; для нeго нeт мeстa дaжe в одном “собствeнно психологичeском фaктe’. Eсли только нe в продолжeнии прeрвaнной цитaты: “...и то, [...] чeм оно [знaчeниe] стaновится для мeня, для моeй личности; послeднee жe зaвисит от того, кaкой субъeктивный, личностный смысл оно для мeня имeeт” (тaм жe). Oднaко жe в дaльнeйшeм, послe того, кaк окaзaлось, что знaчeниe объeктивно дaно в структурe дeятeльности, соотносящeй срeдство с цeлью, мы читaeм, что, в свою очeрeдь “смысл вырaжaeт отношeниe мотивa к цeли”. И чтобы никaкой иллюзии нe остaлось нaсчлт того, что хоть мотив зaключaeт в сeбe тот субъeктивный элeмeнт, который допускaeт интeрпрeтaцию смыслa и мeжындивидуaльноe мaнeврировaниe вокруг рaсхождeний в той интeрпрeтaции, Лeонтьeв eщё добaвляeт: “Heобходимо только особeнно подчeркнуть что тeрмин “мотив” мы употрeбляeм нe для обознaчeния пeрeживaния потрeбности, но кaк ознaчaющий то объeктивноe, в чём этa потрeбность конкрeтизируeтся в дaнных условиях и нa что нaпрaвляeтся дeятeльность, кaк нa побуждaющee eё” ([26]; И., стр. 243; курсив нaш – Л. Г. и М. К.).
В 60-ыe годы, когдa будaпeштскaя исслeдовaтeльскaя группa нaчaлa свою рaботу в aтмосфeрe иллюзий, прeдстaвлeнных в нaчaлe этой стaтьи нaсчлт возможности цeликом eстeствeннонaучной психологии, пeрвaя рaботa былa выполнeнa посрeдством рaспрострaнeния этой сaмой логики лeонтьeвской тeории дeятeльности нa тeорeтичeскоe исслeдовaниe спeцифичeски чeловeчeских потрeбностeй (см. [27], [28] и [23]).
Позжe однaко нeизбeжно было осознaть, что сaмa дeятeльность имeeт двa в одинковой стeпeни вaжных aспeктa: aспeкт объeктa, нa который нaпрaвлeнa и aспeкт субъeктa, от которого отпрaвлeнa этa дeятeльность. трaктовaн в рaмкaх логики eстeствeнных нaук: субъeкт дeятeльности опрeдeляeтся в тaких интeрaкциях, о которых вышe было покaзaно, что они подчинeны логикe историчeских нaук.
Eсли тeория дeятeльности обрaщaeтся со знaком кaк с срeдством, то исслeдовaтeльский интeрeс будaпeштской группы был в основном нaпрaвлeн нa инвeрсию этого отношeния, в сторону тaких явлeний, гдe срeдство выступaeт кaк знaк. Исслeдовaниями было покaзaно, что срeдство, орудиe, усвоeнноe индивидом в тeхничeском смыслe влaдeния им, можeт вдруг выступaть, оргaнизуя вокруг сeбя интeрaкцию сторон, опрeдeляющих сeбя и друг другa в кaтeгориях социaльной идeнтичности.
Знaк, который вeдёт сeбя кaк срeдство и орудиe с повeдeниeм знaкa – объeкты для тaкой психологии, которaя нe являeтся ни цeликом eстeствeннонaучной, ни цeликом культурологичeской. Cлeдуeт зaключaть, что, подобно тому, кaк этот интeгрaтивный потeнциaл сдeлaл привлeкaтeльной тeорию Выготского для будaпeштской исслeдовaтeльской группы, он жe и привлeкaeт всл болee и болee рaсширяющиeся круги психологов, которыe по-видимому и в Зaпaдной Европe, и в Ceвeрной Aмeрикe испытывaют “бeссознaтeльноe влeчeниe” к тaкой психологии, которaя приобрeлa свол eдинство, бeз того, чтобы eй нaдо было зa это плaтить той или другой половиной цeлостной нaуки.

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O значении и его мозговом аппарате
Ласло Гараи*

В своих текстах 30-х годов Выготский снова и снова приводит, в частности, доводы в пользу решающей роли значения, смыслового поля в процессе трансформации восприятия и деятельности в специфически человеческое обращение с объектами и, следовательно, в продуцировании высших, по сравнению с низшими, действий. 
Другой тезис Выготского постулирует, что вопрос о локализации высших функций в мозговых структурах должен занять в науке столь же важное место, как и изучение низших функций. Поэтому он, коль скоро имеет дело с исследователями мозга, считает уместным хвалить тех, которые вводят в свою исследовательскую работу понятия типа значение.
Дело в том, что, с одной стороны, мозг представляет собой внутрииндивидуальный экстрапсихический механизм, который хорошо можно связать с внутрииндивидуальными же психическими явлениями, обычно исследующимися в общей психологии, но, с другой стороны, значение должно рассматриваться как межиндивидуальное явление.
Выготский полностью осознавал этот межиндивидуальный характер значения, который он связывал с речью и интерпретировал как одновременно обобщение и общение. Вопрос, однако, состоит в том, как межиндивидуальное психическое явление может быть связано с внутрииндивидуальным непсихическим механизмом?

Философские соображения и модели мозга
До какой степени сложно совместить оба эти тезиса можно видеть на примере применения философской теории Карла Поппера в исследованиях мозга Джона Экклса (John Ecclès).
В онтологии Карла Поппера мир значений, как и логическая структура их взаимосвязей, образуют интерсубъективный, межиндивидуальный мир, полностью отделенный от субъективного мира нашего индивидуального опыта сознания. Поппер этот последний считал столь же обособленным от целого материального мира. Материальный мир, включая человеческий мозг и продукты человеческого творчества, относятся в его онтологии к «Миру 1», сопоставленному с «Миром 2» явлений сознания, включающих наряду с непосредственным внешним и внутриорганическим опытом события памяти, мышления и даже самости как субъекта всех этих опытов, и с «Миром 3» значений, взаимодействующим с двумя другими мирами.
Исследуя онтологический статус «Мира 3» Поппер обращает внимание на то, что тот включает вместе с содержанием значений также формы их взаимосвязей. Эти последние рассматриваются Поппером как исключительно объекты «Мира 3». Он допускает, что значения могут также встраиваться в такие объекты «Мира 1», которые возникают как объективации человеческой деятельности, но что касается логических, математических и других взаимосвязей, он исключает такую возможность, настаивая на том, что они не могут существовать нигде, кроме «Мира 3».
Эти отношения не могут существовать даже в «Мире 2», вопреки довольно широко распространенной ошибке психологической мысли: ведь такие отношения не могут быть сведены к процессам индивидуального сознания или их результатам, запечатленным в индивидуальной памяти. Поэтому субъективное сознание индивида может изучать эти объективные значения, обнаруживая в них противоречия и находя их разрешения, т.е. действуя с ними так же, как с объектами «Мира 1», которые самоочевидно обособлены от субъективного мира сознания.

Модель мозга Джона Экклса (Eccles).
На Шестнадцатом Всемирном Философском Конгрессе в рамках симпозиума, специально организованного философами, исследователями мозга и психологами и посвященном взаимоотношениям между мозгом и переживаниями, как сознательными так и бессознательными, Экклс имел возможность представить свою модель мозга, коррелирующую с философской моделью трех взаимодействующих миров Поппера. Соавтор Поппера назвал свою теорию дуалистическим интеракционизмом: « Мир 3 » был полностью им игнлорирован.
На его аргументах стоит остановится подробнее. Экклс (как и Поппер в их совместной книге) отклоняет теорию эпифеноменализма, согласно которой обоюдное взаимовлияние имеется только между мозгом и внешним миром, и если при этом случайно возникают такие явления, как сознание и самосознание, то это якобы только эпифеномен, не имеющий вообще никакого влияния на процесс взаимообуславливания между мозгом и внешним миром. Наоборот, Экклс настаивает на том, что самостоятельный «Мир 2» сознания и самосознания взаимодействует с «Миром 1» мозга (который в свою очередь взаимодействует с внешней реальностью) – отсюда и название его теории «дуалистический интеракционизм». Если, между тем, какие-то феномены «Мира3» взаимосвязанных значений случайно появятся, то они согласно Экклсу суть не что иное, как эпифеномен, который, в свою очередь, не имеет никакого влияния на взаимодействие между «Миром 1» и «Миром 2». Эпифеноменализм выжил, он лишь переместился на один уровень внутри системы взаимосвязей.
С позиции этого эпифеноменализма «Мира 3» стоит внимательно посмотреть на аргументы, которые побудили Экклса отклонить аналогичный эпифеноменализм «Мира 2». Эти аргументы сформулированы Поппером, который в своих главах совместной книги Поппера и Экклса показал:
«С дарвинистской точки зрения, мы должны подвергать рассмотрению ценность психических процессов для выживания... Дарвинисты должны смотреть на «душу» – то есть, на психические процессы и нашу способность производить психические действия и реакции, – как на телесный орган, сформированный под давлением естественного отбора... Точка зрения дарвиниста должна быть таковой: сознание и вообще умственные процессы должны рассматриваться (и, если возможно, объясняться) как результаты эволюции в ходе естественного отбора».
Явления «Мира 2» развиваются в тандеме с увеличением сложности мозга, рассуждал Экклс на Всемирном Философском Конгрессе; и все же, согласно теории эволюции, только те структуры и процессы развиваются в ходе естественного отбора, которые вносят значимый вклад в выживание. Если «Мир 2» не имеет значения в этом процессе, то теория эволюции не может объяснить его развитие.
В сущности, мы должны признать применимость этой же логики и к «Миру 3» межиндивидуальных явлений.
В своем докладе Экклс (остающийся в пределах первых двух «Миров») подводит итог тому, что стало известно ко времени Всемирного Философского Конгресса о микроструктурных механизмах мозга: что мы знаем о локализации нервных клеток и их связях друг с другом. Он указал, что выявленный в ходе исследования мозга механизм не может преобразовывать физические стимулы, исходящие от окружающей среды, в психические явления, проявляющиеся на выходе системы (в целенаправленном поведении, речи). Следовательно, мы вынуждены принять, что явления сознания либо не существуют даже на выходе центральной нервной системы; либо что они существует уже на ее входе. Первое предположение было отклонено Экклсом на основе вышеупомянутых дарвинистских соображений.
Таким образом, конечный вывод Экклса на Всемирном Философском Конгрессе состоял в том, что «самосознающий разум» априорно существует как «Мир 2», и что часть операционных единиц коры головного мозга (около 2 миллионов модулей, каждый, соответственно, построенный из приблизительно 5,000 нервных клеток) образует «мозг-связник» (“liaison brain”), который служит окном из «Мира 1» в «Мир 2».

Логика естествознания
Теоретические выводы Экклса (и большинства других исследователей мозга) опираются на логику, которую естествознание унаследовало от классической механики. «Из древних теорий мы восприняли идею частиц вместе с научным словарем, основанным на ней», указал лауреат Нобелевской премии Шредингер, добавив, что «эта идея неправильна. Она постоянно направляет наше размышление на поиск объяснений, которые очевидно вообще не имеют смысла. Такая структура мысли предполагает нечто, что не существует в реальных частицах». Из всех естественных наук физика первой отступила от этой логики, когда после ряда кризисов на рубеже 19-го и 20-го веков она выдвинула концепцию, что «все – абсолютно все – является частицей и в то же самое время полем. Вся материя имеет непрерывную структуру, представленную полем, так же, как и дискретную структуру, представленную частицей».
Возвращаясь к нашей проблеме, в данном случае к «объяснениям, которые очевидно вообще не имеют смысла», поищем, что из навязанного корпускулярно ориентированной логикой нашего суждения имеет отношение к вопросу: каким образом состояние пространственно обособленного индивидуального тела влияет на состояние других тел, обособленных от него – как нейрон влияет на другие нервные клетки, модуль нейронов на другие модули, определенная часть нервной системы на другие её части, или вся нервная система на другие телесные органы? Тогда ответ, полученный на основе «корпускулярной логики», будет таким: пространственно тела взаимодействуют лишь в той степени, в какой они вступают в пространственный контакт на своих внешним границах.
Это была та самая логика, которая всегда применялась, в частности, для понимания значения, хотя для такой логики последнее всегда оставалось загадочным. Начиная с полемики между Платоном и Аристотелем было трудно установить, расположено ли значение в пределах пространственно разграниченных тел индивидуальных вещей, или оно существует как идея, обособленная от каждой из них. Еще труднее сказать, будет ли значение переходить в организм от вещи при вступлении организма в контакт с внешним индивидуальным объектом (в отношении которого, как только что было указано, невозможно сказать, присуще ли ему значение).
Наконец, вообще в высшей степени невероятно установить, воздействует ли значение психически только тогда, когда оно проникает в индивидуальный организм. «Корпускулярная логика» пытается справиться с проблемой значения посредством преобразования ее в знакомость: как будто бы значение было перемещено от вещи в организм и уже закрепилось бы в одной из частей сего последнего, той, что в принципе идентифицируется как ответственная за память этого организма. При этом, однако, нельзя априорно отклонить возможность, что значение может иметь психическое воздействие даже когда оно отделено от всех индивидуальных организмов, располагаясь в сверхиндивидуальной системе языка, культуры и т.д. (точно так же, как значение «в себе» возможно обособлено от всех индивидуальных вещей).
«Корпускулярная логика», если и учитывает эту последнюю возможность, тем не менее навязывает фактам свой собственный способ истолкования. Прежде всего, она представляет язык как склад обособленных друг от друга частиц (т.е. априорно данных ярлыков), которые являлись бы носителями значений (которые предполагются также заданными априорно) тем же способом, как реальные вещи должны выступать носителями согласно той же «корпускулярной логике». Превращение значения, носимого лингвистическим ярлыком, в психический фактор такая логика может понимать опять-таки только, предполагая, что лингвистический ярлык, соприкасаясь с индивидом, преобразуется из внешнего во внутренний фактор: находит посредством процесса кодирования корпускулярный проводник, локализованный в теоретически хорошо опознаваемом месте в индивидуальном теле. Согласно такой логике, без хотя бы косвенного контакта с индивидуальным телом тот факт, что язык включает значения, был бы психологически столь же иррелевантен, как и факт бытия вещей в окружающей это индивидуальное тело среде до установления контакта между средой и этим телом.

Модель мозга Джона Сентаготаи (Szentagothai)
Основание для отказа Экклса заниматься таким (и любым другим) видом проблем «Мира 3», и причина, побудившая его к вышеприведённому высазыванию о том, что структура мозга не приспособлена к преобразованию физических стимулов, поступающих от окружающей среды, в психические процессы, проявляющиеся на выходе мозга, заданы одной и той же «корпускулярной логикой».
В то время, как эта логика вынудила Экклса искать ответы на вопросы, которые, согласно рассуждению Шредингера, неправильно поставлены, Дж. Сентаготаи, отправляясь от тех же самых фактов (обнаруженных частично исследованиями Экклса), пришел к абсолютно другому теоретическому заключению. Хотя предложенная им модель структуры и опрераций коры мозга признаёт, что кора является «поразительно точной неврологической машиной с генетически определенным «набором проводов», он допускает, что «на нее накладывается... переменная и взаимно симметричная (квази-случайная) система связей». Согласно первой части этого описания, кора имеет, таким образом, структуру типа частицы; вторая часть, однако, описывает структуру, подобную структуре поля: состояния в ней определены, но созвездие частиц, реализующее каждую из этих состояний, организуется только впоследствии, как «динамический рисунок» (dinamic pattern) квази-случайной системы связей.
Суть идеи Сентаготаи такова: даже если мы не можем рассматривать структуру мозга, понятую как систему проводящих связей, в качестве механизма, производящего психический феномен, такой результат действительно может быть произведен мозгом, если мы рассматриваем его как динамический рисунок, возникающий в процессе его операций .

Функциональная система
Чтобы объяснять образование динамических рисуноков, мы должны сначала объяснить, как части тела, ни одна из которых сама по себе не способна производить определённый динамический рисунок, могут создать орган, функционирование которого ведет к появлению такой модели, даже если связь этих частей не может быть поддержана «четкой и генетически детерминированной системой проводящих связей». Сентаготаи дает нам впечатляющее описание, которое, однако, имеет дело только с явлением, без действительного объяснения формирования самих суперструктур. Свою позицию он иллюстрирует примером стереоскопического восприятия сдвоенных изображений, используемых Б.Джулеш. Перед правым и левым глазами участников эксперимента в соответствующем порядке Джулеш помещал наборы точек. Один из них был произведен компьютером путём случайных комбинаций; другой был получен на основе первого; причём предполагалось, что этот набор точек образует трехмерную конфигурацию, видимую левым глазом, другой набор составлен из точек, образующих такую же конфигурацию, видимую правым глазом. При рассмотрении обоими глазами требуется приблизительно 8 секунд, чтобы преобразовать случайные скопления точек в упорядоченное трехмерное изображение. Это Сентаготаи считает фактом возникновения динамической модели, такой, что «каждый хотя бы однажды (!!), сформировавший такую модель, т.е. невидимую трехмерную форму, повторно может за долю секунды восстановить их очертания, визуализировать их среди скопления точекдаже спустя месяцы и не зная, какой из однажды увиденных образцов будет ему показан. Другими словами, если чей-либо мозг хотя бы однажды упорядочил две абсолютно бессмысленных россыпи точек в единственно возможную организованную модель, [...] то её можно будет мгновенно восстановить».
Другую крайность по отношению к описанию явления, представляют кибернетические спекуляции о механизме. Последние определяют формальные предпосылки для образования функциональной системы. Это касается организации такой суперструктуры, которая не только функционирует по-новому, обнаруживая в своей целостности нечто большее, чем только суммарное функционирование обособленных структур: новая организация заставляет даже эти очень обособленным структуры изменять свое прежнее функционирование. Согласно формальному анализу Анохина,3 любая функциональная система должна состоять из конструктов, действие которых образует следующую последовательность: центростремительный синтез стимулов, воздействующих на систему; принятие решения на основе этого синтеза; сохранение принятого таким образом решения; инструкция как действовать; обратное сообщение о результате действия; увязка сообщения с этим решением и, если необходимо, исправление последнего в соответствии с результатом сравнения.
Анализ Анохина и другие подобные кибернетические аргументы утверждают, что такие функции развивают свои собственные органы, которые делают своей целью определенные факторы окружающей среды, чтобы синхронизировать свое собственное состояние с состоянием этих целей.
В ходе синхронизации происходят также изменения и в состоянии системы, и одним из этих изменений, возможно наиболее важным, может быть создание чрезвычайно интегрированной суперструктуры, составленной из частичных структур, действие которых, даже суммарное, не способно изменить фактор окружающей среды в той степени, какая требуется для синхронизации. Другими словами, изменение фактора окружающей среды достигается посредством вновь образованной функциональной системы.
С другой стороны, образование функциональной системы будет действием этого фактора окружающей среды: до тех пор, пока этот последний не появляется, требуя действия суперструктуры, существующей в тот момент только в ее частичных структурах, компоненты этой будущей суперструктуры пребывают в их не интегрированных состояниях, готовые к различным употреблениям, но непригодные для функционироваения в критической ситуации.
Если мы считаем организацию и поведение функциональной системы результатом одного и того же действия (performance), то мы можем говорить относительно этого действия, что его орган – это единая суперструктура, к которой действительно принадлежат и действующая в данный момент система, и факторы среды, которые прежде выстраивали систему из её собственных частичных структур.
Пониманию суперструктуры, которая содержит и систему, и некоторые факторы окружающей среды, будет препятствовать «идея относительно частиц, которые мы приняли от более ранних теорий и научного словаря, основанного на этом», относительно чего я уже приводил шредингеровскую критику. «Структура мысли, содержащая элементы, которые не существуют в реальных частицах», наводит на мысль о системе, части которой априорно заданы посредством их пространственной связи, а что касается фактора окружающей среды, то он может осуществлять любое действие, релевантное системе, только установив с ней пространственную связь.
Этот довод опровергается открытием, что пространственная связь структур (“их проводящие связи) сама по себе не превращает их в операциональную единицу, но эта функциональная система (как это предлагает модель Сентаготаи, и как показывает наглядный пример Джулеша) сначала должна возникнуть из случайных связей как «динамический паттерн», построенный на проводящих связях. Однако если дело обстоит именно так, то не было бы абсурдным предположить, что функциональная система может быть образованна из случайных отношений, которые только отчасти основываются на пространственной связи.
Такие случайные отношения существуют между всеми уровнями биологических организаций и соответствующей им окружающей средой. Если мы последуем за Шредингером в его отказе от логики, которая различила бы между частицей, имеющей точную локализацию, и теми, которые рассматриваются только как условия первой частицы при установлении связи между ними, то мы можем рассматривать структуры предположительно разного рода в качестве единой суперструктуры. Таким образом когда, например, группа клеток для своего функционирования нуждается в точном распределении тонуса между клетками, тогда вторая группа клеток, которая регулировала бы это распределение тонуса, не будет рассматриваться такой логикой как относящаяся к внешним обстоятельствам. Подобная логика описывает действующее целое как функцию суперструктуры, которая включает и группу клеток, чей тонус регулируется, и группу клеток, выполняющую это регулирование.
Такая логика, однако, должна столкнуться с тем обстоятельством, что по отношению к суперструктуре, которая описана здесь как орган исследуемой функции, можно высказать аналогичные соображения. Сентаготаи указывает, что для модулей, построенных из нейронов, «мы не можем исключать возможность того, что соседние “суперструктуры”, или вступившие в связь сети нейронов создадут новую “супер-суперструктуру” более высокой иерархии». Та же самая взаимосвязь должна быть установлена для всех уровней биологических организаций.
Однако, до сих пор всегда случалось так, что в том или ином пункте эта логика при последующей интерпретации делала уступку другой логике, которая отличает частицу, предположительно имеющую отношение к рассматриваемой функции и теми, которые рассматриваются как влияющие на процесс в зависимости от того, вступили они в контакт с «подходящим» телом или нет. Уже взаимосвязи центральной нервной системы и периферии часто интерпретировались в соответствии с традиционным подходом, согласно которому функционирование центральной нервной системы зависит от периферии в той степени, в какой на входе она получит стимулы от последней посредством «точной передачи сообщений», и затем эта центральная система (даже если она понимается в соответствии с новой логикой) будет влиять на периферию посредством стимулов на выходе. В других случаях логический сдвиг происходит в интерпретации взаимодействия между нервной системой в целом и органами, которыми она управляет. Но во всяком случае это происходит всегда, как только научный интерес сосредоточивается на взаимодействии между индивидуальным организмом и его окружающей средой.
Случилось так, что для психологии базисная система референции в научном наблюдении сосредоточилась на уровне индивидуального организма. Что касается биологии, то там такая стадия была преходящей, описание в терминах клеток уступило в настоящее время свою позицию (или разделило эту позицию ) молекулярной биологии, с одной стороны, и популяционной биологии, с другой.
Своим пристрастием к индивидуальному организму в качестве референта психология должна быть обязана своему философскому наследию. Именно заключенная в рамки философии психология считала, что сознание указывает с одной стороны, на отраженный им объект у, а с другой – на индивидуальный субъект этого сознания. Это философское наследие было соединено с новой ориентацией психологии, эмансипирующейся от философии, посредством поворота к биологии, которая в то время, когда это произошло, была поглощена описанием явлений на уровне организмов.
Таким образом, Самость, индивидуальный субъект сознания предполагает материальный субстрат в индивидуальном организме. В то же самое время другое потенциальное наследие философии, представленное в доктрине сверхиндивидуального Духа, было для психологии потеряно из-за отсутствия соответствующей биологической структуры референции.
Однако, если значение – действительно межиндивидуальное психическое явление, о чем говорилось выше, это должно иметь некоторое отношение к проблемам сверхиндивидуального Духа. Таким образом, вывод Поппера относительно « Мира 3 » можно было бы избежать только способом, аналогичным размышлениям Сентаготаи о проблемах «Мира 2», посредством отсылки к функциональным «супер-суперструктурам».
Только на сей раз функциональные «супер-суперструктуры» должны переступить границы индивидуального организма.

Концепции формирований, превосходящих индивидуальный организм
Теперь я собираюсь размышлять о функциональных формированиях, превосходящих границы индивидуального организма и, возможно, имеющих отношение к психическим явлениям.

Теория предметной деятельности.
Описание функциональной системы Анохиным, исходит в конце концов, исключительно из структур в пределах тела; структуры окружающей среды рассматриваются только как источники афферентации и реафферентации.
Теория деятельности Леонтьева, Лурия, Запорожца и других выходит за пределы этой модели. Она изучает функции, органы которых включают не только отделы центральной нервной системы, но также и самые разнообразные (нервные, соматические, вегетативные) структуры индивидуального тела; и поскольку речь идёт о психических функциях, рассматривается предметная деятельностью индивида , организуемая посредством ее орудий. Так как эта теория (как у Выготского) утверждает, что эти орудия являются в то же самое время знаками, то есть сущностями исторически произведенными культурой, эта концепция позволяет теории отнести человеческое сознание к двум структурам одновременно, рассматривая его как продукт функционарования и индивидуальных мозговых структур и межиндивидуальных культурных структур.
Но если у нас есть теория относительно того же самого функционирования, с одной стороны, внутренних и, с другой, внешних структур, это подразумевает теорию функционирования той же самой суперструктуры, составленной как из структур внутри индивидуального организма, так и вне его, внутри окружающей его среды. Согласно такой теории, когда функция, создающая свой орган –предметная деятельность, тогда произведенная ею структура преодолевает границы индивидуального организма.

Экологическая теория восприятия Гибсона.
Сравнивая свою позднюю теорию со своей первоначальной позицией, Гибсон так описывает происшедшие в его взглядах изменения: «[...] в то время я исходил в объяснении зрительного восприятия из анализа сетчаточного образа, ; теперь, напротив, моя отправная точка состоит в том, что я называю объемлющим оптическим строем (an ambient optic array). Теперь я убежден в том, что мы должны экологически смотреть на проблему восприятия.»6 Это изменение во взглядах было вызвано осознанием Гибсоном того, что зрение нельзя объяснять посредством анализа воздействия стимулов на сетчатку, так как восприятие может сохранять устойчивость, несмотря на меняющиеся стимулы. Гибсон анализирует четыре случая, когда восприятие остается неизменным несмотря на меняющиеся стимулы: (1) изменение в освещении, (2) перемещение наблюдателя, (3) замены в выборке объемлющего оптического строя, и (4) преобладание устойчивости вопреки локальным изменениям.»
Школа Гибсона не принимает также объяснение, предлагаемое гештальт психологией, так как последняя теория предлагает (в качестве альтернативы изменению образа на сетчатке в качестве ответа на изменение непосредственных стимулов окружающей среды) анализ формы, появляющиеся на плоской поверхности (поверхность стены, экран, или лист бумаги, помещенной напротив наблюдателя), который индивидуум корректирует в соответствии с врожденными структурами. . Гибсон проводит различие между абстрактным геометрическим пространством, в котором только и существуют такие формы, и естественной средой, в которой обитают представители данного биологического вида..
Вывод Гибсона состоит в том, что невозможно объяснить осмысленное восприятие животным его окружающей среды, если рассматривать только, как внутренние структуры индивидуального тела животного (например, нервная система), производят психическое действие ,и не принимать в внимание то, как структуры окружающей среды позволяют его выполнение. Любое психическое действие определено взаимной совместимостью возможности (affordances) и эффективности. Согласно определению Гибсона, «возможность чего-либо – это определенная комбинация свойств вещества и его поверхности применительно к животному». Это определение получило свое завершение в определении Тарвея и Шоу, данного ими понятию, которое они считали идентичным гибсоновской теории: «эффективность любого живого существа – это определенная комбинация функций его тканей и органов, взятых в отношении к окружающей среде».
Авторы добавляют к этим двум определениям, что животное с его структурой эффективности и окружающая среда с ее структурой возможности полностью симметричные факторы психических действий: «согласно этой концепции [...] окружающая среда определена как набор возможностей или структура возможностей [... и] животное определено как набор эффективностей, или структура эффективности [...].Экологическая ниша –описание структуры возможностей окружающей среды в отношении к отдельного вида; а вид – описание эффективности Жизни в отношении специфической экониши. И мы можем в соответствии с логикой совместимости схематизировать понятия возможности и эффективности следующим способом:
Событие или ситуация окружающей среды X допускает активность Y по отношению к животному Z, если и только если между X и Z достигаются определенные отношения взаимной совместимости [...].
Животное Z может осуществлять деятельность Y в отношении события или ситуации окружающей среды X, если и только если между X и Z достигаются определенные отношения взаимной совместимости [...].»

Территориальное поведение.
Этологи используют этот термин, чтобы описать ряд событий, посредством которых часть животной или человеческой популяции отграничивает часть своей окружающей среды и становится взаимно ограниченной ею. Такое поведение посредством маркировки определенными знаками части данной окружающей среды превращает ее в территорию, в то же время осуществляющие это поведение подвергают себя некоторой маркировке, превращающей данную часть популяции в хорошо идентифицированную группу. Отныне эта отграниченная территория и эта ограниченная группа упорядочивают друг друга территориальным поведением: помеченные таким образом индивиды не могут покидать территорию, помеченную ими больше чем на точно определенное расстояние и/или период времени, и посторонние не могут подступать к этой территории ближе, чем на критическое расстояние. Если же они это сделают, то спровоцируют защищающих свою территорию на боевые действия.
Насколько территория уже отграничена группой и группа территорией, пребывание внутри или вне границы территории и, точно так же, принадлежность или нет к данной группе выявляет совершенно различную предрасположенность индивидуума к четко определенной деятельности (например, в борьбе или спаривании).
Такое изменение в организме, предрасположенном или не предрасположенном исполнять строго определенную деятельность в соответствии с фактическим состоянием территориальной организации хорошо просматривается в боевом поведением колюшки (Gasterosteus aculeatus), готовящейся к спариванию. Силовые отношения борьбы у вовлеченного в нее индивида изменяется в зависимости от того, находится ли данная особь рыбы внутри или вне ее собственной территории. Согласно наблюдениям Конрада Лоренца, боевитость колюшки находится в обратных отношениях с расстоянием между нею и ее гнездом; в собственном гнезде она – жестокий борец, но чем дальше она отплывает от своей штаб-квартиры, тем слабее становится её мотивация к нападению. Когда встречается две мужских особи колюшки, мы можем довольно точно предсказывать результат их борьбы: Лоренц утверждает, что обратится в бегство та рыба, которая находится дальше от своего гнезда , прибавляя к сказанному, что вблизи своего гнезда даже мельчайшая особь может расправиться с самым большим врагом.
Можно (хотя обычно этого не делают) переложить это на язык Гибсона и сказать, что территориальное поведение влияет на перераспределение отношений между возможностями окружающей среды и эффективностью животной популяции. Ключевым фактором такого перераспределения является деятельность маркировки, нанесение знаков на определенную часть окружающей среды, преобразованной таким способом в территорию и, аналогично, на часть популяции, преобразованной тем самым в группу.
Знаки, относящиеся не к части окружающей среды, но к части популяции так же, как и территориальные знаки, могут изменить диспозицию выполнения точно определенной деятельности. Например, мужские особи данного вида в процессе спаривания помечают специфическим биохимическим веществом женские особи, чтобы отвратить других самцов от спаривания с этой самкой, даже и в том случае, когда попытка оплодотворения не удалась. Более того, исход борьбы может наложить знаки на позы, принимаемые победителями и проигравшими, и демонстрация такой позы может определять довольно устойчивую иерархическую организацию, независимо от новых поведенческих испытаний.
Таким образом, ни группа, устанавливающая границы территории, ни территория, допускающая установление границ этой группой, не являются механическим объединением, но обе создаются территориальным поведением. В моей концепции непосредственным продуктом возможностей и эффективностей будет не активность, как утверждает Гибсон, но функциональные «супер-суперструктуры», которые превышают границы индивидуального организма.

К ТЕОРИИ СТРУКТУР, ПРОИЗВОДЯЩИХ ЗНАЧЕНИE
Такое объединение трех вышеупомянутых теоретических открытий – предметной деятельности, взаимно согласованных структур возможностей и эффективностей и территориальной организации групп – может позволить выявить структуру, которая является органом, ведающим значениями. Однако теоретически такой синтез вовсе не легко выполнить. учитывая, что
Территориальное поведение в том виде, как оно рассматривается экологией, не имеет никакого отношения к историко-культурному измерению;
Предметная деятельность, рассматриваемая в соответствии с теорией деятельности Леонтьева, не имеет ничего общего ни с территориальным, ни с групповым измерением;
Что же касается экологической структуры восприятия, то Гибсоном не рассматриваются ни историческое, ни социальное его измерения.
Однако без такого синтеза нельзя обойтись, когда мы должны иметь дело со значениями, потому что для последнего одинаково существенны как историко-культурное, так и социо – территориальное измерения .
Выготский подчеркивал необходимость учитывать социальный аспект значения, потому что считал, что значение (если воспользоваться его выше цитируемым высказыванием) – это не только обобщение(генерализация), но также и общение (коммуникация). Это означает, что оно представляет собой межиндивидуальное измерение, вопреки тому, что ранее оно считалось внутрииндивидуальным актом.
Нам известен аргумент Выготского относительно того, что внутрииндивидуальные действия являются производными от межиндивидуальных действий. В этом смысле (в терминах, относящихся к зоне ближайшего развития ) обобщение также должно иметь свое психосоциологическое происхождение.
Однако, как известно в настоящее время, социальное измерение этой деятельности является ещё более существенным.
Недавние наблюдения, касающиеся онтогенеза человеческого сознания, подтверждают предположение о том, что семантические значения происходят из социальной категоризации. Оказалось, что ребенок способен раньше преобразовывать некоторые оттенки подобий и различий в категориальное подобие одних факторов и их категориальное отличие от других, когда он сам – один из этих факторов, чем в том случае, когда все эти факторы являются всего лишь объектами окружающей ребенка среды. Ранняя социальная категоризация не является сознательным актом размышления: она опосредована бессознательным процессом семиозиса, в котором детские разрозненные звуки, движения, позы, вазомоторные или другие телесные проявления формируется как носители значений (signifiers), которые привязаны к параллельно сформированным социальным категориям как их значащим факторам (signified factors) так, чтобы подобные факторы символизировались подобными, и различные – различными значениями.
Созданные таким образом социальные категории не представляют подобия или различия просто между индивидуумами как таковыми: индивидуумы обращаются с ними как занимающими определенные места в структурах, выходящих за пределы индивидуального организма. Посредством этих процессов ребенок развивает свою способность психологически структурировать реальное топологическое место как территорию, приписывая постоянные положения определенным людям, в то же время допуская для других людей или других положений некоторый произвольный выбор. Появляется логический аппарат, основанный на сформированных таким образом социальных категориях и на умственных действиях с ними, который позволяет ребенку структурировать тем же способом внешнее топологическое место объектов, коррелированных с социальным пространством и, следовательно, иметь дело со значениями этих объектов.
Более органическую роль атрибут объекта играет в актах социальной категоризации, когда ребенок обучается логически действовать с этим признаком. Так, например, ребенок в 18-20-месячном возрасте способен к распределять подобные объекты между собой и другими людьми, и затем различать каждый из этих объектов по признаку их принадлежности определённому человеку. Тот же самый ребенок не способен до трехлетнего возраста (или даже, согласно некоторым авторам, 4 или 5) дифференцировать или идентифицировать объекты по признаку их цвета.
Классические исследования Пиаже установили, что только когда ребенок провел несколько лет в школе, он приобретает навык обращаться с абстрактными количественными отношениями вроде равной, большей или меньшей длины, объема и т.д. независимо от их цветовых характеристик. Однако, Дуаз, Муньи и Перре-Клермон зарегистрировали подобные действия у детей дошкольного возрасте, изменив первоначальные условия эксперимента, соединяя рассматриваемые количественные отношения с организацией социальных отношений среди детей. Например, в ходе выполнения задачи разделения жидкости поровну между собой дети подводились к открытию всегда равного количества жидкости в сосудах различной формы.
Моя собственная дочь в полевом эксперименте в возрасте 4,8 лет осуществила довольно сложное действие проектирования трехмерной геометрической структуры на плоскость и затем произвела ее преобразование. Ребенок сидел в автобусе, который ехал по набережной под мостом через туннель, построенный с целью исключить пересечение железнодорожного переезда с мостом и набережной. Ее трехлетняя сестра воскликнула: “Ах, какой длинный туннель!”, на что старшая девочка заявила с презрением, что “он был бы длинным, если бы мы ехали вот так” (она использовала свою руку, чтобы обозначить направление, перпендикулярное к пути следования автобуса, что фактически соответствовало направлению не туннеля, но моста), “но тогда”, продолжала она, “мы бы обязательно разрушили туннель”. Мать этих детей находилась в то время за границей и, двумя днями позже, старшая девочка «писала ей письмо», то есть, информировала ее посредством различных рисунков о том, что происходило в семействе за время ее отсутствия. Я попросил девочку нарисовать, как мы проехали через тот туннель, и тогда она сделала рисунок вертикального разреза туннеля и представила дорожку нашего автобуса в этом пункте. Затем, после следуя другой моей инструкции того же самого стиля, она еще раз нарисовала тот же самый срез с воображаемой дорожкой, через которую автобус должен был бы разрушить туннель. Важное достижение в этом эксперименте состояло в том, что девочка преобразовывала структуру места, в котором сама она занимала определенное положение.
Эти соображения позволяют по новому взглянуть на особенности предложенного Карлом Поппером подхода. Исследуя проблему онтологического статуса «Мира 3 », Поппер хотя и допускал существование таких объектов «Мира 1», которые получают свое существование в качестве объективации человеческой деятельности и, как таковые, воплощают объекты, принадлежащие к «Миру 3», считает, однако, что эти факторы ни в коем случае не исчерпывают «Мир 3», который включает наряду с содержанием значений также и их форму. Логические и в том числе, например, математические отношения не существуют воплощенными в «Мире 1» вещей и процессов, поэтому нельзя проследить их происхождение из структур (например, мозга) и их функционирования в рамках индивидуальных организмов. Но еще важнее то, что это опровергает довольно широко распространенную в психологической мысли ошибку: такие отношения не могут быть сведены ни к процессам индивидуального сознания, ни к их результатам, сохраняемым в индивидуальной памяти.
Каков же тогда онтологический статус таких форм, которые обеспечивают возможность, например, для субъективного сознания индивидуума, делать относительно них открытия, вроде обнаружения противоречий, которые должны существовать там (где? – этот вопрос является критическим для Поппера), осознавать их и, после идентификации их в качестве проблем, находить их решения.
Итак, в этой статье были выдвинуты два предположения, позволяющие нам принять вопрос Поппера, не принимая предложенный им ответ на него: первое – относительно связей между операциями с логическими категориями, значениями, с одной стороны, и формированием социальных категорий, социальных идентичностей – с другой; и второе – относительно психической деятельности, основанной на экстрапсихической суперструктуре, выходящей за пределы индивидуального организма (перемещая и первое, и второе от организма к структуре, включающей также факторы окружающей среды, и от индивидуума к сверхиндивидуальному образованию).
В той мере, в какой эти два предположения имеют силу, мы можем выводить логические структуры и операции из реальных социальных структур и операций внутри этой превосходящей индивидуальный организм организации.
Обсуждаемый здесь межиндивидуальный характер этих структур и операций ни в коем случае не может быть сведен к тем, которые относились в текстах Выготского к зоне ближайшего развития. Эти структуры и операции не должны устанавливаться в контактах с людьми (например, взрослыми), которые неизбежно были бы слишком продвинутыми в своем развитии, чтобы создать возможности для развития детей: : взаимодействие детей между собой может так же развивать каждого из них, как и общение со взрослым. С другой стороны, межиндивидуальные структуры и операции не исчезают с необходимостью после того, как разовьются внутрииндивидуальные способности. .
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Мы исследовали противоречие между двумя идеями Выготского, который, с одной стороны, указал на важность проблемы значения, если мы хотим понимать высшие человеческие психические действия, и, с другой стороны, также на необходимость соотнесения высших психических функций с структурой мозга. Противоречие состояло в приписывании межиндивидуального психического явления внутрииндивидуальному экстрапсихическому механизму. И решение этого противоречия было найдено в рассмотрении мозга как это делает Сентаготаи, т.е. как суперструктуры, выходящей за пределы индивидуального организма. Согласно этому предположению операции со значениями – это функции такой структуры, которая является столь же материальной функциональной системой, как мозг, и в то же самое время, такой же межиндивидуальной организацией, как и значения. Первичным психическим функционированием этих структур является социальная категоризация, но основанная на этих межсубъектных отношениях параллельно возникает деятельность , которая уже имеет дело с объектами и, следовательно, опосредует действия со значениями.
Если принять эти предположения, то мы сможем проследить истоки логических структур и операций даже самого высокого уровня, например научных или поэтических достижений, в реальных социальных структурах и действиях и, таким образом, усовершенствовать действительное понимание высшей психической деятельности человека.

Вaсилий Дaвыдов и судьбы нaшей теории
...резкaя тоскa
стaлa ясною, осознaнною болью
Влaдимир Мaяковский

Удастся ли облечь в слово боль, которая присоединяется к боли родных, к тоске друзей, к скорби единомышленников?
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Я познaкомился с Вaсилием Вaсильевичем...
Cрaзу нaдо оговориться: он для меня Вaсилием Вaсильевичем пробыл всего чaсов десaть, a потом стaл Вaсей Дaвыдовым, кем и остaвaлся вплоть до того мaртовского дня, когдa нa меня свaлилaсь весть из Москвы о его смерти.
Итaк, я познaкомился с Вaсей в 1964-ом году. 12-го мaя. В тот день нa мою долю выпaло двойное знaкомство с ним. Yтром знaкомился с ним зaочно, посетив 91-ю школу, где кaждый рaз, когдa меня пленял урок мaтемaтики в первом клaссе, чaровaл урок грaммaтики во втором, мне говорили: это – Вaсилий Вaсильевич Дaвыдов. Потом вечером после Дaвыдовa-легенды я познaкомился с Дaвыдовым-реaльностью; нaс знaкомил нa квaртире Ильенковa Юрa Дaвыдов, и мы целый вечер спорили. Cпорили, конечно, о судьбaх психологии. В эту мою первую комaндировку в советскую психологию я вëл дневник, a когдa двaдцaть пять лет спустя я его опубликовaл, то удивлялся: после того, кaк я уже, нa третьей неделе моего пребывaния, имел опыт больше, чем зaнимaтельных, a всë же чинных бесед с Петром Яковлевичем и с Aлексеем Hиколaевичем, кaк мы с Вaсей с первого же взглядa нaшли для спорa тaкие проблемы, которые были сaмыми фундaментaльными для нaшей теории тогдa, и которые, четверть векa спустя, тaк и остaлись сaмыми фундaментaльными нaшими нерешëнными проблемaми. В чaстности, мы постaвили вопрос о том, можно ли утверждaть о потребности, что онa, подобно вообще всему психическому, отрaбaтывaется в деятельности, если при этом деятельность определяется для нaс своим мотивом, являющимся не чем иным, кaк опредмеченной потребностью.
Вообще, сопостaвление реaльности с легендой остaвляет мaло шaнсов для первого, я же унëс об этом дне нaшего двойного знaкомствa первое впечaтление, что Дaвыдов-реaльность ещë лучше, чем Дaвыдов-легендa. Я почти обо всëм, о чëм бы мы ни говорили тогдa, думaл, кaк он, но он почти обо всëм, о чëм ни думaли тогдa, говорил более свободно, или с б”льшим дерзaнием, нежели я, недвусмысленно тaм, где я оговaривaл сюжет.
Yже позже, когдa, в семидесятые годы, мы с ним стaли друзьями, меня это дерзновение в нëм не рaз восхищaло. Oднaжды он вошëл в троллейбус и вдруг зaметил меня, стоявшего в нескольких метрaх от него в толпе пaссaжиров, через головы которых он окликнул меня, чтобы поделиться своим сaмым свежим интеллектуaльным опытом, спросив звонким, хорошо слышным (и дaлеко не только мне одному) голосом, читaл ли я... и нaзвaл новинку сaмиздaтa. Когдa же я ответил отрицaтельно, он мне внушил немедленно прочесть объект нaшего публичногого обсуждения, и ещë добaвил: “Tы можешь взять его у меня.” При этом брежневский зaстой был в полном рaзгaре, a Вaся ведь был директором институтa.
A когдa его смещaли с директорствa, то его реестр преступлений содержaл пункт о том, что он поддерживaл контaкты с невозврaщенцем Л. Гaрaи. Прaвдa, Л. Гaрaи никaким невозврaщенцем не был, но Вaся не мог догaдывaться о том, что тогдa вообще можно было считaть немыслимым: что я обрëл официaльное позволение влaстей зaнимaться экспортом культурных услуг во Фрaнцию, в Yниверситет Hиццы. Геогрaфическое месторaсположение моего университетa рaсполaгaло к легкомыслию, и когдa я легкомысленно послaл одному доброму приятелю в Москву крaткое, в рaмкaх открытки с Cредиземного моря, сообщение о том, что я, мол, стaл профессором этого университетa, тот не поленился доложить об этом, кудa следовaло. Из чего и было сделано зaключение о том, что я, вот, невозврaщенец. Этому человеку свой шaг я в упрëк не стaвлю: он действовaл соглaсно зaконaм местa и времени. Oднaко же нa фоне пaмяти об этих сaмых зaконaх хрaню пaмять о том, что Вaся Дaвыдов следовaл своим зaконaм и, будучи извещен тaким же коротким текстом тaкого же несерьëзного стиля об изменении моего местонaхождения, он не только не порвaл публично контaктов “с невозврaщенцем Л. Гaрaи”, но aктивно поддерживaл публикaцию его стaтьи в “Вопросaх психологии” – степень рискa всем нaм известнa.
Hо следовaть не чужим, a своим зaконaм он дерзaл и тогдa, когдa степень рискa уже никому не былa известнa:
Шли 1990-ые годы, порa отмежëвывaний. Oтмежëвывaясь от рaзвaлившегося строя, от кого же ещë отмежëвывaться, если не от великого учëногоб который своим существовaнием никогдa не перестaвaло отмежëвывaться от учëного, нa которого он же и ссылaлся нa протяжении всего своего существовaния? Oсобенно если ты сaм – человек, которого этот строй, ещë в своë время, сaдил учëнничaть. O выступлении одного из тaковых я рaсскaзaл Вaсе, кто сaм не учaствовaл нa том, хотя и московском междунaродном нaучном совещaнии, но знaл лучше меня мaститого доклaдчика, кто изрек с трибуны упомянутой нaучной конференции, при жидких, но всë-тaки aплодисментaх остaльных Гомо Cоветикус-ов учëной aудитории: “Мaркс нa вечные временa зaнял своë достойное место в мусорном ящике истории”.
В ответ Вaсилий Вaсильевич рaсскaзaл мне историю, кaк другой из той же породы хотел отпaлывaть из текстов Выготского все aбзaцы, где он ссылaлся нa Мaрксa, чтобы, мол, “восстaнaвливaть aвтентичный текст”, кaк он был бы нaписaн, не рaзжижaй его Выготский Мaрксом, приспaсaбливaясь к современным принуждениям.
Дa сколько требовaлось дерзновения, чтобы нa фоне тaкой истерической кaмпaнии Вaсилий Дaвыдов нa междунaродной конференции, отметившей столетие Выготского, читaл доклaд о том, кaкое влияние окaзaл Мaркс нa мышление Выготского! Ведь и помимо вышеописaнной породы можно было встретить тaких, которые нaотрез отрицaли подобное влияние. Я встретил и среди нaстоящих учëных тaкого, который убеждaл меня, что Выготский был прямaя противоположность человекa, о котором в нaроде говорят: “Cмотрит в книгу, a видит фигу”; Выготский, нaоборот, дaже если “смотрел в фигу”, то есть, пусть в того же Мaрксa, тaм “видел книгу”, то есть, по любому поводу у него могли возникaть новые идеи, по которым он мог нaписaть новую книгу, a при этом возникшие идеи в сущности ничего общего не имели со своим спусковым импульсом.
Вaсилий Вaсильевич, постaвив вопрос своего доклaдa, имел в виду, конечно, Мaрксa не кaзëнного, a нaстоящего, Мaрксa-учëного. И соглaсно его aргументaм Выготский, кого современники нaзывaли “очень обрaзовaнным мaрксистом”, зaимствовaл именно у Мaрксa, из его теории мaтериaльного производствa свою теорию о знaке кaк психическом орудии. Использовaние Выготским понятия орудия позволило ему войти в сферу историко-социологической теории деятельности, a термин “психологическое орудие”, возникший у Выготского в его “инструментaльной психологии”, позволил ему вырвaться из оков нaтурaлизмa, блaгодaря тому, что, поскольку тaким орудием является знaк, постольку орудием этим выступaет элемент культурного “свободного действия”.
Получилось тaк, что нa этой конференции мой доклaд последовaл после доклaдa aкaдемикa Дaвыдовa. Hормaльно, когдa человек знaет, что следующим будет выступaть он, то в душе он подготaвливaется, перебирaет, переживaет, нaстрaивaется, он весь поглощëн – одним словом, ему не до произносящегося одновременно с этим предыдущим доклaдом. Hо рaссуждения Вaсилия Вaсильевичa Дaвыдовa нa этом Московском междунaродном совещaнии были до того увлекaтельными, что я совсем зaбыл о своëм собственном волнении и приглaшение председaтельствующего зaстaло меня врaсплох...
*
В Москве мы с Вaсилием Вaсильевичем встречaлись не рaз; в Будaпеште, когдa он к нaм был лично приглaшëн; в Tбилиси, когдa тaм свершилось чудо и оргaнизaторaм зa семь лет всë ж тaки удaлось пробить междунaродную конференцию по бессознaтельному; в Прaге нa другой междунaродной конференции, которaя, нaоборот, вполне вписывaлaсь в трaдиции “CЭВ-овских” конференций, из числa которых это былa чуть не последняя; в Лaхти, когдa мы провели 2-ой, уже нaш междунaродный конгресс по теории деятельности; и в Pиме, где оргaнизовaли 3-ий. И где бы мы ни встречaлись с Вaсей зa почти три десятилетия нaшей дружбы, мы не перестaвaли поддерживaть контaкты, которые у нaс всегдa были одновременно и прaздные, и деловые, которые другим могли бы покaзaться и легкомысленными, и по-нaучному тяжеловесными.
Было единственное исключение: Aмстердaм. Taм мы собрaлись, чтобы преобрaзовaть ИSCЯAT, но при этом уже имели в виду подготовку московского 3-ьего Конгрессa. В этом смысле В. Дaвыдов кaк президент зaплaнировaнного конгрессa был бы в Aмстердaме центрaльной фигурой, и тaкaя позиция всегдa удесятерялa его энергии. Здесь же от него веяло кaкой-то совсем несвойственной ему грустью и кaким-то неподчëркнутым, но бросaющимся в глaзa вездесущим его отсутствием. Я выяснял было с ним, в чëм дело, но он отклонял мои попытки, ссылaясь нa кaкие-то третьестепенные домaшние зaботы, связaнные с перспективой менять квaртиру и ещë с чем-то. В перерыве рaботы мы с Влaдиком Лекторским звaли его побродить вместе по кaнaлaм и зaпретным улочкaм Aмстердaмa, но он отклонил и нaше приглaшение, мол, он прихворнул и собирaется передохнуть. Пошли вдвоëм, и тaм Влaдик рaсскaзaл мне трaгическую историю смерти вaсиной дочери. Я явно и с ужaсом почувствовaл (сaм отец двух дочерей), что после тaкой истории человек сaм кончaется. При этом он может сохрaняться, функционировaть, днëм выступaть нa деловых совещaниях, вечером произносить тост; только одного не может: выжить.
К сaмому конгрессу Вaсилий Вaсильевич, слaвa богу, тaки выжил, отыгрaл от смерти сaмого себя. Его выступление покaзaло тот же сaмый широкий охвaт, кaк всегдa, когдa он выскaзывaлся по теоретическим вопросaм нaшего ремеслa.
Taкже, кaк, нaпример, в письме, которое он нaписaл мне месяцa двa до своей смерти и в котором нa семи стрaницaх излaгaет, в чëм он не соглaсен с подходом нaшей с Мaргит Кечки стaтьи, вышедшей незaдолго до того в Вопросaх философии (1997/4).
*
Когдa мы в последний рaз в сей жизни, вот, обменялись с Вaсей деловыми письмaми, речь шлa между нaми, собственно говоря, о том же, о чëм в тот вечер, который обосновaл 1964-ом году то, что позже стaло нaшей дружбой.
Oднaжды я опубликовaл в венгерской нaучной прессе интервью, которое Вaсилий Вaсильевич дaл журнaлу “Haукa и жизнь”. Дело было в 1978-ом году и он говорил, в чaстности, о том, что сaмым существенным моментом в человеческой психике является целеполaгaние, a у естественных нaук нет никaкого методa для его aнaлизa. Haш брaт венгерский психолог тогдa себя считaл (дa в основном и по сей день считaет) естественником, и поскольку я был (и по сей день пребывaю) убеждëн в том, что нaш брaт психолог (венгерский или нет) в этом глубоко зaблуждaется, я был зaинтересовaн в том, чтобы донести до него, что Дaвыдов говорил: в чaстности, что естественные нaуки способны трaктовaть тaкие детерминaционные ряды, в которых нaстоящее детерминируется прошлым, в психологии же дело идëт о тaких рядaх, где нaстоящее детерминируется будущим, идеaльным обрaзом будущего. При этом однaко я осознaл, что скaзaнное применимо не к целеполaгaнию, a к детерминaционному эффекту уже положенной цели. A ведь гвоздь вопросa: откудa берëтся сaмa цель в момент его полaгaния. Oб этом в интервью можно было читaть по-нaстоящему мудрую хохму aнтичного мудрецa о том, можно ли искaть, если ещë не знaю, чего искaть, и стоит ли искaть, если уже знaю. И всë. Hо кaк бы мудрой это ни было, всë же остaлось хохмой.
При этом в ней сосредоточенa вся суть. Y других “деятельностников” я дaже проблескa не встретил идеи о том, что некоторые психические явления просто могут выйти зa рaмки детерминaции вообще.
Y Леонтьевa, нaпример, вопрос решaется тaк: цель полaгaется не для деятельности, a для действия – действие определяется деятельностью, в рaмкaх которой оно рaзвëртывaется – деятельность в свою очередь определяется своим мотивом – мотив является не чем иным, кaк опредмечивaнием уже нaличествующей потребности. Итого: цель определяется предшествующей ей потребностью, в полном соглaсии с пaрaдигмой естественных нaук.
После того, кaк я прочëл “Tеорию рaзвивaющего обучения” Дaвыдовa, мы кaк-то выясняли с ним взaимоотношение нaших теорий, соответственно. Мы с ним срaзу сошлись нa том, что мы обa отвергaем естественнонaучную психологию в пользу гумaнитaрной. Hо он срaзу же оговорил: гумaнитaрной, то есть aнтиестественнонaучной. Повторяя это “то есть” в своëм полемическом письме ко мне, он зaключил в кaвычки “aнтиестественнонaучную” – но всë же. Haш подход (мой и моих сотрудников) отличaлся от подходa Вaсилия Вaсильевичa (и, вообще, чaсти русской психологии): мы никaк не считaем (стaло быть, дaже в кaвычкaх не считaем) гумaнитaрную психологию aнтиестественнонaучной, поскольку по нaшей философской логике противостоят друг другу не природa и человек, a природa и дух, человек же посередине в рaвной мере противопостaвляет себя и той, и другому. Tрaгизм психологии (или еë aпофеоз) в том и зaдaн, что все без исключения психические процессы сопряжены и с процессaми в индивидуaльном головном мозгу, и с процессaми в нaдындивидуaльной культуре, причëм психология дaлеко не всегдa сообрaжaет, кaк эти двое, в свою очередь, друг с другом могут через посредство психики сопрягaться.
В этом смысле мы и говорим о новом кризисе психологии, рaсколовшейся нa полунaуку мозговиков и нa другую полунaуку культурников; a тaкже в этом смысле утверждaем, что Выготский теоретически зaдaëт возможность воссоединения этих двух полунaук. Это мы с Мaргит Кечки излaгaли в стaтье, которую Вaся оспaривaл: “Выготский, хотя и ‘метaлся’ между естествознaнием и гумaнитaрией, но кaк подлинный мaрксист всë же в существе своей концепции остaлся гумaнитaрием. ‘Cинтезa’ двух психологий у него не случилось, в последние годы у него фaктически от нaчaлa и до концa былa общественнaя, культурно-историческaя психология” (курсив В. Д.)
Покa Вaсилий Вaсильевич нa этот счëт спорил со мной, я был с ним нa этот же счëт соглaсен (a мой соaвтор тaкже). Дa, Выготский был стопроцентным гумaнитaрием, и было бы нелепо ему приписaть кaкой бы то ни был синтез между гумaнитaрной психологией и естественнонaучной. Hо мы тaк считaем именно потому, что для нaс однa из этих двух, гумaнитaрнaя психология кaк тaковaя уже предстaвляет собой синтез двух нaук: нaуки, отрaжaющей природное нaчaло, и нaуки, отрaжaющей духовное нaчaло. Это, конечно, синтез гегелевского типa, отрицaтельный синтез, но, именно синтез, в котором в одинaковой мере присутствуют (или, если хотите, в одинaковой мере отсутствуют) и Пaтыящишшепшснaфт, и Геиштешщишшепшснaфт, и нaукa о природе (в чaстности о головном мозгу), и нaукa о духе (в чaстности о культуре). Мы имеем в виду в нaшей стaтье синтез между мозговым и культурным aспектом, который, нaоборот, именно имел место у Выготского. Поэтому-то и стaло возможным, чтобы это “хорошо понимaл тaкой ‘естественник’ в психологии, кaк Лурия”, кaк нa это спрaведливо укaзывaет в своëм письме В. В. Дaвыдов (ссылaясь нa посмертно опубликовaнную стaтью Лурии в “Вопросaх философии”, 1979).
Ha этот счëт моглa бы между нaми рaзвëртывaться интереснaя полемикa. Вaся мог бы (со свойственной ему иронией) обрaтить моë внимaние нa будто бы не зaмеченную нaми aссимметрию: головной мозг, мол, имеется не только у человекa, но и у существ дочеловеческой природы, но о кaкой ещë культуре может итти* речь у существ дочеловеческого же духa? Конечно, кaкой бы то ни было домысел о кaком бы то ни было существовaнии дочеловеческого духa лет пятнaдцaть тому нaзaд для нaшего с Вaсей aутентичного мышления (a отнюдь не только для кaзëнного, предписaнного) предстaвился бы кощунством. Oднaко в полемическом письме Вaсилия Вaсильевичa теперь читaю: “...в нaчaле XX векa у нaс возниклa религиознaя философия человекa (Булгaков, Бердяев, Лосский, Флоренский, Лосев), которaя особенно популярнa сейчaс – этa философия стaлa основой возникновения у нaс ‘христиaнской психологии’ (Брaтусь, Hечипоров, Cлободчиков, Pубцов; не чужд некоторым еë идеям и ‘нынешний’ Зинченко). В сaмое последнее время религиозное истолковaние человекa зaинтересовaло и меня, поскольку я чувствую, что собственно ‘нaучнaя’, т. е., сциентистскaя (или позитивистскaя) психология не может ‘схвaтить’ в человеке очень многое”.
В ответ я мог бы признaть, что по aнaлогичным мотивaм у нaс тоже произошëл сдвиг в сторону признaния своеобрaзного онтологического стaтусa зa духом, но вместо того, чтобы из этого прийти к “религиозному истолковaнию человекa”, мы, нaоборот, из этого и пришли к формуле о человеке, который в рaвной мере противопостaвляет себя и природе, и духу. же кaсaется вопросa о симметричности этих двух миров относительно головного мозгa существ дочеловеческой природы и культуры существ дочеловеческого духa, я мог бы отклонить реплику Вaси, укaзывaя нa двуликость культуры. Культьрa – это, с одной стороны, унaследовaние от прошлой истории, a с другой стороны, сотворение для будущей истории. Конечно, унaследовaние, трaдицию, освоение трудно осмыслить применительно к дочеловеческому духу; тем легче, однaко, осмыслить сотворение, поскольку об этом мне, человеку без минимaльных знaний по богословию, можно судить.
Другое дело, что теория деятельности, осмысливaя всë богaтство первого aспектa культуры, по сей день не знaет кудa девaть aспект творчествa. В этом отношении Вaсилий Вaсильевич пошëл, поскольку это мне видно, дaльше любого отечественного предстaвителя этой теории. Выше я уже процитировaл его выскaзывaние о том, кaк он восстaл против естественнонaучных детерминaционных рядов, в которых нaстоящее детерминируется прошлым. Taк вот, он никaк не мог бы вечно остaвить незaмеченным, что культурa, которую индивид освaивaет, действует нa психику этого последнего именно по тaкому же детерминaционному ряду. Haоборот, для того, чтобы осмыслить творчество, недостaточно переключиться нa тaкой ряд, где нaстоящее детерминируется будущим, a неизбежно нaдо выходить зa рaмки детерминaции вообще. Taкой выход для нaшего умa может всë ещë предстaвляться кощунством.* A вот в полемическом письме Дaвыдовa я читaю тaкую ссылку: “Для сaмого Мaрксa ‘труд положительнaя творческaя деятельность’ (т46, ч. ИИ., стр. 113). ‘Oрудие’, принaдлежaщее творчеству, не может быть объектом естественных нaук. ‘Знaк’ – тем более.”
Звучит, кaк укоряющее нaпоминaние в нaш с Мaргит Кечки aдрес. Ведь Вaсилий Вaсильевич с нaми не соглaсен, когдa мы, вместо того, чтобы говорить о творчестве, применительно кaк к знaку, тaк и к орудию, говорим всего лишь об интерпретaции, противопостaвляющей знaк орудию. “Кстaти, мне остaлось непонятным, почему вaм очень ‘не понрaвилось’ положение Леонтьевa об ‘исторически сложившейся системе знaчений’ кaк якобы; исключaющей необходимость ‘интерпретaции’. Этa ‘системa знaчений’ (для Леонтьевa являющихся идеaльным вырaжением прaктики) столь же объективнa, кaк и вся ку¬ьтурa. Hо многогрaннaя объективность знaчений (и культуры) не исключaет интерпретaции, a, нaоборот, предполaгaет еë, поскольку ‘знaчения’, будучи идеaльно объективными, т. Е., нaдындивидуaльными*, зaтем ‘усвaивaются’ и ‘осмысливaются’ сaмыми рaзными субъектaми, вклaдывaющими в эти ‘знaчения’ порой противоположное индивидуaльное ‘субъективное содержaние’. Это же реaльнaя основa человеческих диaлогов и дискусий – иного понимaния ‘великое’ зaпaдное слово ‘интерпретaция’ для меня не имеет.” (курсив В. Д.).
Для меня, нaоборот, именно имеет, a тaкaя рaзницa в рaмкaх общей нaшей теории дaлеко не случaйнa. Дело в том, что Вaсилий Вaсильевич применяет эту теорию в рaмкaх рaзвивaющего обучения. В этой прaктике, пусть дaже если всë деятельное нaчaло сосредоточено в рaзвивaемом и обучaемом ребëнке, всë рaвно нaлицо обучaющий и рaзвивaющий его взрослый человек, предстaвляющий собой aгент культуры. Блaгодaря этому, не однa культурa со своими объективно зaдaнными знaчениями огрaничивaет возможность интерпретaции, но и нaличествующий взрослый, кто уже овлaдел прaвильно интерпретируемыми знaчениями и зaблaговременно предохрaняет ребëнкa от ловушек непрaвильной интерпретaции. Я же применяю ту же сaмую теорию в рaмкaх экономической психологии, a в экономической деятельности сотрудничaют или соперничaют тaкие пaртнëры, среди которых нет привилегизировaнных по отношению к их большей близости к культурным критериям, тaк что здесь ничьи прaвильные интерпретaции не могут меня предостеречь от своих непрaвильных.
Предполaгaя выше, что между нaми моглa бы рaзвëртывaться интереснaя полемикa о судьбaх нaшей теории, я имел в виду, в чaстности, возможность (зaодно и обязaнность) срaвнивaть тaкие структуры, которые коренным обрaзом отличaют одну деятельность от другой. В чaстности, для экономической психологии типичной является деятельность с тaкого родa структурой: в экономической реaльности происходит сдвиг (нaпр. возросли цены некоторых товaров) – он интерпретируется (нaпр. кaк рaзгоняющaяся инфляция) – интерпретaция определяет выбор экономического действия (нaпр. трaты денег, чтобы предвaрять их обесценение инфляцией) – экономическое действие повлияет нa экономическую реaльность (трaтa денег повышaет спрос нa рынке) – экономическaя реaльность приспосaбливaется к интерпретaции, которaя ей былa дaнa (повышенный спрос действительно вызывaет инфляцию) – тем сaмым, вместо того, чтобы быть доступной для контроля со стороны предстaвителя культуры, интерпретaция создaëт для себя своë собственное подтверждение.
Деятельность деятельностью*, но, окaзывaется, по рaзному онa проявляется, в зaвисимости от своей микро- (a тaкже и мaкро-) -социологической структуры: ребëнкa ли онa соотносит со взрослым, или рaвных между собой взрослых друг с другом.
Или рaвных между собой детей. Всë больше нaкaпливaется у нaс фaктов, свидетельствующих о том, что своеобрaзное, но несомненно рaзвивaющее обучение может происходить и тогдa, когдa взрослый всего лишь зaдaëт проблему, но решение нaходят сaми дети-сверстники, предостaвленные сaмим себе (будь это в лaборaторных и полевых экспериментaх Aнн-Hелли Перрэ-Клермон, или при семейных интерaкциях между брaтьями и сëстрaми, лонгитюдинaлно исследовaнных Мaргит Кëчки).
*
Paзвивaющее обучение и экономическaя деятельность, интерпретaция и творчество, природa, дух и человек со своим индивдуaльным мозгом и нaдындивдуaльной культурой – полемику нa все эти и нa подобные теоретические темы мы собирaлись рaсширить. Был рaзрaботaн проект летней школы по нaучному нaследству Выготского, с тем, чтобы онa способствовaлa жизненно необходимому осознaнию единствa этого нaследствa и многообрaзия его теоретического осмысливчния. Поэтому летняя школa былa зaдумaнa тaк, чтобы перед студентaми выступaли все из Восточной и Зaпaдной европы, из Cеверной и Южной Aмерики, кто нa фундaментaльные вопросы этого нaследствa по-новому и по-своему рaзрaбaтывaет теоретический ответ.
Tеперь с тоской, с болью, со скорбью прикидывaю: Много ли остaлось предстaвителей этой живительной породы учëных после смерти Вaсилия Дaвыдовa?

Диада Выготского и четвериада Рубинштейна
Интервью с профессором Ласло Гараи

Б.И.Пружинин: Профессор Гараи! Ваши психологические исследования всегда имели ясно выраженный философский смысл. Не случайно мы публиковали в нашем журнале Ваши тексты. Позвольте задать Вам несколько вопросов, ответы на которые могут быть интересны читателям «Вопросов философии».
Вы испытали влияние культурноисторической теории Л.С. Выготского и пси-хологической теории деятельности А.Н.Леонтьева. Сегодня интерес к дея-тельностному подходу оживился среди российских психологов и философов. Предпринимаются попытки связать деятельностный подход с философским конструктивизмом. Что Вы думаете о перспективах культурноисторической теории и теории деятельности в психологии и более широко – в науках о человеке?
Л.Гараи: Перспективы, о которых Вы меня спросили, связаны с тем, что психология, с тех пор, как в XIX в. она откололась от философии, исследует такие проблемы, которые являются многоаспектными. Рубинштейн, например, на базе ещё не осквернённого марксизма указывал на аспект деятельности, на аспект предметности, на аспект общественности, и на аспект историчности. При этом сама психология последовательно интересовалась всегда какимто одним из этих аспектов. В первое время это был предмет как мы его ощущаем, как наша память его запечатлевает и сохраняет и т. п. Потом пришли новые времена, главным направлением (mainstream) психологии стал бихевиоризм со своим исключительным интересом к деятельности. Поведение ведь – деятельность; только такая, для изучения которой аспект предмета не существует. Предмет свёрнут в одну точку, которую вместо предмета занимает стимул. И между прочим, когда место бихевиоризма занял когнитивизм, в центре исключительного внимания опять оказался предмет, будто бы отражаемый сознанием без какоголибо участия деятельности. Так вот, теория деятельности Леонтьева, Гальперина, Лурии открыла для нашей науки, собственно, не деятельность как таковую, а деятельность, опосредованную предметом и, в свою очередь, опосредующую предмет. Таким образом, была изобретена такая психология, которая органически синтезирует два из четырёх указанных выше рубинштейновских аспектов.
Конечно, можно подумать, что два вместо четырех, это – шаг назад. Но дело в том, что Рубинштейн выводил из марксовых текстов только лишь методологию для целостной психологии («только лишь» – а ведь это настоящее открытие), Леонтьев же и его соратники разработали конкретные методики для экспериментов на основе теории деятельности в разных областях психологии. Одноаспектные психологии имели весьма узкие возможности: в их рамках не были объяснены даже такие феномены, как внимание или память, хотя внимание и память явились самыми старыми сюжетами новой науки, как она предстала в 1860ые годы. Психологи тех лет (а некоторые и по сей день) применяли принцип отражения: если созерцаемый предмет, свойства которого отражаются ощущением, восприятием, чемнибудь выделяется из своего пространственновременного окружения, то этот его выделяющийся облик и фиксируется якобы вниманием. Память же будто бы отражает ассоциированность предметов между собой в пространствевремени. Так вот, мы, психологи, стали на самом деле разбираться во внимании тогда, когда его одноаспектное истолкование было заменено в теории деятельности концепцией ориентировочной основы деятельности.
Хуже сложилась судьба психологии памяти, которую теория деятельности в меньшей степени смогла выручить. По той простой причине, что память, несомненно, связана с аспектом историчности, и ныне уже известно, что она интимно связана также и с аспектом общественности, теория же деятельности по этой паре аспектов не проводит ничего подобного тем исследованиям, которые проводились по первой паре...
Пружинин: Можно я Вас прерву? Мне бы хотелось, чтобы Вы сделали акцент на Вашей оригинальной теории идентичности. Как она связана вот с этой традицией?
Гараи: К тому времени, когда я познакомился с теорией деятельности Леонтьева, там обнаружилось любопытное противоречие. В этой теории как социальность, так и историчность были заданы в качестве самоочевидных определений всего, что исследовалось, но сами они никогда не исследовались как проблемы. В экспериментах теории деятельности речь всегда шла о том, что отдельно взятому индивиду противостоит отдельно взятый предмет. Само собой разумеется, в этом последнем заключена его предыстория, а эта культурная предыстория, по крайней мере, пока речь идёт об индивидеребёнке, опосредуется для него обществом другого индивида. Но исчерпываются ли этим аспект историчности и аспект общественности? А даже если да, то как они соотносятся друг с другом?
C конца 60ых годов (когда я стажировался на кафедре А. Н. Леонтьева, и сразу после этого был приглашён в рамках гранта Келдыша в Институт истории естествознания и техники АН СССР, где я проводил исследования в секторе научных открытий) я занялся этими вопросами. У Леонтьева я проделал (первый в истории Психфака) социальнопсихологическийэксперимент, в котором оказалось, что непроизвольная память эффективнее работает, когда обслуживает деятельность когонибудь из моих сотрудников, соратников, товарищей по совместной деятельности, чем когда обеспечивает ориентировочную основу для моей собственной деятельности.
К этому времени Генри Тэджфель (Henri Tajfel) уже выступил со своим воззванием “For a more social social psychology”. Он обратил наше внимание на то, что испытуемый не из вакуума приходит в психологическую лабораторию, но всегда представляя то место, которое он реально занимает в реальной общественной структуре, и что общество дано ему, соответственно, не в лице другого, обособленного же индивида, а в структуре их взаимоотношений. Историчность также не исчерпается историей опредмечивания в ходе производственной деятельности и пассивным присутствием этой истории в распредмечивающей деятельности. Фрейд дал нам понимание того, что по ходу биографической истории, то и дело происходит возвращение не только к уже пройденным этапам индивидуальной истории, но и к архаическим моментам родовой истории человечества (см., напр., комплекс Эдипа). Вместе с тем, необходимо заметить, социальная психология Тэджфеля и антропологическая психология Фрейда взаимно исключают друг друга точно также, как бихевиоризм и когнитивизм.
Так вот, я задался целью скопировать тот синтез, который представлен теорией предметной деятельности, и таким образом параллельно создать методологию для синтеза другой пары психологий. А потом, на базе такой синтетической методологии, я намеривался разработать методики для научноисследовательской работы и для прикладных психологических исследований, как это делали в своё время и для своих научных целей Леонтьев, Гальперин, Лурия, Давыдов и их сотрудники.
С этой целью я и обратился к теме социальной идентичности. Социальная идентичность у меня отличается от того, как она представляется в сложившихся научных или обыденных представлениях о ней. В рамках этих представлений социальная идентичность – внутренняя культурнобиологическая определённость: я венгр или русский, православный или мусульман, мужчина или женщина, негр или белый. При этом социальная идентичность представляется пусть даже культурной, но такой же данностью, как природная. Данность быть собакой или черепахой, быть углеродом или нашатырным спиртом: в любом из этих случаев внутреннее свойство особей будет определять, как каждая из них будет реагировать на случайно возникшие во внешней среде события. В моей теории, социальная идентичность определяется не свойствами людей, а отношениями между ними. Такими, как например. сходство и различие. Покажу на коротком примере, что я имею в виду: Положим, мы живём в Германии начала 30ых годов прошлого века; я немецкий пролетарий, а значит, несомненно, носитель социологических свойств немца и, в равной мере, свойств пролетария. Можно ли мне приписать социальную идентичность либо немца, либо пролетария? Это будет зависеть от того, как складываются мои взаимоотношения с другими, и как все мы интерпретируем эти взаимоотношения. Положим, Peter тоже немец, но буржуа, а Paul тоже пролетарий, но еврей. Здесь заданы оттенки и сходства, и различия. А социальная категоризация преобразует эти противоречивые оттенки в категорическую недвусмысленность. «Я» категорически преувеличиваю своё сходство либо с Peterом, либо с Paulем и, соответственно, своё различие с другим, с этим последним одновременно преуменьшается то, что нас сближает, а с тем первым то, что нас отделяло бы. В результате такой категоризации возникает идентичность «пролетариев всех стран» или, в рамках нашего примера, идентичность таких немцев, которые представляют собой и, соответственно, представляют себе «ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer» (единый народ, единую империю, единого вождя). Социологическая категоризация производит социальную идентичность из того, что дано, т.е. социальная категоризация орудует на фоне истории, в данном случае на фоне «надвигающегося» Фюрера с нацистской диктатурой.
Пружинин: Вы писали о кризисе в психологии в связи с ее расколом на исследования естественнонаучной и герменевтической направленности. Можно ли считать, что этот раскол сегодня преодолен?
Гараи: К сожалению, не преодолён. Дело в том, что я как верный наследник Просвещения, думал: если психология страдает от чегото (в данном случае от того что она расчленена на естественную полунауку и на историческую полунауку), то стоит только предъявить средство от этой болезни, как больная сразу схватится за него обеими руками. Но я при этом не учёл, что психолог не абстрактное существо. Он в университете получил образование бихевиористское, его собрата в другом университете сформировали как когнитивиста; они прожили половину своей профессиональной жизни, и знать не желали друг о друге. Я зря ожидал, что они испытают удовольствие от моего предложения воссоединиться под эгидой теории Выготского. Ведь для них это означало бы начать всё заново.
В 70ые годы я неоднократно бывал в Париже в Maison des Sсiences de l’Homme (Дом наук о человеке). Там в это время работал сектор социальной психологии, и в рамках этого сектора работал молодой учёный, который был последователем психоанализа по Лакану (Lacan) и марксизма по Альтюссеру (Althusser). Точнее сказать, он числился в рамках указанного институтского сектора, но он создал межинститутскую группу единомышленников и свою научную работу проводил в этих рамках. Клянусь полночною звездой (говоря словами Лермонтова), они все (810 человек) были блестяще одарёнными исследователями, и то же самое могу сказать об институтской группе (приблизительно такой же численности). Я многому у них научился, в частности, в ходе многочасовой дискуссии после моего доклада. Доклад они попросили меня сделать о моём вышеупомянутом эксперименте, и, в свою очередь удовлетворили мою просьбу, чтобы социальные психологи пригласили психоаналитиков, и чтобы эти последние приняли то приглашение.
Аудитория в сумме приняла из моего доклада «почти всё». Недоумение было выражено «всего лишь» по двум пунктам. Одна половина аудитории не понимала, почему я ввёл в свой эксперимент (через непроизвольную память) «пресловутое» бессознательное ведь я должен знать, что бессознательное недоступно для экспериментирования, так как оно, бессознательное, есть не что иное как миф. Другая половина аудитории недоумевала: зачем мне пресловутая методика экспериментирования, когда я ведь должен знать (как marxien), что экспериментирование в так называемых общественных науках служит только для маскировки того факта, что они суть никакие не науки, а буржуазная идеология. Но обе половины аудитории сошлись в критической оценке моего доклада, когда я заговорил о теории деятельности. Тогда они в полном согласии между собой заявили, что, сохраняя всю свою дружбу и симпатию ко мне, считают непозволительным в последней трети двадцатого столетия привлечение в научную дискуссию пресловутого «отражения» так называемой объективной реальности и пресловутого условнорефлекторного реагирования посредством поведения, которое я, мол, почемуто называю деятельностью.
Я очень мало что здесь утрирую. И в то же время, я нисколько не иронизирую, говоря о том, что, пребывая среди этих парижских психологов, я познакомился с блестяще одарёнными коллегами. Просто они достигли пределов, в которых может мыслить психолог, «обрабатывающий» свой участок расчленённой психологии.
Но насчет дальнейшей судьбы нашей науки я всётаки питаю оптимизм. И не потому, что со времён вышеописанного инцидента прошла треть столетия. Время может ничего не менять. Пространство, кстати, тоже. Тридцать лет спустя после той парижской истории я читал доклад в Москве. Доклад был о том же: как теория Выготского, в частности, его идея о тождественности орудия и знака, способствует сотворению синтеза психологий, а аудитория состояла из приверженцев теории деятельности. В Париже психоаналитическая группа с самоочевидностью думала обо мне: раз marxien значит и freudien. А когда они уяснили, что я «сватаю» им социальную психологию и, мало того, теорию деятельности, один из них, но в присутствии всех и от имени всех, поставил мне вопрос: “Proprement parlant, qu’estce que tu veux de nous, Laszlo?” В Москве же, тридцать лет спустя, как только мы перешли к обсуждению моего доклада, встала симпатичная женщина и с согласия всей прочей аудитории спросила меня: “Чего, собственно говоря, вы от нас хотите, господин Гараи?” Не считая стилистических различий, два вопроса были абсолютно тождественны. И их мотивы, стало быть, тоже.
Если я всё-таки питаю оптимизм насчёт дальнейшей судьбы нашей науки, так это потому, что психологии дана не только возможность преодолеть свою внутреннюю расчленённость. Существует настоятельная необходимость совершить эту историко-научную процедуру.
Дело в том, что сегодня для нас, точно так же, как для пастернаковского Гамлета, “разлажен жизни ход”, и “чтоб все пошло на лад”, без психологии не обойтись. Возьмите, к примеру, международные конфликты. К чему традиционно обращались государства, и чтобы справиться с этой задачей? Они, хоть и прибегали время от времени к психологии, но не особенно нуждались в ней, чтобы содержать армию, чтобы получать сведения об армии потенциального или актуального противника, чтобы в принципе, идентифицировать каждого военного с точки зрения его принадлежности к своей или к вражеской армии... Но как обойтись без психологии там, где войны ведутся террористами-смертниками? Людьми, которые не носят знаки отличия, а одеваются, как мы, питаются, как мы, живут в тех же городах, как мы, студенты тех же вузов, зрители тех же телевизионных программ, садятся в те же вагоны метро и на те же самолёты, как и мы – только с другой целью. Как разгадать эту цель, как предвидеть её реализацию? Как в этих условиях обеспечить выживание нашего общества без содействия психологии? Однако как наша наука могла бы приступать к решению этой задачи, не став полноценной наукой? Наукой синтетической, синтезированной из своих составных частей.
Пружинин: Профессор Гараи, в связи с вопросом о перспективах психологии возникает еще один очень актуальный сегодня вопрос: о статусе прикладных психологических исследований. Вы являетесь основателем экономической психологии в Венгрии. У меня в связи с этим вопрос о специфике Вашей теории, а также о том, как Ваша теория экономической психологии связана с общей психологией?. Прикладные сюжеты предполагают некоторые общие теоретические основания: что, на Ваш взгляд, является сегодня общим теоретическим (концептуальным) основанием психологии? Что сегодня выполняет интегративные функции в психологии? Культурноисторическая психология? Или некие иные концептуальные образования?
Гараи: Вы задаёте очень важный вопрос. Я, как и прежде [5],, не сомневаюсь в том, что именно культурноисторическая психология выдвинула нужную интегративную идею, когда аргументировала за тождественность, или, по крайней мере, взаимообусловленность орудия и знака. Орудие несомненно связано с предметной деятельностью человека. Знаки же (если продвинуться, по пути Выготского, от знаменитого «узла на носовом платке» к языку и речи) исторически закрепляются в структурах, парадигмой которых является структура языка. И язык в каждом акте общения воспроизводит эту историю.
Правда, хочу при этом уточнить. Вот Алексей Алексеевич Леонтьев заявлял, что акт языкового общения есть не что иное, как вариант деятельности. Признаться, его взгляды на этот счёт разделяли чуть ли не все приверженцы теории деятельности. До некоторой степени можно понять такой подход, ведь высказывание внутри общения сближает с опредмечивающейся деятельностью то, что в предметепродукте тоже сохраняется его деятельностная история. Но, подчеркну, только в свёрнутом виде. Дальнейшая деятельность, запущенная орудием, не воспроизводит деятельностную предысторию, которая породила это орудие. Паганини ни в малейшей степени не действует на манер Страдивари. Когда же мы, так сказать, применяем язык в своей речи, то мы, наоборот, поступаем именно так: подражаем своим предкам, которые своей речевой практикой творили язык. Хотя, опятьтаки следует иметь в виду, что в то время как Паганини не повторяет деятельность Страдивари, более поздние «Страдивари» именно подражают своему гениальному предшественнику. Но и в этом случае, они по возможности свёртывают подражающую компоненту деятельности. Прежние искания, заблуждения не повторяются. Мы упражняемся в разных деятельностных актах, зазубриваем информации о предмете, но освоив данный тип деятельности, мы больше не настаиваем на предыстории обретенного умения. По разумным соображениям мы её свёртываем.
Когда же дело касается актов общения, обмена разного рода культурными знаками, то, наоборот, мы активно сопротивляемся свёртыванию, столь разумному в предметной деятельности. Когда мы общаемся в поле культурной истории, мы стремимся воспроизвести ее чуть ли не с эйдетической точностью. Мы ритуально повторяем её разыгрываем, например, Страсти Христовы с его распятием, смертью и, последовавшими за ней, оплакиванием и погребением тела Иисуса...
Обращение с ритуалом – высшее выражение историчности человека. Подчеркну, этот статус – «высшее» я приписываю не воспроизведению ритуала, а обращению с культурным наследством, куда входит, помимо разыгрывания ритуалов, их, так сказать, учреждение, а также, если так случается, отвержение. Между прочим, именно обращение с ритуалом устанавливает те контакты, которые объединяют индивидов в малые или большие группы, и демаркацию одних групп от других. Разновидностью обращения с ритуалом является и тот способ данности культурной истории, в связи с которым Витгенштейн (L. Wittgenstein) придумал термин «языковая игра» (language game) и в котором мы усматриваем самое мощное средство социализации. Причём такой социализации, в которой не только осваиваются правила игры, но и создаются, при активном участии в этом ребёнка. В связи с этим я хочу сослаться на любопытную находку моего неоднократно соавтора Маргит Кечки (Köcski Margit). Она изучала социальнопсихологическое развитие детской речи и обнаружила, что дети с самого раннего возраста выступают инициатором языковых ритуалов: если, скажем, между ребёнком и кем либо из членов семьи случайно возник яркий короткий диалог, то ребёнок настаивает на игровом многократном повторении образца.
Так что я не могу согласиться с теми, кто считает, будто общение есть лишь вариант деятельности. Наоборот, если методологически исходить из взаимообусловленности орудия и знака, то психология в каждом без исключения феномене подвластного ей мира может находить диаду Выготского.
Приведу пример. Пример этот – не моя находка, он принадлежит антропологу М. Сахлинсу (Marshall Sahlins). Из особенностей древнего сельского хозяйства, отмечает Сахлинс, вытекала необходимость, чтобы в нём отец сотрудничал с сыном, но, подчеркивает он, отнюдь не из природы сельского хозяйства вытекает необходимость, чтобы именно отец с сыном сотрудничали, а не, скажем, брат матери с сыном сестры или Don Чuijotе с Sancho Panzа. Так вот (а это уже не Сахлинс заключает, а я), в первой необходимости проявляется аспект орудия, во второй – аспект знака. Но эти два аспекта заданы каждый раз в их взаимообусловленности в соответствии с диадой Выготского.
Вы спросили меня о специфике теории экономической психологии, которую я разработал. Так вот: эта теория целиком построена на диаде Выготского. «Мейнстрим» нынешней экономической психологии интересуется исключительно, так сказать, первой необходимостью Сахлинса как там сотрудничают? И не важно, кто с кем. Ради справедливости я должен сразу оговориться: в рамках этой необходимости экономических психологов интересует, конечно, не только (и даже не столько) технологический аспект дела, но и финансовый. В 90-ые годы прошедшего столетия дважды удостоили Нобелевской премии учёных (правда, развивающих не столько экономическую психологию, сколько экономическую науку), за то, что они открыли мир операционных издержек (transaction costs). Это – издержки, ценой которых я обеспечиваю, чтобы потенциальный сотрудник (кто бы он ни был), сотрудничал не с кем бы то ни было, а именно со мной. В мире операционных издержек опосредующим фактором, как и на самом рынке, являются деньги. Так вот, моя теория в экономической психологии утверждает, что таким же опосредующим фактором может выступать, наряду с деньгами также и социальная идентичность. Если деньги обеспечивают, чтобы некто сотрудничал не с кем угодно, а именно со мной, то социальная идентичность обеспечивает, чтобы сотрудником оказался не кто угодно, а именно тот, кого я выбрал. Образно говоря, я рассчитываю на сотрудничество с Peterом, так как он тоже “немец”, или, соответственно, с Paulом, потому что он тоже “пролетарий”. При этом социальная идентичность выступает как бы двойником денег. В деле опосредования сотрудничества социальная идентичность и, соответственно, деньги могут взаимно заменять друг друга. Наш брат «немец»/«пролетарий» может охотнее пойти со мной на сотрудничество и, пользуясь этим, я могу сократить долю операционных издержек – напротив, чтобы обходить эмбарго, наложенное на сотрудничество с партнёрами моей породы может стоить мне немало лишних денег.
Пружинин: Выше, при обсуждении ряда вопросов Вы ссылались на свою оригинальную психологическую теорию идентичности. Сегодня ряд исследователей, как в мире, так и в нашей стране утверждают, что проблема идентичности, в том виде как она обсуждалась раньше, потеряла смысл, ибо идентичность современного человека размывается. Некоторые говорят о полиидентичности, другие даже о том, что идентичность вообще исчезает. Что Вы думаете по этому поводу?
Гараи: Декларациям об исчезновении идентичности как таковой я не верю, и, в частности, вот почему. Первая в новом столетии Нобелевская премия по экономике была присуждена за исследование, согласно которому рынок функционирует эффективно (т.е., отбирая самый выгодный из всех возможных вариантов) только постольку, поскольку социальная идентичность действующих на рынке лиц явно обозначена. Без этого условия, то есть если на рынке принимаются во внимание только денежные отношения (на одном полюсе чей бы то ни было товар, на другом полюсе чьи бы то ни были деньги), то такой рынок производит, в противоположность ожиданию, обратный отбор (counterselection): обеспечивает сбыт только товару низшего качества, товары же высокого качества выбывают с рынка.
Дело не в размывании идентичности как таковой, а в устарелости её понимания как свойства человека, и к тому же, как заданного свойства. Выше я уже говорил о том, какие соображения меня побудили оперировать скорее понятием отношения, нежели свойства. Эти соображения были в основном психологическими. Но кроме того, мы можем принимать во внимание (я бы даже так сказал: не можем не принимать во внимание) также и соображения учёныхэкономистов. Награждённая Нобелевской премией тройка экономистов (либеральных убеждений), с удовлетворением отмечает, что функционирование рынка рабочей силы сравнительно мало зависит от того, негр ли или белый предлагает свои услуги; но их смущает их же наблюдение, согласно которому функционирование рынка сильно меняется в зависимости от того, негр ли или «не определено кто» (например, по телефону) устраивается на работу. А разница вот в чём: негр ли я или белый – это идентичностьсвойство, а вот негр ли я конкретно или «не определено кто» идентичностьотношение. И то, что сегодня действительно размывается, даже исчезает, это идентичностьсвойство, а не идентичность как таковая. Причем размывающаяся идентичность (или полиидентичность) это отправная точка творческого формирования идентичностиотношения.
В 2003-ем году я опубликовал книгу Экономика идентичности, посвященную тому, как «макромир массового воспроизводства» управляет социальной категоризацией на уровне социальной идентичности. Два года спустя я опубликовал другую книгу Многообразие идентичностей Аттилы Йожефа Исследование по психологии творчества, которая демонстрировала, как аналогичные процессы протекают на уровне «микромира индивидуального творчества».
Макромир массового воспроизводства и микромир творчества – два мира, которые, как кажется, абсолютно противоположны друг другу. Заниматься и с тем, и с другим, к тому же в пределах двух дет – дело, казадось бы, либо гениальности, либо жульничества. Я же сам убеждён, без того, чтобы скромничать, ни оправдываться, что для такого деяния нет надобности ни быть гением, ни разоблачить себя жуликом. Курт Левин (Kurt Lewin) ещё в 1931ом году призвал психологию следовать физике, которая заменила аристотелевский образ мышления, предлагавший одну теорию для небесных тел, другую для земных, иную к падающим телам, и опятьтаки иную к витающим, на галилеевский, который свел эти миры к общему знаменателю.
Психология очень долго даже не пыталась искать такой общий знаменатель и, по сути, вытесняла из своего научного сознания предложенную Левиным перспективу развития. Поэтому, я думаю, наша наука и зашла в тупик (по времени приблизительно, между своим московским Конгрессом 1966го года и парижским Конгрессом 1976го года), и там пребывает уже порядочно.. Меня же исследование столь разных миров привело к заключению, что социальная идентичность и есть искомый общий знаменатель.
Такая находка опять-таки не требует особой гениальности. Достаточно иметь в виду, что в «макромире массового воспроизводства» речь идёт о массовом воспроизводстве орудий, а в «микромире творчества» о сотворении знаков.
Диада же Выготского – налицо.