

There is no precedent in American history as this of Cardinal Mindszenty, that a Cardinal of the Roman Catholic Church be “guest” of an American Embassy for 15 years, 5437 days, from November 4, 1956 until September 28, 1971, in Budapest (Hungary).

This files were originally in the Archives of the Embassy, then in the Department of State in Washington. Today it is preserved in six boxes in the “National Archives and Records Administration” near Washington DC. In Budapest it was called “His Eminence Files”.

This book contains the inventory of the 1971 files, 15th Year of “refuge” (not “asylum”) of Cardinal Mindszenty. This is the second and revised edition which is based on new digital photos, shooted in 2010.

*

Ez a könyv az Egyesült Államok Budapesti Nagykövetségének anyagát hozza, mindazt, ami Mindszenty József hercegprímásra, esztergomi érsekre vonatkozóan a nagykövetség megőrzésre méltónak talált, az 1971. esztendőben, amelynek folyamán, 15 év tartózkodás után, elhagyta az amerikai követséget. Ennek dokumentálását találjuk meg e kötetben, leltárszerű pontossággal. A levéltári anyag kutatható az amerikai Nemzeti Levéltárban, Washington mellett, College Parkban (Maryland), www.archives.gov. Az anyag túlnyomó része angol nyelvű, de tartalmaz magyar nyelvű dokumentumokat is. A fontosabb iratok előtt magyar nyelvű bevezetést találunk. Ebben a második kiadásban új felvételek alapján dolgoztunk, ezért új jelzetekkel láttuk el és kiegészítettük szintén a budapesti hat dobozból néhány újabb és fontosnak ítélt dokumentummal.

HIS EMINENCE FILES, US EMBASSY, BUDAPEST ARCHIVES, 15 (1971)

“HIS EMINENCE FILES” AMERICAN EMBASSY, BUDAPEST

FROM EMBASSY ARCHIVES, 15 (1971)

*

MINDSZENTY BÍBOROS AZ AMERIKAI NAGYKÖVETSÉGEN

KÖVETSÉGI LEVÉLTÁR, 15 (1971)



METEM 2012

HIS EMINENCE FILES
AMERICAN EMBASSY, BUDAPEST
FROM EMBASSY ARCHIVES
15 (1971)

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**MINDSZENTY BÍBOROS
AZ AMERIKAI NAGYKÖVETSÉGEN**

Követségi Levéltár, 15 (1971)

2nd and revised edition

Budapest, 2012

Photographed by the Author, by the Members of the Institute for
Social Research of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences:

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and by two other Persons

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PREFACE

This book contains the documentation of the American Embassy in Budapest on Cardinal Mindszenty from his last year of refuge.

Each document is introduced in Hungarian summary and giving mostly the whole text.

Rome, Pentecost 2012

BEKÖSZÖNTŐ

Ez a kötet a budapesti amerikai nagykövetség által készített dokumentációt tartalmazza Mindszenty bíborosról, menedékének utolsó esztendejéből.

Az egyes iratokat magyar rezümével láttuk el, ahol szükségesnek láttuk.

Róma, 2012 Pünkösdjén

To the People of the United States,
In memory of the Presidents
Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon;
Secretaries of State
Dulles, Herter, Rusk and Rogers;
two Ambassadors of the U.S. Embassy in Budapest:
Hillenbrand and Puhán;
the Chargés of the U.S. Legation in Budapest: Barnes,
Wailes, Ackerson, Tolbert, Jones, Shelton,
O'Shaughnessy, Tims and Meehan;
the Officers of the Hungarian Desk
in the State Department;
the Directors and Officers of the Eastern European
Office in the State Department;
of all named and unnamed FSOs in the Embassies in
Budapest, Vienna and Rome;
and in memory of the generosity of the N.C.W.C.
offered during the refuge
– 15 years, 5437 days –
1956–1971

to Cardinal Joseph Mindszenty
Prince Primate of Hungary
Hero of Freedom for the Hungarian People

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ABBREVIATIONS – RÖVIDÍTÉSEK

Amembassy – American Embassy
Cf. – v. ö.
CF – Central Foreign Policy Files or Central Files
DCM – Deputy Chief of Mission
EMB – Embassy
EXDIS – Extremely Limited Distribution
FonMin – Foreign Minister
Emboff – Embassy Officer
FSO – Foreign Service Officer
GOH – Government of Hungary
GOI – Government of Italy
GOVT – Government
LEGTEL – Legation Telegram
LIMDIS – Limited Distribution
m. s. – kézírásos
QTE – idézet kezdete
RMN – Nixon Library (Yorba Linda, CA)
- NSF – National Security Files
- NB – Name Files Box
RPT – repeat
s. d. – é. n.
UNQTE – idézet bezárva
USG – Government of the US
./ – new page / új oldal kezdete

*

A kurzívval írt részek vagy a magyar bevezetés, vagy az eredetiben kézzel írt szövegrészek. A táviratok hivatkozási száma, pl: REF: BUDAPEST 1125 fontos lehet, amikor egy-egy korábbi távirat tartalmára visszautalnak. Az átírásban követtük az eredetit, ahol a távirat nagybetűvel volt (beérkező táviratok), mi is nagybetűvel írtuk. A BT jelzés gyakorlatilag a táviratok végét jelzi. Szögletes zárójelben esetleges kiegészítéseink, javításaink. A kézírásos följegyzések érdemi információi legtöbb esetben megjelennek a gépelt följegyzésekben, ill. a levelekben, táviratokban.

FOREWORD

Inspired by the series *Foreign Relations of the United States*,¹ and with access to the records of the U.S. Embassy in Budapest, after several years of study I thought it useful to present a volume of this material to show how exciting this period was in the lives of both the Embassy and Cardinal Mindszenty.

There is no precedent in American history, of a Cardinal of the Roman Catholic Church be the guest not for a day, not for a week, not for a year, but almost 15 years, 5437 days, from November 4, 1956 until September 28, 1971.

The documentation was originally in the Archives of the Embassy (in the period 1957–1966 a “Legation”), then in the State Department in Washington. Today it is preserved in the “National Archives and Records Administration” (NARA) near Washington. In Budapest these records referred to as the “His Eminence Files”.

These files, photographed by seven persons during the years 2009 and 2010, are to be found in their original in NARA, “Budapest Embassy Files: Lot 75 F 163. Classified and unclassified files relating to Cardinal Mindszenty, 1956–1972, as maintained by the U.S. Embassy in Budapest”.

Many more records were found in NARA, “Hungarian Desk Files: Lot 75 D 45. Miscellaneous Hungarian files, 1949–1972, including material on the trial of Cardinal Mindszenty and his asylum in the Mission of Budapest”. Similarly we have found more Mindszenty-papers in the “EE Files: Lot 79 D 55. Miscellaneous files pertaining to Hungary, 1945–1971, maintained by the Office of Eastern European Affairs”, and again, in the Central Foreign Policy Files. Some originals and memos were found in the Nixon Presidential Library in Yorba Linda, California.

¹ Especially the volumes on Eastern Europe (Hungary):

- Eisenhower Administration Volumes, Vol. XXV, Part 1. Washington, D.C. 1990.
<http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v25>
- Eisenhower Administration Volumes, Vol X, Part 1. 1958–1960, Washington, D.C. 1993.
<http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v10p1>
- Kennedy Administration Volumes, Vol. XVI. Washington, D.C. 1994.
<http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v16>
- Johnson Administration Volumes, Vol. XVII. Washington, D.C. 1996.
<http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v17>
- Nixon Administration Volumes, Vol. XXIX. Washington, D.C. 2008.
<http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v29>
- On Cardinal Mindszenty in these first four volumes see: SOMORJAI Á., *Amerikai levéltári források Mindszenty József bíboros prímásról, esztergomi érsekről. Publikált források, 1956–1967*, in: Magyar Egyháztörténeti Vázlatok (Essays in Church History in Hungary) 19 (2007/3–4) 175–221. – On the internet: www.heh.hu.

This book intends to give an insight into this important time in the Cardinal's life, which concludes his refuge in the Embassy.² This period because was chosen because of its importance for later years, in understanding the conflict of the Cardinal with Paul Pope VI, and in appreciating better the vision that the Cardinal upheld of his role in both Church and State in Hungary.³

A kee for our abbreviations:

1. BP, Boxes 1–6, [digital copy number, which is casual] stands for His Eminence (Cardinal Mindszenty) Files in the Budapest Legation/ Embassy, conserved in the NARA, as Record Group 84, State Department: Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, 1788–1964 (ARC Identifier 600980 / MLR Number UD-WX 2691B).

2. EE, Boxes 9–11 [digital copy number, which is casual] stands for His Eminence (Cardinal Mindszenty) Files in the Office of the Eastern European Affairs, Department of State, Washington DC, conserved in the NARA, as Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State, Bureau of European Affairs, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Records relating to Hungary, 1941–1971 (MLR A1 5577)

3. CF or CFB, Boxes Nos, [digital copy number, which is casual] stand for His Eminence (Cardinal Mindszenty) Documents in the Central Foreign Policy Files, Department of State, Washington DC, conserved in the NARA, as Record Group 59, State Department, Central Files.⁴

4. Nixon Presidential Library (Yorba Linda, CA as “RMN”), NSF (National Security Files) and Box Number (Box 693 for “Hungary”, Name Box 828 for a few other documents).

Rome, August 13, 2012

PhD Fr. Adam Somorjai, OSB

2 There is some evaluation in our study about the significance of this year, giving an oversight over the literature in Hungarian and also some documents in Hungarian, see: SOMORJAI Á. – ZINNER T., *Majd halálra ítélve, Dokumentumok Mindszenty József élet-történetéhez*, Magyar Közlöny Lap- és Könyvkiadó, Budapest 2008; ID., *Washingtonból jelentjük. A budapesti amerikai nagykövetség Mindszenty bíboros tevékenységére vonatkozó, 1971-ben keletkezett iratai*, in: Századok 144 (2010/1) 143–196.

3 SOMORJAI, Á.: *Trilogia “Sancta Sedes Apostolica et Cardinalis Mindszenty”*, Budapest, 2007–2012.

4. For the numbers of the Boxes see: *Mindszenty bíboros követségi levelei az Egyesült Államok elnökeihez – Letters to the Presidents. Cardinal Mindszenty to the Political Leaders of the United States, 1956–1971*, Ed. by Á. Somorjai, METEM Budapest 2011. 373s.

ELŐSZÓ

Adriányi professzor úrnak „A Vatikán keleti politikája és Magyarország 1939–1978. A Mindszenty-ügy” c. könyvéről írt recenzióiban¹ nemrég a következő megállapítást tettük: „a forrásanyag bővítése nélkül nem tudunk előrelépni a Mindszenty-kutatásban.”² A következőkben a forrásanyag bővítésének egyik lehetőségét ismertetjük, az Amerikai Egyesült Államok Budapesti Nagykövetségének anyaga alapján.³

Mivel az anyag igen terjedelmes,⁴ ki kellett választani egy adatsort. Az 1971. esztendő láthatóan hiányosan feldolgozott a szakirodalomban, ezért erre az évre esett választásunk.⁵ Ebben az évben hagyja el ugyanis Mindszenty bíboros az Amerikai Egyesült Államok Budapesti Nagykövetségét, de még függőben maradt ennek számos részlete. Célunk az, hogy felhívjuk a figyelmet ennek az idáig nem vizsgált anyagnak a fontosságára.

Az anyagot előbb a State Department őrizte Washingtonban, majd, átkerült az Egyesült Államok Nemzeti Levéltárába: “National Archives and Records Administration” (NARA), helyileg Washington D. C. közvetlen szomszédságába.⁶ Itt 2002 folyamán deklasszifikálták, így kutathatóvá vált.

1 SOMORJAI Á., „Az igazság szabaddá tesz titeket”. *Adriányi Gábor Ostpolitik-monográfiaja kapcsán*, in: Magyar Egyháztörténeti Vázlatok / Essays in Church History in Hungary 19 (2007/1–2) 219–224.

2 *I. h.*, 224. Lásd még: SOMORJAI Á., *A vádlott megszólal. A Mindszenty-kutatás jelenlegi helyzetéről*, in: Magyar Egyháztörténeti Vázlatok 21 (2010/3–4) 207–209.

3 Tanulságos olvasmány az amerikai nagykövet, Alfred Puhán emlékirata is, amely 1990-ben jelent meg: PUHAN, A, *The Cardinal in the Chancery and Other Recollections*, Vantage Press, New York – Los Angeles, 1990. 228 l. Témánk szempontjából különösen is figyelemreméltó: „The Mindszenty Story: 1969–1971” fejezet, 185–218. Zinner Judit fordításában lásd: SOMORJAI Á. – ZINNER T., *Majd halálra ítélve, Dokumentumok Mindszenty József élettörténetéhez*, Budapest 2008. 1157–1183.

4 1957. nov. 4.–1972. tavasza közti periódusra digitális fényképezőgéppel mintegy 7800 felvételt ismerünk, oldalanként rögzítve a dokumentumokat.

5 Terjedelmében ez az esztendő anyaga az 1956–1971. közti 15 év anyagának kb. egy tizenötöde. A teljes anyag közlése tehát e kötet tizenötszörösét jelentené.

6 The National Archives and Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi Road, College Park, MD 20740-6001. A Nemzeti Levéltár interneten is elérhető: www.archives.gov. – A budapesti Mindszenty Files hat dobozának repertóriumát lásd: *The Cardinal Mindszenty Documents in American Archives. A Repertory of the six Budapest Mindszenty Boxes – Mindszenty bíboros budapesti amerikai követségi tartózkodásának dokumentumai. Repertórium*, Ed. by Á. Somorjai, Főapátsági Levéltár, Pannonhalma 2012. 288 p.

Az új adatfelvételt 2009 és 2010 folyamán hét személy végezte, a dokumentumokat újrakezelték. Az amerikai nagykövetség levéltárában ezek a dokumentumok a következő bejegyzést kapták: „HE files”, „His Eminence files”, „Cardinal files”, vagy csak egyszerűen: „Cardinal Mindszenty”, vagy: „Cardinal”.

Közlésünkben időrendbe téve közöljük a dokumentumokat, ahol indokolt volt, rövid összefoglalással. Több esetben kísérletet teszünk ezeknek rövid kiértékelésére. Jelen dolgozatnak nem feladata a fontosabb dokumentumok magyar fordításban való közlése. Ezért megelégszünk a legszükségesebb kommentárral.

A dokumentumok általános jellemzése

A dokumentumoknak három fő csoportját találtuk. A leggyakoribb a távirat, amelyben a State Department, a washingtoni külügyminisztérium, amelyet SecState-nek is rövidítenek,⁷ a fő központ, vagy az küldi, vagy oda küldik a táviratot. Legtöbb távirat nem egy címzetthez érkezik, az első helyen a megjegyzés: ACTION, a második és további helyen közölt címzettnél a megjegyzés: INFO. Tehát az elsőnek tennivalót jelent, a többinek információt. A távirat titkosságára utaló rövidítések: LIMDIS – Limited Distribution, EXDIS – Extremely Limited Distribution. A távirat küldésének módjára utaló rövidítések: LEGTEL – Legation Telegram, DEPTTEL – Department Telegram, GOVTEL – Government Telegram. A táviratok, fontos események kapcsán, olykor néhány óra elteltével is érkezhettek, a küldés óra és perce általában megtalálható a beérkező táviratokon (melyeknél megtartottuk a csupa nagybetűt), így szükség esetén a sorrend utólag rekonstruálható. Mi itt megelégedtünk az év, hónap, nap feltüntetésével.

A második gyakori műfaj a levél. Általában a State Department Kelet-Európai Osztályának vezetője levelez a budapesti nagykövettel, a levelek ez esetben aláírtak, tehát eredetiek. A budapesti nagykövet ill. annak valamelyik helyettese által a State Departmentnek megküldött levele általában nincs aláírva, ami azt jelenti, hogy az eredetit az US Nemzeti Levéltár egy másik fondjában lehet megtalálni. A levelek közlésekor ezeket a körülményeket feltüntettük, azért is, hogy tudatosítsuk, e helyen csak a budapesti követség anyagát ismerjük. Mivel az amerikai külügyesek a hivatalos

⁷ Secretariat of State, névegyezés van Vatikáni Államtitkársággal: Secretariat of State „of the Vatican”, vagy: „of the Holy Father, Pope Paul VI”.

levelekben keresztnéven szólítják egymást, ennek közlésétől általában eltekintettünk.

A harmadik műfaj a memorandum, memorandum of conversation, rövidítve: memo, magyarul: följegyzés, emlékeztető. Ezek a följegyzések Mindszenty bíborossal való személyes megbeszélést követően születtek, általában azért, hogy a nagykövet erről tudomást szerezzen, és utána elhelyezték a követség levéltárában. Ezek a följegyzések olykor igen értékesek, mert Mindszenty bíboros pillanatnyi lelkiállapotát is rögzítik.

Szükségtelennek tűnt annak ismételt feltüntetése, hogy az anyag titkos: „secret”, mert szinte mindegyik Washingtonnak küldött vagy Washingtonból érkező anyagon szerepel ez a jelzés. Mindenesetre a táviraton többnyire, de nem mindig, feltüntetjük a „secret”, a „confidential”, stb. besorolást, a levelek esetében ezt magától értetődőnek tartottuk.

Az első kiadás anyagát közöljük újra, némely javítással a szövegben, egyben törekedtünk az oldalhelyességre. Két levéltári egység anyagából válogattunk (a budapesti amerikai nagykövetség hat doboza közül a 4. doboz 7. őrzési egysége, és az 5. doboz 1. őrzési egysége), mert elsősorban itt találhatók az 1971. esztendő dokumentumai. Ebben a második kiadásban három új dokumentumot is közlünk, amelyek a római amerikai nagykövetség Mindszenty-anyagában találhatók (6. doboz 7. őrzési egysége, lásd az Appendixben). Azokban az esetekben, amikor más példányokat is föllettünk, ezt a tényt külön jelzetben hozzuk. A rövidítések konkordanciájában kulcsot kapunk az előző kiadásban alkalmazott digitális felvételek beazonosításához, továbbá itt tanulmányozható, hogy mely dokumentum került már máshol is kiadásra – akár angolul, akár magyar fordításban.

Ennek a levéltári anyagnak a megítélése ezidáig nem egységes. Van olyan szerző, aki szerint semmi újat nem tartalmaz.⁸ Véleményünk szerint az *Emlékirataim* szerzőjére és álláspontjára vonatkozóan számos új, kiegészítő felismerésre juthatunk.⁹

8 MÉSZAROS István, *Egy hivatástudattal megáldott/megvert ember hűsége (1971 nyara). Somorjai Ádám egyik dokumentumkötetéről*, in: Uő., *Árnyak és fények. Kiegészítések a Mindszenty-életrajzhoz*, Eötvös József Könyvkiadó, Budapest 2008. 207–226.; Lásd még: Uő., *Kód a követségi Mindszenty-iratokhoz. Jegyzetek a Somorjai/Zinner gyűjteményhez*, in: Magyar Egyháztörténeti Vázlatok 21 (2009) 321–348.

9 SOMORJAI Ádám – ZINNER Tibor, *Washingtonból jelentjük. A budapesti amerikai nagykövetség Mindszenty bíboros tevékenységére vonatkozó, 1971-ben keletkezett iratai*, in: Századok 144 (2010/1) 143–196.

1971. JANUÁR

Az 1971. esztendő első három hónapja forrás szempontjából elhanyagolható ahhoz képest, ami majd áprilistól megindul, és különösen június, július hónapokban kulminál, de bőven lesz még anyag a szeptember 28-i kiutazásig, s még utána is várható néhány meglepetés. Az itt beköszöntő témák a későbbiekben magyarázatra találnak, így Nyárádi egykori magyar pénzügyminiszter régi újságcikke is, amely Mindszentynek azért volt fontos, hogy a valutázás vádját utólag visszautasítsa. Az év eseménye az, hogy megszűnik az amerikai követségi periódus és ez talán a legfontosabb, 8. sz. dokumentumban, január 13-án, Puhan nagykövet levelében vetődik fel: cselekvésre kell készíteni a Vatikánt, a magas kort elérő bíboros kiutazása érdekében.

1971. január 8, péntek

1. BPB0407[185] – Memorandum, m. s., 1 p.

This is the note which you proposed to put into your own words (or mine if you wish) and send to John Vought. For background I have attached the 1949 N[ew] Y[ork] T[imes] article (I don't know how HE figured out the Feb 10 date).

HE learned J. Nyaradi's appointment to a Dept. of State position via a recent emigré paper.

olvashatatlan aláírás (Puhan?)

2. BPB0407[186] – Mindszenty bíboros a washingtoni külügyminisztériumhoz, 1 p.

Nyárádi-ügyben.

Budapest, January 8, 1971

Most Honorable Leadership of the State Department,

In a doubtful situation I do not dare to use a personal official address. I am not certain is my communication still existing or not with the United States.

But there is now necessity. Mr. Nicholas Nyaradi Hungarian received a high position in the State Department.

He was so good in 1949 that in the N. Y. Times (II, 10 '49) he published a large article as a former Minister of the Hungarian Finance: the Church was privileged (1947–48) by the Supreme Economic Counsel in circulation of foreign currency, so I did not commit the foreign currency offence. I was on a legal base. I had not with him a direct connection, therefore I ask the Honorable Leadership of the State Department: please put a question to Mr. Nyaradi for me:

1) From a compassion and charitable action did he write this article or for the reality and truth?

I received the article only in 1967. I have not the authors's address, only by the new nomination in the last days. I congratulate the nominated on nomination.

2) Why was not the positive and negative decision communicated with the Church officially?

(Both, the compassion and reality I appreciate).

I am grateful for the activity of the state Department.

Awaiting your kind response

Sincerely
[not signed]
Primate of Hungary

január 11, hétfő

3. BPB0407[189] – Levél, Miss Lamar Miss Driscollhoz, 1 p.

Megköszöni a bíboros számára küldött csekket és karácsonyi üdvözléseket

Thanks very much for your letter of December 22 (received January 5!), enclosing a check and greetings for Cardinal Mindszenty.

I cashed your check and took money and card in personally to H.E., thinking possibly I might have to refresh his memory as to the giver. Not at all! He told me you send greetings to him every year, and seemed pleased this year was no exception. Enclosed is his thank you note.

Yes, I am enjoying life in Budapest very much. Tho a day like today, so foggy/smoggy one cannot see the Soviet memorial in the middle of Liberty Square, makes one yearn for some sunshine!! Why not pay a

return visit to Budapest one day? The welcome mat will always be out (at Szechenyi, Apt. 51 – your domicile too, I suppose?)

Best wishes for 1971.

Sincerely,
(Miss) Jeanne F. Lamar [not signed]

Enclosure

4. BPB0407[192] – Memorandum, R. Titus Puhannak, 1 p.

A bíboros gyóntatója, Rev. Dr. Tátrai Gyula OFM. Megjegyzésében utal a bíboros magányosságára: gyónásaiban szereti kibeszélni magát.

SUBJECT: The Cardinal's Confessor

The Cardinal's confessor, Father (Dr.) Gyula TATRAI, usually says no more than a few words about "the poor old one", having a need above all just to talk and talk. To say even this takes about all the time we have in the elevator, which is about the only semi-isolated place we have in which to talk. Today, however, he noted that it is now a year since he started to come regularly to her the Cardinal's confession and in all that time he has adhered strictly to my request that he not agree to any request the Cardinal might make to carry messages out of the Embassy or to bring in any. He said that, while he has brought in host wafers for the Mass and an occasional book or pamphlet relating strictly to spiritual affairs, he has never taken out or brought in personal messages of any kind and has never been requested to do so by the Cardinal. He also said that he had expected at the beginning that the Hungarian authorities would be interested in his activities but not once during the year has he been asked to report to the regime authorities and has received no statements or instructions from them.

You will recall that a period of over two months elapsed from the time I visited the Franciscan Provincial on Martirok utca on September 3, 1969 until Father Tatrai showed up for the first confession. I assumed then, and still to, that the intervening period was required for the Provincial to clear the arrangement with the State Office for Church Affairs. In fact, the Provincial implied during our meeting that he would of course have to check the arrangement (with whom he did not say) before Dr. Tatrai's first visit. There is no question, therefore, that Father Tatrai's visits

here are a matter of official knowledge and the apparent lack of detailed official interest in what transpires during the confessor's hour-long conversations with the Cardinal, if true, is a commentary itself on the way the regime views the Cardinal: perhaps the existing files on our Guest are already so voluminous that they have passed the point of diminishing returns. For any police agency to recognize such a state of affairs is real progress – if that is that has happened.

január 12, kedd

5. BPB0406[003], BPB0407[180], McKisson Puhanhöz, 1 p.

A Fehér Ház szóbeli válasza a bíborshoz, a szent korona ügyben.

*

John Baker has been away since about December 21 on his home leave. We expect him back sometime between January 18 and 25. In the meantime, with reference to your letter of November 6 to John, we have received word from the White House concerning the Cardinal's message of October 13 to the President on the subject of the Crown, which was transmitted with your letter.

The White House has authorized us to request that you inform the Cardinal orally as follows:

- (1) That his letter was received and read in the White House;
- (2) That we have no present plans for returning the Crown of St. Stephen to Hungary;
- (3) That we appreciate fully the Cardinal's interest in this matter;
- (4) That we regret, however, we cannot comply with his request to send the Crown to the Vatican, since the Crown is clearly the property of the Hungarian nation and we cannot in these circumstances unilaterally transfer this Hungarian national treasure from our custody to that of a third party.

With all best wishes for the new year,

Sincerely,

Robert M. McKisson [signed]

6. BPB0407[179] – Memorandum, 1 p.
Cf. 13. sz. *Tarló Gyula ügye*.

The Cardinal says he received the enclosed letter (copy) from Mr. Papendorp at the time of his departure from Budapest. He now requests P. to secure further information about the matter discussed in the letter either from the sender or the recipient. He asserts that the recipients of the money referred to in the letter had no role in the publication of his memoirs and no commission of any kind in connection with the memoirs. Earlier, he said, he thought he would not concern himself with the letter, since even though there may have been a swindle the company had let itself be swindled. Later, however, he took the matter up since his name expressly appears in the affair, as does the name of Legrady (evidently the nephew who died in N. Y. after emigrating there several years ago)... and he implies that it might therefore be assumed that he had a role in the collection of the \$25,000.

H. E. says he knows Tarlo and that the fraud originated with him. The other (presumably referring to Legrady) in all probability (he says) became a party after much persuasion. He states that the book can appear only after his death and it will be only at that time that the firm will be defrauded (this bit of legal expertise may be of the same quality as his dictum that the gestation period for boy babies is longer than for girl babies in order to provide for the additional development of their stronger musculature). He adds something, however, about the mass of the money already being obtainable with the swindle.

He asks P. to get the information directly or by way of another person. It would be important to have the address of the bilked enterprise as well as perhaps the text of the contract. He asks P. not to do something (illegible to me) vis-a-vis the mentioned reference because his appearance in any possible proceeding against him or against the (literary great power?) would be a legal advantage to the enterprise.

He asks finally whether his mother's name appears in the contract and, if so in what connection.

január 13, szerda

7. BPB0407[172] – Villot bíboros államtitkár Mindszentyhez, 1 p.
Megköszöni a karácsonyi jókívánságokat.

[Seal]

CHURCH COUNCIL

for

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Most Eminent and Reverend Lord

Joseph Cardinal Mindszenty:

The august Pontiff gratefully received the wishes extended by Your most reverend Eminence and is most pleased to express His paternal feeling toward you and prays that you may receive heavenly comfort in your labors, in token of which He cordially bestows upon you His Apostolic blessing.

Cardinal Villot

Vatican City, January 13, 1971

8. BPB0407[193–196], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [082–083, 125–126], RMN NSFNB828 – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: SecState, 4 pp.

Az 1971-es esztendő első fontosabb dokumentuma – véleményünk szerint – Alfred Puhan nagykövet távirata Washingtonnak, amelyben beszámol a bíboros lelkiállapotáról. Közelgő 79. születésnapja és emlékiratai kiadásának megoldatlansága zavarják őt. Puhan itt idézi Mindszentyt: „a washingtoni külügyminisztérium halálomra vár.” Puhan itt is, máshol is, majd pedig Washington is azzal fog érvelni, hogy az idős bíborost a nagykövet-ségen nem tudják alkalomadtán megfelelő orvosi ellátásban részesíteni. Ehhez helyet kell változtatnia. A nagykövet sürgeti a megoldást, és ehhez szükségesnek ítéli a Vatikán és a magyar kormány aktivizálását. Vagy ahogy fogalmaz: „Úgy gondolom, föl kell ráznunk a Vatikánt.” Erre éppen a bíboros érdekében, alapvető emberiességi megfontolásból van szükség.

BUDAPEST 0048

EXDIS

SUBJECT: Cardinal Mindszenty

1. When I talked with the Cardinal most recently he spoke, as he does from time to time, about his feeling of the nearness of death. Perhaps he was a bit sorry for himself over the treatment of his request regarding his memoirs. He remarked that he has the impression “the Department of State is just waiting for me to die”. I told him I thought he looked in pretty good shape, as he does in fact. But the conversation impels me to take up a point again which has been covered in informal correspondence.

2. The Cardinal will be 79 in March. There is no immediate difficulty but clearly the problems of looking after an old man, seeing that he has professional medical and nursing attendance, cannot be very far away. He has, as the Department knows, no attendant now. He shows some signs – at least they seem so to me – of senescence. [./.]

3. There are other problems. Illustrative is the following: the wife of an FSO in the Embassy now acts voluntarily as typist for the Cardinal, who spends much of his time writing long hand. When the officer, whose wife does this work for the Cardinal, is transferred this summer, there is no other person with the qualifications or time to do this job for him. A local Hungarian employee is out of the question.

4. So we may not be able to continue to go on with him very much longer as we have for the past fourteen years. I feel increasingly strongly that we should more actively try to get the Vatican and the Hungarians to come up with a solution to the problem of the Cardinal which would get him out of the Embassy to some place where he can be properly cared for. Given the difficulties involved, no time should be lost in getting things started. Even under the best of circumstances, with good will on every side, it will be a hard road.

5. I do not think it is enough to maintain our classical stance on the Cardinal namely that we are not involved in [./.] negotiation, which is a matter between the Vatican and the Hungarians. I think we should try to stir the Vatican up. I do not believe we should just let things go on as they have gone for years, and cross the bridges when we come to them. I think we owe it to the Cardinal on basic human grounds, if nothing else, to do something. I do not feel happy with the thought that on the historical record we will have left it passively to others.

6. I am perfectly well aware that the main obstacle to changing the Cardinal's status may be the Cardinal himself. I believe he is content to stay where he is indefinitely, till death in fact, if he cannot get the complete and unconditional rehabilitation, including return as Primate with all ecclesiastical and civil powers, which he feels in his due. The only thing that would change his attitude is probably an order from Rome, which Rome would doubtless be reluctant in the extreme to give.

7. Thus, looking realistically at the various facets, the [./.] problem is immensely difficult. Doubtless these considerations lie behind our reluctance over the years to get into the thickets. However, after most careful review and with the benefit – which others do not have – of seeing the human dimensions of the problem day by day, I urge that we now do so, and with some urgency.

PUHAN

január 15, péntek

9. BPB0407[187–188] – Levél, Puhán Davieshez, 2 pp.

A bíboros emlékiratainak esetleges amerikai kiadása – az előző évről áthúzódó probléma és az 1971. évet is végig meghatározza. Fölsejlenek az amerikai álláspont sarkkövei: Mindszenty nem adhatja ki addig emlékiratait, amíg menedéket élvez a követségben.

*

I would like to comment on the Cardinal's memoirs problem. We carried out the instructions conveyed in John Baker's letter of December 15. I must say, though, that I have doubts about our opposing so strongly eventual publication in the U. S. I am in the dark on what exactly went on between the Department and the White House on this. I infer that the Department had some trouble in selling its position, and for this reason I chose to go the letter route with these comments, rather than send a telegram. I might say in passing that it would have been good to know at the time what the Department was trying to do. It's another of those cases where I think Ambassadors might be sent copies of the papers circulating in the Department, and also between the Department and the White House, in time enough for them to say something.

I can imagine that the negative effect on U.S.–Hungarian bilateral relations of eventual publication in the States may have played a role in the memoirs' deliberations. In my view the importance of this factor can be exaggerated. I do not rate it very high myself, on at least two grounds. First, I do not believe the memoirs would have all that much impact in the U.S. or elsewhere. The Cardinal will, I'm sure, spend much time fighting old battles that don't mean much to anybody any more. Second, even though they will be highly critical of the regime here, and there will be resentment that we permitted publication, I would guess [./] the regime assumes we will go that road and is prepared to live with it. The people in power here are pretty realistic.

More important to me, however, is the question of doing justice to the Cardinal and what he has stood for. I think I am as interested as anyone in promoting good relations with the Hungarians, but there are more important considerations. The Cardinal is a man who has been dealt many heavy blows. He sees the memoirs as a formal statement establishing his place in history. I would not like to see us thwarting his purpose. It is clear

he does not trust the Vatican to see the memoirs into print because, he believes, it will not want to complicate its always delicate relations with Eastern Europe. He has not asked us to publish the memoirs, but simply guarantee to get them, after his death, to the man who will arrange for publication. Such a guarantee, if it were given, would give him peace of mind on what is probably the most important remaining factor in his political life. My own recommendation would be to give the guarantee. I think we owe him this not in any technical sense, but simply out of decency to a man who has suffered and been gravely wronged in basic causes that he and we believe are right.

The memoirs problem would, I feel, be subsumed in the larger question of possible change in the Cardinal's status, which is discussed in our recent telegram suggesting a more active policy toward the Vatican in order to get things moving. I look forward to discussing the various aspects of the problem during your coming visit.

With best regards,

Sincerely,
Alfred Puhan [not signed]
Ambassador

január 22, péntek

10. BPB0407[183–184] – Levél, Meehan Bakerhez, 2 pp.

Megküldi a bíboros Nyáradi ügyben írt levelét.

I enclose a letter from the Cardinal addressed in somewhat Chinese style to "Most Honorable Leadership of the State Department." He thought of sending it to the President, then to the Secretary, but remarked quite reasonably that it was silly to bother them with this kind of thing. At the same time he would like a reply. He learned of Nyaradi's association with the Department from the press, and he just happened to have an article written by Nyaradi for the New York Times dating from February 1949 (copy also enclosed). Is it the same Nyaradi, one wonders? The Cardinal calls him Nicholas. The New York Times says Miklos, which is Michael. (This shows how good my Magyar is! Miklos = Nicholas, like H. E. says. Sorry about that.)

As to the point and purpose of the Cardinal's inquiry, the matter refers to the currency violation charge in his trial, which latter is a basic issue to him. He asks if Nyaradi was just trying to be helpful (compassionate and charitable) in writing the article, or was his point that the Church was exempted from certain legal provisions concerning foreign currency strictly correct. In the latter case, the Cardinal says, he was never informed and asks why not.

As with many of the Cardinal's request, this may seem pretty old red hat, but we would ask you to give it a hard try in getting some kind of response. Apart from the point at issue, the procedural aspect is important to us. It would be useful to show the Cardinal that when he asks a question like this we can handle it effectively through normal channels, without his having [./.] to escalate to the Secretary or the President. Al has asked me to stress this point, to which he attaches some importance.

With best regards.

Sincerely,
Francis J. Meehan [not signed]
Deputy Chief of Mission

Enclosure:

Letter dated Jan. 8, 1971

január 26, kedd

11. BPB0407[177–178] – Levél, Meehan Bakerhez, 2 pp.
Tarló Gyula ügyében.

Another Cardinal point, this time concerning a facet of the memoirs question.

The Cardinal recently gave us the enclosed letter from him to Ted Papendorp, with the letter of September 28, 1963 (Munson to Ludwig), which we had never seen before, as an attachment. The Cardinal told us Papendorp gave him the 1963 letter when he left Budapest.

In his letter to Papendorp, the Cardinal asks him to get further information concerning the matter discussed in the letter either from the sender or the addressee. He states that the recipients of the money referred to in the letter have no role in the publication of his memoirs, no authorization of any kind in that connection. He decided at the time, he says, not to concern himself with the letter, but felt subsequently he should take the

matter up since it concerns him directly and since the name Legrady appears (presumably he is the nephew who died in New York after immigrating some years ago). He is concerned by the possible implication that he (the Cardinal) had a role in the collection of the \$25,000.

The Cardinal says he knows Tarlo and that the fraud (in the sense of pretending to be able to deliver the memoirs) originated with him. The Cardinal asks Papendorp specifically to try and get the address of the defrauded enterprise, as well, perhaps, as the text of the contract. He asks finally whether his mother's name appears in the contract and if so in what connection.

Clearly we don't want to get a Papendorp-H.E. correspondence going on on the memoirs. There is no question of that. We made it clear to Papendorp after he left here that he was no longer officially involved in the Cardinal's [./.] affairs. As you may know, his name has cropped up specifically re the memoirs. It was said that he had been designated the Cardinal's literary executor and so named in the Cardinal's will. (Since we haven't seen the will, we don't know whether this is the case.)

I recommend that in the interest of throwing light in another dark corner someone talk to Papendorp about the '63 letter, in fact asking him the questions the Cardinal has put without, however, conveying that the Cardinal is doing the asking. It could be said simply that the Cardinal told us he got it from him and we wonder what he knows about the background.

Look forward to hearing from you on the matter.

With best regards.

Sincerely,
Francis J. Meehan [not signed]
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim

Enclosure:

As stated

január 29, péntek

12. BPB0407[173–174] – Levél, Baker Meehanhez, 2 pp.

Nyarádi ügyben, ill., megküldi a csekket a bíboros alapra.

Your letter of January 22 transmitting the Cardinal's inquiry of January 8 about Dr. Nyaradi's association with the Department and his New York Times article of February 1949 was awaiting me when I returned to the Office yesterday from home leave.

Dr. Nyaradi, as you know, is a consultant to EUR and is in touch from time to time with EUR officers on various matters including, particularly, those of interest to CHP, BRY, SOV, and GER.

Happily, Dr. Nyaradi was in the Department yesterday and called on us to discuss various matters. We had an immediate opportunity, therefore, to raise with him the questions asked by the Cardinal.

1. With regard to the first question, Dr. Nyaradi, noting that a long time had passed since these events, said he had written the article not only because of compassionate considerations but also in order to state publicly the background and facts known to him.

2. As regards the second question, Dr. Nyaradi pointed out that the Cardinal (who was arrested, as we recall, in Christmas eve) was incommunicado in Hungarian police custody. [./.] We have now received from the US Catholic Conference a check in the amount of \$1,000.00 for the Cardinal's subsistence. The check is enclosed.

With best wishes for the New Years,

Sincerely,

John A. Baker, Jr. [signed]

Enclosure:

Check for \$1,000.00.

1971. FEBRUÁR

1971. február 2, kedd

13. BPB0407[176] – Levél, Puhan Bakerhez, 1 p.

A bíboros anyagi alapja ügyében (eltartása költségei).

Since the Cardinal's funds are almost exhausted, I wonder if you would mind inquiring again about their replenishment from the usual source (see my letter of December 15). It is not a serious problem for us, since we can meet the Cardinal's modest expenses for some time from our petty cash supply, but since Bishop Bernardin usually responds quickly to the Department's request, I thought there might be a hitch somewhere which you might be able to clear up.

Sincerely,
Alfred Puhan [not signed]
Ambassador

1971. február 3, szerda

14. BPB0407[171] – Levél, Baker Puhanhoz, 1 p.

Mellékelten küld a bíboros számára egy üzenetet.

Would you be good enough to see that the enclosed message is transmitted to the Cardinal.

Cheers.

Sincerely,
John A. Baker, Jr. [signed]

Enclosure: Message to Cardinal

15. BPB0407[175], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [122] – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: SecState, 1 p.

Bíborosi kinevezésének 25. évfordulója (február 18). Puhan Budapestről kéri, hogy a washingtoni apostoli delegátuson keresztül kérdezzen rá a Vatikánban, hogy időben érkezzen a gratuláló levél.

BUDAPEST 163

LIMDIS

SUBJECT: Cardinal Mindszenty

According our files February 18 is twenty fifth anniversary of Cardinal's getting red hat. Recommend Department ask Apostolic Delegation if Vatican intends send greetings to mark occasion. If so, further recommend text such greetings be sent to us by telegram so they reach Cardinal in time for anniversary.

PUHAN

1971. február 12, péntek

16. BPB0407[169] – Levél, Baker Meehanhez, 1 p.

Megküldi a "L'Attività della Santa Sede 1970" c. kiadványt és a pápaság ezévi emlékérmét.

*

Enclosed are several items which the Apostolic Delegation brought in today for forwarding to the Embassy and delivery to His Eminence.

The items are as follows:

1. Volume entitled L'Attività della Santa Sede 1970.

2. Pontifical Medals (2), with a brief message of transmittal (in Latin) from the secretariat of His Holiness.

Will you kindly pass these items on to the Cardinal.

Sincerely,

John A. Baker, Jr. [signed]

Enclosures

17. BPB0407[170] – Levél, Meehan Bakerhez, 1 p.

Nyarádi írásáról.

Thank you for your letter of January 29 on Dr. Nyaradi. On point 2 on page 1, there is a misunderstanding. The Cardinal's question is why he was never informed by the Government of the legal provision exempting the Church in the period prior to his arrest. The point is not why was he

not told after his arrest, which is what Nyaradi evidently talked to. It occurs to me it would be useful to have – if Nyaradi can give it – precise references to the exemption. Was it published in the official gazette, or in Ministry of Finance regulations?

We have acted on Bob McKisson's letter of January 12 to AI on the Crown. We covered points 1 through 3 with the Cardinal. He seemed pleased and did not pursue the matter – beyond remarking that he would have preferred to get the good word in writing. We did not cover point 4 because it fell away in light of point 2. The Cardinal's request that we give the Crown to the Vatican was contingent, as you know, the contingency being if we did not intend to retain it. His clear preference was, and is, that we continue to hold it.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Francis J. Meehan [not signed]

Chargé d'Affaire ad interim

18. BPB0407[181–182] – s. d. Levéltervezet, 17. sz.-hoz, 2 pp.

1971. február 18: csütörtök

19. BPB0407[168] – Távirat 27767, SecState Washington küldi: Amembassy Budapest, 1 p.

VI. Pál pápa üzenete Mindszenty bíboroshoz, a szöveget l. 20. sz.

1971. február 19, péntek

20. BPB0407[167] – VI. Pál pápa levele Mindszenty bíboroshoz, 1 p.

Bíborosi kinevezésének 25. évfordulója.

*

The Embassy has been instructed by the Department of State to transmit the following message to His Eminence, which the Department received through the Apostolic Delegate in Washington.

VENERABILI FRATRI NOSTRO CARDINALI MINDSZENTY ARCHIEPISCOPO STRIGONIENSI, PERPETUA MEMORIA ET CARITATE INDEFESSA EO IPSO AMPLEXATI PROCUL CELEBRAMUS ACERBO CUM DESIDERIO VIGESIMUM QUINTUM ANNIVERSARIUM DIEM EX QUO IN AMPLISSIMUM PATRUM CARDINALIUM SENATUM ES HONORIFICE COOPTATUS TUOSQUE MAIORES CUM UNIVERSA ECCLESIA COMMUNICANTES SALUTEM PACEM SOLATIONEM LAETITIAM MISERENTISSIMI SALVATORIS TIBI IMPLORAMUS PER APOSTOLICAM BENEDICTIONEM AMANTISSIME TRANSMISSAM.

PAULUS SEXTUS

1971. február 22, péntek

21. BPB0407[163–165] – Levél, Baker Meehanhez, 3 pp.

Dr. Nyárádi írása a "New York Times"-ban (1949. február 10.)

With regard further to your letter of January 22 and my reply of January 29 on Dr. Nyaradi's "New York Times" article of February 10, 1949 and the questions raised in your letter of February 12, we realize that our response, based on Bob McKissons's brief discussion of the matter with, was not entirely clear and fully responsive. The matter is not without certain delicacy, of course, in respect of what can be relayed authoritatively to the Cardinal and how far we can press Nyaradi for explicit answers without mutual embarrassment.

For your own information only at this time, let my try to fill in the background a little more fully.

1. Dr. Nyaradi was vague, when Bob spoke to him on the subject, as to the legal status of "privileges granted in these matters by the Hungarian Government to philanthropic organizations and churches" (fifth paragraph of the Nyaradi article). Nyaradi's first comment when the matter was raised was to note that a long time had passed since those events.

2. He did not refer to any legal decree or regulations formally exempting the Primate, churches, or other organizations from foreign exchange controls. The impression given was more to the effect that such controls, whatever they may have been at the time, were by custom or in practice not enforced or else were benignly disregarded, with the "privi-

leges” being tacitly taken for granted in the case of these particular entities. (This [./.] seems inherently probable, since if such exemptions formally existed by virtue of government decrees or Finance Ministry regulations (a) Nyaradi would very likely have cited them specifically in his article and (b) the churches and the Cardinal himself would have been quite aware of such a legal exemption, and therefore the question of the Cardinal’s not being “told” prior to his arrest would not rise).

So far as Nyaradi’s course of action (as Finance Minister in the period preceding Mindszenty’s arrest) is concerned, you will note he stated in his article (second column, third and fourth paragraphs) that, at the time of Rakosi’s announcement on November 28, 1948 that measures would be taken against Mindszenty, he (Nyaradi) was abroad and that he decided on December 3 to resign and not to return to Hungary. He then wrote his article from selfimposed exile in Switzerland “in defense of Mindszenty.” Obviously, after that decision, and assuming his decision was made or became known with reasonable promptness to the Hungarian government, Nyaradi ceased to function and had no further authority as a Hungarian official. From that moment, he became anathema to the Rakosi regime, and anything he said carried no weight and had no validity so far as that regime was concerned. In these circumstances, he acted in good conscience to do what he could to set the public record straight with his article in defense of the Cardinal.

When next we see Dr. Nyaradi, we will pursue this matter further and discreetly in an effort to ascertain the facts more precisely, though there are clearly difficulties in trying to pin down a matter like this through an individual who held office some 23 years ago and whose memory of details, like that of most of us, may have dimmed over such a long period. I think therefore, that this particular inquiry of the Cardinal’s is unlikely to get a very solid response. Meanwhile, I suggest you do nothing to encourage him to expect a further or more explicit answer. We’ll let you know, however, if we are able to get in due course.

You also mentioned in your letter of February 12 the points you made to the Cardinal on the subject of the Crown, which were based on Bob’s letter of January 12 to Al. We understood, of course, that the Cardinal’s request [./.] was that we send the Crown to the Vatican in the contingency that we did not intend to retain it. We included point 4, nevertheless, as authorized by the White House, in order to have it explicitly on the record should the need arise that we cannot unilaterally alienate the property. We have no problem, however, with the omission of this point in what was conveyed to the Cardinal in the circumstances at this time.

With best regards.

Sincerely,
John A. Baker, Jr. [signed]

22. BPB0407[8] – Levél, Villot bíboros államtitkár Mindszenty bíboroshoz, 1 p.
A Lectionarium missae kezdetű levél angol fordítása.

No. 79700

Most Eminent and Reverend Lord:

The Supreme Pontiff, having on the fiftieth anniversary of his priesthood presented to all bishops a copy of the new Roman missal, as likewise kindly decided to give them, as a deferred gift, the Lectionarium Missae, [Book of Lessons for the *Divine Office* – not correct! Book of Lessons for the *Holy Mass* – Red.] the first volume of which was recently published.

I am indeed happy to send you a copy of it, feeling certain that this new token of paternal love will strengthen still further the bonds of piety with which you are joined to the Victory of Christ, whether it be by the respect shown for Him or by the prayers poured out for Him.

I gladly avail myself of this opportunity to express to you my most devoted regards.

J. Card. Villot

1971. február 25, csütörtök

23. BPB0407[166] – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: SecState, 1 p.
Mindszenty bíboros VI. Pál pápához.

BUDAPEST 296

LIMDIS

SUBJECT: Message from Cardinal to Pope

Cardinal has requested that following message addressed to Pope be sent by cable to Vatican. BEGIN MESSAGE. Pro clementissima paterna memoria jubilaris anniversarii immeritae cooptationis meae in patrum cardinalium senatum, pro precibus atque benedictione apostolica humillime gratias agit. With deep homage. Signed Jozsef Cardinal Mindszenty. END MESSAGE. Phrase QUOTE with deep homage UNQUOTE given in English in original.

MEEHAN

1971. MÁRCIUS

1971. március 3, szerda

24. BPB0407[141] – News, New York Times, 1 p.

C.L. Sulzberger: Great Stalin's Ghost.

Száll József olaszországi magyar nagykövet otthagya állomás - helyét és megtagadta, hogy visszatérjen Magyarországra.

25. BPB0407[142–144] – Comments on the article in the New York Times, 3-3-71, entitled

“Great Stalin's Ghost” by C. L. Sulzberger, 3 pp.

1971. március 31, szerda

26. BPB0407[156] – Levél, Mindszenty bíboros VI. Pál pápához, 1 p.

Beatissime Pater,

Tractationes fiunt Pragae de Hungaria Superiori. Uti legitur, fertur, ut Slovacia evadat nova provincia ecclesiastica (separata a Strigonio) cum distincto archieppo.

Humillime supplico Sanctitatem Tuam, ne fiat. Est verum nexum illius territorii cum Strigonio et cum mille annorum hierarchia Sancti Stephani iam per spatium 50 annorum esse vi impeditum; attamen similiter est verum etiam hoc spatium non esse continuum, sed in medio, in annis 1938–47 ab Apostolica Sede benigne interruptum pro Strigonio.

Causa gravitatum in vita pastoralis illic existentium non est nexus juris cum Esztergom, sed nexus in politicis cum Moscovia.

Basis huius iteratae supplicationis est conscientia.

Ante saeculum Zagrabia erat elevata ad archieppatum et evulsa e supramemorata hierarchia per ultionem absolutistae tyranni Francisci Iosephi et ex indulgentia ecclesiastica et taciturnitate Strigonii. (Hoc factum communicavit archivista Strigoniesis).

Skizma (et Balcan) accepit hoc Occidentale territorium. Juvenis Stepinac dimicabat qua miles in I bello mundano – pro statu Haemi-voluntate. In II bello ipse est persecutus per immensam crucem. R. I. P.

In manibus bolshevismi et Bohemorum non reiteratur hoc in loco meridianus exitus? Husak non est melior quam prior tyrannus meridianus. Ipse est infensissimus exstinctor ibi Hungaris fidelibus.

Utique et ego probo restitutionem Ecclesiae gr. cat. et sescentorum impeditorum sacerdotum et fere exstinctae religionis instructionis in scholis. Tantum post haec tria multum valentia priora etiam novos eppos sine archieppo. Cum hoc annus jubilaris esset annus luctus et decoratio eppatus, qui tacebat in annis deportationis innocentium c. 100,000 fidelium in hieme ad Sudetas e domibus, ecclesiis, scholis, coemeteriis avitis.

Humillima supplicatione reiterata benedictas manus pedesque
Tuae Sanctitatis deosculans

[not signed]

27. BPB0407[136–137] – Levél, Mindszenty bíboros VI. Pál pápához, angol fordítás, 2 pp.

Most Blessed Father:

Negotiations are being conducted in Prague regarding Upper Hungary. According to written reports, it is a question of Slovakia becoming a new ecclesiastical province (detached from Esztergom) with a separate archbishop.

I most humbly entreat Your Holiness not to let this happen. There is a genuine bend between that territory and Esztergom and the thousand-year hierarchy of St. Stephen, forcibly obstructed now for a period of 50 years; it is likewise true, however, that even this period was not continuous; on the contrary, it was benevolently interrupted in the middle, from 1938 to 1947, by the Apostolic See in favor of Esztergom.

The cause of the difficulties existing in the pastoral life there is not the juridical bond with Esztergom but the political tie with Moscow.

This repeated entreaty is based on conscience.

A century ago Zagreb was elevated to an archdiocese and torn away from the above-mentioned hierarchy through the vengefulness for the absolut tyrant, Francis Joseph, and the ecclesiastical indulgence and silence of Esztergom. (This has been reported by the archivist of Esztergom.) [/.]

Skizma [?] (and Balkan) received this Eastern territory. Young Stepinac fought as a soldier in World War I – for the Balkan state – as a volunteer. In World War II he himself was persecuted by a heavy cross. R.I.P.

In the hands of Bolshevism and the Bohemians, is not the outcome in the south being repeated in this place? Husak is no better than the earlier tyrant in the South. He himself is a bitter suppressor of faithful Hungarians there.

I, too, assuredly approve restoration for the sake of the Catholic Church and of the six hundred restricted priests and the virtually extinct religious instruction in the schools. [Unintelligible sentence.] Although this was a year of jubilee, it was a year of mourning and shame [?] for the diocese which remained silent during the years when about 100,000 faithful innocents were deported in winter to Sudetas from their homes, churches, schools, and their ancestral burial grounds.

Repeating my most humble supplication, and kissing the blessed hands and feet of Your Holiness,

[sgd.] Joseph Card. Mindszenty
Archbishop of Esztergom

1971. ÁPRILIS

Április hónap egyik témája Puhan nagykövet fölvetése Washington felé: engedjenek Mindszenty óhajának és keressék meg annak módját, hogyan biztosítsák őt arról, hogy emlékiratainak kéziratát halálát követően – és nem korábban – átadják kívánsága szerint, bizalmi emberének, Mons. Szabónak. Ezt Washington nem engedélyezi, de a State Department is belátja, hogy a Vatikánt cselekvésre kell bírniuk. Kapóra jön Péter János fogadása VI. Pál pápánál, április 16-án, amelynek folyamán a hivatalos álláspont szerint ugyan nem, de valójában foglalkoztak a Mindszenty-kérdéssel. Ez a másik nagy témakör, amely alkalmat ad további vélemény egyeztetésre. Mons. Cheli új gondolattal áll elő: mivel Mindszenty-nél sem König bíboros, sem bármely vatikáni kiküldött nem ér el eredményt – külföldiek, akik Mindszenty szerint nem értik a magyar kérdést – egyeztetést követően magyar főpapot kell hozzá beküldeni, aki megérteti vele, hogy ellenállása értelmét veszítette, nincs többé szimbólum jellege, továbbá, hogy emlékiratait nem tudja kiadatni, amíg a nagykövetségen tartózkodik. – Puhan nagykövet május és június folyamán USA-ba készül, időpont egyeztetést kezdeményez. Dr. McIntyre regionális főorvos, miután rutin-vizsgálatot végez Mindszenty-n, jelzi a korosodással járó tünetek jelentkezését és további műszeres vizsgálatokat ír elő.

április 9, péntek

28. BPB0407[161–162] – Levél, Puhan nagykövet küldi: Richard T. Davies, Esquire, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, Department of State, 2 pp.

Hivatkozva január 15-i levelére, amelyben kifejezte gondolatát, hogy engedni kellene Mindszenty bíborosnak és halálát követően át kel - lene adni az emlékiratok kéziratát Mons. Szabónak. A bíborosnak nem tetszik, hogy a Vatikánnak akarják átadni. Az a félelme, hogy a magyar kormánnyal való kapcsolatai miatt, a Vatikán késleltetni fogja a kiadást, ami viszont neki szívégye. A bíboros nem említett más lehetőséget, mint a halála utáni publikálást. Ezt be szándékoznak tartani. Ha jól értette a korábbi instrukciókat, biztosítani lehet Mindszentyt, hogy a kéziratokat halálát követően Mons. Szabónak adják át. Esetleg az eredetit a Vati -

kánnak, a másodpéldányt Szabónak. Utóbbi a bíborostól szabad kezet kapna. A kérdés tehát az, milyen biztosítékot lehet neki adni. A bíboros elnöki biztosítékot óhajt. Javaslatot tesz az eljárás módjára.

I thought it might be useful to review where I believe we came out in our discussion of the Cardinal's memoirs during your visit here in early March.

The point of departure for our discussion was my letter to you of January 15, in which I expressed the view that we should meet the Cardinal's wishes that after his death the memoirs be put into the hands of Monsignor Sabo. As you know, the Cardinal is unhappy about our position that we would only deliver the manuscript to the Vatican. He fears that the Vatican, because of the sensitivity of its relations with the Hungarian government, would be reluctant to publish the memoirs in what he would consider a complete and acceptable form.

From our discussion I gathered that a main consideration with you is that there be no publication until after the Cardinal's death. I would like to tie this point down firmly. The Cardinal has not suggested, nor do I suggest, publication prior to his death. We are, therefore, talking only about publication after death. I understood you to say that, if this point was clear, you believed it possible for us to go forward and give the Cardinal assurance that we will get the manuscript to Sabo. You also mentioned the possibility of giving the original to the Vatican and a copy of the manuscript to Sabo. I do not know what the Cardinal's reaction would be to this, but I am sure the main point for him would be that Sabo have complete freedom to publish. [./] here is also the question what form the assurance to the Cardinal should take. As you know, he asked for a Presidential assurance because he thinks only that would have any real weight. I am not suggesting to have to humor him on his distrust of the bureaucracy but if, as I would assume, it is decided not to go to the President, then the assurance should be given in somewhat formal style by a ranking officer of the Department. I would suggest the Secretary, myself. The Secretary could do this directly to the Cardinal or if he prefers, he could write to me, instructing me to assure the Cardinal. I think the secretary's name would reassure the Cardinal.

I look forward to hearing from you further on the matter, and I hope that it will be possible to go ahead in the direction which our discussions indicated.

Sincerely,
Alfred Puhan [not signed]
Ambassador

április 13, kedd

- 29.** BPB0407[153] – Levél, Villot bíboros Mindszenty bíborosnak, 1 p.
A Szentatya húsvéti jókívánsága. Latin nyelvű üzenet továbbítása.

His Eminence, the Cardinal Secretary of State of His Holiness, Pope Paul VI, would be very grateful if the following message were transmitted to His Eminence, Cardinal Mindszenty:

“CHRISTI RESURGENTIS GAUDIUM PLENUM TIBI OMINAMUR IPSUMQUE PRECIBUS ARCTE CONIUNCTI OMNIA BONA ATQUE SOLACIA A PATRE LUMINUM INVOCAMUS UT SUAM PACEM QUAE EXSUPERAT OMNEM SENSUM TIBI NOBILIQUE ISTI NATIONI USQUE CONCEDAT – PAULUS PP SEXTUS.”

Cardinal Villot

- 30.** BPB0407[154] – Levél, Villot bíboros Mindszenty bíborosnak, 1 p.
L. 2. sz., angol fordítás

WE WISH YOU THE FULL JOY OF THE RISEN CHRIST AND CLOSELY UNITED THROUGH OUR PRAYERS WE WISH YOU ALL GOOD THINGS AND ALL CONSOLATION. WE CALL UPON THE FATHER OF LIGHTS TO GRANT HIS CONSTANT PEACE WHICH PASSES ALL UNDERSTANDING TO YOU AND TO YOUR NOBLE NATION. POPE PAUL THE SIXTH

Cardinal Villot

- 31.** BPB0407[160] – Távirat, Amembassy Rome küldi: SecState, Amembassy USMISSION NATO, 1 p.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ROME 2278

Az olasz kormány április 12-én közzétette, hogy Péter János magyar külügyminiszter április 14-én és 15-én hivatalos látogatást tesz Romában, ezt követően nem hivatalosan fogadja őt a pápa.

GOI ANNOUNCED APRIL 12 THAT HUNGARIAN FOREIGN MINISTER PETER WOULD PAY OFFICIAL VISIT TO ROME APRIL

14-15, FOLLOWING WHICH HE WOULD REMAIN ON UNOFFICIALLY AND BE RECEIVED BY POPE.

IN ADDITION TO MEETING WITH MORO, PETER WILL ALSO CALL ON PRIMIN COLOMBO AND PRESIDENT SARAGAT. VISIT REPAYS MAY 1970 VISIT BY MORO TO BUDAPEST.

STABLER

április 14, szerda

32. BPB0407[157–159], CF SOC-1 HUNG [117–118] – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: SecState, 3 pp.

Dr. McIntyre, bécsi nagykövetségen elérhető regionális orvos befejezte rutinvizsgálatát Mindszenty bíboroson. Több utóbbi, műszeres vizsgálatot írt elő. Felhívta a figyelmet a korosodással járó tünetekre.

BUDAPEST 595

EXDIS

SUBJECT: Cardinal Mindszenty

REF: Budapest 048

1. Dr. McIntyre, the Regional Medical Officer in Vienna, has just completed his regular examination of Cardinal Mindszenty. While the Cardinal's health remains basically fairly good for a man in his eightieth year, Dr. McIntyre noted that the effects of old age are decidedly present. Dr. McIntyre recommended that the Cardinal have an ophthalmological examination as soon as possible, since he is having problems with his eyes. He also recommended that the Cardinal see an internist, a dentist and an x-ray technician. He has not had a chest x-ray since his T-B attack in 1965.

2. We tried to meet the immediate problem, his eyes, by asking him if he would see a Hungarian Ophthalmologist. He categorically refused, stating that any doctor allowed by the Hungarian Government to see him would be, at the least, a spy [./.] and added that his experience with Hungarian doctors while in prison was very poor.

3. We can meet this immediate problem by arranging to bring in a U.S. Army ophthalmologist, hopefully in May.

4. The findings of Dr. McIntyre serve however to emphasize my recommendations in Budapest 048 to the effect that we seek speedily a

change in the Cardinal's status. It is clear from the Cardinal's reaction to our query regarding a Hungarian eye specialist that he may be expected to react with equal vehemence if a heart or other specialist were required. The day draws nearer when he may need full time medical attention, something which we cannot expect the U.S. Army to provide and something he is going to refuse to let us arrange to provide from Hungarian sources.

5. Kadar in his recent interview with a UPI correspondent invited an offer be made to him to consider a solution of the Mindszenty problem. It seems to me that this may be a propitious time for an initiative by the Vatican with the [./] Hungarians. I note further that Foreign Minister Peter is apparently hoping to have an unofficial interview with the Pope (Rome 2278). I hope it will be possible for us to learn quickly from Vatican sources if the Mindszenty case comes up in the meeting.

In the light of Dr. McIntyre's recommendations and the possibility that an initiative may be successful at this time, I repeat my recommendation to move with the Vatican in seeking a change in the Cardinal's status before we are faced with even stickier problems than we have now.

PUHAN

április 15: csütörtök

33. BPB0407[152] – Levél, Baker küldi Puhán nagykövetnek, 1 p.

A washingtoni apostoli delegátuson keresztül április 13-án megkapták a bíboros államtitkár üzenetét Mindszentynek. Küldi az eredetit és az angol fordítást (Cf. 29. és 30. sz.)

We received the enclosed message from the Cardinal Secretary of State for the Cardinal through the Apostolic Delegate on April 13. Language Service gave us very quick service. I suspect the Apostolic Delegate did not receive this until after the long Easter weekend.

Sincerely,

John A. Baker, Jr. [signed]

Enclosures:

1. Latin Message for the Cardinal
2. English Translation

április 16, péntek

34. BPB0407[155] – Levél, Meehan küldi Bakernek, 1 p.

Megküldi továbbításra Mindszenty bíboros március 31-én kelt levelét, amelyet a pápának küld. Kéri az angol fordítást.

I enclose the original of a Latin letter of March 31 to the Pope from Cardinal Mindszenty. The Cardinal requests that it be forwarded to Rome through the usual channels.

We would be grateful if you would let us have a translation in due course for our files. From a quick, untutored reading it looks like another chapter in the old feud about carving up the Diocese of Esztergom for the benefit of those benighted Slovaks. But we will await your translation for the final word.

Sincerely,
Francis J. Meehan [not signed]
Deputy Chief of Mission

Enclosure:

Letter from Cardinal Mindszenty dated March 31, 1971

április 20, kedd

35. BPB0407[138–140] – Levél, Baker küldi Puhán nagykövetnek, 3 pp.

A bevezetőben Száll József ügyére tesz utalást (aki római magyar nagykövet volt és onnan távozott, ismerheti a magyar kormány álláspont -ját Mindszentyre vonatkozólag, a közeljövőben várják tájékoztató beszél -getésre Washingtonban), majd rátér Puhán nagykövet január 13-i levelére. Úgy gondolja, hogy újabb, 1967-es képest energikusabb kísérletet kell tenni a Vatikánnál, viszont el kell kerülni, hogy Mindszenty biztosítékot kapjon tőlük emlékiratait illetően, mint amint Puhán javasolta Davieshez írt levelében (28. sz.). Péter fölvehette a kérdést a pápánál. Az amerika -iaknak cselekvésre kell bírniuk a Vatikánt. De maga Mindszenty a fő prob -léma. A kevés kártya, amivel játszhatnak az ő esetében, az ő kedvenc kér -dése, a történelemben elfoglalandó helye. Majd rátér a Benyő-ügyre.

As a sequel to the Szall defection, I enclose some comments by the man himself stimulated by Sulzberger's article of March 3, 1971. Although Szall was reported to be annoyed at Sulzberger's misrepresentations, they don't appear too great after reading Szall's comments. Sulzberger did over-use "Stalinization" and "Stalin-type" to spice up his piece. As for the difference of view on the reported kidnap effort, Szall denies it while the Sulzberger claim is upheld by witnesses, I am told.

Fortunately, Sulzberger has not returned to the topic and Szall's digressions are prolonging his examination, a development which, hopefully, will delay his emergence on the market for domestic journalism. So far as I can see, rather little reaction has occurred on the Hungarian Government side, unless we can relate Marjai's rather stiff line during Dick Davies' visit to the Szall affair.

We expect to see Szall next week to see what, if anything he knows about the Hungarian Government's thoughts on Mindszenty. If he has anything useful it will be reflected in the restudy we are undertaking in response to your telegram No. 48 of January 13 and your more recent message on his health. I believe that, until we have made another try at the Vatican, hopefully a more energetic one than in 1967, we should avoid giving Mindszenty any assurances on his memoirs such as those suggested in your recent letter to Dick Davies. Kadar's recent UPI references to the Cardinal were not bad. Peter may have touched on the matter in the Vatican. We, too, may try to stir the Vatican to action. But it is Mindszenty himself that is the main problem. One of the few cards we have to play [./.] with him in trying to get him to budge may be his concern for his place in history. I certainly share your concern about the Cardinal's continuing to remain in the Embassy as his health deteriorated and I would hate to see us weaken an argument, however small, weighing with him on the side of departure.

We regret being so slow to comment on your thoughts on the Benyo case. We asked ORM, which has the action on asylum policy to come up with their thoughts and these did not prove precise enough on the limits of temporary asylum or refuge in Eastern Europe to be very helpful as guidelines to you. We are seeking to obtain a clear and unequivocal statement that Embassies in Eastern Europe are not to grant asylum to anybody, except under conditions of civil disturbance, mob violence, revolution, or upheaval in which an individual's life may be temporarily in immediate danger. With such a policy, there would be no need for you to have any provision for handling asylum seekers on weekends, unless the exceptional circumstances named above obtained. Other agencies have shown some concern that we might miss the occasional walk-in. Possibly, procedure

could be set up whereby a weekend walk-in who could not return during working hours could be told to phone the duty officer or whereby the Marine on duty could ask the duty officer to come promptly to the Embassy to see a person requiring special handling. The only trouble with these methods is that in both cases, the authorities, who probably have the Duty Officers phone tapped, are alerted to the fact that the walk-in or asylum-seeker is standing outside your Embassy. If there is enough interest in the possible weekend walk-ins, it is really up to those most interested to devise a mechanism that can work in a closed-doors situation.

I think that, until we get a clear signal, there is no reason not to proceed with your closed-doors policy, working out procedures which will permit those of your officers most interested in doing so to talk with weekend walk-ins who cannot physically "walk in". (If you had a courtyard – as Embassy Prague does – into which walk-ins could enter without getting their foot in your door, you'd be better off in avoiding the Benyo type case.) [./.] With regard to the timing of our reply to you on Benyo, there was about a three-hour slip-up on the part of the Operations Center. When they did get around to our CHP Duty officer, he had to get someone to locate me in the Washington Coliseum where my boy was playing hockey. I was ready quite quickly with a reply but, in the post-Kudirka atmosphere, each instance sought a higher clearance until even the White House signed off! That gives you an idea of the mood on asylum matters. We weren't too concerned in this case as we really didn't want you to get the Benyos out until late in the evening. However, it did take longer than it should have. When we get a clear and explicit policy line, I think people will be readier to act without escalating to higher levels, and you will be able to act in most cases, without having to consult telegraphically.

I look forward to seeing you on your return home and to discussing these matters, in particular the question of the Cardinal. Is there a chance that you could pause for lunch on your way from Boston to the South? The reason I suggest this is that I may, in order to accomodate EUR, take my leave in June in order to be on hand for the possible pre-Tito efforts in the summer which may be required of me in view of anticipated turnovers in BRY. If we could have a few hours, we could go over some of these matters and get your clearance on your schedule of consultations.

Sincerely yours,

John A. Baker, Jr. [signed]

Enclosures: 1. Sulzberger's article, March 3, 1971.

2. Comments on Sulzberger's article.

36. BPB0407[150–151] – Chicago Daily News, 1 p.
Újságkivágás Mindszentyről.

George Weller: Mindszenty: unbroken, unbent. A pawn in duel between the Kremlin and Vatican, the cardinal remains defiant in Budapest refuge.

április 21, szerda

37. BPB0407[146] – Távirat, Amembassy Rome küldi: SecState, Amembassy Budapest, 1 p.

Péter János látogatása a Vatikánban: április 16-án 45 percen át, francia nyelven beszéltek. Forrásuk szerint nem volt konkrét eredménye, de úgy gondolják, hogy az ajtó nyitva maradt jövőbeli megegyezés előtt. A pápa azt mondta volna Casarolinak, hogy általában elégedett a találkozással és Pétert rendkívül szívélyesnek találta. Forrásuk továbbá jelezte, hogy a Mindszenty-ügy napirendre került, de Péter nem tett különösebb javaslatot. Péter a magyar álláspontot képviseli, miszerint Mindszentyre teljes hallgatást kell kényszeríteni, ha elhagyja Magyarországot. Sajtókérdésekre reagálva, a vatikáni sajtóiroda tagadta, hogy a Mindszenty-kérdés napirenden lett volna.

SECRET ROME 2482

SUBJECT: JANOS PETER VISITS VATICAN

REF: ROME 2278

1. VATICAN SOURCE HAS INFORMED US THAT HUNGARIAN FORMIN PETER SPOKE ALONE WITH POPE PAUL APRIL 16 FOR 45 MINUTES. TALKS IN FRENCH DEALT MOSTLY WITH CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IN HUNGARY, BUT INTERNATIONAL SCENE ALSO COVERED. SOURCE REPORTED THERE NO CONCRETE RESULTS FROM TALKS, BUT HE BELIEVES DOOR MAY HAVE BEEN OPENED SLIGHTLY WIDER FOR FUTURE UNDERSTANDINGS. IN SOURCE'S OPINION, MEETING OF MINDS MORE LIKELY WITH PRACTICAL POLITICAN LIKE PETER THAN WITH COMMUNIST OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE FOR

RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS WHO NORMALLY AMONG MOST INTRACTABLE PARTY MEN. FOLLOWING TALKS, POPE REPORTEDLY TOLD CASAROLI (VATICAN FORMIN) THAT HE GENERALLY SATISFIED WITH MEETING AND THAT HE FOUND PETER MOST CORDIAL.

2. SOURCE ASSURED THAT MINDSZENTY CASE WAS DISCUSSED, BUT THAT PETER MADE NO PARTICULAR REQUEST FOR ACTION. ALL SOURCE WOULD SAY WAS THAT PETER REPEATED PREVIOUS GOH WISH THAT HOLY SEE IMPOSE ON MINDSZENTY ABSOLUTE SILENCE SHOULD HE EVER LEAVE HUNGARY. SOURCE COMMENTED THAT HOLY SEE COULD EASILY STALL PUBLICATION OF MINDSZENTY PAPERS, BUT TO IMPOSE SILENCE ON CARDINAL DIFFICULT. IN RESPONSE TO PRESS ENQUIRIES LAST WEEK, VATICAN PRESS OFFICE DENIED THAT MINDSZENTY CASE EVEN TOUCHED ON DURING PETER VISIT.
MARTIN

38. BPB0407[148–149] – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: SecState, Amembassy Rome, 2 pp.

Beszámol Kádár Jánosnak április 20-án egyik budapesti gyárban elmondott választási kampánybeszédéről.

BUDAPEST 648

SUBJECT: Hungarian-Vatican Relations

1. Kadar made election campaign speech at Budapest factory April 20. Main stress was on domestic topics. However, in short passage on relations with Western countries, he referred to Hungarian desire to normalize relations specifically with US, FRG and Vatican. Regarding Vatican, he said “we would like to further settlement of certain questions”. He said regime takes into account that there are churches in Hungary, and church leaders should also take into account that Hungary is building socialism. We want cooperation, he added, and we see certain possibilities for this in defense of European security and peace.

2. Comment: Kadar was not specific on what questions he would like to settle with Vatican. There are several issues, including religious

education, appointment of bishops, activity of religious orders, arrests of priests, property matters – and, of course, Cardinal Mindszenty. In recent [./.] past we have had Kadar's UPI interview which he indicated receptiveness to proposals on Cardinal. More recently we have had Foreign Minister Peter meeting with Pope. Now, with this latest Kadar speech, we have increasing impression of regime's desire at least to go on record publicly with statements conveying interest in moving forward.

3. Would be all more interesting against this background to have Vatican view in light Peter's visit with Pope.

PUHAN

április 22: csütörtök

39. BPB0407[147] – Levél, Puhan nagykövet küldi John P. Humes, bécsi US-nagykövetnek, 1 p.

Jelzi, hogy május 14-től otthon, majd június végén két hétig, Washingtonban tartózkodik, július 2-re tervezi visszatértét. Kéri, tájékoztódjon König várható budapesti látogatása előtt, hogy időpontját úgy jelöljék ki, hogy ő is találkozhatson vele.

As you know, Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter saw the Pope for 34 minutes on April 16. We have no idea what was discussed by the two men. I shall probably be seeing the Foreign Minister the week of May 10 and he may say something about our guest at that time – maybe not. Earlier, you may recall Kadar in the interview with UPI's Longworth appeared to invite an initiative in the Mindszenty case. So there may be some very small movement in this matter.

This brings me to the point of this letter. It is conceivable that Cardinal Koenig may be planning a visit here at some time in the foreseeable future. I would, of course, want to see him. Now I plan to go on home leave on May 14 with consultations in Washington during the last two weeks in June and return to Budapest about July 2. If the Cardinal decides to make a visit to Budapest, you might want to give him my timetable so that we would not miss each other. I leave that up to you, of course.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely,
Alfred Puhan [not signed]
Ambassador

április 23, péntek

40. BPB0407[133–134], BPB0607[0635] – Levél, Robert F. Illing küldi Puhan nagykövetnek, 2 pp.

Illing római misszióvezető helyettes e levelét utólag, november 1-jén Puhan nagykövet nagyra értékeli, mint első reménysugárt arra nézve, hogy Mindszenty kiutazása elintézhető. – Illing tájékoztatása szerint a Péter-látogatás óta két fontos megbeszélésre utal. Még április 16-án beszélt Mons. Chelivel, akinek elképzelését rendkívül érdekesnek tartotta. Szerinte csak egy másik magyar egyházi vezető tudja meggyőzni Mindszentyt, hogy ellenállását nem érdemes tovább folytatni, mert már megszűnt szimbólumnak lenni. E magyar egyházi vezető személyének kiválasztása egyeztetést kíván mind a Vatikán, mind a magyar kormány részéről, akinek tudtával kell történnie e megbeszélés. Cheli továbbá jelezte, hogy König bíboros nem fog tudni elérni Mindszentyt, az ő útjai időpocsékolásnak tekintendők. Mindszenty szemében mind König, mind bármely vatikáni kiküldött külföldi, aki nem ismeri a magyar helyzetet. Mindszentynek pedig tudomásul kell vennie, hogy emlékiratait nem tudja kiadni, amíg az amerikai nagykövetségen tartózkodik. Cheli végül úgy gondolja, hogy a magyar kormánynak érdeke Mindszenty távozása, mert halva nagyobb probléma lehet, mint élve. Ha Magyarországon hal meg, akkor kezelni kell azt a problémát, hogy hol temessék el. – A másik megbeszélés Pio Gaspari Monsignorral, Casaroli helyettesével történt, aki Rai mondí washingtoni delegátus révén informálva volt arról, hogy Washington újra foglalkozik Mindszenty kiutazásának gondolatával. Miután Illing diplomatikusan kitért a válaszáadás elől, ennyiben maradtak.

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Dear Mr. Ambassador:

There are a number of signs in the air which seem to indicate heightened Vatican interest in the Mindszenty case. In addition to the Pope's talk with Foreign Minister Peter I think two conversations I recently had are significant.

On the day of Peter's visit (April 16) I spoke with Monsignor Giovanni Cheli, Vatican Desk Officer for Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Romania. Most of the discussion concerned his recent visit to Prague but

we also got on to Hungary. Cheli was unaware what the Pope and Peter covered in their talks since he had not been present nor had he yet received a report. Most interesting, however, were Cheli's "strictly personal ideas" on how Mindszenty might be encouraged to abandon his self-imposed exile in your Embassy.

According to Cheli, only another Hungarian Church leader could convince Mindszenty to leave Hungary. This would have to be a ranking Hungarian churchman whom Mindszenty knows and respects. Such a person must be carefully selected, and of course, accepted by the Holy See. Naturally, Cheli added, the USG would also have to approve the Hungarian churchman's access to Mindszenty.

Cheli considers Cardinal König thoroughly unable to convince Mindszenty of anything, and for the Vatican repeatedly to send him to Budapest is a waste of time. Mindszenty, Cheli continued, is flattered to have the visit of a Cardinal but considers König, as a foreigner and as a younger man, hopelessly ignorant of the realities in Hungary. Mindszenty would, Cheli believes, view any other Vatican emissary in the same light. Hence the only solution is to locate the right Hungarian.

Cheli hold that such a Hungarian could delicately impress upon Mindszenty that his day has passed, that he is no longer a symbol of Hungarian opposition to the regime, and that by perpetuating his captivity he [./] serves neither the Church, his country nor himself. Mindszenty must also be made to realize that his treasured memoirs have no chance of being published if he dies in the U.S. Embassy. Certainly the USG would not publish them, and if we turn them over to the Vatican, as the Cardinal would surely will, the Vatican would most likely wait at least 50 years before publishing them. Obviously, either choice would not appeal to Mindszenty.

Cheli feels that the Hungarian Government is itching to get Mindszenty out of Hungary, mainly because he would be a greater problem for them dead than alive. If he dies in Hungary, the GOH will be faced with the agonizing decision of where and how to bury him.

When I spoke to Monsignor Pio Gaspari (Vatican Deputy Foreign Minister) about the Peter visit on April 21 (Rome 2482), he asked me whether there was any truth to rumors circulating in Washington a few months ago alleging USG interest in getting Cardinal Mindszenty out of our Embassy in Budapest. He added that Apostolic Delegate Raimondi had picked up and reported these rumors to the Vatican. I told him I was unaware of any changes in our views on Mindszenty or of any interest in forcing him out of our Embassy. Gaspari said that he and Raimondi had thought as much and had therefore dismissed the rumors.

I have also written Ambassador Lodge about the above and trust he will pass the information on to the Hungarian Desk Officer.

Sincerely yours,
Robert F. Illing [signed]
Assistant to Ambassador Lodge

41. BPB0407[145] – Távirat, SecState küldi: Amembassy Rome, Amembassy Budapest, 1 p.

Washington köszöni a tájékoztatást a Péter-látogatásról és további információkat kér.

SECRET STATE 069269
SUBJ: JANOS PETER VISIT TO VATICAN
REFS: A. ROME 2482
B. BUDAPEST 648

1. DEPARTMENT APPRECIATES TIMELY REPORT OF FONMIN PETER'S MEETING WITH POPE PAUL.

2. ANY FURTHER DETAILS WHICH EMBASSY CAN OBTAIN ON NATURE OF PETER'S DISCUSSIONS AT VATICAN, ESPECIALLY WITH REFERENCE MINDSZENTY SITUATION AND HOW SUBJECT AROSE, WOULD BE VERY USEFUL.
ROGERS

42. – törölve / canceled.

április 26, hétfő

43. BPB0407[135] – Levél, Baker küldi Meehannek, 1 p.

Baker nyugtázza Mindszenty bíboros latin nyelvű üzenetét, l. 34. 3689. sz., amelyet az apostoli delegátuson keresztül továbbít. Megküldi az angol fordítást.

*

We received your letter of April 16 which enclosed a Latin message from the Cardinal to Pope Paul. We have delivered the original of the message to the Apostolic Delegation for forwarding to the Holy See.

A copy of an English translation of the message is enclosed for your files.

Sincerely,
John A. Baker, Jr. [signed]

Enclosure:

English translation of latin message from Cardinal Mindszenty to Pope Paul, March 31, 1971.

1971. MÁJUS

május 3, hétfő

44. BPB0407[128] – Levél, Baker Meehanhez, 1 p.

Dr. Nyárádi április 30-án személyesen eljött a washingtoni külügy - minisztériumba, így meg lehetett beszélni vele Meehan január 22-i levelé - ben fölvetett kérdéseket. Megerősítette, hogy nem volt törvény arra, hogy az egyházakat és a segélyszervezeteket kivegyék Magyarországon a külföldi fizetőeszközök beváltási kötelezettsége alól. Amennyiben a törvényileg szabályozott kötelezettségtől eltérő tapasztalatokra jutottak, a kormányhi - vatalok adott esetben eltekintettek ettől. Baker igazolva látja február 22-én kelt levelében leírtakat.

*

Dr. Nyaradi was at the Department for consultations on April 30, so we had an opportunity to pursue further with him the questions which you raised in your letter of January 22 and which we discussed in subsequent correspondence.

He confirmed explicitly that there existed no legal decree exempting the churches and philanthropic organizations from Hungarian foreign currency exchange control laws and regulations. Thus, the analysis suggested in my letter to you of February 22 was entirely correct. In those circumstances where Government officials may have had knowledge of or suspected irregularities involving foreign currency transactions by the clergy or other “privileged” entities and on occasion, at least, looked the other way, the situation, according to Dr. Nyaradi, was essentially a sub rosa activity or as he described it in his own words “under the counter.”

I trust the foregoing information will enable you to close the books on his particular matter.

Sincerely,
John A. Baker, Jr. [signed]

május 4, kedd

45. BPB0407[129–132] – Levél, Puhan nagykövet Illinghez, Rómába, 4 pp.

Hosszú levelében először megköszöni Illing április 23-án kelt rendkívül értékes levelét Mindszenty bíboros ügyében. Nagyra értékeli Mons. Cheli gondolatát, hogy egy magyar főpap bírja rá a bíborost a távozásra. Majd sorba veszi az 1969-ben kinevezett új püspököket és ismerteti róluk Mindszenty véleményét. A vatikáni hivatalnokokat azzal vádolja: el akarják kerülni, hogy a pápa személyesen kérje föl Mindszentyt a nagykövetség elhagyására. Ezt követően jellemzi a bíborost: éppen a pápa kérése lenne az, amely Mindszentyt távozásra bírná, mert az engedelmesség Rómának az egyik kulcsfontosságú elv, amely a bíborost jellemzi. Ezen kívül még jellemzik őt: magyar, bíboros prímás, sikertelen politikus, akit a jelenlegi rezsim igazságtalan eljárásával mélyen megsebzett. Mivel a rezsim megtagadja visszatérését primási székére, inkább marad a nagykövetségen, hogy ily módon fejezze ki tiltakozását a rezsim ellen, bár passzív módon, egész élete végéig. Ezért rendkívül fontos neki, hogy Magyarországon maradjon. Ezt követően Puhan nagykövet kifejti, csak rendkívül kényszerítő motívumok készíthetik arra a bíborost, hogy elhagyja a nagykövetséget és az országot is. Ilyen az emlékiratok publikálásának kérdése. A bíboros fölismerte, hogy az egyetlen módja emlékiratai megjelentetésének az, ha elhagyja az országot és személyesen felügyeli a kiadást. Ha ez a pápa kérésével párosulna, az döntésre bírná. Az emlékiratok bizonyára kellemetlen olvasmányul szolgálnának mind a magyar kormánynak, mind a Vatikánnak, mind az amerikai kormánynak, de Puhan ezt is vállalná, mert úgy gondolja, hogy az emlékiratok annyira ultramontanok, hogy diszkreditálnák a bíborost.

Puhan osztja Mons. Cheli véleményét, miszerint a magyar kormánynak érdeke, hogy Mindszenty elhagyja az országot, nehogy itt haljon meg, különben a temetés súlyos problémákat okozhatna. A magyar kormányt zavarhatja az a körülmény, hogy Mindszenty valóban az ellenállás szimbólumává válhat, az igazság és a nemzeti érzés védelmében. Majd Puhan, elemzésében visszatér a König-kérdéshez, illetve annak szükségéhez, hogy a pápa személyesen foglalkozzon a problémával. Amerikai részről fontos, hogy a bíboros a lehető leggyorsabban távozzék, hiszen 80. életévének küszöbén van és komoly betegségek léphetnek fel, amelynek kúrálása a nagykövetség épületében nem lehetséges.

Végül Puhan kéri Illinget, tájékoztassa annak tartalmáról Lodge nagykövetet, és jelzi, hogy a levél másolatát megküldi Hillenbrandnak Washingtonba.

*

Robert F. Illing, Esquire
Assistant to Ambassador Lodge
American Embassy
Rome, Italy

Dear Mr. Illing:

Thank you for your extremely interesting letter of April 23 on Cardinal Mindszenty. It raises a number of points where I thought it might be useful to comment on the basis of how we see the situation close up.

Cheli's idea of getting a Hungarian church leader to talk to Mindszenty about leaving Hungary is imaginative and breaks new ground. It has possibilities and it also raises certain problems. Presumably a Hungarian Bishop in whom Mindszenty has confidence should be better able to help convince the Cardinal that it would be in the best interest of the Church in Hungary if he were to step down as Primate and/or leave the country. Much would depend on Mindszenty's attitude toward the churchman in question, and on this it is not easy to be sure of one's ground.

We cannot say with certainty that Mindszenty fully trusts any of the present members of the Hungarian Church hierarchy. However, of the priests who were named archbishops, bishops, auxiliary bishops and apostolic administrators by the Pope in January 1969, he has commented in favorable terms on the following. Imre KISBERK, Bishop of Szekesfehervar: Mindszenty has said Kisberk is a good priest. Imre SZABO, Apostolic Administrator of Esztergom: Though active in the peace priest movement before 1956, he was reported to have been assigned by the Cardinal to the job of suspending the worst among the peace priests during October-November 1956. Mindszenty has said nothing since the 1969 appointment to indicate change in his former attitude of trust. Jozsef BANK, Bishop of Vac, has been favorably mentioned [...] by the Cardinal, though in somewhat general terms. Mindszenty does not know Jozsef KACZIBA, Apostolic Administrator of Gyor, but he says Cardinal KOENIG told him that he is a good churchman who is not a peace priest.

Mindszenty has indicated several times in conversations with Embassy officers that he considers Dr. Jozsef IJJAS, Archbishop of Kalocsa and Head of the Bench of Bishops, little more than a weak tool of the regime. His attitude toward Pal BREZANOCZY, Archbishop of Eger and Chairman of Foreign Affairs Committee of Bench of Bishops, appears to be equivocal: He seems to see Brezanoczy as a capable and well intentioned man, but necessarily in a compromised position and not able to function effectively in the best interests of the Church.

We would be interested in knowing if the Vatican has anyone in mind among the Hungarian churchmen to tackle the Cardinal.

Even at that, you can't be sure of success, on several grounds. One is the Cardinal's position as Primate. It is true he has been out of the game for 20 years or more, but I suspect that given his formal status and temperament, it would be a pretty courageous Bishop who would confront him with what in effect would be a request to give up and get out.

Another point strikes me. Quite frankly, I see Cheli's idea as reflecting the Vatican's interest in getting the Hungarian Bishops – or anyone else – to do its own work for it. The Vatican presumably wants to avoid doing anything directly itself which would amount to the Pope's requesting Mindszenty to leave. This is understandable, but my judgment is that if anything is going to move the Cardinal, it is precisely such a request from the Pope directly, not a request from the Hungarian hierarchy.

I think there is a chance – I put it that way deliberately – that the Cardinal would be responsive to such a direct request from the Pope. Obedience to Rome is one of the key principles by which he is governed. The other key is a kind of conglomerate principle: He is a Hungarian, the Cardinal Primate, a politician manqué, and a man with the deepest sense of injury suffered at the hands of the present regime. We have inclined strongly to the view in the past that in the absence of an arrangement which would be tantamount to complete capitulation on the part of the regime, that is his free return as Primate to his see [./.] (which is out of the question so far as the regime is concerned), he would prefer to stay to the end of his days in the Embassy. By doing this he would, as he sees it, be a symbol of resistance and defiance, albeit passive, to the regime to the bitter end. All of us involved in this matter should be absolutely clear how important it is in the Cardinal's view of his own role and purposes for him to remain physically in Hungary.

Against this background you will see why we are of the opinion that only extremely compelling reasons would be sufficient to move Mindszenty to consider leaving the country. A request from the Pope

might do it, a request from the Bishops would probably not be enough, the two together might have the greatest chance of success.

This brings me to the question of the memoirs, which I feel is a large and as yet unexploited factor in this tangle of issues. If the Cardinal were brought to believe that the only way he could be sure of having his memoirs published unexpurgated was for him to leave Hungary and supervise their publication, this might be a decisive factor, especially if coupled with a request from the Pope, to get him to leave. Clearly, if this were done, we, the Vatican, and the Hungarian Government would all have to accept publication as a fact of life. The conventional wisdom on this is to say that the memoirs would be terribly embarrassing for all concerned. I agree there would be rough spots for us all but I believe strongly we could all live with them. I believe that the views the memoirs contain are so ultramontane that they will tend to discredit the Cardinal. I would regret this for Mindszenty's sake, but that is not the main point. It is that the Vatican, the Hungarians and we should not worry too much about it. I see the memoirs as a possibly effective lever if used in conjunction with some action by the Pope.

I agree with Cheli that the Hungarian regime would like to get Mindszenty out of the country before he dies. They are not, however, worried about where and how to bury him, if our information acquired here is any good. A Deputy Foreign Minister once told me that the only way Mindszenty would return to his Cathedral in Esztergom would be as a corpse. I think the point is rather that the regime in a strange Hungarian way is bothered by the possibility that the old man by staying here will he dies will in fact have remained a kind of symbol to their lack [./] of justice and national feeling. National feeling is very important hereabouts and it takes odd shapes even under a communist regime. I also believe that this concern has grown in recent months.

Cheli may be right that Koenig will not be able to persuade the Cardinal to do anything. Here again, though, I think the Vatican is ducking the issue. Having had the privilege of getting to know Koenig I know it hasn't been his fault he hasn't been able to move Mindszenty. He simply hasn't had the kind of mandate he need from the Pope. It is the Pope who has to act personally and directly if they really want to do anything. They are, in my view, just not going to be able to accomplish their purpose through third parties, and the sooner they can be brought to bite this particular bullet, the nearer we are all going to get to reality.

I should add one further strictly U.S. – perhaps U.S. Embassy Budapest – consideration. As I have told the Department, the Cardinal is

in his 80th year and the chances of a serious illness with all the concomitant difficulties increase with every day that passes. So we should move to get a change in the status of the Cardinal as rapidly as possible.

I am afraid I have run on at length, but I wanted to give you a full and, I hope, fair view of the situation as we see it here. I would be grateful if you would pass the contents of this letter to Ambassador Lodge at your convenience.

Since you, we here and the Department need to stay in phase on all of this, I am sending a copy of this letter to Assistant Secretary Hillenbrand who will, I take it, have meantime received the contents of your letter to Ambassador Lodge paralleling your letter of April 23 to me.

Sincerely,
Alfred Puhán [not signed]
Ambassador

május 7, péntek

- 46.** BPB0407[127] – Levél, Puhán nagykövet Bakerhez, 1 p.
A bíboros eltartásának költségeiről („Cardinal’s fund”).

május 11, kedd

- 47.** BPB0407[122] – Memorandum, Puhán kézírásos följegyzése, 1 p.

RPT

Suppose we owe Baker a reply, thanking him, saying we passed info, H.E. not satisfied, but no further...

- 48.** BPB0407[123] – Memorandum, Meehan följegyzése, 1 p.
Meehan közli Mindszentyvel Baker május 3-i levelének tartalmát (l. 44. sz.). A beszélgetésben kiderült, hogy a bíboros az amerikai magyar nyelvű sajtóra támaszkodva Nyárádit magasrangú minisztériumi tiszt - viselőnek vélte, pedig csak miniszteri tanácsos volt. Nyárádi közlésének tartalmával a bíboros nem volt meglegedve. Majd formális kifogásokkal

*élt: nem helyes, hogy nem kapott írásos választ levelére. Végül is nem sür -
getett további lépéseket.*

*

Memorandum for the files

I gave the Cardinal orally today a paraphrase of para. 2 of Baker's letter of May 3 to me. The gist was that Nyaradi said there was no legal exemption of churches from foreign exchange regulations, but officials at the time sometimes looked the other way at irregularities on the part of churchmen.

Emerged in conversation that, contrary to Cardinal's belief, based on reading U.S. Hungarian-language press, Nyaradi was simply Department consultant. Cardinal had assumed he had "leading role" in Department, was surprised and disappointed when I explained things.

On substance of his inquiry and reply I conveyed from Baker letter, Cardinal was also disappointed, seemed to feel Nyaradi, or Department or I was being evasive. I explained Department had questioned Nyaradi closely and I was relating accurately results of questioning.

Still disappointed, Cardinal shifted to matter of form. Not right, he said, that he didn't get a reply, meaning a written reply, to his letter. Not pleasant for guest to be treated that way. I tried to stress care with which we had all treated his inquiry. He did not press for further action.

FJMeehan

49. BPB0407[124–126] – Memorandum, Puhan nagykövet följegyzése, 3 p.

Mindszenty rögtön rátért a szívéhez legközelebbi témára, az emlékiratokra. Megköszönte a múltbéli megértést ennek közlése fontosságát illetően, és kifejezte sajnálatát, hogy ohaja, miszerint halálát követően Mons. Sz[abo] kaphassa meg a publikálás jogát, nem teljesülhetett. Részletesen kitért arra, miért fontos neki ez az ügy. Elmondta, hogy igaztalanul vádolták és a történelemben elfoglalt helyét meghamisították. Elmondta, hogy egyedül azért él, hogy a hamisításokat helyre tegye és a maga részéről ismertesse történetét a világgal. Kifejezte félelmét, hogy kézírásának olvashatatlansága miatt a publikálás számos hibát tartalmazhat. Ezért van szüksége gondos kiadóra. Kérdezte, nem küldhetné-e el emlékiratait -

nak kéziratát Bécsbe, ahol Mons. Sabo elolvashatná és megküldhetné javításait. Ily módon levelezésbe kezdene a kézirat közzétételével kapcsolatosan. Mons. Sabo személye felől – aki korábban egyházmegyéjének papja volt¹ – bizonyos: nem fogja megszegni a megegyezést, hogy az emlékiratokat nem teheti közzé halála előtt. Mindszenty úgy vélte, hogy csak az Elnök beleegyezése marad hátra, hogy az emlékiratok megjelenhessenek, feltehetően halálát követő dátummal. – Puhan nagykövet válaszában nagyra értékelte az emlékiratok jelentőségét, és biztosította a bíborost, hogy erről Washington is tájékoztatni fogja. Nehézséget látott abban, hogy a bíboros hosszú levelezésbe kezdjen Mons. Sz[abó]val, hiszen az azt jelentené, hogy nem tartja be az alapvető feltételeket. Ugyanakkor más lehetőséget is fölvetett, utalva Kádár János közelmúltban történt megnyilatkozására (UPI-interjú) és Péter János vatikáni látogatására. Mindkettő arra utal, hogy a magyar kormány felfogása megváltozott. Puhan szeretné, ha nem adna okot félreértésre, nyilvánvaló, hogy, a nagykövetség elhagyása olyan kérdés, amelyben a döntés a bíboros kezében van, és ha úgy óhajtja,

¹ Ez belekerül Puhan memoárjába is: PUHAN, A, *The Cardinal in the Chancery and Other Recollections*, Vantage Press, New York – Los Angeles, 1990. 194. – Mons. Sabo másutt elmondja magáról, hogy amerikai születésű, Magyarországon egy alkalommal járt 1938-ban, a bíborost annak 1947. évi amerikai útja alkalmából látta először, és amikor a bíborosnak szüksége volt rá, időnként küldött neki misestipendiumot. Kérdés, hogy ilyen fontos ponton miért csal a bíboros emlékezete. Lásd Ross P. Titus (a budapesti nagykövetség munkatársa) följegyzését Mons. John Sabóval folytatott megbeszéléséről, 1970. május 3-án a schwechati repülőtéren: “He was (he said) born in the United States, has spent his entire life there except for short trips abroad during a few summers, has been in Hungary but once in his life (attended a religious conference here in 1938), never met Cardinal Mindszenty until the latter went to Canada and the United States in 1947 to attend the Marian Congress – when Sabo was assigned as one of the Cardinal’s two aides for the trip – and has maintained only a tenuous, indirect contact with the Cardinal through the infrequent Mass intention lists. Monsignor Sabo profoundly admires and loves the Cardinal for his dogged and fiery adherence to the principles he has always espoused, but he appears not to share the Cardinal’s seemingly unshakeable certainty that the communist world is unchanged and exempt from the evolutionary debility that afflicts other societies. The Monsignor commented a couple of times that the times had passed the Cardinal by and illustrated his view of certain irrelevancies about the Cardinal’s world view by retelling one story he had heard from former priests of the Cardinal who later lived in the United States.” – A megoldást abban véljük megtalálni, hogy ténylegesen volt egy másik, floridai Mons. Szabó János, aki korábban ténylegesen budapesti főegyházmegyes volt. Börtönmélekeit megjelentette angolul: Szabo, John, *I Was in Prison with Cardinal Mindszenty*, Southern Publishing Company, Orlando (Fl) 1962. (Reprint: Brantley Burcham Literary Licensing, LLC 2011.)

haláláig a nagykövetségen maradhat. Egyben Puhán fölvetette, nem lenne-e célszerűbb az emlékiratok közzétételét személyesen felügyelni. – Mindszenty biztosította Puhant, hogy megértette közlését, kifejezte szkepszisét Kádár megnyilatkozását illetően, akiről feltételezi, hogy el akarja tüntetni emlékiratait. A Péter-látogatásról tudott, s nagy bizalommal informálni akart engem a vatikáni Casaroli-vonalról. Kérte, ne beszéljek erről, mert nem akar szembekerülni a Vatikánnal. Elmondta, tudomása van arról, hogy a Vatikán érdekelt abban, hogy javítsa kapcsolatait mind a Szovjetunióval, mind a kelet-európai kommunista országokkal. Ő ennek ellene van, de tudatában van a Vatikán érdekeinek. – Puhan a maga részéről nem óhajtott belebocsátkozni a Vatikán politikájának értékelésébe, lévén, hogy a bíboros jobban van informálva, de elmondta, hogy az ő felfogása szerint a Vatikán politikai kérdésekben úgy cselekszik, mint egy adott ország kor-mánya. Puhan a maga részéről kifejezte, hogy megérti a Vatikán politikáját, amely javítani akarja kapcsolatait a kommunista világgal, csakúgy, mint saját kormányának ugyanilyen értelmű politikáját. Elmondta még, hogy – bár nem fogadja el a kommunizmus szempontjait – a jó kapcsolatok ápolásáról való lemondás szerinte holokauszttal érne fel. – Végezetül Puhan felhívta a bíboros figyelmét, hogy az a valószínű, hogy az amerikai kormány és a Vatikán nem változtatja meg álláspontját a bíboros emlékiratainak kiadását illetően. Washingtoni útjáról való visszatérését követően újra foglalkoznak majd a kérdéssel.

Cardinal Mindszenty

I met with Cardinal Mindszenty for one hour today in the acoustical room. Although I had planned to talk to him before going on home leave, it was clear both from remarks he had made to my Deputy, as well as to me when our conversation began, that he was most anxious to have a talk with me before I left.

He plunged immediately into the subject closest to his heart, his memoirs. He thanked me for past understanding of his concern regarding the publication of his memoirs but regretted that his desire to have Monsignor Sabo be granted the right to publish them after his death had not been granted. He made a very moving plea regarding the significance he attaches to these memoirs. He said that he had been maligned and his place in history falsified. He said he lived only to have this falsification rectified by having his side of the story told to the world. He was afraid that if his memoirs were published as they stood now they would lead to

false conclusions because, as he put it, his “scripture”, meaning his handwriting was very poor. He needed a good editor. He asked whether his memoirs could not be sent out to Vienna where Monsignor Sabo could read them and send in corrections. He envisioned a correspondence with him regarding the task of preparing the memoirs for publication. As if to anticipate an objection that this might release the memoirs for publication prior to his death, he said he knew Monsignor Sabo as a former priest in his diocese and regarded him a man of integrity who would abide by the agreement that the memoirs were not to be published prior to his death. He felt that with this matter settled it remained only for the President to agree to the publication of the memoirs at a date, presumably after his death. [./.] I assured the Cardinal that I appreciated the significance he attached to his memoirs, and would of course make known his request during my visit in Washington. At the same time, I said to him I knew he was a realist. I did not want to get his hopes up high that his wish would be granted. I pointed out to him that there were fifteen years of history on this matter, that the position consistently taken by the Department of State had been that his memoirs would not fall into the hands of the Hungarians but would be sent to the Vatican for publication after his death. I saw virtually no chance of having his memoirs edited by Monsignor Sabo in Vienna for this would involve the risk, in spite of the integrity of Monsignor Sabo, that they would be published while the Cardinal was still in this Embassy. They would also, as I had pointed out, involve a lengthy correspondence with the Monsignor which would be quite extraordinary and outside of present ground rules. I asked him at this time if he had ever considered other ways in accomplishing his objective, since he attached such great significance to the publication of the memoirs. I said I was sure he was aware that Kadar had recently appeared to invite an initiative on the Cardinal’s status in an interview granted to an UPI correspondent. I said I was sure he also knew about the recent meeting that Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter had with the Pope. I told him I had no idea what Kadar had in mind or what had transpired in the meeting between the Pope and Janos Peter. I was certain, however, that the passage of fifteen years had wrought (sic! – brought) changes both in the conditions in Hungary as well as in the thinking of the Government here regarding a good many matters. I said I wanted to be quite sure I was not misunderstood. I said that it was obviously a matter that he would have to decide for himself and if he wanted to stay here until he died that would be quite acceptable to us. However, I thought that he had more of a chance to get his memoirs published if he were in a position to supervise that project.

The Cardinal listened intently, nodded several times, assured me he did not misunderstand. His reaction to this suggestion, however, was to say first of all that he distrusted Kadar completely, he was sure Kadar's plan was to get the Vatican to agree to suppress his memoirs. He thought that Kadar's chances were fairly good in accomplishing this objective, for when the Vatican would ask for the approval of a Bishop in Hungary or would ask for improvement in relations between the Vatican and the Hungarian Government, Kadar would make the suppression of the memoirs a condition sine qua non. As for the meeting of Peter with the Pope, he said he was aware. [./.] of it. He said he wished to speak in great confidence to me about the Casaroli line in the Vatican. He asked me not to talk about this because he said he did not wish to have problems with the Vatican. However, he said he was aware of the Vatican interest in improving relations with the Soviet Union and the Communist states of Eastern Europe. He said he was opposed to this but he was aware of the interests of the Vatican.

I said I appreciated his reaction. I told him it would be presumptuous of me to tell him about the Vatican since he knew so much more about it than I did. However, in my experience the Vatican tended in political matters to act like a government of a country. I said I could understand why the Vatican was pursuing a line of improving relations with the Communist world just as I understood our desire to improve relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. It seemed to me that without approving any aspect of Communism the alternative to seeking better relations was a holocaust.

Cardinal Mindszenty said he was very grateful to be able to talk to me about matters that were dearest to his heart. I replied that I was always ready to listen to him but that I again wished to remind him to remain realistic and not raise his hopes regarding a change in the attitude of my Government as well as the Vatican on his memoirs. I said that I wished he would think over other ways of accomplishing this objective and that I would be very happy to talk to him again after my return from Washington.

Distribution:

AMB

C&R

Briefing Book

50. BPB0407[7] – Levél, Baker Meehanhez, 1 p.

Baker megküldi a Vatikáni Államtitkárságtól február 22-én datált latin üzenetet Mindszenty bíboros számára, amely egy latin nyelvű könyv kíséretében érkezett, csatolja az angol fordítást is.

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We received on May 7 through the Apostolic Delegation for forwarding to the Cardinal the enclosed Latin message dated 22 February and an accompanying Latin volume from the Vatican Secretary of State.

Will you kindly deliver these items to the guest. An English translation of the Latin message is enclosed for your records.

Sincerely,

John A. Baker, Jr. [signed]

Enclosures:

1. Latin message.
2. Latin volume.
3. English translation of Latin message.

Delivered May 19, 19and71

május 12, szerda

51. BPB0407[116] – Távirat, CG USAMEDCOMEUR küldi: Amembassy Budapest, Vienna, 1 p.

Orvosok érkezésének részletei.

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SUBJ: EMBASSY MEDICAL SUPPORT
FOR AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

1. FOL INDIVIDUAL WILL TRAVEL TO BUDAPEST 25-29 MAY 71 IN SUPPORT OF SUBJ PROGRAM AND SUPPORT OF MR. JACKSON.

2. LIC STANLEY M. GALAS, MC, OPHTHALMOLOGIST, BORN 5 AUGUST 1926 IN GRAND RAPIDS, MICHIGAN, PASSPORT

Z892732. VISTA APPLICATION TO AMEMB BONN FOR PROCESSION ON 12 MAY 71.

3. INFORMATION ON THE DENTIST, LIC THOMAS P. SWEENEY, AND THE X-RAY TECHNICIAN, MSG DAVID V. THOMPSON, WILL BE FORWARDED AT A LATER DATE.

FOR AMEMBASSY VIENNA
PLEASE PROVIDE THIS HQ WITH FUND CITATION.

május 13, csütörtök

52. BPB0407[109] – Távirat részlete, SecState küldi: Amembassy Bucharest, Budapest, London, Moscow, Rome, USNATO, Warsaw, 1 p.

A körtávirat részletének 2. pontjában tájékoztatás a francia L'Ex - press hetilap beszámolójáról a pápa és a magyar külügyminiszter tárgya - lásával kapcsolatosan. Mindszenty bíboros esetleges kiutazása, lemon - dása. A hír több francia újságban is utánközlésre került.

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CONFIDENTIAL PARIS 7910
SUBJ: FRENCH-EE RELATIONS

1. POLAND. QUAI EE AFFAIRS OFFICER DE LA COSTE TOLD EMBOFF HE CONSIDERED "VERY ACCURATE" MAY 12 LE MONDE'S FRONTPAGE REPORT ON POLISH LEADER GIEREK'S STEADY DOWNGRADING OF FORMER SECURITY CHIEF MOCZAR. RECENTLY RETURNED FROM ACCOMPANYING STATE SEC LIPKOWSKI ON APRIL 26 – MAY 1 VISIT TO POLAND, DE LA COSTE INDICATED FRENCH EMBASSY WARSAW HAD NOTED MANY SIGNS OF MOCZAR'S DECLINE. HE SAID VISIT OF LIPKOWSKI (OF POLISH DESCENT) WAS ORGANIZED AT LA[S]T MINUTE, WAS ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY PROTOCOLARY, AND CONTAINED PRACTICALLY NO TALKS OF SUBSTANTIVE INTEREST. AS FOR UPCOMING FRANCO-POLISH EXCHANGES, ALPHAND WILL VISIT WARSAW ABOUT JULY 1 TO INAUGURATE NEW FRENCH EMBASSY, DESIGN OF WHICH SO IRRITATED LIPKOWSKI THAT HE JOKINGLY TOLD POLES HE

WOULD HAVE FRENCH ARCHITECT ARRESTED. QUAI EXPECTS PREMIER JAROSZEWICZ TO VISIT FRANCE IN LATE 1971 OR EARLY 1972.

2. HUNGARY, EMBOFF NOTED ITEM IN CURRENT ISSUE OF WEEKLY L'EXPRESS ALLEGING ACCORD IN PRINCIPLE BETWEEN POPE PAUL VI AND FONMIN PETER SETTLING PROBLEM OF HUNGARIAN CARDINAL MINDSZENTY. L'EXPRESS STATED THAT SINCE MINDSZENTY WILL REACH RETIREMENT AGE AT SO NEXT YEAR, HE WILL THEREAFTER BE CONSIDERED INNOCUOUS TO HUNGARIAN REGIME AND WILL BE FREE TO LEAVE AMERICAN EMBASSY CONFINEMENT. DE LA COSTE COULD NOT CONFIRM OR DENY AUTHENTICITY OF THIS REPORT, WHICH HAS BEEN REPEATED IN SEVERAL FRENCH JOURNALS.

3. ROMANIA, ROMANIAN CHARGE ILIE TOLD EMBOFF MAY 13 BUCHAREST PLEASED WITH SCHUMANN'S COMMENTS IN MOSCOW SUPPORTING IDEA OF STEPPED UP CONTACTS BETWEEN FINNISH MFA AND RESIDENT AMBASSADORS IN HELSINKI ON CES. ILIE CALLED ATTENTION TO MAY 4 PRESS CONFERENCE BY ROMANIAN AMBASSADOR FLITAN, UNDERSCORING CONTINUING [a szöveg itt végetér]

53. BPB0407[111] – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: CG USA-MEDCOMEUR, Amembassy VIENNA, CINCEUR, 1 p.

Nyugtázza az orvosok érkezéséről szóló távirat vételét, l. 51. sz. Utazás további részletei.

REF: CG USAMEDCOMEUR 121500A MAY 71

1. LTC Galas should proceed to Embassy Vienna on May 25 by POV or train and plan to drive to Budapest with Vienna Embassy Dr. McIntyre on May 26. Embassy Vienna requested reserve appropriate accommodations for night of May 25.

2. Travel should be charged to: T.A.: BUDA-52-71. Fiscal Data: 1910113 – 5244 – 171 – 324401 – 2156.

3. Travel authorizations for LTC Sweeney and MSG Thompson will be provided when travel dates known.

4. Very much appreciate your assistance.

PUHAN

54. BPB0407[112–113], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [084–085], RMNNSFB693
– Memorandum, Puhan nagykövet Péter János külügyminiszternél, 2 pp.

A külügyminiszter tért rá a tárgyra, saját kezdeményezésére. Nem számolhat be arról, mint jelezte, mit mondott neki a pápa, de bizalmasan összefoglalhatja, mit mondott ő a pápának. Elmondta neki, hogy a magyar kormány elismeri, hogy Mindszentynek az amerikai követségen való tartózkodása problémát jelent Magyarországnak, a Vatikánnak és az amerikai nagykövetségnek is. Magyar részről két feltétellel készek arra, hogy megoldást találjanak a Mindszenty-problémára: egyrészt, hogy a bíboros nem használható fel arra, hogy megzavarja az egyház és az állam viszonyát Magyarországon, másrészt, hogy a bíboros nem használható fel Magyarország elleni hidegháborús célokra. Péter továbbá megkérdezte, tudása van-e a nagykövetnek arról, hogy Mons. Cheli a közelmúltban Budapesten járt. A nagykövet nem tudott róla. Cheli, bár nem hozott új ajánlatot, három héten belül javaslatot szándékozik tenni a Mindszenty-probléma megoldására. Puhan nagykövet válaszában megköszönte a külügyminiszter öszinteségét, elmondta, hogy idáig nem hallotta magyar tisztviselő ajkáról, hogy elismerje: a bíboros problémát okoz a magyar kormánynak, a Vatikánnak és az amerikaiaknak egyaránt. A múltban az volt a hivatalos vélemény, hogy ez csak az amerikai nagykövetség problémája. Kifejezte meglepődését, hogy eljutottak a probléma méreteinek és az illetékeseknek közös felismeréséig. Elmondta, hogy kevés a remény a megoldásra, mert a bíboros ragaszkodik pozíciójához mint magyar ember, mint primás, és foglalkoztatja a történelemben elfoglalandó helye is. Megemlítette ebben az összefüggésben az emlékiratokat és jelezte, hogy a magyar kormány bizonyára felkészült arra, hogy valamikor a jövőben ezek meg fognak jelenni. – A külügyminiszter a továbbiakban jelezte, hogy a pápát érdekelte a probléma megoldása, majd a legnagyobb bizalommal sürgette az amerikai nagykövetet: maga a pápa is arra a következtetésre jutott, hogy Mindszenty bíboros ne töltse élete hátralévő napjait Magyarországon. Hozzáfűzte, hogy a pápával folytatott beszélgetés kapcsán az a benyomása, hogy csökkent Mindszenty ellenállása az amerikai követség elhagyását illetően. – Puhan nagykövet nem tudta megerősíteni ez utóbbi állítást. Természetesen nem rendelkezik azon információkkal, amelyekkel az Apostoli Szentszék, de az a benyomása, hogy ez a megállapítás nem pontos. Elmondta, hogy amerikai részről nincs akadálya annak, hogy a bíboros a nagykövetségen maradjon, viszont szembe kell nézni azzal a nehézséggel, hogy ha rendszeres orvosi ellátásra lenne szüksége, a követség ezt nem tudja biztosítani. Péter elismerte ennek a nehézségnek a fölmerülését. Az

zal fejezte be a találkozót, hogy megismételte kormánya készségét a megoldásra, a két feltétel fenntartásával. Nagy a bizalma a Vatikánban, hogy e feltételek teljesítését biztosítani tudja.

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SUBJECT: Cardinal Mindszenty

The Foreign Minister raised this subject on his own initiative. He said he was not at liberty to interpret or disclose what the Pope said during his conversation with him in Rome. He said he was much impressed with the Pope as a man of great vision and high intelligence. Peter said, however, he was at liberty to say what he had said to the Pope, in confidence, of course. He said he had told the Pope that the Government of Hungary was ready for a real solution of the Cardinal Mindszenty problem. He said that his Government acknowledged that it was a problem for Hungary and for the Vatican, as well as for the American Embassy, as long as the Cardinal was in the Embassy. He said he had told the Pope that there are two conditions the Hungarians would have to insist upon at arriving at a solution of this problem. The first was that the Cardinal not be used to disturb relations between church and state in Hungary. The second was that the Cardinal not be used for cold war purposes against Hungary. Peter asked me at this point whether I knew that Monsignor Cheli had recently been in Budapest. (By "recently" he appeared to mean within the last two weeks and in any case probably after Peter's visit to Rome.) I replied in the negative. Peter said that Cheli had come here to talk with Hungarian officials. He said he brought no new proposals but intended to present a solution of the Mindszenty problem to the Hungarian Government with two or three weeks.

I told the Foreign Minister I appreciated his frankness in speaking about this problem to me. I said I also appreciated the fact that he acknowledged something which I had not heard Hungarian officials acknowledge before, namely, that the Cardinal was a problem for the Hungarian Government and the Vatican as well as to us. In the past the Hungarian view had [./.] been he was a problem only to the American Embassy. I said I was glad to see that we were reaching some sort of agreement at least on the dimensions of the problem and whom it concerned. I said I wished to reciprocate the candor with which he had spoken. I frankly saw little hope of a solution because of the Cardinal's strong feelings regarding his position as a Hungarian, as Primate, and his concern over his place in history. I mentioned in this connection his memoirs and said that I trusted the Hun-

garian Government was prepared at some date in the future for the appearance of his memoirs.

The Foreign Minister said that while he couldn't interpret what the Pope had said he would tell me that the Pope was anxious for a solution of this problem. He urged the greatest confidence upon me, and said the Pope also had come to the conclusion that Cardinal Mindszenty should not spend his remaining days in Hungary. He added that he also had had the impression from the Pope that Cardinal Mindszenty's resistance to leaving the American Embassy and Hungary had diminished somewhat.

I said I could not confirm the latter statement in any way. Of course I may not have information which the Holy See has, but my own impression is that this is not accurate. I also said that as far as we were concerned, the Cardinal could remain in our Embassy. I was, however, concerned with the difficulties that might ensue if he should be the victim of a lingering illness which required medical assistance of the sort we could not render. Peter acknowledged this potential difficulty. He concluded the conversation by saying that he wished to repeat that his Government was prepared for a workable solution but the two conditions he had mentioned earlier would have to be met. He had great confidence in the ability of the Vatican to assure the fulfillment of these conditions.

55. BPB0407[115], CFB (3067) SOC-1 HUNG [116] – Távirat, Amembassy Moscow küldi: Amembassy Budapest, SecState, 1 p.

Ötödkézből érkezett információ szerint Mindszenty bíboros elhagyta volna a budapesti nagykövetséget és valahol Magyarországon tartózkodik. Feltételezi, hogy a forrásul szolgáló amerikai turisták terjeszteti fogják a hírt és előbb-utóbb meg fog jelenni a sajtóban is. Kéri Budapest kommentárját.

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CONFIDENTIAL MOSCOW 3147

SUBJ: REPORTED MINDSZENTY DEPARTURE FROM EMBASSY

1. NYT BUREAU CHIEF GWERTZMAN (PROTEST) SAYS HIS WIFE WAS TOLD MAY 13 BY US CATHOLIC CHAPLAIN IN MOSCOW OF REPORT THAT CARDINAL MINDSZENTY HAD LEFT EMBASSY BUDAPEST MAY 11. THE CHAPLAIN, FATHER LOUIS DION, SAID HIS SOURCE WAS A GROUP OF CATHOLIC TOURISTS JUST ARRIVED HERE FROM BUDAPEST. AMERICAN

MEMBERS OF THE GROUP TOLD DION THEY HAD HEARD FROM AN OFFICIAL OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY, UNNAMED, THAT MINDSZENTY DEPARTED EMBASSY PREMISES MAY 11 AND WAS RESIDING SOMEWHERE IN HUNGARY.

2. THIS RUMOR WAS FIFTH-HAND BY THE TIME EMBASSY HEARD IT THIS MORNING. ASSUME TOURISTS WILL BE SPREADING IT AND IT WILL SURFACE IN PRESS SOON. BUDAPEST MAY WISH TO COMMENT ON ITS POSSIBLE SOURCE. BEAM

56. BPB0407[114], CFB (3067) SOC-1 HUNG [115] – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: SecState, Amembassy Moscow, 1 p.

Cáfolja az ötödkézből érkező információt. Mindszenty bíboros továbbra is az amerikai nagykövetségen tartózkodik. Nem tudják, honnan eredhet ez a dezinformáció.

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BUDAPEST 784

SUBJECT: Cardinal Mindszenty

REF: Moscow 3147

1. Gwertzman, his wife, Fr. Dion, tourists, and unnamed official to contrary, Cardinal did not depart Embassy May 11 but is in his quarters as usual, and in good health and spirits.

2. Mindszenty rumors are one of Budapest's favorite pastimes. We have no idea how this one got started.

PUHAN

57. BPB0407[117–121], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [109–111], RMNNSFB693 – Távirat, 785, Amembassy Budapest küldi: SecState, 5 pp.

Puhan nagykövet Péter János külügyminiszterrel folytatott tárgyalásáról. Lényegében visszaköszön 54. sz. alatt olvasható följegyzése. A távirat 7. pontjában közli értékelését („comment”). Bár Péter személyét illetően kétségei vannak, határozottan állította, hogy a Vatikán megoldásra törekszik a közeljövőben. Erre utal Cheli látogatása Budapesten, amely Péter vatikáni tárgyalásait követte. Amerikai részről passzív magatartást

javasol, de ismerni kellene a Vatikán ez irányú gondolatait. Kéri Washington és Cabot Lodge római nagykövét véleményét.

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SUBJECT: Cardinal Mindszenty

1. During my May 13 meeting with him, Foreign Minister Peter raised the subject of Cardinal Mindszenty on his own initiative. He said he was not at liberty to interpret or disclose what the Pope said during his conversation with him in Rome. He had been much impressed with the Pope as a man of great vision and high intelligence. Peter said, however, he was at liberty to say what he had said to the Pope, in confidence of course. He had told the Pope that the GOH was prepared for a real solution of the Mindszenty problem. He said his Government acknowledged that it was a problem for Hungary and for the Vatican, as well as for the American Embassy, as long as the Cardinal was in the Embassy. He said he had told the Pope there are two conditions the Hungarians would have to insist upon for arriving at a solution of this problem. The first was that the Cardinal not be used to disturb relations between church and state in Hungary. The second [./.] was that the Cardinal not be used for cold war purposes against Hungary.

2. Peter asked me at this point whether I knew that Monsignor Cheli had recently been in Budapest. (By "recently" he appeared to mean within the last two weeks and in any case probably after Peter's visit to Rome.) I replied in the negative. Peter said Cheli had come here to talk with Hungarian officials. He said he brought no new proposals but intended to present a solution of the Mindszenty problem to the Hungarian Government within two or three weeks.

3. I told the Foreign Minister I appreciated his frankness. I said I also appreciated the fact that he acknowledged something which I had not heard Hungarian officials acknowledge before, namely, that the Cardinal was a problem for the Hungarian Government and the Vatican as well as to us. In the past the Hungarian view had been he was a problem only to the American Embassy. I said I was glad to see that we were reaching some sort of agreement at least on the dimensions of the problem and whom it concerned. I said [./.] I wished to reciprocate the candor with which he had spoken. I frankly saw little hope of a solution because of the Cardinal's strong feelings regarding his position as a Hungarian, as Primate, and his concern over his place in history. I mentioned in this connec-

tion his memoirs and said I trusted the Hungarian Government was prepared at some date in the future for the appearance of his memoirs.

4. The Foreign Minister said that while he couldn't interpret what the Pope had said he could tell me that the Pope was anxious for a solution of this problem. He urged the greatest confidence upon me, and said the Pope also had come to the conclusion that Cardinal Mindszenty should not spend his remaining days in Hungary. He added he also had had the impression from the Pope that Cardinal Mindszenty's resistance to leaving the American Embassy and Hungary had diminished somewhat. [./.]

5. I said I could not confirm the latter statement in any way. Of course I may not have information which the Holy See has, but my own impression is that this is not accurate. I also said that as far as we were concerned, the Cardinal could remain in our Embassy. I was, however, concerned with the difficulties that might ensue if he should be the victim of a lingering illness which required medical assistance of the sort we could not render.

6. Peter acknowledged this potential difficulty. He concluded the conversation by saying he wished to repeat that his Government was prepared for a workable solution but the two conditions he has mentioned earlier would have to be met. He had great confidence in the ability of the Vatican to assure the fulfillment of these conditions.

7. Comment. Peter is a slippery character, and what he told me should be looked at with caution. He certainly conveyed more movement on the Mindszenty problem than I have seen in the past two years with, if he can be believed, a fair [./.] amount of understanding between the Hungarian Government and the Vatican as to what is to be done. The Cheli visit to Budapest, apparently following closely on Peter's visit to Rome, suggests desire on both sides to pursue the question actively. Peter talked quite firmly of the Vatican's presenting a "solution" of the problem shortly, and his confidence in the Vatican's ability to assure fulfillment of the Hungarian conditions is noteworthy. Our role at this stage is a passive one, but it would be helpful at least to have some idea of what the Vatican has in mind. Department and Ambassador Lodge comments requested.

PUHAN

május 14, péntek

58. BPB0407[107] – Memorandum, Résztvevők: Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., Richard T. Davies, John A. Baker, Robert M. Beaudry, 1 p.

Davies helyettes titkár washingtoni irodájában Cabot Lodge nagykövettel folytatott megbeszélésen előbbi javasolta a titkárság ajánlását az US Elnök felé, hogy tájékozódjon a Vatikánál a Mindszenty-problémával kapcsolatosan. Ezt a washingtoni apostoli delegátuson keresztül kezdeményezik, jelezve a delegátus felé, hogy Lodge római nagykövet, Rómába való visszatérését követően, hangsúlyozni fogja a pápa felé az amerikaiak kérését a megoldást illetően. Lodge véleménye szerint a Vatikán jól tenné, ha megfelelő pozíciót ajánlana fel Mindszentynek, nem csupán nyugdíjazást és az orvosi ellátás biztosítását. Lodge jelezte készségét, hogy ezt továbbítsa a Vatikán felé.

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SUBJECT: Meeting on May 13 re Cardinal Mindszenty

During a conversation with Ambassador Lodge on May 13, 1971 in the office of Deputy Assistant Secretary Davies, the former concurred in the recommendation drafted for the Secretary to send to the President regarding an approach to the Vatican on the Mindszenty problem. He agreed that the approach should be initiated through the Apostolic Delegate, recommending, however, that the Delegate be told that Ambassador Lodge planned on his return to Rome to emphasize to the Pope the US interest in the resolution of this problem. Ambassador Lodge said that the Vatican would be well advised to consider an appropriately dignified position in the Vatican to offer Mindszenty, and not confine itself to an offer of a place of retirement and proper medical care. Ambassador Lodge agreed that we could indicate his concurrence in the recommendation.

EUR/CHP: JABaker:mw

59. BPB0407[108] – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: SecState, Amembassy Rome, 1 p.

Másodlagos forrásra hivatkozva jelzi Mons. Cheli közelmúltban történt budapesti útját. Részletekről nincs tudomása.

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BUDAPEST 797

SUBJECT: Cheli in Hungary

REF: STATE 83485

In last few days we have had reports of Cheli visit to Hungary from Hungarian official contacts and Western diplomatic colleagues. We gather Cheli was here recently for talks with Hungarian officials. One diplomatic source tells us Cheli left Budapest on conclusion of visit last weekend. We do not know who was in his party or whom he met on Hungarian side. We have no information on further Cheli visit within next few days (reftel).

PUHAN

60. BPB0407[110] – Távirat, Amembassy Rome küldi: SecState, Amembassy Budapest, 1 p.

Római nagykövetség jelzi, hogy Mons. Cheli május 10-én, rövid budapesti tartózkodást követően, visszatért Rómába. Illing találkozni fog vele május 17-én.

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ROME 3068

SUBJECT: VATICAN MISSION TO HUNGARY

REF: STATE 083485

MSGR. GIOVANNI CHELI RETURNED ROME MAY 10
AFTER SHORT BUDAPEST VISIT. ILLING SEING HIM MAY 17 FOR
DETAILS. EXEMPT. MARTIN

május 17, hétfő

61. BPB0407[99–100] – Levél, Baker Meehanhez, 2 pp.

Január 26-i levelére hivatkozik, amelyben megküldte a bíboros 1970. december 23-i levelét. Tarló Gyula nincs vér szerinti rokonságban a Pehm családdal, nevelt fiúként élt ott, de az USA-ba érkezve kihasználta ezt a kapcsolatot és a bíboros unokaöccseként mutkozott be.

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This is in reply to our letter of January 26, 1971, transmitting the Cardinal's unsigned letter of December 23, 1970, and discussing his concern about the implication of certain activities in which Julius Tarlo was involved.

WE HAVE TALKED WITH TED PAPENDORP ABOUT THE 1963 LETTER ALONG THE LINES RECOMMENDED IN YOUR LETTER: I.E., WE NOTED THAT THE CARDINAL TOLD THE EMBASSY HE GOT THE LETTER FROM TED, AND WE WONDERED WHAT TED MIGHT KNOW ABOUT THE BACKGROUND. WE ASKED HIM THE QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE CARDINAL WITHOUT, HOWEVER, CONVEYING THAT THE QUESTIONS WERE SPECIFICALLY THE CARDINAL'S. WE SHOWED HIM THE LETTER FROM MUNSON TO LUDWIG, OF COURSE.

TED HAS DONE A BRIEF COMMENTARY IN RESPONSE. IT IS QUOTED IN FULL BELOW:

"I frankly do not recall when I received the attached letter, but it was from Miss Eva Trefner, a long-time friend of the Pehm family. The Cardinal's nephew, Joseph Legrady, managed her restaurant on Madison Avenue in New York, and lived in the building until his death in April 1963. It seems likely that she obtained it in connection with the settlement of Legrady's estate. Legrady's widow, Margaret, was permitted to come to the US by Hungarian authorities in order to be able to take payment in New York of the estate, and also stayed with Miss Trefner during this period. [/.]

"I have no knowledge of the respective identities of Munson and Ludwig, nor further information of Legrady's role in this matter.

"Tarlo, as far as I am aware, is not a blood relation of the Pehm family but lived with it as a foster child or the like. After he got to

the US after the revolution (or conceivably even before – I’m not sure) he did exploit this relationship and claimed to be a nephew of the Cardinal.

“My recollection is hazy, but I also passed to the Cardinal a collection of letters from his mother to Miss Trefner, written during the period he was in prison, and a copy of an agreement of some sort between her and (inter alia?) Tarlo relating to the memoirs. I feel sure I checked this out with Marty or Dick Tims. I do not recall the details of the latter document, nor do I know how it passed between Tarlo and Mrs. Pehm.”

AS YOU WILL SEE, TED IS UNABLE TO THROW MUCH REAL LIGHT ON THE MATTER.

IN OUR VIEW, THE ENTIRE MATTER IS A POTENTIAL CAN OF WORMS AND SOMETHING WE WOULD BE WELL-ADVISED TO AVOID INVOLVEMENT WITH THE CARDINAL AND ANY OTHERS CONCERNED. EVEN TED’S LIMITED INVOLVEMENT (PASSING OF THE 1963 LETTER AND ALSO, APPARENTLY, LETTERS FROM HIS MOTHER TO MISS TREFNER) IS UNFORTUNATE, BUT THAT IS NOW WATER OVER THE DAM. IT WAS, HOWEVER, CONTRARY TO THE ESTABLISHED GROUND RULES, AND THE DEPARTMENT WAS UNAWARE OF IT UNTIL IT RECEIVED YOUR LETTER AND SPOKE TO TED ABOUT THE SUBJECT.

We leave it to your best judgment what use, if any, you make of the contents of Ted’s statement in connection with the Cardinal’s original inquiry. In any event, we suggest maximum caution and low-key treatment in the interest of avoiding further involvement.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

John A. Baker, Jr. [signed]

62. BPB0407[104–105], CFB (3067) SOC-1 HUNG [079–080] – Távirat, Amembassy Rome küldi: SecState, Amemb. Budapest, 2 pp.

Beszámol Illingnek Mons. Chelivel tartott megbeszéléséről. Cheli Budapesten az ÁEH tisztviselőivel tárgyalt, a dolog nem mozdul korábbi helyzetéhez képest és még hosszú út vezet a megegyezéshez. Cheli jövő hé - ten tervezi újabb útját Budapestre, valószínűleg König bíborossal és Mons. Zágon Józseffel együtt érkezik. Mindszenty bíborossal óhajtanak talál -

kozni, a washingtoni apostoli delegátus fogja kérvényezni ennek engedélyezését Washingtonban. Cheli reméli, hogy a pápa nyomást fog gyakorolni Mindszentyre távozását illetően. Bár Cheli nem mondta ki, Illingnek az a benyomása, hogy Mindszenty hallgatása a magyar kormány feltétele bármely egyezménynek a bíboros távozával kapcsolatosan. Cheli szerint a Vatikán nem lát nehézséget abban, hogy Mindszenty megtartsa prímási és érseki címét. Mons. Zágont úgy jellemezte, mint akiben bizalma van és akinek a véleményére Mindszenty sokat ad. A tervezett megbeszélésen Cheli és Zágón foglalkoznak majd a részletekkel, König feladata az, hogy a missziónak magas rangot biztosítson. Cheli sürgős szükségét látja annak, hogy megismerje Mindszenty álláspontját, mert hosszabb ideje nem került erre sor. Cheli kifejezte reményét, hogy a pápa határozottabb álláspontot foglalt el, és így lehetővé válik a Mindszenty probléma megoldása. Idáig a pápa nem gyakorolt nyomást Mindszentyre, távozásával kapcsolatosan.

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SECRET ROME 3122

EXDIS

SUBJECT: HUNGARIAN CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS

REF: STATE 083485; ROME 3068

1. MONSIGNOR CHELI (PROTECT) INFORMED ILLING MAY 17 THAT HIS RECENT TALKS IN BUDAPEST WITH GOH RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS OFFICIALS REPRESENTED EARLY STAGES OF WHAT HE FELT WOULD BE LONG ARDUOUS NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE ANY AGREEMENTS MIGHT BE REACHED. CHELI PLANS TO RETURN TO BUDAPEST SOON, POSSIBLY NEXT WEEK. MOST LIKELY WILL TRAVEL WITH CARDINAL KOENIG AND MSGR. JOSEPH ZAGON, A HUNGARIAN EMPLOYED (sic! – recte: employee) IN VATICAN. GROUP HOPES TO CONFER WITH CARDINAL MINDSZENTY, AND CHELI SAID APOSTOLIC DELEGATE IN WASHINGTON WILL SUBMIT REQUEST FOR ACCESS TO DEPARTMENT.

2. CHELI ADMITTED, ALTHOUGH SOMEWHAT GUARDEDLY, THAT GROUP HOPED POPE WOULD AGREE TO PUT INCREASED PRESSURE ON MINDSZENTY TO ENCOURAGE HIM TO DEPART. CONTRARY TO PREVIOUS VIEWS EXPRESSED BY VATICAN OFFICIALS, CHELI NOW SEEMS TO BELIEVE IT NECESSARY OBTAIN MINDSZENTY'S PROMISE TO REMAIN

SILENT IF HE LEAVES HUNGARY. ALTHOUGH CHELI DID NOT SAY SO, ILLING GAINED IMPRESSION HE NOW CONVINCED THAT MINDSZENTY'S SILENCE IS "SINE QUO NON" OF ANY GOH AGREEMENT TO CARDINAL'S DEPARTURE. CHELI SAID HE SEES NO DIFFICULTY FOR VATICAN IN LETTING MINDSZENTY RETAIN HIS TITLES OF PRIMATE AND ARCHBISHOP. CHELI NOTED THAT MSGR. ZAGON VERY FAITHFUL CHURCHMAN WHOSE OPINION MINDSZENTY LIKELY TO RESPECT. IN PLANNED TALKS WITH MINDSZENTY, CHELI AND ZAGON WILL MANAGE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES: KOENIG WILL BE INCLUDED TO GIVE MISSION PROPER HIGH LEVEL CHARACTER.

3. CHELI SAID THERE URGENT NEED TO CONSULT MINDSZENTY WHOSE OPINION ON LATEST PLANS CONCERNING HIS POSSIBLE FUTURE HAD [./.] NOT BEEN SOUGHT IN LONG TIME. CHELI SEEMS HOPEFUL THAT IF POPE TAKES FIRMER STAND, THERE REASONABLE POSSIBILITY OF SOLVING MINDSZENTY PROBLEMS CHELI ADMITTED THAT HERETOFORE POPES HAVE BEEN RELUCTANT TO PUT SUFFICIENT TEETH IN THEIR APPEALS FOR MINDSZENTY'S DEPARTURE FROM HUNGARY.

MARTIN

május 19, szerda

63. BPB0407[6], CFB (3067) SOC-1 HUNG [105–106], XR POL 15-1 VAT – Távirat, SecState küldi: Amembassy Rome, Amembassy Budapest, 1 p.

Rogers államtitkár nyugtázza Illing részletes beszámolóját Cheli budapesti missziójáról. Washington különösen is érdekelt abban, hogy a Vatikán bátorítsa Mindszentyt a Magyarországról való távozásra. Puhán nagykövettel május 17-én Washingtonban való megbeszélések során tisztázták a Mindszenty probléma részleteit, mi szerint a budapesti nagykövet - séget és a washingtoni külügyminisztériumot is aggasztja Mindszenty előrehaladott kora. Illing közölje Chelivel, hogy Washington tárgyalásokat tervez Raimondi apostoli delegátussal, a közeli budapesti tárgyalások kapcsán. Hamarosan lényeges információ várható, amely hasznos lehet a vatikáni tervezés folyamán.

SECRET STATE 086951
EXDIS
SUBJ: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY
REF: ROME 3122

1. APPRECIATE ILLING'S THOROUGH REPORTING ON CHELI BUDAPEST MISSION. DEPT HIGHLY INTERESTED IN EVIDENCE VATICAN CONSIDERING EFFORT TO ENCOURAGE MINDSZENTY TO DEPART HUNGARY.

2. CONSULTATIONS MAY 17 WITH AMBASSADOR PUHAN IN WASHINGTON HAVE GIVEN US USEFUL INSIGHTS ON MINDSZENTY PROBLEM WHICH OF GROWING CONCERN TO EMBASSY BUDAPEST AND DEPARTMENT IN VIEW CARDINAL'S ADVANCING AGE.

3. ILLING SHOULD TELL CHELI THAT DEPT LOOKS FORWARD TO CONSULTATIONS WITH RAIMONDI DURING PLANNING FOR DELEGATION'S NEGOTIATIONS IN BUDAPEST WITH MINDSZENTY AND GOH. WE WOULD WISH PROVIDE RELEVANT INFORMATION WHICH MAY BE HELPFUL IN VATICAN PLANNING. ROGERS

május 20, csütörtök

64. BPB0407[95] – Levél, Mindszenty bíboros a Bíboros Államtitkárnak Rómába, 1 p.

Mindszenty bíboros megköszöni az új latin misekönyvet.

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Eminentissime ac Reverendissime Domine,
Cardinalis ac Status Secretari,

Profundissimas gratias meas pro novo Missali Romano Suae Sanctitati nuntiare dignetur cum homagio meo.

Tuae Eminentiae addictissimus servus

Aepp. Strigonien. [not signed]

május 21, péntek

65. BPB0407[102] – Access Restricted

Cardinal Mindszenty 1-6/1971, Document Date: 05/21/1971

Description: TEL, NND: 20019019 Withdrawn: 07/09/2001

66. BPB0407[3–4] – Távirat, Amembassy Vienna küldi: SecState, Amembassy Budapest, 2 pp.

Kézírástól jegyzetek a lapszámon.

Humes nagykövet értesítése: Hans Bock, a német Quick magazin munkatársa – értesülve Mindszenty bíboros küszöbönálló távozásáról – magas árat ígérve fényképet kért róla James Smith őrmestertől. Ővja Bu - dapestet és javasolja, készüljön fel arra, hogy Bock más úton is kísérletet tesz.

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VIENNA 3069

SY CHANNEL

WASDC FOR SAS

SUBJECT: MSG-VIENNA APPROACHED FOR PHOTO OF
CARDINAL MIND[S]ZENTY

1. SGT. JAMES SMITH, MSG-VIENNA, ADVISED RSO THIS DATE THAT EARLY THIS MORNING (6130) HANS BOCK, PHOTOGRAPHER FOR QUICK (A GERMAN MAGAZINE) ASKED HIM TO OBTAIN A CURRENT PHOTO OF CARDINAL MIND-[S]ZENTY. BOCK SAID SMITH COULD ALMOST NAME HIS ONE PRICE FOR THE PHOTO, ALTHOUGH NO SPECIFIC PRICE OFFERED. BOCK MENTIONS RECENT STORIES ABOUT THE CARDINAL'S LEAVING THE U.S. EMBASSY IN BUDAPEST AND IMPLIED THAT AN EVEN BIGGER STORY ABOUT THE CARDINAL WOULD SOON BREAK FOR WHICH PHOTO NEEDED. SMITH WAS TOLD THAT ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN BOCK AND HIM, BUT BOCK'S COMPANY WOULD PAY EXPENSES FOR BOCK AND SMITH TO TRAVEL TO BUDAPEST TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE PHOTO. BOCK ALSO SAID HE HAD EXCELLENT CONTACTS IN EAST BLOCK COUNTRIES AND

COULD VISIT AND PHOTOGRAPH EVENTS WHICH WERE CLOSED TO AMERICAN NEWSMEN, I. E. SITUATION IN PRAGUE IN 1968. IT WAS HINTED THAT BOCK AND SMITH COULD WORK TOGETHER. SMITH COULD GET A PICTURE OF THE CARDINAL FOR BOCK AND BOCK WOULD GIVE SMITH NEWS PHOTOS FOR POSSIBLE SALE TO AMERICAN NEWS PUBLICATIONS.

2. BOCK CLAIMS EASE OF TRAVEL IN EAST BLOC DUE TO HIS BIRTH IN HUNGARY AND AUSTRIAN CITIZENSHIP.

3. SMITH TOLD BOCK HE WOULD THINK ABOUT OFFER. BOCK TO CALL SMITH AT MARINE HOUSE AT 1600 HOURS TODAY OR WILL SEE HIM LATER THIS EVENING AT LOCAL BAR. SMITH INSTRUCTED BY RSO TO TELL BOCK HE IS NOT INTERESTED AND REPORT BOCK'S REACTION.

4. SMITH CLAIMS ONLY CASUAL PRIOR ASSOCIATION WITH BOCK [./] PAST SEVERAL MONTHS. ENCOUNTERS WITH BOCK HAVE ALWAYS BEEN ACCIDENTAL, AND THIS FIRST TIME BOCK SOUGHT HIM OUT. HE WAS NO OTHER KNOWLEDGE ABOUT BOCK OR ASSOCIATES.

5. CAS ADVISED AND STATED THEY HAVE NO INFORMATION LOCALLY, BUT THERE IS A FILE IN WASHINGTON. SECURITY OFFICE FILES NEGATIVE.

6. SUGGEST BUDAPEST ALERT MSGS TO POSSIBLE APPROACH BY BOCK AND DETERMINE IF BOCK ALREADY KNOWN TO THEM. HUMES

67. BPB0407[5], CFB (3067) SOC-1 HUNG [103] – Távirat, Amembassy Rome küldi: SecState, Amembassy Budapest, 1 p.

Illing május 21-én informálta Mons. Chelit 63. sz. távirat értelmében. Cheli hálásan fogadta és jelezte, Raimondi hamarosan instrukciókat kap a Washingtonnal való tárgyalásokhoz a Mindszenty-ügy fejleményeiről. Róma örülne, ha Washington értesítené a Raimondinak szóló közlés tartalmáról. Cheli azt mondta, mindhárman szívesen beszélnének Puhán nagykövettel Budapesten, a Mindszentyvel való találkozást megelőzően.

SECRET ROME 3215

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY

REF: STATE 086951, ROME 3122

1. ILLING INFORMED CHELI MAY 21 CONTENTS PARA 3 STATE 086951. CHELI MOST GRATEFUL AND ASSURES THAT RAIMONDI WILL SOON BE INSTRUCTED CONSULT DEPARTMENT FOR LATEST RELEVANT INFORMATION ON MINDSZENTY.

2. EMBASSY ROME WOULD APPRECIATE BEING ADVISED WHAT DEPARTMENT TELLS RAIMONDI.

3. CHELI SAID HE, CARDINAL KOENIG, AND ZAGON WOULD WELCOME CHANCE TO SPEAK WITH AMBASSADOR PUHAN IN BUDAPEST PRIOR TO SEEING MINDSZENTY. MARTIN

május 22, szombat

68. BPB0407[2], RMNNSFNB828 – Puhan kézírásos jegyzete és a válasz, 1 p.

május 24, hétfő

69. BPB0407[1], CFB (3067) SOC-1 HUNG [077, 099], RMNNSFB693 – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: SecState, Amembassy Rome, 1 p.

Engedélyt kér, hogy kellő időben közölhesse a bíborossal a küszöbön álló hármás látogatást, feltéve a kérdést, hogy fogadja-e ezt a delegációt. Ezt tisztán formai okokból és hogy elkerüljék, hogy a bíboros egyik napról a másikra kerüljön ilyen helyzetbe.

BUDAPEST 0857

SUBJECT: Cardinal Mindszenty

Ref: Rome 3215 and previous

Recommend we give Cardinal reasonable advance notice of Koenig-Cheli-Zagon visit. Once visit set we would propose, in line with past practice, to ask Cardinal if he is prepared to receive visitors. We have no reason to believe he will object or delay, but he is strict on matters of form and would not be pleased if visit sprung on him from one day to next.

MEEHAN

május 25, kedd

70. BPB0407[98], CFB (3067) SOC-1 HUNG [098] – Távirat, Amembassy The Hague küldi: Amembassy Budapest, SecState, 1 p.

Hans Knoop holland újságíró, a De Telegraaf konzervatív újság munkatársa engedélyt kér interjú készítésére Mindszenty bíborossal.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE THE HAGUE 2109

SUBJ: REQUEST FOR INTERVIEW WITH CARDINAL MIND-[S]ZENTY

RESPONSIBLE DUTCH JOURNALIST, HANS KNOOP OF DE TELEGRAAF (LARGEST DAILY IN NETHERLANDS, CONSERVATIVE), HAS ASKED US TRANSMIT HIS REQUEST TO INTERVIEW CARDINAL MIND[S]ZENTY. KNOOP STATES HE IS PLANNING HUMAN INTEREST STORY AND SAYS INTERVIEW WILL RAISE NEITHER CONTROVERSIAL NOR POLITICALLY EMBARRASSING QUESTIONS. KNOOP IN POSSESSION HUNGARIAN VISA VALID BETWEEN MAY 31 AND JUNE 4. PLEASE ADVISE. EXEMPT

MIDDENDORF

május 26, szerda

71. BPB0407[97], CFB (3067) SOC-1 HUNG [097] – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: Amembassy The Hague, SecState, 1 p.

Meehan nem engedélyezi a holland újságíró interjú-kérését a bíborossal.

BUDAPEST 870

REF: THE HAGUE 2109

No press interviews of any kind permitted with Cardinal Mindszenty under long-established ground rules governing his status of refuge in Embassy.
MEEHAN

május 29, szombat

72. BPB0407[103] – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: SecState, Amembassy Vienna, 1 p.

Hivatkozva 66. sz. táviratra, közli, hogy Bock ismeretlen és igyekezik meggyőztetni közlekedési kísérleteit.

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BUDAPEST 860

SY CHANNEL

REF: VIENNA 3069

1. We have alerted Budapest MSG complement about conversation reported reftel. None of the men knows Bock or anything about him, but will be alert to any attempt by him to gain access – either direct or indirect – to Cardinal.

2. Request SY/SAS provide copy reftel and this message, plus any subsequent information, to EUR/CHP.

MEEHAN

1971. JÚNIUS

1971. június havának eseményei Mindszenty bíboros távozásának feltételei kimunkálásával telnek. Az amerikaiak javasolják vatikáni misszió küldését és hivatkozva arra, hogy volt idejük kiismerni a bíboros gondolkodását, fogalmazzák meg a résztvevő felek lehetséges feltételeit. Tekintettel arra, hogy a hónap jelentős részében Puhan nagykövet Washingtonban van, kézzelfekvő a gondolat, hogy a római képviselőhöz küldött precíz utasítások mögött az ő személyét kell keresnünk, ilymódon elsősorban Puhan nagykövet realizálja az amerikaiak szándékát: Mindszenty bíboros kiutazását.

Az első kiemelkedően fontos dokumentuma a június 3-i memorandum, Washington utasítására a római nagykövet helyettes, Illing adja át ezt Casarolinak június 5-én. Az amerikaiak a korosodással együtt járó orvosi ellátás gondjait nem tudják megoldani, ezért sürgetik a megoldást: Mindszenty hagyja el a budapesti nagykövetséget. Mivel a bíborost a történelemben elfoglalandó helye érdekli leginkább – ezzel utalnak az emlékiratok készülésére – és ennek érdekében az amerikaiaktól független csatornákkal keresi a kapcsolatot, ellenőrzése is egyre nehezebb, és szándékát is csak úgy tudja megvalósítani, ha elhagyja Magyarországot. Az amerikaiak e kérdésben végig ellenállnak, mert javítani akarják kapcsolatukat a magyar kormánnyal. Mindszenty csak legfelső helyről érkező hívásnak fog eleget tenni, érvelnek az amerikaiak, ezért sürgetik, hogy a pápa személyesen foglalkozzék a kérdéssel. E memorandumban gyakorlatilag minden fontos elem megtalálható. Washington még óvatos és kéri a budapesti nagykövetség kommentárját. Meehan válaszol, június 8-án, amelyben kifejti, hogy a magyarok, bármennyire is érdektelennek tüntetik fel magukat, igenis érdekeltek a bíboros távozásában, elkerülendő a komplikációkat esetleg bekövetkező halálával kapcsolatosan. Így van lehetőség a tárgyalásra. A sajtó problémáját is jelzi, főleg, hogy König közlékeny szokott lenni. E fázisban jobb, ha a sajtó nem tud semmiről. Washington június 10-én újabb részletes instrukciókat ad a római nagykövetségnek. Az emlékiratok publikálásának kilátásba helyezésével vissza lehetne fogni Mindszenty külföldi megnyilatkozásait. Az esetleges sajtóközlemények egyeztetését is kéri.

Casaroli június 5-én idézi VI. Pál szavait: nem lenne méltó és igazságos Mindszentyt azért hozni ki a magyar fogságból, hogy vatikáni fogságba vessék őt. Továbbá jelzi, hogy a pápa, mint legfőbb erkölcsi és lelki vezető, ez behatárolja mozgását, de a maga részéről mindent meg fog ten-

ni, hogy elérje a bíboros távozását. Casaroli július 14-én fogadja másodszor Illinget, az új, kiegészítő instrukciókkal. A vatikáni missziót a hónap végére időzítik, megkéri a magyar kormány, majd Washington hozzájárulását. König bíboros lenne az első látogató Mindszentynél, aki átadná a Szentatya meghívását. Ennek időpontját előbb június 21-re vagy 22-re tervezik, végül is június 23-án valósult meg. Mindszenty gondolkodását aznap délutáni megbeszélése és az arról készített följegyzés rögzíti (l. 313. sz.) Távozását illetően legnagyobb kételye az, nem fogja-e a világ közvéleménye megfutamodásnak, a magyarok – úgy az emigrációban, mint otthon – cserbenhagyásnak tartani. Saját budapesti követségi létét ugyanis a magyar rezsim fennállása elleni tiltakozás jegyében élte meg. – Június 24-én este érkezik Budapestre Mons. Cheli és Mons. Zágon, akik a részletekről tárgyalnak. (Cheli és Zágon a magyar kormány vendégházában lakik és állami kocsival közlekedik Budapesten. Június 27-én állami kocsival távoznak Hegyeshalomig, onnan a bécsi nunciatúra kocsiján Bécsig.) A följegyzések és a táviratok napról napra rögzítik a fordulatokat, amelyekből az derül ki, hogy a vatikáni misszió nagyobb ellenállásra talált, mint gondolt, és az amerikaiak voltak azok, akik jobban ismerték Mindszentyt. Ebben az összefüggésben még fontos VI. Pál instrukciója, aki Königen keresztül üzenve teljes szabadságot hagyott Mindszentynek döntését illetően, Chelinek és Zágonnak pedig kifejezetten megtiltotta, hogy nyomást gyakoroljanak a bíborosra. Érveljenek és motiváljanak, ez volt a feladat.

Bár a feltételekben megállapodtak, Zágon pro memóriáját a bíboros végül nem írja alá és nem ad meg időpontot távozására. Nyugodtan akar gondolkodni erről, nem nyomás alatt. Mindenki meglepetésére, Mindszenty nem szabta távozása feltételül rehabilitálását, bár álláspontja szerint ez az egyetlen, amit elvárna a magyar kormánytól. Ugyanakkor nagy hatással volt rá a pápa biztosítéka, hogy távozása után megtarthatja címeit. A látogatást követően, a hónap végén Mindszenty két fontos levelet küld, időrendben az elsőt Nixon elnöknek, a másodikat VI. Pál pápának. Nixon elnöknek azt írja, hogy a Vatikán kéri, hogy hagyja el a nagykövetséget és tanácsát, véleményét kéri. Fontos mondata: „Eltávolítása kiolthatja a magyar emigránsok és rabszolgák alig pislákoló reményének lángját.” A pápának megírja, hogy eldöntötte: elhagyja az országot. A két levél eredeti szövege és a pápának írt levél angol fordítása e levelezésben megtalálható.

A hónap érdekessége, hogy Puhan nagykövet Washingtonban tartózkodik, mondható, hogy onnan szervezi az egészet. Csak június 28-án érkezik vissza a nagykövetségre, ő az, aki postázza Mindszenty két levelét. A pápának írt levelet – az eddigi gyakorlattól eltérően – lepecsételt borítékban küldi meg a római nagykövetségen keresztül a Vatikánnak. Az

amerikaiak kedvenc kifejezése e döntő fordulat után: a kedvező pillanat kihasználása: „sustain the momentum now achieved, maintain momentum”. E hónap levelezésében megtaláljuk Mons. Zágon június 25–26–27-i promemóriájának magyar és angol szövegét, de hiányzik a június 27-i rész. E hónap folyamán Illing négyszer tette tiszteletét Casarolinál.

június 1, kedd

73. BPB0407[94], RMNNSFNB828 – Levél, Meehan Bakerhez, 1 p.

Mindszenty bíboros kéri a mellékelt levél megküldését a Vatikáni Államtitkárságnak, amelyben megköszöni az új misekönyvet.

*

Cardinal Mindszenty requested that we transmit to the Vatican Secretary of State the enclosed note of appreciation for the new Missal he recently received.

With best regards.

Sincerely,
Francis J. Meehan [not signed]
Chargé d’Affaires ad interim

Enclosure:

június 3, csütörtök

74. BPB0407[92–93], CFB (3067) SOC-1 HUNG [060–062, 064–068, 073–076 (3x)], RMNNSFNB828 – Távirat, SecState küldi: Amembassy Rome, Amembassy Budapest, 2 pp.

Illing kérjen mihamarabbi időpontot Mons. Casarolinál és Chinél, és közölje a következőket: Mindszenty korosodásával egyre inkább olyan gondoskodásra szorul, amelyre a budapesti nagykövetség nincs felkészülve, szükség esetén magyar kórházba kell őt beszállítani. Ezért a bíboros lakóhelyének megváltoztatása minden tárgyalási fél érdeke, így a

Vatikáné és a magyar kormányé is. A Vatikán részéről a javaslatnak határozottnak kell lennie, hogy legyőzze Mindszenty habozását a nagykövetségi menedék elhagyását illetően. Az ő jelenlegi gondja, úgy tűnik, a történelemben elfoglalt helye, ezért tőlünk függetlenül igyekszik gondoskodni emlékiratainak elhelyezéséről és posztumusz kiadásáról. Ez azonban csak akkor áll módjában, ha elhagyja Magyarországot. Bár ismételten kért engedélyt kiadatlan emlékiratainak megküldésére az ő választott bizalmasa és kiadója, Mons. Szabó (US) felé, közöltük vele, hogy ez nem áll összhangban menedéke feltételeivel, és erre nem is tudunk ígéretet tenni. Puhan nagykövet május elején újból közölte vele, hogy nem valószínű, hogy ez a döntés megváltoztatható. Ily módon megítélésünk szerint a Vatikán egyik legeredményesebb lépése az lehet, ha a bíborosnak, óhaja szerint, felajánlja emlékiratai kiadásra való előkészítését. Véleményünk szerint a vatikáni kiküldött akkor tud eredményesen tárgyalni Mindszentyvel távozását illetően, ha Őszentsége VI. Pál pápa kifejezett irányítása és teljes tekintéllyel való támogatása kíséri. A Vatikánnal együtt az a benyomásunk, hogy a magyar kormány kész új erőfeszítésre e kérdésben és elfogadná, hogy Mindszenty megtartsa címeit, feltételezve, hogy a jövőben nem lesz befolyása az állam és az egyház viszonyának alakulására Magyarországon. Budapesti nagykövetségünk egy héttel korábban szívesen informálná a bíborost az esetleges vatikáni delegáció érkezéséről. Illing pontosan kövesse az utasításokat és ne fűzzön hozzájuk kommentárt. Nagyon nagy óvatossággal kell eljárni ez ügyben, mivel kényes vonzatai vannak.

SECRET STATE 097483

EXDIS

SUBJ: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY

REF: STATE 086951, ROME 3258

ILLING SHOULD SEEK APPOINTMENT WITH MSGR. CASAROLI AND CHELI AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY AND MAKE FOLLOWING POINTS:

1. WE ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT CARDINAL IN HIS ADVANCED YEARS IS IN NEED OF TYPE OF CARE WE CANNOT PROVIDE AT OUR EMBASSY IN BUDAPEST. WE FEAR THAT SITUATION COULD ARISE IN WHICH WE WOULD BE FACED WITH NECESSITY, IN EVENT OF MEDICAL EMERGENCY, OF TAKING HIM TO HUNGARIAN HOSPITAL. EMBASSY BUDAPEST

WILL BE PREPARED PROVIDE VATICAN EMISSARIES WITH DETAIL ABOUT CARE HE NOW NEEDS WHICH INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT FOR EMBASSY TO PROVIDE.

2. AN EARLY ARRANGEMENT FOR CARDINAL'S RESETTLEMENT IS NECESSARY AND IN INTEREST OF ALL PARTIES CONCERNED, FOR THIS REASON, AS WELL AS FOR REASONS VATICAN AND GOH MAY HAVE.

3. WE BELIEVE PROPOSAL PUT TO CARDINAL BY VATICAN MUST BE SUFFICIENTLY FORCEFUL, AS WELL AS ATTRACTIVE TO HIM, TO OVERCOME HIS DEEP-STATED RELUCTANCE TO DEPART FROM HIS REFUGE AT OUR EMBASSY.

4. THE CARDINAL'S PRINCIPAL PRESENT CONCERN APPEARS TO BE HIS PLACE IN HISTORY. THIS HE HOPES TO ESTABLISH THROUGH INDEPENDENT ARRANGEMENTS FOR EDITING AND POSTHUMOUS PUBLISHING OF HIS MEMOIRS, A POSSIBILITY OPEN TO HIM ONLY IF HE LEAVES HUNGARY. ALTHOUGH HE HAS REQUESTED SEVERAL TIMES PERMISSION TO SEND [./] HIS UNEDITED MEMOIRS TO HIS CHOSEN CONFIDANT AND EDITOR, MONSIGNOR SZABO, IN THE US, WE HAVE TOLD HIM THIS WOULD NOT BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH HIS TERMS OF REFUGE AND WE CANNOT MAKE ANY COMMITMENTS ON THIS OR ON POSTHUMOUS PUBLICATION OF HIS MEMOIRS. HE WAS AGAIN TOLD BY AMBASSADOR PUHAN IN EARLY MAY THAT IT WAS UNLIKELY THAT THIS DECISION WOULD BE CHANGED.

5. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, ONE OF THE VATICAN'S MOST EFFECTIVE INDUCEMENTS, IN OUR JUDGMENT, WOULD BE TO OFFER CARDINAL FACILITIES TO EDIT AND PREPARE HIS MEMOIRS FOR POSTHUMOUS PUBLICATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH HIS WISHES.

6. WE BELIEVE THAT THE SUCCESS OF ANY NEW EFFORTS TO PERSUADE CARDINAL MINDSZENTY TO END HIS REFUGE AND LEAVE HUNGARY WOULD BE GREATLY ENHANCED IF THE VATICAN EMISSARY DESIGNATED TO CONFER WITH HIM COULD SPEAK AT EXPRESS DIRECTION AND WITH FULL SUPPORT OF AUTHORITY OF HIS HOLINESS POPE PAUL VI.

7. WE CONCUR WITH VATICAN'S IMPRESSION THAT GOH READY FOR NEW EFFORT ON THIS PROBLEM AND MIGHT BE WILLING SEE MINDSZENTY RETAIN HIS TITLES PROVIDED HE

HAD NO INFLUENCE ON FUTURE COURSE OF REGULATION OF CHURCH-STATE AFFAIRS IN HUNGARY.

8. WE BELIEVE OUR EMBASSY IN BUDAPEST SHOULD BE ABLE TO GIVE CARDINAL COURTESY OF ONE WEEK ADVANCE NOTICE OF ARRIVAL OF ANY VATICAN DELEGATION.

9. RECOMMEND ILLING BE INSTRUCTED TO FOLLOW FOREGOING AUTHORITATIVE BRIEF EXACTLY AND AVOID ADDING ANYTHING TO IT, REPORTING BACK ANY QUESTIONS WHICH MAY BE PUT TO HIM. GREAT CARE NECESSARY WITH THIS ISSUE WHICH HAS MANY SENSITIVE RAMIFICATIONS.

IRWIN

június 4, péntek

75. BPB0407[90], CFB (3067) SOC-1 HUNG [059], RMNNSFB693 – Távirat, SecState küldi: Amembassy Budapest, 1 p.

State Department Budapest kommentárját (véleményét) kéri, mielőtt Róma válaszol.

SECRET STATE 098914

EXDIS

FOR CHARGE FROM BAKER

REF: STATE 097483

WELCOME ANY COMMENTS YOU MAY WISH TO ADD ON APPROACH TO CARDINAL AS SOON AS ROME REPLIES TO REFTEL.

IRWIN

76. BPB0407[91] – Levél, Ross Titus küldi: a tábori püspökségnek, New Yorkba, 1 p.

Ross Titus bérmlás anyakönyvezésének intézését kéri az amerikai tábori püspökségtől. A bérmlást Mindszenty bíboros végezte a budapesti nagykövetségen.

Gentlemen:

I am enclosing a letter from His Eminence Jozsef Cardinal Mindszenty to which is attached data pertaining to the confirmation of Edward Shaw Wilgis and Karen Ann Kuhla. As the fathers of these children are Catholic civilian employees of the United States Government serving abroad, I understand that they and their families would, for certain purposes, come within the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Military Ordinariate, and that the official certificates of confirmation would be issued by the Ordinariate.

The certificates may be sent to me at the following address:

Ross Titus
Budapest
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20521

If there are any fees or other charges in connection with the preparation of the certificates, please write to me at the above address.

Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely yours,
Ross Titus [not signed]
Second Secretary of Embassy

június 8, kedd

77. BPB0407[84–86], CFB (3067) SOC-1 HUNG [055–0556], RMNNSF B693 – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: SecState, Amembassy Rome, 3 pp.

Meehan ügyvivő megköszöni, hogy kommentárt küldhet. A bíboros szándéka a maradás, így a nyomás és a motiválás jól adagolt keverékét kell alkalmazni, hogy mozduljon. A Rómának való engedelmesség alapvető elv a számára. Így a vatikáni javaslat akkor lesz eredményes, ha a pápa személyes óhajaként jelenik meg. A bíboros minden más esetben manőverezni és halogatni fog. Az emlékiratok publikálása valóban kulcsfontosságú tényező. A magyar kormány nyomást akar gyakorolni a Vatikánra, hogy hallgatásra bírják a bíborost, beleértve az emlékiratok publikálásának tiltását, még halála után is, mert valószínűleg érzik, hogy a Vatikán kész

megfizetni ezt az árat az egyház helyzetének normalizálása érdekében. A bíboros kiutazása nem valószínű, ha elmarad az emlékiratok publikálásának kilátásba helyezése. A Vatikánnak tudatában kell lennie: a magyarok nem óhajtják, hogy a bíboros a nagykövetségen haljon meg, így egyáltalán nincsenek abban a helyzetben, hogy a feltételeket ők szabják meg, bármennyire is úgy tüntetik fel. Van tere a tárgyalásnak, bár a magyarok nem lesznek könnyű vagy gyors tárgyalófelek. A javasolt König-Cheli-Zágon látogatás a bíboroshoz valószínűleg az első állomás lesz egy hosszabb folyamatban. Fölveti a sajtó problémáját és jelzi, hogy várható: König, mint a múltban is, közlékeny lesz a sajtó felé.

BUDAPEST 0942

SUBJECT: Cardinal Mindszenty

REF: STATE 97483, ROME 3538

1. Appreciate the opportunity to comment.

2. Para 3 State 97483 contains the nub of the matter. The Cardinal's whole instinct is to stay put, and it will take a well considered mix of pressure and inducement to move him. Obedience to Rome is a basic principle to him. Thus, the Vatican proposal should carry the force of a personal wish of the Pope to be fully effective. Anything short of this will give the Cardinal room to maneuver and temporize.

3. Publication of the memoirs is indeed a key factor (Para 5, State 97483) and this issue and the question of silence loom as main negotiating areas. The Hungarian Government will exert heavy pressure to get a Vatican commitment on silence and against publication, even [./.] posthumously, and it probably feels the Vatican is not unwilling to pay the price in an effort to normalize the situation of the church in Hungary. It should be realized that the chances of getting the Cardinal out will be severely reduced in the absence of some arrangement for publication. The Vatican should be aware that in our judgement the Hungarians do not want the Cardinal to die in the Embassy, and are therefore not in as commanding a position as they will doubtless try to convey. There is room for negotiation, though the Hungarians will not give in easily or quickly. The proposed Koenig-Cheli-Zagon visit to the Cardinal is likely to be only the first stage in an extended process.

4. We take it that the Department is considering the question of press handling of the visit and will give us guidance. We must assume that the visit will be public knowledge. The most frequently asked question we

get from diplomatic colleagues these days is when is Koenig [./] coming to see the Cardinal with the Vatican proposals. Given his past performance Koenig for one will likely be prepared to talk to the press either here or in Vienna.

MEEHAN

78. BPB0407[101] – Utólag titkosítva (titkosítás dátuma: 2001. július 9.), eredetileg 3 pp.

Meehan följegyzése/távirata lehet Puhan nagykövet számára, aki az idő szerint Washingtonban tartózkodik.

Access Restricted

Cardinal Mindszenty 1-6/1971, Document Date: 06/08/1971

LTF, FR: MEEHAN, TO: PUHAN, NND: 20019019

WITHDRAWN: 07/09/2001

június 10, csütörtök

79. BPB0407[82–83], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG Box 3068 [237–240] – Távirat, SecState küldi: Amembassy Rome, Amemb. Budapest, 2 pp.

Mivel az elmúlt évek alatt elég jól kiismerték Mindszentyt, s ennek következtében előre meg tudják mondani, mi lesz a reakciója, kéri Illinget, hogy Mons. Casaroli és Cheli felé a következő pontokat közvetítse. Meg - erősítve azt a véleményt, hogy Mindszenty számára két kulcsfontosságú tényező: a pápa személyes óhaja és a Vatikán elkötelezése aziránt, hogy megkönnyítse emlékiratainak halála utáni publikálását, ez utóbbit illetően a vatikáni kiküldöttek ne titkolják el ajánlatukat oly mértékben, hogy az visszatartsa a bíborost a távozástól. A Vatikán adja meg a lehetőséget Mindszentynek, hogy megválassza kiadóját, tekintet nélkül arra a rizikóra, amelyet az emlékiratok kritikája jelentene úgy a Vatikán, mint az US felé. Ennek ellenében a Vatikán kérheti tőle, hogy távozását követően fogja vissza polémiaját a magyar kormánnyal szemben. Ez fontos lesz a magyar kormány - nak. Utóbbi nyomást fog gyakorolni a Vatikánra, hogy ígértessék meg a hallgatást, de úgy véljük, hogy a magyar kormány jobban fél attól a lehe - tőségtől, hogy a bíboros a nagykövetségen hal meg. Így a magyar kormány nincs abban a biztos tárgyalási pozícióban, amelyet el akar hitetni a Vati - kánnal. Ezt követően javasolják, hogy a vatikáni kiküldöttek érjék el: Mindszenty ne szabjon feltételeket, pl. rehabilitását illetően. Végül kéri a Vatikánt, értesítsék az amerikaiakat az esetleges sajtóközleményekről, hogy időben fel tudjanak készülni a sajtó kérdéseire.

SECRET STATE 103282
EXDIS
SUBJECT: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY
REF: A) ROME 3538 B) BUDAPEST 942

UTILIZING INTRODUCTORY OBSERVATION THAT OVER THE YEARS WE HAVE COME TO KNOW MINDSZENTY RATHER WELL, AND CONSEQUENTLY ARE IN POSITION TO PREDICT HIS REACTIONS, REQUEST ILLING MAKE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL POINTS TO MSGR. CASAROLI AND CHELI:

1. REAFFIRM OUR BELIEF THAT TWO KEY ELEMENTS FOR MINDSZENTY ARE (1) PERSONAL WISH OF POPE; (2) A COMMITMENT BY THE VATICAN TO FACILITATE PREPARATION OF CARDINAL'S MEMOIRS FOR POSTHUMOUS PUBLICATION. ON THIS LATTER POINT, WE ARE CONVINCED THAT VATICAN EMISSARIES SHOULD NOT HEDGE THEIR OFFER TO THE EXTENT THAT IT WOULD DISCOURAGE THE CARDINAL FROM DEPARTURE. TO BE EFFECTIVE, WE BELIEVE VATICAN'S COMMITMENT WAS TO GIVE MINDSZENTY HIS CHOICE OF EDITOR AND PUBLISHER REGARDLESS OF RISK THAT MEMOIRS MAY INCLUDE CRITICISM OF VATICAN AS WELL AS OF US. VATICAN MIGHT CONSIDER IN RETURN FOR THIS COMMITMENT, SEEKING UNDERTAKING BY CARDINAL TO REFRAIN FROM POLEMICS AGAINST GOH AFTER HE DEPARTS HUNGARY. THIS WILL BE IMPORTANT TO GOH.

2. GOH WILL PROBABLY PUSH FOR VATICAN COMMITMENT ON SILENCE, BUT WE BELIEVE GOH CONCERN THAT CARDINAL NOT DIE IN EMBASSY IS REAL, AND GOH CONSEQUENTLY NOT IN AS STRONG A POSITION AS IT MAY TRY TO MAKE VATICAN BELIEVE. AFFIRM EARLIER SUGGESTION THAT GOH TOO BE ENCOURAGED AVOID IMPOSING UNREALISTIC CONDITIONS.

3. WITH REGARD PARA 3 REFTTEL (4), WE CANNOT BE SURE CARDINAL HAS ABANDONED HIS EARLIER INSISTENCE THAT GOH DROP ALL CRIMINAL CHARGES AGAINST HIM. WE BELIEVE VATICAN DELEGATION SHOULD COUNSEL CARDINAL IN STRONGEST POSSIBLE TERMS TO REFRAIN FROM POSING CONDITIONS, BUT WE CANNOT BE SURE THIS ADVICE WILL BE [./.] ACCEPTED. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE UNDERSTAND CARDINAL KOENIG COMMENTED ON MINDSZENTY REHABILI-

TATION TO PRESS ON MAY 28. IN OUR JUDGMENT, THIS TYPE OF PUBLIC OBSERVATION, WHICH MAY MAKE CARDINAL AWARE HIS FUTURE BEING WEIGHTED BEFORE HE FORMALLY APPRISED OF VISIT, WILL NOT BE HELPFUL IN SOLVING MINDSZENTY PROBLEM. IT ALSO ADDS TO BURDEN OUR EMBASSY IN BUDAPEST MUST BEAR IN MANAGING CONSEQUENT PRESS INQUIRES.

4. WE WOULD APPRECIATE VATICAN INFORMING US IN ADVANCE OF ANY STATEMENTS VATICAN OR MEMBERS OF ITS DELEGATION PLAN TO MAKE TO PRESS ON MINDSZENTY QUESTION AS THIS WILL BE ESSENTIAL TO EMBASSY BUDAPEST'S EFFORTS TO HANDLE PRESS INQUIRIES AND CARDINAL MINDSZENTY HIMSELF.

ROGERS

június 11, péntek

80. BPB0407[87–89] – Távirat, Amembassy Rome küldi: SecState, Amemb. Budapest, 2 pp. A távirat dátuma helyesen június 5.

Casaroli Chelivel együtt fogadta Illinget június 5-én. Illing tájé - koztatta a távirat pontos értelmében. Casaroli nagyra értékelte az infor - mációt, amely új hasznos elemeket tartalmazott. Június 6-án referál a pápának. A Vatikán gyorsan fog lépni, és egy héttel korábban jelezni fogja a Mindszentynél teendő látogatás dátumát. Casaroli számára új gondolat volt, hogy Mindszentynek engedélyezzék emlékiratainak halála utáni közlését, de a Vatikán ellenőrizni kívánja azt. Ellenzi, hogy Mons. Szabo vagy más harmadik fél szerepet kapjon, mert nem ellenőrizhetők. Ha Mindszenty beleegyezik a posztumusz publikációba, a forgatókönyvet egyeztetni kell a bíboros és az Apostoli Szentszék között. Casaroli meg - említette, hogy a magyar kormány nem vetette föl az emlékiratok kérdését, még Péter János látogatásakor sem. Fő feltételük az, hogy a Vatikán bírja hallgatásra, kifejezetten tiltsa meg a sajtóval való kapcsolatot. A pápa elmondta Péternek és gyakran elmondja saját környezetének, igen nehéz lenne hallgatást parancsolni Mindszentynek. Újabban úgy fogalmazott Casaroli előtt, hogy nem lenne méltó és igazságos, hogy azért hozzák ki Mindszentyt a magyar fogságból, hogy vatikáni fogságba vessék őt. Casa - rolinak feltűnt, hogy az amerikaiak nem említik a bíboros óhaját, hogy a magyar kormány fölmentse őt a vádpontoktól, s arra következtetett, hogy a

bíboros a távozás érdekében idővel megváltoztatta a mindent vagy semmit feltételét. Casaroli, annak tudatában, hogy az amerikai kormány részéről úgy vélik, a pápa nem tett meg mindent Mindszenty távozása érdekében, kifejti, hogy a pápa, mint erkölcsi és lelki vezető, bizonyos határok között mozoghat csupán, de erkölcsileg mindent meg fog tenni, hogy a bíborost távozásra bírja. Casaroli optimista volt, hogy a pápa el fogja fogadni a javaslatokat. Cheli nagy reményeket fűzött Mons. Zágon személyéhez, akit Mindszenty nagyra értékel. Zágon személyesen meg van arról győződve, hogy a bíborosnak el kell hagynia Magyarországot.

SECRET ROME 3538

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY

REF: STATE 097483

1. CASAROLI TOGETHER WITH CHELI RECEIVED ILLING JUNE 5. ILLING BRIEFED THEM FOLLOWING REFTTEL EXACTLY. CASAROLI MOST APPRECIATIVE FOR INFORMATION WHICH HE FELT CONTAINS SOME NEW HELPFUL ELEMENTS. AT MEETING WITH POPE JUNE 6 HE WILL DISCUSS MATTER. VATICAN INTENDS TO MOVE FAST BUT ASSURES THEY WILL GIVE AT LEAST ONE WEEK NOTICE BEFORE VISITING MINDSZENTY.

2. CASAROLI SINGLED OUT IDEA THAT MINDSZENTY BE PERMITTED TO PUBLISH HIS MEMOIRES POSTHUMOUSLY. HE THOUGHT THIS SEEMINGLY NEW ELEMENT COULD BE KEY TO MOVING CARDINAL WHO PREVIOUSLY DESIROUS PUBLISH HIS PAPERS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. CASAROLI NOTED THAT SHOULD MINDSZENTY PAPERS EVER LEAVE HUNGARY THEIR DISPOSITION SHOULD BE CONTROLLED BY HOLY SEE. HE CONTRARY TO ADMITTING ROLE FOR MSGR. SZABO OR ANY "THIRD PARTY" WHO COULD NOT BE PROPERLY CONTROLLED. IF MINDSZENTY AGREES TO POSTHUMOUS PUBLICATION, CASAROLI BELIEVES TIMING AFTER MINDSZENTY'S DEATH COULD BE WORKED OUT BETWEEN CARDINAL AND HOLY SEE.

3. CASAROLI MENTIONED THAT GOH, EVEN DURING PETER VISIT, HAD NEVER RAISED PROBLEM OF MEMOIRES. GOH MAIN CONCERN HAS BEEN THAT VATICAN IMPOST SILENCE ON MINDSZENTY, ESPECIALLY DENYING HIM ANY

CONTACTS WITH MEDIA. AS POPE TOLD PETER AND HAS OFTEN REPEATED TO HIS STAFF, IT WOULD BE MOST DIFFICULT TO "IMPOSE" SILENCE ON CARDINAL. CASAROLI REPORTED THAT POPE RECENTLY TOLD HIM IT WOULD VIOLATE AL[L] DECENCY AND JUSTICE TO REMOVE MINDSZENTY FROM HUNGARIAN CAPTIVITY TO PLACE HIM IN VATICAN CAPTIVITY.

4. CASAROLI STRUCK THAT REFTTEL MADE NO MENTION CARDINAL'S [./.] HERETOFORE INSISTANCE THAT GOH RESCIND ALL CRIMINAL CHARGES AGAINST HIM. THIS MAY, CASAROLI MUSED, BE INDICATION THAT WITH HIS TIME RUNNING OUT CARDINAL MAY BE WILLING ALTER HIS PREVIOUS ALL OR NOTHING AT ALL APPROACH TO DEPARTURE.

5. CASAROLI SAID HE WOULD LIKE USG TO APPRECIATE THAT POPE HAS BEEN DOING ALL MORALLY POSSIBLE TO CONVINCE MINDSZENTY TO DEPART OUR EMBASSY. CASAROLI SAID HE AWARE THAT CERTAIN PERSONS IN USG FEEL POPE HAS NOT BROUGHT SUFFICIENT PRESSURE ON CARDINAL. THERE NO QUESTION, HE STRESSED, THAT VATICAN STRONGLY WISHES RAUC (sic!) THIS TRAGIC AFFAIR, BUT THERE CERTAIN LIMITS BEYOND WHICH POPE AS MORAL AND SPIRITUAL LEADER CANNOT GO REGARDLESS HOW DEEPLY THIS PARTICULAR PROBLEM TROUBLES HIM.

6. DURING HIS TALK WITH POPE CASAROLI HOPES TO OBTAIN PERMISSION TO OFFER MINDSZENTY POSTHUMOUS PUBLICATION HIS MEMOIRES. WILL ALSO DISCUSS FUTURE OF CARDINAL'S TITLES AND ATTEMPT HAVE POPE WRITE CARDINAL A FORCEFUL LETTER. CASAROLI SEEMED HOPEFUL POPE WOULD APPROVE THIS LINE OF APPROACH.

7. FOLLOWING MEETING CHELI TOLD ILLING THAT HE SANGUINE SOME REAL PROGRESS NOW POSSIBLE. CHELI ESPECIALLY OPTIMISTIC THAT HIS COLLEAGUE, MSGR. ZAGON, WOULD BE ABLE PRESENT STRONG, CONVINCING CASE TO MINDSZENTY. CARDINAL APPARENTLY PLACES GREAT STORE IN ZAGON'S JUDGMENT, AND ZAGON NOW PERSONALLY CONVINCED THAT MINDSZENTY SHOULD LEAVE HUNGARY. MARTIN

június 14, hétfő

81. BPB0407[81] – Távirat, Amembassy Rome küldi: SecState, Amembassy Budapest, 1 p .

Június 14-én Casaroli fogadta Illinget, aki előhozta az újabb távirat (79. sz.) szerinti pontokat. Casaroli mindezt hálásan tudomásul vette. A vatikáni kiküldöttek megkísérlik a bíborost arra bírni, hogy álljon el nem realista feltételektől, különös tekintettel arra, hogy a magyar kormány ejtse el a vádpontokat. Casaroli nincs ellene annak, hogy a bíboros megválassza kiadóját, ez esetben azonban nincs értelme a posztumusz kiadásról tárgyalni. A Vatikán minden áron el akarja kerülni, hogy a bíboros halála előtt bármely információ kiszivároгjon az emlékiratok kapcsán. Bár Casaroli nem árult el részleteket június 6-i találkozásáról a pápával, annyit elmondott, hogy a Szentatya nem túl optimista Mindszenty távozását illetően, de szívesen próbát tesz. Június 15-ig tud időpontot jelezni. Illing hangsúlyozta, hogy a bíborosnak egy héttel előbb tudnia kell az időpontot. Cheli öt napot javasolt, de rögtön hozzátette, hogy ismeri Mindszenty érzékenységet és a lehető leghosszabb időt adná. A vatikáni misszió június végére reális. A Vatikán nem tervez nyilatkozatot kiadni, hiszen további látogatásokra van kilátás és a magyar kormánnyal is egyeztetni kell. König megnyilatkozásait illetően sajnálatukat fejezték ki, de ő végül is nem hivatalos minőségben teszi mindezt.

SECRET ROME 3714

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY

REF: STATE 103282

1. ILLING SAW CASAROLI AND CHELI JUNE 14 AND MADE PRESENTATION AS INSTRUCTED REFTel. CASAROLI THANKFUL FOR ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE AND DEPARTMENTAL INSIGHTS OF WHICH HE MADE CAREFUL NOTE. VATICAN EMISSARIES WILL ATTEMPT DISUADE CARDINAL FROM STIPULATING UNREALISTIC CONDITIONS FOR HIS DEPARTURE, ESPECIALLY REGARDING INSISTENCE GOH DROP ALL CRIMINAL CHARGES AGAINST HIM. CASAROLI THOUGHT VATICAN COULD PERMIT MINDSZENTY AN EDITOR AND PUBLISHER OF HIS CHOICE, BUT FEAR IS THAT IF THIRD PARTY WERE TO WORK WITH

CARDINAL IN PREPARING MEMOIRS THERE GREAT DANGER OF LEAKS WHICH COULD RENDER MEANINGLESS ANY AGREEMENT FOR POSTHUMOUS PUBLICATION. VATICAN WOULD WISH AT ALL COSTS AVOID ANY DIVULGENCE OF MINDSZENTY'S WRITINGS PRIOR HIS DEATH.

2. CASAROLI UNWILLING REVEAL DETAILS HIS JUNE 6 MEETING WITH POPE BEYOND REMARK THAT POPE NOT "OVERLY OPTIMISTIC" ABOUT DISLODGING MINDSZENTY BUT WILLING GIVE A TRY.

3. CASAROLI SAID VATICAN EXPECTS HAVE DETAILS FOR BUDAPEST VISIT READY TO PRESENT TO EMBASSY ROME BY JUNE 15. ILLING REEMPHASIZED IMPORTANCE OF GIVING MINDSZENTY AMPLE ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF VISIT, AS A MINIMUM ONE WEEK. CHELI REPLIED, "WOULDN'T FIVE DAYS BE ENOUGH?" HE THEN ADDED THAT HE AWARE MINDSZENTY'S SENSITIVITY AND WOULD GIVE AS MUCH LEAD TIME AS POSSIBLE. AS REPORTED PREVIOUSLY VATICAN ANXIOUS TO SEND MISSION TO BUDAPEST SOONEST, IDEALLY DURING LAST HALF JUNE.

VATICAN EMISSARIES PLAN NO STATEMENT TO PRESS EITHER BEFORE OR AFTER BUDAPEST VISIT. SINCE ADDITIONAL VISITS MAY BE REQUIRED AND SINCE FUTURE CONSULTATIONS WITH GOH NECESSARY, CHELI DOUBTS ANY "STATEMENTS" FORTHCOMING IN NEAR FUTURE. HE SAID CARDINAL KOENIG'S REMARKS MOST REGRETTABLE, BUT KOENIG A FREE AGENT WHO IN HABIT OF MAKING IMPRUDENT COMMENTS TO PRESS. CHELI WAS IRATE OVER RECENT REFERENCES TO BUDAPEST VISIT AND CALLED KOENIG TO TRY TO IMPRESS ON HIM DAMAGE SUCH UNGUARDED REMARKS MAY CAUSE. MARTIN

június 17, csütörtök

82. BPB0407[74–75] – Távirat, Amembassy Rome küldi: SecState, Amembassy Budapest, 2 pp.

Cheli tájékoztatta Illinget a budapesti látogatás részleteiről, átadta memorandumát, amelynek szövegét egy újabb következő távirat tartalmazza. A magyar kormány már beleegyezését adta König bíboros, Mons. Zágón

és Cheli látogatásához. Az egyetlen hiányzó elem Washington jóváhagyása a látogatás időpontját illetően. Cheli elmondta: a Vatikán eldöntötte, hogy Mindszenty meggyőzése érdekében maximális erőbedobásra van szükség. König várhatóan június 21-én vagy 22-én érkezne, hogy általánosságban tolmácsolja a pápa óhaját Magyarország elhagyását illetően. Mivel Mindszenty szerint König nem érti az egyház magyarországi helyzetét, a Vatikán nem óhajtja, hogy König részletekbe bocsátkozzék, viszont úgy gondolja, hogy presztízs szempontból szükséges, hogy Mindszenty a pápa óhaját bíboros testvére szájából hallja meg. Ezt követné Mons. Zágon és Cheli látogatása, hogy a részleteket is megvilágítsák. Ha mindhárman együtt menének, túl nagy feltűnést okozna és a kitűzött célra irányítaná a figyelmet. Cheli és Zágon magyar rendszámú autóval érkeznének, hogy elkerüljék a feltűnést, és addig maradnának Budapesten, amíg szükségesnek mutatkozik, hogy meggyőzzék Mindszentyt a távozás szükségességéről. Cheli szerint a Vatikán nem gondolja, hogy Mindszenty ragaszkodna teljes rehabilitációjához, de – szintén a Vatikán véleménye szerint – az sem várható, hogy Mindszenty amnesztiát kérjen a magyar kormánytól. Cheli elmondta, hogy a magyar kormány ettől függetlenül Mindszentyt – távozását követően – egyoldalúan hivatalosan amnesztiában részesíti. Mindszenty címeiről Cheli azt nyilatkozta, hogy a magyar kormány beleegyezett megtartásukba, de kikötötte, hogy a bíboros nyilvánosan nem foglalkozhat magyar egyházi ügyekkel, távozását követően pedig apostoli kormányzót neveznének ki. Két rendkívül nehéz pont van még: az emlékiratok és a bíboros hallgatása. Mindszentynek el kell fogadnia, hogy emlékiratait csak halálát követően teheti közzé, s elismeri ez ügyben az Apostoli Szentszék illetékességét. Tudomásul kell vennie, hogy a publikálásra csak akkor van lehetősége, ha elhagyja Magyarországot. Remélik, hogy a pápa iránti engedelmességből nem tesz nyilatkozatokat távozását követően. Cheli, Zágonnal együtt, úgy érvel majd, hogy Magyarországon élve el van temetve, és nem tehet semmit sem, hogy segítsen egyházán. Ha viszont kijönne Rómába, érvényesíthetné magán (nem nyilvános) befolyását a kúrián belül a magyarországi teendőket illetően. Cheli június 19-én szombaton távozik Bécsbe, hogy találkozzék Königgel. Illing biztosította Chelit, hogy haladéktalanul kéri Washingtont a budapesti dátum engedélyezésére.

SECRET ROME 3812

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY

REF: ROME 3714

1. MONSIGNOR CHELI OF VATICAN SECRETARIAT OF STATE CALLED AT HIS REQUEST ON DCM JUNE 17 TO PROVIDE DETAILS FOR BUDAPEST VISIT (PARA 3 REFTEL). HE LEFT MEMORANDUM, TEXT OF WHICH IS CONTAINED IN IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.

2. CHELI NOTED WITH RESPECT TO PARAGRAPH FOUR OF MEMORANDUM THAT HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT (GOH) HAD ALREADY GIVEN ITS APPROVAL FOR THE ENTRY OF CARDINAL KOENIG, MONSIGNOR ZAGON AND HIMSELF, AND THE ONLY MISSING ELEMENT WAS WASHINGTON'S APPROVAL FOR PRECISE DATE OF VISIT.

3. CHELI SAID THAT VATICAN HAD DECIDED THAT MAXIMUM EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE THIS TIME TO PERSUADE MINDSZENTY TO LEAVE HUNGARY. THE TACTIC WHICH HAD BEEN DECIDED UPON WAS TO HAVE CARDINAL KOENIG GO TO BUDAPEST ALONE, HOPEFULLY ON MONDAY, JUNE 21 OR TUESDAY, JUNE 22, TO EXPRESS TO MINDSZENTY IN GENERAL TERMS POPE'S DESIRE THAT HE LEAVE HUNGARY. SINCE MINDSZENTY CONSIDERS THAT KOENIG DOES NOT UNDERSTAND SITUATION OF CHURCH IN HUNGARY, VATICAN DOES NOT WANT KOENIG TO GET INTO ANY OF DETAILS. VATICAN BELIEVES, HOWEVER, THAT FOR REASONS OF PRESTIGE, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR MINDSZENTY TO RECEIVE WORD OF POPES'S DESIRE THAT HE LEAVE FROM A FELLOW' CARDINAL.

4. VATICAN PLAN THEN CALLS FOR ZAGON, WHO HAS GREAT INFLUENCE WITH MINDSZENTY, AND CHELI TO GO TO BUDAPEST IMMEDIATELY AFTER KOENIG'S RETURN TO VIENNA (ARRIVING SAME DAY OR NEXT MORNING) IN ORDER TO GO INTO ALL THE DETAILS. CHELI SAID THAT VATICAN BELIEVED THAT IF KOENIG, ZAGON AND CHELI ALL WENT TOGETHER, TOO MUCH PUBLIC NOTICE MIGHT BE ATTRACTED TO THE MISSION, WITH OBVIOUS CONCLUSIONS BEING DRAWN AS TO ITS OBJECTIVE. CHELI AND ZAGON WOULD PLAN TO TRAVEL IN CAR WITH HUNGARIAN LICENSE PLATES TO TRY TO REDUCE TO MINIMUM POSSIBILITY OF PUBLIC NOTICE. THEY WOULD REMAIN IN BUDAPEST AS LONG AS NECESSARY [./.] AN EFFORT TO CONVINCE MINDSZENTY THAT HE WOULD LEAVE.

5. TURNING TO DETAILS, CHELI SAID THAT VATICAN DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT MINDSZENTY WILL INSIST THAT GOH

“REHABILITATE” HIM THROUGH DROPPING ALL CRIMINAL CHARGES. BY SAME TOKEN, HOWEVER, THERE CAN BE NO QUESTION OF MINDSZENTY REQUESTING GRACE OR AMNESTY FROM GOH. CHELI SAID THAT IN FACT VATICAN HAD ALREADY RECEIVED ASSURANCES FROM GOH THAT AS SOON AS MINDSZENTY LEAVES HUNGARY, GOH WILL UNILATERALLY TAKE OFFICIAL ACTION TO EXPURGE MINDSZENTY’S RECORD AND MAY MAKE LOW-KEY ANNOUNCEMENT TO THAT EFFECT.

6. REGARDING MINDSZENTY’S TITLES, CHELI SAID GOH HAS AGREED TO THEIR RETENTION, IT BEING CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THEY DID NOT ENTITLE CARDINAL TO CONCERN HIMSELF PUBLICLY WITH CHURCH IN HUNGARY WHICH WOULD ON HIS DEPARTURE BE PLACED UNDER CONTROL OF AN ADMINISTRATOR.

7. TWO MOST DIFFICULT POINTS REMAINED THOSE OF MEMOIRS AND CARDINAL’S SILENCE. ON MEMOIRS, MINDSZENTY WOULD HAVE TO ACCEPT THAT THEY COULD ONLY BE PUBLISHED POSTHUMOUSLY. HE WOULD HAVE TO BE WILLING TO PUT HIS FAITH IN THE PROMISE OF THE HOLY SEE TO PUBLISH THEM AT A SUITABLE TIME AFTER HIS DEATH. IT WOULD BE EMPHASIZED TO MINDSZENTY THAT ONLY HOPE FOR PUBLICATION AT ALL LAY IN HIS WILLINGNESS TO LEAVE HUNGARY. ON SILENCE, IT WOULD BE HOPED THAT CARDINAL WOULD DEMONSTRATE HIS OBEDIENCE TO POPE BY RESPONDING TO EXPRESSION ON POPE’S DESIRE THAT HE MAKE NO DECLARATIONS OR STATEMENTS AFTER HE LEAVES HUNGARY. CHELI SAID THAT IN TALKING WITH CARDINAL ZAGON AND HE WILL PLACE MUCH EMPHASIS ON FACT THAT WHILE CARDINAL REMAINS “BURIED ALIVE” IN HUNGARY, HE CAN DO NOTHING AT ALL TO HELP THE CHURCH THERE. HOWEVER, WOULD HE COME TO ROME HE WOULD BE ABLE TO EXERT PRIVATE (BUT NOT PUBLIC) INFLUENCE WITHIN THE CURIA ON WHAT IS OR IS NOT DONE REGARDING CHURCH IN HUNGARY.

8. CHELI SAID THAT ANOTHER POINT WHICH WOULD RESIDE HERE. THERE WERE SEVERAL SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM, BUT HE DID NOT ENLARGE.

9. REITERATING THAT VATICAN DESIRED THIS TIME TO MAKE CONCERTED EFFORT TO PERSUADE MINDSZENTY TO LEAVE, CHELI STRESSED VATICAN’S HOPE THAT KOENIG MISSION WELL AS HIS AND ZAGON’S MISSION CAN BEGIN

WITHOUT DELAY. CHELI WOULD BE LEAVING ROME SATURDAY, JUNE 19, FOR VIENNA TO SEE KOENIG.

10. DCM PROMISED CHELI TO INFORM DEPARTMENT IMMEDIATELY, UNDERLINING URGENCY OF REPLY SO THAT DATE FOR VISIT TO BUDAPEST COULD BE SET.
MARTIN

83. BPB0407[76-77], BPB0607[0642-0644] – Távirat, Amembassy Rome küldi: SecState, Amembassy Budapest, 2 pp.

Vatikáni memorandum az amerikai kormány számára. A König-Cheli-Zágon misszió kilátásba helyezése.

SECRET ROME 3813

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY: VATICAN MEMORANDUM

REF: ROME 3812

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF VATICAN MEMORANDUM LEFT WITH DCM JUNE 17 BY MONSIGNOR CHELI OF VATICAN SECRETARIAT OF STATE:

BEGIN QUOTE: THE HOLY SEE CLEARLY UNDERSTANDS THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH THE PRESENT STATE OF HEALTH OF CARDINAL MINDSZENTY CREATES FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES, AND THE GRAVE PROBLEMS WHICH CAN ARISE FROM SUCH A SITUATION.

IN EXPRESSING ONCE AGAIN THE SENTIMENTS OF ITS GRATITUDE FOR THE GENEROUS HOSPITALITY AND CARE WHICH HIS EMINENCE RECEIVES IN THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN BUDAPEST, THE HOLY SEE WISHES TO REPEAT THAT IT HAS NOT FAILED, AND WILL NOT FAIL, TO HAVE RECOURSE TO ALL POSSIBILITIES IN ORDER TO RESOLVE THE DELICATE PROBLEM, ALTHOUGH IT IS UNABLE, FOR UNDERSTANDABLE AND WELL-KNOWN REASONS, TO CONSTRAIN CARDINAL MIND[S]ZENTY TO LEAVE HIS PRESENT REFUGE.

IN THE RENEWED INTENT TO REACH A POSITIVE RESULT, THE HOLY SEE HAS IN MIND TO AVAIL ITSELF, FOR THIS PUR-

POSE, OF THE SERVICES OF THE ARCHBISHOP OF VIENNA, WHO HAS RECENTLY EXPRESSED HIS INTENTION OF GOING TO VISIT CARDINAL MIND[S]ZENTY.

THE HOLY SEE IS MAKING EFFORTS SO THAT THE HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT WILL NOT OPPOSE THE PROPOSAL THAT CARDINAL KOENIG BE ACCOMPANIED ALSO BY THE REVEREND MONSIGNOR JOSEPH ZAGON, SECRETARY OF THE PONTIFICAL COMMISSION FOR EMIGRATION AND TOURISM, [./.] AS WELL AS BY AN OFFICIAL OF THE COUNCIL FOR THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS OF THE CHURCH.

THE HOLY SEE WILL PROMPTLY INFORM THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OF THE RESULTS OF THESE STEPS, AND WILL BE VERY GRATEFUL TO THE GOVERNMENT ITSELF IF IT WILL KINDLY MAKE ARRANGEMENTS THAT THE ABOVE-MENTIONED MEETING CAN SUBSEQUENTLY TAKE PLACE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. END QUOTE
MARTIN

június 18, péntek

84. BPB0407[80], CFB (3067) SOC-1 HUNG [042] – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: SecState, Amembassy Rome, 1 p.

Mindszenty bíboros szívesen várja König bíborost, bármikor óhaj - tana jönni. Június 21 vagy 22 elfogadható.

BUDAPEST 1042

SUBJECT: Cardinal Mindszenty

REF: ROME 3842; STATE 108781

Cardinal Mindszenty says he will gladly receive Cardinal Koenig whenever the latter wishes to come. He said that either June 21 or 22 is acceptable and he would be guided by Cardinal Koenig's convenience.

MEEHAN

85. BPB0407[71], CFB (3067) SOC-1 HUNG [044], RMNNSFB693 – Távirat, SecState küldi: Amembassy Rome, Amembassy Budapest, 1 p.

Washington engedélye. Budapest hamarosan kap sajtótájékoztatósi anyagot.

SECRET STATE 108781

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY

REF: (A) ROME 3812

(B) ROME 3813

(C) BUDAPEST 1041

1. DEPT APPROVES VISIT OF VATICAN EMISSARIES TO
EMBASSY BUDAPEST PER REFTELS A AND B

2. FOR BUDAPEST SEPTEL PRESS GUIDANCE FOLLOWS.
ROGERS

86. BPB0407[72–73], CFB (3067) SOC-1 HUNG [050], RMNNSFB693 – **s. d.** Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: Sec State, Amembassy Rome, 2 pp. A dátum helyesen június 17.

*Nincs akadálya a nagykövetség részéről a tervezett vatikáni misszió -
nak. A bíborossal annyit közölnek, hogy König látogatása van kilátásban,
Königre vár, hogy közölje a folytatást. A turistaszezon kezdetével a misszió
két részben való érkezése, különösen Cheli és Zágon maradása, fölkeltheti
az érdeklődést, ezért a sajtóanyag összeállítása sürgető feladat.*

*

BUDAPEST 1041

SUBJECT: Cardinal Mindszenty

REF: Rome 3812

1. There is no problem from the Embassy's viewpoint in the proposed timing of the Koenig-Cheli-Zagon visit. We would also assume the advance notice to the Cardinal, though a bit tight, would be enough to satisfy

him. Subject to the Department's approval, therefore, the Charge will call on the Cardinal as soon as possible and inform him that Cardinal Koenig hopes to visit with him the 21st or 22nd. We would propose to leave it to Koenig to inform Mindszenty of the Cheli-Zagon follow up.

2. In regard to paragraph 4 of Rome' 3812, we are skeptical that splitting Vatican mission in two parts, and the use of Hungarian plates, will effectively ward off public interest. The tourist season is on and we have occasional visits by U.S. newsmen from outside Hungary. If Cheli and Zagon intend to stay "as long as [./.] necessary", their activities will likely become public knowledge quickly. With this in mind, press guidance for the Embassy's handling of inquiries is now a matter of some urgency.

MEEHAN

87. BPB0407[79], CFB (3067) SOC-1 HUNG [046] – Távirat, Amembassy Rome küldi: SecState, Amembassy Budapest, 1 p.

Illing június 18-án délelőtt tájékoztatta Chelit a washingtoni engedélyről, utóbbi június 21-én adja meg a tervezett König-látogatás pontos időpontját, amely továbbra is június 21 vagy június 22. König fogja tájékoztatni Mindszentyt Zagon-Cheli érkezéséről. Cheli érkezésének indokát a német katolikus híriügynökség megtudta budapesti egyházügyi hivatalból. Megpróbálják továbbra is titokban tartani jövetelük célját.

SECRET ROME 3842

EXDIS

SUBJ: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY

REF: STATE 108781; BUDAPEST 1041

1. DCM INFORMED MONSIGNOR CHELI MORNING JUNE 18 OF DEPT'S APPROVAL FOR VISITS. CHELI WILL NOTIFY US BY MORNING, JUNE 21 OF PRECISE DATE FOR KOENIG VISIT WHICH IS STILL EXPECTED TO BE JUNE 21 OR JUNE 22.

2. IT WAS ALSO AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE LEFT TO KOENIG TO INFORM MINDSZENTY OF ZAGON-CHELI FOLLOW UP.

3. RE PRESS, CHELI CONFIRMED THAT VATICAN WILL DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO AVOID PRESS INTEREST. HOWEVER, HE SAID THAT GERMAN CATHOLIC NEWS AGENCY HAD CARRIED STORY TO EFFECT THAT HUNGARIAN OFFICE OF RELIGIONS HAD ANNOUNCED THAT CHELI WOULD SOON

BE COMING TO BUDAPEST TO SEEK SOLUTION TO MINDSZENTY QUESTION. SO FAR VATICAN HAS HAD NO PRESS QUERIES ON THIS STORY. CHELI INDICATED HE PLANNED TO INFORM HUNGARIAN EMBASSY HERE THAT ANNOUNCEMENTS BY GOH ON THIS SUBJECT WERE NOT HELPFUL. MARTIN

június 19, szombat

88. BPB0407[67–68] – Memorandum, 2 pp.

Wilgis áttekintette Mindszenty bíboros levéltári anyagát és jelzi észrevételeit Meehannek. Érdekazonosságot lát a magyar kormány és a Vatikán között a Mindszenty-kérdés megoldásában, de ezek nem felelnek meg az amerikai kormány és a bíboros érdekeinek. Attól tart, hogy a Vatikán, túlhangsúlyozva a bíboros egészségügyi problémáját, Budapest helyett Vatikánt jelölné ki tartózkodási helyül. Viszont Mindszenty mindig is ódzkodott attól, hogy ezt elfogadja. Az ő óhaja az, hogy magyar népével maradjon, legyen az a nagykövetségen, börtönben, Esztergomban, vagy saját falujában, de mindenképpen Magyarországon. Kérdés: ez teljesen elfogadhatatlan-e a magyar kormánynak? Továbbá: nem látja, hogy a bíboros megváltoztatta volna felfogását rehabilitációjának kérdésében. A hallgatás felől pedig bizonyosra várható, hogy megtalálja módját annak, hogy fölemelje hangját a kormány ellen. A Vatikán javaslata hosszabb folyamattal indít el és nem hoz közvetlen megoldást. A közvetlen megoldást vagy az válthatja ki, hogy a pápa parancsot ad, de ez nem reális, vagy az, hogy a bíboros úgy gondolja, hogy már nem szívesen látott vendég a nagykövetségen. A Vatikán meg fogja kísérelni a második lehetőséget, hiszen nem tudja biztosítani az első.

To: Charge
From: POLEC: H Wilgis
Subject: HE

1) I read the current HE file this morning. Two things struck me: When the delegation from the Vatican arrives, it will not find an enfeebled man here in our Embassy. We here all understand the problems connected with the Cardinal's advanced and advancing age and the urgency of solving the problem of his refuge before serious health problems intervene to im-

pose a resolution of his residence which would be bad from all points of view. But I fear that the Vatican, in its eagerness to resolve this problem, has latched on to the health question and has magnified it out of all immediate proportion. Rather, the focus should be on a long-term solution – a long-term which may become very short-term at any moment.

2) The focus of all planning to date has been to substitute residence in our Embassy with residence in the Vatican. Here I think HE will be most reluctant to accept the Vatican's thinking. His response, I think, is that he chooses to remain with his Hungarian people – whether it be in the Embassy, in jail, in Esztergom, or in a quiet place in the country (Mindszenty [Csehimindszent?]): but in Hungary. Is this completely unacceptable to the GOH?

Also: I have seen no evidence that HE has modified his demands about the criminal charges. The memoirs are key. Silence is also key – but I think this is unrealistic. He will find a way of talking, either in the Vatican or in Hungary. But HE's underlying philosophy is one of unmitigated opposition to communism, and he will maintain this position.

Finally: I think the Vatican approach will lead to a long, involved process, with no immediate solution. To my way of thinking, only two things can provoke an immediate solution: an order from the Pope, which is not forthcoming, or HE's getting the impression that he is no longer welcome in the Embassy. The Vatican may attempt to give the latter impression because it cannot provide the former.

It looks like a trying week, and I wish you luck. I for one believe the USG's interests and HE's interests are quite the same if we focus on a resolution of [./.] his refuge which is satisfactory to both parties. I also believe the Vatican's interests and the GOH's interests are quite the same, but I doubt if they correspond with the USG's and HE's.

Please don't regard my remarks as impertinent. My thought will be with you.

89. BPB0407[69–70], CFB (3067) SOC-1 HUNG [034–037], RMNNSF B693 – Távirat, SecState küldi: Amembassy Budapest, Amembassy Rome, 2 pp.

Puhan nagykövet levele König bíborosnak. Sajnálataát fejezi ki, hogy nem tudja személyesen köszönteni Budapesten, mivel Washingtonban tartózkodik. Kifejezi örömét jötte és missziója felől. Közös törekvésük, hogy Mindszenty bíborosnak, idős korában, biztosítani tudják a szükséges gon-

doskodást. A magyar kormány együttműködése felől biztosított, és ez talán az utolsó alkalom, hogy Mindszenty kiutazását el tudják érni. A bíboros szándéka azonban megváltozhat, ha a sajtó tudomást szerez erről. Ezért jelzi, hogy munkatársait teljes diszkrécióra kérte és törekvésük csak akkor jár sikerrel, ha nem szivároog ki hír a sajtó felé.

SECRET STATE 110041

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY

1. PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING LETTER FROM AMBASSADOR PUHAN TO CARDINAL KOENIG UPON LATTER'S ARRIVAL AT EMBASSY.

2. DEAR CARDINAL KOENIG:

OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS I HAVE COME TO VALUE OUR ASSOCIATION AND TO LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR PERIODIC VISITS TO THIS EMBASSY. AS YOU KNOW, I REGARD VERY HIGHLY THE COMPASSION YOU HAVE SHOWN TO YOUR BROTHER PRELATE, AND I BELIEVE YOUR MISSION HAS BEEN OF GREAT SERVICE IN MAINTAINING THE MORALE OF OUR GUEST. THEREFORE I REGRET VERY MUCH THAT I AM UNABLE TO BE PRESENT TO GREET YOU IN PERSON ON THIS VERY IMPORTANT OCCASION. I AM CONFIDENT, HOWEVER, THAT YOU WILL ACCEPT MY THOUGHTS IN THIS LETTER IN THE SAME SPIRIT AS YOU HAVE ACCEPTED MY OBSERVATIONS IN OUR SEVERAL CONVERSATIONS IN THE PAST.

YOU ARE AS AWARE AS I OF CARDINAL MINDSZENTY'S ADVANCING AGE. FROM MY POSITION I HAVE WITNESSED THIS PROCESS WITH GREAT CONCERN, I AM MORE THAN EVER CONVINCED THAT WE MUST PREVAIL IN OUR EFFORT TO GAIN HIS CONSENT TO TRANSFERRING HIM TO A LOCATION WHERE HE CAN BE PROVIDED WITH THE TYPE OF CARE AND ATTENTION HE MUST NOW HAVE. RELATED TO MY CONCERN IS MY STRONG CONVICTION THAT YOUR MISSION MUST SUCCEED. I GREATLY FEAR THAT IF WE FAIL, WE MAY NOT HAVE ANOTHER OPPORTUNITY.

MY INFORMATION IS THAT THE HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT HAS SHOWN A MARKED DISPOSITION TO COOPERATE [./] THIS CURRENT EFFORT. AGAIN FROM MY VANTAGE POINT

I REGARD THIS AS A MOST HELPFUL SIGN. I DO FEAR, HOWEVER, THAT THIS WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE COULD CHANGE IN A MOMENT WERE THERE ANY PUBLICITY. FOR THIS REASON I HAVE INSTRUCTED MY STAFF TO EXERCISE ALL POSSIBLE PRUDENCE IN DISCUSSING YOUR VISIT. INDEED WE SHALL DO NO MORE THAN CONFIRM YOUR PRESENCE, AND THAT ONLY IF WE ARE ASKED. I HOLD STRONGLY THE VIEW THAT THE EFFORT CAN SUCCEED ONLY WITHOUT THE GLARE OF PUBLIC NOTICE.

I LOOK FORWARD TO MY EARLY RETURN TO BUDAPEST, AND TO THE RENEWAL OF OUR PLEASANT RELATIONSHIP. PLEASE ACCEPT, YOUR EMINENCE, MY VERY BEST WISHES FOR THE SUCCESS OF YOUR MISSION.

SINCERELY,
ALFRED PUHAN [not signed]
AMERICAN AMBASSADOR

CONFIRM DELIVERY AND REPORT KOENIG COMMENTS IF ANY.
ROGERS

90. BPB0407[78], CFB (3067) SOC-1 HUNG [039-040], RMNNSFB693
– Távirat, SecState küldi: Amembassy Budapest, Amembassy Rome, 1 p.
Sajtóanyag, szükség esetére.

SECRET STATE 110058
EXDIS
SUBJECT: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY

REF: (A) ROME 3812; (B) ROME 3813; (C) BUDAPEST 1014.

1. ASSUMING VATICAN MISSION TAKES PLACE, EMBASSY BUDAPEST MAY RESPOND TO PRESS INQUIRIES ON IF ASKED BASIS AS FOLLOWS:

Q. HAS CARDINAL KOENIG RECENTLY VISITED THE EMBASSY?

A. CARDINAL KOENIG PAID ONE OF HIS PERIODIC VISITS TO CARDINAL MINDSZENTY ON (DATE).

I. WAS CARDINAL MINDSZENTY'S FUTURE DISCUSSED AT THAT TIME?

A. THE EMBASSY IS NOT AT LIBERTY TO COMMENT ON THE DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE TWO MEN.

Q. HAVE ANY OTHER CHURCH OFFICIALS VISITED CARDINAL MINDSZENTY LATELY?

A. MONSIGNORS CHELI AND ZAGON VISITED THE CARDINAL ON (DATE). THE EMBASSY HAS NO FURTHER COMMENT TO MAKE ON THESE VISITS.

2. FOR ROME: YOU MAY WISH INFORM VATICAN OF ABOVE PRESS GUIDANCE. NOTE THAT ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT INTEND TO ADD ANYTHING TO SPECULATION WHICH WILL INEVITABLY ACCOMPANY KOENIG VISIT, WE HAVE NO CHOICE IF ASKED BUT TO CONFIRM THAT VISITS HAVE TAKEN PLACE.

3. FOR BUDAPEST: IF YOU CONCUR, BELIEVE IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO ADVISE MFA IN ADVANCE OF ANSWERS WE INTEND TO GIVE.

4. DEPT PLANS TAKE SAME LINE IN RESPONDING TO INQUIRIES HERE.
ROGERS

június 21, hétfő

91. BPB0407[64] – Memorandum, kézírásos, 1 p.

92. BPB0407[65], CFB (3067) SOC-1 HUNG [031] – Távirat, Amembassy Rome küldi: SecState, Amembassy Budapest, 1 p.

Cheli információja szerint König június 23-án érkezik, valószínű - leg délelőtt. Zagon és Cheli csütörtök délután vagy péntek reggel, június 24-én vagy 25-én jelentkeznek telefonon.

SECRET ROME 3884

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY

REF: ROME 3842

MONSIGNOR CHELI INFORMED EMBASSY TODAY THAT KOENIG WILL CALL AT EMBASSY BUDAPEST ON WEDNESDAY, JUNE 23, PROBABLY IN THE MORNING. HE WILL BE ALONE. ZAGON AND CHELI WILL CALL AT EMBASSY EITHER THURSDAY AFTERNOON OR FRIDAY MORNING. JUNE 24 OR 25. MARTIN

93. BPB0407[66], CFB (3067) SOC-1 HUNG [033] – Távirat, Amembassy Vienna küldi: Amembassy Budapest, Sec State, 1 p.

Bécsi nagykövetség jelzi König bíboros érkezését június 23-án délelőtt 9–10 óra között, távozása 12 óra körül várható.

CONFIDENTIAL VIENNA 3783

SUBJECT: CARDINAL KOENIG TO VISIT MINDSZENTY

CARDINAL KOENIG'S OFFICE HAS ADVISED US THAT KOENIG WILL VISIT MINDSZENTY JUNE 23. KOENIG WILL ARRIVE AT 9–10 A.M. AND DEPART AROUND 12 MOON. HUMES

94. BPB0407[59–60] – Sajtótájékoztatási anyag, 2 pp.

1. BEFORE KOENIG-CHELI-ZAGON VISIT

Q. IS CARDINAL KOENIG COMING TO BUDAPEST?

A. We have heard reports that Cardinal Koenig is planning to visit Budapest sometime soon. But we do not know exactly when.

Q. WE UNDERSTAND THAT A VATICAN MISSION IS COMING TO BUDAPEST TO MEET WITH CARDINAL MINDSZENTY. TRUE?

A. We have no such information. We have heard such rumors but have no confirmation on them. There have been such rumors circulating in the diplomatic community here for some time. We understand there has been speculation in the Austrian, French and German press, though we have not seen any of it.

2. DURING KOENIG-CHELI-ZAGON VISIT

Q. IS CARDINAL KOENIG IN BUDAPEST? IS HE MEETING WITH CARDINAL MINDSZENTY? WHAT ARE THEY DISCUSSING?

A. Yes, he is in town and is calling on Cardinal Mindszenty. I have no idea what they are discussing.

Q. WHAT IS THE VATICAN MISSION DOING IN BUDAPEST? TWO PRIESTS HAVE BEEN SEEN GOING IN AND OUT OF THE EMBASSY.

A. Monsignors Cheli and Zagon are in fact visiting Cardinal Mindszenty. Cheli is from the Vatican Secretariat of State. Zagon is Secretary of the Pontifical Commission for Emigration and Tourism.

Q. WHAT ARE THEY DISCUSSING?

A. I have no idea. [./.]

3. AFTER KOENIG-CHELI-ZAGON VISIT

Q. HAS CARDINAL KOENIG VISITED THE EMBASSY RECENTLY?

A. Yes, he paid one of his periodic visits to Cardinal Mindszenty on June

Q. WAS CARDINAL MINDSZENTY'S FUTURE DISCUSSED THEN?

A. The Embassy is not at liberty to comment on the discussion between the two men.

Q. HAVE ANY OTHER CHURCH OFFICIALS VISITED CARDINAL MINDSZENTY RECENTLY?

A. Monsignor Cheli and Zagon visited the Cardinal on June The Embassy has no further comment to make on these visits.

95. BPB0407[61] – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: SecState, 1 p.

Mindszenty bíboros gratuláló távirata a pápának, megválasztásának évfordulója alkalmából.

BUDAPEST 1065

FOR EUR/CHP BAKER

SUBJECT: Message from Cardinal Mindszenty to Pope

Cardinal Mindszenty has requested that following Latin message be transmitted to Pope. Begin text Die anniversarii gloriosae coronationis gratulationes, gratias observantesque preces et homagium nuntiat tuae sanctitatis. end text. Signed Jozsef Cardinal Mindszenty.

MEEHAN

96. BPB0407[62–63] – Levél, Puhan nagykövet küldi König bíborosnak, 2 pp.

Szövegét cf. 89. sz. alatt.

97. BPB0407[58], CFB (3067) SOC-1 HUNG [029] – Távirat, Amembassy Rome küldi: SecState, Amembassy Budapest, 1 p.

*Illing informálta Casarolit az amerikai sajtóanyagról, a maguk részé -
ről kommentár nélkül csak a látogatás tényét erősítik meg. Casaroli egyet -
értéséről biztosította és szándékozik informálni Chelit, aki Bécsben van.*

SECRET ROME 3924

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY. PRESS GUIDANCE

REF: STATE 110058; ROME 3884

1. DCM INFORMED ARCHBISHOP CASAROLI JUNE 22 OF PRESS GUIDANCE TO BE FOLLOWED BY BUDAPEST AND DEPT. WE POINTED OUT THAT WE WOULD LIMIT OURSELVES TO CONFIRMATION OF VISITS AND WITHOUT FURTHER COMMENT.

2. CASAROLI WAS APPRECIATIVE AND AGREED WITH OUR LINE. HE WILL PRESUMABLY INFORM CHELI WHO IS NOW IN VIENNA.

MARTIN

június 23, szerda

Két dokumentum, 1. Addendum, 312–313.

Two documents, see Addendum, pages 312–313.

június 24, csütörtök

98. BPB0407[46–48] – Memorandum, Mindszenty bíboros és Meehan megbeszélése, 3 pp.

*A König látogatása utáni délután, a két vatikáni kiküldött érkezé -
sére várva, Mindszenty bíboros elmondja álláspontját. A pápa König bíbo -*

ros közvetítésével meghívta őt, hogy hagyja el Magyarországot, de teljesen ráhagyta annak eldöntését, mit óhajt tenni. Nem fogja kényszeríteni. A bíboros a maga részéről meg akarja hallgatni, mit fog mondani a két kívül-dött, és azt fogja válaszolni nekik, hogy meg kell fontolnia a végső választ. Magyarország elhagyását illetően komoly problémát lát. A személyes szabadság neki semmit sem jelent. Nem érdekli őt magas római hivatal sem. Nem tudja elfogadni a Beranra, Stepinacra, Slipijre kényszerített hallgatást sem. Ami fontos neki, az az elvi kérdés, a rezsimmel szembeni ellenállása és helye a történelemben. Magyarország elhagyása annak elárulása lenne, amiért idáig kiállt, feladás, a reménytelenség kinyilvánulása – az otthoni és a külföldi magyarok ezt így értelmeznék. A Vatikán jól akar, de nem ismeri igazán a magyarországi helyzetet. Casaroli fáradozásai, egyezményei semmit sem érnek. Érti, hogy Péter új érseket kért a pápától Esztergomba, de a pápa – ebben Koenig megerősítette – sohasem fog nyomást gyakorolni rá, hogy lemondjon, még akkor sem, ha eléri a 80. életévét. Továbbá, ő neki nem csupán egyházi hivatala van mint érsek, hanem primásként közjogi hivatalt is betölt. Ő katolikusként is mindig magyar marad. Ez az, amit a Vatikán nem ért meg teljesen. Gondolt arra, hogy visszatérjen szülőfalujába, egyfajta házi őrizetbe. Kellemes volna otthon lenni, rokonai közelében, ahol szülei el vannak temetve. De elveti ezt a lehetőséget, mert tucatnyi detektívet hozna rokonai nyakára. A rezsimtől nem kér sem amnesztiát, sem kegyelmet. Egyedül a teljes rehabilitáció lehetséges. Kérdezi, van-e változás státuszát illetően az Egyesült Államok, különösen is az Elnök magatartásában. Fontos tudnia erről, mielőtt tárgyalna a vatikáni kiküldöttekkel. Meehan biztosította arról, hogy nincs változás. A bíboros fölveti: tárgyaljanak együtt a vatikániakkal. Meehan ezt elhárította azzal, hogy helyesebb, ha a közvetlenül érdekelt felek tárgyalnak, kért információt, hogy tájékoztathassa Washingtont. A bíboros biztosította készségéről és a tárgyalások befejezését követően be óhajtja mutatni a kiküldötteket Meehan hivatalában, hogy őket is meghallgathassa.

Memcon: Cardinal Mindszenty

FJM

Place: FJM Office

Time: June 24, 1600-1645 hours

Has been thinking about Cardinal Koenig's visit and tomorrow's visit by two Vatican officials, one of whom is a trusted Hungarian and the other a Hungarian also, he believes.

The Pope expressed through Cardinal Koenig an invitation to leave Hungary but left it completely up to him to decide what to do. There

is no constraint of any kind. He intends to listen to what the two emissaries have to say, and he will tell them he will meditate further after they leave and give a final answer later.

In considering whether to leave Hungary, several considerations arise. First, personal liberty means absolutely nothing to him. The Pope doubtless feels that he should have a period of liberty toward the close of his life, but he is indifferent to this. He is not interested in high office in Rome. Moreover, he could not accept the condition of silence imposed on Beran, Stepinac and Slipij. Beran heard only when he was on the plane that he would be unable to return to Czechoslovakia and he doubtless regretted going. What is important to him, however, is the question of principle, of his stand against the regime, his record in history. To leave Hungary now would amount to a denial of what he has stood for, a giving up, a declaration of hopelessness [./.] which would be read as such by Hungarians at home and abroad.

The Vatican means well, but it is not fully aware of the situation in Hungary. Casaroli is active in Eastern Europe, but the Vatican is at a disadvantage in negotiating with Communist governments. Casaroli's agreements with Hungary have proved largely worthless – in the matter of appointment of bishops and religious education, for example. The Hungarian regime wants to exploit Vatican interest in improving relations specifically to get rid of the Mindszenty problem. He understands Peter asked the Pope to appoint a new Archbishop of Esztergom, but the Pope's position – confirmed to him by Koenig – is that he would never exert pressure on him to resign, even when he achieves 80. In addition, he not only has ecclesiastical authority as archbishop, but is as Primate a civil authority. He must always think not only as a Catholic, but as a Hungarian. This is something the Vatican does not fully understand.

He has considered the possibility of returning to his home village, under a situation similar to house arrest. It would be pleasant to be at home, with relatives near, and where his parents are buried. But he rejects the idea of imposing a dozen detectives on his relatives, and cannot therefore accept the idea of going home.

There can be no question of his asking the regime for any act of amnesty or clemency. Only full rehabilitation is acceptable. [./.] He asks has there been any change in the US, specifically the President's attitude on the question of his situation in the Embassy. It is important for him to know the answer to this in anticipation of his discussions with the Vatican emissaries.

I assured him there was no change.

He suggested I should join him in the discussions with the Vatican officials. I declined, on the grounds that I felt it would be more appropriate for these discussions to be conducted in full privacy by the parties directly concerned. I would, however, appreciate being kept informed of the progress of the discussions so that I could in turn inform Washington.

He promised to keep me well briefed, and said he would bring the emissaries to my office on conclusion of his talks with them so that I would have a chance to hear their views.

99. BPB0407[49] – s. d. Távirat tervezet, m. s., 1 p.

100. BPB0407[50, 51] (2x) – Távirat, Amembassy Vienna küldi: Amembassy Budapest, SecState, 1 p.

König bíboros hivatala tudatja, hogy két vatikáni kiküldött érkezik Budapest repülőtérére ma, június 24-én este 19 óra 15 perckor és hívni fogja a nagykövetséget, hogy egyeztessék a másnapi programot.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE VIENNA 3881
MEEHAN FROM FORD

CARDINAL KOENIG'S SECRETARY WISHES YOU TO KNOW THAT TWO VATICAN OFFICIALS WILL ARRIVE BUDAPEST AIRPORT TONIGHT (JUNE 24) AT 1915 HOURS AND WILL CALL EMBASSY TO SET UP APPOINTMENT TOMORROW.
HUMES.

101. BPB0407[52] – Távirat, CD USAMECOMEUR küldi: Amembassy Vienna, 1 p.

Orvosi jellegű információ.

REF: CD USAMECOMEUR 221000Zjune 71

1. Fiscal citation for LTC Sweeny and MSG Thompson:
1920113 – 5244 – 1 – 324401 – 2158
2. Do not repeat not incur expenses prior to July 1, 1971.
MEEHAN

június 25, péntek

102. BPB0501[64–65] – Kleine Zeitung újságcikk angol fordítása, 2 pp.

103. BPB0407[40–45], RMNNSFB693 –Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: SecState Amembassy Rome, 6 pp.

Olykor szó szerinti megfogalmazásban vissza-visszaköszön Mind - szenty álláspontjának ismertetése a 98. sz. följegyzés szerint, amit a távi - rat kiegészített aznapi információkkal. – Cheli és Zágon megtartották első megbeszélésüket Mindszenty bíborossal. Ma és holnap (szombat) tervezik a folytatást és vasárnap akarják elhagyni Budapestet. Még korai lenne jóslatokba bocsátkozni az eredményt illetően. Nehéz volt a kezdet, de úgy tűnik, hatást gyakoroltak a bíborosra. Cheli elmondotta Meehannek, hogy a pápa kifejezetten megtiltotta neki is, Zágonnak is, hogy sürgessék Mind - szenty távozását. Inkább motiválják őt, így érzék el, hogy a bíboros maga döntsön. Cheli úgy gondolja, hogy ez a látogatása csak az első állomás azon az úton, hogy a bíborossal megértessék a Vatikán álláspontját. – Cheli az első nap, miután köszöntötték a bíborost, eltávozott és csak ebédre jött vissza. Mindketten a kormány vendégházában laknak és állami kocsival közlekednek. Cheli elmondta, hogy ez alkalommal nem terveznek részletes megbeszélést a magyar kormánytényezőkkel, ennek ideje azt követően jön majd el, hogy visszatértek Rómába és beszámoltak a Mindszentyvel való tárgyalások eredményéről. Cheli közölte még, hogy a bíborosra nagy hatást gyakorolt az a biztosíték a pápától, hogy megtarthatja címeit távozása után is. Ugyanígy rendkívül érdekelte az emlékiratain való munkálatok foly - tatása, beleértve a halála utáni publikálást is. – Kétséges, hogy Cheli és Zágon elérik, amiért jöttek, de legalább megtették a kezdeti lépéseket.

BUDAPEST 1107

SUBJECT: Cardinal Mindszenty: Cheli-Zagon Visit

REFERENCE: BUDAPEST 1088

1. BEGIN SUMMARY. Cheli and Zagon have had their first meeting with Cardinal Mindszenty. They plan to continue their discussions today and tomorrow (Saturday), and expect to leave Budapest Sunday. It is too early to say how their talks will come out. They found it heavy going to begin

with but believe they are beginning to have some impact on the Cardinal. Mindszenty has told the Charge that the Pope, while expressing through Cardinal Koenig his concern about his welfare, has left the decision whether to leave Hungary completely in his own discretion. Cheli has confirmed this. He told the Charge the Pope expressly forbade him and Zagon to [./.] quote him as urging Mindszenty to leave. Rather they should set out considerations which would induce Mindszenty to take the decision himself. Cheli feels that this visit is only the first stage in the process of bringing the Cardinal around to the Vatican's views.

END SUMMARY.

2. Cheli and Zagon had their first meeting with Mindszenty the morning of June 25. Cheli stayed only briefly, leaving the Cardinal and Zagon alone, and then rejoined them for lunch. Zagon is coming back to the Embassy to resume the discussions in the afternoon and further talks are planned for Saturday, with departure scheduled for Sunday. They are living, Cheli said, in a Hungarian government guest house, with an official car provided. Cheli said they do not plan to have extended discussions with Hungarian officials on this trip. This stage would come after they had returned [./.] to Rome and reported on their talks with Mindszenty.

3. Cheli briefed the Charge on the first round of talks with Mindszenty. He said Zagon had found the going very difficult to begin with. Mindszenty had said that he suspected the existence of some kind of scheme whereby the Vatican and/or the U.S. Government was trying to reach an agreement with the Hungarian Government at his expense. Apparently Mindszenty made no bones about his suspicions concerning the Vatican's efforts to improve relations with communist countries, including Hungary. Zagon said, however, that as time went on he had the feeling that he was beginning to reach the Cardinal with the Vatican's arguments in favor of his departure. Cheli and Zagon were quick to acknowledge that the process was difficult. Cheli felt this might be only the first of a series of meetings with the Cardinal which would hopefully have the effect of bringing him around to the [./.] Vatican way of thinking.

4. In the interval between the Koenig visit and the arrival of Cheli and Zagon, Mindszenty took the initiative to discuss the situation with the Charge. He said the Pope had left it completely up to him to decide whether to leave. He stressed that he was under no constraint of any kind from the Vatican. Cheli confirmed this impression. He told the Charge the Pope had expressly forbidden him to quote him as urging Mindszenty to leave. The method was to present considerations which, it was hoped, would be forceful enough to persuade the Cardinal to reach this decision on his own.

Mindszenty told the Charge that he was grateful for the Holy See's solicitude, and he would listen carefully to what Cheli and Zagon had to say. He would tell them, he said, that he would reflect on their views following their departure and would give a [./.] final response later. However, he said, he had very strong feelings against leaving Hungary. Personal liberty meant nothing to him. He was not interested in a high but empty office in Rome. He would never accept silence. He could never ask the regime for an act of amnesty or clemency. Only full rehabilitation was acceptable. He asked if there was any change in the U.S. Government's attitude concerning his situation of refuge in the Embassy. The Charge told him there was not, though there was naturally increasing concern about his health and welfare as he grew older.

5. Mindszenty's attitude being what it is, Cheli and Zagon will clearly have their work cut out for them. They do not underestimate the difficulties. Cheli told the Charge, however, that a solution must be found and he for one seemed determined to exert every effort to move things ahead. He seemed rather optimistic at the [./.] results of the first session with the Cardinal despite the difficult beginnings. He said the Cardinal was impressed by the assurance from the Pope that he would retain his titles after he left. Mindszenty was also extremely interested, Cheli said, in the prospect of being able to work on his memoirs, even for posthumous publication.

6. It is doubtful that Cheli and Zagon will achieve definite results on this visit, but at least a beginning has been made. As they get deeper into the details in the continued discussions with the Cardinal it should be possible to take a better reading on the prospects.

MEEHAN

június 26, szombat

104. BPB0407[39] – Memorandum, Mons. Zágon, 1 p.

Zágon beszámolója, június 26. szombat reggel 9 óra 30 perckor. Az a véleménye, hogy Mindszenty bíboros el akar távozni a nagykövetség - ről, komolyan gondolkodik erről, de neki a mód a fontos, ahogyan távozik. Nem akarja, hogy távozását menekülésként fogják fel. Láthatóan elfogad - ja, hogy ne kelljen kormányozni egyházmegyéjét, ha megtarthatja címeit távozását követően is. Nem akarja, hogy egyházmegyéje megüresedettnek legyen nyilvánítva. Nem akar Rómába menni, inkább Bécsbe, a Pázmáneum - ba. A bíboros fenntartja azt a jogot, hogy nyíltan beszélhessen, bármikor

és bárkivel, de nem óhajt sajtónyilatkozatot tenni távozásakor. Viszont elvárja, hogy a Vatikán megfelelő módon tájékoztassa a világot és távozását a lehető legjobb fényben tüntesse föl. Zágon biztosította, hogy a Szent - atyának is ez az óhaja, aki semmit sem kíván tenni, ami árnyat vethet a róla kialakított képre. Mindszenty bíboros semmiképpen nem akar tárgyal - ni a magyar kormányval, jövőjét illetően. A Vatikán tárgyal a magyarokkal, és ezt tartja helyesnek, nem akar ebben részt venni. Bár beszélt a rehabili - táció gondolatáról, s ezt nagyon óhajtja, idáig nem vette föl távozásának feltételei közé. Ezt a pontot még tisztázni kell. A bíboros mindezen el akar még gondolkodni. Ha elhatározásra jut, megírja levelét a Szentatyának. Zágon nem visz magával ilyen levelet. Az a benyomása, hogy ez valamivel később lesz esedékes.

ZAGON report – Saturday morning June 26. 9:30 a.m.

1. It is Monsignor Zagon's opinion that Cardinal Mindszenty wishes to leave the American Embassy, that he is seriously considering it, but that he is deeply concerned about the manner in which he would go. He does not want anyone to get the impression that he is running.

2. He apparently would be willing to give up the administration of his See provided that he retained all this titles upon departure. Nor would he wish to the See to be declared an open one. Furthermore, he has no wish to return to Rome, and prefers instead to go to Vienna to reside in the Pazmaneum.

3. The Cardinal maintains his right to speak openly whenever he wishes and to whomsoever he wishes. However, under no circumstances is he considering making any statements upon his departure to press. However, he not only wishes but expects the Vatican to issue the appropriate information worldwide that would put his departure in the best possible light. He was assured by Monsignor Zagon that this would be fully in accord with the Holy Father's wishes, who would wish to do nothing that would adversely affect the Cardinal's image.

4. Cardinal Mindszenty under no condition whatsoever will deal with the GOH in any matter affecting his future. The Vatican is talking to the Hungarians, and so far as he is concerned that is going to have to be the channel. He will have no part of it.

5. Curiously, he spoke of rehabilitation, but somehow it came out that while the Cardinal wanted this very much, he did not (so far) make a point of it as a condition for his departure. This requires some clarifica-

tion. If Zagon was clear about it, it did not come out that way, and it was not understood that way by me.

6. The Cardinal wants to meditate all of this, of course. When he has concluded, he will send a letter to the Holy Father. Zagon would not take such a letter with him. Impression is that it would come some time later.

105. BPB0407[35–38], RMNNSFB693 – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: SecState, Amembassy Rome, 4 pp.

Zágon és Cheli folytatták megbeszéléseiket Mindszentyvel szombat reggel, vasárnap reggel tartják az utolsó megbeszélést. Elmondták, hogy a bíboros beleegyezett a Vatikán javaslatába, hogy elhagyja az országot és alá fog írni egy dokumentumot, hogy ezt megerősítse, mielőtt ténylegesen elutazik. Ugyanakkor Mindszenty haladékat kért további megfontolásra, távozásának időpontját illetően. Cheli úgy gondolja, hogy vasárnap végső választ fog kérni Mindszentytől távozásának időpontját illetően, hiszen nem várakoztathatja meg a pápát. A vasárnapi találkozás így döntő lehet. – Cheli és Zágon személyüket illetően elnyerik ugyan Meehan dicséretét, aki kételyeit fejezi ki optimizmusukat illetően. Ismerve a bíborost, nem valószínű, hogy ilyen alapvető kérdésben gyors döntést hoz, de a vasárnapi megbeszélés várhatóan választ ad arra a kérdésre, hol is tartunk. Részletezően összefoglalja a feltételeket, újabb elemeket nem fedeztünk föl. Zágon közlése szerint Mindszentynek a fő meggondolása az, hogyan tudja igazolni távozását a világ közvéleménye előtt. Attól fél, hogy megadásként, köteleltessége feladásaként fogják föl. Zágon e ponton határozottan érvelt a bíborosnak: a pápa ítélete szerint most mind a magyar, mind a világegyháznak azzal teszi a legjobb szolgálatot, ha elhagyja az országot, természetesen tisztességes feltételek mellett. Zágon biztosította Mindszentyt, hogy indokait a Vatikán megfelelően méltányolja. A döntés nem lesz Mindszenty elvei ellen.

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BUDAPEST 1109

SUBJECT: Cardinal Mindszenty: Cheli-Zagon Visit

REF: Budapest 1107

1. BEGIN SUMMARY. Zagon and Cheli resumed their discussions with Mindszenty Saturday morning and will have a final session Sunday. They say Mindszenty has agreed with the Vatican position that he should leave the country and will sign a document confirming this before

they leave Hungary. At the same time, Mindszenty has asked for a period for further reflection, seemingly to consider the question when he will leave. Cheli plans to press Mindszenty hard on Sunday for a definitive position on the timing of departure. The Sunday session could therefore be crucial. END SUMMARY.

2. Zagon resumed discussions with Mindszenty Saturday morning. He and Cheli plan a final session with [./.] Mindszenty Sunday morning, after which they will depart for Vienna and Rome.

3. The Charge debriefed them after the Saturday morning session. They say that Mindszenty has accepted the Vatican position that he should leave the Embassy and Hungary. They have drawn up a record of the discussions which, they say, embodies Mindszenty's agreement, and he is prepared to sign the document. However, Zagon said that Mindszenty has asked for a period for further reflection on the situation. He and Cheli believe that this is basically a question of setting a date for departure, but they are alive to the possibility that Mindszenty might extend the reflection period indefinitely. Cheli has expressed to the Charge in the strongest terms the need to tie Mindszenty down firmly on arrangements for departure before he and Zagon leave Budapest. He says he intends to tell Mindszenty that he "cannot keep the Pope waiting," and he talks as if he means to get a date without fail before he leaves. Thus the Sunday morning session could well be crucial.

4. Cheli and Zagon are both prudent men and their judgment as to the progress of their mission should be given due weight. At the same time, given what we know of the Cardinal's views, they may have an overly [./.] optimistic reading on the situation. It is unlike Mindszenty to commit himself so quickly on so basic an issue, but Sunday's session will presumably give the answer as to where we stand.

5. Cheli and Zagon have given us some of the specific points of the discussion with Mindszenty. He confirmed to them that he does not want to go to Rome. Instead, he would go to Vienna to the Hungarian church property there (the Pazmaneum), which he, as Primate, controls. He would thus be "in his own house". Zagon said he had told Mindszenty that he would retain his titles as Primate and Archbishop of Esztergom when he left. Mindszenty in turn agreed to the appointment of an administrator to Esztergom. He accepted that with the appointment of an administrator he would not exercise jurisdiction in Hungary. Mindszenty repeated to Zagon that he would not accept clemency from the regime, nor would he personally enter into any negotiations with it. Only full rehabilitation was acceptable. However, Zagon said Mindszenty was apparently not

making rehabilitation a condition for departure. Mindszenty also made clear that he would not accept silence in Vienna. He would be free to speak and write. Zagon apparently accepted this. [./.] 6. Zagon said the main consideration in Mindszenty's mind remained how he could justify his departure to Hungarian and world public opinion. To leave at this juncture, he feared, would be regarded as surrender, as dereliction of duty. Zagon told us he had argued very strongly with Mindszenty on this point. He had stressed that it was the Pope's considered judgment that the best service Mindszenty could now render the Church in Hungary and the Church in the world at large would be to leave the country, of course under honorable arrangements. Zagon assured Mindszenty that the Vatican would see to it that Mindszenty's motives were fully and properly explained. The decision to leave would carry no reflection on Mindszenty's principles.

MEEHAN

június 27: vasárnap

106. BPB0407[31–34], RMNNSFB693 – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: SecState, Amembassy Rome, 4 pp.

Cheli és Zágon további, utolsó megbeszélést tartott Mindszentyvel vasárnap délelőtt, Cheli közben eltávozott és csak az utolsó tíz percre tért vissza. Majd ebédre voltak hivatalosak, ahonnan Bécsbe távoztak kocsival (a határig magyar állami kocsival, osztrák területen a bécsi nunciatúra kocsiján), onnan pedig Rómába. Mindketten csalódottak voltak, mert Mindszenty visszautasította, hogy aláírja a dokumentumokat, amely tartalmazza az elvi megegyezést távozását illetően. Azzal érvelt, hogy nincs nehézsége a tartalmat illetően, de nem érezte, hogy szükség volna aláírására. Még másodpéldányt sem akart elfogadni. Visszautasította azt is, hogy kijelöljenek egy újabb dátumot Cheli és Zágon látogatására, hogy a Vatikánnak hivatalos választ adjon. Mindszenty azzal érvelt: a pápa szabadon hagyta, hogy eldöntse sorsát, nem fog tudni gyors döntést hozni bármely nyomás alatt. Zágont idézte: a közvélemény meg fog lepődni, ha két római hivatalnok látogatása után hirtelen a távozás mellett dönt. Zágon úgy gondolta, hogy Mindszenty méltóságán alulinak tartotta, hogy két nála alacsonyabb rangúval történt megbeszélést követően döntsön. Meehan élt az alkalommal, hogy kifejtse az amerikai álláspontot, miszerint csak a pápa közvetlen,

személyes üzenete fogja tudni megmozdítani Mindszentyt. Cheli és Zagon ezzel egyetértettek, és most értették meg a kialakult helyzet súlyosságát. Ígérték, hogy ebben az értelemben informálják Rómát, s két vagy három hétre lesz szükségük, hogy a pápai üzenet megérkezzen. Úgy gondolták, hogy ezt az üzenetet egy bíborosnak kell hoznia, de nem Könignek. (Futólag megjegyezték, hogy a pápa elmondta nekik: nem gondolja, hogy König lenne a megfelelő ember, akit Mindszentyhez kellene küldeni a jelen helyzetben, de hagyta őket, hogy próbát tegyenek.) Elsőre Wyszyńskire gondoltak. – Meehan táviratát azzal a megjegyzéssel zárja, hogy a jelenlegi misszió eredménye az lehet, hogy Cheli és Zagon fölmérték a helyzet súlyosságát és nehézségeit. A pápai óhaj közvetlenül kifejezett súlyára lesz szükség, hogy meg tudják mozdítani Mindszentyt és még ha ez meg is történik, a bíboros továbbra is halogatni fog és manőverezni.

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BUDAPEST 1110

SUBJECT: Cardinal Mindszenty: Cheli-Zagon Visit

REFERENCE: Budapest 1109

1. BEGIN SUMMARY. Cheli and Zagon had a further, final session with Mindszenty Sunday and are leaving for Vienna and Rome. Mindszenty would not after all sign the document recording his agreement in principle to leave Hungary. He further refused to set a date for a second visit by Cheli and Zagon to obtain his official response to the Vatican's position that he should leave. Mindszenty insisted that since the Pope had left him free to decide his fate, he should not be put under any pressure to make up his mind in a hurry. In reviewing the situation with Cheli and Zagon, the Charge reiterated the view that only a direct personal message from the [./] Pope was likely to move Mindszenty. Cheli and Zagon accepted this and said they would recommend that such a message be sent, perhaps in two or three weeks. They felt the message should be brought to Mindszenty by a Cardinal, other than Koenig. They mentioned Wyszyński as a possibility. END SUMMARY.

2. Zagon and Cheli had their final session with Minds[z]enty in their present visit Sunday morning. Again, Zagon did almost all the talking with Mindszenty. Cheli joined them only for the final ten minutes. They planned to have lunch with Hungarian officials and then leave for Vienna by car. They said they would be driven to the Austrian border in the vehi-

cle provided by the Hungarian Government and they would be met there by a car from the Papal Nunciature in Vienna.

3. Cheli and Zagon were very disappointed at the results of the final session. Before going in to Mindszenty, Cheli said they would get his signature on a document recording agreement in principle to leave the country. Cheli envisaged a second visit in about a week to get Mindszenty's "official response" to the Pope. Cheli said on the second visit they would set a definite date for departure. This hopeful scheme of things has clearly gone awry. [./.]

4. Mindszenty refused to sign the document. He said he had no difficulty with the contents but he did not feel his signature was called for. He did not even want to accept a copy of the document. He further refused to set a date for a later visit by Cheli and Zagon. He said the Pope had left it up to him to decide freely whether to go or stay and he saw no reason whatsoever why he should be made to reach this decision hurriedly. Zagon quoted him as saying that public opinion would be surprised if he decided all of a sudden to leave "only after getting a visit from two officials from Rome". Zagon felt the implication was that Mindszenty thought it beneath his dignity to act in consequence of discussions with them since they are his inferiors.

5. In reviewing the situation after the final session, the Charge took the occasion to say that we thought it doubtful that anything short of a direct personal message from the Pope would be able to move Mindszenty. Cheli and Zagon readily agreed in the light of their discussions. They said they now realized the full difficulty of the situation. They intended, they said, to report in this sense to Rome. They would draw up a draft message for the Pope's consideration. This could be sent perhaps in two or three weeks. They thought it [./.] necessary that the message be brought by a Cardinal. They did not think Koenig was appropriate. (They remarked in passing that the Pope told them that he did not think Koenig was the right man to send to Mindszenty in the present stage but was willing to let them try him if they wanted.) Cheli and Zagon brought up Cardinal Wyszynski's name as a possibility and said they would be discussing this further on their return to Rome.

6. Cheli seems determined to press ahead for a solution of the Mindszenty question. He said on several occasions that the Vatican considers this absolutely essential for the welfare of the Church in Hungary. He and Zagon doubtless go back to Rome with a more realistic appreciation of the difficulties they face in persuading Mindszenty to leave. If only in this sense, their mission has been fruitful. The key point in our view remains what it was before they came. It will take the full force of the

Pope's authority, directly expressed, to have a chance of moving Mindszenty and even at that we would guess the Cardinal would still temporize and maneuver.
MEEHAN

107. BPB0501[14–17] – Mons. Zágon Pro Memoriája, 4 pp.

Magyar nyelvű eredeti (hiányzik: június 27). Közlésétől itt eltekintetünk, mert több helyen megjelent.² Feltűnő, hogy a nyomtatásban megjelent szövegek, melyek a Mindszentynek átadott példány alapján készültek, ugyanúgy nem ismerik a feltételezhetően elkészült június 27-i följegyzést, mint az amerikaiaknak átadott példányt.

108. BPB0501[8–13], EEB1004[346–351], – Mons. Zágon Pro Memoriája, 6 pp.

Angol fordítás. Hiányzik a június 27-i följegyzés.

PRO MEMORIA

Subject: Visit with Jozsef Cardinal Mindszenty,
Primate of Hungary and Archbishop of
Esztergom, at the American Embassy in
Budapest, June 25–26–27, 1971

Monsignor Giovanni CHELI delivers a gift from the Holy Father to the Cardinal, the first volume of the New Breviarium and conveys the

2 MINDSZENTY J., *Emlékirataim*, Szent István Társulat, Budapest 1989. 4. kiadás, 474–476. (részletek); L. még: ADRIANYI, G., „Miért és hogyan hagyta el Mindszenty József a budapesti amerikai nagykövetséget?” in: *Mindszenty József emlékezete*, szerk. TÖRÖK J., (Studia Theologica Budapestinensia, 13. Budapest 1995) 73–89. Itt: 81–85. (jún. 25–26.); *Mindszenty-leveleskönyv. Gondolatok a bíboros leveleiből 1938–1975*, Összeállította: MÉSZAROS István. Budapest 1997. 56. 274/b. sz. (részletek); Faksimilében: MÉSZAROS, T., *A száműzött bíboros szolgálatában. Mindszenty József titkárának napi jegyzetei (1972–1975)*, S. a. r. HETÉNYI VARGA Károly, Abaliget 2000. 181–184 (jún. 25–26.); ADRIANYI, G., *Die Ostpolitik des Vatikans 1958–1978 gegenüber Ungarn. Der Fall Kardinal Mindszenty*, (Studien zur Geschichte Ost- und Ostmitteleuropas, 3.) Herne 2003. 70–74. (jún. 25–26.); Uő, *A Vatikán keleti politikája és Magyarország 1939–1978. A Mindszenty-ügy*, Budapest 2004. 89–95. (jún. 25–26.); SOMORJAI, Á.: *Sancta Sedes Apostolica et Cardinalis Ioseph Mindszenty, Documenta 1971–1975*, Romae 2007. 102 skk. (jún. 25–26.), 159 skk. (jún. 25–27. – olasz). Lásd még: NÉMETH László Imre, *Zágon-Leveleskönyv. Iratgyűjteménytörredék Mindszenty József bíborosról, 1967–1975*, Budapest 2011. 41–43.

respects of State Secretary – Cardinal J. VILLOT and Monsignor A. CASAROLI.

After a short discussion Monsignor Cheli departs.

Monsignor Jozsef ZAGON, whose mission was made known through Cardinal KOENIG, expressed the Holy Father's loving concern for Cardinal Mindszenty's personal fate, which he would like to ameliorate by assisting in the resolution of the entire complex of questions. The infirmities which go with advancing age, possible illness, the necessary curatives and treatments, surgical intervention can hardly be assured by the Embassy, not to speak of the political difficulties which may arise from the refuge in the event of serious illness or death.

Departing from the Embassy would create new possibilities for His Eminence to do valuable service for the Hungarian Catholic Church in its foreign and domestic aspects; the preservation of his memoirs would, with their publication, advance the better understanding of the fate of the Hungarian Church and Nation, particularly with respect to the jubilee of Saint Stephen and the thousandth anniversary of Hungarian Christianity.

The already very long imprisonment of His Eminence would be a damaging influence, from the Church's point of view, on its prestige, which is embodied in his person, especially if the present situation ended with his death. The world is apt to forget and it can only with difficulty judge the sojourn in the Embassy as a necessary sacrifice for the Church. The Holy Father on the other hand is considering such a solution which would place Your Eminence's sacrifice in a new light and which would raise it all the more, in its moral significance, in world public opinion, would in no way detract from its merits, and would serve as an example for the entire Church. [./.]

Cardinal MINDSZENTY thanks the Holy Father with filial respect for his interest, and for his good will toward him personally and the Hungarian Church. He is prepared now, as always, to subordinate personal considerations to the interests of the Church. He asks for a statement of the conditions by which it would be possible to solve the matter.

ZAGON: 1/ The status of Your Eminence as Primate and Archbishop of Esztergom would remain unchanged. The exercise of the rights and obligations which go with this status would be suspended by Your Eminence and you would not be concerned with national or Esztergom Diocese matters. The latter – *sede plena* – would receive an apostolic administrator.

MINDSZENTY: I express my grateful thanks to the Holy Father for the retention of the status of Primate and Archbishop. It was with plea-

sure and satisfaction that I read in the papers that the Holy Father also had so informed the Hungarian Foreign Ministry.

I orally accept the suspension of the above jurisdiction, no one will receive it in writing, including the new apostolic administrator.

The suspension of rights should apply only to Hungarian territory, the Pazmaneum in Vienna should remain nominally under my jurisdiction.

I am against the 'sede plena' solution. It should stay as it was. As in 1948, also precisely in 1971 I am impeded and shall so remain.

ZÁGON: 2/ Your Eminence will depart his present place of sojourn and, if circumstances should so require, Hungary itself. You should not, in connection with your change of place, make any statements either orally or in writing, circular letters to believers and priests, or a press statement.

MINDSZENTY: The decision requires my thorough meditation. There can be serious consequences domestically and abroad.[./.] If, after reflection, I decide to leave the country, I consider it most appropriate for me to stay at the Pazmaneum.

I do not intend to make a statement. It is natural, however, that a cardinal cannot be pigeonholed without a word, especially after hearing long imprisonment and suffering for the Church. The interests of the Church and my own honor demand that public opinion be correctly informed of the reasons for it.

ZÁGON: I can assure Your Eminence in the name of the Holy See that there will be no failure concerning the correct informing of public opinion. I accept personal responsibility to Your Eminence for this.

As far as the difficulty of deciding is concerned, I understand completely Your Eminence's difficulties. I can assure you, however, that the Holy Father has at great length and conscientiously balanced the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed solution and has become convinced that Your Eminence would better serve the Hungarian and the Universal Church if you would make up your mind to leave the Embassy. The concern of the Holy Father will be to lessen to a minimum the negative consequences of such a decision.

It is more than natural that Your Eminence should express in complete frankness, in a letter to the Holy Father, your own arguments which could influence the Holy See so that it should see your concerns more clearly and understand your worries.

As far as the informing of public opinion is concerned, the Holy See would inform the large press agencies of the world through its press service so that erroneous interpretations should be averted.

MINDSZENTY: The information activities marked for the public would only set my mind at rest if you, Monsignor, are given a positive role and if, before publication, Monsignor Gyula Magyary and Monsignor Sándor Csécs also can make their observations.[./.]

ZÁGON: 3/ In your new situation Your Eminence should not make any statement, either orally or in writing, which would disturb the relations between the Holy See and the Hungarian Government or which would offend the Hungarian Government or the People's Republic.

MINDSZENTY: I do not accept the Hungarian Communist regime, which caused the destruction of the Hungarian Church and Nation, as a negotiating partner, still less as a judge of my statements, and I reject its possible conditions. My only claim against the regime: my full rehabilitation after a miscarriage of justice.

The judgment as to whether a possible statement by me harms the relations between the Holy See and the Hungarian regime belongs solely to the competence of the Holy See.

The Holy See should make sure that the other side, too, i.e. the Hungarian regime and its organs, as well as the inevitably divisive peace priest movement, should exhibit a similar attitude toward me and [the Holy See] should not be pressed to refute false or offensive statements.

ZÁGON: 4/ Your Eminence should keep his memoirs secret, should not publish them and should arrange that in case of death they come into the possession of the Holy See, which at a suitable time will look after their publication.

After having been informed by Your Eminence of the contents of your memoirs, I do not see serious difficulty with their publication, at least of a significant part of them, even during the lifetime of Your Eminence.

You may retain the memoirs or hand them over to a priest who has the confidence of Your Eminence and of the Holy See.

MINDSZENTY: I have already arranged that my memoirs should come into the possession of Monsignor János SZABÓ, papal prothonotary. I ask that this be accepted. [./.]

ZÁGON: By way of summary, I would like to assure Your Eminence that, apart from the conditions under points 1–4, you can go abroad as a free man. The Holy See will support Your Eminence with confidence, understanding and with readiness to be of assistance. It follows that the special situation demands a heightened sense of responsibility and circumspection.

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June 26, 10 a.m.

ZÁGON: During yesterday's discussion, Your Eminence asked for a time for reflection in order that, weighing everything conscientiously, a decision can be made in your matter. I, in turn, must report to the Holy Father, who considers a solution of the question to be urgent and therefore sent me, despite my personal situation vis-à-vis the Hungarian organs, to Your Eminence. It is obvious that it would not have a favorable effect on the Holy Father if I returned with the news that Your Eminence had postponed a decision for an indefinite period. I therefore consider it necessary that Your Eminence give a time within which the Holy Father can expect a decision.

MINDSZENTY: I fully respect the Holy Father's wishes. But I feel that I owe it to him, to the Church and to the country to request a short period of contemplation for my decision. I cannot exempt myself from a conscientious deliberation. The Holy Father probably understands the concern of an old man if he asks for time for such a serious decision. He does not want to be an opposition, but only to manifest the consciousness of responsibility which he owes himself.

The removal of my belongings will take time because of their nature and of the outside circumstances and cannot take place overnight. But I will not prolong the decision for a year. [/.]

ZÁGON: The change in situation would not cause a great sensation or surprise abroad since for years it has been a recurrent theme in the newspapers. The removal of your writings and other things is an easily solved technical question. The decision and the removal can also be separated. The decision presses, the carrying out can be extended for one-two months, with the decision itself also kept secret for this time.

MINDSZENTY: I cannot now change my position as explained above. I ask for the understanding of the Holy Father.

109. BPB0407[19, 20] (2x), RMNNSFNB828 – Mindszenty bíboros Nixon Elnökhöz, 2 pp.

Mindszenty bíboros tudatja Nixon elnökkel, hogy a Vatikán 15 év után változást akar: – a rezsim által akadályozott – címei megtartásával vagy Magyarországon élhet tovább, vagy feltételekkel, külföldön. A moszkovita helytartók feltételeit, kegyelmét és amnesztiáját elutasítja, kivéve a rehabilitációt, a justizmord után. A helyzet azonban nem könnyű. Eltávolítása kiolthatja a magyar emigránsok és rabszolgák alig pislákoló reményének lángját. Kinek fontos a magyarok sorsa? – Első kötelességének tartja, hogy közölje ezt az elnökkel, kérve tanácsát és információját.

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Sir,

Please excuse me, Mr. President, that among the great cares also I worry my host, to whom I am very grateful, as also to legislature, to government and citizens of the United States. The Vatican after 15 years wishes a change about me: with a maintenance of my – by regime impeded – ranks and rights, either I live in Hungary, or under coercion abroad.

I refuse all conditions and stipulations, graces at amnesties of the Moscovite settlers, excepted after the justicemord the rehabilitation.

The situation and decision is not at all easy. Only the displacement of me can destroy the scarcely glimmering hope of the Hungarian emigrants and slaves. To whom well-to-do is the Hungarian lot important?

Among the meditations it is my first obligation to inform my host about this asking His of great value counsel and information.

When for it I ask Mr. President, I am sincerely and gratefully
Primate of Hungary, [not signed]
Archbishop of Esztergom

június 28, kedd

110. BPB0407[14–15, 16–17] (2x) – Levél, Mindszenty bíboros levele VI. Pál Pápához, 2 pp.

*Mindszenty bíboros megírja döntését VI. Pál Pápának, hogy el -
hagyja az amerikai nagykövetség épületét.*³

Budapestini, die 28. Junii, 1971

Beatissime Pater,

Transacta sunt iam quinque lustra a tempore, quo fiducia Sedis Apostolicae me Archiepiscopum Strigoniensem et Primatem Regni Hungariae constituit. Cui missioni conatus sum fideliter servire, constanter annuntiando veritatem intrepideque defendendo iura Ecclesiae, cum vehementer irripuit me longa multotiesque dolorosa nox plena animi corporisque molestiis. Crucem a Divina Providentia mihi impositam sine ulla voce ac profunda fide in supranaturalem valorem dolorum portavi.

Non obstante, quod ultimis duobus decenniis evolvendarum sortium Ecclesiae in Hungaria tantum testis mutus esse potui, non desunt tamen, proh dolor, accusationes, aliquoties etiam in coetibus ecclesiasticis, acsi ego essem principale impedimentum sanarum rectorumque vicissitudinum constituendarum inter Ecclesiam et potestatem civilem.

Ipsum tamen factum, quod nempe gravia vulnera Ecclesiae, limitatio iurium eiusdem et ex eadem emanans multitudo quaestionum nondum solutarum tempore meae captivitatis evenerunt, absolvit me ab hac accusatione. Et veritas et conscientia me obligant, ut expresse declarem et manifestem: me non fuisse neque potuisse esse impedimentum aequae compositionis relationum inter Ecclesiam et Statum, nisi fors illo sensu, quod iuribus fundamentalibus Ecclesiae nunquam renuntiare potui. Qua obligatione tenebar. Agnitio enim iurium huiusmodi non solum restaurationem relationum normalium, sed etiam solutionem mei negotii significasset.

Ut autem praetextus contra me pronuntiatus eliminetur et veritas factorum lucidior appareat, itemque ut onera et incommoda tam longae simulque generosae hospitalitati coniuncta subleventur, libenter desidero Sanctitatem Tuam certiore reddere me nunc, eodem modo ac in praeterito, non recusare, ut sortem propriam emolumentis Ecclesiae subiiciam.

Hoc ductus spiritu, ponderatis in profundo conscientiae obligationibus meis dignitati episcopali cardinalitiaeque inhaerentibus, etiam uti

³ A latin szöveg megjelent a Magyarországi Mindszenty Alapítvány Levéltárában őrzött tervezet alapján: SOMORJAI, Á., *Sancta Sedes, i. m.*, 2007. 165–166; Magyar eredetije (ugyancsak MMAL-ben őrzött fogalmazvány): *i. m.*, 106–107. (Ezt megelőzően csak részletei jelentek meg, l. *i. m.*, 74.) Angol fordítását l. itt, a 111. sz. alatt.

testimonium mei absoluti amoris erga Ecclesiam, decisionem cepi me aedificium legationis Statuum Foederatorum Americae derelicturum.

Residuam partem vitae meae in Hungaria inter meum dilectum populum cupio transagere, independenter ab externis adiunctis quae me expectant.

Si autem passiones contra me excitatae vel aliae maximi momenti considerationes ex parte Ecclesiae hoc impossibile redderent, suscipiam fors gravissimam vitae meae crucem: promptus sum etiam valedire amatae patriae, ut in exilio continuum meas orationes poenitentiasque pro Ecclesia et pro Hungaria.

Hoc meum sacrificium humiliter depono ante pedes Sanctitatis Tuae illa persuasione, quod etiam maximum sacrificium alicuius personae perexiguum deminuitur, si de bono Deo et Ecclesiae praestando agitur.

Iudicium de sinceritate intentionum mearum, de veritate meorum verborum et de rectitudine mearum actionum Deo et historiae relinquo. Molestias doloresque uti sacrificium expiatorium pro Ecclesia et Hungaria offero. Iustitiam humanam non postulo, clementiam vero tantum a Deo imploro. Oro, ut adveniat mundus veritatis et caritatis. Inimicis meis ex corde do veniam.

Ea qua par est devotione permaneo Sanctitatis Tuae
humillimus servus in Domino
Joseph Card. Mindszenty [not signed]
Primas Hungariae
Archiepiscopus Strigoniensis

111. BPB0407[12–13], RMNNSFNB828 – Levél, Mindszenty küldi: VI. Pál Pápának, 2 pp.

Az előző levél angol fordítása.

Most Holy Father,

Twenty-five years have passed from the time when the confidence of the Apostolic See made me Archbishop of Esztergom and Primate of the Kingdom of Hungary. I endeavored to serve this mission faithfully, constantly proclaiming the truth and courageously defending the rights of the Church, until a long and sorrowful night, full of grievances of soul and body, violently seized me. I have carried the cross imposed on me by divine providence in silence and profound faith in the supernatural value of suffering.

Despite the fact that I have been only a silent witness for the last two decades of the development of the fate of the Church in Hungary, there has been, to my sorrow, no lack of accusations, even in some Church

assemblies, as if I were the principal obstacle to the remedying and rectification of the difficulties existing between the Church and the civil authority.

The very fact, however, that the indeed grave wounds of the Church, the limitation of its rights, and the many questions arising from this were not solved during the time of my captivity, absolves me from this charge. And truth and conscience oblige me to expressly declare and state: I would not have been and could not have been an obstacle to the just settlement of the relations between the Church and State, unless perhaps in the sense that I could never renounce the fundamental rights of the Church. I hold to this responsibility. Recognition of such rights would mean not only restoration of normal relations but also the solution of my case. [./.] In order, however, to remove the charge against me and that the truth might be seen more clearly, and in order to lighten the burden and inconveniences connected with so long and so generous hospitality, I freely desire Your Holiness to believe that, as in the past, so now, I will not refuse to subordinate my own fate to the interest of the Church.

Led in this spirit, and having considered in the depth of conscience the obligations of my office of Bishop and Cardinal, as proof of my absolute devotion toward the Church, I have taken the decision to leave the building of the Legation of the United States of America.

I wish to spend the remaining part of my life in Hungary among my beloved people, regardless of the external circumstances which await me.

If, however, feelings aroused against me or other considerations of very great weight on the part of the Church make this impossible, I accept the perhaps heaviest cross of my life: I am prepared even to bid farewell to my beloved country and continue in exile my prayers and penances for the Church and for Hungary. I humbly lay my sacrifices at the feet of Your Holiness in the conviction that the greatest sacrifice of any one is reduced a little if it is a question of the preeminent good of God and the Church.

I leave the judgment about the sincerity of my intentions, the truth of my words and the correctness of my actions to God and history. I offer my troubles and sorrows as a sacrifice of expiation for the Church and Hungary. I do not ask for human justice, indeed I only implore mercy from God. I pray that the Kingdom of truth and love will come. I pardon my enemies from my heart.

I remain devotedly the most humble servant of Your Holiness in the Lord.

Primate of Hungary [not signed]
Archbishop of Esztergom

június 29, kedd

112. BPB0407[26–30], RMNNSFB693 – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: SecState, Amembassy Rome, 5 pp.

Puhan június 28-án érkezett vissza és új helyzetet talált. Tájékoztat Mindszentynek az elnökhöz, és a pápához írt két levele felől. Összefoglalja ezek tartalmát. A két levél a Cheli-Zágon látogatást követő hírtelen változást rögzíti. Kéri Washington, utasítsa Illinget, hogy haladéktalanul adja át az eredeti példányt. A Vatikánnak gyorsan kell cselekednie, hogy kihasználható legyen a kedvező pillanat. A következő lépés feltehetően a pápa válasza Mindszentynek. Javasolja, hogy Nixon elnök kivételén adjon választ a bíborosnak. Javaslatot tesz ennek főbb pontjaira.

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BUDAPEST 1123

EXDIS

SUBJECT: Cardinal Mindszenty: Mindszenty Letters to President and Pope

REFERENCE: BUDAPEST 1110

1. BEGIN SUMMARY. Mindszenty has written two letters, one to the President, the other to the Pope. The letter to the President states that the Vatican wishes a change in his status, that this is a difficult decision, and he asks for the President's advice. The letter to the Pope includes the statement that he has decided to leave the Embassy and, though he would prefer to remain in Hungary, is prepared to leave the country if this is considered in the best interests of the Church. The letter to the Pope thus signifies a sudden and decisive change following the Cheli-Zagon visit. The Vatican should follow up quickly to sustain the momentum now achieved. [/.]

2. On my return to Budapest June 28 I found that there had been sudden new developments in the Mindszenty question since the end of the Cheli-Zagon visit (reftel). Mindszenty had told the DCM that he wished to send a letter to the President and another to the Pope. The complete texts of the letters will be transmitted in the two immediately succeeding telegrams.

3. The letter to the President is short and states essentially that the Vatican wants a change in his status, that this is a difficult decision, that his first obligation is to inform his host of the situation, and he would be grateful for the President's advice. I am sending the original by pouch

today to Assistant Secretary Davies (Invoice No. C-51, pouch No. K5-694, Registry No. 1198854).

4. Mindszenty did not give us the text of the letter to the Pope, which is in Latin. He asked that it be sent sealed to the Pope and we said we would do this. However, we have the text and, according to our translation – we [./.] are not expert Latinists and request the Department to furnish an official translation as soon as possible – the Cardinal states among other things that he has decided to leave the Embassy and, while preferring to spend the rest of his days in Hungary, he is also prepared to leave the country if this is considered in the best interests of the Church.

5. We have not seen the actual contents of the sealed envelope, but we assume it is the June 28 letter of which we got a copy. It would clearly be important to verify the text which we are transmitting (Budapest 1125) against the signed original. I assume Illing will be able to do this in his consultations with Vatican officials.

6. Since Mindszenty's letter to the Pope is of high importance at the present juncture and should be given quick action in the Vatican, I am sending the original by pouch today (Invoice No. C-1, Pouch No. J-1193, Registry No. 1198855) to Embassy Rome, for Illing. I recommend [./.] that the Department instruct Illing to deliver the original as soon as possible to Casaroli. I also recommend that prior to the arrival of the letter in Rome, Casaroli be told that what we believe is an important message from Mindszenty to the Pope is on its way.

7. The Mindszenty letter to the Pope is a key development and I urge that we make it clear to the Vatican that it should seize the opportunity to press ahead quickly and firmly for a resolution of the Mindszenty case. The next step is presumably a reply from the Pope accepting Mindszenty's offer. No time should be lost in sustaining the momentum we have now achieved.

8. I believe the present letter to the President should, contrary to the usual practice, be given a Presidential reply. I recommend that this include the following elements: An expression of satisfaction that the U.S. was able to extend hospitality at a time of need; [./.] understanding that the Cardinal may wish to change his status; and a general offer to be of assistance to him in the event he decides to change his present status.

PUHAN

113. BPB0407[21–23] – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: SecState, Amembassy Rome, 3 pp.

Mindszenty bíboros június 28-i levele a pápához, a latin szöveghez cf. 110. sz.

BUDAPEST 1125

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY: LETTER TO POPE

REF: BUDAPEST 1123

Following s the text of Mindszenty's letter to the Pope, dated June 28 (ref-tel) – see Nr. 110. 3556–3557.

114. BPB0407[9], CFB (3067) SOC-1 HUNG [017–018] – Távirat, SecState küldi: Amembassy Rome, Amembassy Budapest, 1 p.

Római nagykövetség sürgősen kérjen időpontot Chelivel vagy Casarolival és közölje: Úgy véljük, Mindszenty bíboros láthatóan döntött afelől, hogy elfogadja a Vatikán óhaját és elhagyja menedékét budapesti nagykövetségünkön. Mindszenty bíborosnak a pápához címzett levele zárt borítékban úton van a római nagykövetség felé. A nagykövetség haladéktalanul juttassa majd el a címzetthez, az átvétel igazolása mellett. Ez alkolomból fejtsse ki a vatikáni tisztségviselőnek, mily fontos a kedvező pillanat kihasználása, egyben jelezze készségünket, hogy folytassuk a tárgyalásokat.

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SECRET STATE 116425

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY

REF: BUDAPEST 1123

1. EMBASSY SHOULD SEEK IMMEDIATE APPOINTMENT WITH CHELI OR CASAROLI AND SAY:

(A) WE HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE CARDINAL MINDSZENTY HAS APPARENTLY NOW DECIDED TO ACCEPT THE VATICAN'S WISH THAT HE DEPART HIS REFUGE AT OUR EMBASSY IN BUDAPEST.

(B) A SEALED LETTER FROM CARDINAL MINDSZENTY TO THE POPE IS BEING TRANSMITTED TO THE EMBASSY IN ROME.

(C) EMBASSY WILL DELIVER THE LETTER AS SOON AS IT ARRIVES.

2. EMBASSY SHOULD PROMPTLY DELIVER LETTER UPON RECEIPT. AT THIS MEETING EMBASSY SHOULD STRESS TO THE VATICAN OFFICIAL THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO MAINTAINING MOMENTUM IN THIS EFFORT. AT SAME TIME EMBASSY SHOULD REITERATE OUR WILLINGNESS TO ASSIST THE NEGOTIATIONS IN EVERY WAY POSSIBLE AS WE HAVE DONE IN THE PAST.
ROGERS

115. BPB0407[10, 18] (2x) – Levél, Puhán nagykövet Richard T. Davies-hez (Deputy Assistant, Secretary for European Affairs, Department of State, Washington D.C.), 1 p.

Megküldi Mindszenty bíborosnak Nixon elnökhöz címzett június 27-i levelét.

Enclosed is the signed original of Cardinal Mindszenty's letter to the President dated June 27, referred to in Budapest 1123.

With best regards.

Sincerely,
Alfred Puhán [not signed]
Ambassador

Enclosure:
Letter to President

116. BPB0407[11], BPB0607[0635] – Levél, Puhán nagykövet Illinghez, Rómába, 1 p.

Puhán nagykövet megküldi Mindszenty bíboros június 28-án kelt, pápához címzett levelének eredetijét, zárt borítékban. Nem látta a boríték tartalmát, de feltételezi, hogy ez az a június 28-i levél, amelyből van másolatuk.

*

Enclosed is the sealed original of Cardinal Mindszenty's letter of June 28 to the Pope, referred to in Budapest 1123. We have not seen the actual

contents of the envelope, but we assume it is the June 28 letter of which we were able to get a copy. It would clearly be important to verify the text which we transmitted by telegram against the signed original. I assume you will be able to do this in your consultations with Vatican officials.

With best regards.

Sincerely,
Alfred Puhán [not signed]
Ambassador

Enclosure:

Letter to the Pope

117. BPB0501[24–25], RMNNSFNB828 – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: SecState, Amembassy Rome, 2 pp.

Megküldi Mindszenty bíboros levelének szövegét Nixon elnökhöz, szövegét l. a táviratban, 109. sz. alatt.

BUDAPEST 1124

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY: LETTER TO PRESIDENT

REF: BUDAPEST 1123

Following is the text of Mindszenty's letter to the President, dated June 27 (reftel) Text see: Nr. 109. 3556–3557.

118. BPB0407[6] – Levél, Ernst Conrath (Dep. of State) küldi Lawrence D. Russelnek (Administrative Officer, Amembassy Budapest), 1 p.

Hivatkozva a május 28-i levélre közli, hogy Mindszenty bíboros megnövekedett orvosi költségeinek fedezését nem tudja engedélyezni. A megoldást az amerikai püspöki kartól reméli.

Just a few lines in response to your letter of May 28th concerning your anticipated increased medical costs for Cardinal Mindszenty. Regretfully, we will not be able to authorize the expenditure of S&E funds for that purpose.

I have discussed the possibility of getting the U.S. Catholic Conference to also underwrite these costs with John Vought, and he is pursuing the issue further. He also believes that this type of expenditure would fall within the purview of that organization's support activities of the Cardinal. As soon as he has had an opportunity to test the waters I will writing to you again.

With all best wishes,

Sincerely,
Ernst Conrath [signed]

cc: Mr. John Vought, EUR/CHP

június 30, szerda

119. BPB0501[2], CFB (3067) SOC-1 HUNG [015] – Távirat, Amembassy Rome küldi: SecState, Amembassy Budapest, 1p.

Illing találkozott június 30-án reggel Casarolival és az instrukciók szerint járt el. Casaroli értékelte az információt és azzal kommentálta, hogy a Zágonnal való megbeszélést követően jutott el a döntéshez. Casaroli nem becsülte le a nehézségeket, de kifejezte reményét, hogy a magyar kormány megértéssel fogja kezelni a kérdést. Casaroli jelezte, hogy a Vatikán további lépéseket tervez.

SECRET ROME 4099

EXDIS

SUBJ: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY

REF: STATE 116425

1. DCM SAW CASAROLI MORNING JUNE 30 AND CARRIED OUT INSTRUCTIONS REFTEL.

2. CASAROLI APPRECIATED INFORMATION AND COMMENTED THAT CARDINAL OBVIOUSLY HAD TO REFLECT ON CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN HIMSELF AND ZAGON AND TO REACH HIS OWN DECISION. CASAROLI DID NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE PROBLEMS WHICH LAY AHEAD, INCLUDING INITIAL PUBLICITY WHICH WOULD SURROUND CARDINAL'S DEPARTURE, CARDINALS OWN ATTITUDE REGARDING EVENTUAL ACTIONS BY GOH TO AMNESTY HIM, AND QUESTIONS RELATING TO CARDINAL'S MEMOIRE. CASAROLI HAS HOPED THAT ALL THESE QUESTIONS COULD BE HANDLED IN PERSPECTIVE AND EXPRESSED PARTICULAR HOPE THAT GOH WOULD BE WILLING TO HANDLE MATTER AS TACTFULLY AS POSSIBLE.

3. CASAROLI SHOWED EVERY INDICATION THAT VATICAN WOULD PRESS FORWARD TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF CARDINAL'S APPARENT DECISION AS SET FORTH PARA 1A REFTTEL.

MARTUN [MARTIN]

1971. JÚLIUS

A hónap közepe, Mons. Cheli és Mons. Zágon vatikáni látogatók érkezése miatt, biztosítja a legtöbb dokumentumot: csak július 15-ére 13 dokumentum van keltezve. A táviratok lehetnek néhány sorosak, de elérhetik a több, adott esetben hét oldal hosszúságot is (155. sz.). A levelek általában egy-két oldalasak, a memorandumok úgyszintén, de előfordulnak három oldalas memók is. A memorandumok tartalmából sok információ vissza-köszön a táviratokban.

A hónap fő témái Mindszenty habozása, az Elnökhöz írt levelére adandó válasz várása, emlékiratait be akarja előbb fejezni, és utána akar csak megválni tőlük, viszont biztosítani akarja azok sorsát. Idáig háttérben maradt Clem Scerback, akinek feljegyzései pontosan rögzítik a bíboros lelkiállapotát.

Lásd még: Somorjai Á., *Egy hónap Mindszenty bíborosnak az Amerikai Egyesült Államok Budapesti Nagykövetségén való tartózkodásából, a követségi dokumentumok tükrében: 1971. július hava*, in: Magyar Egyháztörténeti Vázlatok 20 (2008/1–2) 167–194.

Július 2, péntek

120. BPB0501[4–5] – Távirat, SecState a budapesti nagykövetségnek, 2 pp.

Mindszenty bíboros június 28-án kelt és VI. Pál pápához írt leve - lének angol fordítása, 2 pp.

SECRET STATE 119533

SUBJECT: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY

REF: BUDAPEST 1125

1. TRANSLATION CARDINAL MINDSZENTY'S LETTER TO POPE FOLLOWS.

2. BEGIN TEXT: MOST BLESSED FATHER: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS HAVE NOW PASSED SINCE THE TIME WHEN, WITH THE CONFIDENCE OF THE HOLY SEE, I WAS APPOINTED ARCHBISHOP OF ESZTERGOM AND PRIMATE OF THE STATE OF HUNGARY. I HAVE ENDEAVORED TO SERVE FAITHFULLY IN THAT CAPACITY,

CONSTANTLY PROCLAIMING THE TRUTH AND INTREPIDLY DEFENDING THE RIGHTS OF THE CHURCH WHEN THERE FELL UPON ME A LONG, OFTEN PAINFUL NIGHT, FILLED WITH SPIRITUAL AND PHYSICAL TROUBLES. I BORE THE CROSS LAID UPON ME BY DIVINE PROVIDENCE WITHOUT ANY COMPLAINT AND WITH A DEEP FAITH IN THE SUPERNATURAL VALUE OF SUFFERING.

DESPITE THE FACT THAT IN THE LAST TWO DECADES OF THE DEVELOPING DESTINIES OF THE CHURCH IN HUNGARY I COULD ONLY BE A SILENT WITNESS, ACCUSATIONS HAVE, ALAS BEEN MADE, FREQUENTLY EVEN IN ECCLESIASTICAL MEETINGS, ALLEGING I WAS THE PRINCIPAL OBSTACLE TO A RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE CHURCH AND THE CIVIL AUTHORITIES.

HOWEVER, THE VERY FACT THAT THE SERIOUS WOUND OF THE CHURCH – THE RESTRICTION OF ITS RIGHTS AND THE MULTITUDE OF QUESTIONS ARISING THEREFORE – HAVE NOT BEEN SOLVED DURING THE PERIOD OF MY CAPTIVITY, ABSOLVES ME OF THIS ACCUSATION. TRUCK AND CONSCIENCE COMPEL ME TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT EXPRESSLY AND OPENLY: I NEVER WAS, AND NEVER COULD BE, AN OBSTACLE TO AN EQUITABLE SETTLEMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE, EXCEPT PERHAPS IN THE SENSE THAT I COULD NEVER RENOUNCE THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE CHURCH. BY THIS OBLIGATION I WAS CONSTRAINED. FOR RECOGNITION OF SUCH RIGHTS WOULD MEAN NOT ONLY THE RESTORATION OF NORMAL RELATIONS, BUT ALSO THE SOLUTION OF MY TROUBLES.

HOWEVER, IN ORDER THAT THE FALSE CHARGE MADE AGAINST ME [./.] MIGHT BE DISPELLED, AND THE WHOLE TRUTH MIGHT APPEAR MORE CLEARLY, AND THAT THE BURDENS AND INCONVENIENCES CONNECTED WITH THE PROTRACTED AND AT THE SAME TIME GENEROUS HOSPITALITY (I HAVE RECEIVED) MIGHT BE REMOVED, I GLADLY WISH TO INFORM YOUR HOLINESS THAT, AS IN THE PAST, I WILL NOT REFUSE TO SUBORDINATE MY FATE TO THE GOOD OF THE CHURCH.

GUIDED IN THIS MATTER BY THE SPIRIT, HAVING WEIGHED IN THE DEPTHS OF MY CONSCIENCE MY OBLIGATIONS INHERENT IN THE DIGNITY OF A BISHOP AND CAR-

DINAL, AND ALSO AS A TESTIMONY TO MY ABSOLUTE LOVE FOR THE CHURCH, I HAVE MADE THE DECISION TO LEAVE THE EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

I WISH TO SPEND THE REST OF MY LIFE IN HUNGARY, REGARDLESS OF THE EXTERNAL RESTRICTIONS THAT AWAIT ME.

IF, HOWEVER, THE PASSIONS AROUSED AGAINST ME OR OTHER CONSIDERATIONS OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE FOR THE CHURCH SHOULD MAKE THIS IMPOSSIBLE, I WILL TAKE UP PERHAPS THE HEAVIEST CROSS OF MY LIFE AND BE WILLING EVEN TO LEAVE MY BELOVED FATHERLAND, SO THAT I MAY CONTINUE IN EXILE MY PRAYERS AND ACTS OF PENANCE IN BEHALF OF THE CHURCH AND HUNGARY.

THIS SACRIFICE OF MINE I HUMBLY PLACE AT THE FEET OF YOUR HOLINESS, BEING PERSUADED THAT EVEN THE GREATEST PERSONAL SACRIFICE IS REDUCED TO INSIGNIFICANCE WHEN IT IS IN THE INTEREST OF GOD AND THE CHURCH.

I LEAVE IT TO GOD AND HISTORY TO JUDGE THE SINCERITY OF MY INTENTIONS. I OFFER MY TROUBLES AND SORROWS AS AN EXPIATORY SACRIFICE FOR THE CHURCH AND HUNGARY. I DO NOT DEMAND HUMAN JUSTICE, BUT ONLY IMPLORE GOD'S MERCY. I PRAY THAT A WORLD OF TRUTH AND LOVE MAY COME. I FORGIVE MY ENEMIES FROM MY HEART.

WITH DUE DEVOTION, I REMAIN THE HUMBLE SERVANT OF YOUR HOLINESS IN THE LORD. THE PRIMATE OF HUNGARY, ARCHBISHOP OF ESZTERGOM. END TEXT

3. FOR ROME: TRANSLATION PROVIDED FYT ONLY. FACT THAT WE HAVE TEXT NOT TO BE DISCUSSED WITH VATICAN REPRESENTATIVES.

TO-1. ROGERS

Július 3, szombat

121. BPB0501[3] – Távirat, Amembassy Rome küldi: SecState, Amembassy Budapest, 1 p.

A küldés dátuma június 2, hibásan, mert mind tartalma, mind a hivatkozott táviratszámok későbbi eseményekre utalnak, és vétele július 3.

Illing Mindszentynek pápához írt levelét július 2-án átadta Mons. Chelinek, aki biztosította, hogy Casaroli aznap 13 órakor átadja a pápának. A választ két héten belül küldenék, annak átadójaként fölmerült Sebastiano Baggio bíboros, Cagliari érsekének személye (korábban Wyszyński bíborosra is gondoltak, de Cheli ezt most elvetette).

SECRET ROME 4186

EXDIS

REF: STATE 116425; BUDAPEST 1123, ROME 4099

1. ILLING DELIVERED MINDSZENTY LETTER TO CHELI MORNING JULY 2. CHELI ASSURED THAT CASAROLI WOULD DELIVER TO POPE BY 1300 SAME DAY.

2. ILLING STRESSED NEED TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM IN THIS EFFORT. CHELI AGREED. HE HOPES THAT REPLY FROM POPE CAN BE DELIVERED TO MINDSZENTY WITHIN NEXT TWO WEEKS, HE NOW CONSIDERING CARDINAL SEBASTIANO BAGGIO, ARCHBISHOP OF CAGLIARI, AS POSSIBLE PAPAL MESSENGER. CHELI HAS ABANDONED HIS PREVIOUS IDEA OF USING CARDINAL WYSZYNSKI SINCE SUCH A MISSION MAY BE DETRIMENTAL TO WYSZYNSKI'S OWN POSITION. BAGGIO, A YOUNGER ITALIAN CARDINAL, IS VERY CLOSE TO HOLY SEE AND HIS PRESENCE IN BUDAPEST LESS LIKELY CAUSE POLITICAL SIDE CURRENTS.

3. CHELI EXPECTS TO HAVE MINDSZENTY'S ORIGINAL LETTER BACK FROM POPE IN NEXT FEW DAYS AGREED TO SHOW TEXT TO ILLING.
MARTIN

Július 5, hétfő

122. BPB0501[20], EEB1004[353] – Mindszenty bíboros kéziratos levele, 1 p.
Angol fordítását l. 124. sz. alatt.

Bpest, 71. VII. 5.

Charissime!

Küldök két másolatot. Az egyik nem cáfolt híradás. Ehhez csatolkozik a bécsi kitérő válasz: azóta nem volt a Szentatyánál.

A második a várható hatással kapcsolatos. Van ennél kifejezettebb is: Prof. Pogány András beszéde Irvingtonban [sic! – angol ford. Washing - tont ír] (Kat. M. Vas. 71. IV. 4)

Szeretettel áldja

+ József

P.S. Belém nyilallott a gondolat: mozdulatommal én lennék János Kádár öröme [?] Moszkváért és 2 1/2 millió magyar magzat után. Ezért jöttem én a világra? Javítanék ezzel az egyház helyzetén?

123. BPB0501[22], EEB1004[357], cf. BPB0501[020, 023] – Magyar nyelvű újsághír Mindszenty fölmentéséről, cf. 122. és 124. sz. 1 p.

124. BPB0501[23], EEB1004[354] – Mindszenty 122. sz. alatt említett magyar nyelvű levelének angol fordítása, 1 p.

Budapest, 71. VII. 5.

Charissime!

I am sending two copied items. One is an undenied news item. To it is appended Vienna's evasive answer (Or, it is related to Vienna's evasive answer). He has not seen the Pope since then.

The second is related to the expectable effect. There also is a more explicit one than this: Professor Andras Pogany's speech in Washington [sic! – a kézirat Irvingtont ír] (Kat. M. Vas. 71. IV. 4.).

Bless you.

József

P.S. The thought struck me. By my movement would I be the cause of Janos Kadar's joy – after 2 1/2 million Hungarian abortions – did I come into the world for this? Would I improve the situation of the Church by this?

125. BPB0501[24] – Cf. 124, egy kézírásos megjegyzés, 1 p.

RT Note: Both items referred to are from Hungarian-American papers. One refers to Janos Peter's meeting with the Pope, during which, according to L'Express, agreement was reached to divest H.E. of his Hungarian Church dignity and permitted him to leave the Embassy and quietly be

sent to forced retirement. The other is a report of a speech on May 8, 1971 at the 20th anniversary of the opening of Mindszenty Hall at Windsor, Ontario. The speaker said that many wanted to bury H.E. twenty years ago because he was of peasant origin, borne of a babushka-headed peasant woman, was not a diplomat, etc. Others, peace-at-any-price modern diplomats, would like to bury him in a new imprisonment... but they don't know that by his resolute behavior, sober ability to perceive reality, he became the world's first freedom hero.*

**presumably by sending him off to retirement in a Hungarian college, but ... [két olvashatatlan szó]*

Július 6, kedd

126. BPB0501[19], EEB1004[359] – Mindszenty bíboros Villot bíboros államtitkárhoz, 1 p.

Budapest, die 6. Julii 1971

Eminentissime,

Dignetur mittere hanc epistolam D[omi]no Prelato Dr. Zágon.

Gratias! Humillimus servus

+ Joseph Mindszenty [signed]

Július 7, szerda

127. BPB0501[46] – Baker washingtoni osztályvezető levele Puhan nagykövethez, 1 p.

Javasolja, hogy Mindszenty írásban értesítse Puhan nagykövetet távozási szándékáról. Puhan kézírásos bejegyzése szerint ezt a logikát nem tudja követni.

It would be most helpful to have from you a confirmation to you by the Cardinal of his intent to leave the Embassy as he stated unequivocally in the text we have of his letter to the Pope. I leave it to your discre-

tion as to the advisability of fishing for such a statement if the Cardinal has not volunteered such an observation to you or to Frank. If you have had such confirmation, or are able to obtain it, please report it by telegram.

Sincerely,

John A. Baker, Jr. [signed]

(I don't understand this request – seems silly to me. In my event, in his present mood, I am not going fishing! W.)

Július 8, csütörtök

128. BPB0501[7], EEB1004[345] – Puhán nagykövet levele Bakerhez, 1 p.

Megküldi Mons. Zágon június 25–26–27-én kelt Pro Memoriáját, jelzi, hogy Mindszenty ezt nem írta alá és hogy hiányzik június 27-e. Cheli habozott, hogy átadjon Meehannek egy példányt, végül is arra az érvre, hogy különben nem tudnak pontosan beszámolni Washingtonnak, átadta azt.

*

John A. Baker, Jr., Esquire
Director (EUR/CHP)
Department of State
Washington, D.C.

I enclose a copy of our translation of the Pro Memoria drawn up by Monsignor Zagon during his and Cheli's visit to Budapest June 25–27. (We will keep the original Hungarian in our files.) This was the document they thought they would get the Cardinal to sign as an agreed record of their discussions but which, as we reported in our 1110, he did not sign. You will see that it is a record of only two days, the 25th and 26th, and that on the 26th Zagon put the pressure on, but to no avail. Things took a very different turn, of course, with the development reported in our 1123, but the Pro Memoria is an interesting document of record, nevertheless, since it gives a close look at some of the issues on which Zagon spent a lot of time, and which will doubtless come up again.

Cheli was at first reluctant to give Frank the Pro Memoria but yielded to the argument that we had an obligation to give the Department

an accurate record. He asked, however, that it be held very closely, and we promised to do so. I know you will handle it accordingly.

With best regards.

Sincerely,
Alfred Puhan [not signed]
Ambassador

Enclosure:

Copy of Pro Memoria

129. BPB0501[18], EEB1004[352] – Puhan nagykövet levele Bakerhez 1 p.
Melléklet: Mindszenty bíborosnak 122., 124. és 126. sz.-ban említett levele.

*

The other day the Cardinal gave us a sealed envelope addressed to Cardinal Villot and asked that it be sent to Rome. We opened it and found that the letter to Villot simply asked him to pass on enclosures to Monsignor Zagon. The enclosures are a letter to Zagon and two press clippings from the Hungarian American emigré press.

I don't believe the contents of the Cardinals letter to Zagon (I enclose our translation) are all that important. The first paragraph is part of the continuing gamesmanship between Mindszenty and Koenig. You will see also that the postscript gives some insight into the Cardinal's reluctance to leave Hungary.

I was more concerned with the question of channels to Rome than with the substantive contents, and decided the best way to play it was to send it back for normal transmission through the Apostolic Delegation. This will have the effect of slowing down the process. I think particularly at this stage, when it is important that the Cardinal not be disturbed or excited, that temporizing on matters like this is the name of the game.

With best regards.

Sincerely,
Alfred Puhan [not signed]
Ambassador

Enclosures:

1. Letter to Mgr. Zagon w/encls.
2. Letter to Cardinal Villot

130. BPB0501[25] – Dr. Péter főorvos följegyzése, 1 p.

Mindszenty bíboros húga egészségügyi állapotáról, ill. az operációról, angol fordításban.

*

Dr. PETER Head Physician

Operation was necessary – symptoms of atresia appeared – thus she could only gain by the operation.

A pulpy tumour, as big as a man's head, was removed. The intestines were quite interweaved and grown together. The parts – where necessary – were extirpated. The intestines were made free.

The operation lasted for three hours and a half, which, in spite of her high blood-pressure, calcination and her weight of 110 kg, she underwent satisfactorily.

There is no result of the histological examination yet, but the danger of its being malignant is potential.

At the moment she is in the protecting room. Visits are not permitted.

Her daughters were there yesterday.

We may call Dr. PETER daily between 10–13^h.

He was very pleasant and informative, did NOT ask for what reasons we were inquiring.

Mr. TITUS informed.

Július 9, péntek

131. BPB0501[26–27], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [247–248] – Távirat, Amembassy Rome küldi SecState-nek és Amembassy Budapestnek, 2 pp.

Mons. Cheli és Mons. Zágon érkezéséről, akik VI. Pál pápa levelét hoznák, továbbá Mindszenty kiutazásának részleteiről. Cheli arra gondol, hogy Mindszenty vatikáni útlevelét más névre, pl. édesanyja vezetéknévére kellene kiállítani.

E távirat 7. pontja számunkra különösen is érdekes. Mons. Chelire hivatkozva jelzi, hogy Mons. Zágon június végén Budapesten alaposan megtekintette Mindszenty emlékiratainak kéziratát és csodálkozva látta, hogy jobbára magyar egyháztörténeti anyagot talált, korai periódusra, különös tekintettel a középkorra és a tatárjárásra. Mindszenty még nem írta meg az utolsó kötetet, amely feltételezhetően saját korát tárgyalja. Ezért Mons. Chelinek az a benyomása, hogy az emlékiratok valójában nem léteznek.

ROME 4337

SUBJECT: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY

REF: STATE 116425; BUDAPEST 1125; ROME 4186

1. CHELI CALLED ILLING TO HIS OFFICE LATE JULY 8 TO SAY THAT HE AND ZAGON HOPED TO DEPART ROME FOR BUDAPEST JULY 13, ARRIVING SAME OR FOLLOWING DAY AFTER SHORT LAYOVER IN VIENNA. MSGR GABRIEL MONTALVO, ANOTHER VATICAN EASTERN EUROPEAN EXPERT, WILL PROBABLY ALSO ACCOMPANY BUT WILL PARTICIPATE ONLY IN TALKS WITH GOH. CHELI AND ZAGON EXPECT TO DELIVER TWO LETTERS TO CARDINAL MINDSZENTY, ONE FROM POPE AND ONE FROM SECRETARIAT OF STATE WHICH DISCUSSES TECHNICAL DETAILS OF CARDINAL'S MOVE TO VIENNA. CHELI URGED THAT EMBASSY BUDAPEST ONLY TELL MINDSZENTY THAT HE AND ZAGON WISH TO SEE HIM ON OR ABOUT JULY 14 TO DELIVER LETTER FROM "HOLY SEE," AND NOT MENTION THAT LETTER COMING FROM POPE. IDEA OF HAVING A CARDINAL DELIVER LETTER DROPPED AS UNNECESSARY. CHELI WISHES TO BE INFORMED BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE IF HIS TIMING ACCEPTABLE EMBASSY BUDAPEST AND CARDINAL.

2. CHELI ANTICIPATES THAT MINDSZENTY CAN BE TRANSFERRED TO VIENNA BY MID-AUGUST, PERHAPS EVEN WITHIN NEXT WEEK, IF CARDINAL AGREEABLE. CHELI BELIEVES IT BEST TO SEND TWO CARS FROM PAPAL NUNZIATURE IN VIENNA TO BUDAPEST TOGETHER WITH PAPAL NUNZIO TO AUSTRIA, ARCHBISHOP OPILIO ROSSI, TO ESCORT MINDSZENTY AND HIS BELONGINGS TO VIENNA. VATICAN PASSPORT WILL BE ISSUED TO MINDSZENTY, POSSIBLY USING HIS MOTHER'S RATHER THAN HIS OWN SURNAME. CHELI UNAWARE WHETHER MINDSZENTY WOULD ALSO HAVE HUNGARIAN PASSPORT BUT FEELS IT BEST ENTER AUSTRIA WITH VATICAN PASSPORT AS AUSTRIA REQUIRES NO VISA THEREIN.

3. ALTHOUGH NOTHING YET DECIDED, CHELI FEELS VATICAN PRESS OFFICER WILL SIMPLY ANNOUNCE THAT CARDINAL MINDSZENTY HAS LEFT HUNGARIAN TERRITORY. IDEALLY SUCH ANNOUNCEMENT, ACCORDING TO CHELI'S PRESENT THINKING, WOULD BE MADE ABOUT TIME CARDINAL ENTERS AUSTRIA. AT ALL COSTS VATICAN WISHES

AVOID HAVING [./] CARDINAL MET BY LARGE GROUP NEWS-PAPERMEN ON HIS ARRIVAL AT HUNGARIAN SEMINARY IN VIENNA.

4. CARDINAL HAS ALREADY GIVEN WORD THAT HE WILL MAINTAIN SILENCE ON HUNGARIAN POLITICAL SITUATION FOLLOWING HIS DEPARTURE. CHELI CONSIDERS THIS ASSURANCE SUFFICIENT, FOR ITS PART, VATICAN WILL ATTEMPT TO HOLD CARDINAL TO THIS PROMISE, ALL OF WHICH SATISFACTORY TO GOH.

5. CHELI SAYS HE MIGHT SUGGEST DURING TALKS WITH GOH AUTHORITIES THAT GOH CONSIDER AMNESTYING MINDSZENTY BUT PUBLISHING NOTIFICATION THEREOF ONLY IN OFFICIAL GAZETTE WITHOUT FURTHER FANFARE. THIS WOULD BE DONE SEVERAL MONTHS AFTER CARDINAL'S DEPARTURE. HOWEVER, IT POSSIBLE THAT PRIOR CHELI'S DEPARTURE CASAROLI MAY OVERRULE PRESENTING THIS SUGGESTION.

6. CHELI HAS VERIFIED THAT LATIN TEXT IN BUDAPEST WAS IDENTICAL TO LETTER RECEIVED BY POPE.

7. CHELI SAID THAT WHILE IN BUDAPEST ZAGON CAREFULLY PERUSED MINDSZENTY'S MUCH DISCUSSED MEMOIRS AND WAS ASTONISHED TO FIND THAT THEY IN REALITY MOSTLY HISTORIES COVERING EARLY PERIOD OF CHURCH HISTORY IN HUNGARY, WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON MIDDLE AGES AND FIGHT AGAINST MONGOLS. MINDSZENTY HAS NOT YET WRITTEN LAST VOLUME WHICH WILL PERSUMABLY COVER CONTEMPORARY PERIOD. THEREFORE, IT CHELI'S IMPRESSION THAT "MEMOIRS" PER SE DO NOT REALLY EXIST.
MARTIN

132. BPB0501[28–29], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [242–243], RMNNSFB693 – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi SecState-nek és Amembassy Rome-nak, 2 pp.

Mons. Cheli és Mons. Zágon látogatásáról. Mindszenty nem fog beleegyezni, ha más vezetéknév alatt kellene utaznia, ezért a javaslat ellen foglalnak állást. Figyelemreméltó, hogy az amerikaiak Mindszentyt mintha jobban ismernék és a nevében foglalnak állást. A kiutazás további részletei.

BUDAPEST 1202

SUBJECT: Cardinal Mindszenty

REF: Rome 4337

1. The proposed timing for Cheli, Zagon and Montalvo to visit with the Cardinal presents no problems to the Embassy. Subject to the Department's approval, we will inform the Cardinal.

2. It will be important to us in connection with the visit to have the contents of the Pope's letter and also the one from the Secretariat of State. Will Embassy Rome be able to provide ahead of the visit?

3. The proposed Vatican arrangements seem generally well thought out, but it strikes us as highly doubtful that the Cardinal would consent to travel under any name but Mindszenty. This could be an important point in what is going to be in any case a delicate business. Mindszenty might regard the idea of using another name as a "provocation". [./.] We strongly urge against it.

4. The Vatican's proposed press arrangements seem to have one flaw. If the announcement were made as Mindszenty crossed the border, there would be a very real likelihood in our view that Vienna newsmen would descend immediately on the Pazmaneum to be on hand for the Cardinal's arrival. Would it not be better to make the announcement after he is actually in the Pazmaneum? This would give at least a little time to catch breath. The U.S. side (the Department and we here) will also get press queries. We assume the Department will coordinate our statement with the Vatican's. Meantime, we also assume the guidance worked out for the Koenig-Cheli-Zagon visit will remain in force for the next round. That is, if queried during or after the visit, we will confirm the fact of the visit and the visitors' identity, but make no comment.

PUHAN

133. BPB0501[31], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [245] – Távirat, Amembassy Rome küldi SecState-nek, Amembassy Budapest-nek, 1 p.

Vatikáni delegáció érkezéséről.

ROME 4358

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY

REF: BUDAPEST 1202; ROME 4337

1. ILLING TOLD CHELI THAT EMBASSY BUDAPEST HAD NO PROBLEM WITH PROPOSED TIMING OF VISIT NEXT WEEK BUT THAT IT NECESSARY TO AWAIT DEPARTMENT'S APPROVAL.

2. CHELI WILL NOT RECEIVE POPE'S LETTER OR LETTER FROM SECRETARIAT OF STATE UNTIL JUST PRIOR HIS DEPARTURE FROM ROME, THEREFORE UNABLE PROVIDE ADVANCE COPIES OF TEXTS. HE SEES NO DIFFICULTY, HOWEVER, IN SHOWING LETTERS TO EMBASSY BUDAPEST ON ARRIVAL.

3. CHELI NOT CONVINCED THAT IF VATICAN DECIDES ISSUE MINDSZENTY PASSPORT IN OTHER NAME THAT THIS WOULD CAUSE ANY PROBLEMS. IN ANY CASE, PASSPORT WOULD BE USED ONLY TO CROSS HUNGARIAN-AUSTRIAN BORDER. NEVERTHELESS, CHELI AGREED TO TAKE EMBASSY BUDAPEST'S SUGGESTION UNDER CONSIDERATION.

4. CHELI ALSO AGREED CONSIDER EMBASSY'S SUGGESTIONS ON TIMING ANNOUNCEMENT OF CARDINAL'S DEPARTURE. CHELI WILL DISCUSS FULLY ALL DETAILS WITH EMBASSY BUDAPEST ON ARRIVAL AND PRIOR TO SEEING CARDINAL.
MARTIN

134. BPB0501[86] – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: USAMED-OCOMEUR, Amembassy Vienna, Amembassy Bonn, 1 p.

Programtorlódás miatt Puhán nagykövet kéri az orvosok látogatásának elhalasztását.

*

BUDAPEST 1270

SUBJ: Medical Support

REF: Budapest 01203, 9 July 1971

Due to unforeseen conflict of appointments and scheduling of other important Emb activities, regret visit of LTC Sweeney and MGB Thompson must be postponed to later date. We will advise as soon as possible when visit can be rescheduled. Sincerely regret any inconveniences caused to your command and the LTC Sweeney and MBG Thompson. We continue to be grateful for your assistance.

PUHAN

Július 10, szombat

135. BPB0501[30], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [234–235], RMNNSFB693 – Távirat, SecState küldi: Amembassy Budapest, Amembassy Rome, 1 p.
A vatikáni delegáció fogadásának engedélyezése.

STATE 124391

SUBJECT: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY

REF: A. ROME 4337

B. BUDAPEST 1202

1. EMBASSY AUTHORIZED TO ARRANGE APPOINTMENT DESCRIBED IN REFTTEL A.

2. AGREE WITH EMBASSY BUDAPEST'S RECOMMENDATIONS ON MINDSZENTY PASSPORT AND PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT. ROME AUTHORIZED TO OFFER THESE THOUGHTS TO CHELI OR CASAROLI AS POSSIBLY HELPFUL SUGGESTIONS.

3. DO NOT BELIEVE WE CAN PROPERLY PRESS FOR ADVANCE ACCESS TO TEXTS OF VATICAN LETTERS TO MINDSZENTY, BUT LEAVE THIS TO EMBASSY ROME'S DISCRETION.

4. EMBASSY BUDAPEST CORRECT THAT SAME PRESS GUIDANCE SHOULD APPLY TO COMING VISIT AS TO PREVIOUS ONE.

5. AT TIME MINDSZENTY'S PRESENCE IN AUSTRIA BECOMES KNOWN, DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN WILL CERTAINLY BE QUERIED. WE ARE PREPARING REPLY WHICH WILL RECALL BASIC FACTS OF MINDSZENTY'S REFUGE. HOWEVER, WOULD WELCOME EMBASSY BUDAPEST'S SUGGESTIONS FOR FINAL SENTENCES WHICH WOULD DESCRIBE MANNER IN WHICH REFUGE TERMINATED. WE WILL WANT THEN TO CHECK OUR FINAL PROPOSED REMARKS WITH VATICAN. IRWIN

136. BPB0501[32–34] – Memorandum a Nagykövet számára, anonim, 3 pp.

A feljegyzéskészítő (valószínűleg Francis J. Meehan) kommentárja: a beszélgetés arra utalt, hogy a bíboros hadakozik a távozás gondolatával. Az Elnök válaszára várás részéről csak taktikai fogás. Valószínűleg nem vár

olyan választ, amely távozása ellenében foglalna állást. A válasz hiányát viszont arra használhatja fel, hogy Mons. Cheli és Mons. Zagon előtt halassza távozását, mert úgy érvelhet, hogy nem adhat végleges választ a pápának, amíg nem kap tájékoztatást az Elnök szándékáról. Ezért a pápa leendő levelének hangvétele rendkívül fontos. Ha a hívás egyértelmű, akkor a bíborosnak nehéz lesz visszautasítania, még akkor is, ha húzza-halasztja a távozás időpontját. Ha nem, akkor megpróbál manőverezni, arra hivatkozva, hogy egyszerűen nem akar távozni.

*

Note to AMB: I decided to set this down as draft memcon rather than telegram

I told the Cardinal this morning that Monsignors Cheli and Zagon planned to come and visit him on or about July 15. They would be bringing a letter from the Holy See ((in line with Rome's message, I did not say a letter from the Pope). The Cardinal said he would be glad to receive them. I said we would pass this to Rome.

The Cardinal said that before the Ambassador left for Washington they had had a good talk. He would like to know if the Ambassador brought any word back with him from Washington on the matters discussed. I said the Ambassador had wished to see him on his return but had deliberately held back because he knew that he (the Cardinal) had had a strenuous time recently with the visit from Rome. The subject matter was difficult, and the Ambassador appreciated this. I would, however, now convey the Cardinal's interest in meeting with the Ambassador, and I was sure the Ambassador would be delighted to see him.

The Cardinal said he would particularly like to see the Ambassador before the visitors from Rome returned. The reason was not just to have the Ambassador's comments on the subject discussed before the Ambassador's departure (the memoirs), but also the recent events, that is the Cheli-Zagon visit. He wanted to know what the atmosphere in Washington was, on the question of his possible departure. He assumed the Vatican had fully informed Washington about the purpose of the Cheli-Zagon visit. And he has written the President to ask for his advice. [./.] It was urgent to have the President's reply, otherwise he would be missing one of the key factors for the consideration of his decision, and would not be fully able to deal with Cheli and Zagon when they came back. The Cardinal referred back to the question he asked me before Koenig and Zagon. Cheli came last time, that is, was there any change in the US attitude toward giving him refuge.

He appreciated my reply, to the effect that while there was no basic change, there was increasing concern for his health and welfare, as he got older, but he wanted to have the Ambassador's views, based on his recent trip home and, beyond that, the President's actual reply. I said I was sure the Ambassador would be glad to let him know his impressions of Washington thinking. I added that I could not presume to anticipate what the White House response would be. On a purely personal basis, however, I offered the opinion that on the US side the feeling would be that the decision whether to leave the Embassy and Hungary was a matter for the Cardinal, presumably in conjunction with the Vatican, but in any case not a matter on which the US would wish to pronounce for or against.

The Cardinal then turned to his views on Vatican attitudes, prefacing his comments with the familiar remark that personal freedom was a matter of complete indifference to him. He said the Vatican simply did not understand the Hungarian situation. It hoped to get the nomination of two bishops to vacant sees in return for an arrangement to move him out of Hungary. He found this ridiculous. The Church in Hungary does not need bishops, he said, but good priests and youth. The bishops were largely a cause for scandal to the faithful in any case because of their weak attitude to the regime. The proposed [./.] deal – his departure for the two bishops – would make Kadar happy, but he has never considered it his ambition to serve that end. His departure from the country would mean the extinction of the last glimmering hope the country had. As long there was even one person left, in Hungary or outside, who felt that way, this made it very difficult for him to go. (I noticed he was careful in using this formulation, which he repeated several times. He did not say it made it impossible for him to go, or he would not go, but just that it made it very difficult for him to go.)

Comment: The conversation in general gave every indication that the Cardinal is fighting the decision to go very strongly. I think the matter of the President's reply is tactical. He probably does not expect realistically a reply that will take a stand for or against his going. However, he may use the absence of a reply as a procedural point to temporize when Cheli and Zagon return, perhaps saying in effect that he cannot give the Pope a definite date for departure until he hears the President's views. Also, clearly, the tenor of the Pope's letter is going to be tremendously important. If the call to go is unambiguous, the Cardinal will find it hard to refuse, even though he might try to stretch the time frame. If it is not, he will try to maneuver on the basic decision, for he simply does not want to go.

137. BPB0501[35], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [232], RMNNSFB693 – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: SecState, Amembassy Rome, 1 p.

Mindszenty szívesen látja Mons. Chelit és Mons. Zágont július 14-e körül.

BUDAPEST 1212

EXDIS

SUBJECT: Cardinal Mindszenty

REF: State 124391

Mindszenty has agreed to receive Cheli and Zagon on or about July 14. We told him they would bring letter from Holy See and did not mention that letter coming from Pope (Rome 4337).

PUHAN

Július 12, hétfő

138. BPB0501[36–38] – Memorandum, Puhan följegyzése Mindszenty bíborossal való találkozásáról, 3 pp.

A bíboros kérésére fölkereste őt aznap reggel, kb. húsz percig tartott a találkozás. Mindszenty fáradt volt, gyűrött, borotvátlan és rendkívül komoly. Puhan tisztázza, hogy az emlékiratok szövegét addig nem áll mód - jában Bécsbe küldeni, amíg maga Mindszenty a budapesti követség poli - tikai menedékjogát élvez. Mindszenty viszont az Elnök válaszát sürgeti, és szemrehányást tesz, hogy sohasem kapott írásos választ az Elnöknek írt leveleire. Másnapra fontos látogatókat vár a Vatikánból, és meg kell nekik mondania, hogy még nem kapta meg az Elnök tanácsát jövőjét illetően.

Mindszenty kritikusan viszonyul a Vatikánhoz. Igen szkeptikus a kelet-európai országok jövőjével kapcsolatban. Figyelemre méltó, hogy ebben a dialógusban az amerikai nagykövet képviseli azt a gondolatot, hogy az egyháznak javára válhat az üldöztetés: az istentelen rendszerek nem tudják megsemmisíteni. és bár az egyház nyilvánvalóan nem olyan erős, mint ott, ahol nem volt elnyomás, ő bizonyos abban, hogy a vallás újra fel fog éledni, sőt még erősebb is lesz, mint az elmúlt években.

Kommentár: soha nem látta a bíborost ennyire udvariasságnak és el - keseredettnak. Láthatóan igen nehezebbre esik, hogy eleget tegyen a Vatikán kérésének, hogy hagyja el Magyarországot. Az Elnök elmaradt válaszát föl akarja használni a vatikáni látogatókkal való tárgyalás folyamán. Egészen egyszerűen azt mondhatja, hogy nem tud végső döntést hozni, amíg nem értesül az Elnök szándékáról. Másrészt – hiszen ő rendkívül fortélyos em - ber –, segítséget próbál kapni tőlünk a Vatikán ellenében, hogy ne kelljen

elmennie. És még itt a veszély, hogy azt fogja mondani, hogy az amerikaiak kiutasították őt.

Puhan nagykövet emlékirataiban is részletesen leírja ezt a találkozást.⁴

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SUBJECT: Cardinal Mindszenty
Ambassador Puhan

I met with Cardinal Mindszenty at his request for approximately twenty minutes this morning. He appeared tired, drawn, unshaven and most serious.

I opened the conversation by saying that I had purposely refrained from asking him to meet with me after my return, since I was aware of the visits he had had from Rome and Vienna and that he had been deeply involved in contemplation. I had not wanted to disturb him in this. When however, Mr. Meehan informed me on Saturday that he wished to see me, I was ready as I always was, to talk to him.

Since he made no comment, at this point I said I regretted to inform him that on the question he had taken up with me prior to my departure for Washington, namely the possibility of having his memoirs edited by an outsider in Vienna, I was unable to return with a changed position from that we had held previously. This was that we would guarantee that his memoirs would not fall into the hands of the Hungarians and that we would turn them over to the Vatican upon his demise. I said that the impression I had gained in Washington was that we would not risk publication of his memoirs while he remained in asylum in the United States Embassy in Budapest. We could have no objection, of course, to the publication of the memoirs if he were not in the U.S. Embassy. I was sorry I could not add to that.

At this point Cardinal Mindszenty asked point blank why he never received a written reply to his letters. He said he had written a letter to the President some time ago, seeking his advice but he had received no reply. He said that tomorrow he was expecting visitors from Rome and he would have to state that he had not received the President's advice on his future, on whether hospitality would continue to be extended to him or not. [./.] I said I knew that he had sent a letter two weeks ago and that as yet there was no reply. I could assure him, however, that on the question of asylum

4 PUHAN, *i. m.*, 201. sk.

it remained as it was before. In other word, that he was free to remain in the American Embassy. I said I could not, of course, tell him what the President's views were in the absence of a conversation or a letter from the President, but I knew that on the question of his future it was a matter for the Cardinal himself to decide. This was obviously a highly personal decision in which we would not and could not advice him. I added that I had found some concern for his health in Washington in view of his advancing years and our inability to give him the care he needed at some future date.

Cardinal Mindszenty said that early in his exile he used to receive personal letters from the President but in recent years he has had no written replies. He said he realized a Cardinal in exile had to be humble and tolerant of such treatment. However, he found it difficult to understand why he could not get an answer in writing.

I said that I thought during the time I had been here he had always been informed that his letters had been received and he had been given oral replies. That is as far as I could go.

Cardinal Mindszenty then took off on the Vatican in a most scathing manner. He spoke of the so-called Foreign Minister of the Vatican being received by a junior official in Moscow. He said the Vatican does not understand the situation and wants Bishops in Hungary. He said the populations of the East must perish. He said that we must remember that this is after Yalta and not before and that we are all now in the hands of Moscow.

I said I would not presume to discuss the relationship of church and state in various countries. I did wish to point out to him that it was not our business to get into this question in other countries. On the state of the church in Eastern Europe, I felt that the Godless regimes had sought to eradicate it but had failed and while the church obviously was not as strong as it was where there was no oppression, I was certain religion would continue to flourish and even grow stronger as the years passed. I said that he should realize that we, the United States, for a good many reasons must try to find ways of living with realities. I assumed, although I did not presume to talk about the Vatican, the Vatican had a similar approach.

Cardinal Mindszenty sought to summarize our conversation by saying that he learned from me he could not expect a letter from the President telling him whether hospitality was extended or not. I corrected him immediately, saying that was not what I had said. I said I wished to make it very clear that there was no question about his being able to remain in asylum in the United States Embassy. [./.] if he chose that course. That in my view, however, he could not expect guidance or advice from us on what to do about his future, that this was a matter for him to decide.

We parted on this note.

COMMENT. I have never seen the Cardinal as curt and even bitter. He is obviously having the greatest difficulties facing up to the wishes of the Vatican to have him leave Hungary. He sees in the President's failure to reply to his letter a straw to be used in the upcoming talks with the Vatican representatives. He may quite easily decide to say he cannot give his final decision until he has heard from the President. Alternatively – and he is a very wily man – he is trying to get support from us to be used against the Vatican in making the decision not to go. And there is the threat that he will say he has been ordered out by the Americans.

139. BPB0501[39–42], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [229–230], RMNNSFB693 – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: SecState, Amembassy Rome, 4 pp. Cf. 138. sz.

BUDAPEST 1217

SUBJECT: Cardinal Mindszenty

1. SUMMARY. In a short meeting I have had with him Mindszenty has indicated that he will tell Cheli and Zagon he cannot give them a definitive response in the absence of a reply to his letter to the President. I told Mindszenty that, while I could not presume to anticipate the President's reply, I felt that the U.S. position was that the decision whether to leave could only be made by him. I recommend that I be authorized on an urgent basis to convey to him, as the official U.S. position, that we cannot presume to advise him on what must be personal decision. In the absence of such a response on our part, Mindszenty will probably temporize further on his commitment to the Pope to leave. END SUMMARY.

2. I had a twenty-minute meeting with Cardinal Mindszenty at his request the morning of July 12. The Cardinal was tense and serious, clearly concerned about the decisions he will be [./] facing with the new visit from Rome. He was scathing in his criticism of Vatican policy in Eastern Europe. He said the Vatican simply did not understand the situation in Eastern Europe and in Hungary in particular. He seems to be fighting the commitment given in his letter to the Pope to leave the Embassy and Hungary. I think he will continue to do so in the approaching Cheli-Zagon visit, which could be a very tough one.

3. One practical point of significance emerged which has a very direct bearing on the Cheli-Zagon visit. The Cardinal noted that he did not

yet have a reply to his letter to the President. In the absence of a reply he would, he said, be obliged to tell Cheli and Zagon that one of the essential factors is missing and he could not give them a definitive response. I told Mindszenty that I could not of course presume to anticipate the President's reaction to his letter. However, I felt I should in all candor give him my personal view of the situation. This was that on so highly personal and on so [./] grave an issue as the decision whether to leave the Embassy and Hungary, the U.S. Government would not consider it appropriate for it to offer the Cardinal any advice. Rather, this was a matter which only he could decide. I stressed that the U.S. attitude concerning the Cardinal's situation of refuge was unchanged, although there was increasing concern about his health and welfare as he grew older.

4. Mindszenty tried to summarize our conversation by saying that he understood me to say that he would not be getting a reply from the President. I corrected this immediately, saying that I did not presume to speak for the President, that I was sure his letter was being given the most careful consideration.

5. We are obviously in a very delicate phase with the Cardinal. He does not want to leave despite his letter to the Pope, and I think he is looking around for some means of avoiding or at least postponing a final decision. He evidently would like to be able to use a reply from the President in effect to negate [./] the force of the Vatican's urging that he should leave. In the absence of any response from Washington to his letter to the President I believe he will, as he indicated to me, tell Cheli and Zagon that he cannot give them a definitive response. I believe we should head off this possibility which, if it developed in fact, would have the effect of drawing out the process of decision. With this in view, I recommend that I be authorized on an urgent basis to convey to the Cardinal as a U.S. Government position essentially what I have already told him. That is, that with regard to his letter to the President, the U.S. Government does not presume to advise him on so grave and so personal a matter which must remain for his decision alone.

PUHAN

140. BPB0501[43], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [226–227] – Távirat, Amembassy Rome küldi: SecState, Amembassy Budapest, 1 p.

Engedélyt kér az elnökhöz írt levél tényének a Vatikánnal való közlésére. Javaslatot tesz a Mindszenty bíborosnak adandó elnöki válaszra.

ROME 4393

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY

REF: BUDAPEST 1217

1. IN ABSENCE OF INSTRUCTIONS WE DID NOT, OF COURSE INFORM VATICAN OF MINDSZENTY'S LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT AND WE ARE NOT AWARE THAT VATICAN HAS BEEN INFORMED OF IT FROM OTHER SOURCES. WE ARE SOMEWHAT CONCERNED THAT IF MINDSZENTY USES HIS LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT AS AN EXCUSE FOR NOT GIVING CHELI AND ZAGON A DEFINITIVE REPLY, THE VATICAN WILL BE SURPRISED THAT WE HAVE NOT SHOWN MORE CANDOR WITH THEM, PARTICULARLY SINCE WE HAVE BEEN URGING THE VATICAN TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM INITIATED BY CARDINAL'S LETTER TO THE POPE.

2. WE RECOMMEND THAT WE BE AUTHORIZED TO INFORM VATICAN OF MINDSZENTY'S LETTER AND, IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, NATURE OF PRESIDENT'S REPLY PRIOR TO CHELI-ZAGON DEPARTURE.

3. IN REGARD TO REPLY, IT OCCURS TO US THAT MINDSZENTY WOULD BE LESS ABLE TO PROCRASTINATE IN HIS FINAL DECISION TO LEAVE BUDAPEST IF AMBASSADOR PUHAN WERE AUTHORIZED TO MAKE REPLY TO CARDINAL ALONG FOLLOWING LINES: PRESIDENT WHO IS NOW IN SAN CLEMENTE HAD INSTRUCTED THAT CARDINAL BE INFORMED THAT PRESIDENT HAD LEARNED WITH MUCH SATISFACTION THAT CONDITIONS HAD EVOLVED TO THE POINT WHERE THE CARDINAL HAD INDICATED TO THE POPE HIS READINESS TO LEAVE BUDAPEST AND THAT THE POPE, TO WHOM THE CARDINAL HAD ALWAYS SHOWN SUCH EXEMPLARY DEVOTION, HAD ACQUIESCED IN SUCH A SOLUTION. THE PRESIDENT SENT HIS BEST WISHES TO THE CARDINAL TO WHOM A WRITTEN REPLY ALONG THE LINES OF THE ORAL MESSAGE WOULD BE DELIVERED IN VIENNA.

4. SUCH A REPLY WOULD PLACE THE MATTER COMPLETELY IN CONTEXT OF MINDSZENTY'S DISCUSSIONS WITH THE VATICAN, UNDERLINE THE "DEVOTION" OF THE CARDINAL TO THE POPE, AND MAKE CLEAR THAT A DECISION MADE BY THE POPE AND THE CARDINAL WOULD BE ENTIRELY SATISFACTORY TO US.

MARTIN

Július 13, kedd

141. BPB0501[44] – Följegyzés Nagy János helyettes külügyminiszterrel történt tárgyalásról, 1 p.

SUBJECT: Mindszenty Case

PLACE: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

PARTICIPANTS: Janos Nagy, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

Ambassador Puhán

H. Wilgis

The Ambassador then turned to the subject of Cardinal Mindszenty and noted that a three-man delegation from the Vatican is due to arrive at Budapest the next day. He told Nagy that this is a delicate situation and that the Cardinal is in a grim mood. While, on the one hand, he appears to be prepared to leave the Embassy, on the other he is fighting this possibility bitterly. In the Ambassador's opinion it is "touch and go" whether or not the Cardinal will choose to leave. Given the sensitivity of the situation, he appreciates the willingness of the Government of Hungary to work quietly toward a solution. The Ambassador added that the Cardinal does not want to deal with the GOH. Therefore, if the need should arise, he thought he and Nagy should agree to act as a channel for any necessary discussions concerning the modalities of the Cardinals' departure. Nagy agreed and assured the Ambassador that the GOH has done the necessary contingency planning.

142. BPB0501[45], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [213] – Távirat, Amembassy Rome küldi: Amembassy Budapest, 1 p.

Mons. Cheli és Mons. Zágon érkezésének napja: július 14.

ROME 4396

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY

REF: BUDAPEST 1212

CHELI HAS ADVISED EMBASSY THAT HE AND ZAGON PLAN TO ARRIVE BUDAPEST JULY 14 AT 4 P.M. THEY WOULD HOPE TO SEE CARDINAL MINDSZENTY THAT SAME EVENING. MARTIN

143. BPB0501[57], – Memorandum, kézíratos, s. d., 1 p.

Teendők a bíboros esetleges távozása esetén.

Item

1) Memoirs

2) Titles

3) Silence?

4) Rehabilitation – amnesty

5) Forniture a. belongings

6) Press Guidance

7) Safe Conduct Guarantee

8) ... escort?

10) What do we ...

Július 14, szerda

144. BPB0501[47], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [215–217], RMNNSFB693, RMNNSFNB828 – Távirat, Sec State küldi: Amembassy Budapest, Amembassy Rome, 1 p.

Nixon elnök levele Mindszenty bíboroshoz. Ennek szövege.

SECSTATE 127273

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO CARDINAL MINDSZENTY
FOLLOWING TEXT RECEIVED FM W.H.

PRESIDENT NIXON ON JULY 14 SIGNED LETTER TO CARDINAL MINDSZENTY. TEXT FOLLOWS:

QUOTE DEAR CARDINAL MINDSZENTY:

THE CONSIDERATIONS OUTLINED IN YOUR LETTER OF JUNE 27 ATTEST TO THE LONG ORDEAL YOU HAVE BORNE SO PATIENTLY AND SO WELL.

SPEAKING NOT ONLY FOR THIS GOVERNMENT BUT FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AS WELL, I TAKE GREAT SATISFACTION THAT WE WERE ABLE TO BE OF ASSISTANCE TO YOUR EMINENCE WHEN THE NEED WAS URGENT AND PRESSING. NO THANKS ARE NECESSARY FROM OUR HONORED GUEST, BUT THE GRATITUDE YOU HAVE SHOWN IS DEEPLY APPRECIATED.

YOUR DECISIONS ABOUT THE FUTURE ARE, OF COURSE, ONES BETWEEN YOURSELF AND THE VATICAN. I KNOW THAT IN REACHING THEM, YOU AND HIS HOLINESS WILL BE GUIDED BY YOUR FAITH, BY THE INTERESTS OF THE CHURCH, AND BY YOUR CONCERN FOR ITS MINISTRY TO THE PEOPLE OF HUNGARY. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED IN MAKING YOUR DECISION.

WITH EVERY GOOD WISH, SINCERELY,
RICHARD NIXON END QUOTE

2. FOR BUDAPEST: CONTENTS OF LETTER SHOULD BE CONVEYED TO CARDINAL MINDSZENTY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW BY POUCH. YOU MAY AT YOUR DISCRETION BRIEF CHELI ON GENERAL PURPORT OF LETTER.

(Conveyed to Cardinal Mindsz. 0925, 7/15/71, AP)

3. FOR ROME: EMBASSY AUTHORIZED TO CONVEY FACT OF CARDINAL'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT AND PRESIDENT'S REPLY TO CASAROLI. GENERAL PURPORT OF PRESIDENT'S LETTER MAY BE CONVEYED BUT NOT RPT NOT TEXT.

(Briefed Zagon [Cheli delayed] at 10:00 AP)

(Briefed Cheli at 11:00 am AP)

EMBASSY ROME MAY ALSO TELL CASAROLI THAT AMBASSADOR PUHAN IS CONVEYING SAME INFORMATION TO CHELI. TP-1. IRWIN

145. BPB0501[48] – Nixon elnök levele Mindszenty bíboroshoz, levél formában, nincs aláírva, 1 p.

Szövegét l. 144. sz. alatt.

146. BPB0501[76–77], BPB0606[0417–0418], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [219–222], RMNNSFB693 – Távirat, SecState küldi: Amembassy Budapest, Rome, Vienna, 2 pp.

Az Elnök aláírta a Mindszenty bíboroshoz írt levelet.

SECSTATE 127281

SUBJ: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY

REF: BUDAPEST 1217

1. PRESIDENT HAS SIGNED LETTER TO CARDINAL MINDSZENTY. TEXT SEPTEL.

2. AT SUCH TIME AS CARDINAL APPEARS IN AUSTRIA AND HIS PRESENCE KNOWN TO PRESS, WE EXPECT TO BE QUERIED ON FACTS OF HIS DEPARTURE. ASIDE FROM CONFIRMING FACTS OF ANY U.S. ROLE IN ACTUAL PHYSICAL MOVEMENT OF CARDINAL WHICH EMBASSIES BUDAPEST AND VIENNA MAY DO WHEN QUERIED, WE WILL PREFER TO HAVE INITIAL STATEMENTS ON REASONS FOR DEPARTURE COME FROM CARDINAL HIMSELF AND FROM VATICAN THEREFORE, SUGGEST ADDRESSEES REFER QUESTIONS ON U.S. ROLE OR ATTITUDE TO DEPT OF STATE. THIS WILL ALLOW SOME TIME FOR CARDINAL AND VATICAN TO HAVE THEIR SAY AS THEY ARE THE PRINCIPALS, TOGETHER WITH GOH, IN THIS MATTER.

3. DEPT PROPOSES TO REPLY TO INITIAL QUESTION BY ISSUING FOLLOWING RELEASE. "JOZSEF CARDINAL MINDSZENTY, PRINCE PRIMATE OF HUNGARY AND ARCHBISHOP OF ESZTERGOM, DEPARTED AMERICAN EMBASSY AT BUDAPEST ON (BLANK). CARDINAL MINDSZENTY'S DECISION TO LEAVE THE EMBASSY WAS MADE BY HIM PERSONALLY AFTER HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE HOLY SEE. CARDINAL MINDSZENTY REQUESTED REFUGE IN THE AMERICAN LEGATION AT BUDAPEST ON NOVEMBER 4, 1956. HE WAS GRANTED REFUGE ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS BECAUSE IT APPEARED AT THAT TIME THAT HIS FREEDOM AND LIFE WERE IN IMMINENT JEOPARDY. THE UNITED STATES GOVT IS PLEASED THAT IT WAS ABLE TO ASSIST THE CARDINAL

WHEN THE NEED APPEARED URGENT AND PRESSING. WE WISH HIM WELL IN HIS FUTURE SERVICE TO HIS CHURCH.”

4. DEPT SPOKESMAN WOULD DRAW ON FOLLOWING GUIDANCE FOR REPLIC TO FURTHER QUESTIONS:

Q: WHY DID THE CARDINAL LEAVE AT THIS TIME? [./.] A: I BELIEVE I ANSWERED THAT IN THE STATEMENT I JUST READ.

Q: DID THE U.S. URGE THE CARDINAL TO LEAVE?

A: NO.

Q: DID THE VATICAN, OR THE HUNGARIAN GOVT, URGE HIM TO LEAVE?

A: THAT IS NOT AN APPROPRIATE QUESTION FOR ME TO DEAL WITH. I WOULD REITERATE, HOWEVER, THAT THE DECISION WAS A PERSONAL ONE, MADE BY THE CARDINAL HIMSELF.

Q: DID HE DECIDE TO LEAVE FOR REASONS OF AGE OR HEALTH?

A: SINCE, AS I SAID, THE DECISION WAS A PERSONAL ONE, I CAN'T ANSWER THAT.

Q: WILL THE CARDINAL'S DEPARTURE IMPROVE U.S.-HUNGARIAN RELATIONS?

A: THERE REMAIN A NUMBER OF OUTSTANDING U.S.-HUNGARIAN BILATERAL ISSUES. WE CONTINUE TO WORK ON THESE. THE PROSPECTS FOR ACHIEVING SOLUTIONS HAVE IMPROVED IN RECENT MONTHS BUT I DO NOT RELATE THAT IMPROVEMENT IN ANY WAY TO THIS DEVELOPMENT. N.B.: ANY QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE CARDINAL'S PLANS FOR THE FUTURE SHOULD BE ANSWERED: "I AM NOT IN A POSITION TO COMMENT ON THAT," OR "THERE ARE MATTERS FOR THE CARDINAL AND THE HOLY SEE TO DECIDE UPON."

5. WELCOME ADDRESSEES COMMENTS ON PARAS. 3 AND 4. GPI. IRWIN

147. BPB0501[116], RMNNSFNB828 – (Cf. 47, 48) – Nixon elnök levele Mindszenty bíboroshoz, aláírt példány, 1 p.

Szöveghez cf. 141. sz. és a mellékletben. Fakszimiléje cf. 206.

Július 15, csütörtök

148. BPB0501[99], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [210], RMNNSFB693 – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: Secstate, Amembassy Rome, 1 p.

Nixon elnök levelét Puhan nagykövet 9 óra 25 perckor átadta Mindszenty bíborosnak. Puhan nagykövet egyben tájékoztatta Mons. Chelit és Zágont a levél tartalmáról, Mindszenty bíborossal való találkozásuk előtt.

BUDAPEST 1248

SUBJECT: President's Letter to Cardinal Mindszenty

REF: State 127273

Text President's letter conveyed by Ambassador to Cardinal Mindszenty at 0925 this morning. Ambassador also briefed Cheli and Zagon on general content of letter prior to their meeting with Cardinal Mindszenty today.

PUHAN

149. BPB0501[50], BPB0606[0416], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [206] – Távirat, Amembassy Vienna küldi: al SecState, Amembassy Budapest, 1 p.

Tájékoztatást kér, hogy a bíboros Ausztriában marad-e, mikorra valószínűsíthető és szükség van-e segítségre.

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VIENNA 4346

SUBJECT: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY

REF: STATE 127181

UNCLEAR FROM REFTEL WHETHER CARDINAL REMAINING AUSTRIA ANY LENGTH OF TIME OR IMMEDIATELY PROCEEDING ROME. WHILE ASSUME NO ACTION REQUIRED THIS EMBASSY WOULD APPRECIATE INDICATION PROBABLE TIMING IN CASE SOME ASSISTANCE REQUIRED. HUMES

150. BPB0501[51–52] – Memorandum, anonim, 2 pp.

A Nagykövet találkozott Mons. Zágonnal, egyedül, délután 18 óra 20 perckor. Zagon beszámolt neki a Mindszentyvel való, ma délelőtti második találkozásáról. Elmondta, hogy értésére adta a bíborosnak: nem szabhat már feltételeket a pápának, mert az Apostoli Szentszék nem fogadhat el feltételeket. Továbbá megmondta a bíborosnak, hogy feltételeinek több mint fele már nem aktuális. Mindszenty azzal vágott vissza, ha ez a helyzet,

akkor miért nem informálta őt erről a Szentszék. Zágon elmondta neki, hogy az egyház helyzetének jobbítására vonatkozó javaslatait egy pro memoria-ba foglalhatja. Tudomására hozta, hogy távozásra nem jelenti a fennálló problémák megoldását.

Zágon elmondta, hogy végezetül kerek pereg kijelentette: Wyszyńskinek van igaza, és minden nap, amelyet Mindszenty bíboros a követségen tölt, csökkenti értékét az egyház számára és vele annak esélyét is, hogy a történelem mint az egyház konstruktív főpapjáról emlékezzék meg róla. Zágon megmondta még neki, hogy ha a követségen halna meg, akkor a történelem keményfejű, konok emberként (németül: Dickschädel) emlegetné. Zágon maga is meglepődött, hogy Mindszenty elfogadta tőle a kritikát, egyben meg is ijedt, hogy megjegyzéseivel mekkora rizikót vállalt magára. A följegyzést készítő nagykövet szerencsét kívánt neki.

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I met with Monsignor Zagon alone at 6:20 p.m. He reported on his second meeting with the Cardinal this morning. He reported that he had told the Cardinal he could not make any conditions to the Pope because the Holy See cannot accept conditions. He told the Cardinal further that 50% of the conditions which he had submitted had already been resolved. The Cardinal retorted at this point that if that was so, why had he not been informed accordingly by the Holy See. Zagon said he had told the Cardinal he could put his suggestions for improving the status for the church in Hungary in a promemoria to the Holy See. He could make it clear that his departure did not mean a solution of the existing problems.

Zagon said the Cardinal had raised the question of his sister visiting him. Zagon's suggestion that the Vatican would arrange for a visit by the invalided sister to the Cardinal in Vienna was rejected by him on the grounds that he wished no favors from the GOH. Zagon then said it would not be impossible to arrange for his sister to come and visit him here in Budapest, by ambulance if necessary.

Zagon said he next talked to him about his transfer to Vienna. He found the Cardinal ready to agree to a Vatican passport and to arrangements previously reported. The Apostolic Nuncio in Vienna, and Monsignor Zagon would come to get the Cardinal. They would try to arrange with the GOH for a rapid passing of the border without having the Cardinal get out of the car. The Cardinal then appeared [...] concerned about the transfer of his effects, pointing to books and old papers which he had collected. Monsignor Zagon assumed something could be worked out to effect a transfer of his effects.

Zagon next described to Cardinal Mindszenty his future existence in Vienna. He said that Mindszenty grew quite optimistic as he thought of activating the Pazmaneum, training Hungarian priests, and working together with Cardinal Koenig on some ecclesiastical matters.

Zagon said it remained now for him to get a definite date for his departure which he would try to get tonight. Zagon was shooting for late August or early September. He said he knew he would have great difficulty in getting him to fix a date. Zagon said that the Cardinal handed him two emigré newspapers from the United States which dwelt on his refuge here to justify the opinion that his stay here is worthwhile. Zagon said this was most regrettable. I pointed out that we could expect more of this sort of thing if his stay here were a lengthy one.

Zagon concluded his remarks by saying that he finally took the bull by the horns and said that Wysinski had followed the right path; that every day which Cardinal Mindszenty spent in this Embassy would lessen his value to the church and diminish his prospects for presenting to history the image of a constructive Prelate of the church. He said that if he died in this Embassy history would show him as a thick-headed (Dickschaedel). Zagon said he was rather surprised that Mindszenty took this from him and he realized that he was taking a great risk in making this kind of remark. I wished him luck.

151. BPB0501[53–54] – Följegyzés beszélgetésről, 2 pp.

Résztevők: Mons. Zágon, Puhan nagykövet,

Följegyzést készíti: H. Wilgis

Mindszenty feltételei távozását illetően:

- 1) A papokat nem akadályozhatják vallási funkcióik gyakorlásában;*
- 2) Ki kell engedni a bebörtönzött papokat, továbbá azt a mintegy száz főt, aki 56 miatt még mindig börtönben van;*
- 3) A kormány által a püspöki aulákba helyezett megbízottakat vissza kell hívni;*
- 4) A szemináriumok és a főllesztelendő szeminaristák számát illető korlátozásokat meg kell szüntetni;*
- 5) Garantálni kell a vallásoktatás szabadságát;*
- 6) Fel kell oszlatni a papi békemozgalmat.*

Mons. Zágon elmondta, hogy a bíboros értesülései nem teljesek és nem pontosak, így pl. a 3. és 4. pont már megoldódott.

Participants: Zagon; Amb. Puhan; H. Wilgis

Date: July 15, 10:00

Subj: Cardinal Mindszenty

Place: American Embassy

Ambassador Puhan met with Monsignor Zagon to give him the purport of the President's letter to Cardinal Mindszenty. Zagon appeared to be satisfied with the contents of the letter as paraphrased to him by the Ambassador.

Zagon then briefed the Ambassador on him and Cheli's talk with Cardinal Mindszenty the night before. He said that the Cardinal had mentioned two problems which would arise if he left the American Embassy at the present time. First, the world would not understand his leaving without his speaking to the Hungarian people or church. This problem is particularly acute right now because there are four or five priests imprisoned for giving religious instruction. Secondly, the concessions which the GOH has offered – the appointment of three bishops in Szombathely, Esztergom and Veszprem – are not sufficient.

The Cardinal had also given Zagon and Cheli a list of six points for consideration by the Holy See and asked that Zagon and Cheli transmit this list to the Holy See. These points are:

- 1) All priests in Hungary must not be hindered or impeded from carrying out their religious functions;
- 2) All priests imprisoned – either recently or for a long time – must be released, as well as approximately 100 people still imprisoned for their activities in 1956;
- 3) The representatives placed by the GOH in bishops' offices (curias) must be dismissed;
- 4) Restrictions on the size of seminaries and how many priests can be ordained must be removed;
- 5) Freedom to give religious instruction must be guaranteed; and
- 6) The peace priest movement must be dissolved.

Zagon commented that the Cardinal's information about the status of the church in Hungary is neither complete nor precise. For example, problems (3) and [./.] and (4) do not exist; they have already been solved in Vatican-GOH negotiations. The other four points raised by the Cardinal are already being negotiated between the Vatican and the GOH. If the Cardinal makes him leaving the Embassy contingent on the resolution of these problems, not only is there no hope for improved church-state relations, but the whole negotiations between the Vatican and the GOH are endangered.

The Ambassador asked Zagon if the Cardinal were making resolution of these problems pre-conditions to his leaving the Embassy, or were they points which should be considered in the Vatican-GOH negotiations. Zagon replied that he thought the Cardinal regarded them as pre-conditions, but he hoped in his upcoming conversations with the Cardinal to explain 1) that some of the problems do not exist and 2) the others are under negotiations. Therefore, the conditions should be converted into desiderata, to be considered in connection with the Cardinal's leaving the Embassy.

152. BPB0501[55–60] – s. d. Puhan nagykövet kézírásos jegyzetei, 5 pp.

153. BPB0501[61–62] – s. d. Memorandum, 2 pp.

Az események kronológiája. Mons. Cheli átadja VI. Pál pápa és Villot bíboros államtitkárnak Mindszenty bíborshoz írt levelét. Ennek tartalma rövid összefoglalásban.

*

1. Cheli and Zagon called on Ambassador upon arrival in Budapest at 6:45 p.m. July 14. In brief meeting Ambassador told Rome emissaries that Cardinal Mindszenty had expressed intent on Monday to say he could not make definitive decision on departure since he had no reply from the President of the United States. Ambassador said he had stated to Cardinal, he would not anticipate President's reply but Cardinal could hardly expect the President to advise him on a decision which he alone could make.

2. Cheli replied that Cardinal Mindszenty had made definitive decision to leave Embassy and Hungary and had so informed the Pope. Cheli could not see how Cardinal's letter could change this decision but hoped that President would reply.

3. Ambassador asked the two emissaries about the letter they were bringing to Cardinal Mindszenty. Cheli produced two letters, both, in Latin, one by the Pope to the Cardinal and the other by Cardinal Villot to Mindszenty. Cheli described the Pope's letter as welcoming the decision of Cardinal Mindszenty to depart the Embassy and Hungary. His interpretation gave it an air of finality. The other, much shorter letter by Villot, informed the Cardinal that financial arrangements had been made for his future outside of Hungary.

4. Cheli and Zagon then had a half hour meeting with Cardinal Mindszenty. Cheli departed after the first five minutes and left the conversation to Zagon and Mindszenty. [./.] The letters were presented to Cardinal Mindszenty. He listed a number of conditions which he felt ought to be made by the Hungarians in return for his departure (NOTE: As of this moment we don't have a copy of these conditions. Cheli described them as impossible. It is not clear whether these conditions are desiderata or a sine qua non to departure.)

5. President's letter arrived in the early morning hours of July 15. Ambassador conveyed contents of the President's letter to Cardinal Mindszenty at 0925 July 15. Cardinal asked Ambassador to read the letter to him. He made no comment other than to express thanks. I told him he would get the original in due time.

AMB: APuhan/jfl

154. BPB0501[63] – Airgram 557, Amembassy Vienna küldi: SecState, Amembassy Budapest, Rome, 1 p.

A gráci Kleine Zeitung cikk angol fordítása. Az újság spekulációi a küszöbönálló magyarországi egyházi változásokról.

SUBJECT: Cardinal Mindszenty

Following a visit to Budapest, last month by Cardinal Franz Koenig, the Graz newspaper, Kleine Zeitung, ran an article speculating upon the possibility that Pope Paul VI will order Cardinal Mindszenty to Rome. The newspaper cites among its sources the Archbishop of Eger, Pal Brezanoczy, and the Bishop of Pécs, József Cserhádi.

An English translation of this article is enclosed.

HUMES

Enclosure: English Translation of Kleine Zeitung Article

155. BPB0501[68–74], RMNNSFB693 – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: SecState, Amembassy Rome, 7 pp.

Mons. Cheli és Mons. Zágon missziójáról. Mindszenty feltételeiről. Tartalmához cf. 150. és 151. sz.

BUDAPEST 1254

EXDIS

SUBJECT: Cardinal Mindszenty

1. SUMMARY. After three tough sessions lasting nearly five hours, Monsignor Zagon reports to me that Cardinal Mindszenty has promised him to set a date tomorrow for his ultimate departure for Vienna. The three remaining conditions he has posed are: 1) that the world should understand his departure does not mean the problems of the church in Hungary have been resolved by his departure; (2) that his sister be allowed to visit him here in Budapest before he departs; and (3) that his memoirs be expedited to Vienna in a safe fashion (read by the Embassy) before his arrival there. Cheli and Zagon presented him with two letters, one from the Pope welcoming his decision to leave Hungary the other from Cardinal Villot assuring him that arrangements for his future had been made. Cardinal Mindszenty did not raise [./.] with Rome emissaries the President's letter. Fourth session scheduled for 10:00 a.m. tomorrow. END SUMMARY

SECTION I.

2. Zagon had three meetings with Cardinal Mindszenty. Cheli accompanied Zagon for brief courtesy call on evening July 14 but left Zagon with the Cardinal for half hour meeting. At this first meeting Zagon presented Cardinal Mindszenty with letter from Pope and one from Cardinal Villot. Letter from Pope, according to Cheli, informs Mindszenty that Holy Father is pleased with the decision reached by the Cardinal to leave the Embassy and Hungary and bids him join him in Rome for a synod in September. Villot's letter informs Cardinal that arrangements for his future have been made.

3. Zagon told me Cardinal Mindszenty mentioned two problems which would arise if he left the American Embassy at this time. First, the world would not understand his leaving without his speaking to the Hungarian people or church. This problem, he said was particularly acute right now because there were [./.] four or five priests imprisoned for giving religious instruction. Secondly, the concessions which the GOH has offered, namely the appointment of three Bishops in Szombathely, Esztergom and Veszprem, are not sufficient.

4. Cardinal Mindszenty gave Zagon a list of six "conditions" to be met by the Hungarians in return for his departure. These conditions are: (1) all priests in Hungary must not be hindered or impeded from carrying out their religious functions; (2) all imprisoned priests must be released as well as approximately 100 people still in jail for their activities in 1956; (3) the representatives placed by the GOH in Bishops' offices (curias) must

be dismissed; (4) restrictions on the size of seminaries and number of priests that may be ordained must be removed; (5) freedom to give religious instruction must be guaranteed; and (6) peace priest movement must be dissolved.

5. Zagon told me that the Cardinal's information about the status of the church in Hungary is neither complete nor accurate. For example, problems 3 and 4 do not exist, the [...] other four points are being negotiated between the Vatican and the GOH. Zagon noted that if the Cardinal makes his leaving the Embassy contingent on the resolution of these problems, not only is there no hope for improving church-state relations but the improvements already achieved as a result of negotiations between the Vatican and the GOH were in danger.

6. In response to my question whether the Cardinal was making resolution of these problems pre-conditions to his leaving the Embassy, Zagon thought he was but he hoped in his subsequent conversations to point out to the Cardinal that some of the problems do not exist and that others are under negotiation. Therefore, these conditions should be converted to desiderata rather than conditions.

SECTION II.

7. Zagon's second meeting with Cardinal Mindszenty took place between 10:30 a.m. and 12:50 p.m. on July 15. Both Cheli and Zagon had been apprised of the President's response [...] to Cardinal Mindszenty. Zagon informed Mindszenty that Holy See could not accept conditions made by Cardinal. Fifty per cent of his conditions had already been resolved. Suggested to Mindszenty he put his recommendations in a pro memoria and present them to the Pope. According to Zagon, Mindszenty agreed on the modalities of his transfer to Vienna, on a Vatican passport, in a car with the Apostolic Nuncio from Vienna and Zagon. Mindszenty became almost enthusiastic when speaking of activating the Pazmaneum in Vienna and possibly training Hungarian priests. Zagon reported that what remained was setting the date for a departure which he hoped would be end of August or early September.

8. Meeting reportedly concluded with some rather tough talking by Zagon who pointed out to Mindszenty that every day that he remained in the American Embassy reduced his chances of doing constructive work for the church and tended to diminish his image in history. Zagon says he told Mindszenty that if he died in the American Embassy, history would remember him as a [...] thick-headed individual (German: Dickschaedel) who refused to listen to reason, and that he should actually have left the

American Embassy a year or so after the revolution failed. Zagon said he surprised himself that Mindszenty accepted his remarks without defiance.

SECTION III.

9. Zagon reported after nearly hour and a half of a third meeting that Cardinal Mindszenty referred to his conditions, said he placed no reliance on Hungarian regime's promises, he must insist that the world know that his departure did not resolve the problems of the church in Hungary. He wants the Vatican to publicize the fact that he has not forgotten the problems of his church. He asked next whether he could see his sister before he left. He was assured that the emissaries from Rome would be in touch with her still tonight to arrange for a visit by her here in the Embassy. Mindszenty then raised a third problem relating to his memoirs. He said he did not trust a truck to take [./.] them out and asked if they could be smuggled out by American Embassy officers with diplomatic passports. I told Zagon, I could assure the Cardinal that we could guarantee the safe delivery of his memoirs in Vienna.

10. Zagon asked Mindszenty if he could assure the Pope that the Cardinal would leave the American Embassy and Hungary at the end of August or the beginning of September. Mindszenty promised to agree to a date tomorrow in a fourth meeting.

PUHAN

156. BPB0501[75] – Clem Scerback följegyzése, 1 p.

Mindszenty bíboros, távozása előtt, be akarja fejezni emlékiratait, újabb és újabb könyvkérésekkel áll elő.

*

TO: The Record – H.E. – July 15, 1971

4:05 p.m.

Came to CGS and wanted to know who would be replacing Titus. I said, "For the moment, it looks like me."

"Looks good to me," he said. "Let me ask then where the situation stands with all those books Mr. Titus was supposed to get for me. They were supposed to come for local libraries here. First the library was closed, then the translator was sick, now the Embassy has no cars, and when there are cars then we have no drivers, and so on. I need those books, and I would appreciate it if someone could look into it for me." I said I would.

COMMENT: He is partially right. But getting books, and extracts from books, is not a simple job. Some of the reasons above have been valid ones. It is a Titus project with Mrs. Mate. I'll try to get some movement on it, though our practice has been to go slowly so as not to alarm our sources with huge requests.

Clem

157. BPB0501[78], BPB0606[0415], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [208] – Távirat, SecState küldi: Amembassy Vienna, Amembassy Rome, Budapest, 1 p.

A bíboros esetleges távozásáról Bécs irányába.

SECRET STATE 128000

EXDIS

SUBJ: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY

REF: VIENNA 4346

ACTUAL DECISION RE CARDINAL STILL UNDER NEGOTIATION BY VATICAN EMISSARIES IN BUDAPEST. WE DO NOT YET KNOW OUTCOME, TIMING, OR POSSIBLE ROUTE OF CARDINAL. LIKELY, HOWEVER, THAT FIRST APPEARANCE HE WOULD MAKE OUTSIDE OF HUNGARY WOULD BE IN AUSTRIA. HENCE, DEPARTMENT DESIRES TO COORDINATE CONTINGENCY PRESS GUIDANCE. DEPARTMENT AND BUDAPEST WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED IF ACTUAL MOVEMENT IMMINENT. MEANTIME, HOLD WHOLE ISSUE VERY CLOSELY. IRWIN.

158. BPB0501[79] – Távirat, Amembassy Rome küldi: SecState, Amembassy Budapest, 1 p.

Illing informálta Casarolit Mindszenty és Nixon elnök levélváltásáról, melynek lényegét úgy foglalja össze, hogy a bíboros jövőjét az Elnök a bíboros és a Vatikán döntésére bízza. Casaroli tájékoztatja Illinget a pápa levelének tartalmáról, továbbá az esztergomi érseki szék betöltésének nehézségeiről.

*

ROME 4462

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY

REF: STATE 127273

1. ILLING INFORMED CASAROLI JULY 15 THAT MINDSZENTY HAD WRITTEN PRESIDENT NIXON AND THAT PRESIDENT HAD REPLIED. ILLING CONVEYED GENERAL SENSE OF PRESIDENT'S REPLY, NOTING THAT PRESIDENT MADE CLEAR ANY DECISION REGARDING CARDINAL'S FUTURE WAS CONCERN OF CARDINAL AND VATICAN. CASAROLI EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR BEING INFORMED ABOUT EXCHANGE BETWEEN CARDINAL AND PRESIDENT AND OBSERVED THAT PRESIDENT'S DISINCLINATION BECOME INVOLVED IN DECISIONS CONCERNING CARDINAL'S FUTURE A WISE AND STATESMANLIKE COURSE.

2. CASAROLI SAID THAT POPE'S REPLY TO MINDSZENTY, WHICH CHELI AND ZAGON PRESUMABLY DELIVERED EVENING JULY 14, EXPRESSED TO MINDSZENTY IN UNEQUIVOCAL TERMS POPE'S UNDERSTANDING THAT MINDSZENTY NOW FIRMLY COMMITTED TO DEPART HUNGARY. IN HIS LETTER POPE EXPRESSED STRONG DESIRE TO EMBRACE MINDSZENTY IN ROME SOME TIME IN THE NEAR FUTURE. HOWEVER, CASAROLI WARNED, FACT THAT MINDSZENTY SEEMS TO HAVE TAKEN FIRM DECISION TO LEAVE DOES NOT EXCLUDE POSSIBILITY HE MAY TEMPORIZE ON SETTING DEPARTURE DATE.

3. CASAROLI THEN SURFACED NEW OBSTACLE WHICH HE SAID MUST BE OVERCOME BEFORE MINDSZENTY CAN DEPART, THAT IS, NAMING NEW ADMINISTRATOR FOR ARCHDIOCESE OF ESZTERGOM ACCEPTABLE BOTH TO MINDSZENTY AND GOH. CASAROLI CATEGORIZED PRESENT ADMINISTRATOR, MSGR IMRE SZABO, AS "GOOD AND HOLY MAN BUT INCOMPETENT". CASAROLI FEELS SURE MINDSZENTY WOULD NOT DEPART UNTIL ACCEPTABLE REPLACEMENT CHOSEN. CHELI PRESENTLY BEARING LIST OF CANDIDATES ACCEPTABLE TO HOLY SEE AS WELL AS LIST OF THOSE UNACCEPTABLE. CASAROLI HOPEFUL THAT, LURED BY POSSIBILITY OF MINDSZENTY'S DEPARTURE, GOH WILL DISPLAY SOME FLEXIBILITY ON REPLACEMENT FOR SZABO.
MARTIN

159. BPB0501[98] – Papendorp levele Meehanhez, 1 p.

Mrs. Livia Jancso, korábban a budapesti nagykövetség munkatár - sa, küszöbönálló budapesti látogatásáról. Megküldi Kursch konzulhoz írt levelének másolatát.

*

I am enclosing for your information, and delivery, my letter of even date to Don Kursch about the visit to Budapest of Mrs., Livia Jancso. I have counseled Livia against going back to Hungary in the light of what happened to her before, but to no avail. Nevertheless, I wanted to point out to you that she was the one who first began to type the Cardinal's memoirs after his arrival, and this was one of the topics on which the AVH interrogated her after her apprehension in (I believe it was) March 1957. She says she gave them no information. It is possible that once she visits the Embassy she may ask to see the Cardinal. Forewarned is forearmed. You may want to mention to him the fact that she came, since he has a very warm feeling for her – even though she's Reformatus!

Best wishes to you, the Puhans, and of course, your guest!

Sincerely,

J. Theodore Papendorp [signed]

cc: EUR/CPH – Mr. Baker

P.S. – You might want to mention to HE the sad news that Alice Nemeth, wife of the 1960-62 ARMA, Steve Nemeth, was killed accidentally week before last when a tree fell on her. Their lot for thus planned retirement home was being cleaned of trees. I know Steve could use his prayers.

(Clem – no word to him of her coming. – she does not see him.

*OK to mention tragic death of Mrs. Nemeth to him,
Al[fred Puhans]?)*

160. BPB0501[99–100] – Papendorp levele Donald Kursch budapesti konzulhoz, Budapest, 2 pp.

Informálja Mrs. Livia Jancso látogatási szándékáról.

I hope that you and your family had a good journey to the “Duna-gyöngy”, and that you are settled comfortably into your house on the Bela Kiraly ut. As I told you when you stopped by to see me, I certainly envy you those lodgings.

I am writing now to alert you to the arrival of Mrs. Livia Jancso on the BEA 3:30 p.m. flight from London on July 30. You may recall her as the librarian in the GW Sino-Soviet Institute. She is a former FSL of the then-Legation, was imprisoned for some time after the 1956 revolution, was later sent into internal deportation on the Nagyalföld until 1960, and finally was able to emigrate – nominally to the Netherlands – in 1962. She then came to the US, has become a US citizen (and has been released from Hungarian citizenship by the Presidential Council), got a librarian degree at CU, and has been working for GWU for some time now.

With this background, Livia wanted to be sure that the Embassy knew of her coming. She will be living in a privately-rented room rather than a hotel or with relatives, and so she will have to register with the police within 24 hours of her arrival. She wanted to check in with the Embassy before this, but it will probably be closed before she is able to get into town from Ferihegy and get settled. Instead she will telephon to “register” that evening or next morning, and probably pay a somewhat more formal call early the next week. She is holder of passport J 364626, in which the Hungarian Embassy here affixed visitor’s visa 351-049046-8, valid for a stay of 30 days until October 16, 1971. She will be living at Budapest II, Kuruclesi ut 25b, c/o Dr. Szeredy Ida. [./.] If and when you see her, please give Livia my very best wishes for an enjoyable stay. Best wishes, also, to you and all my friends at the Embassy, American and Hungarian.

Sincerely,
J. Theodore Papendorp [signed]

Július 16, péntek

161. BPB0501[80–81], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [202–203], RMNNSFB693 – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: SecState, Amembassy Rome, 2. pp.

Mindszenty bíboros jóváhagyta a Pro Memoria-t.

Cheli osztja a véleményt, hogy a sajtó felé történő kiszivárogtatás, ill. a sajtó felől várható kritika Mindszentyt arra ösztönözheti, hogy késlel - tesse távozását, vagy megváltoztassa elhatározását.

BUDAPEST 1265
SUBJECT: Cardinal Mindszenty
REF: Budapest 1254

1. Cardinal Mindszenty approved Pro Memoria stating he hopes to leave U.S. Embassy in September or at latest in October to reside in Vienna. After fourth meeting with Cardinal lasting more than one and a half hours, Zagon told me that after repeated attempts to alter his decision to depart, Mindszenty himself presented above formulation.

2. Mindszenty next asked Zagon to thank Ambassador for assuring safe conveyance of his memoirs to Vienna. I noted to Zagon they would be conveyed to Embassy Vienna and there held in safekeeping until Mindszenty was safely out of Hungary. Zagon added that he and Cheli would urge the Pope to pressure Cardinal Mindszenty to leave earlier than dates above to attend Synod in Rome. Attempt will be made, Cheli suggested, to get Villot to send letter to Mindszenty welcoming his [./.] decision to leave and then setting date for audience with Pope in Rome.

3. Cheli and Zagon depart for Rome Saturday morning. Montalvo, however, who has not participated in discussions with Cardinal, apparently will remain over to consult with GOH officials. While negotiators apparently have reasonably firm commitment from Mindszenty, Cheli is first to admit that much now depends on GOH readiness to be flexible and not raise obstacles to Cardinal's departure. Cheli agrees that delay and possible leakage to press at this critical juncture would encourage Mindszenty to procrastinate and possibly even change his mind.

PUHAN

162. BPB0501[83-84] – Clem Scerback följegyzése Puhan nagykövet számára, 2 pp.

Estefelé, 17 óra 50 perckor Mons. Cheli és Mons. Montalvo váratlanul látogatást tettek a Nagykövetségen.

For The Record

Friday July 16, 1971

At 5:50 p.m. this evening Msgri. Cheli and Montalvo paid a surprise return visit to the Embassy. I spoke to them briefly in the library and they went on. They asked that this message be passed on to you...

"... the GOH is 75-25, maybe 80-20, in favor of agreeing to the conditions. The memoirs have not caused any comment, and the sister can be brought her in an ambulance with a doctor in attendance. However, a problem exists in the appointment of an Apostolic Administrator for Esztergom. To assist in this problem, it would be useful if the Ambassador told FM Peter in a most casual fashion that the Holy See has worked long

and hard to get the Cardinal to come as far as he has. The Amb now understands there is some problem about the Apostolic Administrator. He would like only to comment that the Vatican is most aware of all the problems in PR, etc., it will face when the Cardinal leaves, and it may not feel it is all worth the trouble if the GOH blocks settlement of whatever the Apostolic Administrator problem more [./.] seems to be. The Vatican may feel it would be much simpler then to forget it all and let the Cardinal remain in the Embassy for the remainder of his days.”

COMMENT: Obviously, Cheli needs some help to push over the hurdle. He tells me – though we are not supposed to indicate that we know – that the hangup over the appointee is the person, who he will be. The Vatican has one man in mind, and apparently the GOH is balking. He wants our assistance. I said I would pass the message to you, period.

CGScerback

PS. They were very nervous this time about being overheard [?].

163. BPB0501[82], BPB0606[0411], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [191], rpt to Vienna 132809: CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [200], RMNNSFB693 – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: SecState, Amembassy Rome, 1 p.

A nagykövet javasolja, hogy minél hamarabb küldjék a bécsi nagykövetségre a bíboros emlékiratait, ott biztonságba helyezve, hogy rendelkezésre álljon, mihelyt a Vatikán jóváhagyja a bíboros szándékát és ő maga is megérkezik Bécsbe. Az a véleménye, hogy az ilyen eljárás mód a kedvező pillanat kihasználása jegyében történne.

BUDAPEST 1267

SUBJECT: Cardinal Mindszenty – Memoirs

REF: Budapest 1265

1. In talks with Cardinal Mindszenty Rome emissaries were able to confirm significance which Cardinal's memoirs play in his departure from Hungary. After final session with Cardinal, Zagon said Cardinal greatly relieved that Memoirs would be conveyed in safety to Vienna. Zagon said confirmation from Vienna his Memoirs were there would expedite his departure.

2. I propose therefore we convey earliest to Embassy Vienna for safekeeping Cardinal's Memoirs, to be surrendered to him after Vatican gives approval and he appears in Vienna. Believe such action, would keep momentum going. Cheli and Zagon agree.

PUHAN

Július 19, hétfő

164. BPB0501[115] – Szállítólevél, 1 p.
Nixon elnök levelének szállítólevele.

*

For delivery at earliest convenience, a letter to Cardinal Minszenty of Hungary from Pres. Nixon.

File No. S/S 7109773, Signature. Paul M. Washington

Rec. 7/27/71 in pouch.

Del. to Card. Mind. 7/28/71

APuhan [signed]

Július 18, vasárnap

165. BPB0501[85] – Wilgis följegyzése Puhan nagykövet számára, 1 p.
Vasárnap a sétán Őeminenciája ismét rátért a kérdésre, hogy egy teherautó hogyan tudna bejárni az udvarba.

Subject: HE

During Sunday's walk, HE began to talk again about the possibility a truck could enter the courtyard. I explained the situation again to him. After another five minutes of conversation about this subject, I told him that there is a second entrance to the Embassy, to which a truck could back up. He asked to see this entrance, and I showed it to him (from inside – we did not approach it). HE said that this demonstration made his position much easier. It did not solve everything, but made it much easier.

He then said he asked because of the shipment of his memoirs. He absolutely refuses to ship them to Rome, because Rome is negotiating with Kadar and Kadar would ask for the memoirs in return for some minor concession.

July 18, 1971 walk - Sunday

Július 19, hétfő

166. BPB0501[87] – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: SecState, 1 p.
Kongresszus az Európai Biztonságról.

BUDAPEST 1276

SUBJECT: Conference on European Security

REF: Budapest 1241

My call on Foreign Minister Peter scheduled for 1000 Wednesday, July 21. Would appreciate any guidance and/or material on CES and MBFR as requested reftel.

PUHAN

Július 20, kedd

167. BPB0501[88] – Clem Scerback följegyzése Puhan nagykövet számára, 1 p.

A valóságtól való elrugaszkodása nagymértékben megnyilvánult abban, ami ma reggel történt: amikor értesítette arról, hogy egy bizonyos anyagot nem lehet kihozni a Széchenyi Könyvtárból, azt kérte, menjen oda és fényképezze le... Azt mondta neki, hogy ezt nem teszi meg és igen gyanús lenne bárki számára, ha megtenné. Egyébként, mondta neki Scerback, nincs ilyen felvevő kamera a nagykövetségen.

*

I have gotten the impression rather rapidly that being an aide to H.E. is a rather difficult and annoying job when a person has other things also on his mind. He keeps popping in and out and up with all kinds of requests that are penny ante at times and requently most confusing.

But, I'm keeping him bemused. I've gotten Miss Mate moving, and we are getting some books. We handed over a few new ones to him yesterday.

His removal from reality is evidenced in great mesaure to me by what happened this morning: when I informed him that one set of folios culd not be taken out of the Szechenyi Library, he asked if I would go over and photograph them. I could not let that one pass. I told him I would not and that it would look pretty suspicious for anyone to do so. Also, I said we had no such camera.

He is presently collecting books on the societies for the blind, deaf, and also insane asylums. I suspect he is writing about Catholic aid to these.

Clem

168. BPB0501[89] – Clem Scerback följegyzése Puhan nagykövet számára, 2 pp.

A bíboros unokaöccsét, Fukszberger Imrét, 11 óra 40-kor kísérte le. Értesítés nélkül jött és kb. 45 percet töltött nagybátyjával. Lefelé elmondta, hogy benyomása szerint Óeminenciáját kiváló fizikai és szellemi állapotban találta.

*

I took the Cardinal's nephew, Imre Fu[k]szberger, downstairs at 11:40 this morning. He had arrived unannounced and spent about 45 minutes with his uncle.

On the way down, he commented that he thought H.E. was in excellent health and spirits, and also mentally sharp.

I fished around for some inkling of their talk, but if appeared to me that the Cardinal did not reveal anything about himself and his future to his nephew. The nephew agreed quite readily that it would not be in the Cardinal's interest to discuss anything about his visit on the outside.

We left it at that. He suggested before departure that he would be back again. Didn't say when.

Clem

Július 21, szerda

169. BPB0501[90–92], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [194–195] – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi SecState, Amembassy Rome, 3 pp.

Péter János külügyminiszter Mindszenty bíborosról. Puhan kifejti, Mindszenty bíboros még maradhat a követségen, a Vatikánnak várhatóan nagyobb problémákat fog okozni külföldön, mint így, továbbá, a magyar kormánynak érdeke, hogy rugalmasságot mutasson. Péter informált volt, kifejezte kormánya tárgyalási készségét és azt a véleményét, hogy Mindszenty távozása javítaná az US-magyar kapcsolatokat.

BUDAPEST 1310

EXDIS

SUBJECT: Cardinal Mindszenty – Foreign Minister Peter's Views

1. Foreign Minister Janos Peter during our talk today raised Mindszenty case, saying he understood from Monsignor Cheli and Vatican sources via Hungarian Embassy in Rome that Cardinal Mindszenty now ready to leave US Embassy and Hungary. I replied that my understanding from Rome emissaries who had long talks with Cardinal was that he hoped to leave US Embassy in September, at the latest October. I understood that there remained agreements to be reached between the Vatican and the GOH. I reiterated our position that we had lived with the Cardinal for nearly 15 years and could continue do so. The Vatican negotiators had indicated that Cardinal could conceivably pose a greater problem for the Vatican outside of our Embassy than in. But for the Hungarians, it seemed to me, it was of interest to settle the Mindszenty case. I expressed the hope that the GOH would show flexibility in [./] dealing with Vatican interests such as the administration of the Archdiocese of Esztergom (which of course was of no concern to US Government). Foreign Minister Peter said GOH was momentarily expecting a detailed proposal from the Vatican and assured me the GOH would give a speedy reply. He added that while in the past both the US and Hungary had tried not to let the Cardinal's presence in the US Embassy affect our relations, he was convinced the Cardinal's departure would be beneficial in our efforts to normalise US–Hungarian relations.

2. I mentioned in passing that while the cardinal's decision to leave was his own and the time of his actual departure would obviously have to be set by him with the Vatican and in agreement with the GOH, his departure before the anniversary of the October 23, 1956 events would probably be desirable. Peter agreed.

3. Department may wish to authorize Rome to inform Cheli I made casual reference to Vatican interests in [./] assuring Hungarian flexibility as he asked me to do.

PUHAN

170. BPB0501[93] – Memorandum, 1 p.

Résztevők: Péter János külügyminiszter, Puhan nagykövet. Cf. 169. sz.

SUBJECT: Cardinal Mindszenty

PARTICIPANTS: Hungarian Foreign Minister Janos Peter
Ambassador Puhan

EXDIS

Peter turned to the Mindszenty case. He said he understood from Monsignor Cheli and from Vatican sources via the Hungarian Embassy in Rome that the Cardinal had agreed to leave. He said that the Vatican had assured the GOH it would present a detailed proposal shortly and he had given his promise that his Government would react flexibly and speedily.

I took this opportunity to point out the necessity of remaining flexible in dealing with the Vatican. I said that the meetings between the emissaries from Rome and Cardinal Mindszenty had been long and arduous. I reiterated our position that while we had lived with the Cardinal for nearly 15 years and could for 10 or more, and while the problems for the Vatican were probably greater once the Cardinal was outside of Hungary, it seemed to me in the greatest interest of the Hungarian Government to have him leave the American Embassy in Budapest. I hoped, therefore, the Government of Hungary would put no obstacles in the way of the decision taken by the Cardinal to leave. I added the thought that if the Foreign Minister were going to head his delegation to New York in September he might wish to have the Mindszenty problem resolved before he got there. Peter nodded in agreement. I mentioned in passing that I had heard from the Rome emissaries that there were some Vatican-GOH problems which were basically of no concern to me but one of them that I recalled was some problem over the administration of the Archdiocese in Esztergom. Without claiming knowledge of details I said I hoped there would be no problem about matters of this sort. Peter reassured me that he was awaiting the proposal from the Vatican and the GOH would give a speedy answer.

171. BPB0501[94] – Clem Scerback följegyzése, találkozása a bíborossal, 1 p. – Cf. július 26, 185. sz.

A bíborosnak időre van szüksége, hogy befejezze emlékiratait. Addig nem akarja elküldeni, amíg ezt a munkát be nem fejezi.

Ez attól függ, elegendő könyvet kap-e, hogy befejezze az utolsó, a hatodik kötetet. Úgy gondolja, ha megkapja a szükséges könyveket, akkor két héten belül be tudja fejezni.

Nem akarja, hogy emlékiratai Vatikánba kerüljenek. A Vatikán, mint mondja, épp olyan rossz, mint a helyi kormányzat, véleménye szerint, ami az emlékiratait illeti. Nagyra értékelte Scerback közlését a csoma - golásról, lepecsételésről, stb., és hogy megőrzi Bécsbe való érkezéséig.

*

Meeting with Cardinal
12 noon, July 21, 1971

1. Cardinal needs time to finish his memoirs. Prefers not to send them until he ends his work.

2. Ending his work depends on how many more books he can get here to finish Volume Six, the last. He estimates that if he gets the proper books, he can be finished in two weeks.

3. He agrees that it is best to ship beforehand.

4. He prefers delivery in several packets by an American officer. He does not trust air transport. I mentioned it could even be Ambassador under certain circumstances, but probably someone else.

5. He reminds that he suggested once in letter to President (last Fall?) that they be shipped out, but got no answer. So he uses this to show that he really is interested in getting them out.

6. If he wants to send them out in sections, why not start shipping now, I asked. He replied, because he needs them for reference.

7. He said he wants to keep them out of the Vatican's hands. The Vatican, he says, is "just as bad as the local authorities," in his views, so far as his memoirs are concerned. He appreciated my statements about packing, sealing, etc. that would safeguard them until he arrived in Vienna.

8. He said he expected to leave in late September or October. Reason, he said, was because of his ill sister. He thought it would be some time before authorities granted permission for her to visit, or before her doctors would permit it.

9. He thanked Ambassador again and that was it.

Clem S.

172. BPB0501[95], BPB0606[0414], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [197] – Távirat, Amembassy Rome küldi: SecState, Amembassy Budapest, Amembassy Vienna, 1 p.

A „herceg” titulus eltörlése a bíboros címéből. A vatikáni tisztviselővel való beszélgetésben nyilvánvalóvá vált, hogy a „hercegprímás” cím már nem használható és a Vatikán soha nem is használja azt.

ROME 4561

SUBJECT: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY

REF. STATE 127281 (attached)

LANGUAGE PROPOSED IN PARAS 3 AND 4 REFTEL APPEARS SUITED FOR HANDLING ANY PUBLICITY CONCERNING CARDINAL MINDSZENTY'S EVENTUAL DEPARTURE FROM HUNGARY. ONE SUGGESTION, HOWEVER, WOULD BE DELETION OF WORD "PRINCE" IN CARDINAL'S TITLE. DURING DISCUSSIONS OF MINDSZENTY CASE WITH VATICAN OFFICIALS IT HAS BECOME CLEAR THAT TITLE "PRINCE PRIMATE" IS NO LONGER APPLICABLE AND THEREFORE NEVER USED BY VATICAN. MARTIN

173. BPB0501[101] – Távirat, Amembassy Vienna küldi: Amembassy Budapest, 1 p.

Humes bécsi nagykövet beajánlja Mrs. Eleanor Weems kaliforniai jogászt, aki rövid találkozót két Mindszenty bíborossal. Amennyiben lehet - séges, a kérést elfogadásra javasolja.

*

UNCLAS VIENNA 4467

FOR AMBASSADOR PUHAN FROM HUMES

MY GOOD FRIENDS MRS. ELEANOR MEEMS, A CALIFORNIA LAWYER NOW IN BUDAPEST INTERESTED IN BRIEF AUDIENCE WITH CARDINAL. IF APPROPRIATE, WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR COOPERATION. HUMES

174. BPB0501[96] – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: Amembassy Vienna, 1 p.

Mrs. Weemsnek nem engedélyezték a találkozást Mindszenty bíborossal.

BUDAPEST 1306

REF: Vienna 4467

FOR AMBASSADOR HUMES

Mrs. Weems appeared at Embassy early this afternoon and most graciously accepted our reasons for not permitting audience with Cardinal Mindszenty. Much as I would have liked to accede to your request, it was necessary to turn it down. First, ground rules have been in effect for good reasons over some fifteen years precluding this kind of visit. Secondly, and this is strictly for your information and not to be passed to Mrs. Weems or any other visitors seeking similar intercession, this is a difficult time for the Cardinal and I do not wish to interject any new note into our talks. I am sure you will understand.

PUHAN

175. BPB0501[97] – Memorandum, 1 p.

Mrs. Livia Jancsónak, ha jön, nem engedélyezik a találkozást a bíborossal.

MEMORANDUM:

| | |
|---------|--------------------------|
| TO | : NCOIC/MSG – SSgt. Ruth |
| FROM | : ADMIN – L. D. Russel |
| SUBJECT | : Mrs. Livia JANCZO |

We expect Mrs. Livia Jancso to call at the Embassy on either July 20 or 31. She is the bearer of U.S. passport number J 364262. Mrs. Jancso is a former local employee of the Embassy who emigrated to the U.S. in 1962. She has friends among the Hungarian staff and very likely will ask to see them. That is perfectly alright. She may also ask to see the Cardinal. That is not alright. Should she call or come in while a Marine Guard is on duty and ask to see the Cardinal or anything about him, the Guard should tell her – very politely – that she must speak to an American officer. Ask her to call Mr. Scerback when the Embassy next opens for business. Under no circumstances is Mrs. Jancso to be admitted beyond the main lobby or the Consular Section.

Július 22, csütörtök

176. BPB0501[102] – Távirat, Amembassy Vienna küldi: Amembassy Budapest, 1 p.

Humes bécsi nagykövet teljes mértékben megérti az elutasítást.

UNCLAS VIENNA 4497

REF: BUDAPEST 1306

UNDERSTAND COMPLETELY. THAT WAS REASON FOR “IF APPROPRIATE” IN TELEGRAM. HUMES

177. BPB0501[103–104], BPB0606[0413], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [187], RMNNSFB693 – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: SecState, Amembassy Rome, Amembassy Vienna, 2 pp.

Esetleges sajtókonferencia kérdései és válaszai, Mindszenty bíboros távozása esetén, javaslat az utolsó válasz megváltoztatására.

BUDAPEST 1321

SUBJECT: Press Guidance for Eventual Departure of Cardinal Mindszenty

REF: State 127281; Rome 4561

1. Press guidance in State 127281 appears flexible enough to cover contingencies related to Cardinal Mindszenty’s eventual departure. However, response to last question reftel “Will the Cardinal’s departure improve US–Hungarian relations?”, specifically the words “but I do not relate that improvement in any way to this development” struck us as not completely realistic. As Department is aware, Cardinal’s presence in US Embassy has always had an effect on US–Hungarian relations, which at times was dramatic as for example when he threatened to walk out upon the designation of the first ambassador to Budapest. Moreover, Hungarian FonMin Peter in his recent talk with Ambassador, as well as Dr. Bartha earlier, have stated that from Hungarian point of view departure of Cardinal [./.] from Embassy will have a beneficial effect on US–Hungarian relations. Better response in our view would be something along these lines: “We hope so. There remain a number of outstanding US–Hungarian bilateral issues. We continue to work on these. The prospects for achieving solutions have improved in recent months”.

2. Agree with Embassy Rome’s suggestion.

PUHAN

178. BPB0501[105] – Clem Scerback följegyzése Puhan nagykövet számára, 1 p.

CARDINAL BUSINESS

At our dinner last night several people mentioned that the BBC had reported yesterday that five priests and one woman were sentenced to five years in jail in Hungary for anti-state activity.

These undoubtedly are the same five that have been in the news off and on for months.

The point, however, is that the less H.E. hears about this, the better off we all are. We'll try to watch our newspapers closely. Haven't seen anything yet. May not. But the outside papers most certainly will come through on this...

C. S.

179. BPB0501[106], BPB0606[0412], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [192], RMN NSFB693 – Távirat, SecState küldi: Amembassy Budapest, Amembassy Vienna, Amembassy Rome, 1 p.

Washington engedélyezi Puhan javaslatát, hogy az emlékiratokat azután szállítsák Bécsbe, hogy a Vatikán azt jóváhagyja és maga a bíboros is megérkezik ugyanoda. A két érintett nagykövetségre bízta a részletek kidolgozását.

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SECSTATE 132785

SUBJ: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY-MEMOIRS

REF: BUDAPEST 1267

1. DEPT. APPROVES AMBASSADOR PUHAN'S PROPOSAL THAT WE CONVEY EARLIEST TO EMBASSY VIENNA FOR SAFEKEEPING CARDINAL MINDSZENTY'S MEMOIRS, TO BE SURRENDERED TO HIM AFTER VATICAN GIVES APPROVAL AND HE APPEARS IN VIENNA.

2. EMBASSIES BUDAPEST AND VIENNA ARE AUTHORIZED TO WORK OUT MODALITIES OF CONVEYANCE, WHICH MAY INCLUDE POUCH FACILITIES. DEPT AND EMBASSY ROME SHOULD BE INFORMED OF PLAN WORKED OUT PRIOR TO ITS BEING PUT INTO OPERATION. EMBASSY ROME SHOULD THEN SEEK INFORMAL AGREEMENT OF VATICAN TO PLAN AND NOTIFY DEPT AND EMBASSIES BUDAPEST AND VIENNA WHEN THIS AGREEMENT RECEIVED. ROGERS

Július 23, péntek

180. BPB0501[66–67] – Clem Scerback följegyzése a bíborosról, 2 pp.

Két év személyes kapcsolat után személyes véleményét rögzíti a bíborosról. Úgy tűnik, túl nagy terhet vett magára és a kiűt feltételeit vendéglátóira hárítja.

To: AMB

After two years of Cardinal watching, and many conversations with him in Hungarian, I have reflected anew on his comments of today, and these thoughts cross my mind:

(1) he runs scared when he is rushed. When he is scared he becomes suspicious and stubborn.

(2) By now he figures I think he has over-committed himself. He will look for ways out – and even by imposing conditions on us.

(3) He trust few people, if any. Should he leave here finally, he will focus on one person or several people as the villains who got him out of here.

(4) I simply do not and will not believe that the memoirs are a bunch of useless papers insofar as his outside image is concerned. I believe they contain the kind of personal anecdota that can prove an international embarrassment to people still alive... sensitive people. Like Kadar. When one considers how much money was made over [./.] pushing the Valacchi papers, this guy's reflections will provide many opportunities for sensationalism in the media. If I could have them in my possession for 30 days, with rights to extract for publication, I believe I could set myself up financially for life. And I could pick my publishers at my price. I simply find it most difficult to believe from what I know and sense that these will pass without a murmur.

Clem

181. BPB0501[107], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [185], RMNNSFB693 – Táv-irat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: SecState, Amembassy Rome, 1 p.

Puhan referál Bakernek, Mindszenty ügyben, aki szeptember végén vagy októberben szándékozik távozni.

BUDAPEST 1330

EXDIS

REF: Baker letter to Ambassador dated July 7, 1971 re Cardinal Mindszenty

1. During exploratory conversation with Emboff today re conveying his memoirs to Emb Vienna, Cardinal Mindszenty said he expected to leave in late September or October. Gave reason for delay until then illness of his sister and probable time required before authorities and/or doctors would grant permission for visit here.

2. Septel dealing with conveyance of Memoirs.

PUHAN

182. BPB0501[108] – Clem Scerback följegyzése, 1 p.

Mindszenty Emlékiratok. Az Elnök hiányzó válasza.

FOR THE RECORD

Mindszenty Memoirs

The Cardinal came into my room at 2:55 p.m., closed the door, and asked me to turn on my radio.

Referring to our earlier conversation, he said he wanted to emphasize a point. The only thing left to him in this world, he said, are his memoirs. He trusts neither the Vatican nor the GOH to do right by these papers. He even suspects that the two of them might arrive at a deal at the ultimate expense of publication of his memoirs.

Nor does he feel really persuaded about us either. Most important to him, he said, was the request he had made months ago to President Nixon. He had asked at that time, he said, for a written assurance from the President that when the memoirs were moved from Budapest they would be given to him and to no one else. A signature on a note from the President, he said, would provide him that kind of a guarantee. The fact that he never has received such an assurance, as he has requested, makes him wonder all the more today.

He is not concerned about the transport of the memoirs, he said. He assumed that we would have this worked out. But he worries about what happens to them when they leave his care. Under no circumstances does he want them sent to Rome, he said. And if it is going to be Vienna, then he must have some form of assurance – like the Presidential signature – guaranteeing him that the memoirs will be put into his hands and nobody elses when he leaves Hungary.

There is enough in those memoirs, he said further, to make him somewhat apprehensive about their safety in transit. He does not trust Kadar at all in this matter. He had worked on memoirs while in prison, he

said, and was assured that they were his personal property, yet when the trouble started (I assume he meant the 1956 revolution) they were all confiscated by Kadar, so that when he finally took refuge here, he had to start all over and he has no intention of losing track of them this time because that is all he has left. His problem, therefore, is a guarantee, he said, asking anew, why did not the President answer his letter?

I said the President has been occupied with many things. He said he was aware of all that, but the neither did he expect an overnight response. It has been months. I said that I would make his feelings known to the Ambassador, for which he thanked me and glided out.

Clem Scerback [signed]

183. BPB0501[109] – Memorandum, Cf. 179., 1 p.

Addendum July 23, 1971

1. The Cardinal sought me out in the hallway about 3:20 p. m. to make another point. President Nixon is a busy man, he said, and not for a moment would he want us to disturb the presidential vacation by sending a telegram to California. "There is still time," he said, "to send a slower message to Washington to get the kind of assurance I want."

2. I asked him then to be very explicit with me. Would a telegram from the President suffice? No, the Cardinal said, that would not be enough. He had to have the President's signature on a message. It did not have to be a long message by any means, but it had to provide him a guarantee and it had to be signed.

Clement G. Scerback [signed]

184. BPB0501[147] – Memorandum, 1 p.

Őszentsége VI. Pál Pápa Államtitkárságának kérésére, a washingtoni Apostoli Delegáció [Nunciatura akkor még nem volt] megküldi VI. Pál pápának ausztráliai és Csendes-óceáni látogatásáról készült könyvet, amelyet Mindszenty bíboros számára átadni kér.

MEMORANDUM

Confidential

At the request of the Secretariat of State of His Holiness, Pope Paul VI, the Apostolic Delegation forwards the enclosed volume, "Visit of

Pope Paul VI to the Far East Australia and the Pacific” and would be deeply grateful if this were sent to His Eminence, Cardinal Mindszenty.
July 23, 1971

Július 26, hétfő

185. BPB0501[110–112], BPB0606[0407–0408], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [182–183] – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: Amembassy Vienna, SecState, Amembassy Rome, 3 pp.

A bíboros emlékiratainak átszállításáról. A bíboros az utolsó, hatodik kötetten dolgozik.

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BUDAPEST 1337

SUBJECT: Transporting Cardinal Mindszenty's Memoirs

REF: State 132785

1. We have explored with Cardinal Mindszenty modalities to transport his memoirs to Vienna for safekeeping in the Embassy until he arrives in late September or October. Not unexpectedly he discovers difficulties and potential obstacles to departure.

2. However, Cardinal states he hopes to have memoirs ready for shipment within two weeks depending on research books available to him here. He claims he still has work to complete on final volume six that requires research possible only here in Budapest. While he wishes papers shipped in several sections, he is not prepared to release any of early volumes at this time since he says he requires them for review and reference in finishing last one.

3. Total shipment would fit into one standard-size filing [./.] cabinet drawer. Cardinal wants papers wrapped in his presence by American officers, sealed, and transported out of Hungary by Americans with diplomatic passports in automobile. He opposes airplane shipment.

4. We propose subject to Embassy Vienna's concurrence to make three separate trips with memoirs when Cardinal finally agrees to release them. If Embassy Vienna will designate one repeat one Embassy officer to receive memoirs and act as custodian, we will assure delivery at times still to be determined. Embassy Vienna upon receipt of each segment could then confirm EXDIS safe receipt and guaranteed safekeeping until such time as Vatican approves release to Cardinal upon his appearance in Vienna.

5. If above plan agreeable to Vienna, please confirm in order that we can inform Department and Embassy Rome and get final approval before putting plan into operation.

6. Comment: We get impression Cardinal thinks he has over-committed himself and is looking for ways of getting out of commitment made to Pope, by inter alia imposing conditions [./.] on us. We should, however, proceed with our plans and remove the conditions one by one as they are posed to us.

PUHAN

Július 27, kedd

186. BPB0501[113], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [179–180] – Távirat, SecState küldi: Amembassy Rome, Amembassy Budapest, 1 p.

Cf. 169. sz. (Budapest 1310) távirattal kapcsolatos intézkedések.

SECRET STATE 135476

EXDIS

SUBJ: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY

REF: BUDAPEST 1310, AND 1321; ROME 4561; AND STATE 127281

1. FOR ROME: YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO CONVEY SUBSTANCE OF BUDAPEST'S 1310 TO CHELI OR CASAROLI, WITH EXCEPTION OF EXAMPLE CITED BY AMBASSADOR PUHAN IN REFERRING TO ADMINISTRATION OF ARCHDIOCESE OF ESZTERGOM. (WHILE THIS EXAMPLE PERFECTLY APPROPRIATE, BELIEVE IT PREFERABLE NOT TO TELL VATICAN WE MENTIONED ANY ONE OF ITS INTERESTS IN PARTICULAR).

2. WITH REGARD TO PRESS RELEASE, USE OF WHICH CLEARLY NOT IMMINENT, APPRECIATE REPLIES FROM ROME AND BUDAPEST. ROME'S POINT WELL TAKEN. BUDAPEST'S POINT UNDERSTOOD BUT MAY NEED TO BE OVERRULED IN VIEW OF NEED DEFLECT ANY POSSIBLE CHARGES THAT WE URGED CARDINAL ALONG IN ORDER IMPROVE US-HUNGARIAN RELATIONS. BELIEVE PROBLEM COULD BE SOLVED IF AMBASSADOR PUHAN WERE TO MAKE APPROPRIATE REMARKS TO MFA JUST PRIOR TO USE OF PRESS RELEASE SO AS TO AVOID ANY MISUNDERSTANDING BY HUNGARIANS OF REASONS FOR OUR CHOICE OF WORDS. FP-1. ROGERS

187. BPB0501[114], BPB0606[0406], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [177] – Távirat, Amembassy Vienna küldi: Amembassy Budapest, SecState, Amembassy Rome, 1 p.

A bécsi nagykövetség kifejezi egyetértését Mindszenty emlékiratainak szállítását illetően.

VIENNA 4584

EXDIS

SUBJECT: TRANSPORTING MINDSZENTY MEMOIRS

REF: BUDAPEST 1337

1. WE AGREE TO PLAN OUTLINED IN REFTEL FOR TRANSPORTATION AND SAFEGUARD OF MINDSZENTY MEMOIRS.

2. POLITICAL COUNSELOR EMMETT P. FORD, JR. IS DESIGNATED TO RECEIVE MEMOIRS AND ACT AS CUSTODIAN. HUMES

Július 28, szerda

188. BPB0501[117] – Clem Scerback följegyzése, 1 p.

Bevitte az Elnök levelét a bíborshoz. Ő azonnal kinyitotta, s bár mondta neki, hogy ez azonos azzal, ami a táviratban állt, láthatóan elége - detlen volt a tartalmával. Mindenesetre köszöni az Elnöknek... Nem hisz a bürokráciában, mondta a bíboros, és nem szeretné emlékiratait elveszíteni, mert akkor egész élete hiábavaló volt.

Kommentár: Az Elnök levelének késlekedése (hiánya) – vagy valamely más rövid biztosítéké, amelynek tartalmát meg kell állapítani – határozatlan időre itt fogja őt tartani.

FOR THE RECORD

Scerback calls on Cardinal Mindszenty

10:25 a.m.

1. I took in the President's letter to the Cardinal. He immediately opened it, and, even though I had told him it was the same as the telegram, he seemed a little disappointed in its contents. He thanked the President for it in any case.

2. But he is still waiting for a reply to his other request, he said, regarding a signature from the President assuring him of the security of his memoirs when they leave Hungary. I made no comment.

3. He has no faith whatsoever in bureaucracy, the cardinal said, and he would not like to feel that the memoirs would be lost to him and his entire life therefore would be wasted. He does not want to appear stubborn or unreasonable, but he awaits the letter from the President assuring him. I made no comment except to say that I understood what he was saying and would pass his remarks to the Ambassador.

4. Perhaps, he said, the Ambassador would like to meet with him to discuss this. After making this statement, the Cardinal then proceeded to qualify it, by saying that he of course "is not urging" such a meeting, but that I, perhaps, could suggest to the Ambassador that such a suggestion would be well received. I responded that I would report to the Ambassador, and that in the last analysis, of course, I was no factor in whether such a meeting would come about. The Ambassador would decide. The Cardinal replied that he understood, and we parted.

COMMENT: The lack of a letter from the President – or some acceptable form of assurance short of that that must be negotiated – will keep him here indefinitely, I am afraid. I do not think he will part company with those memoirs unless some formula is devised to reassure him. He spoke several times about being "troubled" because he has not received such assurance. This issue must be somehow met. Without it, he'll be here for a long time to come.

Clement G. Scerback [signed]

189. BPB0501[118], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [172] – Távirat, Amembassy Rome küldi: SecState, Amembassy Budapest, 1 p.

Casaroli és Cheli augusztus 16-ig Rómán kívül.

SECRET ROME 4735

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY

REF: STATE 135476; BUDAPEST 1310

BOTH CASAROLI AND CHELI OUT OF ROME UNTIL AUGUST 16. SINCE SUBSTANCE OF BUDAPEST 1310 PRIMARILY OF INTEREST TO THEM AND SINCE MINDSZENTY UNLIKELY DEPART PRIOR THEIR RETURN, EMBASSY PLANS DELAY INFORMING THEM UNLESS DEPARTMENT FEELS IT USEFUL TO INFORM MSGR. GASPARI, CASAROLI'S DEPUTY WHO NOW IN CHARGE. MARTIN

190. BPB0501[119], BPB0606[0405], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [174] – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: SecState, Amembassy Rome, Amembassy Vienna, 1 p.

A Nagykövetség a mai napon távirati értesítést kapott a bíboros unokaöccsétől, hogy húga meghalt a kórházban.

BUDAPEST 1382

SUBJECT: Cardinal Mindszenty

Embassy received telegram today from Cardinal's nephew stating Mindszenty's sister has died in Csehmindszent hospital. Services scheduled 1700 hours July 28. Embassy has forwarded Cardinal's condolences in return telegram signed by Embassy officer.

PUHAN

Július 29, csütörtök

191. BPB0501[120] – Puhán nagykövet levele Mindszenty bíboroshoz, 1 p.

A nagykövet kondoleál Mindszentynek, húga halála kapcsán.

Your Eminence:

On behalf of my government and this Embassy, I extend the most heartfelt condolences to you upon the loss of your beloved sister. My wife joins me in expressing our sympathies to you.

Sincerely,
Alfred Puhán [not signed]
Ambassador

192. BPB0501[121] – Mindszenty bíboros levele Puhán nagykövethoz, m. s., 1 p.

Megköszöni a kondoleálást.

Mr. Ambassador,

With deep emotion I express my thanksgiving for the consoling condolences of Government, of Mrs. Puhán your and Embassy upon the death of my sister.

Sincerely
Joseph Card. Mindszenty [signed]

193. BPB0501[122] – s. d. Mindszenty bíboros kéziratos címzése (borítékon), 1 p.

Mr. Alfred Puhán Ambassador

194. BPB0501[123], EEB1004[0343] – (1971. július 28) Távirat, Mindszenty bíboros Nixon elnökhöz, 1 p.

Kéri, hogy írásban biztosítsa: ezek a rendkívül fontos dolgok (em - lékiratok) a Vendég Szerző személyes tulajdona és a bécsi nagykövetség át kell adja neki, vagy kijelölt megbízottjának, késlekedés nélkül.

Fakszimiléje cf. 280.

DRAFT TELEGRAM

Cardinal to President Nixon

Dear Mr. President:

Last week the Embassy informed me that it was prepared to do what I had asked a year ago, namely, to begin transporting my most important possessions to Vienna.

I seek not to impose any burdens on you, dear Mr. President, but I request that you give me a signed note saying that these most important things are the individual and personal possessions of the Guest Author and that the Embassy in Vienna must hand them over to him or to his designated representative without deflection, without delay or without pretext.

With deep gratitude,

Card. Mindszenty [signed]

195. BPB0501[124–126], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [169–170], RMNNSFB693 – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: SecState, Amembassy Rome, 3 pp.

Puhan nagykövet véleménye szerint nem kérhető az Elnök arra, hogy ebben az összefüggésben interveniáljon. Ugyanis ez kétségbe vonja a Vatikán integritását és az US kormány integritását is.

BUDAPEST 1387

EXDIS

SUBJECT: Cardinal Mindszenty

REF: Budapest 1334; Rome 4735

1. Cardinal Mindszenty, although visibly shaken by news of his sister's death, raised question of his memoirs once again about an hour later. He asked Embassy officer to send a telegram to President Nixon requesting President's assurance in writing that Cardinal's memoirs would be turned over only to him in Vienna or to someone designated by him to receive them.

2. Believe it is inappropriate for the President to reply to such a request in this context. It appears to cast doubts on the integrity of the Vatican, for whom the Cardinal harbors considerable suspicion where his memoirs are concerned, and doubts on the integrity of the US Government.

3. I therefore would like to explain to the Cardinal that in our view the memoirs certainly are his personal property. [./.] We were unable to comply with his earlier request that his memoirs be sent to Vienna for editing by Monsignor Szabo because of the risk of publication while he was still our guest. Since he now has communicated his decision to leave to the Pope and expressed such an intention to us, we are prepared to assist him in transporting his effects including his memoirs. The plan which he preferred and to which we had his consent, was that Embassy officers would take memoirs out in diplomatic vehicles and that these memoirs would be held in custody for the Cardinal. It is not, however, the Cardinal's only option.

3. (sic!) The Cardinal can leave his memoirs behind in our custody and we will deliver them directly to him when he arrives in Vienna. Or, if he chooses, he can take them along in one of the cars that will transport him out of Hungary.

4. In order for me to proceed with this talk, I need to know urgently whether the Department perceives any objection to any of these options. I recognize the difficulties in getting Vatican reaction with Casaroli and Cheli absent [./.] (Rome 4735), but I believe this may be the only way I can head off the telegram to the President. Even this may not work since it remains our judgment that Cardinal is struggling with the decision he arrived at to leave.

PUHAN

Július 30, péntek

196. BPB0501[127], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [165], RMNNSFB693 – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: SecState, Amembassy Rome, 1 p.

Nagy külügyminiszter helyettes július 30-án elmondta Puhan nagykövetnek, hogy a magyar kormány megkapta a Vatikán följegyzését, amelyet a megegyezés „jó alapjának nevezett”. Majd a 2. pontban rámu - tat Puhan a magyar kormány taktikázására és késlekedésére, amely óvatosságra int.

BUDAPEST 1406

EXDIS

SUBJECT: Cardinal Mindszenty

1. Deputy FonMin Nagy July 30 told me during meeting GOH had received Pro Memoria from the Vatican which he described as “good basis for agreement”. Nagy said GOH had informed Vatican it was ready to iron out details on basis of Vatican Pro Memoria in Rome. Nagy called this a positive development. On timing of Cardinal’s departure he said he got impression Vatican wanted Cardinal Mindszenty out in September. Nagy said that departure of Cardinal from Hungary would have beneficial effect on US–Hungarian relations.

2. Comment: While Nagy’s description of the Vatican proposal rings of progress, a word of caution regarding Hungarian tactics is in order. Working out details with them often proves tedious and extremely difficult.

PUHAN

197. BPB0501[128] – Memorandum, 1 p.

Följegyzés Puhan nagykövet találkozásáról Nagy János külügy - miniszter helyettessel. L. 76. sz.

DRAFT MEMCON

PARTICIPANTS: Deputy Foreign Minister Janos Nagy
Ambassador Puhan

DATE: July 30, 1971

EXDIS

I met with Deputy Foreign Minister Janos Nagy for one hour and 15 minutes today.

MINDSZENTY CASE

Nagy began with the Mindszenty case. He said the GOH had received a Pro Memoria from the Vatican which form a good basis for agreement. He said the GOH had informed the Vatican it was ready to iron out details on the basis of the Vatican Pro Memoria. Details are to be worked out in Rome. Nagy called this a positive element[s] which would have beneficial effect on US–Hungarian relations. On, timing, he said, he got the impression the Vatican wanted Cardinal Mindszenty out in September.

I informed him of Cardinal Mindszenty sister’s death reported to us on Wednesday. He quite clearly had not heard this and expressed sympathy.

Later he referred to Cardinal Mindszenty again and said that presumably the Crown of St. Stephen could be returned to Hungary after the Cardinal's departure. I said I recognized the connection but I would make no comment or promise in this regard.

AMB: APuhan/jfl

198. BPB0501[129–131] – Clem Scerback följegyzése, 3 pp.

A bíboros ma különösen ingerült volt: ideges, fáradt, bizonytalan és gyanakodó.

For the Record Mindszenty

The Cardinal was particularly agitated today.

I took three books to him at about 11 a.m. Miss Mate had procured them. One interested him a great deal, while the other two were marginal. But he was grateful of her efforts.

I then told him that the various special documents he wanted could not be given out from the various libraries that had them (these are operational records for societies for blind, deaf, etc.). He was disappointed. I furthermore said that our sources were drying up. Libraries would be closed in August. He asked if Miss Mate could perhaps rely on personal contacts to get to some libraries even though they were closed, and I told him I could not ask a Hungarian citizen to do that. He seemed to accept it.

He came in later to ask if we could arrange a contact for him with Mr. (Prof. perhaps) Dery. He had approached Ross Titus on this in the past, and Ross had put him off. He mentioned Dery to me earlier in the week, in connection with his frequent MORE [./.] questions about then is Titus coming back? Now he came in and said that Ross probably would not come in today, Friday, and so could I send Miss Mate to tell Dery to telephone me and let me know if he could come in to see a Hungarian citizen out to do that, since it could put the person into a delicate and even dangerous situation. Then he thought I ought to do it. I said that might not be possible, but that it would take some thinking over. I would do that.

He came later to ask that since libraries here are closed, and our sources are drying up, would I send a telegram to Vienna to Koenig's office asking where are the books he wanted. He will take a partial shipment in lieu of nothing at all. I said I would try to inquire. (I have done so

by preparing a personal note from me to Nancy Hood in our RPO office in Vienna to call Mr. Kirschlaeger (sic!) and ask him what the status is. Nancy was hooked into the book deal by me when I was last in Vienna).

Anyway, the Cardinal is jumpy. He bothered Doris about a missing book (Justice For Hungary) that was lost when new shelves were put up. It has been found. MORE [./.] If I had to describe him, I would say he is nervous, annoyed, uncertain and suspicious. He is getting more demanding in a nagging sort of way. Perhaps he feels a deadline approaching that he cannot meet.

The Dery case – something that Ross mentioned to me once before – requires further discussion with Ross before anything can be done – if we wish to do anything at all. I don't quite know who the man is or what business the Cardinal has with him. But we must stall him.

Clem

Július 31, szombat

199. BPB0501[132], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [167], RMNNSFB693 – Távirat, SecState küldi: Amembassy Budapest, Amembassy Rome, 1 p.

SECRET STATE 139464

EXDIS


SUBJECT: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY

REF: BUDAPEST 1387

IN VIEW OF INFORMATION IN REFTTEL, FURTHER DISCUSSION OF MODALITIES AND TIMING OF GETTING CARDINAL'S MEMOIRS TO EMBASSY VIENNA WOULD SEEN LIKELY TO LEAD TO QUESTION OF ASSURANCE THAT THEY BE DELIVERED TO HIM OR HIS DESIGNATED AGENT MATTER WHICH, WE UNDERSTAND, STILL BEING NEGOTIATED BY CARDINAL AND VATICAN. THEREFORE, FOR PRESENT, IF CARDINAL RETURNS TO SUBJECT RECOMMEND YOU TAKE LINE THAT PROBLEM OF ADEQUATE ASSURANCES HAS ALREADY BEEN REFERRED TO USG WHERE IT WILL RECEIVE PROMPT AND SYMPATHETIC CONSIDERATION.

IN INTERIM RECOMMEND YOU DEFER ACTION YOU SUGGEST IN REFTTEL PARA 3 AND FOLLOWING. FURTHER DEPARTMENT VIEWS WILL BE CABLED EMBASSY IN FEW DAYS.

ROGERS



1. Nixon elnök levele Mindszenty bíborshoz, 1971. július 14.
Jelzetét lásd fönt. Mi jelzetünk: BPB0501[116]

1971. AUGUSZTUS

Augusztus hónapból 27 dokumentum áll rendelkezésre, a következő témákról: Mindszenty bíboros kiutazásának fő indoka annak a reménye, hogy Bécsben publikálhatja emlékiratait. A hónap folyamán – Puhan nagykövet fölvetésére és sürgetésére – Washington utasítja a római nagykövetséget, tárgyaljon ebben az értelemben a Vatikánban. Az emlékiratok Bécsbe való szállításának előfeltételei: a Vatikán beleegyezése, Mindszenty érkezése Bécsbe. A Vatikán beleegyezése azért fontos, hogy a kiutazás ténylegesen megtörténjék. A Vatikán problémája az esztergomi kinevezés megoldatlansága. Mindszenty tovább dolgozik emlékiratain, kérve újabb irodalmat. Távozását halogatni próbálja, ebben közrejátszhatott e letételéről szóló július 15-i gráci újsághír is. Miután megkapta Nixon elnök levelét, táviratot akart küldetni neki, biztosítékok ügyében, és a válasz hiányában vendég helyett rabnak minősíti vissza magát, újra azon morfondíroz, hogy kísétál a nagykövetség kapuján. Puhan nagykövet javaslatára Washington elfogadja a megoldást: maga a nagykövet az, aki augusztus 24-én történt személyes megbeszélésében, hivatalos felhatalmazás birtokában írásban átadja Mindszentynek az Elnöktől várt biztosítékot. Puhan sürgeti a Vatikánt és leírja Mindszenty érzelmi ingadozását. Budapesti kormány részéről a hónap folyamán nem történik lényeges esemény. Ennek oka a nyári uborkaszezon, a szabadságolások.

E hónap irataiból kitűnik, hogy a megoldás Mindszenty feje fölött születik meg, az amerikai kormánytényezők (Washington, Department of State, Budapesti Nagykövetség, Római Nagykövetség), a Vatikán (Mons. Casaroli, Mons. Cheli), és a budapesti kormány, ill. AEH között (amely most passzív), de Mindszenty kívánságának és lelkiállapotának figyelembe vételével. Ugyanakkor a követségi hivatalnok megjegyzése is jelzi, hogy Mindszenty még mindig nem vette tudomásul, hogy a fontos emberekkel, így Nixon elnökkel való kapcsolattartásában nem élvez(het) teljes szabadságot (augusztus 24, 222. sz. dokumentum).

Mindszenty fájós bal lábára Bécsből hivatnak amerikai szakorvost, rövid határidőre. Az orvosi diagnózist a nagykövetség megküldi Washingtonnak.

augusztus 6, péntek

200. BPB0501[133], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [160], RMNNSFB693 – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: SecState, Amembassy Rome, 1 p.

A magyar külügy tájékoztatása szerint a magyar kormány válaszolt a Vatikán pro memoriájára.

BUDAPEST 1468

EXDIS

SUBJECT: Cardinal Mindszenty

Both Deputy FonMin Nagy and Sec Chief Bartha told me last night GOH had replied to Vatican Pro Memoria. Said Vatican had requested reply be put in writing. Hungarians about to comply.

PUHAN

201. BPB0501[135], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [162] – Távirat, SecState küldi: Amembassy Budapest, 1 p.

Mindszenty bíboros közeli távozásáról szóló hírek és a budapesti Vadászati Világkiállításon való amerikai részvétel szintjének esetleges össze - függései. Washington óvatos.

SECRET STATE 143496

NO DISTRIBUTION OUTSIDE DEPARTMENT EXDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR PUHAN FROM ASSISTANT SECRETARY

HILLENBRAND

SUBJ: RAISING LEVEL OF DIALOGUE AND CARDINAL'S DEPARTURE

IN SEPTEL DEPT COMMENTS ON SUGGESTION THAT SECRETARY STANS VISIT BUDAPEST IN CONNECTION WITH HUNTING AND FRBHING [FURBISHING] EXHIBITION. IN ADDITION, IT ALSO OCCURS TO US THAT SECRETARY STANS' PRESENCE IN BUDAPEST AROUND THE PROPOSED TIME THAT CARDINAL MINDSZENTY MAY DEPART COULD LEAD TO UNWARRANTED SPECULATION ABOUT A POSSIBLE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE TWO EVENTS, A RISK WE DO NOT WISH TO RUN. SAME CONSIDERATION, OF COURSE, WOULD APPLY TO VISIT BY BLOUNT, BUT HIS PROFILE WOULD BE LOWER SINCE HE IS NOT IN FACT CARLNET MEMBER. ROGERS

augusztus 7, szombat

202. BPB0501[137–138], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [155–158] – Távirat, Sec-State küldi: Amembassy Rome, Amembassy Budapest, 2 pp.

Mindszenty emlékiratainak szállítása, az Elnöktől várt kötelező ígéret részletei, a magyar kormány és a Vatikán álláspontja. Hivatkozik Zágon június 25–27-i pro memoriájának 4. pontjára, ill. Zágon véleményére: az emlékiratok kiérkezése meggyorsítaná a bíboros kiutazását. A budapesti US-nagykövetség érdekelt abban, hogy Mindszenty engedélyt kapjon a Vatikántól az emlékiratok legalább posztumusz közlésére, különben nem hagyná el a nagykövetséget. Utasítások a római nagykövetnek, mit fejtessen ki a Vatikán felé.

*

SECRET STATE 144482

EXDIS

ROME FOR AMBASSADOR LODGE

SUBJ: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY

REF: BUDAPEST 1387; STATE 139464; ROME 4735

1. WE ARE CONCERNED WITH PROBLEM OF COMMITMENT TO MINDSZENTY ON TRANSPORT OF HIS MEMOIRS. IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING FROM REVIEW OF RECORD THAT VATICAN HAS NOT ACCEPTED VIEW THAT IN RETURN FOR A COMMITMENT NOT TO PUBLISH WRITINGS ON POLITICAL MATTERS OR TO RELEASE MEMOIRS PRIOR TO HIS DEATH, MINDSZENTY SHOULD BE GIVEN RIGHT TO ARRANGE AS HE WISHES FOR POSTHUMOUS PUBLICATION. RELATED TO THIS QUESTION IS WHETHER THE "SOMEONE" DESIGNATED BY CARDINAL TO RECEIVE MEMOIRS IN VIENNA (BUDAPEST 1387, PARA. ONE) WOULD, IN VATICAN'S VIEW, BE SOMEONE ON WHOM VATICAN AND CARDINAL HAD AGREED (ZAGON-MINDSZENTY PRO MEMORIA, JUNE 25–7, POINT 4.)

2. IN VIEW OF THIS, AND FACT THAT CHELI AND CASAROLI ARE OUT OF ROME UNTIL AUGUST 15 (ROME 4735), WE DO NOT FEEL WE CAN AT THIS TIME PROPERLY MAKE COMMITMENT TO CARDINAL TO DELIVER MEMOIRS INTO HIS POSSESSION (OR TO SOMEONE OF SIGNATED BY HIM) UNTIL WE REACH AN AGREED POSITION WITH THE VATICAN.

3. ALTHOUGH WE SHARE BUDAPEST'S DESIRE TO AVOID DIRECT MESSAGE FROM CARDINAL TO PRESIDENT, WE BELIEVE WE COULD RISK THIS BETTER THAN WE COULD RUN RISK OF PUTTING MINDSZENTY IN A POSITION TO ARGUE TO THE VATICAN THAT HE WAS BETTER COMMITMENT FROM US THAN THEY HAVE GIVEN HIM.

4. SINCE WE WOULD FAVOR ULTIMATELY MAKING RESPONSE TO CARDINAL AS PER PARA. 3, BUDAPEST 1387, WE HOPE TO AVOID [./.] SUBJECT WITH CARDINAL UNTIL WE CAN OBTAIN VATICAN CONCURRENCE WITH THIS APPROACH.

5. FOR ROME: REQUEST YOU ATTEMPT TO REACH CHELI OR CASAROLI AND EXPLAIN TO THEM.

A. CARDINAL SEEKING WRITTEN ASSURANCES FROM US THAT WE DELIVER HIS MEMOIRS TO HIM OR HIS DESIGNATED AGENT IN VIENNA PRIOR TO PERMITTING US TO SHIP THEM FOR HIM TO VIENNA.

B. WE PROPOSE TO GIVE HIM SUCH ASSURANCES AS OUTLINED IN PARA. 3 OF BUDAPEST REFTTEL SPECIFYING THAT WE WILL TURN MEMOIRS OVER TO HIM PERSONALLY WITHOUT CONDITIONS, SINCE WE BELIEVE THIS WILL PROVIDE HIM WITH INCENTIVE TO MAKE HIS MOVE.

C. HOWEVER, WE RELUCTANT COMMIT OURSELVES AT A TIME OR IN A MANNER WHICH COULD COMPLICATE VATICAN'S EFFORTS TO MOVE HIM.

D. WE BELIEVE THAT IF CARDINAL DOES NOT HAVE VATICAN ASSURANCES AT LEAST OF POSTHUMOUS PUBLICATION IN MANNER OF HIS CHOICE, HE COULD USE THIS AS MOTIVATION FOR STAYING ON.

E. WE DOUBT WHETHER WE CAN MOVE MEMOIRS PRIOR TO GIVING HIM UNCONDITIONAL COMMITMENT TO TURN THEM OVER TO HIM IN VIENNA, BUT WE HOPE AVOID COMMITMENT TO TURN THEM OVER TO HIS DESIGNATED AGENT.

F. WE ALSO AGREE WITH ZAGON (BUDAPEST 1267) THAT CONVEYANCE OF MEMOIRS TO VIENNA WOULD PROBABLY EXPEDITE CARDINAL'S DEPARTURE.

G. WE WOULD, OF COURSE, PREFER HANDLE MATTER IN MANNER ACCEPTABLE TO CARDINAL AND TO VATICAN PROMPTLY IN ORDER EXPEDITE MOVEMENT OF MEMOIRS.

H. WE THEREFORE HOPE OBTAIN PROMPT EXPRESSION OF VATICAN'S VIEWS.

6. FOR BUDAPEST A. WOULD APPRECIATE PROMPT BUDAPEST COMMENT ON LINE IN PARE5 PRIOR TO ITS IMPLEMENTATION BY ROME.

B. SHOULD CARDINAL PRESS TO SEND CABLE TO PRESIDENT, AND IS NOT DISSUADED BY ARGUMENTS THAT THIS HARDLY APPROPRIATE AND THAT MATTER IS RECEIVING SYMPATHETIC ATTENTION BY USG, YOU SHOULD TRANSMIT CABLE AND WE WILL, IN DUE COURSE, ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN IN RESPONSE STATEMENT FOR YOU TO MAKE ON BEHALF OF USG.

ROGERS

augusztus 9, hétfő

203. BPB0501[134] – Memorandum, C. Scerback, 1 p.

CARDINAL CHRONOLOGY

August 9, 1971, 1130 a.m.

Mindszenty újabb dokumentumokat kap, fáj a lába. A bíboros érdeklődik, hogy elment-e távirata Nixon elnökhöz, feltétlenül meg akar róla győződni.

*

This morning I took some document to the Cardinal. He had been anxiously awaiting them and was happy to have them. He looked a little better, but his foot still hurts him and it remains difficult for him to stand with any degree of comfort.

Before leaving he called me back. The telegram to the President, he said, interested him very much. Did I really give it to the Ambassador. I said that I had. Was it sent? I said I had to presume that it was sent, but I had no way of ascertaining this since communications with the President are a privileged matter for the Ambassador's approval and discretion. Then, asked the Cardinal, is there a copy of it in the files as it was sent? I said I thought not, since communications with the President remain in the Ambassador's administrative jurisdiction. Then, said the Cardinal, perhaps he should speak with Miss Lamar? That is up to him, I said, but in my opinion, from what I read, the President is occupied with all kinds of things, and right now the preparations for his China visit are paramount. In

that regards, said the Cardinal, he stood apparently aligned with Chiang Kai Shek. He asked in conclusion if I would check to see what had happened to his request.

CGScerback [signed]

204. BPB0501[136], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [151], XR POL HUNG-US – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: SecState, 1 p.

Hivatkozva a 201. sz. dokumentumra, jelzi, hogy a Világkiállítás dátuma túl közeli ahhoz, hogy összefüggésbe hozzák a bíboros esetleges távozásával.

BUDAPEST 1482

EXDIS

FOR HILLENBRAND

SUBJECT: Raising Level of Dialogue and Cardinal's Departure

REF: State 143496

Recognize risk you cite in reftel. Believe, however, dates of September 4–6 too early for departure. At least I am not counting on it by that time.

PUHAN

205. BPB0501[139–140], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [152–153], RMNNSFB693 – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: SecState, Amembassy Rome, 2 pp.

Hivatkozva a 202. sz. dokumentumra, közli véleményét, hogy Mindszenty bíboros távozásának fő indoka az a reménye, hogy külföldön publikálhatja emlékiratait, s így igazolhatja az elmúlt 23 évben követett álláspontját. Az Elnök – írásbeli – biztosítéka nélkül, hogy az emlékiratok Bécstől neki vagy megbízottjának átadjuk, félő, hogy a bíboros nem hagyja el a nagykövetséget. Fordítva is igaz: az emlékiratok Bécsbe szállítása azzal a biztosítékkal, hogy átadjuk neki vagy megbízottjának, meggyorsíthatja távozását.

Az emlékiratok publikálásának kérdése a bíboros és a Vatikán közti megegyezés tárgya.

A bíboros nyomást gyakorol a nagykövetség személyzetére az elnöki biztosítékok ügyében. Ha kap is felhatalmazást, hogy meggyőzze a bíborost kérésének indokolatlanságáról, lehetséges, hogy ez nem sikerül, ez esetben meg kell küldje az Elnöknek szánt bíborosi táviratot.

BUDAPEST 1489

SUBJECT: Cardinal Mindszenty

REF: State 144482

1. We have been asked to comment on line in para 5 reftel prior to its implementation by Rome.

2. As we have stated from very beginning, principal motivation in Cardinal's decision to leave Embassy and Hungary is hope that with this action he can ensure accurate publication of his memoirs to vindicate his conduct in past 23 years. Without assurances – possibly written assurances signed by President – that memoirs will be turned over to him in Vienna or to someone designated by him, Cardinal will not turn memoirs over to us for conveyance to Vienna or, for that matter, leave Embassy. I think it is equally true that conveyance of memoirs to Vienna with assurance that they will be turned over to him or his designated agent will expedite Cardinal's departure. [/.]

3. The question of publication of his memoirs, once the Cardinal is out of our Embassy, is of course an entirely different matter and one entirely between him and the Vatican. It is in my view not a question we ought to get into.

4. Agree fully with Department that we ought to handle matter in manner acceptable to Cardinal and to Vatican promptly.

5. Cardinal is not pressing me for reply to his request but is pressuring Embassy officers who deal with him for Presidential assurances. If after I have authority to seek to persuade Cardinal that cable to President not appropriate, and he remains unconvinced, I shall of course transmit cable as proposed reftel 6B.

PUHAN

augusztus 10, kedd

206. BPB0501[141], EEB1004[342] – Levél, Puhán Bakerhez, 1 p.

Fontosabb pontjait cf. 205. sz.

EXDIS

As you know from our reporting, the Cardinal has so far not asked me about his telegraphic request to the President for a signed note guaranteeing that his Memoirs will be turned over to him or to his designated representative “without deflection”. However, the pressure which he exerts

on Embassy officers, particularly on Clem Scerback who has taken over the Ross Titus role on these matters since Ross's departure, is growing both in intensity and frequency. I am prepared to give the Cardinal the interim reply recommended in Department's 139464. However, until we all have an agreed upon reply, I thought you ought to have the Cardinal's prepared telegram to the President, a copy of which I enclose.

I have indicated earlier that I don't think much of the idea of the President's doing what the Cardinal wants, but it may become necessary in the final analysis.

Regards,

Sincerely yours,
Alfred Puhan [not signed]
Ambassador

Enclosure

207. BPB0501[142, 144], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [147-148] – Távirat, Sec State küldi: Amembassy Rome, Amembassy Budapest, 1 p.

Lényegében ismétli Puhan nagykövet gondolatait, l. 205. 206. sz., ill. saját instrukcióját, l. 202. sz.

SECRET STATE 145749

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY

REF: BUDAPEST 1489, STATE 144482

1. APPRECIATE EMBASSY BUDAPEST'S COMMENTS IN REFTTEL. PARAGRAPHS 2 AND 4 OF BUDAPEST REFTTEL REINFORCE DEPARTMENT'S VIEW AS EXPRESSED IN STATE 144482, RE PARAGRAPH 3, DEPARTMENT AGREES THAT, ONCE CARDINAL WAS LEFT EMBASSY, PUBLICATION OF MEMOIRS NOT A MATTER WE SHOULD GET INTO. INASMUCH AS CARDINAL STILL IS IN EMBASSY AND IS REQUESTING US, INTER ALIA, TO GIVE HIM COMMITMENT TO DELIVER MEMOIRS TO HIS DESIGNATED AGENT, QUESTION OF CHOICE OF AGENT AND EVENTUAL DISPOSITION OF MEMOIRS BY SUCH AN AGENT INVITABLY ARISES, ESPECIALLY IN EVENT CARDINAL SHOULD EVENTUALLY DECIDE NOT TO DEPART. FOR THIS REASON, COORDINATION WITH VATICAN APPEARS APPROPRIATE. IN COURSE OF CONSULTING VATICAN, SEE NO REASON WHY

WE SHOULD NOT GIVE OUR VIEWS AS TO BEST ULTIMATE DISPOSITION OF MEMOIRS IN VIEW OUR RELIEF SHARED BY EMBASSY BUDAPEST THAT SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENTS FOR ULTIMATE PUBLICATION ARE IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN CARDINAL'S DECISION TO LEAVE.

2. FOR ROME FOR AMBASSADOR LODGE: PLEASE PROCEED ACCORDING TO INSTRUCTION IN PARAGRAPH 5 OF DEPTTEL 144482. ROGERS.

208. BPB0501[143] – Távirat, SecState küldi: Amembassy Budapest, 1 p.

A washingtoni Apostoli Delegátus kérésére megküldi Villot bíboros államtitkár latin nyelvű üzenetét, melyben továbbítja VI. Pál pápa kondo - leálását Mindszenty bíboros húgának halála miatt.

CONFIDENTIAL STATE 145647

LIMDIS

SUBJECT: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY

APOSTOLIC DELEGATE IN WASHINGTON HAS ASKED FOLLOWING BE TRANSMITTED:

MEMORANDUM STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL – HIS EMINENCE, THE CARDINAL SECRETARY OF STATE OF HIS HOLINESS, POPE PAUL VI, WOULD BE VERY GRATEFUL IF THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE WERE TRANSMITTED TO HIS EMINENCE, CARDINAL MINDSZENTY:

QTE DOLOREM QUEM EX MORTE SORORIS TUAE CAPIS MENTE ET CORDE PARTICIPANTES MAESTITIAM TUAM CUPIMUS IN DOMINO CONSOLARI TEQUE CERTIOREM REDDERE NOS ANIMAM EIUS PIIS SUFFRAGIBUS ESSE PROSECUTUROS BENEDICTIONEM DEMUM APOSTOLICAM SINCERAE CARITATIS TESTEM TIBI VOLENTES IMPERTIMUS. PAULUS PP SEXTUS. CARDINAL VILLOT AUGUST 9, 1971. END QTE. ROGERS

augusztus 11, szerda

209. BPB0501[145] – Memorandum, C. Scerback, 1 p.

*Mindszenty érdeklődik, elment-e távirata az Elnöknek. Majd kese -
rűen azt mondja: Ha nem tudja megválaszolni az ilyen kérdést, akkor már
nem vagyok vendég, hanem rab.*

*Néhány perccel azután, hogy kézhez kapta a pápa kondoleáló
üzenetét, két kézzel írt levelet hozott, az egyiket Benellinek, köszönve a
pápa utazásairól szóló könyvet, a másikat Villotnak, köszönve a pápa távi -
ratát. Közli ez utóbbi szövegét.*

*Majd néhány perccel ezt követően, ismét jött, kérte, hogy ne küldjük
el levelét a pápának. Majd kérdeztem tőle, vissza akarja-e kapni levelét.
Azt mondta: nem, legyen nálam, amíg levelezési jogai nem lesznek tisztázva.*

MINDSZENTY FILE

August 11, 1971

Cardinal approached me in morning, just as Ambassador was leav-
ing again asking if his telegram was sent or an answer received. I responded
that it was being attended to by the Ambassador, at which the Cardinal
said, "If you can't answer that kind of a question, then I am no longer a guest
here but rather a prisoner." (He used Hungarian word "rab.") Ambassador
at this point walked by, and that broke up that conversation, but not before
I gave him telegraphed copy of message from Villot.

Few minutes later, he came back with two handwritten letters for
me. One, to Msgr. Benelli, Vatican Secretariat of State, thanking him for a
book on Pope Paul's travels. Second letter was to Villot for the Pope, text
roughly as follows:

"Holy Father. I am moved greatly by your benevolent consolation,
support and timely blessing, on the occasion of my sister's death. She was
a blessed mother of eight children, who endured 48 years of bolshevism
and could not always feed her children. But she was an excellent teacher.
My profound thanks. I kiss your blessed hands, Holy Father." JCM.

Cardinal few minutes later left note on my desk asking me not to
send letter to Pope. Almost immediately I encountered him in hall, and
asked if he wanted letter back. He said no, I should keep it, until the mat-
ter of "my mailing rights is clarified."

CGScerback [signed]

augusztus 16, hétfő

210. BPB0501[148–149], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [143–145] – Távirat, Amembassy Rome küldi: SecState, Amembassy Budapest, 2 pp.

Lodge római nagykövet értesítése: Vatikánnak nincs kifogása, hogy az amerikaiak elszállítsák az emlékiratokat és Bécsbe érkezését követően átadják a bíborosnak. A publikálás egy későbbi kérdés. Casaroli négy héten belül tárgyalni óhajt a magyarokkal, hogy tisztázzák a Mindszenty-kérdést. Az esztergomi apostoli adminisztrátor kinevezése a legnagyobb probléma.

A részletezésben visszaköszönnek az eddigi szempontok. Casaroli úgy tudja, hogy az emlékiratok korábbi periódussal foglalkoznak. Csak az utolsó kötet foglalkozna élő személyekkel. Casaroli megjegyezte, hogy az amerikaiak kelet-európai politikáját a bíboros várhatóan nem fogja bölcsnek tartani. A magyarokkal való tárgyalás helyszínéről aug. 3-án megkérdezték a magyarokat. Az új apostoli kormányzó kinevezését Mindszenty „sede impedita” szeretné, míg a Vatikánban többen „sede plena”.

ROME 5157

FROM LODGE

SUBJECT: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY

REF: STATE 144482, STATE 145749

SUMMARY: CASAROLI ASSURED AMBASSADOR LODGE THAT VATICAN HAS NO OBJECTIONS TO USG REMOVING CARDINAL'S MEMOIRS FROM HUNGARY AND DELIVERING THEM TO CARDINAL WHEN HE HAS ARRIVED IN VIENNA. VATICAN FEELS QUESTION OF PUBLICATION CAN BE DECIDED LATER. CASAROLI WILL MEET WITHIN NEXT FOUR WEEKS WITH HUNGARIAN OFFICIALS TO DISCUSS MINDSZENTY. CHOICE OF NEW APOSTOLIC ADMINISTRATOR FOR ES[Z]-TERGOM IS A MAJOR PROBLEM. END SUMMARY.

1. AT A MEETING WITH ARCHBISHOP CASAROLI THIS MORNING I SAID:

A. THE CARDINAL IS SEEKING WRITTEN ASSURANCES FROM US THAT WE WILL DELIVER HIS MEMOIRS TO HIM OR HIS DESIGNATED AGENT IN VIENNA PRIOR TO PERMITTING US TO SHIP THEM FOR HIM TO VIENNA.

B. WE PROPOSE TO GIVE HIM ASSURANCES THAT IN OUR VIEW MEMOIRS CERTAINLY ARE HIS PERSONAL PROPERTY. SINCE HE NOW HAS COMMUNICATED HIS DECISION TO LEAVE

TO THE POPE AND EXPRESSED SUCH AN INTENTION TO US, WE ARE PREPARED TO ASSIST HIM IN TRANSPORTING HIS EFFECTS INCLUDING HIS MEMOIRS. THE PLAN WHICH HE PREFERRED AND TO WHICH WE HAD HIS CONSENT, WAS THAT EMBASSY OFFICERS WOULD TAKE THE MEMOIRS OUT IN DIPLOMATIC VEHICLES AND THAT THESE MEMOIRS WOULD BE HELD IN CUSTODY IN VIENNA FOR THE CARDINAL.

C. WE ARE RELUCTANT TO COMMIT OURSELVES AT A TIME OR IN A MANNER WHICH COULD COMPLICATE THE VATICAN'S EFFORTS TO MOVE HIM.

D. WE BELIEVE THAT IF THE CARDINAL DOES NOT HAVE VATICAN ASSURANCES, AT LEAST OF POSTHUMOUS PUBLICATION IN A MANNER OF HIS CHOICE, HE COULD USE THIS AS MOTIVATION FOR STAYING ON.

E. WE DOUBT WHETHER WE CAN MOVE THE MEMOIRS PRIOR TO [./.] GIVING HIM AN "UNCONDITIONAL" COMMITMENT TO TURN THEM OVER TO HIM IN VIENNA, BUT WE HOPE TO AVOID A COMMITMENT TO TURN THEM OVER TO HIS DESIGNATED AGENT.

F. WE BELIEVE THAT THE CONVEYANCE OF THE MEMOIRS TO VIENNA WOULD PROBABLY EXPEDITE THE CARDINAL'S DEPARTURE.

G. WE WOULD, OF COURSE, PREFER TO HANDLE THE MATTER IN A MANNER ACCEPTABLE TO THE CARDINAL AND TO THE VATICAN PROMPTLY IN ORDER TO EXPEDITE THE MOVEMENT OF THE MEMOIRS.

H. WE THEREFORE HOPE TO OBTAIN PROMPT EXPRESSION OF THE VATICAN'S VIEWS.

2. CASAROLI TOLD ME THAT VATICAN HAS NO OBJECTIONS TO USG GIVING MINDSZENTY UNCONDITIONAL ASSURANCES ON TRANSPORTING HIS MEMOIRS FROM HUNGARY AND THEN RELEASING THEM TO HIM ONCE HE HAS HIMSELF DEPARTED. CASAROLI DID NOT COMMENT ON DISTINCTION BETWEEN DELIVERING MEMOIRS TO CARDINAL OR HIS DESIGNATED AGENT. CASAROLI SAID QUESTION OF PUBLICATION WOULD ARISE LATER.

3. IT IS CASAROLI'S UNDERSTANDING THAT MOST OF MEMOIRS DEAL WITH EARLIER TIMES, COMING BEFORE THE "REAL MEMOIRS" BEGIN. ONLY LAST VOLUME WILL COVER PRESENT PERIOD AND THUS CONTAIN JUDGEMENTS ON LI-

VING PERSONS AND POLICIES. CASAROLI NOTED THAT CARDINAL CAN BE EXPECTED TO DESCRIBE US EASTERN EUROPEAN POLICY AS "NOT WISE".

4. CASAROLI PERSONALLY EXPECTS TO TAKE UP MINDSZENTY QUESTION WITH GOH IN LATE AUGUST OR EARLY SEPTEMBER. COMMENT: CASAROLI DID NOT SAY WHERE HE WOULD MEET WITH HUNGARIAN OFFICIALS BUT HIS DEPUTY, MSGR. GASPARI, SPOKE WITH HUNGARIAN EMBASSY ROME AUGUST 3 TO FIND OUT WHERE GOH WANTS TO MEET FOR SETTLEMENT OF FINAL DETAILS ON MINDSZENTY DEPARTURE.

5. CASAROLI SAID ONE OF MAIN POINT YET TO SETTLE IS CHOICE OF NEW APOSTOLIC ADMINISTRATOR FOR MINDSZENTY'S DIOCES. CARDINAL INSISTS THAT REPLACEMENT FOR BISHOP SZABO, WHO NOT CONSIDERED SATISFACTORY, BE TITLED "APOSTOLIC ADMINISTRATOR SEDE IMPEDITA" WHILE SOME VATICAN QUARTERS DESIRE HE BE GIVEN TITLE "AS APOSTOLIC ADMINISTRATOR SEDE PLENA." MARTIN

augusztus 17, szerda

211. BPB0501[150–151], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [140–141] – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: SecState, Amembassy Rome, 2 pp.

Puhan nagykövet, arra hivatkozva, hogy Lodge nagykövet megtud - ta: a Vatikánnak nincs ellenvetése az ellen, hogy az amerikai kormány biz - tosítékokat adjon Mindszenty bíborosnak emlékiratai Bécsbe szállítására és odaérkezése után neki való átadására, határozott intézkedéseket kér.

BUDAPEST 1560

EXDIS

SUBJECT: Cardinal Mindszenty

REF: Rome 5175

1. Now that Ambassador Lodge has received Vatican assurance it has no objections to USG giving Mindszenty unconditional assurances on Embassy conveying his memoirs from Hungary to Vienna and releasing

them to Cardinal once he has himself departed, believe we ought to act quickly. We note Casaroli takes relaxed view of contents of memoirs. Nor did he comment on distinction between delivering memoirs to Cardinal or his designated agent.

2. Department should keep in mind that while Casaroli expect to iron out details of Mindszenty departure within next four weeks, we will need some time to prepare Cardinal for his departure. While he has given Pope his decision to leave he cannot be expected to receive news that cars will come for him in a couple of days to take him to Vienna. He will [./.] require some time to put his affairs in order. A major obstacle is the safe conveying of his memoirs to Vienna and if we can tell him shortly in writing this is assured, precise time for his departure, after Vatican negotiations with Hungarians are completed, can be set.

3. A not insignificant aspect of his departure for our future relations with GOH is to get Mindszenty out of here before statements on 15th anniversary of October 23 revolution appear.

4. In the meantime, Cardinal becomes more impatient and inquisitive. He is pressing all members of staff, now including Ambassador's secretary, to discover whether Ambassador sent his telegram, whether reply has been received, etc.

PUHAN

212. BPB0501[152–154], BPB0606[0402–0403], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [126–127, 134–135 (2x)], RMNNSFB693 – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: SecState, Amembassy Rome, Vienna, 3. pp.

Puhan nagykövet köszöni Washington gyors ügyintézését és java - solja, hogy írásban adhasson biztosítékot Mindszenty bíborosnak, az ame - rikai kormány nevében, ami az emlékiratok Bécsben történő átadását illeti. Megküldi e javasolt levél szövegét, kér felhatalmazást.

BUDAPEST 1563

SUBJECT: Cardinal Mindszenty

REF: State 151133

1. Appreciate speedy action by Department.

2. While I am prepared of course to inform Cardinal Mindszenty along lines para 1 reftel, believe the situation has now reached a point where it is futile to go to him with anything but written assurance that his possessions, particularly his memoirs, will be turned over to him or his designated agent

after he has left Hungary. Propose therefore that after talking with him I give him the following letter:

3. QUOTE. Your Eminence: In response to your request to have the Embassy of the United States assist you in conveying your memoirs and personal possessions to Vienna, I am happy to inform you that the Government of the United States is pleased to be of assistance. The Embassy is ready [./.] to transfer your personal property, including your memoirs, to such locations as you may designate. It is my understanding that it is your wish that your possessions, including your memoirs be transferred to Vienna. I can now assure you that they will be held in safekeeping for you by the United States Embassy in Vienna, and that they will be turned over to you or to an agent you may wish to designate at such a time as you have left Hungary.

4. You will understand, Your Eminence, that the Government of the United States could not, of course, perform this service for you as long as you remained in refuge in the United States Embassy in Budapest, since such action would have put our Embassy into jeopardy.

5. I am authorized to comply with your request as soon as you are prepared to turn over to me your possessions, including your memoirs, for conveyance. Sincerely. UNQUOTE.

6. Would appreciate speedy clearance.

7. I should point out that in view of the fact that the Cardinal has expressly and repeatedly requested written [./.] assurance from the President, even the above letter may not do the trick.

PUHAN

augusztus 18, szerda

213. BPB0501[155], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [132], RMNNSFB693 – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: SecState, Amembassy Rome, 1 p.

Sűrgeti, hogy a Vatikán javasoljon Mindszentynek egy időpontot a távozást illetően.

BUDAPEST 1564

EXDIS

SUBJECT: Cardinal Mindszenty

REF: Rome 5157; State 151133

Now that Vatican has agreed to the transfer of Cardinal's memoirs to him or his designated agent in Vienna after his appearance there and after Em-

bassy Budapest has been authorized to inform Cardinal Mindszenty to this effect, it would seem important to me to have a communication from the Vatican to the Cardinal, suggesting a date for his departure. Recall from my conversations with Cheli and Zagon that the Vatican had planned to send a letter from the Vatican Secretary of State, expecting the Cardinal to accede to Pope's wish for Cardinal to appear in Rome for a synod in September. I urge strongly some such communication in order to fix a date sufficiently in advance of departure and to give the Cardinal time to prepare himself and for us to prepare him for what is for him a great wrench.

PUHAN

214. BPB0501[156], BPB0606[0404], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [137-138], RMNNSFB693 – Távirat, SecState küldi: Amembassy Budapest, Amembassy Rome, Vienna, 1 p.

Washington felhatalmazza a nagykövetet, hogy közölje Mindszentyvel: emlékiratait át fogják neki adni Bécsben. Ha a bíboros kitart az írásbeli biztosíték kérésénél, a nagykövet írásban is lefektetheti ezt.

SECRET STATE 151133

EXDIS

SUBJ: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY

REF: ROME 5157, STATE 144482

1. EMBASSY AUTHORIZED TO INFORM CARDINAL MINDSZENTY THAT IT WILL COMPLY WITH HIS REQUEST TO CONVEY THE MEMOIRS TO THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN VIENNA TO BE HELD THERE IN SAFEKEEPING AND TURNED OVER TO THE CARDINAL DIRECTLY OR TO AN INTERMEDIARY HE MAY DESIGNATE FOR DELIVERY TO THE CARDINAL AT SUCH TIME AS THE CARDINAL, THEN IN RESIDENCE IN VIENNA OR SOME OTHER LOCATION WITHOUT HUNGARY, MAY SO DIRECT. EMBASSY SHOULD SAY THAT THE USG IS PLEASED TO BE OF ASSISTANCE TO THE CARDINAL IN PLANNING HIS JOURNEY BY TRANSFERRING THE CARDINAL'S PERSONAL PROPERTY INCLUDING THE MEMOIRS TO SUCH LOCATIONS AS HE MAY DESIGNATE. EMBASSY SHOULD POINT OUT WE COULD NOT OF COURSE PERFORM THIS SERVICE DURING THE CARDINAL'S REFUGE, SINCE SUCH ACTIVITY WOULD VIOLATE THE TERMS OF HIS REFUGE AND PUT OUR EMBASSY INTO JEOPARDY.

2. SHOULD THE CARDINAL PERSIST IN HIS DEMANDS FOR A WRITTEN GUARANTEE ON THE DELIVERY OF THE MEMOIRS YOU MAY AS A LAST RESORT ACCEDE AND PROVIDE HIM WITH A LETTER FROM THE AMBASSADOR EMBODYING THE POINTS SET FORTH IN PARAGRAPH ONE. TEXT OF ANY SUCH LETTER SHOULD BE CLEARED WITH DEPARTMENT. ROGERS

augusztus 19, csütörtök

215. BPB0501[157] – Memorandum, Clem Scerback, 1 p.

Mindszenty érzelmeinek olyan méretű kinyilvánítása, amelyre az elmúlt két évben nem volt példa. A nagykövetségen megváltozott helyzete: idáig vendég volt, mostantól rab. 1968-ig visszamenő jogai többé nem érvényesek (Scerback ezt nem értette). A jövő őt nem foglalkoztatja. Azon - nal átadná magát Kádár kezébe. Amiért nem ment ki, idáig úgy gondolta, hogy a magyar nép képviselőjeként szívesen látták a nagykövetségen. De rabként máshol is lehet, nem kell ittmaradnia. Az egyetlen dolog, ami visz - szatartja e lépéstől, az az Apostoli Szentszékek tett ígérete, hogy más kurzust fog követni. Isteni megvilágosodásért folyamodik.

MINDSZENTY CHRONOLOGY

At about 2:45 pm I took in to the Cardinal a rosary left for him by a lady tourist from Belgium.

He asked me to sit down, and then began to reflect on his situation in the Embassy. It was as frank a revelation of his feelings that I have ever heard in the two years that I have been here and the many conversations I have had with him.

He made these points:

(1) His situation in the Embassy obviously has changed. To him he has been downgraded from a guest to a prisoner, and those were his words. Furthermore, it is apparent that the understanding about his rights that goes back to 1968 (I do not yet understand the reference) no longer applies.

(2) He has no regard for his future. He would put himself into Kadar's hand immediately (his exact words), even tomorrow, and create for the GOH a problem that it justly deserves for all that it has done to the Church. His life is of no concern to him.

(3) The reason he has not walked out, of course, is because he felt that as a representative of the Hungarian people he was welcome in this Embassy. But now that he has been changed from guest to prisoner, he may as well be a prisoner somewhere else where it may do more good.

(4) The only thing holding him back, the Cardinal said, and it pains him a great deal, is that he gave his word to the Holy See that he would pursue another course (his word again). It hurts him a great deal to be bound by this promise, and were he not, he would freely walk out of this Embassy and put himself into Kadar's hands. It is a matter of conscience with him to keep his word. But he is thinking about it. And he is praying for Divine Guidance to assist him in doing the right thing.

COMMENT: The Cardinal is deeply troubled. It is quite clear that he does feel the situation here has changed with respect to his rights. While he feels bound by his commitment to the Pope, a man of his age and with his mental agility scarcely can be depended on to hold to that commitment if he suddenly decides that God in his Infinite Wisdom has instructed him otherwise. I think he will bear watching.

Clem Scerback

216. BPB0501[158–160], EEB1004[335–337] – Levél, Puhán Bakerhez, 3 pp.

Utóbbi távirataiban küldött sürgős kéréseinek háttéréről: a bíboros, amióta elhatározta és a Pápával közölte döntését, hogy elhagyja a nagykövetséget, megváltozott és újabb ürügyeket keres, hogy halogassa a távozást. Ilyen az Elnöknek írt távirata is, a biztosítékok felől. Majd Scerback memója – 215. sz. – alapján összefoglalja a bíboros lelkiállapotára vonatkozó újabb információkat. Informálja Bakert, hogy minden megtörténhet jelen helyzetben, még az is, hogy a bíboros tényleg kísétál a nagykövetség kapuján. Bár személyesen nem hisz ebben és úgy gondolja, hogy ez a fenyegetés is csak a pszichológiai hadviselés egy része. Másrésztől, Puhán nagykövet, nem egészen biztos ebben az elemzésében.

A nagykövetségen mindenki belefáradt már ebbe a helyzetbe. A Vatikán részéről szükség lenne több érdeklődésre. Egy nyolcvan éves idős ember krízishelyzetéről van szó, amelyet a vatikániak váltottak ki azzal, hogy rendkívüli emóciókat kívánó döntést csikartak ki belőle, majd itt hagyták egyedül, gondolataival.

It you have sensed some urgency in my recent messages dealing with the Cardinal, there are grounds for it which you ought to know. Ever since the Cardinal made his decision to the Pope to leave this Embassy and Hungary, he has been a changed man from the one I've known since I came here. The death of his sister has also had a profound effect on him for she represented the last close tie for him with Hungary.

We analyzed his decision to leave, I think, quite correctly. It was one he did not want to make and one which he has regretted ever since. He has looked for ways and means of getting out of it. One of these ways has been to ask for assurances of one kind or another signed by the President of the United States.

The Cardinal has put pressure on nearly everyone in the Embassy excepting me. Let me give you the most recent example of the kind of thing he is doing. This afternoon Clem Scerback, who has taken over for Ross Titus as the aide to the Cardinal, went in to see him. The Cardinal asked him to sit down and then made the following points. He said this situation in the Embassy obviously has changed. He feels he is now a prisoner instead of a guest. He said that his understanding about his rights that goes back to 1968 (we do not understand this reference) no longer applies. He said he had no regard for his future. He would just as soon as put himself into the hands of Kadar immediately, even tomorrow, and create for the Government of Hungary a problem that is justly deserves, for all that it has done to the Church. He said his life was of no concern to him. The reason he has not walked out, of course, is because he felt that as a representative of the [./] Hungarian people he was welcome in this Embassy. But now that his status has been changed from guest to prisoner he may as well be a prisoner somewhere else where it would do more good.

This reference of his to being a prisoner apparently relates to his resentment, voiced daily to members of the Embassy, that he has not heard from the President. He has tried, incidentally, in a variety of ways, to find out about my correspondence with the Department regarding his status. He has gone so far as to ask my secretary whether I had sent his cable to the President.

The Cardinal told Scerback that the one thing that kept him from walking out, and this pained him a great deal, was that he gave his word to the Holy See that he would pursue another course. He said it hurt him a great deal to be bound by this promise, and were he not, he would freely walk out of this Embassy and put himself into Kadar's hands. It is a matter of conscience with him to keep his word but he added he was thinking about it, and concluded that he was praying for divine guidance to assist him in doing the right thing.

Perhaps by the time this letter reaches you the Department will have authorized me to give him in writing assurances regarding his memoirs. I surely hope so. As I said in the telegram, however, my name at the bottom of the letter may give him another excuse for demanding that the President sign such assurances. I am of course fully prepared to counter his arguments on this score.

I write you all of this because I want you to be alert to the possibility that anything can happen, including a walk-out, by the Cardinal. I personally don't believe he will do this and think that the kind of conversation he had with Scerback is part of his psychological warfare. On the other hand, I don't want to be too definite about this.

All of this points up the need for rather speedy action in his case. He has made his commitment to the Pope. We need something from Rome lest he draw the conclusion, if he has not already, that we are the only ones who appear to be interested in getting him out of the Embassy. A communication from the Vatican plus assurances that we will get his memoirs to him in Vienna will take off a great deal of the pressure here. [./.] Although this is a minor point, I would be remiss if I did not add that nearly all members of the staff here are a bit uncomfortable about his present frame of mind. I repeat I don't wish to be alarmist about all of this and am prepared to play out the game to the bitter end, but a little more zeal on the part of the Vatican would be most helpful.

I have at the moment stuck strictly to my instructions and have not attempted to talk to him about his request for guarantees that his memoirs will be turned over to him or his designated agent in Vienna. I feel, however, I can't wait much longer and will have to have a chat with him. After all, you cannot confront an 80 year old man with a crisis situation, as the representatives of the Vatican did, demand a decision from him of tremendous emotional depth, and then walk away and leave him to his thoughts.

Sincerely,
Alfred Puhan [not signed]
Ambassador

augusztus 21, szombat

217. BPB0501[162], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [128] – Távirat, SecState küldi: Amembassy Rome, Amembassy Budapest, 1 p.

Felhatalmazás a római nagykövetségnek, hogy érdeklődjön a Vatikánban a szándékok felől. Amennyiben a Vatikán érdeklődik – vagy ha

ezt hasznosnak ítéli – ismertetheti a Mindszentynek adandó biztosítékok kérdését is.

SECRET STATE 153868

EXDIS

SUBJ: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY

REF: ROME 5157; BUDAPEST 1560; BUDAPEST 1564

1. EMBASSY AT ITS DISCRETION AUTHORIZED TO APPROACH VATICAN AND SEEK TO DETERMINE WHAT VATICAN PLANS TO DO NEXT TO PRESERVE MOMENTUM IN MINDSZENTY CASE.

2. SHOULD VATICAN EXPRESS INTEREST IN TRANSFER OF MINDSZENTY MEMOIRS DISCUSSED IN LAST MEETING YOU MAY EXPLAIN NATURE OF WRITTEN COMMITMENT WE HAVE INSTRUCTED AMBASSADOR PUHAN TO GIVE CARDINAL. IN ABSENCE OF INQUIRY YOU MAY VOLUNTEER THIS INFORMATION IF YOU BELIEVE IT USEFUL.

TP-1. JOHNSON

218. BPB0501[164], BPB0606[0401], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [125, 130 (2x)], RMNNSFB693 – Távirat, SecState küldi: Amembassy Budapest, Amembassy Rome, Vienna, 1 p.

Jóváhagyja Puhan nagykövet Mindszentynek átadandó levelének szövegét, cf. 212. sz. Szükség esetén szóban közölheti a bíborossal, hogy a nagykövet, mint az Elnök személyes képviselőjének levele, kötelező ígéretet tartalmaz az amerikai kormány részéről.

SECRET STATE 153952

EXDIS

SUBJ: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY

REF: BUDAPEST 1563

APPROVE TEXT OF LETTER FROM AMBASSADOR TO CARDINAL MINDSZENTY PER REFTTEL. IF NECESSARY AMBASSADOR ALSO AUTHORIZED TO STATE ORALLY TO CARDINAL THAT LETTER FROM AMBASSADOR AS PRESIDENTS' PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE IS AS BINDING A COMMITMENT FROM USG AS WE CAN PROVIDE.

JOHNSON

augusztus 23, hétfő

219. BPB0501[161], BPB0606[0400] – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: Amembassy Vienna, 1 p.

Puhan nagykövet az orvost kéri a közeli napokban, Mindszenty bíboros lábfájásának kezelésére.

FOR DR. MC INTYRE ONLY

Cardinal appears to be having problems with his left foot, which you will recall, was seriously injured during his imprisonment. He complains of continual pain and has obvious difficulty in walking. During conversation Sunday with Emboff, he agreed it would be helpful for you to come to Budapest.

While we do not consider the problem cause for alarm, it would certainly be useful and much appreciated if you could visit us briefly as soon as possible, preferably within next day or so. Please advise.

PUHAN

220. BPB0501[163] – Levél, Puhan Mindszentyhez, 1971, 1 p.

A 212. sz.-ban közölt levél szövege, hivatali másodpéldány.

221. BPB0501[177], BPB0607[0632], EEB1004[329] – Levél, Illing Puhanhoz, 1 p.

Beszámol Mons. Chelivel való ebéd fő tárgyalási pontjairól. Cheli osztja az amerikai véleményt, hogy Mindszenty távozása nem halogatható. A gráci Kleine Zeitung hírének negatív hatása Mindszenty habozására. Nem osztják a véleményt, hogy egyes magyar püspökök lennének emögött. Cheli a következő hetek feladatának tartja kérdés megoldását. Sajnálata a budapesti ÁEH elnöke a jelen időpontot tartotta megfelelőnek saját szabadságolására.

At lunch with me last Friday, Msgr. Cheli reiterated his fears that further delay in moving Cardinal Mindszenty could prove disastrous. Naturally, Cheli was happy to learn that Ambassador Lodge had obtained from Casaroli the Vatican's green light for us to give full assurances to Mindszenty about the delivery of his memoirs, thereby removing one excuse which the Cardinal could use to temporize.

One of Cheli's prime concerns is that word of the present negotiations for Mindszenty's departure may be leaked and reach the Cardinal's ears, perhaps even through a letter from a virtually unknown Hungarian emigré. This, in Cheli's view, would provide sufficient grounds for Mindszenty to justify changing his decision to depart, even in spite of what he assured the Pope.

Article's such as the one in the Graz Kleine Zeitung (reported in Vienna's A-577 dated July 15) are especially worrisome to the Vatican. The hints contained therein of developing pressure among Hungarian bishops to force Mindszenty out would be disconcerting to Mindszenty. Casaroli's Under-Secretary, Msgr. Mario Pio Gaspari, told me the other day that the Kleine Zeitung story is untrue and he seriously doubted that it originated with either Brezanocky (sic!) or Cserhati.

Cheli would like to conclude this delicate affaire within the next few weeks. He seems somewhat annoyed that his counterpart in the Hungarian office for religious affairs had chosen the present moment to take his holidays. Hopefully the Hungarians are as aware of the importance of timing as is Cheli.

With best wishes.

Very sincerely,
Robert F. Illing [signed]
Assistant to Ambassador Lodge

augusztus 24, kedd

222. BPB0501[165] – Memorandum, Clem Scerback, 1 p.

Mindszenty 9 óra 15-kor sürgeti a választ, elment-e biztosíték-kérő távirata az Elnökhöz. Még a tíz órás megbeszélés előtt szeretné tudni a választ. Scerback kommentárjában feltűnőnek tartja, hogy a bíboros úgy gondolja, hogy a fontos emberekkel – így az Elnökkel – való kapcsolat -tartása neki volna fenntartva, mások beleavatkozása nélkül.

MINDSZENTY GOES ON AND ON

Cardinal sought me out at 0915 and said that he does not feel qualified, or prepared, to talk at 1000 without a specific piece of information – did his letter go or did it not *and is there an answer?* He wanted me to try to find this out somehow before he went into his meeting.

I explained to him that it would be extremely difficult for me to try to determine this, or to ask as much from the Ambassador. He accepted this, but wondered then whether there was any use in talking at all.

I said that the only thing I could say that might shed light on the substance of the talks that perhaps "some new information had arrived." He chewed on this a while, but then said it still did not answer his question.

I suggested that he simply go to the meeting and see what develops. He said, after some reflection, that he would, and would also raise the question of his letter.

COMMENT: The Cardinal seems to me to feel that his communications with important people – particularly in this case the President – are privileged and not subject to interference by anyone. He has not said so, but he has come pretty close to saying just this.

Clem

augusztus 25, szerda

223. BPB0501[166–169], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [121–122], RMNNSFB693 – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: SecState, Amembassy Rome, 4 pp.

Puhan nagykövet aug. 24-i negyven perces találkozása Mindszenty bíborossal. Mindszenty elfogadta tőle az írásos biztosítékvállalást, hiányolva, hogy nem az Elnök írta alá. Meg fogja gondolni a helyzetet és adott esetben tovább marad. A fájós lábra a bécsi doktort várják. A Vatikán intézkedése sürgősebb, mint valaha.

Puhan részletesen leírja ezt a találkozását saját emlékirataiban. A bíboros nem akart helyet foglalni, hogy így tiltakozzék az Elnök hiányzó válasza miatt. Puhan szerint a történelemben először fordult elő, hogy egy bíboros egy nagykövet hívös, de határozott felszólítására végül is meg gondolta magát és helyet foglalt.⁵

5 PUHAN, A., *i. m.*, 207 sk. „Our meeting took place in the conference room and lasted forty minutes. The cardinal, in a high state of dudgeon, drew himself up to his full height and said he would refuse to sit down because he had received no reply to his telegram to the president about his memoirs. When I suggested, calmly but firmly, to him that this was precisely why I had asked him to meet with me and asked him to sit down, he hesitated but then took a chair, probably the only time in history that a cardinal has been told by an ambassador in no uncertain terms to sit down!”

BUDAPEST 1608

EXDIS

SUBJECT: Cardinal Mindszenty

REF: State 153952

1. SUMMARY: Ambassador met forty minutes with Cardinal Mindszenty August 24. Cardinal accepted letter signed by Ambassador guaranteeing safe delivery his memoirs in Vienna but obviously disappointed letter did not come from White House. He will contemplate letter and, if past practice offers clue, will devise other arguments to prolong his stay here. Note however that Cardinal is ailing and Ambassador has asked Vienna-based doctor to examine Cardinal's foot which pains him badly. Would seem that a Vatican move now more urgent than ever.

END SUMMARY.

2. I spoke in private with Cardinal Mindszenty for forty minutes August 24. Before I could even inquire about his health, he informed me in some agitation that he refused to sit down because he had received no reply to his letter to [./] the President about his memoirs. I replied that this precisely was the reason I wanted to speak to him. Then I reviewed the role his memoirs have played in negotiations with Monsignori Cheli and Zagon. I reminded the Cardinal of our recently expressed willingness to explore with him means for conveying his memoirs and other possessions to Vienna. It was only after we expressed our readiness to assist him in this regard, I recalled, that he asked us to send a telegram asking for President Nixon's personal guarantee that the memoirs and possessions would be delivered either to the Cardinal or to his designated representative. The Cardinal's wish had been communicated to the Government of the United States, I said, where it had received most sympathetic consideration. I was now in a position to give him the USG response, I said, handing him the letter. Because he had some difficulty in reading it, I slowly read it for him.

3. The Cardinal said naturally he would have been more pleased to get a letter signed by President Nixon. He next turned quickly to a request made over a year ago, that his [./] memoirs be turned over to Monsignor Szabo in Vienna. With great bitterness he said he had received no reply, which was an offense to a Cardinal of the Roman Catholic Church. I countered by telling him that his memory appeared at fault, since he had in fact received an oral reply, both from an Embassy officer and from myself, to the effect that his memoirs could not be turned over to his representative outside Hungary so long as the Cardinal remained here in our Embassy. I reiterated that the situation now had changed. Since he had made known

his decision to the Pope to depart the Embassy and Hungary, we therefore were able to guarantee safe delivery of his memoirs to him in Vienna. I noted the method he had appeared to prefer, that is, that they be carried out by officers of the Embassy, was not the only solution. The possibility existed of using our classified pouch, or we could await his departure and deliver the memoirs into his own hands after his arrival in Vienna.

4. While the Cardinal accepted my letter, he appeared to think that the value of a Presidential letter in his memoirs [./.] would be greater than that of an American Ambassador.

5. COMMENT: (A) The Cardinal will now mull over the letter and, if he follows past procedure, think of new obstacles to his departure.

(B) His health has deteriorated in recent days. In fact, I have asked Dr. McIntyre, the Regional Medical Officer from Vienna, to come in and look at his foot, which is causing him a great deal of difficulty.

(C) It seems to me that this makes a move by the Vatican even more urgent.

PUHAN

224. BPB0501[170], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [119], RMNNSFB693 – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: SecState, 1 p.

McIntyre kezelte a bíboros fájós lábát.

Budapest 1627

EXDIS

REF: Budapest 1608

SUBJECT: Cardinal's health

Dr. McIntyre who examined Cardinal early August 25 concludes transient history echymosis of left foot further aggravated by recent sprain. Probable bony changes and arthritis left ankle can only be confirmed by Xray. For now, McIntyre recommends only hot soaks, appropriate bandaging and has prescribed oral medication to alleviate pain. Full report being pouched.

PUHAN

225. BPB0501[172–173] – Orvosi diagnózis, 2 pp.

Chief Complaint: painful left foot

Present History:

The history of the complaint goes back at least 15 years, for the left foot and ankle were injured during imprisonment prior to the Cardinal's seeking asylum in the Embassy. The left ankle has been larger than the right ever since this time and the left foot larger than the right.

On August 1 His Eminence asked for a cane to help him walk. This I learned from Mr. Scerback, so the cause of trouble is not necessarily due to a fall on August 14 which the patient describes as the basis of his symptoms. On that date he fell on leaving his shower, slipping on the wet floor and injuring the foot. There was blood subcutaneously following the accident about the base of the left toes over the distal metatarsal heads. He had great difficulty and pain at mass the next day but felt compelled to hold the mass and wear his slippers that day in spite of much pain and a swollen foot. He does not wear the left slipper now because of the swelling. A week or more after the fall the left knee was briefly painful but is back to normal.

Physical Examination:

The left ankle is large. The bones of the left ankle appear larger than the right above pitting edema medially around and below the medial malleolus. The medial malleolus has its proper relation to the external malleolus, comparing accurately to the malleoli on the opposite foot. The foot is flat with loss of the longitudinal arch. There is no pain on flexion-extension of the left foot at the ankle although slight limitation of this movement appears to be present. The limitation is not due to pain on passive movement but the patient has pain on standing on his toes or trying to walk on his toes. There is no pain or tenderness about the soleus and gastrocnemius muscles. There is no point tenderness to marked pressure over any of the phalanges or metatarsals but the left foot is slightly pink as compared to the right and touching the foot to the cheek reveals an increased skin temperature on the left although this is not perceptible to the hand.

The anterior tibial arteries are palpable and correspond to the radial pulse of 76. The right posterior tibial is weakly palpable but the left posterior tibial could not be palpated. [/.]

Conclusion:

There are probably bony changes and arthritis of the left ankle. Wrays are required to confirm this. There is no evidence of recent fracture but a sprain seems evident from the pain following injury with a history of transient echymosis in the foot. Circulatory disturbance is evident as edema

but I do not believe thromphlebitis exists. Such disturbance results from injury on August 14 and from the old injuries. The left knee pain resulted from favoring the left foot and consequent stresses to the knee. My provisional diagnoses are:

Arthritis, post-traumatic, left ankle
Pes plannus
Sprain, left foot

Rx:

Hot soaks for 10-15 minutes frequently to left foot
Niacin 50 mg 3 times a day
Ace bandage to left foot during the day, applies in morning when arising.
Elevation of foot when reading, sitting, etc.
Dr. McIntyre [signed]

augusztus 26, csütörtök

226. BPB0501[171], EEB1004[339–341] – Levél, Puhán Bakerhez, 1 p.

Puhan megküldi Bakernek McIntyre diagnózisát. Helyi kezelés elegendőnek tűnik.

Enclosed is Dr. McIntyre's report following his examination of the Cardinal on August 25 (see Budapest's 1627). Hopefully, the symptoms will disappear with the local treatment he prescribed. If not, let us hope that events may move quickly enough to make it possible for the Cardinal to get proper medical treatment outside Hungary.

Sincerely yours,
Alfred Puhán [not signed]
Ambassador

Enclosure

1971. SZEPTEMBER

Szeptember hónapra 51 dokumentum található. A nagykövet részéről türelmetlenség tapasztalható, de a nyári uborkaszezon végéhez közeledtével megmozdulnak a tárgyaló felek. Puhan nagykövet megkap minden felhatalmazást és a végén Chelivel és Zágonnal együtt intézi a részleteket. Mindszenty, aki be akarja fejezni emlékiratait a kiutazás előtt, az ismételt, Zágon által személyesen hozott bíboros államtitkári levélre sem képes dönteni, három délelőtti folytatott megbeszélés után, egy álmatlan éjszakát követően, szeptember 16-án.⁶ Zágon előbb a nagykövet irodájából hívja fel Casarolit, majd Bécsbe távozik és egy pápai távirattal érkezik vissza, amelyre Mindszenty végre igent mond. Mind a magyar kormány, mind az amerikai kormány kész külön repülőgépet rendelkezésre bocsátani. Mindszenty nem fogadja el a magyar ajánlatot – az amerikai ajánlatról láthatóan nem tájékoztatják –, és a bécsi nuncius kocsiján távozik Schwechatra, onnan Alitalia menetrendszerű géppel Rómába. Mindszenty személyes holmiját Nolton konzul viszi ki diplomáciai csomagban Bécsbe, és a nunciaturán hagyja letétben.

A szeptember 9-én történt vatikáni–magyar megállapodásról nem esik szó, csak annyi, hogy aznap reggel Puhan nagykövet találkozott Chelivel a Duna Intercontinentalban, amelyen Cheli közölte, hogy a megállapodás küszöbön áll és a kiutazás részleteinek végül is megvalósult változatról beszélt. Zágonnak személyesen Mindszenty mellett kellett maradnia, egészen a kiutazásig. Mindszenty bíboros, kiutazása előtt egy nappal, szeptember 27-én, Puhan nagykövetnek megköszönte a menedéket.

⁶ Puhan nagykövet emlékirataiban is foglalkozik ezzel a fordulattal. A szemtanú így emlékezett rá: „Zagon came into my office, threw up his hands and said, »He has knocked over everything.« Obviously worn out from the negotiations with the cardinal and weary of the whole affair, he said he would ask to be relieved of his mission. He said he could not continue. He felt it was a hopeless task. I suggested to him that he telephone the Vatican from my office in order to inform his chiefs regarding the turn of events. He hesitated for a moment, but then permitted me to put the call through. After a brief conversation in Italian, he was told to proceed to Vienna and get in touch with the Vatican again. I concluded that the only chance the Vatican now had lay in a renewed plea by the pope himself. Somewhat to our amazement, Monsignor Zagon was back on September 18. He had new instructions from the Vatican. Zagon told me he was to stay until the cardinal had left the embassy.”, in: PUHAN, A, *i. m.*, 211.

Szeptember 28-án több táviratban értesítik egymást a budapesti, bécsi és római nagykövetségek a nap eseményeiről, Mindszenty utazásának egyes állomásairól. A hosszú és részletes sajtóanyagból kiemeltük azt a mondatot, hogy ez egy abnormális helyzet volt. („It was an abnormal situation”, cf. 274. sz.) Utolsó, 277. sz. dokumentumunk a washingtoni gratuláló levél, az amerikai külügy elégedett az eseményekkel és a megvalósítás módjával kapcsolatosan.

szeptember 1, szerda

227. BPB0501[174], EEB1004[326] – Levél, Puhan nagykövet Wilgishez, 1 p.

Mellékeli Robert F. Illingnek, Lodge (Róma, US nagykövet) helyettesének küldött levelének másolatát.

Herbert E. Wilgis, Jr., Esquire
EUR/CHP
Department of State
Washington, D.C.

I enclose for your private information the letter I received from Robert F. Illing, the Assistant to Ambassador Lodge. You will see from my reply, copy of which is also enclosed, that I exercised admirable restraint!

With kindest regards,

Sincerely,
Alfred Puhan [not signed]
Ambassador

228. BPB0501[175–176], EEB1004[327–328] – Levél, Puhan nagykövet Illinghez, Rómába, 2 pp.

Hivatkozik Illing augusztus 23-i levelére (221. sz.), örül annak, hogy Mons. Cheli sürgeti a Vatikán intézkedését, amely két hónapja esedékes. Sürgeti a régvárt és ígért levelet a Vatikáni Államtitkárságról, amelyben Mindszentyt a szeptemberi püspöki szinódusra invitálják. Humanitárius szempontra is hivatkozik, mert Mindszenty, döntése óta megváltozott, még mindig habozik. Beszámol egészségi állapotáról, félő, hogy kórházi kezelésre szorul, amelyet a nagykövetség nem tud biztosítani. Félő az is, hogy Mindszenty ki akar sétálni. Történelmi pillanat ez, amelyben fennáll annak lehetősége, hogy eltávozik Budapestről. Ez a pillanat nem tér vissza, ha most elvétik.

Thank you for your letter of August 23. I am glad to learn that Monsignor Cheli would like to conclude the Mindszenty affair within the next few weeks.

At the same time, I am somewhat dismayed to read that Monsignor Cheli, nearly two months after his stay in Budapest, is now apprehensive about leaks in the Mindszenty case and the effect that may have on the Cardinal. I pointed out the very same dangers to Monsignor Cheli and Zagon when they were here and urged speed in proceeding with the entire matter. There is also a very important human consideration: Cheli and Zagon, the later in particular, succeeded in having Cardinal Mindszenty declare his decision to the Pope that he would leave the U.S. Embassy and Budapest. This was a terrific wrench for him which has bothered him ever since he made the decision. You have noticed from our reporting how it has affected his outlook, his attitude toward the staff here in the Embassy and his attitude indeed toward me.

I understand, of course, that the Vatican is undoubtedly trying to extract certain concessions from the Hungarians affecting their relationship with the GOH in return for Mindszenty's departure. I am amazed, however, that nothing has come from the Vatican in two months for the Cardinal to maintain the momentum which is so important. It seems to me that the promised letter from the Secretary of State of the Vatican, asking Mindszenty to appear for the September Synod in Rome, is long over-due. [./] Two new factors have emerged since Mindszenty made his decision to leave which have a bearing on this case. The first is an ailment the Cardinal developed which led me to call in Dr. McIntyre from Vienna. While this does not seem to be dangerous, it is indicative of the kind of thing we can expect from here on in, given the fact that the man is nearly 80 years old. I have made it clear that we are unable to give him hospital treatment in the Embassy.

The second new factor is a hint that Mindszenty might walk out. Indeed, he told one of the Embassy officers that if he had not given a binding commitment to the Pope to leave Budapest, he might just walk into Kadar's arms. Again, I don't believe he will do this but should he, the action would not be useful, either in terms of our relations with the Hungarians or the relations between the Vatican and the Hungarians.

All of this points up the need for speedy action on the part of the Vatican. The Cardinal is a responsibility of the Vatican and it should move. We have reached a historic moment where the opportunity exists to get him out of Budapest. It probably will not come again if we fail.

I thank you for keeping me informed. With kind wishes,

Sincerely yours,
Alfred Puhan [not signed]
Ambassador

229. BPB0501[178], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [110] – Távirat, Amembassy Rome küldi: SecState, Amembassy Budapest, 1 p.

Szeptember 2-án Mons. Casaroli említette Illingnek, hogy szeptember 5-én Cheli egyedül indul Budapestre, a magyar kormánnyal tárgyalni. Mint korábban jelezték, legnagyobb megoldatlan probléma az esztergomi apostoli kormányzó személyének kiválasztása. Casaroli nem tartotta valószínűnek, hogy Cheli meglátogatná Mindszentyt, de lehet, hogy tiszteletét teszi a nagykövetségen.

SECRET ROME 5549

EXDIS

SUBJ: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY

1. WHILE DISCUSSING OTHER SUBJECT WITH ILLING SEPT 2, CASAROLI MENTIONED THAT CHELI TRAVELLING ALONE TO BUDAPEST SEPT 5 FOR DISCUSSION WITH GOH ON MINDSZENTY. AS REPORTED PREVIOUSLY MAIN UNRESOLVED PROBLEM IS SELECTION NEW APOSTOLIC ADMINISTRATOR FOR ESZTERGOM DIOCESE. CHELI WILL STRESS TO HUNGARIANS URGENCY OF CONCLUDING NEGOTIATIONS SOONEST.

2. CASAROLI DOUBTED THAT CHELI EXPECTS TO SEE MINDSZENTY. HOWEVER HE MAY VISIT EMBASSY. MARTIN

230. BPB0501[184–185], EEB1004[332, 333–334] – Levél, Baker washingtoni osztályvezető Puhan nagykövethoz, 2 pp.

Egy hetes távollétről visszatérve elsőként neki válaszol augusztus 19-i levelére (216. sz.). Oszítja véleményét a bíboros szellemi és fizikai állapotával kapcsolatban. Biztatja, hogy továbbra is legyenek szívélyes házilagazdák, nehogy a bíboros valami irracionálisat tegyen és utólag az amerikai kormányt hibáztassa. Konstatálja, hogy a bíboros megkapta Pu -

han garancia-levelét, s felkérték a római nagykövetséget, hogy érdelődjön a Vatikán következő lépése felől. Jelzi, hogy értik a sürgető szavakat és reméli, hogy a következő hetekben eredményre jutnak.

Your letter of August 19 arrived while I was on leave for a week, and I hasten to reply to it on this, my first day in the office.

I share your concern over the mental and physical state of the Cardinal and, like you, hope that the Vatican will move quickly so that the chance that he will do something irrational is reduced to the absolute minimum. As you know better than I, the worst situation for us which could arise is one in which he feels that he is not welcome to remain in the Embassy as long as he likes and then takes his unhappiness out on the USG. We have to rely on you and your staff to continue doing what you have done so well over the years: making HE feel welcome and at home. I suppose that given his nature we must anticipate some public flak from him once he has left the Embassy, but I am sure that you will agree that it is to everybody's advantage to keep this to a minimum.

As of right now the two action points facing the Department have been taken care of: HE has the letter from you guaranteeing the transmittal of his memoirs and their delivery to him and Embassy Rome has been asked to approach the Vatican to ascertain what it intends to do next. We will continue to try to get you instructions quickly as the need arises. [./.] The need for urgency comes through quite clearly in your messages. We will try, and I hope succeed, to meet this need in the coming weeks.

With best regards.

Sincerely yours,

John A. Baker, Jr. [signed]

szeptember 2, csütörtök

231. BPB0501[179], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [112–113] – Távirat, Sec State küldi: Amembassy Rome, Budapest, 1 p.

Római nagykövetség, hivatkozva 244. sz. dokumentumra, kérte, hogy tudathassa a Vatikánnal Puhan nagykövet megfontolását a bíboros egészségi állapotát illetően, ill. Puhan nagykövet biztosítékvállalását az emlékiratok szállításával kapcsolatosan. Tudatában vannak a történelmi pillanat fontosságának.

SECRET STATE 162243
EXDIS
SUBJ: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY
REF: STATE 153868, BUDAPEST 1608

1. IN CARRYING OUT APPROACH ENVISIONED IN STATE 153868, EMBASSY REQUESTED TO CONVEY TO VATICAN AMBASSADOR PUHAN'S CONCERN OVER PHYSICAL STATE OF CARDINAL AS PER PARA 5 B OF BUDAPEST 1608. EMBASSY SHOULD ADD THAT AMBASSADOR PUHAN, ON HANDING CARDINAL AGREED LETTER GU[A]RANTEERING DELIVERY OF MEMOIRS, FOUND CARDINAL AT PRESENT IN VERY UNHAPPY STATE OF MIND STEMMING FROM HIS CONTINUED RESISTANCE TO IDEA OF LEAVING HUNGARY. AMBASSADOR PUHAN HAS, IN ADDITION, CONVEYED TO US HIS CONCERN THAT CARDINAL IN PRESENT STATE OF MIND EVEN CONSIDERING WALK-OUT.

2. IN LIGHT AMBASSADOR PUHAN'S REPORTS RECOMMEND THAT, IN MAKING INQUIRY SUGGESTED IN STATE 153868, EMBASSY OBSERVE THAT, NOW THAT CARDINAL HAS MADE DECISION TO LEAVE HUNGARY, IT IS IN BEST INTEREST OF ALL CONCERNED THAT M[O]MENTUM NOT BE LOST.
ROGERS

szeptember 3, péntek

232. BPB0501[180], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [108] – Távirat, Amembassy Rome küldi: SecState, Amembassy Budapest, 1 p.

Szeptember 3-án Casarolival közölték az 231. sz. dokumentumban megjelölt pontokat. Casaroli értékelte ezeket és rögtön informálta Chelit. Megegyezték, hogy Cheli közvetlenül Puhán nagykövettel intézi a részleteket.

SECRET ROME 5561
EXDIS
SUBJECT: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY
REF: A. STATE 153868

B. STATE 162243
C. BUDAPEST 1608
D. ROME 5549

1. DCM CONVEYED TO ARCHBISHOP CASAROLI SEPTEMBER 3 AMBASSADOR PUHAN'S CONCERN OVER CARDINAL'S PSYCHICAL AND MENTAL STATE AND OVER CARDINAL'S CONSTANT SEARCH FOR NEW OBSTACLE TO HIS DEPART... WE STRESSED URGENT NEED TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM AND SUGGESTED THAT MONSIGNOR CHELI (REF D) MIGHT FIND IT USEFUL TO SEE THE CARDINAL DURING HIS VISIT TO BUDAPEST.

2. CASAROLI APPRECIATED THIS INFORMATION WHICH HE SAID HE WOULD IMMEDIATELY PASS ON TO CHELI. IT WAS AGREED THAT CHELI WOULD GET INTOUCH DIRECTLY WITH AMBASSADOR PUHAN TO DECIDE BEST COURSE OF ACTION VIS-À-VIS CARDINAL.

MARTIN

BP

szeptember 4, szombat

233. BPB0501[181–182], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [106] – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: SecState, Amembassy Rome, 2 pp.

Blount US posta-főigazgató és Puhan nagykövet jelenlétében Péter János külügyminiszter megjegyezte, hogy az amerikai-magyar kapcsolatok szerencsés fordulatot vehetnek, ha az amerikai nagykövetség régi vendége eltávozik. Tudomása volt Cheli jöveteléről. Kétszer is elmondta, hogy a magyar kormány együtt fog működni a Vatikánnal, Mindszenty bíboros távozását illetően. Mintegy tréfásan fölvetette, hogy a bíborost az amerikai nagykövet és Nagy külügyminiszter helyettes együtt kísérje el Ausztriába. Az esztergomi apostoli adminisztrátor személyét illetően kijelentette, hogy Róma nem diktálhat a magyar kormánynak ez ügyben.

Puhan nagykövet hangsúlyozta, hogy ez nem az ő vagy az amerikai kormány illetékessége, hanem a magyar kormányé és a Vatikáné. Megismételte korábbi közlését, hogy a bíboros olyan életkorba jutott, amelyben szükséges a közvetlen jövőben való távozására gondolni. A külügyminiszter osztotta a véleményt, hogy Budapesten maradása nem kívánatos és esetleges halála az amerikai követségen nem lenne senkinek sem előnyére.

BUDAPEST 1706

SUBJECT: FonMin Peter on Cardinal Mindszenty

1. In a meeting with Postmaster General Blount and the Ambassador, Foreign Minister Peter remarked that the future of US–Hungarian relations would take a turn for the better as soon as the long time guest in the American Embassy had departed. He said he was aware of Cheli’s coming on the fifth. He said twice that the Government of Hungary would be most cooperative with the representatives of the Vatican in arriving at an agreement on the departure of Cardinal Mindszenty. In fact, in a somewhat more jocular tone, he suggested that the American Ambassador and the Deputy FonMin, Mr. Nagy, take the Cardinal out to Austria. However, he made it clear that the Hungarians were going to be stubborn on the appointment of an Apostolic Administrator in Esztergom. He said that Rome could not dictate to the Government of Hungary who that person should be and any [./] efforts in this direction would only breed trouble later.

2. The Ambassador pointed out that this was, of course, no concern of his or that of the USG, but one for the Hungarians and the Vatican to work out. He just wished to repeat what he had said before, namely that the Cardinal was reaching an age where his departure ought to be arranged in the very near future. The FonMin agreed that his staying on in Budapest was not desirable not would his death in the American Embassy benefit anybody.

PUHAN

234. BPB0501[183] – Memorandum, Clem Scerback a Nagykövetnek, **s. d.**, 1 p.

Scerback jelzi, hogy a bíboros úgy viselkedik, mint aki távozik, ha nem holnap, a közeljövőben. Hogy melyik módját választja a távozásnak, az más kérdés, lehet, hogy halálát várja. Javasolja, hogy továbbra is jelez - zék neki: könyvét hamarabb be tudja fejezni, ha elmegy.

Just a word on the Cardinal:

I would describe him as being in a “winding up his affairs” stage.

He acts, talks and sounds like a man getting ready to leave here – maybe not tomorrow, but in the near future. How he leaves is something else... he may even foresee his own death, for all I know.

All the more reason, I think, to keep insisting to him that his book better can be completed outside than inside Hungary.

szeptember 7, kedd

235. BPB0501[209–210], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [104–105], XR BG Budapest – Memorandum, 2 pp.

Lodge washingtoni látogatása alkalmából tartott megbeszélésen egyeztetik az információkat és a feladatokat Mindszenty távozása ügyében.

SUBJECT: Cardinal Mindszenty

PARCITIPANTS: Ambassador Lodge

Assistant Secretary Hillenbrand, EUR

Mr. Beaudry, EUR/AIS

Mr. Wilgis, EUR/CHP

COPIES TO: EUR Amembassy ROME
UER/CHP Amembassy BUDAPEST (ez utóbbi példánya)

Mr. Hillenbrand briefed Ambassador Lodge about the current status of the Mindszenty case. Specifically, he told Lodge that Ambassador Puhan is concerned about the physical condition and state of mind of the Cardinal. Physically, he has recently suffered an injury to his foot which is causing him discomfort. Psychologically, he seems to be looking for excuses not to leave the Embassy. The source of his uneasiness probably lies in disagreement with the Vatican over the disposition of his memoirs and over the desirability of his leaving the Embassy, as well as the reluctance of an old man to leave familiar surroundings. In view of the Cardinal's state of mind, it is important that we impress on the Vatican the need to maintain momentum in this matter. If the Cardinal does not leave the Embassy at this time, we may not have another opportunity to resolve the question of his residence in the Embassy and he might remain in the Embassy until his death.

Mr. Hillenbrand said that Cheli is presently in Budapest for negotiations with the Hungarian Government. The chief obstacle to agreement is the question of naming the Apostolic Administrator [./.] for the See of Esztergom. Whether or not Cheli will be successful should be known by the end of this week.

Ambassador Lodge agreed with Mr. Hillenbrand and said he would approach the Vatican in the spirit of the conversation upon his return to Rome in mid-October, if the matter is not resolved by them.

szeptember 9, csütörtök

236. BPB0501[186–187], BPB0606[0395], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [101–102], RMNNSFB693 – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: SecState, Amembassy Rome, Vienna, 2 pp.

Puhan nagykövet találkozott Mons. Chelivel a Duna Intercontinental Hotelben. Cheli beszámolt arról, hogy a magyar kormányval való megállapodás küszöbön áll. Mindszenty távozására szeptember vége előtti időpontot tart szerencsésnek, hogy jelen lehessen október 1-jén Rómában, a püspöki szinódus megnyitásán. Mons. Zágon Budapestre jönne a követ -kező héten. A bíboros a bécsi nuncius autóján távozna Ferihegyre. Puhan ellenvetésére Cheli beleegyezett, hogy akkor Bécs repülőtérén szállna gépre. A magyar fél beleegyezett, hogy a bíboros az emlékiratok írásához szűk -sleges könyveket továbbra is megkaphatja Budapestről.

Budapest 1728

EXDIS

SUBJECT: Cardinal Mindszenty

1. I met with Monsignor Cheli this morning at his request in the lobby of the Duna Intercontinental Hotel. Cheli told me agreement reached with GOH on all counts. Said that GOH had cooperated fully including agreement on matters of interest to Vatican such as appointment of Apostolic Administrator to Esztergom.

2. Cheli said Vatican and GOH would like to have Cardinal out of Hungary before the end of September. Synod to be held October 1 and Pope wants to meet with the Cardinal prior to convening of the Synod. Plan proposed by Cheli is to have Monsignor Zagon come to Budapest next week, time of arrival to be communicated to Embassy Budapest either via Embassy Rome or Embassy Vienna, with letter from Cardinal Villot, asking Cardinal Mindszenty to meet with the Pope in Rome at a specific date prior to October 1. GOH and Vatican [./.] would prefer to see Cardinal leave by special plane which GOH prepared to place at his disposal. Trip to Ferihegy airport would be made in Papal Nuncio car from Vienna. I suggested possible difficulty with this proposal, since Cardinal may refuse to fly. Cheli said in that case they would drive him out to Vienna.

3. I mentioned to Cheli Cardinal's latest obstacle to departure, namely inability to get books he needed for completion of his memoirs. Cheli said GOH had promised him that any books Cardinal wished after he left Budapest they would be glad to supply him.

4. We discussed briefly advisability of preparing Cardinal for Zagon visit and agreed that upon receipt of time of arrival I would inform Cardinal. Cheli hoped part of the memoirs might be gotten out of the country before long.

PUHAN

szeptember 13, hétfő

237. BPB0501[188], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [99] – Távirat, Amembassy Rome küldi: SecState, Amembassy Budapest, 1 p.

Mons. Zágon érkezéséről: szeptember 13.

SECRET ROME 5752

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY

REF: BUDAPEST 1728

MSGR. ZAGON FLYING DIRECTLY ROME-BUDAPEST SEPT. 13.
MARTIN

238. BPB0501[189–190], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [60–61, 96–97 (2x)] – Távirat, Amembassy Rome küldi: SecState, Amembassy Budapest, 2 pp.

Mons. Casaroli tájékoztatta Illinget, remélte, Zágon rögzíti az idő - pontot Mindszenty bíborossal, akinek Rómába érkezését szeptember 28 előtt tartaná kívánatosnak. Remélte azt is, hogy Mindszenty néhány hetet a Vatikánban marad, mielőtt Bécsbe távozik. Zágon feladata, hogy foglal - kozzék a Pázmáneum részleteivel, amennyiben Mindszenty ott óhajtana letele - pedni.

A magyar kormány felajánlott vagy különrepülőgépet, vagy a MALÉV-járat egész első osztályát. A Vatikán a második változatot válasz - totta. Zágon nem optimista, hogy Mindszenty ezt elfogadná. Alternatíva a kocsi Bécsbe, így Mindszenty látna egy darabot hazájából és drámaibb módon léphetné át a határt.

Casaroli érdeklődött, hogy az amerikai kormány esetleg tudna-e repülőgépet biztosítani, ha Mindszenty visszautasítaná a magyar gépet. Casaroli fél, hogy a Bécsbe való kociút, majd a Bécsből való repülőút ki -

*fárasztaná a bíborost, ill. ellenőrizhetetlen lehetőségeket teremtené a sajtó -
val és magánszemélyekkel való találkozásra. Ha nem remélhető, hogy ezt a
magyar kormány engedélyezze, akkor ausztriai felszállással, Bécs közeli
más repülőtérről. Casaroli elmondta, hogy a Vatikán nem gondolkodott
magánrepülő bérléséről, mert így kiszivárogná a hír. Közli a Vatikán és a
magyar kormány által egyeztetett közös nyilatkozat szövegét.*

*Kommentár: Casaroli ismételten hangsúlyozta a vatikáni óhajt,
hogy a bíboros közvetlenül Rómába érkezzen, és ne tartózkodjék hosszab -
ban Bécsben.*

SECRET ROME 5756

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY

REF: BUDAPEST 1728

1. CASAROLI CALLED ILLING TO HIS OFFICE SEPT. 13 TO DISCUSS WHAT HE HOPED WOULD BE FINAL POINTS OF MINDSZENTY DEPARTURE. HIS EXPECTATION IS THAT ZAGON, WHO NOW IN BUDAPEST, WILL BE ABLE TIE CARDINAL DOWN TO SPECIFIC DEPARTURE DATE, USING VILLOT'S LETTER IN POPE'S NAME INVITES MINDSZENTY TO COME DIRECTLY TO ROME FOR MEETING WITH POPE BEFORE SEPT. 30 OPENING OF SYNOD OF BISHOPS. CASAROLI SAID IDEALLY POPE WOULD LIKE TO SEE MINDSZENTY BEFORE SEPT. 28. CASAROLI HOPING MINDSZENTY WILL REMAIN FEW WEEKS IN VATICAN TO REST AND UNWIND BEFORE SETTLING IN VIENNA. ZAGON CHARGED TO ARRANGE WITH PAZMANEUM DETAILS MINDSZENTY'S EVENTUAL RESIDENCE THERE.

2. GOH OFFERED TO PROVIDE OFFICIAL AIRPLANE TO TRANSPORT CARDINAL TO ROME, OR AS ALTERNATIVE GIVE HIM WHOLE FIRST CLASS AREA OF REGULAR BUDAPEST-ROME MALEV FLIGHT. VATICAN CHOSE SECOND POSSIBILITY. CHELI HOPEFUL CARDINAL WILL ACCEPT GOH OFFER, BUT ZAGON NOT SANGUINE. ALTERNATIVE IS AUTOMOBILE TO VIENNA WHICH MAY APPEAL TO MINDSZENTY AS IT WOULD PERMIT HIM TO SEE BIT OF HIS HOMELAND AND ALSO CROSS BORDER IN MORE DRAMATIC MANNER.

3. CASAROLI WISHES TO KNOW IF USG COULD POSSIBLY PROVIDE AIRCRAFT IN CASE MINDSZENTY REFUSES TRAVEL

ON HUNGARIAN PLANE. CASAROLI FEARS DRIVE TO VIENNA AND VIENNA-ROME COMMERCIAL FLIGHT WOULD BE UNDULY FATIGUING FOR CARDINAL AND, MOREOVER, PRESENT UNCONTROLLABLE OPPORTUNITIES FOR CONTACT WITH PRESS AND PUBLIC, SITUATIONS VATICAN WISHES STRENUOUSLY TO AVOID AT THIS POINT. HE REALIZES IF SUG [recte: USG] PROVIDED PLANE LANDING PERMISSION MUST BE SOUGHT FROM GOH. ANOTHER OPTION, CASAROLI CONTINUED, WOULD BE TO PLACE CARDINAL ON USG PLANE FROM VIENNA TO ROME, IF POSSIBLE DEPARTING FROM SECONDARY AIRPORT NEAR VIENNA. IN RESPONSE TO QUERY FROM ILLING, CASAROLI SAID VATICAN HAD NOT CONSIDERED POSSIBILITY OF ITSELF ENGAGING PRIVATE PLANE FOR TRIP. THIS, HE NOTED, WOULD REQUIRE DEALING WITH INDIVIDUALS WHO WOULD PROBABLY LEAK STORY TO PUBLIC. [/.] VATICAN AND GOH HAVE AGREED TO ISSUE WHEN MINDSZENTY HAS DEPARTED COMMUNIQUE ALONG FOLLOWING LINES: QUOTE ON BASIS OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN GOH AND HOLY SEE, CARDINAL MINDSZENTY ON (BLANK) DEPARTED DEFINITELY HUNGARIAN TERRITORY DIRECTLY FOR ROME. UNQUOTE

5. COMMENT: CASAROLI STRESSED REPEATEDLY VATICAN DESIRE THAT CARDINAL COME DIRECTLY TO ROME WITHOUT LAYOVER IN VIENNA.
MARTIN

239. BPB0501[191–192] – Memorandum, a levéltár számára, Puhan, 2 pp.

Puhan nagykövet találkozott Mons. Zágonnal, aki lefordította Villot bíborosnak Mindszentyhez írt levelét. Ebben Villot tudomásul veszi Mindszenty döntését, hogy elhagyja az Amerikai Nagykövetséget és Magyarországot. Jelzi döntésének jóváhagyását. Villot kéri Mindszentyt, hogy szeptember 25 táján érkezék, hogy audienciát kaphasson a pápánál, mielőtt megkezdődik a püspöki szinódus. A levél közli, hogy Zágon felhatalmazást kapott a távozás részleteinek intézésére. Ismét rátérnek az emlékiratok írásához szükséges könyvek problémájára. Zágon szerint ezeket Bécsben el lehet érni, már van készenlétben egy pap, aki utána tud járni. A magyar kormány is ígérte, hogy segít. Az emlékiratok kiszállítását illetően Zágon ígérte, hogy kér egy kötetnyi anyagot a bíborostól és kiviszi magával, hogy demonstrálja neki ennek lehetőségességét. S ez kint fogja megvárni őt.

A nagykövet ezt követően beszámolt az eltelt két hónap eseményeiről, különös tekintettel az elnöki biztosítékokra. Zágon elmondta, hogy azzal is készül érvelni, hogy a nagykövetség elhagyása ténylegesen növelné tekintélyét, erre írásban is felkészült. Ugyanakkor távozásával nem tud előnyöket kilkudni az Egyház számára Magyarországon. Zágon másnap dél előtt 10 órakor találkozik Mindszentyvel, ezt követően beszámol a nagykövetnek.

*

I met with Monsignor Zagon for approximately one hour. Zagon had just arrived, fresh from a conference with Casaroli. He translated for me the letter which he is instructed to deliver to Cardinal Mindszenty from Cardinal Villot. The letter takes note of the Cardinal's decision to leave the American Embassy and Hungary. It indicates approval of this decision. The writer asks the Cardinal to appear in audience with the Pope around September 25, before the Synod convenes. The letter tells the Cardinal that Monsignor Zagon is empowered to work out the modalities of his departure.

I told Monsignor Zagon that the latest obstacle he has raised to his departure is his inability to get various books he claims he needs to complete his memoirs. Zagon said the Vatican was acquainted with this obstacle and was prepared to demonstrate to him that the books were more likely to be available in Vienna where a priest has already been hired to obtain them for him. Moreover, the Hungarian Government had pledged to supply the books the Cardinal wants once he was outside of Hungary.

I raised the conveyance of his memoirs outside of Hungary. Zagon said he would ask the Cardinal for at least one volume so that he might take it out to demonstrate to the Cardinal that it was feasible to get them out and that he would get them after he arrived in Vienna.

I informed Zagon of the Cardinal's moods during the two months since Cheli and Zagon were here together, including the death of his sister, his illness, his petulance regarding his letter to the President. The Cardinal, I added, has now made the claim that I had a letter from the President with me when I presented him my letter. I told Zagon that I did indeed have such a letter but it was my commission of 1969 signed by President Nixon, and I had used it in my meeting with the Cardinal to explain to him that I was the personal representative of the President in this country.

Zagon said he had also given much thought to persuading him that by his action in leaving the Embassy he would in fact raise his reputation.

He read me a two page document of talking points calculated to demonstrate that Cardinal Mindszenty had been unjustly tried and persecuted for his struggle on behalf of the Church. The talking points [./] indicate that there was no way in which Cardinal Mindszenty could obtain a reversal of his judgment here in Hungary and that his departure did not mean that he was less interested in obtaining better status for the Church in Hungary.

Monsignor Zagon has an appointment to see Mindszenty at 10:00 a.m. tomorrow after which he will report to me.

AMB:APuhan/jfl

szeptember 14, kedd

240. BPB0501[193], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [94] – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: SecState, Amembassy Rome, 1 p.

Mindszenty bíborossal tartott közel háromórás megbeszélését követően Mons. Zagon elmondta a nagykövetnek, hogy a bíboros még nem adott végleges választ távozását illetően. Zagon visszautasította Mindszenty azon észrevételét, hogy emlékiratai befejezése érdekében maradnia kell. Mindszenty kételyét fejezte ki afelől, hogy állapota szerint tud-e erre a hosszú útra vállalkozni. Amint várható volt, elutasította a magyar repülőgép gondolatát. Zagon Bécsig kocsitát ígért, majd onnan Rómába repülőutat, amely egy óránál kevésbé tart tovább. Mindszentynek más, a nagykövettel Zagon által nem közölt feltételei is voltak, amelyeket Zagonnak még át kell gondolnia. Zagon meggyőzte a bíborost afelől, hogy nem Casaroli a fő mozgatója az ő Magyarországról való kiutazásának, hanem maga a pápa az, aki ezt kéri. Zagon szerint a helyzet nem reménytelen és folytatja megbeszéléseit Mindszentyvel holnap tíz órakor.

BUDAPEST 1767

EXDIS

SUBJECT: Cardinal Mindszenty

Monsignor Zagon told me after nearly three hours of conversation with Cardinal Mindszenty, latter has not yet given final word on leaving. Zagon reportedly has refuted Mindszenty's objections to leaving on grounds that he must remain here to complete memoirs. Mindszenty expressed doubt re his ability to stand long trip to Rome. As anticipated, he refused to accept

offer of Hungarian plane. Zagon assured him trip to Vienna in car easy and flight from Vienna to Rome little over one hour. Zagon said Mindszenty had raised other conditions which he did not spell out but which Zagon wants to think over. Zagon disabused Mindszenty of the idea that Casaroli chief mover behind scheme to get Mindszenty out of Hungary, and that it was the Pope himself who really wants this done. Zagon guardedly says situation not hopeless and he will continue his talks with Mindszenty tomorrow at 1000.

PUHAN

szeptember 15, szerda

241. BPB0501[194–195], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [92] – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: SecState, Amembassy Rome, 2 pp.

Közel háromórás megbeszélést követően Mindszenty bíboros beleegyezett, hogy a nagykövetséget szeptember 27-én hétfőn elhagyja, de fönntartotta magának a jogot, hogy végső döntését Zágonnal másnap tíz órakor közölje. A távozás részletei, különös tekintettel az emlékiratok kivitelére. Zágon fölveti, hogy a nagykövettel együtt következő héten kivinnék. A nagykövet ezt Washington döntésére bízta, akitől Zágon másnapi távozása előtt vár választ.

BUDAPEST 1775

EXDIS

SUBJECT: Cardinal Mindszenty

1. Following another difficult three hour session, Cardinal Mindszenty has agreed to leave Embassy Monday, September 27, although he reserved right to make what he calls final decision to Zagon tomorrow at 10:00 a.m. Modalities of his departure to be worked out by Zagon in Vienna after his departure here tomorrow. Zagon has suggested to Cardinal he take only necessary effects with him and has asked us to store remaining effects until Cardinal settled outside of Hungary, to which I agreed. Cardinal, according to Zagon, asked if Ambassador personally prepared to carry his memoirs out of Hungary. Zagon said he told the Cardinal he was certain Ambassador would be prepared to carry out what he told him in his letter. Zagon asked if I could travel to Vienna next week, taking memoirs with me and have Zagon accompany me. I said I would inform Department to see if there were any problems [./.] with this.

2. Would appreciate a reply to above question before Zagon's departure tomorrow.

PUHAN

242. BPB0501[196] – Távirat tervezet, s. d., m. s., 1 p.

Közli a távozás várt dátumát és részleteit.

Ref. State 132785

Emb Vienna

Info. Dept.

Info. Rome

Emb[assy] is advised that C[ardinal] M[indszenty] has ... his intentions to depart ... Budapest Hungary. .. Rome on Sept 27. Msg. Zagon ... Vienna today to arrange for modalities, probably Papal Nunciature can take Cardinal to Vienna there by plane to Rome. Emb's assistance not required .. However, Amb. Puhan arriving Vienna in ... can meet Msgr. Zagon on ...

....

szeptember 16, csütörtök

243. BPB0501[197], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [90], RMNNSFB693 – Távirat, SecState küldi: Amembassy Budapest, 1 p.

Washington felhatalmazza Puhan nagykövetet az emlékiratok Bécsbe szállítására, amennyiben a bíboros távozási szándéka realizálásának része.

SECRET STATE 170100

EXDIS

Ref. Budapest 1775

SUBJECT: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY

WITH REGARD TO TRANSPORTATION OF MEMOIRS TO VIENNA, AMBASSADOR HERewith AUTHORIZED TO DO WHATEVER, IN HIS JUDGMENT, NECESSARY ASSIST IN REALIZATION OF CARDINAL'S PLANS FOR DEPARTURE. ROGERS

244. BPB0501[198], BPB0606[0393], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [88], RMN NSFB693 – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: SecState, Amembassy Rome, Vienna, 1 p.

Mindszenty háromnapos megbeszélés végén közölte Zágonnal, hogy egy álmatlan éjszaka után úgy döntött, nem utazhat el szeptember 27-én. Zágon ma délután Bécsbe távozik. Puhan hivatalából Casarolitól új instrukciókat kért. Zágon kapcsolatba akar lépni Bécsben a nagykövetség - gen E. Forddal és J. Mowinckellel, hogy tudósítson visszatérésének lehet - séges időpontjáról.

Kommentár: Mindszenty tovább halasztja távozását. Egyetlen lehetőség rábírni őt a távozásra az, ha a pápa újra felkéri, jöjjön Rómába.

Budapest 1783

EXDIS

SUBJECT: Cardinal Mindszenty

1. Mindszenty told Zagon in final session of three day meeting that after a sleepless night he decided he could not leave by September 27. Zagon leaving for Vienna this afternoon. He asked by telephone from my office for new instructions from Casaroli. Zagon will contact POL Emmett Ford or John Mowinckel US Embassy Vienna to let me know whether or when he is returning to Budapest.

2. COMMENT: Cardinal Mindszenty is resorting to not unexpected tactic of prolonging his departure. Only chance Vatican has of getting him out is for a renewed plea by the Pope to have him come to Rome. Zagon agrees. PUHAN

szeptember 17, péntek

245. BPB0501[199], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [86] – Távirat, Amembassy Vienna küldi: Amembassy Budapest, SecState, Amemb. Rome, 1 p.

Mons. Zágon felhívta Fordot Bécsben, tudatja, hogy holnap, szeptember 18-án érkezik Budapestre.

SECRET Vienna 5822

SUBJECT: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY

REF: BUDAPEST 1783

MONSIGNORE ZAGON CALLED FORD TO SAY THAT HE WOULD RETURN TOMORROW, SEPTEMBER 18, TO BUDAPEST.

HE WILL TELEPHONE AMBASSADOR PUHAN TO MAKE APPOINTMENT. HUMES

246. BPB0501[200–201], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [62–63, 83–84 (2x)] – Távirat, Amembassy Rome küldi: SecState, Amembassy Budapest, 1 p.

Mons. Cheli szept. 17-én értesítette Illinget arról, hogy ma délután VI. Pál pápa személyes táviratot küld Mindszentynek Zágónon keresztül, aki Bécsben várakozik. A táviratban a pápa melegen, de határozottan informálja a bíborost, hogy szeptember 30. előtt várja őt Rómában. Zágón újra kér magyar vízumot és visszatér Budapestre, mihelyt lehetséges. Casaroli, látva, hogy ez az utolsó lehetőség a bíboros Magyarországról való kihozatalára, megbízta Zágont, hogy maradjon Budapesten, míg ez végbe nem megy. Cheli javasolja, hogy Mindszentyvel ne közöljék Zágón vissza - tértének hírért, arra gondolva, hogy jobb, ha elgondolkodik azon, amit tegnap Zágonnak mondott. Cheli továbbá elmondta, hogy Zágonnal együtt azt a következtetést szűrték le a jelenlegi tapasztalatokból, hogy jobb, ha álmatlan éjszakai után egyedül hagyják a bíborost. Ennélfogva Zágón csak akkor keresné fel őt, ha már konzultált az amerikai követséggel, hogy egyeztessék a megfelelő időpontot. Cheli megfigyelése szerint különös, hogy azok, akiket egész életükben az engedelmesség elve vezetett, nehezen tudják megváltoztatni döntésüket. Ezt Zágón kiemelheti a bíboros előtt, ha az kitart újabb elhatározása mellett. Cheli úgy gondolja, hogy a kor és az idegfáradtság magyarázza a bíboros jelenlegi viselkedését. Ezt követően az amerikai repülőgép esetleges küldéséről ír. Cheli nem lát nehézséget abban, hogy kereskedelmi géppel jöjjenek Bécsből, hiszen legtöbben, akik már látták is, nem ismerik fel a bíborost. Kommentár: bár Casaroli kétségkívül teljesen felkészült az amerikai repülőgépet illető negatív válasza, szüksége lenne ennek hivatalos közlésére. Megjegyzés: Miért ne vigyük ki őt kocsin Schwechatba s onnan amerikai repülőgéppel Rómába? cgs.

SECRET Rome 5877

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY

REF: BUDAPEST 1783, ROME 5756

1. MSGR. CHELI INFORMED ILLING SEPT. 17 THAT THIS AFTERNOON POPE PAUL SENDING PERSONAL TELEGRAM TO MINDSZENTY VIA ZAGON WHO AWAITING IT IN VIENNA. IN

TELEGRAM POPE "WARMLY BUT FIRMLY" INFORMS CARDINAL THAT HE EXPECTS HIM IN ROME BEFORE SEPT. 30. ZAGON REQUESTED NEW HUNGARIAN VISA THIS MORNING AND WILL RETURN TO BUDAPEST AS SOON AS ABLE.

2. CASAROLI, REALIZING THAT THIS IS LAST OPPORTUNITY TO GET CARDINAL OUT OF HUNGARY, HAS INSTRUCTED ZAGON TO REMAIN IN BUDAPEST UNTIL MATTER SUCCESSFULLY CONCLUDED. CHELI WILL PROBABLY JOIN HIM SHORTLY. CHELI SUGGESTS THAT MINDSZENTY NOT BE ADVISED THAT ZAGON RETURNING, FEELING IT BETTER TO LET "DIFFICULT OLD MAN" REFLECT ON WHAT HE TOLD ZAGON YESTERDAY. CHELI SAID HE AND ZAGON HAVE LEARNED FROM RECENT EXPERIENCE THAT IT BEST TO LEAVE CARDINAL ALONE WHEN HE HAS EXPERIENCED SLEEPLESS NIGHT. THEREFORE, ZAGON WILL APPROACH HIM ONLY AFTER CONSULTING WITH EMBASSY BUDAPEST TO DETERMINE PROPITIOUS MOMENT.

3. CHELI OBSERVED THAT IT RATHER PECULIAR FOR PERSON WHOSE WHOLE LIFE GUIDED BY PRINCIPLE OF OBEDIENCE TO ATTEMPT REVERSE HIS COMMITMENT, A POINT ZAGON WILL EMPHASIZE TO CARDINAL IF LATTER PROVES INTRANSIGENT. CHELI FEELS AGE AND NERVOUS FATIGUE ONLY REASONABLE EXPLANATIONS FOR CARDINAL'S BEHAVIOR.

4. CHELI ASKED ILLING IF DEPT HAS RESPONDED TO CASAROLI'S REQUEST FOR USG AIRCRAFT. ILLING SAID NO REA[C]TION YET RECEIVED, AND POINTED OUT THAT LANDING OF AIRCRAFT WITH OFFICIAL [./.] MARKING IN BUDAPEST MIGHT POSE DELICATE PROBLEM. CHELI ACKNOWLEDGED THIS DIFFICULTY, AND THEN OPINED THAT SENDING MINDSZENTY COMMERCIALY VIENNA-ROME WOULD NOT BE INSURMOUNTABLE PROBLEM. HE NOTED THAT MOST PEOPLE WOULD NOT RECOGNIZE CARDINAL EVEN IF THEY SAW HIM.

5. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH CASAROLI UNDOUBTEDLY FULLY PREPARED FOR NEGATIVE RESPONSE RE USG AIRCRAFT, NONETHELESS HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE DEFINITIVE ANSWER.

MARTIN

Why not take him by car to Schwechat and from there by USG aircraft to Rome? cgs.

szeptember 18, szombat

247. BPB0501[202–203], BPB0606[0391], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [81] – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: SecState, Amembassy Rome, Vienna, 2 pp.

Zágon közlése szerint Mindszenty nyugodtan fogadta ma reggel 11 órakor a hírt, hogy a pápa a szinódus szeptember 30-i megnyitása előtt látni óhajtja őt. Zágon szerint a bíboros azt mondta: nem lehet engedetlen a pápának, és remélte, hogy a Szentatya megbocsátja neki korábbi kérését, hogy az utat halasszák el. Mindszenty ezt követően azt kérdezte, szeptember 28-a nincs-e túl későn, Zágon azt válaszolta, hogy nincs. Mindszenty rövid pihenőt kért Bécsben a nunciatúrán, a továbbutazás előtt. Majd megkérdezte, hogy a nagykövet hajlandó-e emlékiratait kivinni a bécsi nagykövetségre. Zágon biztosította őt efelől. Zágon Budapesten marad és segít az utazási előkészületekben. Az emlékiratok szeptember 23-án legyenek készen a szállításra. Cheli szeptember 20-án megérkezett, hogy elrendezze a végső részleteket a magyarokkal és az osztrákokkal. Ebben az összefüggésben lehet, hogy megújítja a kérést az amerikai repülőgépet illetően, Bécs–Róma távolságra. Zágon, a nagykövet kérdésére válaszolva, kifejtette, hogy Mindszenty ezek után már nem változtathatja meg álláspontját.

BUDAPEST 1798

EXDIS

SUBJECT: Cardinal Mindszenty

1. Cardinal Mindszenty received news calmly from Zagon this morning at 1100 hours that the Pope insisted on seeing Mindszenty in Rome before the opening of the Holy Synod on September 30. According to Zagon, the Cardinal said he could not be disobedient to the Pope and hoped the Holy Father would forgive him for asking earlier that his trip be delayed.

2. Mindszenty asked if September 28 early enough date and was told by Zagon it was. He also asked if he could have a short rest in Nunciature in Vienna before proceeding to Rome by air. Cardinal also asked if Ambassador was ready to move his memoirs out of Budapest and hold them for him in the Embassy in Vienna. Zagon reassured him on both counts.

3. Zagon remains in Budapest and will help pack Mindszenty's effects. Memoirs to be ready for shipment September 23. [./.] Cheli arrived Monday September 20 to arrange final details with Hungarians and

Austrians. In this connection request for a USG aircraft to fly Mindszenty from Vienna to Rome may be renewed. (I believe it would be a generous gesture though it is not essential.)

4. Zagon, in response to my question, said Cardinal Mindszenty cannot again change his mind.

PUHAN

szeptember 20, hétfő

248. BPB0501[204], BPB0606[0390], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [79], RMNNSFB693 – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest, küldi: Amembassy Vienna, SecState, 1 p.

Puhan jelzi érkezését Bécsbe szeptember 23-án. Felesége és John Nolton konzul fogja kísélni. Találkozni akar Humes nagykövettel és Emmett Forddal a nap folyamán. Az Intercontinental szállodában kér szalmakra helyet foglalni.

BUDAPEST 1802

EXDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR HUMES

SUBJECT: Cardinal Mindszenty

If you have no objection, I shall come to Vienna Thursday, September 23, about noon. Will be accompanied by my wife and Consul John Nolton. Would appreciate meeting with you, DCM and Emmett Ford sometime that day at your convenience to brief you on plans of Cardinal Mindszenty.

Would you please have Embassy reserve one double and one single at Intercontinental for Thursday night.

PUHAN

249. BPB0501[205–206], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [48] – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest, küldi: SecState, Amembassy Rome, 2 pp.

Az amerikai–magyar kapcsolatok javulásáról, a bíboros távozásának függvényében.

BUDAPEST 1820

EXDIS

SUBJECT: Press Release

REF: State 127281 and 135476; Budapest 1321 and 1706

1. Wish to call Department's attention to reiteration of GOH view during PMG Blount's call on Fonmin Peter that departure of Mindszenty will have beneficial effect on US-Hungarian relations. While I appreciate Department's concern that hope expressed by us our relations might improve as result of Cardinal's departure after living here for nearly 15 years could be interpreted as relief at his going, I do not like the idea of gratuitously ruling out a priori the possibility of an improvement as result of Cardinal's departure, especially when one of the parties involved has said such improvement would result. Moreover, in the meantime President Nixon and Hungarian Amb. Szabo have exchanged rather warm remarks, both expressing hope for improvement in US-Hungarian relations.

2. Recommend very strongly therefore that formula proposed in Budapest 1321 on if asked basis be reconsidered in order to put as positive a cast as possible on situation. Suggest [./.] something along following lines: "As The Secretary noted in his Foreign Policy Report last March, there has been considerable improvement over the past year in the atmosphere of our relations with Hungary, to the point where the prospects for resolving some of our long-standing bilateral problems appear better than at any time in many years. We would hope that the prospects for further improvement in our relations will be maintained."

PUHAN

szeptember 21, kedd

250. BPB0501[207], BPB0606[0389], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [66] – Távirat, Amembassy Vienna küldi: Amembassy Budapest, SecState, 1 p.

Humes bécsi nagykövet távolléte miatt sajnos nem tud Puhannal találkozni (cf. 248. sz. dokumentum), felajánlja a bécsi nagykövetség ven - dégházát. Mowinckel és Emmett Ford rendelkezésre áll.

SECRET VIENNA 5879

EXDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR PUHAN

SUBJECT: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY

3. LEAVING VIENNA FOR LONDON AND MOSCOW NOON, SEPTEMBER 23. SORRY TO MISS YOU.

2. SUGGEST YOU AND CONSUL JOHN NOLTON STAY IN GUEST HOUSE AT RESIDENCE.

3. DCM MOWINCKEL AND EMMETT FORD WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR BRIEFING THAT AFTERNOON EITHER AT RESIDENCE OR EMBASSY. HUMES

szeptember 22, szerda

251. BPB0501[212], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [46] – Távirat, Amembassy Rome küldi: SecState, Amembassy Budapest, 1 p.

Mons. Cheli szeptember 25-én várható Budapesten. Megküldi a Vatikán részéről a bíboros távozásának napján 14 órakor kihirdetendő sajtóközlemény szövegét.

SECRET Rome 5996

SUBJECT: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY

REF: ROME 5756

1. MONSIGNOR CHELI ARRIVING BUDAPEST AFTER-NOON SEPT 25. WILL CONTACT EMBASSY.

2. VATICAN HAS PROVIDED FINAL TEXT OF PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT IT WILL MAKE AT 1400 ITALIAN TIME ON DAY CARDINAL LEAVES HUNGARY. TEXT, WHICH CLOSE TO THAT IN REFTEL, IS QUOTE AS A CONSEQUENCE OF AGREEMENTS REACHED BETWEEN THE HOLY SEE AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE HUNGARIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, CARDINAL JOSEPH MINDSZENTY HAS TODAY DEPARTED HUNGARIAN TERRITORY DIRECTLY FOR ROME. UNQUOTE.

3. ASSUME PRESS GUIDANCE CONTAINED STATE 127181, AS MODIFIED IN STATE 135476, STILL APPLIES. MARTIN.

szeptember 23, csütörtök

252. BPB0501[213], BPB0606[0388], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [44] – Távirat, Amembassy Vienna, küldi: SecState, Amembassy Budapest, Rome, 1 p.

Humes nagykövet jelzi, hogy a Mindszenty-émlékiratok 11 órakor a nap folyamán a bécsi nagykövetség épületében elhelyezésre kerültek.

SECRET VIENNA 5963

EXDIS

SUBJECT: MINDSZENTY MEMOIRS

REF: BUDAPEST 1798

MINDSZENTY MEMOIRS DEPOSITED IN SECURE AREA
EMBASSY VIENNA 1100 AM SEPTEMBER 23. HUMES

253. BPB0501[211] – Átvételi elismervény, Embassy of the United States of America, Vienna, 1 p.

A Mindszenty-émlékiratok átvételi elismervénye Emmett B. Ford részéről.

I, the undersigned, Emmett B. Ford, Jr., Foreign Service Officer of the United States of America, acknowledge receipt this date of two locked black suitcases, the property of Joseph, Cardinal Mindszenty.

I understand that I will retain these suitcases in the Embassy until such time as they are delivered to Cardinal Mindszenty or to his duly designated representative after the Cardinal's departure from Hungary.

254. BPB0501[242] – Puhan, menetlevél Mr. John S. Nolton Jr. és az általa vitt diplomáciai posta számára, 1 p.

szeptember 24, péntek

255+256. BPB0501[214–216], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [37–43, 53–59, 70–76 (3x)], RMNNSFB693 – Távirat, SecState küldi: Amembassy Budapest, Rome, Vienna, 3 pp.

Sajttájékoztatási anyag a bíboros távozása esetére, 1. rész.

SECRET SECTION 1 of 2 STATE 176232/1

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY

REF: STATE 11058 AND 127281; BUDAPEST 1310 AND 1321; ROME 4561

1. THIS TELEGRAM CONTAINS PRESS GUIDANCE TO BE USED IN THE EVENT CARDINAL MINDSZENTY DEPARTS EMBASSY BUDAPEST FOR DESTINATION OUTSIDE HUNGARY. THE GUIDANCE GIVEN BELOW GENERALLY CONFORMS TO GUIDANCE ALREADY FORWARDED BY REFTELS BUT SUPERSEDES PREVIOUS GUIDANCE IN CASE OF ANY DIFFERENCES.

2. DEPARTMENT PREFERS THAT INITIAL STATEMENTS CONCERNING DEPARTURE COME FROM VATICAN, HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT OR CARDINAL HIMSELF. WE THEREFORE DO NOT PLAN TO ISSUE PRESS RELEASE OR VOLUNTEER ANY COMMENT UNTIL VATICAN AND GOH HAVE ISSUED JOINT COMMUNIQUE REPORTED IN ROME 5756 AND CARDINAL HAS CROSSED HUNGARIAN BORDER. ALL THREE EMBASSIES ARE INSTRUCTED TO DO THE SAME.

3. IF DEPARTMENT IS QUERIED PRIOR TO CARDINALS' DEPARTURE FROM EMBASSY BUILDING, WE WILL CONFINE OUR COMMENTS TO CONFIRMING DATES OF VISITS BY VATICAN OFFICIALS TO CARDINAL. IF ASKED IF CARDINAL'S FUTURE DISCUSSED DURING THESE VISITS, WE WILL STATE THAT WE ARE NOT AT LIBERTY TO COMMENT ON DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN VATICAN OFFICIALS AND CARDINAL. EMBASSY BUDAPEST AUTHORIZED TO DO SAME.

4. IF DEPARTMENT IS QUERIED AFTER CARDINAL HAS LEFT EMBASSY BUILDING AND PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE FROM HUNGARY, DEPARTMENT WILL CONFIRM FACT THAT CARDINAL HAS DEPARTED EMBASSY. WE WILL NOT SPECULATE ABOUT HIS DESTINATION BUT WILL CONFIRM FACTS

SURROUNDING HIS DEPARTURE (DATE, WHO ACCOMPANIED HIM, MEANS OF DEPARTURE). EMBASSY [./.] BUDAPEST AUTHORIZED TO DO SAME.

5. IF DEPARTMENT IS QUERIED AFTER CARDINAL HAS CROSSED HUNGARIAN BORDER, WE WILL CONFINE OUR STATEMENTS TO THOSE IN PARA 4 UNTIL JOINT COMMUNIQUE HAS BEEN RELEASED BY VATICAN AND GOH. EMBASSY ROME INSTRUCTED TO ASCERTAIN IN ADVANCE, IF POSSIBLE, FROM VATICAN IF THERE IS AN AGREED HOUR FOR ISSUANCE OF COMMUNIQUE. EMBASSIES BUDAPEST, ROME AND VIENNA INSTRUCTED TO INFORM DEPARTMENT AS SOON AS THEY HAVE INFORMATION THAT COMMUNIQUE IS RELEASED.

6. ONCE VATICAN-GOH COMMUNIQUE RELEASED, DEPARTMENT PROPOSES TO REPLY TO INITIAL QUESTION BY MAKING FOLLOWING STATEMENT: QUOTE JOZSEF CARDINAL MINDSZENTY, PRIMATE OF HUNGARY AND ARCHBISHOP OF ESZTERGOM, DEPARTED AMERICAN EMBASSY AT BUDAPEST ON (DATE). CARDINAL MINDSZENTY'S DECISION TO LEAVE THE EMBASSY WAS MADE BY HIM PERSONALLY AFTER HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE HOLY SEE. CARDINAL MINDSZENTY REQUESTED REFUGE IN THE AMERICAN LEGATION AT BUDAPEST ON NOVEMBER 4, 1956. HE WAS GRANTED REFUGE ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS BECAUSE IT APPEARED AT THAT TIME THAT HIS FREEDOM AND LIFE WERE IN IMMINENT JEOPARDY. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IS PLEASED THAT IT WAS ABLE TO ASSIST THE CARDINAL WHEN THE NEED APPEARED URGENT AND PRESSING. WE WISH HIM WELL IN HIS FUTURE SERVICE TO HIS CHURCH. UNQUOTE. ONCE IT IS CLEAR THAT CARDINAL WILL LEAVE EMBASSY BUDAPEST, EMBASSY ROME SHOULD PROVIDE ABOVE TEXT TO VATICAN FOR ITS INFORMATION.

DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN WOULD DRAW ON FOLLOWING GUIDANCE FOR REPLIES TO FURTHER QUESTIONS:

Q: WHY DID THE CARDINAL LEAVE AT THIS TIME?

A: I BELIEVE I ANSWERED THAT IN THE STATEMENT I JUST READ.

Q: DID THE US URGE THE CARDINAL TO LEAVE?

A: NO.

Q: DID THE VATICAN, OR THE HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT, URGE HIM TO LEAVE?

A: THAT IS NOT AN APPROPRIATE QUESTION FOR ME TO DEAL WITH. I WOULD REITERATE, HOWEVER, THAT THE DECISION WAS A PERSONAL ONE, MADE BY THE CARDINAL [./.] HIMSELF.

Q: DID HE DECIDE TO LEAVE FOR REASONS OF AGE OR HEALTH?

A: SINCE, AS I SAID, THE DECISION WAS A PERSONAL ONE, I CAN'T ANSWER THAT.

Q: WILL THE CARDINAL'S DEPARTURE IMPROVE US-HUNGARIAN RELATIONS?

A: THERE REMAIN A NUMBER OF OUTSTANDING US-HUNGARIAN BILATERAL ISSUES. WE CONTINUE TO WORK ON THESE. THE PROSPECTS FOR ACHIEVING SOLUTIONS HAVE IMPROVED IN RECENT MONTHS BUT I DO NOT RELATE THAT IMPROVEMENT IN ANY WAY TO THIS DEVELOPMENT.

N.B.: ANY QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE CARDINAL'S PLANS FOR THE FUTURE SHOULD BE AN[S]WERED: QUOTE I AM NOT IN A POSITION TO COMMENT ON THAT. UNQUOTE OR QUOTE THESE ARE MATTERS FOR THE CARDINAL AND THE HOLY SEE TO DECIDE UPON. UNQUOTE

B. WITH EXCEPTIONS OUTLINED [A]BOVE, EMBASSIES SHOULD REFER ALL PRESS QUERIES TO DEPARTMENT PRIOR TO RELEASE VATICAN-GOH COMMUNIQUE. POSTS SHOULD NOT USE GUIDANCE.

256. Cf. **255.** BPB0501[217], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [43, 59, 76 (3x)], RMNNSFB693 – Távirat, SecState küldi: Amembassy Budapest, Rome, Vienna, 1 p.

Sajtótájékoztatási anyag a bíboros távozása esetére, 2. rész kiegészítése.

SECRET FINAL SECTION OF 2 STATE 176232/2

EXDIS

IN PARA 6 AND 7 UNT[I]L DEPARTMENT HAS USED IT. ONCE GUIDANCE USED BY DEPARTMENT, POSTS MAY DRAW ON IT FOR USE IN REPLYING TO QUERIES.

IRWIN

257. BPB0501[218], BPB0606[0384], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [34] – Távirat, SecState küldi: Amembassy Budapest, Rome, Vienna, 1 p.

Amennyiben a távozás szándéka nem változott meg, a nagykövet felhatalmazást kap annak közlésére a bíboros felé, hogyha utóbbi óhajtja, az amerikai kormány rendelkezésre bocsát egy repülőgépet, budapesti vagy bécsi indulással Rómába. Amennyiben a Vatikánnak és a bíborosnak más, a bíborost kielégítő terve van, nem kell erőltetnie a javaslatot, amely csak udvariasságból történik és nem képez az amerikai kormány számára preferenciát. Rendelkezések a konkrét kivitelezés felé Budapest és Róma számára.

SECRET STATE 177127
EXDIS
FOR AMBASSADOR

1. UNLESS THERE HAS BEEN CHANGE IN CARDINAL'S DEPARTURE PLANS, YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO INFORM HIM, IN CONSULTATION WITH VATICAN REPRESENTATIVE, THAT IF HE DESIRES, USG WILL MAKE AN AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE TO FLY HIM FROM BUDAPEST OR VIENNA TO ROME.

2. IF VATICAN AND CARDINAL HAVE MADE OTHER PLANS SATISFACTORY TO HIM, YOU SHOULD NOT PRESS THIS OFFER WHICH IS INTENDED AS COURTESY AND DOES NOT REFLECT ANY US PREFERENCE AS TO MODALITIES OF HIS DEPARTURE.

3. IF CARDINAL DESIRES FLY FROM BUDAPEST, YOU SHOULD INFORM HUNGARIAN MFA ASAP TO DETERMINE WHETHER HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT IN PRINCIPLE HIS DEPARTURE VIA USAF AIRCRAFT. YOU MAY SAY THAT NECESSARY DATA FOR CLEARANCE WOULD BE SUPPLIED SUBSEQUENTLY.

4. REQUEST IMMEDIATE REPLY AS TIME SHORT FOR NECESSARY PREPARATIONS AND CLEARANCES.

5. FOR ROME: WHEN CARDINAL'S REPLY IS KNOWN, US OFFER AND RESPONSE SHOULD BE MADE KNOWN ASAP TO APPROPRIATE VATICAN OFFICIALS. ROGERS

szeptember 26, vasárnap

258. BPB0501[219], BPB0606[0383], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [32] – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: SecState, Amembassy Rome, 1 p.
Zágonra hivatkozva közli a bíboros távozásának részleteit.

BUDAPEST 1849
EXDIS
REF: State 177127

According to Zagon when he was here last week, plan is for Cardinal Mindszenty do drive to Vienna Schwechat airport in Papal Nuncio car early Tuesday September 28. Alitalia reserving entire first class compartment for Rome flight departing 1325 hours same day. Will advise further when discussion possible with Vatican representative. As of Sunday noon, Cheli had not yet been in touch with Embassy.

PUHAN

szeptember 27, hétfő

259. BPB0501[220–221], BPB0606[0382], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [29–30], RMNNSFB693 – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: SecState, Amembassy Rome, Vienna, 2 pp.

Mindszenty bíboros távozásának terve részletes menete. Mons. Cheli eljegyeztette a részleteket a mai nap folyamán.

BUDAPEST 1851
EXDIS

SUBJECT: Departure Plans for Cardinal Mindszenty Monsignor Cheli conferred with me today on the final departure plans of Cardinal Mindszenty.

1. Time of departure from Embassy Budapest 0830 September 28.
2. Means of departure: diplomatic vehicle of Papal Nuncio Archbishop Rossi of Vienna.
3. Cardinal Mindszenty will be accompanied in car of Papal Nuncio by Nuncio and Monsignor Zagon.
4. Monsignor Cheli will follow in his own car.

5. GOH providing escort to border both fore and aft. neither vehicle to be visible to Cardinal.
6. The rear GOH car will carry a doctor.
7. Arrangements have been made with GOH authorities at Heg[y]eshalom to let cars pass border without stop.
8. Papal Nuncio car will carry Cardinal Mindszenty to [./.] Schwechat where he is to be met by Casaroli.
9. Alitalia flight leaving Vienna at 1325 has reserved entire first class compartment for the Cardinal and party.
10. Embargo on communique to be issued by Vatican and GOH now 1500 repeat 1500 Italian time September 28. Please note this is one hour later than indicated in Rome's 5996. Reason for delaying announcement one hour is that Alitalia flight does not get to Rome until approximately 1500.
11. Cardinal Mindszenty has asked to see me for farewell call at 1600 today.
12. Papal Nuncio calling on me at 1930 tonight after which he will pay short courtesy call on Cardinal Mindszenty.

PUHAN

260. BPB0501[222] – Puhán, Memorandum, levéltár számára, 1 p.

Mindszenty bíboros mai napon 16 órakor húsz perces találkozás során megköszönte a menedéket. Puhán megjegyzi, hogy Mindszenty azzal zárta szavait, amelyekkel megkezdődött kapcsolatuk. Beszélt a bécsi Páz - máneumról, elmondta annak történetét, a magyar nemesek részéről törté - nő múltbéli felajánlásokat, és annak hanyatlását Trianon után. A bíboros jó hangulatban volt, tekintete tiszta, optimizmussal tekintettel a jövőre.

SUBJECT: Cardinal Mindszenty's Farewell Call on the Ambassador

Jozsef Cardinal Mindszenty paid a twenty minute farewell call on me at 1600 September 27. He expressed his appreciation to me and the American Government for the asylum which had been granted him. He asked me to convey to members of my staff his appreciation for the many favors that had been done him during the past fifteen years. He thanked me most warmly for seeing to it that his memoirs were safely transported to Vienna. I gave him a written receipt from Embassy Vienna to this effect for which he was most grateful.

Cardinal Mindszenty ended his call on me about the way we started our relationship. He talked about the Pazmaneum in Vienna, recalled its history, the contributions made to it by former Hungarian noblemen, and its decline after Trianon.

I wished the Cardinal long life and the capability to render even greater service to his Church.

The Cardinal was in very good spirits, clear of eye, and apparently viewing the prospects of the future with optimism.

Alfred Puhán
Ambassador

szeptember 28, kedd

261. BPB0501[223], RMNNSFB693 – Távirat, SecState küldi, 1 p.

Kenneth Freed hírügynökségi jelentése, Associated Press

262. BPB0501[224], BPB0606[0379], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [13] – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: SecState, Amembassy Vienna, Rome, 1 p.

A bíboros 8 óra 28 perckor elhagyta a budapesti nagykövetséget. Rossi bécsi nuncius és Mons. Zágon volt kíséretében.

BUDAPEST 1857
EXDIS
REF: Budapest 1851

Jozsef Cardinal Mindszenty left Embassy Budapest for Rome this morning at 0828. He was accompanied by Papal Nuncio in Vienna, Archbishop Rossi, and Monsignor Zagon.

PUHAN

263. BPB0501[225], BPB0606[0377], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [27] – Távirat, Amembassy Vienna küldi: Amembassy Budapest, SecState, Amembassy Rome, 1 p.

Bécsi nagykövetség jelzi, hogy Mindszenty és kísérete 11 óra 23 perckor átlépték az osztrák határt Nickelsdorfnál és tovább halad Schwechat repülőtér felé.

SECRET VIENNA 6093

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY

MINDSZENTY AND PARTY ENTERED AUSTRIA AT NICKOLSDORF (sic!) 11:23 HOURS SEPTEMBER 28 AND PROCEEDED WEST IN DIRECTION SCHWECHAT AIRPORT. MOWINCKEL.

264. BPB0501[226], BPB0606[0378] – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest, küldi: Amembassy Vienna, 1 p.

Mindszenty bíborosnak a budapesti nagykövetségen hátrahagyott személyes holmija Bécsbe szállításáról.

BUDAPEST 1863

EXDIS

SUBJECT: Cardinal Mindszenty

1. At time of departure, Cardinal left several items of personal effects behind which he asked that we forward to him in Vienna. These have been placed in pouch bag, sealed and addressed to Amembassy Vienna for Emmett B. Ford. This bag has, in turn, been placed in regular courier pouch number X3-32352. Inner bag carries registry number 232003.

2. Pouch scheduled leave Budapest Tuesday, September 28, on regular courier trip, which will put it into Embassy Vienna after close of business.

3. After receipt, request Ford notify Papal Nuncio's office that effects are on hand and availabel fer delivery to Cardinal or his designee.

PUHAN

265. BPB0501[227], BPB0606[0381], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [23] – Távirat, Amembassy Vienna küldi: Secstate, Amembassy Budapest, Rome, 1 p.

Alitalia Mindszenty bíborossal menetrend szerint elindult. Sajtó nem volt jelen az induláskor.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE VIENNA 6098

ALITALIA WITH CARDINAL MINDSZENTY ABOARD DEPARTED ON SCHEDULE. NO PRESS PRESENT AT DEPARTURE. MOWINCKEL.

266. BPB0501[228], BPB0606[0380], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [26] – Távirat, Amembassy Vienna küldi: SecState, Amemb Budapest, Roma, 1 p.
Megküldi az MTI közleményét.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE VIENNA 6119

MTI (HUNGARIAN NEWS AGENCY) CARRYING FOLLOWING NEWS ITEM: QUOTE IN ACCORDANCE WITH AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN HUNGARY AND THE HOLY SEE JOSEPH CARDINAL MINDSZENTY LEFT THE TERRITORY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY FOR GOOD TODAY AND TRAVELLED TO ROME. UNQUOTE. MOWINCKEL.

267. BPB0501[229], BPB0606[0376], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [24], XR POL 15-1 VAT – Távirat, Amemb Rome küldi: SecState WashDC, Amembassy Budapest, Vienna, 1 p.

A római nagykövetség Mindszenty bíboros Rómába érkezésének részleteiről.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ROME 6137
SUBJECT: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY
REF: ROME 5996

1. LOOKING WEARIED BY HIS ORDEAL AND SHAKEN BY CONFRONTATION WITH A CRUSH OF PHOTOGRAPHERS AND JOURNALISTS AT THE PLANE CARDINAL MINDSZENTY ARRIVED AT 1450 TODAY. VATICAN SECRETARY OF STATE CARDINAL VILLOT BOARDED PLANE TO WELCOME CARDINAL AND THEN ACCOMPANIED HIM TO VATICAN IN OFFICIAL LIMOUSINE.

2. AT VATICAN POPE PAUL PERSONALLY GREETED MINDSZENTY ON THRESHOLD OF APARTMENT PREPARED FOR HIM, IN VATICAN'S "BLAIR HOUSE", A TASTEFULLY RENOVATED MEDIEVAL TOWER BEHIND ST. PETER'S WHERE PATRIARCH ATHENAGORUS (sic!) AND OFTHER IMPORTANT VISITORS HAVE BEEN LODGED. MINDSZENTY SHOULD HAVE NO DOUBT HE RECEIVING UNUSUAL RED CARPET TREATMENT NORMALLY RESERVED FOR MUCH HIGHER RANKING VIP'S.

3. TO OUR KNOWLEDGE, FIRST REPORTS OF CARDINAL'S DEPARTURE, ATTRIBUTED TO VATICAN SOURCE, CAR-

RIED AP TICKER 1434. VATICAN SOURCE CONFIRMED TO ILLING THAT FACT OF CARDINAL'S DEPARTURE RELEASED TO PRESS SHORT TIME BEFORE ISSUANCE OFFICIAL COMMUNIQUE AT 1500. MARTIN

268. BPB0501[230], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [25] – Távirat, SecState küldi: AMEMB BP, ROME E VIENNA, 1 p.

Sajtókonferencia anyaga hamarosan következik.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 178059
SUBJ: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY
REF: STATE 176232

1. DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN DREW ON GUIDANCE IN PARAGRAPHS 6 AND 7 OF REFTEL IN REPLYING TO QUESTIONS AT NOON BRIEFING, SEPTEMBER 28.

2. POSTS AUTHORIZED USE SAME GUIDANCE IN RESPONDING TO QUERIES.

3. EXCERPTS FROM TRANSCRIPT WILL FOLLOW SEPTTEL. EXEMPT ROGERS.

269. BPB0501[231], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [10–11] – Távirat, SecState küldi: Amembassy Budapest, 1 p.

Sajtókonferencia anyagához küldött javaslatáról.

SECRET STATE 178793
EXDIS
SUBJECT: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY
REF: BUDAPEST 1820; STATE 176232
FOR AMBASSADOR

1. AMENDMENT TO PRESS GUIDANCE YOU SUGGESTED IN REFTEL NOT REFLECTED IN GUIDANCE FORWARDED BY STATE 176232 BECAUSE THIS GUIDANCE HAD BEEN SUBMITTED FOR HIGHER APPROVAL IN USG AND YOUR SUGGESTIONS COULD NOT BE WORKED IN FROM POINT OF VIEW OF TIME.

2. IN EVENT PRESS SPOKESMAN MAKES STATESMENT THAT QUOTE THE PROSPECTS FOR ACHIEVING SOLUTIONS HAVE IMPROVED IN RECENT MONTHS BUT I DO NOT RELATE THAT IMPROVEMENT IN ANY WAY TO THIS DEVELOPMENT. UNQUOTE YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO INFORM GOH AT YOUR DISCRETION THAT IT WAS NOT MOTIVATED BY ANY DESIRE TO TAKE ISSUE WITH GOH ASSESSMENT OF USEFULNESS OF STEP IN IMPROVING BILATERAL RELATIONS. ROGERS

270. BPB0501[235–236, 251–252 (2x)] – Távirat, SecState küldi: Amembassy Budapest, Vienna, Rome, 2 pp.
Sajtókonferencia anyagához.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE FINAL SECTION OF 2 STATE 178378/2

UNDERSTAND CORRECTLY, HE HAS BEEN RELUCTANT TO LEAVE IN THE PAST UNTIL CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD PERMIT HIM TO RETURN TO HIS FUNCTIONS IN HUNGARY. WHAT MAY HAVE LED TO HIS DECISION TO REMOVE HIMSELF TO ROME, I DON'T KNOW. AND I THINK YOU REALLY OUGHT TO ASK HIM OR THE CHURCH.

Q. IN THAT CONNECTION, QAS THE HUNGARIAN GOVT. WILLING TO LET HIM LEAVE DURING THIS PERIOD, WOULD YOU SAY? HE COULD HAVE LEFT IF HE – WHY DID HE STAY IN HUNGARY? DO YOU KNOW THAT?

A. I SUPPOSE THAT WAS – AGAIN, FOR YOUR GUIDANCE, I SUPPOSE THAT WAS THE ROCK ON WHICH IT ALL FOUNDERED. I JUST CAN'T CARRY THAT VERY FAR.

Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY DETAIL ON THE PHYSICAL SITUATION? DID HE HAVE AN ENTOURAGE? DID HE TAKE OVER A BIG WING OF THE EMBASSY OR ANYTHING LIKE THAT, OR WHAT? DID HE BRING HIS OWN FOOD IN?

A. LET ME TAKE THAT QUESTION. I KNOW HE HAS BEEN OCCUPYING WHAT USED TO BE THE AMBASSADOR'S OFFICE FOR FIFTEEN YEARS. WHEN HE LEFT, HE LEFT THE EMBASSY AT 8:30 BUDAPEST TIME THIS MORNING IN THE CAR OF THE PAPAL NUNCIO OF VIENNA, ARCHBISHOP ROSSI, ACCOMPANIED BY THE ARCHBISHOP AND BY MSGRS. ZAGON AND CHELI

OF THE VATICAN. I DON'T KNOW WHETHER THERE WAS A HUNGARIAN ESCORT.

Q. DID HE MAKE ANY STATEMENT TO THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN BUDAPEST WITH REFERENCE, THANKING HIM OR SOME SUCH?

A. I WILL TAKE YOUR QUESTION.

Q. DO YOU KNOW WHAT THE MOST RECENT PROGNOSIS OF HIS HEALTH [./.] WAS? IS HE IN GOOD OR BAD HEALTH, DO YOU KNOW?

A. I THINK THE PROGNOSIS PROBABLY OUGHT TO COME FROM HIM OR FROM THE VATICAN.

Q. YOU SEEM TO HAVE STEERED VERY CAREFULLY AWAY FROM WELCOMING THIS MOVE, EXCEPT IN TERMS OF WISHING THE CARDINAL WELL. AND I WONDER IF YOU COULD ANSWER WHETHER WE EXPECT THAT THIS DEVELOPMENT IS GOING TO BE A POSITIVE FACTOR, OR COULD BE A POSITIVE FACTOR IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN UNDER WAY, OR IN THE GENERAL CLIMATE OF THE US-HUNGARIAN RELATIONS.

A. I THOUGHT I HAD PRETTY WELL HANDLED THAT ONE. I SAID THAT WE SAW NO CONNECTION BETWEEN THE CARDINAL'S PRESENCE AND DEPARTURE AND WORK ON THE OUTSTANDING BILATERAL ISSUES BETWEEN THE TWO GOVTS.

Q. YOU DIDN'T SAY QUITE 'CT CONNECTION.' YOU SAID YOU WOULDN'T WANT TO RELATE THE IMPROVEMENT IN OUR RECENT RELATIONS.

A. YOU CAN HAVE YOUR CHOICE. UNQUOTE. ROGERS

szeptember 29, szerda

271. BPB0501[243–244], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [003] – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: SecState, 2 pp.

Beszámol a budapesti sajtó gyér tájékoztatásáról. A Magyarországi hetilap kiadója szerint a hivatalos közleményen túl nem foglalkoznak Mindszenty távozásával, mert „a magyarokat nem érdekli Mindszenty bíboros”.

BUDAPEST 1878

SUBJECT: Media Coverage Cardinal's Departure

1. All Budapest papers carried on inside pages September 29 following one-sentence GOH press release on Cardinal's departure. QUOTE: Under an agreement between the Government of Hungary and the Holy See, Cardinal Jozsef Mindszenty left Hungary's territory for good Tuesday and went to Rome. END QUOTE. Same unelaborated announcement made over Hungarian radio September 28 following Cardinal's arrival Rome, and repeated 7:30 PM television news. No coverage late evening television news wrap-up.

2. English language MTI Daily News and Trade Union daily Nepszava added statement that Pope had relieved Bishop Dr. Imre Szabo from his duties as Apostolic Delegate to See of Esztergom due to ill health, appointing Bishop Imre Kisberk of Szekesfehervar in his stead. In accordance 1957 Ordinance, Hungarian Presidential Council gave advance consent to discharge and appointment.

3. Editor of weekly news magazine Magyarorszag predicted to Emboff evening September 28 that there would be no further [./] Hungarian coverage, since "the Hungarian people have no interest in Cardinal Mindszenty". PUHAN

272. BPB0501[245–247] – Leltár, 3 pp

Inventory of items removed from Cardinal Mindszenty's Quarters

Mindszenty bíboros lakrészének leltára.

273+274. BPB0501[232–234, 248–250 (2x)], BPB0606[0370–0374], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [4–7, 15–22 (2x)] – Távirat, SecState küldi: Amembassy Budapest, Vienna, Roma, 3 pp.

Sajtótájékoztatási segédanyag.

STATE 178378/1

SUBJECT: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY

FOLLOWING ARE EXCERPTS FROM DEPT. NOON PRESS BRIEFING SEPT. 28:

QUOTE – Q. DID THE UNITED STATES PLAY ANY ROLE IN SECURING THE FLIGHT OF CARDINAL MINDSZENTY TO VIENNA AND ROME

A. LET ME MAKE A BRIEF STATEMENT, AND THEN I WILL RESPOND MORE DIRECTLY TO YOUR QUESTION.

JOZSEF CARDINAL MINDSZENTY, PRIMATE OF HUNGARY AND ARCHBISHOP OF ESZTERGOM, DEPARTED THE AMERICAN EMBASSY AT BUDAPEST TODAY. CARDINAL MINDSZENTY'S DECISION TO LEAVE THE EMBASSY WAS MADE BY HIM PERSONALLY, AFTER HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE HOLY SEE. CARDINAL MINDSZENTY REQUESTED REFUGE IN THE AMERICAN LEGATION AT BUDAPEST ON NOV 4, 1956. HE WAS GRANTED REFUGE ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS BECAUSE OF A FEAR AT THAT TIME THAT HIS FREEDOM AND LIFE WERE IN IMMINENT JEOPARDY. THE UNITED STATES GOVT. IS PLEASED THAT IT WAS ABLE TO ASSIST THE CARDINAL WHEN THE NEED APPEARED URGENT AND PRESSING. WE WISH WELL IN HIS FUTURE SERVICE TO HIS CHURCH.

Q. HOW LONG HAS THE HUNGARIAN GOVT. BEEN WILLING TO ALLOW HIM TO LEAVE?

A. I CAN'T ANSWER THAT. TO COME BACK TO YOURS, WHICH IS IN PARTIAL RESPONSE TO YOURS AS WELL, WE DID NOT PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT LED TO HIS DEPARTURE. THESE WERE CONDUCTED BETWEEN THE VATICAN AND THE HUNGARIAN GOVT. I THINK IT OBVIOUS FROM THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT WE WERE INFORMED IN A GENERAL WAY OF THE NATURE AND THE INTENT OF [./.] THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

Q. SUCH TALKS HAVE GONE ON FROM TIME TO TIME OVER THE PREVIOUS YEARS, AND I THINK IN THE PAST THE CARDINAL WAS RELUCTANT TO LEAVE THE EMBASSY UNLESS HE COULD STAY IN HUNGARY. DO YOU KNOW WHAT CHANGED HIS MIND OR CAN YOU THROW ANY LIGHT ON HIS VIEWS?

A. I COULDN'T POSSIBLE SPEAK IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, FOR THE CARDINAL, NOR, I THINK, FOR THE VATICAN NOR THE HUNGARIAN GOVT.

AS I SAY, WE WERE ESSENTIALLY A BYSTANDER IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS. (*Bullshit*)

Q. MAY I FOLLOW THAT UP WITH ANOTHER QUESTION? HIS PRESENCE IN THE EMBASSY WAS SOMETHING OF AN IRRITANT, I THINK, IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND HUNGARY. IF THAT IS CORRECT, DO YOU NOW SEE ANY IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS AS A RESULT OF HIS DEPARTURE?

A. I WOULDN'T WANT TO RELATE WHAT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN A GRADUAL IMPROVEMENT IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH HUNGARY IN RECENT MONTHS TO THE CARDINAL'S DEPARTURE. THERE REMAIN A NUMBER OF OUTSTANDING BILATERAL ISSUES ON WHICH HE CONTINUE TO WORK, AND WHILE WE HAVE SOME HOPE FOR ACHIEVING SOLUTIONS OF THEM, AS I SAY, I JUST FIND IT VERY DIFFICULT TO PUT THESE TWO TOGETHER.

Q. WHAT ARE THESE PROBLEMS IN BILATERAL RELATIONS?

A. ON BACKGROUND, THEY, (IMPROVEMENTS IN RELATIONS) I THINK, ARE FAIRLY CHARACTERIZED AS ATMOSPHERIC IN NATURE. I THINK A GOOD RECENT EXAMPLE OF THIS IMPROVED ATMOSPHERE WAS THE VISIT TO BUDAPEST IN EARLY SEPT. OF THE POSTMASTER GENERAL, MR. BLOUNT, FOR THE OPENING OF THE INTERNATIONAL STAMP EXHIBIT, AND THE WARM RECEPTION THAT WAS ACCORDED TO HIM BY OFFICIALS OF THE HUNGARIAN GOVT. I DON'T WANT TO GET INTO AN EXTENDED DISCUSSION CATALOGING THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES. BUT ONE CERTAINLY IS THE QUESTION OF SETTLEMENT OF U.S. CLAIMS FOR NATIONALIZED AND WAR-DAMAGED PROPERTY AND DEFAULTED BONDS. WE HAVE HAD SOME PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS OF THIS SUBJECT WITH THE HUNGARIAN GOVT. IN THE SPRING OF 1970, AND HOPE THAT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO FOLLOW THROUGH ON THESE IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

Q. HOW ABOUT THE CROWN OF ST. STEPHEN? IS THAT UNDER DISCUSSION AS WELL?

A. NO, THIS IS NOT AN ACTIVE ISSUE BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS. [./.]

Q. COULD YOU PUT A PRICE TAG ON ALL OF THIS WAR DAMAGE REPARATIONS, DEFAULTED BONDS, ALL THE BEST-NATIONALIZATION?

A. I PROBABLY COULD IF INQUIRED WHICH I WOULD BE HAPPY TO DO FOLLOWING OUR MEETING.

Q. IN THE PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS IN THE SPRING OF 1970 ON THESE ISSUES, WAS THE PRESENCE OF CARDINAL MINDSZENTY BROUGHT UP AS AN IRRITANT AND AS A PROBLEM BY THE HUNGARIANS?

A. ON BACKGROUND, NO, I DO NOT BELIEVE IT WAS.

Q. JUST ON THIS POINT OF OUR VIEW OF MINDSZENTY

STAYING THERE, DO YOU KNOW WHETHER WE EVER TOOK A POSITION ON URGING HIM TO LEAVE, RECOMMENDING HIM TO LEAVE? YOU USED THE PHRASE 'ACTIVE ROLE' WE PLAYED NO ACTIVE ROLE. DID WE PLAY ANY ROLE IN HIS DEPARTURE?

A. NO, I DON'T THINK WE DID.

Q. WE HAVE BEEN WILLING TO HOST HIM AS LONG AS HE WAS BEEN WILLING TO STAY?

A. YES, ABSOLUTELY. LET ME SAY FOR YOUR GUIDANCE-IF I

274. Cf. **273.** BPB0501[237-239, 254-256 (2x)], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [5-7, 20-22] – Távirat, SecState küldi: Amembassy Budapest, Vienna, Rome, 3 pp.

Informál a washingtoni sajtótájékoztató kérdéseiről és válaszairól. „IT WAS AN ABNORMAL SITUATION”.

STATE 178378/2

1. FOLLOWING ARE SELECTED EXCERPTS FROM PRESS BACKGROUNDER GIVEN BY HUNGARIAN DESK OFFICER AFTERNOON SEPT. 28:

QUOTE – ANOTHER QUESTION CHARLIE GOT HAS: DID THE CARDINAL MAKE A STATEMENT OF THANKS TO THE U.S. AMBASSADOR?

WE DON'T HAVE ANY TELEGRAM OR ANY REPORT FROM OUR EMB. REGARDING THE DEPARTURE, BEYOND A TELEGRAM REPORTING THE FACT OF THE DEPARTURE.

I THINK WE CAN ASSUME, ON VERY GOOD AUTHORITY THAT THE DEPARTURE WAS VERY FRIENDLY, AND I MIGHT SAY THAT IT WAS THE PRACTICE OF THE CARDINAL EVERY YEAR ON NOV. 4TH, THE ANNIVERSARY OF HIS REFUGE, OR TAKING REFUGE IN OUR LEGATION AT THAT TIME, TO FORMALLY THANK THE AMBASSADOR FOR THE GENEROSITY OF THE U.S. GOVT. AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE FOR AFFORDING HIM THE REFUGE...

Q. YOU KNOW, HERB, THIS MAY BE COMPLETELY NEW TO YOU AND YOU DON'T KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT IT; BUT THERE IS A LITTLE ITEM ON THE TICKER ABOUT A MAN COMING INTO THE EMBASSY GROUNDS AND SHOOTING HIMSELF BECAUSE...

MR. BRAY: I THINK YOU OUGHT TO PUT THAT TO ME, STAN.

Q. DO YOU KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT IT?

MR. BRAY: NO, I DON'T. DO YOU?

MR. WILGIS: WELL, YES, BUT —

MR. BRAY: OKAY, WE'LL TALK ABOUT IT LATER AND THEN YOU CAN ASK ME, STAN. I REALLY THINK HE OUGHT TO CONFINE THIS TO THE CARDINAL'S. —

Q. APPARENTLY IT'S CONNECTED IN A SORT OF LATER DEVELOPMENT. [./.] MR. WILGIS: NO. IT'S NOT CONNECTED IN ANY WAY...

Q. DO YOU FEEL THAT THE PROSPECTS OF DEALING WITH THESE OUTSTANDING ISSUES WILL IMPROVE NOW, EVEN THOUGH THE MINDSZENTY THING WAS NOT DIRECTLY HAVING ANYTHING TO DO WITH US; BECAUSE YOU SAY IT'S A VATICAN-HUNGARIAN DEAL? ... NOW THAT THAT 'BURR IN THE SADDLE' SO TO SPEAK, IS REMOVED, THAT THESE THINGS CAN GO FORWARD?

A. THERE, I WOULD HAVE TO GO BACK TO WHAT CHARLIE SAID THIS MORNING; THAT WE DO NOT RELATE IN ANY WAY AN IMPROVEMENT, A PAST IMPROVEMENT, A PRESENT IMPROVEMENT OR PROSPECTS OF IMPROVEMENT IN OUR RELATION WITH HUNGARY, WITH THE CARDINAL'S DEPARTURE FROM OUR EMBASSY.

Q. WE DON'T. DO YOU THINK THE HUNGARIANS DO?

A. I WOULD THINK YOU WOULD HAVE TO ASK THE HUNGARIANS THAT.

Q. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF YOU TURN THE QUESTION AROUND, AND YOU HAD TO MAKE A LIST OF THE STRAINS IN OUR RELATIONS UP TO TODAY, YOU WOULD CERTAINLY HAVE TO LIST CARDINAL MINDSZENTY'S EXISTENCE IN THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN BUDAPEST AS ONE OF THE STRAINS IN OUR RELATIONS WHICH HAS NOW BEEN REMOVED.

A. NO, I DON'T THINK I WOULD LIST IT AS A 'STRAIN'. IT WAS AN ABNORMAL SITUATION.

Q. YOU MEAN IT WASN'T CAUSING A STRAINING OUR RELATIONS?

A. NO, IT WAS NOT. IT IS BASICALLY, A VATICAN-HUNGARIAN MATTER AND THE CARDINAL HAPPENED TO BE IN OUR EMBASSY.

Q. YOU SAID THAT THE LEGATION CHANGED TO AN EMBASSY IN '66; AND MY MEMORY SAYS, AND YOU WOULD

SURELY KNOW BETTER – THAT ONE OF THE REASONS IT STAYED A LEGATION THAT LONG, WAS BECAUSE OF CARDINAL MINDSZENTY, FOLLOWING UP GEORGE'S QUESTION.

IST THAT AN INCORRECT IMPRESSION IN MY MEMORY?

A. I THINK SO.

FOR INSTANCE, WE RAISED OUR LEGATION AT SOFIA AT THE SAME TIME, AND WE DIDN'T HAVE ANY CARDINAL IN RESIDENCE [./.] THE RE... UNQUOTE

2. TRANSCRIPT OF BACKGROUNDER BEING SENT BY AIR POUCH.

ROGERS

szeptember 30, csütörtök

275. BPB0501[240–241], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [002] – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: SecState, 2 pp.

Budapesti sajtótájékoztató összefoglalása.

BUDAPEST 1889

SUBJECT: Press Briefing on Mindszenty Departure

1. Have noticed that press has asked whether Cardinal made a statement of thanks to US Ambassador. As a matter of fact, when the Cardinal paid his farewell call on the Ambassador at 1600 on September 27, the day previous to his departure, he made a formal statement, thanking the United States Government, the United States people, and the Ambassador for the hospitality extended during the past fifteen years.

2. When Cardinal Mindszenty departed on the morning of September 28 he was led out of the Embassy and accompanied to his car by the Ambassador, who took his leave of him, shaking his hand twice, once on the sidewalk and then again after he had gotten into the car. The parting was most cordial.

3. On other matter, the case of the suicide reported Budapest's 1856, there was absolutely no connection between this and the Cardinal, as far as we know. As of this moment his identity has not yet been established by the Hungarians.

PUHAN

276. BPB0501[253, 257 (2x)], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [001] –Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: Amemb. Rome, 1 p.

Magyar Közlönyben megjelent az amnesztia Mindszenty számára.

BUDAPEST 1899

SUBJECT: GOH Remits Cardinal's Sentence

1. September 29 issue MAGYAR KOZLONY, the GOH official gazette, carried following resolution by the Presidential Council:

Quote The Presidential Council of the Hungarian People's Republic, remits the remainder of the sentence of imprisonment the National Council of People's Courts meted out to Jozsef Mindszenty in its decision of July 6, 1949. END QUOTE

2. The resolution was signed by Pal Losonczi and by Lajos Cseterki, respectively President and Secretary of the Presidential Council.

PUHAN

277. BPB0501[273–274] – Levél, Wilgis Puhannak, 2 pp.

Wilgis gratulál Puhan nagykövetnek a bíboros távozásához. A Department előljárói elégedettek a sajtómegnyilatkozással. Megküldi a sajtóanyagot.

*

I just want to add my small vote of congratulations to that which you have already received from the Secretary for your handling of the Cardinal's departure. From my point of view the Embassy looked very good.

You may be interested in the press coverage which his arrival in Rome received here in the US. For this reason, I have enclosed copie of what newspapers I was able to lay my hands on. When the Department collects all the clippings, I will send them on to you. These papers which I am now forwarding are for your personal use and retention. I have also sent Frank Meehan some for his use and reading by the Embassy staff.

The higher-ups in the Department (Marty, Dick Davies, etc.) are very pleased so far with the press coverage. They, and the White House, wanted the focus of the story to remain in Rome and on the Vatican-Hungarian relationship. Marty also did not want any colorful stories coming out of the Department about the monastic life of the Cardinal in the Embassy for the past fifteen years. His attitude was what was behind the rather uncolorful backgrounder which I gave the press yesterday, the tran-

script of which I am sending Frank.

I apologize for not being able to include your wording in the press guidance. This was mainly a question of time: the papers had gone to California with the [./] President and it was not possible to work in new wording. Also, while the Department was ready to accept your wording, it would still have added the disclaimer to which you objected. I hope that you have been able to clear up any possible misunderstanding with the Hungarians.


My thought were with you yesterday. I'm sure the last thing you needed at that time was a suicide in the consular section.

With best regards, congratulations and hopes for an even happier and changed Embassy,

Sincerely,

Herber E. Wilgis [signed]

Enclosures: Newspapers as stated.



2. Mindszenty bíboros levele Nixon elnökhöz, 1971. július 28.
Jelzetét lásd fönt. Mi jelzetünk: BPB0501[123].

1971. OKTÓBER

Miután szeptember 28-án Mindszenty bíboros elhagyta a nagykövetséget, az 1971. év utolsó három hónapjában még további 34 irat foglalkozik vele (október folyamán 13, november folyamán 15, december folyamán 6). Ezek csupán részleges információk, amelyek más forrásokkal egybevetve kerekedhetnek ki egészszé, de általában megbízhatóak.

Az október 1-ji római távirat a vatikáni sajtóiroda közleményét ismerteti, de forrásainkban hiányzik a szeptember 29-i L'Osservatore Romano Mindszentyt köszöntő cikkének ismertetése, valamint a bíboros ezzel kapcsolatos álláspontja. Kitér Mindszenty meleg fogadtatására a püspöki szinódus megnyitó szentmiséjén. Október 29-ére datált a római nagykövet helyettes részletes levele, amelyben Mindszenty első napjairól számol be, a kép nem szívderítő. Chelinek tulajdonított szavakkal keményfejjű, nehéz embernek nevezi Mindszentyt, aki bármely kormányral konfliktusba kerül, beleértve saját egyháza vezetését is. Fontos még Cabot Lodge római nagykövet szintén hónap végi följegyzése, amelyben Chelitől meg tudott információk alapján tekinti át az elmúlt év eseményeit. Májustól szeptemberig a Vatikán és a magyar kormány tárgyalásai kizárólag Mindszenty helyzetének megoldásáról szóltak, csak augusztus 16-án vették fel ismét az egyház helyzetének javítását illető tárgyalások fonalát. Cheli elmondja, hogy a kiközösített politikus békepapok kiközösítésének feloldását egy éven át nem tették közzé, mert aduként tartogatták a Mindszenty kihozatalát célzó tárgyalásokra.

Megtudjuk még, hogy október 30-án érkezett meg Bécsbe Mindszenty könyveinek, jegyzeteinek 22 doboza, első szállítmány, átvévo: Dr. Vecsey József titkár.

Október 1, péntek

278. BPB0501[258–259, 268–269], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [092–093] – Távirat, Amembassy Rome küldi: SecState, Amembassy Budapest, 2 pp.

Ismerteti az Apostoli Szentszék Sajtóirodájának közleményét, amely cáfolja a sajtóértesüléseket, hogy a Szentszék amnesztiát kért volna Mindszenty számára a magyar kormánytól. A Szentszék nem változtatott álláspontján sem, amelyet annak idején kifejtett a bíboros perével és elítélésével

*kapcsolatosan. Arra szorított, hogy kérje: a bíboros szabadon elhagy -
hassa Magyarországot. Ezért a kegyelem megadása a magyar kormány
döntése. Mindszenty bíboros a maga részéről mindig azt nyilatkozta, hogy
csak a teljes rehabilitációt fogadja el. – Ezt megbízható vatikáni körök is
megerősítették, azzal a kommentárral, hogy a magyar kormány várhatott
volna ezzel néhány hónapot. – Beszámol arról, hogy VI. Pál pápa a püspöki
szinódus megnyitóján melegen köszöntötte Mindszenty bíborost. Megjegyzi,
hogy a vatikáni nyilatkozat nem tartalmazza a „véglegesen” szót, mint a
magyar kormány nyilatkozata.*

CONFIDENTIAL ROME 6228

SUBJECT: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY

REF: ROME 4337; BUDAPEST 1899

1. OCTOBER 1 “OSSERVATORE ROMANO” CARRIED FOLLOWING COMMUNIQUE FROM HOLY SEE PRESS OFFICE: “NEWSPAPERS PUBLISHED TODAY THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT THE HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT HAS GRANTED AN AMNESTY TO CARDINAL JOZSEF MINDSZENTY. SOME DAILIES AFFIRM ADDITIONALLY THAT THIS WAS DONE AT THE REQUEST OF THE HOLY SEE. IN THIS REGARD, IT IS NECESSARY TO CLARIFY THAT THE HOLY SEE HAS NOT SOLICITED THIS MEASURE NOR HAS IT MODIFIED ITS OPINION EXPRESSED AT THE TIME CONCERNING THE TRIAL AND CONDEMNATION OF THE CARDINAL. THE HOLY SEE LIMITED ITSELF TO ASKING THAT THE CARDINAL BE GRANTED THE POSSIBILITY FREELY TO DEPART HUNGARY. THE GRANTING OF THE PARDON, THEREFORE, CONCERNS ONLY THE HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT. FOR HIS PART, CARDINAL MINDSZENTY HAS ALWAYS DECLARED HIS INABILITY TO ACCEPT ANYTHING SHORT OF TOTAL REHABILITATION.”

2. RELIABLE VATICAN SOURCE CONFIRMS THAT GRANTING OF AMNESTY BY HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT NOT PART OF AGREEMENT ON MINDSZENTY’S DEPARTURE. IN FACT, MATTER NOT EVEN PURSUED. SOURCE VIEWED ANNOUNCEMENT AS PREMATURE AND SOMEWHAT CLUMSY. HE SAID VATICAN WOULD HAVE PREFERRED THAT GOH HAD WAITED FEW MONTHS AFTER DEPARTURE.

3. CARDINAL MINDSZENTY JOINED POPE IN CELEBRATING MASS YESTERDAY AT OPENING SYNOD OF BISHOPS.

DURING HIS LATIN ADDRESS TO ASSEMBLED BISHOPS, POPE PAUL MADE WARM REFERENCE TO CARDINAL MINDSZENTY'S PRESENCE, ADDRESSING HIM AS "ARCHBISHOP OF ESZTERGOM, AND PRIMATE OF HUNGARY, OUR MUCH DESIRED GUEST... GLORIOUS TESTIMONY OF THE MILLENARY UNION OF THE MAGYAR CHURCH WITH THIS APOSTOLIC SEE."

4. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT VATICAN'S COMMUNIQUE ON MINDSZENTY'S [./] DEPARTURE DID NOT USE WORD "FOR GOOD" OR "DEFINITELY" AS DID GOH COMMUNIQUE. MARTIN

október 5, kedd

279. BPB0501[260–265], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [090–91, cf. 088–89] – Körtávirat, 1931, Amembassy Budapest: SecState, Amembassy: Belgrade, Bucharest, Moscow, Prague, Sofia, Warsaw; USMission: Berlin, NATO, 3 pp.
Kádár János Mindszentyről

1. In a speech made last week on one of his periodic visits in the provinces, published in the weekend press, Kadar took public farewell of Cardinal Mindszenty in his own peculiar way. The bulk of the speech was on agricultural questions but in the closing section on international affairs Kadar referred to the Hungarian Government's efforts to improve relations with various Western states, including the Vatican. He said that in the framework of discussions with the Vatican the agreement had been reached under which Mindszenty had left Hungary for good and gone to Rome. In a characteristic comment, indicative of what the regime hopes to accomplish internally as a result of the Cardinal's departure, Kadar said that if the Government had opposed this or that leading [./] Church personality, it was always a political conflict, not a religious one. The Government had never classified citizens according to whether or not they were believers, but rather whether they were reactionary or progressive, whether they helped the progress of the people and were prepared to cooperate with the people. The Government opposed those who were not and cooperated with those who were.

2. We judge that Kadar is happy to have the Cardinal out of Hungary. The regime has not made the concession, rehabilitation, the Cardinal

had demanded. At the same time they have made a humane gesture which, coupled with the amnesty, is intended to draw a line under the long drawn out Mindszeny chapter of conflict with the Catholic Church. The regime presumably hopes that with that chapter now coming to a close, and with the discreet nod in the direction of national and religious opinion which the Cardinal's release involves, the way will be more open than before for good relations with believers. The GOH decision on the Cardinal can, therefore, be seen in its domestic implications [...] as part of Kadar's effort to conciliate the various sectors of Hungarian public opinion in an effort to win over the people for active support of the regime's programs.

3. During 1971 Kadar has gotten rid of two of his nemeses. Death has removed Rakosi, the Pope has removed Mindszenty. (The ghost of Laszlo Rajk still hovers uncomfortably, however.) In a country such as Hungary, where it is peculiarly difficult to bury the past, these events are important. Kadar must feel strengthened as a result, and confirmed in his view that his careful, moderate internal policies, complemented in foreign affairs by unswerving devotion to Moscow, are the right way to go. All the signs are that he remains the undisputed leader, secure in the key sense of having Russian support and with improved standing among Hungarians.

Puhan.

október 8, péntek

280. BPB0501[266–267, 270–271] – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: SecState, Amembassy Rome, 2 pp.

Cheli Budapesten tárgyal, a Mindszentynek adott magyar amnesztia a kiindulópont, de a fő téma az esztergomi apostoli kormányzó kinevezése. Más tárgyalási pontokat is említ.

Budapest 1985

SUBJECT: Hungarian–Vatican Talks

REF: Rome 6228

1. The amnesty granted Cardinal Mindszenty and the Vatican statement (reftel) that this was a unilateral Hungarian move raises the question what was the scope of Cheli's talks in Budapest with GOH officials. Seems likely that they went beyond the issue of the Cardinals' release and the arrangements for departure. Cheli gave us to understand, for example,

that the toughest part of the negotiations was on who would be the new Apostolic Administrator of Esztergom. Cheli said he felt much had been accomplished by the appointment of Kisberk.

2. Subject to the Department's approval, request Embassy Rome follow up with Vatican on scope, results and further prospects of Cheli's talks in Budapest. Specific points which might be covered are appointments to vacant sees, Mindszenty's tenure [./.] as Bishop of Esztergom and Primate, probable successor, religious education, arrested priests, confiscated church property, activity of religious orders.

PUHAN

október 12, kedd

281. BPB0501[272] – Levél, Puhan nagykövet Wilgishez, 1 p.

Megköszöni szeptember 30-i gratuláló levelét. Mindszenty bíboros távozása óta a nagykövetség nem az, ami volt korábban, de mindenki hozzászokott távollétéhez. Utólag úgy látja, hogy távozása mindenkinek javára vált, legfőképpen magának a bíborosnak.

*

I very much appreciated the sentiments expressed in your letter of September 30 as well as the three newspapers, telling of Cardinal Mindszenty's departure from Budapest. I can assure you the Embassy is not the same since he left, but everyone is adjusting to his absence. I believe in retrospect his departure will benefit everyone, most of all the Cardinal himself.

With kindest regards to Jane and you, in which Fair joins me, I remain

Sincerely,
Alfred Puhan [not signed]
Ambassador

október 13, szerda

282. BPB0501[275], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG Box [080–081] – Távirat, Amembassy Vienna küldi: Amembassy Budapest, 1 p.

Az osztrák kormány október 12-én tárgyalta Mindszenty bíboros letelepedésének kérdését. Rösch belügyminiszter közölte, hogy bár a sajtó arról ír, hogy Mindszenty a bécsi Pázmáneumban óhajt lakni, még nem érkezett hivatalos megkeresés ez ügyben. A bécsi nunciatúra nem tud Mindszenty szándékairól. Kreisky álláspontja – amint október 7-i sajtókonferencián is kifejtette –, hogy az osztrák kormánynak igen liberális magatartást kell tanúsítania. Ugyanakkor Mindszenty nem fejthet ki politikai tevékenységet.

CONFIDENTIAL VIENNA 6487

SUBJECT: GOA TO PERMIT CARDINAL TO RESIDE IN VIENNA

1. ACCORDING TO CHANCELLERY SOURCE, MATTER OF CARDINAL MINDSZENTY AND HIS PLANS RESIDE IN VIENNA CAME UP FOR DISCUSSION AT CABINET MEETING OCTOBER 12. INTERIOR MINISTER ROESCH REPORTED THAT, DESPITE RASH OF PRESS REPORTS TO EFFECT THAT MINDSZENTY WILL RETIRE TO PAZMANEUM IN VIENNA, NO OFFICIAL REQUEST FOR HIS RESIDENCE IN AUSTRIA HAS BEEN RECEIVED. ROESCH SAID THAT OFFICE PAPAL NUNCIO HERE IN VIENNA HAD DISCLAIMED ANY KNOWLEDGE OF MINDSZENTY'S INTENTIONS.

2. KREISKY REPEATED VIEW WHICH HE HAD EXPRESSED IN PRESS CONFERENCE OCTOBER 7 – THAT GOA SHOULD DISPLAY “A VERY LIBERAL ATTITUDE” SHOULD CARDINAL MINDSZENTY DECIDE TO RESIDE IN VIENNA. GOA SHOULD, HOWEVER, BE PROPERLY INFORMED WHEN, AND IF, MINDSZENTY DECIDES TO COME TO VIENNA. GOA WOULD EXPECT CARDINAL MINDSZENTY TO LIVE LIFE OF “RETIRED AND DISTINGUISHED ALIEN” AND TO ABSTAIN FROM ANY POLITICAL ACTIVITY OR EXPRESSION.

3. IN MAKING DECISION TO ADMIT MINDSZENTY FOR RESIDENCE WHENEVER HE SHOULD APPLY, GOA REJECTED ARGUMENT THAT MINDSZENTY RESIDENCE IN VIENNA WOULD CONSTITUTE IMPEDIMENT TO GOOD AUSTRO–

HUNGARIAN RELATIONS. IT WAS CONSENSUS OF CABINET MEMBERS PRESENT THAT, IF ANY IMPEDIMENT IS POSED BY MINDSZENTY BEING IN VIENNA, IT IS TO DEVELOPMENT OF RECENT RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN VATICAN AND HUNGARY (WHICH IS PROBLEM FOR VATICAN TO ASSESS). MOWINCKEL.

október 15, péntek

283. BPB0501[276–277], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [078–079] – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: SecState, Amembassy Rome, 2 pp.

A magyar sajtó október 14-én hozta a hírt: a Vatikáni Államtitkárság értesítette a Magyar Püspöki Kart, hogy az 1957. évi intézkedéseket eltörölték. A papok politikai tevékenységének kérdésében a jövőben a Püspöki Kar saját hatáskörben dönthet. A jelentés kitér arra, hogy itt a kiközösített papokról van szó. Feltételezi, hogy a kiközösítés visszavonása kapcsolatban áll Mindszenty bíboros kiutazásával. Kéri a római nagykövetség helyzetelemzését.

Budapest 2028

SUBJECT: Hungarian-Vatican Relations

REF: Budapest 1965

1. Hungarian press October 14 carries short announcement that Vatican Secretary of State has informed Hungarian Bench of Bishops that Vatican measures of July 1957 have been cancelled. These measures reserved to the Vatican the right to grant permissions to Hungarian Catholic clergy to hold public office. This right has now been transferred to the Bench of Bishops, and the latter has received authority from Rome to “settle matters in this connection.”

2. Our understanding is that the Vatican measures of 1957 resulted in excommunication action against some of the most prominent members of the group of Hungarian Catholic clergy, usually called peace priests, who were willing to accept public office in the absence of Vatican [./.] authorization to do so. It would seem that the new Vatican action clears the way for the removal of the excommunication sanction and other disciplinary measure which may have been taken.

3. We assume that this move on the part of the Vatican is part of the arrangements reached in the GOH–Vatican discussions which led to

the departure of Cardinal Mindszenty. We would be interested in hearing what else Embassy Rome may be able to find out concerning other aspects of the discussions (reftel).

MEEHAN

október 27, szerda

284. BPB0501[278], BPB0606[0410], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [076] – Távirat, Amembassy Vienna küldi: Amembassy Budapest, 1 p.

Ford személyesen átadta az emlékiratokat Mindszenty bíborosnak október 27-én 16 órakor és elismervényt kapott tőle.

CONFIDENTIAL VIENNA 6821

SUBJECT: MINDSZENTY MEMOIRS

REF: BUDAPEST 2101

FORD PERSONALLY DELIVERED MEMOIRS TO CARDINAL MINDSZENTY 4 P.M. OCTOBER 27 AND RECEIVED RECEIPT FROM CARDINAL. MOWINCKEL.

október 29, péntek

285. BPB0501[280, 281] – Távirat, s. d., Amembassy Budapest küldi: Amembassy Vienna, 1 p.

Mindszenty bíboros személyes följegyzéseinek, újságkivágásainak és könyveinek Bécsbe szállításáról. Első szállítmány 22 csomagban október 31-én érkezik. Kérdezi, mikor küldjék a második szállítmányt. Kéri Mons. Zagon véleményét.

BUDAPEST 2101

For Ford

1. Upon telephone request from Monsignor Zagon, we are arranging to transport Cardinal Mindszenty's personal papers, newspaper files and books to him in Vienna.

2. We intend make shipment in two sections, both to be forwarded by pouch in Embassy vehicle driven by Embassy officer.

3. First shipment, consisting of 22 pouches containing personal papers and newspaper files, will be driven to Vienna on Sunday, October 31, by Embassy officer Victor Maffei. He will deliver shipment to Pazmaneum same afternoon.

4. We will advise when second shipment to be made. Anticipate no later than second week of November.

5. Request you communicate foregoing to Zagon, and arrange for unloading and storing at Pazmaneum Sunday afternoon.

7. (sic!) Please confirm that these arrangements agreeable to Zagon.
APuhan

286. BPB0501[294–295], BPB0607[0629–0630] – Levél, Illing küldi Puhan nagykövetnek, 2 pp.

Beszámol Mindszenty római konfliktusairól. Érkezésének másnapján depresszióba esett, panaszkodott távozása miatt és támadta a vatikáni elöljárókat, különösen Casarolit, hogy rossz megállapodást kötött a magyar kormányval. A bíboros elutasította, hogy másnap a pápával koncelebráljon a Szixtusz-kápolnában. Sajtókonferenciát akar tartani Rómában. A római magyar papok, mintegy ötven, szerencsére eltanácsolták ettől és biztosították arról, hogy kiutazása helyes döntés volt. Ugyanígy a konzervatív bíborosok, mint Ottaviani és Antoniutti. Cheli elmondta, hogy sohasem látott egy ilyen keményfejű, nehéz embert. Bizonyos abban, hogy a bíboros bármely típusú kormányval konfliktusba kerülne, beleértve saját egyházát is. Illing azzal zárja levelét, hogy kifejezi örömét és meglegedését, hogy e régi problémának megoldásában segédkezhetett.

I believe the enclosed memorandum which we prepared for Assistant Secretary Hillenbrand covers all questions raised in Budapest's 1985. There is little possibility of obtaining more information on Hungarian-Vatican relations at this time. I shall, of course, report any new developments which may come to my attention.

I am certain the Vatican is as relieved as we are to have Cardinal Mindszenty comfortably settled in the Pazmenum. The day after his arrival in Rome, he became very depressed, lamented having departed your Embassy and sharply attacked the Vatican authorities, particularly Casaroli, for making him a pawn in their "unwise" dealings with the Hungarian Government. At first the Cardinal refused to consider celebrating mass with the Pope in the Sistine Chapel the following day. He even announced his intention to hold a press conference in Rome. He said he wished to consult with a group of prominent Hungarian emigres in Rome before taking a final decision. Five or so Hungarians visited him that same afternoon and fortunately they all advised against holding any press conference and, perhaps more important, freely assured him that his decision to leave Hungary had been

right. A number of staunchly conservative Cardinals like Ottaviani and Antoniutti also called on Mindszenty and expressed agreement with his decision to depart Hungary. Much to everyone's relief, Mindszenty has subsequently settled down and now seems firmly convinced that he took the right decision. Cheli told me he has never seen such a hard-headed, difficult man in his life. He feels sure the Cardinal would have difficulty getting along with any kind of government, including one run by his own Church. [./.] It has been a great pleasure and most interesting for me to have worked with your Embassy on the resolution of this long-term problem.

With best wishes.

Very sincerely yours,
Robert F. Illing [signed]
Assistant to Ambassador Lodge

Enclosure:

Memorandum to Ass't Secretary Hillenbrand

287. BPB0501[296–298], BPB0607[0626–0628] – Memorandum, 3 pp.

Cabot Lodge római nagykövet följegyzésében Mons. Cheli október 27-i információit rögzíti. Mindszenty kiutazásával a Vatikán folytathatja tárgyalásait a magyar kormányval, melyet 1970 októberében megszakítottak, mert a Mindszenty-kérdésre koncentráltak. A tárgyalások újra kezdésének napja augusztus 16-a, Casaroli, Cheli és Ijjas az egyházi részről, Bényi József és Misur tanácsos a quirináli nagykövetségről. Mindszenty kiutazása Péter János külügyminiszter látogatását követően került napirendre. Cheli hangsúlyozta, hogy májustól szeptemberig kizárólagosan Mindszentyvel foglalkoztak. Kisberk esztergomi kinevezése is ennek része, és sajátos módon Kisberk volt Mindszenty jelöltje is. Magyar részről az volt az egyetlen feltétel, hogy Mindszenty ne foglalkozzék politikával külföldön, nem tértek ki arra, hol lakják, hova utazhat, megtarthatja-e címét. Cheli elmondta még, hogy nincs szándék Mindszenty lemondására, de úgy gondolja, 80. évének betöltése küszöbön áll, amikor reményei szerint beadja lemondását ugyanúgy, mint más bíborosok. Az október 16-i kétoldalú tárgyalások eredményeként Cheli reméli, hogy a közeljövőben néhány megüresedett püspök széket betölthető lesz. A magyar fél beleegyezett, hogy liberalizálják a 22. sz. rendelet értelmezését, a püspökök és más papi állások betöltését illetően. Hosszabb távon a Vatikán kinevezne egy nem rezidens (utazó) apostoli delegátust Magyarországra, aki rendszeresen látogatná Magyarországot és tartaná a kapcsolatot az állami és az

egyházi vezetőkkel. Egyelőre nincs szó diplomáciai kapcsolatok létesítéséről. Nincs megegyezés a vallásoktatásról és az elkobzott egyházi vagyonról. Még mindig vannak bebörtönzött papok, de a magyar kormány szerint köztörvényes bűnözők, s a Vatikán nem lát arra lehetőséget, hogy közbenjárjon érdekükben. Öt szerzetesrendről ír és azok vallásoktatási tevékenységéről. A politikai téren szerepet vállaló papok kiközösítésének visszavonása már egy évvel ezelőtti döntés volt, és a püspöki kar kérésére történt, nem Cheli megbeszéléseinek volt eredménye a magyar kormány tényezőikkel. A kihirdetéssel azért késlekedtek, hogy szükség esetén előhozhassák ezt is aduként a Mindszenty-kérdésben. Ezért nem hirdették ki október 14-éig, Mindszenty távozását követően. Mivel egészen Rómába érkezéséig nem volt biztos, hogy Mindszenty bíboros Bécsben fog letelepedni, azért a Vatikán októberig nem kérte hivatalosan az osztrák kormányt. Ez most megtörtént a bécsi nunciuson keresztül. Cheli elmondta még, hogy Mindszenty most a Pázmáneumban emlékiratait írja, és bizonyos abban, hogy Mindszenty nyugodt életet fog vezetni és nem foglalkozik a politikával.

*

From: Cabot Lodge, Rome

To: Hillenbrand (EUR-Assistant Secretary)

In response to the points raised by Assistant Secretary Hillenbrand concerning Hungarian–Vatican relations, Mr. Illing obtained the following information from Msgr. Giovanni Cheli on October 27.

Now that the Mindszenty question is settled, Cheli said, the Vatican can continue its routine discussions with the Hungarians which were interrupted in October 1970, all intervening talks having centered on moving the Cardinal. These talks were resumed on August 16 in Rome between Casaroli, Cheli and Bishop Ijjas from the Church, and Ambassador Jozsef Benyi and Counselor Misur from the Hungarian Embassy to Italy.

Cheli said that a serious effort to arrange Mindszenty's departure began following the Peter visit. Rumors that the groundwork was laid by former Hungarian Ambassador Szall are untrue. Cheli reemphasized that conversations held with the Hungarians from May through September dealt exclusively with Mindszenty's departure. The naming of Msgr. Imre Kisberk as Apostolic Administrator of Esztergom should be viewed exclusively as part of the Mindszenty settlement. Kisberk was on the list of candidates which the Vatican submitted to the Hungarians in August. Incidentally, Kisberk was Mindszenty's preference as Apostolic Administrator.

Cheli insists that the only condition the Hungarians [./.] imposed for Mindszenty's departure was that the Cardinal not engage in political activities. Once outside Hungary, the government has no particular interest in where Mindszenty goes, where he lives, or how long he retains his titles. Cheli said there is no intention to force Mindszenty to resign as Archbishop Primate of Esztergom. However, he sees no reason that an exception should be made for Mindszenty and therefore hopes that Mindszenty himself will submit a resignation by his 80th birthday as the Pope has urged all Cardinals to do. Although Kisberk is definitely not a contender, the Vatican is thinking of various candidates as successor to Mindszenty, but does not plan to consider the matter concretely until the time comes.

As an outcome of the bilateral talks resumed on October 16, Cheli foresees in the near future the possibility that a few vacant dioceses will be filled. The Hungarians have agreed to some liberalization in interpreting Decree 22 which governs the naming of bishops and other clergy. In the long range, he sees the possibility of the Vatican naming a non-resident Apostolic Delegate to Hungary. This official would visit Hungary periodically, having contact with civil and religious authorities. The establishment of diplomatic relations is not considered at all likely.

No agreements or improvements are on the horizon concerning religious education or for confiscated Church property. There are still a number of arrested priests, but as the Hungarian Government insists they are being held for commission of crimes, the Vatican sees no chance of [./.] interceding on their behalf. There are now only about five religious orders authorized to operate in Hungary (Franciscans, Benedictines, on other order of men, and two orders of sisters). These orders are all engaged in religious education.

Cheli said that the Vatican decision to return to Hungarian bishops the right to decide on excommunication of priests who engaged in certain political activities – only three are involved – was decided over one year ago. The Vatican took this decision as the result of repeated requests from the Hungarian episcopate, not as a result of Cheli's talks with Hungarian authorities. At the time of the negotiations on Cardinal Mindszenty's departure it was decided to hold the announcement of the decision on abeyance in the event additional pressure was needed to move the Hungarian Government on Mindszenty. For this reason the decision was not announced until October 14, following Mindszenty's departure.

Since it was not completely certain until after his arrival in Rome that Cardinal Mindszenty would finally settle in Vienna, the Vatican did not request Austrian approval until October. This was done through the

Nuncio in Vienna, Archbishop Rossi. Cheli said Mindszenty is now busy writing at the Pazmaneum, the Hungarian seminary in Vienna where he is now living. He feels quite sure that Mindszenty will live a quiet life, steering clear of any politically embarrassing activities.

N. B.

Two more records see in Addendum, page 314.

Két további iratot l. a 314. oldalon.

október 30, szombat

288. BPB0501[282] – Levél, Meehan Maffeihez, 1 p.

Maffei, a budapesti nagykövetség munkatársa, október 31-én a felsorolt dobozokat szállította a Pázmáneumba. Csatolja az átvételi elismervényt, Vecsey József aláírásával.

Please deliver the following to the Pazmaneum in Vienna October 31:

| | |
|------------|------------------------------|
| 11 cartons | Newspapers |
| 5 cartons | Contents of file cabinet # 1 |
| 2 cartons | Contents of file cabinet # 2 |
| 5 cartons | Contents of file cabinet # 3 |
| 2 cartons | Contents of book case |

You should also get an acknowledgement of receipt of the above from the Pazmaneum on delivery.


I herewith acknowledge receipt of the above, delivered to the Pazmaneum, Vienna, October 31, 1971.

Dr. Josef Vecsey [signed]

október 31: vasárnap

289. BPB0501[283] – Puhan, menetlevél Mr. Victor E. Maffei számára 1 p.

290. BPB0501[284–285] – Diplomáciai csomag bizonyítvány, Mr. Maffei...
22 Diplomatic Pouches, from Budapest to Vienna, 1 p.



3. Nixon elnök levele VI. Pál pápához, 1971. november 29.
Jelzetét lásd fönt. Mi jelzetünk: BPB0501[309].

1971. NOVEMBER

November hónap Puhan nagykövet Illinghez írt levelével kezdődik, amelyből megtudható, hogy Cabot Lodge római nagykövet és helyettese, Illing nélkül nem tudta volna elérni Mindszenty távozását. A második és befejező fuvar Mindszenty könyveivel, stb, 10 csomag, előzetes egyeztetést követően, november 9-én kedden érkezik meg, átvévő: Galavits Geraldine kedvesnővér. A hónap végén sajátos intermezzo: a bécsi amerikai nagykövetség portása, a láthatólag magyar származású Ferenc Miklavzic (?) minden elérhető személyen és címen sürgeti a Bécsbe látogató Clem Scerbackot, hogy keresse föl a bíborost. Scerback azonban ezt nem tartja feladatának, viszont részletesen informálja Puhan nagykövetet, visszaérkezését követően. November 29-i dátummal olvashatjuk Nixon elnök válaszlevelét VI. Pál pápának (A pápa előbb megköszönte neki, hogy Mindszentyt vendégül látták a budapesti amerikai nagykövetségen). Mowinckel hó végi leveléből megtudható, hogy Mindszenty még igénybe vette volna az amerikai orvos szolgáltatait. Puhan és Mowinckel, ill. Puhan és Meehan levelezéséből kitűnik, hogy az amerikai diplomácia nem kíván többé a bíboros szolgálatára állni. A hó utolsó följegyzésében van egy Mindszentyre nézve terhelő kijelentés, miszerint a bíboros több csatornán keresztül tartotta a kapcsolatot. A hangsúly jelzi, hogy ezt az amerikaiak a múltban nem szívesen nézték.

november 1, csütörtök

291. BPB0501[293], BPB0607[0625] – Levél, Puhan nagykövet Illinghez, 1 p.

Megköszöni október 29-i levelét, különösen kommentárját Mindszenty bíboros bécsi letelepedésével kapcsolatosan. A bíboros valóban nehéz ember. Római érkezését követő magatartása egyáltalán nem lep meg. Jól ismertük őt, depresszióit. Én is – mint a Pápa – ismerem tartózkodását a velem való személyes találkozástól, stb. Visszatekintve azonban, távozása mindenkinek javára várt, leginkább magának a bíborosnak, de nekünk is, a Vatikánnak is, a magyar kormánynak is. – Ezt követően elismerő szavakat ír Illingnek, utalva április 23-i levelére, amely az első reménysugár volt arra nézve, hogy Mindszenty kiutazása elintézhető. Lodge nagykövet és Illing nélkül nem tudták volna tető alá hozni.

Thank you for your letter of October 29 and its enclosure on Hungarian–Vatican relations. I fully appreciate your comments on Vatican feelings concerning Cardinal Mindszenty's settling in the Pazmaneum. The Cardinal is indeed a difficult man. His actions upon his arrival in Rome do not surprise me at all. We came to know him well, his moods of depression; I too – like the Pope – was confronted with his unwillingness to meet with me, etc., etc. In retrospect, however, I regard the ending of his exile here and his departure for Rome and Vienna as benefitting all concerned, foremost the Cardinal himself, but also us, the Vatican and the Hungarians. I am happy the venture was successful.

In this connection I want to reiterate what I said in a somewhat different way in an earlier letter to you. Your first letter to me of April 23 looked like a ray of hope in an otherwise rather bleak sky. Until Cabot Lodge and you got into this thing, we were working a pretty clogged up channel with little hope of success. From Ambassador Martin I learned recently of your personal role in this work. My compliments. I hope to meet you some time.

Sincerely,
Alfred Puhan [not signed]
Ambassador

292. BPB0501[286, 287] (2x) – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: Amembassy Vienna, dátum nélkül, 1 p.

Második fuvar, kilenc könyvsomaggal, mely november 7-én vasárnap érkezik. Ismét Maffei kíséri. Közvetlenül a Pázmáneumba vinnék és rakodnának, a délután folyamán. Kéri, hogy értesítse a bíboros titkárságát és egyeztesse az időpontot.

*

Budapest 2137

FOR FORD

SUBJECT: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY'S EFFECTS

REF: BUDAPEST 2101

1. Will forward second shipment, consisting of 9 pouches containing books, on Sunday, November 7. Maffei will again accompany. Unless you instruct to contrary, he will go directly to Pazmaneum and unload. He expects to arrive mid-afternoon. Please advise Cardinal's secretary and confirm this timing agreeable.

2. Would be grateful if Embassy can provide quarters for Maffei for one night. Please advise.

PUHAN

november 5, hétfő

293. BPB0501[288, 289] – Távirat, Amembassy Budapest küldi: Amembassy Vienna, 1 p.

A november 4-i Ford-Meehan üzenetváltásra hivatkozva, a második fuvar november 9-én kedden érkezik, Donald B. Kursch követségi munka - társsal.

BUDAPEST 2155

Confirming Ford-Meehan telecon of November 4, Embassy officer Donald B. Kursch will arrive afternoon of Tuesday, November 9, with final shipment of Cardinal Mindszenty's files and books. Unless we hear to contrary, will assume arrangement satisfactory for Embassy and Pazmaneum.

PUHAN

november 7, szerda

294. BPB0501[290] – Puhán, menetlevél Mr. Donald B. Kursch számára, 1 p.

november 8, csütörtök

295. BPB0501[291] – Levél, Meehan Kurschhoz, 1 p.

A levél végül is tíz könyvsomagról ír. A levél alján Galavits Geraldine nővér aláírása, az átvétel igazolására, november 9. dátummal.

Please deliver the following to the Pazmaneum in Vienna November 9:
10 cartons Miscellaneous books

You should also get an acknowledgement of receipt of the above from the Pazmaneum on delivery.

I herewith acknowledge receipt of the above, delivered to the Pazmaneum, Vienna, November 9, 1971.

Sister Geraldine Galavits [signed]

november 11: vasárnap

296. BPB0501[292] – Távirat, Amembassy Vienna küldi: Amembassy Budapest, 1 p.

Az osztrák püspöki kar háromnapos ülését követő sajtókonferencián König bíboros azt nyilatkozta, hogy Mindszenty bíboros értesítette a magyar kormányt, hogy nem fog lemondani hivatalairól. König szerint Mindszenty könyvet ír a magyar egyházról. Kérdésre válaszolva König megjegyezte, hogy az egyházi helyzet Magyarországon javult Mindszenty távozása óta.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE VIENNA 7176

SUBJECT: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY

AT PRESS CONFERENCE FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF THREE-DAY CONFERENCE OF AUSTRIAN BISHOPS, VIENNA CARDINAL KOENIG DECLARED THAT CARDINAL MINDSZENTY HAS INFORMED GOVERNMENT OF HUNGARY THAT "HE WILL NOT RESIGN FROM HIS OFFICES". ACCORDING TO KOENIG MINDSZENTY IS CURRENTLY ENGAGED IN WRITING A BOOK ON HUNGARIAN CHURCH. IN REPLY TO QUESTION, KOENIG OBSERVED THAT "(RELIGIOUS) CLIMATE IN HUNGARY HAS IMPROVED SINCE DEPARTURE OF CARDINAL MINDSZENTY". HUMES

november 17, szombat

297. BPB0501[299], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [071] – Távirat, Amembassy Vienna küldi: Amembassy Budapest, Rome, 1 p.

Mindszenty bíboros felhívta ma, a találkozó rövid volt, és az volt a célja, hogy kifejezze köszönetét neki és a nagykövetségnek a segítségért, különösen az emlékiratokat és a személyes holmikat illetően.

CONFIDENTIAL VIENNA 7343

CARDINAL MINDSZENTY CALLED ON ME TODAY. MEETING WAS VERY BRIEF AND HIS SOLE PURPOSE WAS TO THANK ME AND THE EMBASSY FOR ASSISTANCE WE HAVE PROVIDED. ESPECIALLY IN CONNECTION WITH HIS MEMOIRS AND PERSONAL BELONGINGS. HUMES

november 21, szerda

298. BPB0501[306, 307] – Levél, Ferenc Miklavzic, 1 p.

Fontos üzenet van Mindszenty bíborostól, kapcsolatot keres. A föl - jegyzés írója a bécsi amerikai követség portása, címzettje: Clem Scerback, cf. 300. sz.

Vienna, 21. XI. 71.

Dear Sir!

I have an urgent message for You from Kardinal Mindszenty. – Please call me today afternoon at my home, or Monday at the Embassy Ext. 2321.

Thank You. Yours truly

F. Miklavzic [signed]

(FERENC MIKLAUZIC)

home number: 57-79-244

november 22-23, csütörtök-péntek

299. BPB0501[300–301] – Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation (by telephone), ad Amembassy Budapest e Amembassy Roma, 2 pp.

Washingtonban készült följegyzés, telefonhívást követően, megküldik a budapesti és római nagykövetségnek. Washington Star november 16-i száma kapcsán, végül is a hír nem bizonyult komolynak.

PARTICIPANTS: Donald Henderson, US Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Herbert E. Wilgis, EUR/CHP

COPIES: EUR/CHP (2) USIA Amembassy BUDAPEST
EUR/P H Amembassy ROME

Mr. Henderson called me on November 22 and referred to the story in the November 16 edition of the Washington Star in which Cardinal Mindszenty was quoted as having criticised the US for the role that CIA propaganda and the VOA player in encouraging the Hungarian revolution of 1956. Mr. Henderson asked if the Cardinal had actually made

such statements upon his arrival in Rome in September, as the Star claimed in the article.

I told Mr. Henderson that while I did not have 100% knowledge of what the Cardinal had said, I had read his public statements closely and had seen no such statement. Furthermore, although the Cardinal does not agree with some aspects of US policy toward Eastern Europe, I would be surprised if he had in fact issued such a statement.

On November 23 I called Mr. Henderson to advise him that we had checked with the author of the Star story, who could not give us any authoritative reference substantiating the remarks attributed to Cardinal Mindszenty. It therefore appeared to me that the story was based on hearsay. I added that I knew the Cardinal, knew that he had been deeply disappointed that the revolution of 1956 had not succeeded, but also strongly doubted that he would issue a statement critical of US policy in 1956 upon his departure from our [./.] Embassy at Budapest after almost fifteen years.

Mr. Henderson agreed that there did not appear to be any foundation to the Star story and thanked me for my assistance.

300. BPB0501[302–303] – Memorandum, Clem Scerback Ferenc Miklavzicről, 2 pp.

Följegyzése arról, hogy Ferenc Miklavzic minden követ megmozgatott, hogy elérje: látogassa meg Mindszenty bíborost. Ő nem látogatta meg, már azért is, mert a bíboros valami pénzt akar Amerikából. A följegyzés fontosabb fordulatai visszaköszönnék a 301. sz. dokumentumban.

1. I arrived in Vienna on Tuesday, Nov. 16, went to a cocktail party that evening given by John Jacobs, the RPO boss, and there met and spoke with John Mowinckel.

2. In general terms I informed him of the substance of the Illing letter without telling him such a letter existed. I explained that the Cardinal, by fueding first with Konig, and now with Rome, too, would obviously be looking for certain kinds of administrative assistance, and with the U.S. government next door, we were the likely choices, Mowinckel said that he had just learned that the Cardinal was paying a call on the Ambassador the next morning.

3. The entire conference group stayed at the Hotel Bohemia. The thing we were there for kicked off at 6 p.m. Wednesday, and we stayed at the hotel, owned by the Czechoslovak government.

4. Starting Thursday morning, I began to get a veritable stream of messages, by phone, with notes left in my box, to come to see Cardinal Mindszenty on "urgent business." Some people who so advised me included, Phil Arnold, the PAO; Ted Arthur, from USIA; John Daly, the Amerika-Haus Director; the receptionist at the USIS office, not to mention Embassy Receptionist Ferenc Miklavzic (see note attached) who phoned me early Nov. 22 and I was checking out of the hotel. I ignored all these messages, and, in all fairness to the Americans at least, they understood that I was not going to accept the invitation.

5. Miklavzic is the Embassy receptionist, who seems taken up with the Mindszenty mistique. He speaks Hungarian. He was upset that I was not going to see the Cardinal when I entered the Embassy Monday morning to get Frank's medicine, and he even stood outside the door in the cold to watch me drive off, trying to make sure whether I would or would not go to the Pazmaneum. I am convinced that with him in his job, the Cardinal will know of all traffic into the Embassy and out. Miklavzic's one argument to me, for instance, was "the Cardinal likes to see people and old friends from Budapest," but I am quite satisfied that there is more to it than that. (He sent Doris Tilton a note saying he had received no money lately from the U.S., and would she send him the documents, whatever they are. The Cardinal apparently thinks we are still supposed to funnel money to him).

ADDENDUM: A Hungarian-speaking priest was steered over to USIS to see a "Hungarian speaking officer there," namely JOT peter Beckehazi. He needed research assistance, and it was seriously being considered to assign a USIS local to the project. While the Embassy seems to have quashed this, after I expressed horror at the thought, I was deeply torubled by how such things can get started in Vienna with no checking upward for policy approval. It is their Embassy, but, egad!

Clem [signed] [./.] One thing need patching – para 2 – "He was advised to do so ...etc"

Rather:

The source of these messages and pleas, transmitted through Embassy, USIS and even visiting USIA personnel, seems to have been your Embassy receptionist, Ferenc Miklavzic, who left no stone unturned to pressure Clem, who had no such intention at this time to visit the Cardinal Miklavzic seemed to be functioning as the Cardinal's aide in this respect and appeared deeply disappointed when Clem drove off without visiting the Pazmaneum.

Clem [signed]

301. BPB0501[304–305] – Levél, Puhan nagykövet Mowinckelhez, 2 pp.

Tájékoztatja arról, hogy az amerikai nagykövetség magyar származású portása minden áron el akarta érni a Bécsben időző Clem Scerbackot, hogy tegye tiszteletét Mindszenty bíborosnál. Attól tart, hogy Mindszenty, akinek ismeri nézeteit mind a Vatikánról, mind König bíborosról, ismét az amerikaiakat használja fel saját céljaira. Továbbá valami pénzt keres, amit kijövedele óta nem kapott volna kézhez, s ami az Egyesült Államokból várható. Nem akar beavatkozni a bécsi nagykövetség ügyeibe, de megírja fenntartásait Dr. McIntyre igénylésével kapcsolatosan is. A levél fordulataiban Clem Scerback megfogalmazása köszön vissza, cf. 300 sz.

*

I had not planned to write to you on this subject, although Lorane Schiff told me that she spoke to you some few days ago and that you would be interested in hearing what our views were on the Cardinal now that he is in Vienna.

Yesterday Clem Scerback returned with some rather alarming information. He said that while he was in Vienna he received a veritable stream of messages, by phone, with notes left in his box in the hotel, to come and see the Cardinal on “urgent business”. The source of these messages and pleas, transmitted through Embassy, USIS and even visiting USIA personnel, seems to have been your Embassy receptionist, Ferenc Miklavzic, who left no stone unturned to pressure Clem, who had no such intention at this time to visit the Cardinal. Miklavzic seemed to be functioning as the Cardinal’s aide in this respect and appeared deeply disappointed when Clem drove off without visiting the Pazmaneum.

What the Cardinal does now is none of my business. I would just like to reiterate what I said when I saw you and Emmett on that day in September in your office. Once he stepped over the sill of our Embassy on September 28 we ceased to have any kind of responsibility for him, having taken care of him for some fifteen years. I am not opposed to having any contact with him.

On the other hand, knowing his mind fairly well and knowing his view on the Vatican, Cardinal Koenig, and other matters, I am inclined to think that he has [./] written the Vatican off as he has Cardinal Koenig, and will now once again depend upon another U.S. Embassy to do his work for him. I am told he has sent a note here, saying he has received no

money lately from the United States and would like to know where such money is. Apparently he is of the view we are still supposed to funnel money to him.

I would just like to reiterate my concern lest he become a factor in United States–Hungarian relations again or worse for you, a factor in Austro–Hungarian relations, to say nothing of becoming an irritant in your relations with the Archbishop of Vienna, Cardinal Koenig. He is quite capable of trying something like this. The Hungarians, incidentally, have noticed that he has given an interview to Figaro which in their unofficial view is a violation of his agreement with the Vatican.

I should therefore like to urge that we temper our humanitarian instincts with good sense. There is no need for us to supply medical care for him, as apparently Dr. McIntyre was prepared to do. He is now free to seek the best medical care Vienna has to offer. I should like to have him less well informed than he appears to be now on Budapest traffic into your Embassy. Apparently by way of your receptionist he keeps track of who comes from where and can thus make a play to see the visitor. USIS in Vienna has apparently been approached for research assistance for him. This seems to have been quashed, but this is the kind of thing that bears watching.

Let me assure you, John, I have no interest in getting into Embassy Vienna's business. Nor have I any feelings about the Cardinal and his relations with the rest of the world, including the United States. I just would like to avoid creating a situation which will cause you and us difficulty in the future.

With kindest regards, I remain

Sincerely,
Alfred Puhán [not signed]
Ambassador

november 29: csütörtök

302. BPB0501[309], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [066] – Levél, Nixon elnök VI. Pál Pápához, 1 p.

VI. Pál pápa megköszönte Nixon elnöknek a 15 éves vendéglátást a budapesti nagykövetségen. Nixon elnök erre válaszol VI. Pál Pápának, eredeti aláírás. Fakszimiléje cf. 294.

Your Holiness:

It was very thoughtful of you to express your gratitude for the years Cardinal Mindszenty was our guest at the American Embassy in

Budapest. The United States Government was pleased to be able to assist his Eminence in his time of urgent need.

I know that people in all parts of the world were moved and impressed by the patience with which the Cardinal withstood his long ordeal. And I am sure that they shared the joy you felt in welcoming him to the Vatican.

You have my warmest good wishes, Your Holiness, and my very highest esteem.

Sincerely,
Richard Nixon [signed]

His Holiness
Pope Paul VI
Vatican City

303. BPB0501[316–317] – Levél, Mowinckel Puhan nagykövethez, 2 pp.

Mowinckel leveléből kiderül, hogy Mindszenty bíboros igényelte volna még Dr. McIntyre szolgálatait, amire a jövőben már nincs mód, Miklavzic Ferenc követségi alkalmazott pedig saját szakállára cselekedett. Nincs szándék arra, hogy a jövőben teljesítsék a bíboros kéréseit.

Dear Al:

I appreciate your last letter on the subject of Cardinal Mindszenty and the word of caution on letting him get a foot in the door.

Thanks to past conversations with you I have been all too aware of the pitfalls involved. This is why I was shocked when I was causally informed by Dr. McIntyre, after the fact, that his services had been called upon.

Clem Scerback, incidentally, passed on some of his forebodings on the subject to Emmett Ford, who had relayed them to me. The situation, I am happy to report, is not quite as serious as it may have seemed to Clem. There have been no real demands on us by the Cardinal with the exception of the one request that he be visited by Dr. McIntyre. The good Doctor has now been “advised” that future requests should be received politely but evasively.

With regard to the Embassy receptionist, we have applied what corrective measures seem necessary. Ferenc Miklavzic is a rather simple-minded Hungarian who seems virtually to worship the Cardinal. We have advised him that, while we have nothing to do with his association with the Church or the Cardinal during his free time, he is not to act as messenger or go-between without specific order from Emmett Ford.

Anyway, I want to assure you that we continue to be aware of the possibilities involved in preserving even minimal links with the Cardinal and that we have no intention of permitting our employees here [./.] to commit indiscretions in this regard.

On the positive side, it would seem that the Cardinal is not all that anxious to establish relations with yet another American Embassy if his three-minute call on Ambassador Humes is any evidence.

If you have further thoughts on this subject do not hesitate to pass them on. They will always be gratefully received.

With warmest regards, I remain,

Sincerely,

John W. Mowinckel [signed]

Deputy Chief of Mission

november 30, péntek

304. BPB0501[313–315] – Kézírásos följegyzés, 3 pp.

Cf. Őminenciája csatolt levelét Dorishoz [itt hiányzik]. Doris átadta neki az eredeti elszámolást, távozása előtt. Készíthetünk másod - példányt és elküldhetjük neki. Két kérdés: el kell dönteniünk, hogy közvet - lenül neki válaszoljunk-e, vagy a bécsi nagykövetségen keresztül. Talán inkább az utóbbi. Ha viszont közvetlenül válaszolunk, akkor minden válasz egy személyesen keresztül menjen, pl. rajtam keresztül. A lényeg az, hogy Őminenciája ne játszassa régi játékát, hogy több csatornát használ.

*

Pls. see attached letter from H. E. to Doris.

H.E. subject of his inquiry, Doris gave the original of attached accountability record before he left. We could make another copy and send it to him.

Apart from this, 2 points occur to me:

1) We should decide whether we should reply directly to H.E., on ... Emb.Vienna do it, on our instruction. [./.] There are pros and cons. Either way, but my inclination is to let Vienna do it, rather than have us get into direct correspondance.

2) If you decide that we should correspond directly, I recommend we centralize it, i.e. any correspondance with H.E. should be over one signa -

*ture, mine from example. We would issue instructions to effect.
Purpose is to make sure H.E. does not plan his old [./.] game of using
multiple channels.*

305. BPB0501[312] – Memorandum, From: The Ambassador, To: DCM, 2 pp.

Puhan följegyzése Meehan számára. A jövőben nem óhajt közvetlen levelezést a bíborossal, miután ő Bécsben van. Abban sem bizonyos, hogy erre a bécsi nagykövetség az alkalmas. A múltban más volt a helyzet, nem volt más semleges megoldás. Nincs ellenére, hogy küldjön egy másodpéldányt a pénzek elszámolásáról, bár a bíboros már kapott eredetit. Viszont a kérés mögött rejlik egy másik kérdés is: hol van a pénz, amit én a múltban meg szoktam kapni? Megmondjuk neki, hogy a jövőben közvetlenül kell tartsa a kapcsolatot South Benddel?

*

There is no doubt in my mind about point 1 in your note to me. I do not believe we should have direct correspondence with the Cardinal now that he is in Vienna. In fact, I believe he should be discouraged from engaging in such correspondence. Therefore, I don't believe we should reply to him directly.

That brings me to the second point and here I have some problems. I am not even sure the Embassy in Vienna ought to be the channel. When he was here in the Embassy, we of course used the Department of State and the Apostolic Delegate for sending communications from him and to him. It may not be feasible to have a more neutral intermediary. In that case, Vienna ought to be carefully instructed by us, preferably Emmett Ford. [./.] I don't relish the idea, tho, of having messages passed back and forth via Emmett Ford from him to us and from us to him.

There is another point on the substance of his request. I have no problems with having a duplicate made of the document already given to him. There seems to be more to his request, however, and that is "where is the money I used to receive in the past?"

Don't we have to tell him that this is not a matter to take up with us but with his sources in South Bend?

I think we had better talk about this a little more.

1971. DECEMBER

Decemberről mindössze hat dokumentumunk van, ebből kettőt emelünk ki. Az adventi lelkipásztori levél belpolitikai téren bonyodalmakat okozott Ausztriában. Az amerikaiak megtudják Kreisky osztrák kancellár hivatalából, hogy – bár Mindszenty ezt emlékirataiban bagatellizálta – az osztrákok azon a ponton voltak, hogy megfontolják: maradhat-e a bíboros Bécsben, ha politikai jellegű kijelentéseket tesz. A másik fontos információ egy elszámolás másodpéldánya, amelyből összecszerűen tájékozódhatunk a bíboros által a szegényeknek stb. ajándékozott segélyei felől az elmúlt 15 év folyamán.

december 2, vasárnap

306. BPB0501[308] – DepState, Szállítólevél, Nixon elnök VI. Pál Pápához írt levelének példánya, 1 p.

december 3, hétfő

307. BPB0501[310–311] – Levél, Puhan nagykövet Mowinckelhez, 2 pp.

Közös álláspont kialakítására kéri fel a Mindszenty bíborossal való kapcsolattartást illetően: lehetőleg egy kézben legyen a vele való levelezés. Ugyanis Mindszenty levélben fordult segítségért F. J. Meehan titkárnőjéhez, Doris Tiltonhoz, aki korábban is rendelkezésére állt. Javas - lata az, hogy az amerikai nagykövetség legyen a közvetítő.

*

Thank you for your letter of November 29. I had some misgivings, frankly, about offering advice on the Cardinal – it's always presumptuous to tell other posts how to suck eggs – but perhaps in this special case, having logged fifteen years of unique experience, Budapest did have something to offer. I hope so anyway, and I very much appreciate the spirit in which you took my suggestions. I have the feeling that the Cardinal will be giving you more business as time goes on, but perhaps I'm being unduly pessimistic.

I now turn to a practical matter concerning the Cardinal which came up recently and which raises questions of procedure that affect both you and us. He wrote a letter, copy enclosed, to Doris Tilton, who is Frank Meehan's secretary and who also did a lot of secretarial work for the Cardinal when he was here. The question is how to answer the Cardinal's inquiry.

So far as this Embassy is concerned, I do not much relish the prospect of the Cardinal writing to members of the staff indiscriminately. With him, one thing is apt to lead to another, and I have visions of multi-channel correspondence stretching on and on. I have therefore issued instructions that any mail received by members of my staff from the Cardinal on official matters is to be referred to me. Beyond this, I would rather not have this Embassy in direct communication with the Cardinal. What I propose is that Embassy Vienna act as an intermediary, if you have no difficulties with the idea. In the case of the letter to Doris Tilton, for example, I enclose a draft reply for our consideration, which would come from your office. [/.] Please let me know how this strikes you. I believe my suggestion has some merit, chiefly that of centralizing the matter of dealing with the Cardinal in one place.

With best regards.

Sincerely,
Alfred Puhan [not signed]
Ambassador

Enclosures: As stated

december 7, péntek

308. BPB0501[323], CF SOC 12-1 HUNG [063-064] – Távirat, Amembassy Vienna küldi: SecState, Amembassy Budapest, Rome, 1 p.

Részletesen beszámol a Mindszenty bíboros adventi lelkipásztori körlevele kapcsán kialakult politikai komplikációkról, valamint Dr. Vecsey József, a bíboros titkára nyilatkozatáról. Fontos információ Kreisky nem hivatalos reakciója, amelyet a kancellári hivatalból tudtak meg: Kreisky fel volt háborodva (szó szerint: dühöngött) Mindszenty magatartásával kapcsolatosan és ilyen értelemben informálta a bécsi nunciust is: a jövőben az osztrák kormány nem fogja tolerálni Mindszenty politikai nyilatkozatait és felül fogja vizsgálni a bécsi letelepedés engedélyezését, ha még egy ilyen eset előfordul.

CONFIDENTIAL VIENNA 7793

SUBJECT: MINDSZENTY STATEMENT DRAW PROTESTS

1. CARDINAL MINDSZENTY ISSUED PASTORAL LETTER TO HUNGARIANS IN FREE WORLD DECEMBER 3 CONTAINING PASSAGE "WITH FAITH AND TRUST IN GOD WE HAVE CROSSED THIS PROVISIONAL BUT DEADLY DANGEROUS STATE BORDER", REFERRING OF COURSE TO HIS DEPARTURE FROM HUNGARY. BURGENLAND GOVERNOR SENT LETTER OF PROTEST TO CHANCELLOR KREISKY IN WHICH HE CHARACTERIZED MINDSZENTY'S REMARK AS CHALLENGE TO INTEGRITY OF AUSTRIAN TERRITORY AND ADDING THAT BURGENLAND HAS "OVERCOME ALL HISTORICAL RESENTMENT TOWARD HUNGARY".

2. IN ATTEMPT TO SMOOTH THINGS OVER, CARDINAL'S SECRETARY VECSEY ISSUED STATEMENT THAT "PROVISIONAL AND DEATH-LADEN BORDER" MENTIONED BY MINDSZENTY REFERRED QUITE CLEARLY NOT 50-YEAR OLD AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN, BUT DEADLY IRON CURTAIN WHICH EVERY HUNGARIAN CONSIDERS AS BEING OF TEMPORARY EXISTENCE.

3. DESPITE KREISKY'S STATEMENT TO PRESS THAT IN VIEW OF THIS CLARIFICATION "GOA WOULD LET MATTER REST", WE LEARNED FROM EXCELLENT SOURCE IN CHANCELLOR'S OFFICE THAT KREISKY WAS FURIOUS AT MINDSZENTY'S REMARK AND SO INFORMED PAPAL NUNCIO WHO CALLED AT KREISKY'S REQUEST. GOA INFORMING MINDSZENTY AND PAPAL NUNCIO THAT IT WILL NOT TOLERATE ANY FURTHER POLITICAL PRONOUNCEMENTS FROM MINDSZENTY AND "WILL REVIEW ITS DECISION TO LET HIM REMAIN IN VIENNA" IF REPETITION OCCURS.
MOWINCKEL.

december 9, vasárnap

309. BPB0501[324] (2x) – Levél, Mowinckel Puhán nagykövethez, 1 p.

Hivatkozással december 3-i levélre, elfogadja a javaslatot, hogy a jövőben közvetítsen a bíboros felé, cf. melléklet (310. sz.).

Thank you for your letter of December 3, with your proposal that Embassy Vienna act as an intermediary between your Embassy and the Cardinal.

As you can see from the enclosed copy of my letter to the Cardinal we are happy to comply with your suggestion. You will note, and I hope will not take amiss, the fact that I added a word or two. I just couldn't resist adding something.

In the hope that the feeling you express in the last sentence, first paragraph, of your letter will not turn out to be accurate, I am sending you my very best wishes for a Merry Christmas and the happiest of New Years.

Sincerely,
John W. Mowinckel [signed]
Charge d'Affaires, a.i.

Enclosure

december 10, hétfő

310. BPB0501[318, 325] (2x) – Levél, Mowinckel Mindszenty bíboros-hoz, 1 p.

Hivatkozva november 9-én, a budapesti amerikai nagykövetségnek írt levelére, biztosítja a bíborost arról, hogy nem érkezett számára küldemény az Egyesült Államokból, távozása óta. Amennyiben ilyen érkezne, természetesen eljuttatják neki. Mellékeli a pénzügyi elszámolás újabb példányát, amelynek eredetijét távozása előtt adták át neki Budapesten.

Your Eminence:

With reference to your letter of November 9 to the American Embassy in Budapest, I am authorized to inform you that that Embassy has not received any further remittances for you from the United States since your departure. In the event that such remittances are received, the will, of course, be forwarded to you immediately.

As regards the statement of your financial account, I am taking the liberty of enclosing a further copy of the accountability record which, you may recall, was given to you prior to your departure from Budapest.

Respectfully yours,
John W. Mowinckel [not signed]
Charge d'Affaires, a.i.

Enclosure

311. BPB0501[319–322] – Számlakivonat, s. d., (másodpéldány, eredeti 1971. szeptember 24 lehetett) 1 p.

Elszámolás Mindszenty által 1966. szeptember 12 óta, ill. 15 év alatt átadott összegekről. Bevétel 334,500 Ft, a szegényeknek ebből 313,500 Forintot adományozott a követségi alkalmazottakon keresztül.

Records of Account prior to 1966 in Embassy, 1 p.
From Sept. 12, 1966 to date

| | |
|-----------------------------------------------------|-------------|
| Number of Checks Received | 35 |
| Amount in Dollars | \$ 3,445.00 |
| Amount in Forints after Cashing/Approx. 6 yrs. Fts. | 133,800 |

| | |
|-------------------------------------|-------|
| Checks on Hand as of 9/24/71 | NONE |
| Dollars on Hand as of 9/24/71 | \$ 30 |
| given to Hungarian Mailman | |
| upon instructions from the Cardinal | |
| Forint on Hand as of 9/24/71 | NONE |

| | |
|--------------------------------|--------------|
| In 15 years rec'd approx. Fts. | 334,500 |
| Amt. to Chars & other | 21,000 |
| Given to the Poor | Fts. 313,500 |

ADDENDUM

1971. június 23, szerda

312. BPB0407[57], CFB (3067) SOC-1 HUNG [027] – Telegram, incoming, from Amembassy Rome to SecState, Amembassy Budapest, 1 p.

SECRET ROME 3973

EXDIS

SUBJ: CARDINAL MINDSZENTY

REF: BUDAPEST 1088

ARCHBISHOP CASAROLI INFORMED DCM MORNING JUNE 23 THAT CHELI (WHO HAD RETURNED HERE FROM VIENNA) AND ZAGON WOULD LEAVE ROME TODAY AND WOULD BE IN BUDAPEST JUNE 24 TO SEE MINDSZENTY AS SCHEDULED.
MARTIN

313. BPB0407[53–56], RMNNSFB693 – Telegram, from Amembassy Budapest to SecState, Amembassy Rome, 4 pp.

EXDIS

SUBJECT: Koenig's call on Mindszenty

1. BEGIN SUMMARY. Cardinal Koenig spent most of three hours, including lunch, with Cardinal Mindszenty June 23. Mindszenty agreed to receive Monsignors Cheli and Zagon, who are expected to arrive in Budapest June 24. From the Chargé's debriefing of Koenig it is clear that his discussion of Mindszenty's future was preliminary and tentative. The real negotiation with Mindszenty still lies ahead in the Cheli-Zagon visit.
END SUMMARY.

2. Koenig told the Chargé that he found Mindszenty in good health and spirits. In contrast to previous visits, Mindszenty this time seemed mostly concerned to discuss his own personal future, rather than broad political and religious issues. Koenig seemed to consider this a good sign. [./.]

3. Koenig said he conveyed the Pope's desire to find the elements of a solution of Mindszenty's situation. With this end in view the Pope wished to send two trusted Vatican officials for discussion with Mindszenty. Koenig said he had mentioned Zagon by name, but not Cheli. Mindszenty

had been receptive and agreed to receive the Vatican representatives who, Koenig said, would arrive in Budapest June 24. (Koenig said he would ask Embassy Vienna to send us a message confirming Cheli-Zagon's arrival.)

4. Koenig said he had deliberately kept his discussion with Mindszenty in somewhat general terms. However, when questioned, Koenig said he had brought up the question of the memoirs and silence. He had told Mindszenty that he would be able to take the memoirs out of Hungary with him. He had not, however, brought up the point about posthumous publication. He said Mindszenty had been extremely interested in the memoirs question. On silence, Koenig said he had conveyed to Mindszenty that it was understood in Rome [./.] that there would not be any question of an attempt to impose total silence. Mindszenty would be free to travel, and - he apparently inferred - to speak. Koenig added to Chargé that of course Mindszenty would be subject to guidance in all of this.

5. The Chargé asked Koenig how long Cheli and Zagon were likely to stay in Budapest. Koenig said he thought for a few days. Zagon would do most of the talking with Mindszenty. Cheli would be somewhat in the background, basically to be available for discussions with Hungarian officials if necessary. Cheli had full powers for such discussions. Koenig said he would see Cheli and Zagon before they came to visit with Mindszenty. He intended to brief them carefully, and specifically would tell them to avoid getting into too much detail since, he felt, detailed discussions would give Mindszenty the opportunity to create difficulties.

6. The Chargé gave Koenig Ambassador Puhan's letter (State 110 041) before his meeting with Mindszenty. [./.] Koenig expressed thanks and said he was in full agreement with the Ambassador's view that publicity would be harmful. He intended to confine himself to confirming the fact of his visit, but without comment.

7. For Rome: Koenig asked that Embassy Rome pass the message to Casaroli as soon as possible that Cheli and Zagon should proceed with their plans to visit Mindszenty.

8. Koenig was accompanied by his secretary, Kirchschlaeger, a layman, doctoral candidate in theology, and son of the Austrian Foreign Minister. Kirchschlaeger was not present at the Cardinal's private meeting, but they invited him to join them for lunch.

9. Comment: The Koenig visit can be regarded as successful to the extent that Mindszenty has agreed to receive Cheli and Zagon, but no more than that. Clearly the main negotiation still lies ahead and the Vatican mission has not seriously come to grips yet with the main problem areas.

MEEHAN

1971. október 29, péntek

314. BPB0501[279], BPB0606[0409] – Telegram, incoming, from Amembassy Vienna to Amembassy Budapest, October 29, 1971, 1 p.

CONFIDENTIAL VIENNA 6865

SUBJECT: MINDSZENTY EFFECTS

REF: BUDAPEST 2101

1. SINCE ZAGON NOT RPT NOT IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE, ARRANGEMENTS OUTLINED IN REFTEL HAVE BEEN APPROVED BY MINDSZENTY SECRETARY VECSEY AFTER CONSULTATION WITH CARDINAL. VECSEY WILL HOLD HIMSELF READY TO ACCEPT SHIPMENT AT PAZMANEUM AFTERNOON OF OCTOBER 31.

2. MAFFEI SHOULD CONTACT MARINE GUARD AT EMBASSY ON ARRIVAL. MOWINCKEL

315. BPB0501[281] – Telegram, outgoing, from Amembassy BUDAPEST to Amembassy VIENNA, October 29, 1971, 1 p. See: No. 285. pages 288s.

BUDAPEST 2101

FOR FORD

1. Upon telephone request from Monsignor Zagon, we are arranging to transport Cardinal Mindszenty's personal papers, newspaper files and books to him in Vienna.

2. We intend make shipment in two sections, both to be forwarded by pouch in Embassy vehicle driven by Embassy officer.

3. First shipment, consisting of 22 pouches containing personal papers and newspaper files, will be driven to Vienna on Sunday, October 31, by Embassy officer Victor Maffei. He will deliver shipment to Pazmaneum same afternoon.

4. We will advise when second shipment to be made. Anticipate no later than second week of November.

5. Request you communicate foregoing to Zagon, and arrange for unloading and storing at Pazmaneum Sunday afternoon.

7. Please confirm that these arrangements agreeable to Zagon.

PUHAN

APPENDIX

Ezidáig az első kiadás anyagát közöltük, oldalhelyességre törekedve. Ebben a kiegészítésben három olyan levél szövegét hozzuk, amelyeket nem az eredetileg feldolgozott két levéltári egységben (4. doboz 7. őrzési egység, 5. doboz 1. őrzési egység) található, hanem a 6. doboz 7. őrzési egységében, amely – a NARA levéltárosai szívességből – a római amerikai nagykövetség anyagát tartalmazza, előrendezve. Ebben az 1971. esztendőre vonatkozóan három levélre figyeltünk föl, mindegyiket Illing jegyezte, kettőt hivatali főnökének, Henry Cabot Lodge Jr.-nak, Washingtonba, egyet pedig Herbert H. Wilgisnek, a State Department magyar referensének írt. Az első rögtön Péter János vatikáni látogatásának estéjén Mons. Chelivel történt telefonbeszélgetését foglalja össze, ezért különösen is figyelemre méltó:

A-1. BPB0607[0639–0640], Letter, Robert F. Illing to Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, April 19, 1971, 2 pp.

Rome, Italy

April 19, 1971.

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On April 16, I called on Msgr. Giovanni Cheli, Desk Officer for Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Romania in the Vatican Council for Public Affairs. After Casaroli he is probably their best man on Eastern Europe. The purpose of my call was to discuss his recent visit to Prague (reported by telegram). Since Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter had seen the Pope the morning of my call, our conversations naturally turned to Hungary. Cheli – or for that matter Casaroli – had not participated in the talks, so he could not comment, but he did discourse at length about Mindszenty.

His remarks on Mindszenty were very interesting and I received the definite impression that he hoped I would report them to Washington. They concern his ideas on how the Cardinal might be convinced to leave Hungary voluntarily. You will remember that when you were here last month we picked up a rumor from Mickey Wilson that the Holy See was planning to request the USG to pressure Mindszenty to leave our Embassy at Budapest. Cheli's remarks to me give substance at least to the fact that the

Vatican is thinking about new, unexplored means of resolving the Mindszenty problem.

According to Cheli, only another Hungarian Church leader could impress Mindszenty with the folly of continuing his self-imposed exile in our Embassy. This would have to be a ranking Hungarian Churchman whom Mindszenty knows and respects. Such a person must be carefully selected, and of course, approved by the Holy See. Naturally, Cheli added, the USG would also have to approve this Hungarian Churchman's access to Mindszenty.

Cheli considers König thoroughly unable to convince Mindszenty of anything, and for the Vatican repeatedly to send him to Budapest is a waste of time. Mindszenty is flattered to have the visit of a Cardinal, but considers König, as an Austrian and a younger man, hopelessly ignorant of the realities in Hungary. Mindszenty would reportedly view any Vatican emissary in the same light. Hence the only solution is to locate the right Hungarian.

Cheli believes such a Hungarian could delicately impress upon Mindszenty that his day has passed, that he is no longer a symbol of Hungarian opposition to the regime, and that by perpetuating his captivity he serves neither the Church, his country or himself. Mindszenty must also be made to realize that his treasured memoirs have no chance of being published if he dies in the U.S. Embassy. Certainly the USG would not publish them, and if we turn them over to the Vatican, as the Cardinal would surely will, the Vatican would most likely wait at least 50 years before publishing them. Obviously, either choice would not appeal to Mindszenty.

Cheli feels that the Hungarian Government is itching to get Mindszenty out of Hungary, mainly because he would be a greater problem for them dead than alive. If he dies in Hungary, the Government will be faced with the agonizing decision of where and how to bury him.

Warmest regards,

Sincerely yours,

Robert F. Illing [not signed]

Hon. Henry Cabot Lodge,
c/o Robert M. Beaudry,
Country Director, EUR/AIS,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

VAT: RFillig: ka 4/19/71

A-2. BPB0607[0638], Letter, Robert F. Illing to Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., April 21, 1971, 1 p.

Rome, Italy

April 21, 1971.

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

I had a talk with Monsignor Gaspari today about Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter's visit to the Vatican (reported by telegram). At one point in the conversation, Gaspari asked me whether there was any truth to rumors circulating in Washington a few months ago alleging USG interest in getting Cardinal Mindszenty out of our Embassy in Budapest. He added that Archbishop Raimondi had picked up and reported these rumors to the Vatican. I told him I was unaware of any changes in our views on Mindszenty or of any interest in forcing him out of our Embassy. Gaspari said that he and Raimondi had thought as much and had therefore dismissed the rumors.

Once again, it looks like there is something moving in the Vatican on Mindszenty. Gaspari posed the question very adroitly and I got the impression that it was not an afterthought.

Warmest regards,

Sincerely yours,

Robert F. Illing [not signed]

Hon. Henry Cabot Lodge,
c/o Robert M. Beaudry, Esquire,
Country Director, EUR/AIS,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

VAT: RFilling: ka 4/21/71

A-3. BPB0607[0624], Letter, Robert F. Illing to Herbert H. Wilgis, December 6, 1971, 1 p.

Rome, Italy

December 6, 1971

Herbert H. Wilgis, Jr., Esquire
EUR/CHP – Hungarian Desk Officer
Department of State, Washington, D. C.

Dear Herb:

Glad to know you are on the Hungarian Desk. It seems we were cooperating intimately on the Mindszenty departure and, at the time, I didn't even know you were there.

I received a clipping from Robin Sloan's question & Answer section of the November 16 *Washington Star*. In his answer to a reader's question, Sloan alleges that on his arrival in Rome Cardinal Mindszenty "loosed a blast at his hosts of 15 years, blaming our CIA and Voice of America broadcasts for sucking Hungarians into the armed uprising which the Russians crushed in 1956." This is utter nonsense. No such stories have appeared in the Italian press. I was at the airport on Mindszenty's arrival and the only thing he said, in Latin, was "a blessing on all you kind gentlemen come down to welcome me." Msgr. Cheli assures me that Mindszenty has never expressed anything but the deepest gratitude for the hospitality accorded him by the United States. Of course, it is no secret that he disagrees sharply with our policy in Hungary.

The Vatican was quite upset by Mindszenty's first pastoral letter, issued last week. It seems to have made reference to the "provisional borders" between Austria and Hungary. I am sure the Austrians were equally upset by such remarks.

There seems to be quite a polemic raging in America about our alleged plans to return the Crown of St. Stephen. One point often heard is that a condition of Mindszenty's departure was our promise to return the crown. As the negotiations for Mindszenty's departure were strictly between the Holy See and the GOH, I imagine it is easy to shoot down that argument. Also, the GOH was obviously so anxious to get rid of Mindszenty they needed no inducements to make him go. Hasn't the Department been able to put some balance in this argument?

Liliana joins me in wishing you, Jane and the family a Merry Christmas and best wishes for 1972.

Cordially yours,
Robert F. Illing [not signed]
Assistant to Ambassador Lodge

VAT: RFillling: ka 12/6/71

Concordance of the abbreviations

- 1st edition 2008 (digital numbers of the old photos) – 2nd edition 2012. (digital numbers of the new photos)
- HEF and number: This edition and No. of document.
- Copies in Central Files 1970–1973, Box No. 3068.
- Copies in the Nixon Presidential Files (RMN).

*

Figyelembe véve minden olyan dokumentum, amely a budapesti amerikai követségi fond hat dobozából a 4. doboz 7. őrzési egységében, illetve az 5. doboz 1. őrzési egységében került elhelyezésre, olyan további dokumentumok is, amelyek nem kerültek be ebbe a kötetbe. Ezen kívül figyelembe vettük az első kiadás óta megjelent amerikai és magyar nyelvű publikációkat, így:

- FRUS Nixon Administration Volumes, Vol. XXIX. Washington, D.C. 2008. – <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v29>
- Somorjai Ádám–Zinner Tibor, *Majd' halálra ítélve. Dokumentumok Mindszenty József élettörténetéhez*, Budapest 2008.
- Somorjai Ádám–Zinner Tibor, *Washingtonból jelentjük. A budapesti amerikai nagykövetség Mindszenty bíboros tevékenységére vonatkozó, 1971-ben keletkezett iratai*, in: Századok 144 (2010/1) 143–196.
- *Mindszenty bíboros követségi levelei az Egyesült Államok elnökeihez – Letters to the Presidents. Cardinal Mindszenty to the Political Leaders of the United States, 1956–1971*, Ed. by. Á. Somorjai, METEM Budapest 2011.
- Somorjai Ádám, *Sancta Sedes Apostolica et Cardinalis Ioseph Mindszenty. Documenta – Az Apostoli Szentszék és Mindszenty József kapcsolattartása, Tanulmányok és szövegközlések*, Vol. III/2. 1967–1971. METEM Budapest 2012.