

NEW APPROACHES  
IN A COMPLEX WORLD:  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,  
HISTORY AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

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L'Harmattan

*New approaches in a complex world.*  
*International relations, history and social sciences*



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# I. History



## NINETY YEARS OF TRIANON CRISIS-MANAGEMENT\*

### 1. Introduction

Few deny the fact that during the “short” twentieth century<sup>1</sup> Hungary has a number of pivotal national trauma; the tragedy of the Treaty of Trianon, signed on 4<sup>th</sup> June 1920 meant a historical shock for the country, which due to be considered rightly the largest Hungarian national disaster in the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

Because the peace treaty<sup>2</sup> legitimized the historical dismemberment of Hungary so that Western Hungary, Upper Hungary, Transcarpathia, Transylvania, the eastern part of the Great Hungarian Plain, Southern Hungary (Bácska, Bánát) and Croatia-Slavonia<sup>3</sup> was separated from Hungary.

As a result, the forced loss of territory reduced the historical territory of Hungary – not counting Croatia-Slavonia – from 282,870 km<sup>2</sup> to 92,963 km<sup>2</sup> and the population of the country from persons 18,264,533 to 7,615,117. The successor states of Czechoslovakia: 61 633 km<sup>2</sup> area and 3 517 568 people; Romania: 103 093 km<sup>2</sup> area and 5 257 467 people; Kingdom of Serbs, Croats

\* The study was written in and sponsored by the project “Társadalmi konfliktusok – Társadalmi jól-lét és biztonság – Versenyképesség és társadalmi fejlődés” (TÁMOP-4.2.2.A-11/1/KONV-2012-0069).

<sup>1</sup> Eric Hobsbawm began to use the concept in the international historical literature. He was the most famous British historian in the 20<sup>th</sup> century and his opinion was the “short” 20<sup>th</sup> century kept from 1914 to 1991. A lot of Hungarian historians feel his conception of their own. For example: PRITZ Pál: *Az a „rövid” 20. század. Történetpolitikai tanulmányok*. Budapest, Magyar Történelmi Társulat, 2005. Hobsbawm named the “long” 19<sup>th</sup> century the period from the French revolution (1789) to the beginning of World War I. (1914).

<sup>2</sup> The Treaty of Trianon was validated by the Hungarian National Assembly on July 26 1921. The text of 1921. years XXXIII. article: <http://www.1000ev.hu/index.php?a=3&param=7489> (28. September 2013) Some part of Treaty: RAFFAY, Ernő: *Trianon titkai*. Budapest, Tornado Dannenija, 1990. (Hereinafter referred as: RAFFAY, 1990.) 150-152., 165-184., ZEIDLER Miklós: *Trianon*. Budapest, Osiris, 2003. (Hereinafter referred as: ZEIDLER 2003.) 166-297.

<sup>3</sup> Borders in this time: SALLAI János: *Az államhatárok. Változó Világ* 58. Budapest, Press Publica, 2004. 59-81.

and Slovenes<sup>4</sup>: 20 551 km<sup>2</sup> area and 1 509 295 people; Austria: 4 020 km<sup>2</sup> area and 291 618 people; Italy<sup>5</sup>: 21 km<sup>2</sup> area and 49 806 people; Poland<sup>6</sup>: 589 km<sup>2</sup> area and 23 662 people were detached.

All territorial and population losses suffered was 189,907 km<sup>2</sup> and 10,649,416 people. That is the historical territory of Hungary lost 67% and the population of 58.3%. Based on data of the 1910 native census:

Czechoslovakia: out of 3 517 568 people 30,3 %,

Romania: out of 5 257 467 people 31,6 %,

Kingdom of SCS: out of 1 509 295 people 30,3 %,

Austria: out of 291 618 people 8,9 %,

Italy: out of 49 806 people 13,0 %,

Poland: out of 23 662 people 1,0 % identified themselves as Hungarians. In other words, from the 10 649 416 Hungarian citizens who came under foreign rule as a result of the Treaty of Trianon, 3 216 124 people declared themselves as native Hungarians in 1910.

Czechoslovakia: 1 066 000

Romania: 1 661 000

Kingdom of SCS: 458 000

Austria: 26 000

Italy: 6 500

Poland: 240 Hungarians were detached.<sup>7</sup>

This in turn meant that 30.2% of the Hungarian population came under the rule of the successor states. In addition, a very significant part of the detached Hungarian population, with the exception of the Transylvania, along the new borders, lived in relatively same array. Hungary's new borders were drawn up without any respect of the ethnic principles.

The freedom treaty contained besides the territorial and human losses many measures restrictive to the national sovereignty. Without being exhaustive

<sup>4</sup> Name of Yugoslavia between 1918 and 1929: Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes

<sup>5</sup> Means Fiume and vicinity of Fiume. The treaty originally declared the city free (Fiume Free State). The city was placed under Italian and the port district of Susak under Serb-Croat-Slovene authority after the Italian-Yugoslav agreement in January 1924. Italy annexed the area on 26<sup>th</sup> March 1924. TARJÁN Tamás M.: 1924. március 26. Az olasz állam annektálja Fiume városát. *Rubicon Online*, (29. July 2013.) [http://liveweb.archive.org/web/20130729215724/http://www.rubicon.hu/magyar/oldalak/1924\\_marcius\\_26\\_az\\_olasz\\_allam\\_annektalja\\_fiume\\_varosat/](http://liveweb.archive.org/web/20130729215724/http://www.rubicon.hu/magyar/oldalak/1924_marcius_26_az_olasz_allam_annektalja_fiume_varosat/)

<sup>6</sup> Szepesség located in the north of Tatra, 589 km<sup>2</sup> area.

<sup>7</sup> Source of statistical analysis ROMSICS Ignác: *A trianoni békeszerződés*. Budapest, Osiris, 2001. 229-230.; RAFFAY, 1990. 153-155.

here are just a few of these: number of the country's armed forces limited in 35 thousands, universal conscription prohibited and weapons production restricted. To supervise these measures a military monitoring Committee was sent to Hungary. And Hungary was committed to reimburse the caused damage of the war in the form of restitution, the amount to be laid down later, and ensure the principle of most favored nation compensation for the victorious power in international trade.

The seriously unjust decisions of the Treaty of Trianon caused economic, financial, political, military, social, ideological, social, transportation-, cultural, moral, etc. and last but not least mental distress for Hungarian people, which is perceptible in many ways today, and this could rightfully be declared the greatest national crisis experienced in the history of twentieth-century Hungary. The one that could not be treated in its fullness and could not be managed to find the right therapy by the present day<sup>8</sup>. This study can not undertake to do so also. However, it aims to introduce and briefly summarize the alternatives of the management of the Trianon trauma between 1920 and 2013. Focusing on the most important solutions, those that came up correctly in political way as potential opportunities to handle the crisis in the post-1920 period.

## *2. Opportunities between the world wars*

### **2.1 A The possible “zero” option. Proposal of Albert Apponyi, president of the Hungarian peace delegation**

The Hungarian government led by Prime minister Károly Huszár was called on by G.B. Clemenceau at the Paris Peace Conference on the 1<sup>st</sup> December 1919 to send representatives to the peace conference, for the purpose of taking the peace-terms. On January 5<sup>th</sup> 1920 the Hungarian peace delegation led by Count Albert Apponyi started off to Paris, where he handed over the lists containing the credentials and the position of the Hungarian party to the Supreme Council on January 14<sup>th</sup>. The next day Clemenceau, greeted the Hungarian delegation, and at the same time he told Apponyi the conditions of peace. Apponyi's could reflect on the draft on January 16<sup>th</sup>. While Apponyi explained the point of the Hungarian view, outlined the principle based on people's right to self-determination and the principle which was based on the Wilson-ideals and, which in the given situation meant the only satisfactory

<sup>8</sup> CSEPELI György: *Nemzet által homályosan*. Budapest, Századvég, 1992. 182-191.; ROMSICS Ignác: Nemzeti traumánk: Trianon. *Magyar Tudomány*. 1996/3. 272-281.

solution to settle the issue. This was a referendum in the areas that were about to be annexed; the results of the referendum were found to be acceptable for the Hungarian party in advance. Apponyi stated: [...] we have a very simple, but unique tool, the only one which we loudly demand to use, to have a clear view on this point. And this tool is a referendum. As long as we have this demand, we refer to Mr President Wilson's excellently great idea which said that no human group, nor any part of the population of the states could be placed, without its permission, as some cattle under the authority of a foreign state. On behalf of this great idea, which otherwise is an axiom of common sense and public moral, we are demanding the referendum in respect of those parts of our country that should be torn apart from us now. I declare that we submit ourselves ahead of the referendums result, whatever it may be. [...] Basically, this is our main wish, which we submitted to the Peace Conference. If you will not be convinced about our argument on historical Hungary in connection with our former territory, then we strongly recommend consultation with the interested. We submit ourselves the judging in advance.”<sup>9</sup>

It is debatable whether it was a correct position to initiate a referendum on the whole annexed area, or instead of it, the claim should have been limited mostly on the ethnic Hungarian areas, it is now difficult to determine. Arguments and counter-arguments can be aligned to both alternatives, but the possible answer remains only a fiction. Especially knowing that the winners did not accept the Hungarian argument and substantive changes to the draft of the peace agreement have not been made. Although, the adoption and the conduct of the referendum could have led to birth of a peace with fairer state at that moment. Afterwards this has not happened, the representatives of the Hungarian government, Dr. Ágost Benárd, Minister of Labour and Social Welfare Affairs, and Alfred Drasche-Lázár, Extraordinary Envoy and Minister of Plenipotentiary were forced to sign the peace treaty on June 4<sup>th</sup> 1920 in a just a quarter -hour ceremony at the Grand Trianon castle of Versailles.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>9</sup> ZEIDLER, 2003. 123-124.

<sup>10</sup> The signature and the person of the signatories of the Trianon Treaty had polemics and debate, see: VIZI László Tamás: A trianoni diktátum aláírója: a politikus Benárd Ágoston. *Közép-Európai Közlemények*. 2010/3. No. 10. 67-79.; VIZI, László Tamás: Ki legyen az aláíró? Vita a minisztertanácsban a trianoni békediktátum aláíróinak a személyéről. *Közép-Európai Közlemények*. 2010/4. No. 11. 109-132.

## **2.2 The referendum as a real possibility of yet active problem solving**

Apponyi's initiation of a referendum on 16<sup>th</sup> January 1920 was not successful, but the idea of a referendum option as a possible tool for repair yet has not been definitively discarded by the great powers. Although this options were not exercised on the whole historical Hungary, not even on the fullness of areas near borders, only on a 257 km<sup>2</sup> long area, Sopron and a relation of eight nearby villages (Ágfalva, Balf, Fertőboz, Fertőrákos, Harta, Kópháza, Nagycenk, Sopronbánfalva) gave the opportunity to exercise their right to self-determination for the people living there. The referendum held on 14<sup>th</sup> to 16<sup>th</sup> December 1921 resulted that Sopron and its surroundings population – 65,1% of them appeared in the poll – decided to join the Hungarian state.<sup>11</sup>

The referendum in Sopron reversed the decision of Trianon, even if just partially and only in a slight amount; it highlighted the fact that the Trianon borders with great power support, even partially, can be changed, and the Wilson-principles of the right of people to self-determination could not be swept under the rug. However, let's not forget, that the referendum attempted to be a remedy for two vanquished countries who had years of armed conflicts because of territorial debates, which solution could not be applied in the case of the other winner successor states in the early 1920s. And, as it turned out, nor after that. Because, the referenda were not supported neither by the powers, nor the successor states. The latter has definitely rejected it. With the rejecting the idea of a referendum the peaceful resolution, which could for all the concerned parties offer a calming solution on the wounds caused by Trianon, were taken out from the toolbar.

## **2.3 „No, not never!” The idea of revision kept alive**

The Treaty of Trianon befell the whole Hungarian society as a real shock; to threat this shock, resources and opportunities had only limited availability. So the idea of revision formulated and kept alive in the 1920s and in the following decade was an important policy objective; the Hungarian society as a whole should be raised to awareness. This was represented by the revisionist propaganda organizations and events, the everyday manifestations of the Hungarian irredentism, the educational and cultural policy of the era, festivals, public statues, commemorations, etc. – all that was implemented to keep the

<sup>11</sup> GULYÁS László: *A Horthy-korszak külpolitikája 1. Az első évek 1919-1924*. Máriabesnyő, Attraktor, 2012. (Hereinafter referred as: GULYÁS, 2012.) 118-119.; ORMOS, Mária: *Civitas fidelissima. Népszavazás Sopronban 1921*. Győr, Gordiusz, 1990.



need for the revision of the Trianon awake in the whole of the Hungarian society.<sup>12</sup> In the 1920s and '30s a number of examples could be listed for this. We cite only a series of events detailed due to space limitations. In particular, the commemorations in the 1930s should be detailed, which have been kept on the 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary's the signing of the Treaty of Trianon.<sup>13</sup>

### 2.3.1 *The protesting grand rally in 1930*

The largest anti-Trianon movement and rally of protesting after 1920 was at the tenth anniversary of the signing on 1<sup>st</sup> June 1930 on the Szabadság (Freedom) square in Budapest. The protesting rally was organized<sup>14</sup> on 1<sup>st</sup> of June in 1930 for closest Sunday to the 4<sup>th</sup> of June by the Hungarian Revisionist League<sup>15</sup> and Social Associations Federation (Társadalmi Egyesületek Szövetsége – TESz)<sup>16</sup> The protest of hundreds of thousands of people was planned and was reported few days earlier in the newspapers.

The rally was opened at eleven o'clock by Gusztáv Ilosvay, emeritus State Secretary, Co-Chair of the TESz. In his speech he called the Treaty of Trianon, which was forced upon the nation in 1920, a terrible thing which blocked the possibility and further ways to all of the Hungarian society groups; this pushed the Hungarians "in the most terrible prospects".<sup>17</sup> Ilosvay was

<sup>12</sup> See ZEIDLER Miklós: *A magyar irredenta kultusz a két világháború között*. Budapest, Teleki László Alapítvány, 2002. (Hereinafter referred as: ZEIDLER, 2002/a.); ZEIDLER Miklós: *A Magyar Revíziós Liga. Századok*. CXXXI. évf. 1997/2. szám. (Hereinafter referred as: ZEIDLER, 1997.) 303–351.; ZEIDLER Miklós: *A revíziós gondolat*. Pozsony, Kalligram, 2009. (Hereinafter referred as: ZEIDLER, 2009.)

<sup>13</sup> The first organized mass-meetings against the signing of the Treaty of Trianon already took place one day earlier than the signature on 3<sup>rd</sup> June 1920 in Budapest. Schools and offices were closed and people hurried with black dresses to the street to take part in a silent procession and demonstration against the unjust decision of June 4<sup>th</sup> The commemorations became systematical in the subsequent years on the anniversaries of the 4<sup>th</sup> June mourning-days but the first real monumental demonstration was held against the Treaty of Trianon only on 4<sup>th</sup> June 1926. The Szabadság square (Freedom square) was the permanent protest-location and / or the place of half official commemoration and rallies against the Treaty of Trianon. From then the Szabadság square was decorated with irredentist statues and a country flag with relic initiated in 1928. See: ZEIDLER, 2002/a 11., 17–18., 36–37.; GERŐ András: *Sorsdöntések*. Budapest, Göncöl. 266–267.; ZEIDLER, 2009. 199–210., 320–322.

<sup>14</sup> ZEIDLER, 1997.303–351.; ZEIDLER, 2009. 126–147., 183–191.

<sup>15</sup> On the activities of TESz see: Magyar Katolikus Lexikon <http://lexikon.katolikus.hu/T/T%C3%A1rsadalmi%20Egyes%C3%BCletek%20Sz%C3%B6vets%C3%A9ge.html>

<sup>16</sup> *Nemzeti Ujság*, 29<sup>th</sup> May 1930. 11.

<sup>17</sup> *Nemzeti Ujság*, 3<sup>rd</sup> June 1930. 5.

followed by Nándor Urmánczy,<sup>18</sup> who was key note speaker of the rally and the most famous and also the most dominant personality of the Hungarian irredentist movements in this era. Urmánczy began his speech with fierce and warrior exclamation: „We must not allow to fulfill the saying „Coward people has no home” on us”.<sup>19</sup> The speaker thereafter contended that only that nation can be strong which was led by dedicated men. According to him in 1920, when the Treaty of Trianon was signed, “the Hungarian nation was not led by brave men”. In his speech he claimed all that happened to be a national shame which everybody can think back only with disgrace. But he attributed it even to be a bigger shame that “we still tolerate with folded hands the yoke of Trianon, we tolerate that four million Hungarian brothers have to suffer in a foreign prison.” The “big lawsuit” (by Urmánczy) can’t be deferred by the Hungarian politics and with this the solution and the responsibilities may not be given to the next generations.<sup>20</sup>

Thereafter Urmánczy shared a resolution proposal to the congress of participants: “The congress held at the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Peace-dictate of Trianon pronounces this hangman’s peace, which cut the thousand year old Hungarian empire into five pieces, the darkest outrage in history. We conclude with deep exasperation that the government is going still on compromise way instead of working to overthrow the murderous peace treaty. But the rally condemns also the behavior of great powers in the hangman’s peace, because even though they realized that the villainy and ignorance sat triumph in Trianon, but they still tolerate the outrageous injustice committed against the Hungarian nation. The grand rally claims instead of quail a strong and determined governmental direction and calls on all true Hungarians to support only the government which is ready to pick up the final battle for the restoration of the territorial integrity of our country.”<sup>21</sup> The proposed resolution labeled the Trianon dictate – citing the quotes of the speaker – to be a hangman’s peace and the darkest outrage and demanded simultaneously a decisive and dedicated foreign policy action<sup>22</sup> by the Hungarian

<sup>18</sup> ZEIDLER, 2009. 200-204., 210.; ZEIDLER 2002/a. 17-21., 26., 44., 49., 78-79.; CZIRJÁK Károly: *Urmánczy Nándor élete és munkássága*. Csíkszereda, 2006.; FRÁTER Olivér: Az Urmánczy-expedíció. *Nagy Magyarország*. III/3. September 2011. 82-87.; DÖMÖTÖRFI Tibor: Az országzászló-mozgalom, 1921-1944. *Élet és Tudomány*. XLVI./8. 21. Februar 1991. 232-234.

<sup>19</sup> *Magyarság*, 3<sup>rd</sup> June 1930. 3.

<sup>20</sup> *Magyarság*, 3<sup>rd</sup> June 1930. 3.; *Nemzeti Újság*, 3<sup>rd</sup> June 1930. 5.; ZEIDLER, 2002/a. 37.

<sup>21</sup> *Magyarság*, 3<sup>rd</sup> June 1930. 3.; *Nemzeti Újság*, 3<sup>rd</sup> June 1930. 5.

<sup>22</sup> Aspiration of Hungarian foreign policy during the 1920s: ROMSICS Ignác: Bethlen István külpolitikája, 1921-1931. *Századok*. 1990/5-6. (Hereinafter referred as: ROMSICS, 1990.) 577-614.; ZEIDLER, 2009. 77-104.; ZEIDLER Miklós: *Mozgástér a kényszer-*

leadership. On this basis, we should assume that the text proposed for approval by the grand rally was created by Nándor Urmánczy himself.

The resolution-proposal by Urmánczy was accepted by the overwhelming majority of the grand rally; dispute emerged although on the proposal of Minister A.D. György Lukács to take the memorandum promptly to the League of Nations by the leadership of the grand rally. The participants expressed their distrust with loud shouts against the League of Nations. Finally Gusztáv Ilosvay managed to convince the audience that Hungary must use any legal means in this situation, so the forum offered by the League of Nations should not be ignored.<sup>23</sup>

### 2.3.2 *The mourning-session of the House of Representatives*

The mourning-session has made the anniversary of the National House of Representatives really elevated on 4<sup>th</sup> June 1930, where before the agenda for the first request of “civic parties” Count Albert Apponyi and on behalf of the Social Democratic Party István Farkas spoke, and formulated the critique of Trianon.

The idea of the memorial in the House of Representatives, as well as the proposal of the protest-meeting at Freedom Square, was formulated in the presidency of Hungarian Revisionist League. The league asked Count Albert Apponyi to speak at the House of Representatives on 4<sup>th</sup> of June in 1930 and to express his opinion and also the Hungarian nation’s resolution against Trianon. Apponyi accepted the invitation.<sup>24</sup>

On the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Trianon on 4<sup>th</sup> June 1930 the representatives began to gather already at 10 am, a way before the start of the 402<sup>nd</sup> meeting of House of Representatives, regardless of party affiliation in black dress in the corridors of the Parliament. At 10.45 bells sounded in the corridor and László Almásy opened the session of the House of Representatives exactly at 11 o’clock. He announced that the delegates

pályán. A magyar külpolitika „választásai” a két háború között. In: *Mítoszok, legendák, tévhitek a 20. századi magyar történelemről*. Ed. ROMSICS Ignác. Budapest, Osiris, 2002: 162-174. In the present days GULYÁS, 2012.

<sup>23</sup> *Magyarság*, 3<sup>rd</sup> June 1930. 3.; *Nemzeti Ujság*, 3<sup>rd</sup> June 1930. 5.

<sup>24</sup> *Magyarság*, 1<sup>st</sup> June 1930. 9.; *Magyarság*, 3<sup>rd</sup> June 1930. 3.

Count Albert Apponyi<sup>25</sup> and István Farkas<sup>26</sup> have asked for permission to speak before the agenda. The first speaker was Count Albert Apponyi.<sup>27</sup>

Apponyi began his speech<sup>28</sup> with the analysis of the fundamental moral requirement of legislation, which says that the legal rule is a type of fixed legal standard, in which nor passion may never get involved neither “an emotional scene call it whatever you want”.<sup>29</sup> According to Apponyi, the moral and emotional rule of the legislation has gotten a permanent gap by the codifying Law Article of the Treaty of Trianon, Law Article XXXIII/1921,<sup>30</sup> as it is only formally comply with the peace agreement and with the basic content of the law and moral expectations. Trianon formally was peace, because it closed the war, abolished the armed opposition and the military conflict, but it did not bring the acquiescence of the souls, “which is the only insurer of the material peace ... [the] durability”.<sup>31</sup> According to Apponyi it is indisputable, that neither the form and the formality of Trianon has not corresponded with the requirements of contracts. But where were “the free agreement between the conflicting parties?”<sup>32</sup> – asked Apponyi. The enacted law did not devoid of constitutional forms and instructions, but it had a high deficit because it lacked the “free expression of the national legislative will”.<sup>33</sup>

Apponyi has criticized the form of Trianon too. This form was forced to Hungary unilaterally and it was like a dictate, which the winners endowed the “binding force of law”. But the created contract and law lacked the real meaning and centuries-old mission of the law, the moral justice. The formal

<sup>25</sup> *Magyar országgyűlési almanach. A felsőház és képviselőház tagjainak életrajza és közéleti működése. 1927–1932.* Ed. KUN Andor, LENGYEL László and VIDOR Gyula, Budapest, Légrády Nyomda és Könyvkiadó. 8–22.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.* 94–95.

<sup>27</sup> *Az országgyűlés képviselőházának 402. ülése. Az 1927. évi január 25-ére hirdetett országgyűlés képviselőházának naplója. Vol. XXIX.* Budapest, Az Athenaeum Irodalmi és Nyomdai Részvénytársulat Könyvnyomdája, 1930. (Hereinafter referred as: KN) 55.

<sup>28</sup> The House of Representatives speech of Albert Apponyi 4<sup>th</sup> June 1930. See KN 55–57.; The newest ZEIDLER, 2003. 407–409.; Speech of Apponyi presented the newspapers in detail on the next day. Examples: *Pesti Napló*, 5<sup>th</sup> June 1930. 1–2., *Esti Kurir*, 5<sup>th</sup> June 1930. 1–2., *Nemzeti Ujság*, 3<sup>rd</sup> June 1930. 6., *Magyarság*, 5<sup>th</sup> June 1930. 1–2., *Az Est*, 5<sup>th</sup> June 1930. 1–2.; *8 Órai Ujság*, 5<sup>th</sup> June 1930. 1–2.

<sup>29</sup> KN 55.

<sup>30</sup> Article XXXIII/1921 about the ratification of the Treaty of Trianon from June 4<sup>th</sup> 1920 with the Northern United States, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, as well as Belgium, China, Cuba, Greece, Nicaragua, Panama, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Kingdom of Serb-Croat-Slovenes, Siam and the Czech-Slovak Republic. See: *Ezer év törvényei*. <http://www.1000ev.hu/index.php?a=3&param=7489>

<sup>31</sup> KN 55.

<sup>32</sup> KN 55–56.

<sup>33</sup> KN 56.

law and the moral justice clashed, so “the consequences cannot be other than permanent insecurity, constant danger”.<sup>34</sup>

Then Apponyi gave details of the reasons for which Trianon lacks moral truth. Among these he mentioned the false accusations of war responsibility firstly, and he pointed out that at the moment of the outbreak of the war, the country had only limited sovereignty, and Prime Minister István Tisza worked “for the moderation and avoidance of war-like actions”.<sup>35</sup> He also questioned the moral truth of Trianon too because it “pushed aside and ignored ... the right to self-determination of nations, without consulting any interested party ... [ and ] moved masses from one state into another, without asking them”.<sup>36</sup> Apponyi mentioned serious moral shortcomings, winners enforced only and only their will, their decision was made without sufficient knowledge of the facts, with those one-sided manipulation with “using information only who is craving for new conquests”. Hereby fragmenting “the natural economic relations,” which naturally brought poverty and deprivation with itself to the area.<sup>37</sup> The winners are not willing to admit these mistakes even ten years later - continued Apponyi – they hide behind the principle of nationality. Of course they generously ignore the validation of the principle of nationality raised by their own argument which in reality meant, that nearly ten million inhabitants separated from Hungary, “only 55 % of them were related to nationalities with the state to which they were attached, 45% of them were foreigner, and 35%, 3,300.000 people were pure Hungarians”.<sup>38</sup> He called it an inconsistent and rough violation of the principle of nationality that the detached Hungarians “nearly two million of them are living in an area, which is only inhabited by Hungarians, which shares borders with the area, which remained to Hungary”.<sup>39</sup> The previous practice of the winners was qualified as balling with principles by Apponyi, which in an immoral way favored the Entente friendly states at the expense of Hungary.<sup>40</sup>

“But perhaps the theory of Trianon is even worse than the praxis of Trianon”

<sup>41</sup> – continued his speech Apponyi - because in the article about the protection of minorities<sup>42</sup> the Treaty of Trianon prescribed fixed standards and a guarantee

<sup>34</sup> KN 56.

<sup>35</sup> KN 56.

<sup>36</sup> KN 56.

<sup>37</sup> Dr. Edit LŐRINCZNÉ BENCZE: Trianon és Magyarország déli határrégiói. *Közép-Európai Közlemények*. III. évf. 4. sz. 2010/4. No. 11. 69-76.

<sup>38</sup> KN 56.

<sup>39</sup> KN 56.

<sup>40</sup> KN 56.

<sup>41</sup> KN 56.

<sup>42</sup> Example this kind of articles are the 44. and 47. articles of Trianon Treaty.

for them; but all that written in the international treaties created for minority protection “remained dead letters” and was never fulfilled. In fact, “Hungarian culture is subject to a genocide campaign”.<sup>43</sup> On the other hand, “everything that has to fulfill the Treaty of Trianon” is demanded and required from Hungary “with the real accuracy”<sup>44</sup> of Shylock<sup>45</sup>.

In his speech Apponyi dedicated a few words to the hypocritical decision which was in connection with the disarmament and demobilization. Meanwhile the winners referred to the 8<sup>th</sup> article in the founding letter of the League of Nations about the total disarmament, they prescribed it in a general meaning for most of the defeated states, but this was only carried out with the vanquished, while this was not considered fundamental principle upon them. In his opinion, “they have created circumstances, that cannot stand the pledge of survival in their inner truth, which they maintain artificially only with the constant threat of superior forces.”<sup>46</sup>

When Apponyi’s speech came to this part, he felt the need to emphatically say, that he would like to fulfill civic party invitation with staying out from “all passionate outburst”, not coloring the relationships of the Treaty of Trianon, and with listing “only the facts, the undeniable, irrefutable facts”.<sup>47</sup> Then in his closing speech he deducted “necessary logical consequences”<sup>48</sup> from what he has said. He put it all in the classic form of question and answer, which fully adapted to the elation form of the mourning-session, this proofed Apponyi’s excellent oratorical skills. As a conclusion he explained in his analytic, remembering speech, that the dictate has plagued some of the nations with “outrageous” injustice, while “other nations ... take advantage” of it; on one hand this leads to international conditions which cannot be called peace, on the other hand, lasting peace cannot be based on a settlement like this.<sup>49</sup>

As closing thoughts Albert Apponyi said that not only on the 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the dictate signature, but in the future, continuously and always “we have to raise our protesting word against the fatal error and injustice committed against us and against the higher interests of humanity [which is Trianon]”.<sup>50</sup> With this Apponyi gave some political guidance to the judgment of the

<sup>43</sup> KN 56. page

<sup>44</sup> Reference to Shakespeare’s *The Merchant of Venice* comedy. Shylock was the vengeful Jewish moneylender, who is only given credit for that condition if the debtor is unable to repay the loan on time, he/she can cut a pound of flesh from his/her body.

<sup>45</sup> KN 56.

<sup>46</sup> KN 56.

<sup>47</sup> KN 56.

<sup>48</sup> KN 57.

<sup>49</sup> KN 57.

<sup>50</sup> KN 57.

Trianon dictate and to the attitude towards it, while the word revision was not mentioned in his speech. He saw the critique and judgment of Trianon and in the consistent enforcement of “the substance of the law, justice”, which should be pursued and “rushed” “with every instrument of right”. According to Apponyi’s view this requires “the command of our national self-esteem” and at the same time it also serves the interests of peace. The acquiescence to Trianon would not mean the loyalty towards peace, as it would be nothing more than pretending, “which would be dishonest, even if it would be true-hearted, in fact in this case it would be even more dishonest”.<sup>51</sup>

Apponyi’s speech was welcomed with “long and general applause and enthusiastic cheer”<sup>52</sup> from all sides of the House of Representatives. As the “House” became quiet, the presiding László Almásy, representative of the Social Democratic Party, gave word to István Farkas. He began his speech to the Social Democratic Party with the analysis of the relationship between war and the party. He explained that his party is opposed to every war, and this principle was followed in 1914 as well. He referred to Prime Minister István Tisza, who stated “in the days after the outbreak of the war that the Hungarian press approved the government’s war policy with complete unanimity, except for the Social Democratic Party’s paper *Népszava*”.<sup>53</sup> Farkas emphasized the war opposing consistency of the Social Democratic Party, which he represented in the *Népszava* being a party outside of the Parliament as well, as being the opposition in the Parliament. The Social Democrats position was that “contradictions need to be settled between nations amicably with tribunals”.<sup>54</sup> However, the Treaty of Trianon – said Farkas – was not created along these principles, because it did not respect the autonomy of nations and therefore he graded it being unfair in his speech. He stated that his party has taken comment on this issue repeatedly, and he read the latest decision of the caucus meeting in this matter from 23<sup>rd</sup> July 1929.

The mentioned decision states in the introduction that any contract that is not based on the legal ground of people’s self-determination, but on the contrary, “[it was] created on the basis of authoritarian and military power, has to be condemned most definitely; the party is struggling therefore for a peaceful revision by any means necessary.”<sup>55</sup> This fight however, could only

<sup>51</sup> KN 57.

<sup>52</sup> KN 57.

<sup>53</sup> KN 57.; Tisza had for that matter a harder criticism, because his opinion was that the party’s position on war led the “Social Democratic Party outside of the nation’s public sentiment”. See: VARGA Lajos: A magyar szociáldemokraták a háború „győzelmes” éveiben (1914–1916) *Múltunk*. 2007/2. 167-168.

<sup>54</sup> KN 57.

<sup>55</sup> KN 57.



be continued with “complete success”, if Hungary could have a governance-system similar to Western Europe’s and even the democratic parliamentary model were similar. According to the party’s point of view the issue of revision could be done the affair of the whole Hungarian nation only in case of a political twist; after this twist „the socialist parties, gaining real political power, millions of members of the parties, the governmental and parliamentary representatives and the press” could be aligned behind the idea.<sup>56</sup> This standpoint of the Social Democratic Party represented the special position of the left-wing principles, based on the self-determination of peoples, peaceful, consensual revision, that is feasible in the spirit of internationalism, and could override national interests and the hunger for power.

The accepted decision confessed to general disarmament and it saw it realizable with the cooperation of social democratic parties of the world. The social-democrats did this partly because they considered the current state of international relations being insupportable and “causing war danger”, because “a large part of heavily armed states stands against mostly disarmed states”. On the other hand, “a position like this within the international community can only provide a crucial role to the word of power.”<sup>57</sup>

In its decision the Social Democratic Party formulated for the detached Hungarians specific demands: “protection of the national minority rights, democratic self-government for minorities in the closed-language areas, full equality of minorities living dispersed, free usage of their language, maintenance of minority schools and cultural development”. It was claimed also that “a permanent committee for complaint should be establish in the League of Nations for the review of the national minorities complaints”.<sup>58</sup>

After István Farkas presented the decision of the Social Democratic Party Caucus it was known before a much wider public than the Népszava reading audiences, because his speech was reported in greater or smaller extent in most of the dailies.<sup>59</sup> Farkas iterated briefly the main demands of the decision in his closing words, stressing out that “the revision of the offending Treaty of Trianon can be done in peaceful way only”, which will be reached only after the “reorganization of the country’s government similar to the Western European democratic states.” His speech was closed with a “Never again war!”

<sup>56</sup> KN 57.

<sup>57</sup> KN 57.

<sup>58</sup> KN 57.

<sup>59</sup> Examples: *Pesti Napló*, 5<sup>th</sup> June 1930. 2., *Esti Kurir*, 5<sup>th</sup> June 1930. 2., *Nemzeti Ujság*, 3<sup>rd</sup> June 1930. 6., *Magyarság*, 5<sup>th</sup> June 1930. 2., *Az Est*, 5<sup>th</sup> June 1930. 2.; *8 Órai Ujság*, 5<sup>th</sup> June 1930. 2.



exclamation and in the midst of the extreme leftists bright cheers and applause.<sup>60</sup> After the two speeches before the agenda the president interrupted the meeting as “a sign of the nation’s universal mourning” and suspended the work of the parliament for five minutes. The mourning-session of the House of Representatives ended with this symbolic act.<sup>61</sup>

## 2.4 The foreign policy-management of Trianon and possible alternatives

The Trianon Peace Treaty from the 4<sup>th</sup> June 1920 and the afterwards signed conventions about cooperation between Prague, Belgrade and Bucharest in 1920-21, the so-called Little Entente treaties, forced Hungary in total foreign policy quarantine. The Little Entente – its idea was born during WWI – organized clearly with a view that the contracting parties accord their political and military aspirations primarily against Hungary and maintain the status quo established in Trianon, prevent revisionist ambitions of Hungary and hinder every restoration-attempt of Hapsburg.<sup>62</sup> The Hungarian foreign policy had quite small room for maneuver<sup>63</sup> against the pressure of the Little Entente. Despite this the full membership in the League of Nations<sup>64</sup> was achieved soon in the first half of the 20s and then Hungary received an important loan from the League of Nations.<sup>65</sup> Therefore the franc forgery case<sup>66</sup> from mid-December 1925, which grew to an international scandal, came at the worst time to hinder the cautious steps and progressive successes of the Hungarian foreign policy. But the scandal reinforced the concept of foreign policy that an effective revisionist policy can only be successful only with the support of

<sup>60</sup> KN 57.

<sup>61</sup> KN 57.

<sup>62</sup> ÁDÁM Magda: *A kisantant 1920-1938*. Budapest, 1981.; ÁDÁM Magda: *A kisantant és Európa 1920-1929*. Budapest, 1989.; GULYÁS László: *A kisantant története. Rubicon* 2011/2. szám. 68-77.; The name “Little Entente” was used for the first time by the newspaper *Pesti Hírlap* published in Budapest in April 1920 when the author of the article wrote about the operation of three countries („Tiny Entente”).

<sup>63</sup> Maneuver of foreign policy, see: RÁNKI György: *Mozgástér és kényszerpálya. A Duna-völgyi kis országok a nemzetközi gazdaság és politika rendszerében (1919-1945)* In: *A két világháború közötti Magyarországról*. Szerk.: LACKÓ Miklós. Budapest, Kossuth, 1984. 11-46.; ZEIDLER, 2002/b. 162-205.

<sup>64</sup> Hungary became full member of the League of Nations on 18<sup>th</sup> September 1922. See: GULYÁS, 2012. 121-130.

<sup>65</sup> Hungary’s League of Nations loan protocol was signed 14<sup>th</sup> March 1924 in Geneva, see: GULYÁS, 2012. 131-142.

<sup>66</sup> ABLONCZY Balázs: *Összeesküvés a frank ellen. Rubicon*. 2005/9. 32-36.; ABLONCZY, Balázs: *A frankhamisítás. Hálók, döntések. Múltunk*. LIII. 2008/1. 29-56.

great powers and can be reached only through negotiations. The adventurous business cannot bring success and additionally may impair Hungary's international reputation.

Therefore, the Hungarian foreign policy<sup>67</sup> named as the main goal to obtain support of a great power and to weaken stifling ring of Little Entente around the country or if it is possible, to force the opening of that ring as an alternative. These goals looked clear but there was no consensus in how to reach their implementation and attainment. The issue was if lacking the support from one of the major powers, could it be than a reality to attempt the weakening of the Little Entente? Would it be a good idea or not, to begin a foreign policy-action against one of Little Entente's state with only a minimal hope and without the support of a great power? Three prominent possible answers were presented to the posed question: to skip the hazardous and one-sided Hungarian steps and to wait until more favorable great power status for Budapest; active and initiating foreign policy, maybe even without the background of a great power; and an effort to obtain support of the major powers but to use the opportunities offered by the international circumstances at the same time.

The first-mentioned foreign policy concept in the middle of the 1920s was represented by two outstanding political leaders of the Hungarian diplomacy, the permanent deputies of the Minister of Foreign Affairs – who were also the Chief Secretaries of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*secrétaire général*)<sup>68</sup> – Kálmán Kánya<sup>69</sup> and Sándor Khuen-Héderváry<sup>70</sup> The foreign policy represented by the Khuen-Héderváry-Kánya duo was characterized by the “patient awaiting” and rejected any kind of action lacking support from the major powers, which aimed to dissolve the Little Entente's block with an unilateral Hungarian move. Initiatives like this were not preferred, and they believed that this could only change if the setting of the mayor powers would

<sup>67</sup> PRITZ Pál: *Revíziós törekvések a magyar külpolitikában 1920-1935. Magyar Tudomány.* 1979. április. 272-279.

<sup>68</sup> HORY András: *Bukaresttől Varsóig.* Ed. by PRITZ, Pál. Budapest, Gondolat, 1987. (Hereinafter referred as: HORY, 1987.) See Pál Pritz' comments about job of the chief secretary in Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the 1. chapter 4. index on 424. p. and 2. chapter 2. index 443. p. of Hory's memorials.

<sup>69</sup> KÁNYA Kálmán (1869-1945). He initiated his diplomatic career in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, later continued it in the independent Hungarian Foreign Service. From 1920 until 1925, he was the regular vice of the foreign minister. From 1925 until 1933 he was ambassador in Berlin, after which he became foreign minister until autumn 1938.

<sup>70</sup> KHUEN-HÉDERVÁRY Sándor (1881-1947). He was one of the organizers of the independent Hungarian Foreign Service. From 1920, he directed the political department of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, after 1925 he became the regular vice of the foreign minister. After this, from 1934 until 1940 he directed the Hungarian embassy in Paris. He retired from politics in 1941.

mutate. The second alternative was represented by the foreign office's new diplomatic elite, which entered in service during the early 1920's, and by the opposition "race defender" politicians. The two party's freedom of movement and ideas differed significantly from each other. The formers were bounded by the political instructions of the foreign office, and were expected to be loyal, while this didn't limit the ambitions of the opposition politicians, who represented a far more radical ideology. The latter sharply criticized the official Hungarian foreign policy, which they labeled as being too adaptive and conform, and they rushed for a more active foreign political presence. At the same time it shouldn't be forgotten that their foreign policy views were significantly influenced by their positions in the domestic political environment.<sup>71</sup> The previously featured third foreign policy pursuit was represented by the most influential politician of the 1920's, Prime Minister Bethlen István. Bethlen's activity was not limited to the direction of the domestic political life; he had a significant influence on the foreign policy as well.<sup>72</sup> For Bethlen, it became absolutely clear by the early 1920's that the partial revision of the treaty of Trianon could only be achieved with support from mayor powers, but the conditions for this weren't existing back then. In the mid 1920's, no mayor victorious power backed the Hungarian revision. This is why the Bethlen-led Hungarian foreign policy decided to pursue the careful awaiting strategy, until the European circumstances will be more favorable for Budapest. Bethlen articulated as such: "for Hungary, the only possible foreign policy is the patient awaiting".<sup>73</sup> However, this didn't mean a passive foreign policy. According to his perception, foreign policy is "shaped by the circumstances".<sup>74</sup>

Bethlen saw the small steps, small results method as the only viable way for enlarging the freedom of movement of the Hungarian foreign policy. These three foreign policy alternatives didn't exist separately from each other, but existed in a parallel way, and they were shaped according to the international circumstances. In the shadows of the political burden of the unfortunate 1920's French Frank currency falsifying scandal, there was a new possibility for the Hungarian foreign policy: the agreement between Hungary and Yugoslavia, which might have resulted in a breach in the Little Entente. However the 1926 Hungarian foreign policy plans to separate Yugoslavia

<sup>71</sup> PRITZ Pál: A fajvédők külpolitikai nézetei (1918-1936). *Századok*. Vol. 124. Nr. 1990/5-6. 654-657.

<sup>72</sup> PRITZ Pál (2005): A magyar külügyi szolgálat története az első polgári korszakban (1867-1948) In: *Az a „rövid” 20. század. Történetpolitikai tanulmányok*. Budapest, Magyar Történelmi Társulat, 2005. 80.; ROMSICS, 1990. 577-615.

<sup>73</sup> Bethlen quoted by ROMSICS, 1990. 588.

<sup>74</sup> ROMSICS, 1990. 580.

from the Little Entente failed.<sup>75</sup> On the other hand, it brought significant results, as this paved the way for the Hungarian-Italian cooperation, which was realized in a treaty about friendship, peace settlement and selected court of justice, signed April 1927 in Rome, between Benito Mussolini and Bethlen István. The treaty signed with Italy enabled Hungary to quit the international isolation which was forced upon her by the treaty of Trianon. Furthermore, the treaty signed with Rome secured the long needed support from a mayor power, which could reduce the pressure from the Little Entente on the short term, and it also contained the possibility for the revision of the Trianon Treaty.

## **2.5. The limited duration of the Trianon treaty's revision**

The drastically mutated political and military circumstances offered a realistic opportunity for Hungary to partially regain some of the lands lost due to the Trianon treaty, to somehow remedy the wounds caused by it. Between 1938 and 1941 four border revisions were carried out in favour of Hungary.

### *2.5.1. The first Vienna Award*

In accordance with the German-Italian arbitrary decision, on 2<sup>nd</sup> November 1938, the southern part of the Hungarian Highlands (present day Slovakia) and Transcarpatia were re-annexed to Hungary from Czechoslovakia. 11.927 km<sup>2</sup> and 1.041.401 individuals were returned. According to the census carried out in December 1938, 84.4 % or 879.007 individuals declared themselves as Hungarians.<sup>76</sup> The first Vienna Award had taken place as a consequence of the auxiliary declaration of the four powers (Germany, Italy, France, and Great Britain) conference,<sup>77</sup> which occurred on the 29-30<sup>th</sup> September 1938, in Munich. The signatory parties summoned the governments of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, to start negotiations about the Hungarian territorial claims.

<sup>75</sup> See for further detailed information VIZI László Tamás: *„Hiszem és remélem, hogy... hamarosan visszatérhet a régi barátság és megértés” Horthy Miklós beszéde és a szerb orientáció alternatívája a magyar külpolitikában.* Manuscript under publication, 2014.

<sup>76</sup> ZEIDLER, 2009. 275.; The resolutions of the first Vienna Award, ZEIDLER, 2003. 315-316.

<sup>77</sup> HALMOSY Dénes: *Nemzetközi szerződések 1918–1945.* Budapest, Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, 1966. 437.

However, the bilateral talks held on 9<sup>th</sup> October in the Czechoslovak part of Komárom<sup>78</sup> didn't produce any results, the parties turned towards Germany and Italy for an arbitrary judicial decision in the disputed issue.<sup>79</sup> While the decision was welcomed with exploding enthusiasm by the Hungarian society, and saw this as the first step to remedy the injustice caused by the Trianon treaty, we have to remark the fact that this decision wasn't the result of a compromise between the two concerned countries, but reflected the will of Germany and Italy, and didn't obtain the necessary guarantees from London and Paris.<sup>80</sup> On the long term, this made the results dubious.

### 2.5.2 *The recapture of Transcarpatia*

In spring of 1939, during the total dismembering of Czechoslovakia, Hungary joined the German action with the permission of Hitler, and accomplished its second successful territorial revision, carried out between the 15<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> March 1939.<sup>81</sup> This wasn't preceded by bilateral talks or arbitrary judicial decision. The Hungarian Army, exploiting the Slovakian independence declaration and the German occupation of Prague, conquered Transcarpatia, obtaining 12.147 km<sup>2</sup> of land and 674.923 individuals were re-annexed into Hungary. Although the territory was important from a strategic point of view for Hungary, and constituted the organic part of historical Hungary before 1920, the re-annexation was less supported by ethnic reasons. The population of the re-annexed Transcarpatia was constituted by only 9,25 % Hungarians (62 173 individuals), and the rest was composed by more than half a million Ruthenian (Ukrainian) people.<sup>82</sup> It is true that this population data didn't support the territory's Czechoslovak, or Slovakian possession claims as well. We must add that the Ruthenian population of Transcarpatia was never asked about which country they would like to continue their existence in the future.

<sup>78</sup> POPÉLY Gyula: *A komáromi tárgyalások (1938. október 9-13.)* <http://www.nogradhistoria.eu/data/files/186782808.pdf> (28<sup>th</sup> September 2013)

<sup>79</sup> SALLAI Gergely: *Az első bécsi döntés*. Budapest, Osiris, 2002.

<sup>80</sup> PRITZ Pál: Magyarország és a nagyhatalmak 1938-ban. In: *Visszacsatolás vagy megszállás? Szempontok az első bécsi döntés értelmezéséhez. Adatok, források és tanulmányok a Nógrád megyei Levéltárból* 58. Ed.: SIMON Attila. Balassagyarmat, Nógrád County Archives - Selye János University, 2010. 11-20.

<sup>81</sup> MIHÁLYI Balázs: Egy elfelejtett „kis háború” 1939-ben. *Magyar Hírlap*. 27<sup>th</sup> Apr. 2012. <http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/tortenelem/egy-elfelejtett-kis-haboru-1939-ben#sthash.No322tFY.dpuf> (28<sup>th</sup> September 2013)

<sup>82</sup> ZEIDLER, 2009. 277.

The repeated territorial gain was achieved again with German support, although London and Paris didn't protest against it, at the same time the two superpowers didn't give guarantees for the new borders.

### *2.5.3 Re-annexation of Northern Transylvania and Székely Land*

The Second World War was already proceeding, when tension between Hungary and Romania was escalating almost into a military conflict. This was the reason why on the 30<sup>th</sup> August 1940, in Vienna, taking into serious consideration Hitler's interests, a German – Italian arbitrary judicial decision was declared, which was strikingly similar to the 1938 decision.<sup>83</sup> This decision was also preceded by unsuccessful negotiations held in Turnu-Severin between 16<sup>th</sup> and 24<sup>th</sup> August 1940.<sup>84</sup> According to the Second Vienna Award,<sup>85</sup> Northern Transylvania and Székely Land was re-annexed to Hungary, all in all 43.104 km<sup>2</sup> land with 2.644.732 individuals. According to the 1941 census, 1.370.053 individuals declared themselves Hungarian native speakers, namely 51,8 % of the population.<sup>86</sup> We shouldn't forget that even in this case the German-Italian territorial reorganizations were not supported by the British, and the solution lacked the Great Britain's guarantees. This happened nevertheless because there was a state of war between the parties, and this "a priori" excluded the possibility of a British confirmation for the Vienna Awards. We must mention here that for the German-assisted revision results – while the Hungarian population regarded them as universally fair, and as a compensation for the Trianon treaty (although they regarded overall the territorial decisions not always satisfactory) – the Hungarian side had to pay a heavy political price. To mention the most important consequences: Hungary had to join the Anti-Comintern Pact in February 1939, later it had to join the Tripartite Pact on the 20<sup>th</sup> November 1940, better known as the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo axis. Hungary had to completely commit itself along the Axis Powers.

<sup>83</sup> L. BALOGH Béni: *A magyar-román kapcsolatok 1939-1940-ben és a második bécsi döntés.* Csíkszereda, Pro-Print, 2002.

<sup>84</sup> HORY, 1987. 310-343.

<sup>85</sup> The resolutions of the Second Vienna Award are stated by ZEIDLER, 2003. 317-318.

<sup>86</sup> ZEIDLER, 2009. 283.

#### 2.5.4 The recapture of the southern territories (*Vojvodina*)

While the first three revisions were carried out fundamentally peaceful – not calculating the minor military action in Transcarpatia – this time Hungary in April 1941 had to participate in the German-Yugoslav conflict, getting involved after the dissolution of Yugoslavia, and took control of the territories historically being part of Hungary after serious military clashes. These territories were Bačka, Baranja, Međimurje and Prekmurje regions of the former Kingdom of Yugoslavia (Bácska, Muraköz, Mura-vidék, baranyai háromszög). Altogether 11.475 km<sup>2</sup> land and 1.030.027 individuals were re-annexed to Hungary. According to the 1941 census, 38,9% of the population, precisely 401.035 individuals regarded themselves as Hungarians.<sup>87</sup>

Previously we have mentioned that the first three territorial revisions were not supported by all the mayor powers, especially it lacked the political guarantees of Great Britain, and as a result of the fourth “state-enlargement”, London broke all diplomatic relations with Budapest,<sup>88</sup> as Hungary attacked Yugoslavia, the only remaining British ally in Europe.

### 2.6 Analyses of the crises management between the two World Wars and the lessons learned from them

The decisive Hungarian foreign policy objective between the two World Wars, without criticism, was to achieve the revision of the Trianon treaty. Because of the lack of support from the mayor powers and the rigid reclusion of the Monarchy’s successor states, Hungarian politics in the 1930’s started to lean towards Germany and Italy, who were re-ordering the European power circumstances, as it could only hope revision results from these states. This was apparently achieved between 1938 and 1941. As the result of these “state-enlargements” Hungary’s territory between 1938 and 1941 increased 78.653 km<sup>2</sup>, and compared to the Trianon borders, 92.963 km<sup>2</sup>, has grown to 171.616 km<sup>2</sup>. The population, according to the re-annexation censuses, expanded by 5.391083 individuals, from which 50,3%, precisely 2.712.268 individuals declared themselves as Hungarians. From the re-annexed territories, 2.678.815 individuals, 49,7% of the population wasn’t Hungarian. Hungary again became a multiethnic country, while approximately half a million Hungarians still

<sup>87</sup> ZEIDLER, 2009. 291.

<sup>88</sup> About the cessation of the diplomatic relations between Hungary and Great Britain see also: BARCZA György: *Diplomata-émlékeim 1911-1945. I.* Budapest, Európa – História, 1994. 488-507.



remained across the borders. Furthermore, the territorial revisions lacked the political consensus of all European powers, which “a priori” made uncertain the future preservation of these gains. The bilateral Hungarian-Czechoslovak and Hungarian-Romanian negotiations were both unsuccessful, and so the last chance to solve the conflicts and disputes between the region’s countries by their own right, vanished. The right of the people for self-determination, in the form of referendum, wasn’t even considered. So the German-Italian arbitrary judicial decisions were felt by Bucharest and Bratislava as the Hungarians experienced Trianon in 1920. The territories recaptured from Yugoslavia by military means had even a less probable chance to endure on the long term. The crises management of the period between the two world wars, the territorial revisions, which were achieved only by Germany’s unilateral decision and support, were only short lived solutions. The most unfortunate fact is that the territorial changes achieved by Hungary between 1938 and 1941, reflected better the ethnic circumstances, and this fact can’t be argued. Not the content of the territorial changes, but the method and the practice of execution which didn’t, and couldn’t make this crises management mode stable and viable on the long term.

### *3. The repeated Trianon – Paris, 1947*

The Paris peace treaty, which ended the Second World War, was signed on 10<sup>th</sup> February 1947 by the representative of the Hungarian government, foreign minister János Gyöngyösi, and it didn’t even attempt to treat or correct the unjust resolutions of the Trianon peace treaty.<sup>89</sup> Actually it deepened the shock caused by Trianon. According to the peace treaty, Hungary “received back” the Trianon borders and it had to give up further territories to Czechoslovakia (three settlements in the Bratislava bridgehead territory – Horvátjárfalu/Jarovce, Oroszvár/Rusovce, Dunacsún/Čunovo). The ethnic minority protection provisions were also omitted. Thanks to these agreements, the cross-border Hungarians were completely exposed to the neighboring successor countries and delegated the minority issues to the given country’s domestic politics.

Article 22 of the treaty exceeded the Trianon dictate by setting the following: “after the treaty becomes effective, all allied military forces must be withdrawn from Hungary within 90 days, nevertheless the Soviet Union has the right

<sup>89</sup> The Paris Peace treaty (signed on the 10<sup>th</sup> February 1947), was codified by the year 1947 number XVIII. Bill. Full text: <http://1000ev.hu/index.php?a=3&param=8265>. See also ROMSICS Ignác: *Az 1947-es párizsi békeszerződés*. Budapest, Osiris, 2006.



to maintain such military units on Hungarian soil, which might be necessary to maintain the connection of the Soviet Army's transport lines with the Soviet occupation zone in Austria". Hungary signed the peace treaty in vain; it didn't restore Hungary's sovereignty, as the units of the Soviet Red Army remained in the country in unverifiable numbers. This settled the domestic political struggle, and this bet was none less than the future of the country as a civil democratic state, or a Soviet style political establishment. The domestic political system, which was established in 1948-49, was completely alien from the Hungarian society, interpreted the Trianon treaty and the whole problem as an issue for which exclusively the previous political elite was to be blamed. "So Trianon was slowly becoming "rightful" in the Hungarian socialist propaganda, and in the official state history, in the journals and in the school text books."<sup>90</sup>

#### *4. Problem swept under the carpet: what we don't speak about, it doesn't exist!*

During the years of socialism, Trianon was considered a taboo. It was forbidden to deal with the topic, to search the truth in the issue, or to publicize the truth, and it was even forbidden to refer to it. Generations have grown up without hearing about Trianon in details. Trianon was ruled by the conspiracy of silence, and this affected the lives of the Hungarians living in the successor states as well. The sheer mentioning of the nationality issue was forbidden.

Those who attempted to circumvent the prohibitions, were forced into silence (sentenced to the so-called "silentium"), and were also labeled as nationalists, chauvinist. They were declared as such counter-system people, who are trying to disrupt the friendly relationship between the socialist countries by raising the ethnic nationality and Trianon issues, and destroy the socialist "peace-camp".

The nationality issue could only be mentioned in an internationalist approach, according to which the nationalities form a bridge between the neighboring socialist countries. The situation was well illustrated by the meeting held in 15<sup>th</sup> June 1977 in Debrecen and 16<sup>th</sup> June in Oradea between János Kádár, the ruling MSZMP party's first secretary and Nicolae Ceausescu, first secretary of the Romanian Communist Party, which was covered by the newspaper Népszabadság. It contained the followings: the meeting "helped the better understanding, contributed to the further evolution of the two

<sup>90</sup> ORMOS Mária: Elhallgatások nélkül. *Magyar Nemzet*. 4<sup>th</sup> June 1990 (Hereinafter referred as: ORMOS, 1990.)

parties' and the two countries' relations, so that the tighter cooperation would help our people to benefit from it more efficiently, as well as promoting peace, security, independence, social development and socialism throughout the world. [...] The problem of the nationalities – who are the respective countries' citizens – is each of the countries' internal issue and a responsibility. At the same time they emphasized the significance of the nationalities, as they fill a bridge role between the Hungarian and Romanian people".<sup>91</sup>

This servile political attitude deliberately swept the Trianon problem and the unresolved nationality issue under the carpet, left behind the Hungarian minorities, and renounced their representation. This political attitude was publicly humiliated on the 28<sup>th</sup> August 1988, when Károly Grósz (first secretary of the communist party MSZMP) met Nicolae Ceausescu in Arad. Pál Szűts, who took part in the Arad negotiations as the ambassador of Hungary in Bucharest, recalled the event in his diary: "the psychological warfare initiated right at the state border: Grósz and his collaborators were transferred into Romanian cars and were transported to Arad in a detour, so in this way they couldn't meet the Hungarians of Romania gathered along the main road to salute them. The Hungarian National Television's envoys were also steered away, so they missed the opening ceremony in Arad. During the negotiations, Grósz presented the Hungarian point of view in 25 minutes, Ceausescu in response told them off for 2,5 hours. Grósz recognized that the Romanian settlement rearrangement was not settlement destruction, accepted that the Cluj-Napoca Consulate General's staff, which was expelled because of the mass demonstrations in Budapest against the settlement destruction in Romania, should have been arrested rather than expelled. Grósz wasn't protesting at all when he was told that the Hungarian House of Culture in Bucharest won't be opened."<sup>92</sup>

The conspiracy of silence, the secrets and the lack of historical analyses around the 20<sup>th</sup> century's great Hungarian tragedy, the trauma of Trianon, produced these negative results.

<sup>91</sup> 1977: Ceausescu in Debrecen, Kádár in Oradea. [http://index.hu/belfold/tegnapiujsg/2009/06/16/1977\\_magyar-roman\\_targyalasok\\_debrecenben\\_majd\\_nagyvaradon/](http://index.hu/belfold/tegnapiujsg/2009/06/16/1977_magyar-roman_targyalasok_debrecenben_majd_nagyvaradon/) (28<sup>th</sup> September 2013)

<sup>92</sup> 1988: Ceausescu humiliates Grósz in Arad. [http://index.hu/belfold/tegnapiujsg/2008/08/28/1988\\_ceausescu\\_megalazza\\_groszt\\_aradon/](http://index.hu/belfold/tegnapiujsg/2008/08/28/1988_ceausescu_megalazza_groszt_aradon/) (28<sup>th</sup> September 2013); see also SZÜTS Pál: *Bukaresti napló 1985-1990*. Budapest, Osiris, 1998.; FÖLDES György: *Magyarország, Románia és a nemzetiségi kérdés 1956-1989*. Budapest, Napvilág, 2007.

## 5. Trianon again in the center of attention

In the year of Károly Grósz's humiliation, the nation was in a regime-change spirit, although the communist system refused to acknowledge this. The opposition movements, parties were forming one after another, and it happened for the first time since 1956 that thousands of people marched the streets, and this time not on the orders of the communist party. On the 27<sup>th</sup> June 1988, responding to the invitation of several opposition organizations, seventy-eighty thousand people demonstrated on Heroes Square (Budapest) against the settlement destruction in Romania. István Csurka delivered a speech at the rally. The Romanian embassy refused to accept the demonstrator's petition, so it was sent to them through mail, and the petition was translated to four languages and transmitted to all foreign embassies in Budapest, and to the International Human Rights Conference, which was held in Vienna, and the petition was sent to the United Nations as well.

The suppressed anger and the words, which couldn't be used for decades, erupted with an unseen force. Nobody could keep Trianon a secret anymore. The taboo word returned again into the public debate. It was a great experience even to think about it, and now we could speak about it, we could research and gain knowledge about what happened on the 4<sup>th</sup> June 1920 in the pink marble halls of the Grand Trianon Palace in Versailles. "It is not a surprise that today every word about Trianon, which is mentioned in public spaces and in front of large audiences, is a shocking experience" – this was written in 1990 by a historian who was dealing with the history of the era.<sup>93</sup>

The regime change opened a new chapter in the understanding of Trianon. Studies, books, shorter-longer writings, analyses were published one after another, and great deal of diligence was perceivable to direct the public opinion towards the reality. The discussion about the topic initiated, but a great deal of illusion was associated to it. After a short period of time, it became obvious that the "Danube and the Olt rivers don't have the same voice".

The successor states, after they got rid of the restraints of socialism, haven't followed the path of cooperation and the policy of solving together their common problems, instead the forces of nationalism resurged. Vainly the new, consensus-based Hungarian foreign policy articulated as its triple strategy the Euro-Atlantic integration, the development of the relationship with the neighbors, the support of the Hungarians living across the borders, the former two strategies were viewed with suspicion from the successor states. Not much time would pass, and even the Hungarian domestic political life was divided

<sup>93</sup> ORMOS, 1990.; the work of Mária Ormos, titled "From Padova to Trianon 1918-1920" was published in 1983.

by the issue of the relationship between the motherland Hungarians and the Hungarians living across the borders.

*6. Governmental endeavors for the healing of the wounds caused by Trianon, the first attempt of the nation-unification.*

The first law, which was created on purpose to ensure governmental responsibility for the Hungarian minorities living in the neighboring countries, helping them cultivating and developing the relationship with the motherland, was enacted during the first Orbán-government, on the 19<sup>th</sup> June 2001. The year 2001, LXII act has conceived as an objective the prosperity of the Hungarians living in the neighboring countries, and to help maintaining their connections with Hungary, to help keeping their national-ethnic identity, to facilitate their connection to the Hungarian cultural heritage, and to facilitate their possibilities to express their bonding to the Hungarian nation. The act has also introduced the Hungarian card and the Hungarian family card, which in substance was similar to the Hungarian passport, and spotted the Hungarian Holy Crown on its top. Symbolically speaking, the owner of these cards became part of the Hungarian nation.

The Hungarian foreign politics managed to achieve a joint Hungarian-Romanian compliance declaration about the act named “Hungarians Living in Neighboring Countries” and other questions of the bilateral cooperation.<sup>94</sup> The document was signed on the 22<sup>nd</sup> December 2001 by Prime Ministers Viktor Orbán and his Romanian counterpart, Adrian Nastase. However, the working permissions, which were part of the compliance declaration, soon became a campaign issue of Hungarian domestic politics, and the opposition party MSZP (socialists) managed to create a political atmosphere, which significantly contributed to the 2002 electoral defeat of the FIDESZ party. The good-intentioned governmental pursuit to heal the under-debated Trianon trauma, after the government change in 2002 became deflated.

The entire affair however, pointed sharply on one issue: the Hungarians living in the neighboring states, as an issue, with the approaching of the elections, became a central topic of the political arguments not only in the successor states, but it also served as a device in the Hungarian domestic political fights.

<sup>94</sup> The text of the Romanian-Hungarian compliance declaration can be read at: <http://itthon.transindex.ro/?cikk=937>

*7. The spiritual Trianon – the unsuccessful referendum in 2004*

The 2001 status act was the first institutionalized step which intended to establish such a legal relationship between the Hungarians living outside the borders and in those living in the motherland, which fixed the unity of the Hungarian people, and would have eased the wounds of Trianon. The World Federation of Hungarians requested a stronger relationship, and advised to grant the citizenship for the Hungarians living abroad. After the MDF party failed to negotiate a preferential naturalization law with the then governing MSZP-SZDSZ coalition, the leadership of the World Federation of Hungarians made a decision on 13<sup>th</sup> August 2003: they will initiate a referendum plan about the preferential naturalization of Hungarians living abroad. In the summer of 2004, three hundred thousand people signed the referendum-proposal and the Hungarian National Assembly, after checking the validity of the signatures, ordered the referendum to take place and President of the Republic, Mádl Ferenc announced the national referendum for the 5<sup>th</sup> December 2004.<sup>95</sup>

The referendum asked the followings: “do you authorize the National Assembly to create an act regarding the preferential naturalization of those non resident non Hungarian individuals, who regard themselves as ethnic Hungarians, and can prove their ethnic Hungarian identity, according to the 2001 year LXII act 19<sup>th</sup> § by already possessing the Hungarian card, or will be able to prove their ethnic Hungarian identity as defined by a new law which will be enacted in the future?” The question essentially was about the National Assembly’s right to create a new law regarding the preferential naturalization, or not to create it at all. When and how this should be accomplished, this was left to the legislator. The referendum question – even in this form – brought up to the surface such emotions, which were capable of dividing the society and to create tensions between the Hungarians living abroad as minorities and the Hungarians living in the motherland. While the opposition parties rallied for the greater participation and to vote “yes”, and stressed that the preferential naturalization was an effective way to unite the Hungarian nation, which was torn apart by the Trianon peace treaty, the parties that formed the government openly refused to support the “yes” answers.

Their main reason was that by granting the Hungarian citizenship for these people, Hungary would face serious economic difficulties. They stressed that instead of the Hungarian citizenship the EU membership will be the solution

<sup>95</sup> Chronology of the double citizenship. Compiled by BAKK Miklós. <http://www.kettosallampolgarsag.mtaki.hu/kronologia.html> (28th September 2013)

for most of the Hungarian minorities, and claimed that a unilateral Hungarian move would deteriorate the relationship between Hungary and its neighbors.<sup>96</sup>

The referendum was held in an extremely tense atmosphere on the 5<sup>th</sup> December 2004, and finally had no valid result. Only 37,49% of the citizens (3.017.739 votes) eligible to vote went to the ballot stations, and although the “yes” votes received majority, with 51,57% (1.521.271 votes), this wasn’t enough to obtain a valid referendum.<sup>97</sup>

The unsuccessful referendum and the following domestic political fight caused a serious trauma for the Hungarian minorities living in the neighboring countries. It pointed also out that until the Hungarians in the motherland can be so divided in this issue, the nation unification and the treatment of Trianon must be postponed.

### *8. The third attempt of the nation-unification*

After the 2010 parliamentary elections, the second Orbán government was formed, and one of its first provisions was to initiate the modification of the 1993 year LV. act about the Hungarian citizenship. The modification proposal, presented 14<sup>th</sup> May 2010, had the following motivations by the bill presenting politicians – such as Viktor Orbán, Zsolt Semjén, László Kövér, Zsolt Németh, Lajos Kósa– who referred to the 6<sup>th</sup> §, (3) section of the Constitution. This part of the Constitution declares: “the Hungarian Republic feels responsibility for the fate of the Hungarians living across the borders, and promotes their relationship with Hungary”. They also fixed that “between the Hungarians living in the Carpathian Basin and all around the World, in the last 20 years from time to time the need arises to have a simplified naturalization process”<sup>98</sup> – based on foreign examples – which would mean a serious help in maintaining their contacts with the motherland and preserve their Hungarian identity. They have fixed in this proposal that their aim is to secure the double citizenship for the ethnic Hungarians living across the borders, with a simplified preferential naturalization process, through the modification of the 1993 year LV. act.<sup>99</sup>

<sup>96</sup> In memoriam 2004. december 5. *Kitekintő*. 5<sup>th</sup> December 2008. [http://kitekinto.hu/karpat-medence/2008/12/05/in\\_memoriam\\_2004.\\_december\\_5.](http://kitekinto.hu/karpat-medence/2008/12/05/in_memoriam_2004._december_5.) (28<sup>th</sup> December 2013)

<sup>97</sup> Final results of the 5<sup>th</sup> December 2004 referendum can be found at: [http://www.valasztas.hu/nepszav04/main\\_hu.html](http://www.valasztas.hu/nepszav04/main_hu.html)

<sup>98</sup> Bill proposal about the modification of the 1993 year LV. act about Hungarian citizenship (14<sup>th</sup> May 2013) <http://www.parlament.hu/irom39/00029/00029.pdf>

<sup>99</sup> Bill proposal about the modification of the 1993 year LV. act about Hungarian citizenship (14<sup>th</sup> May 2013) <http://www.parlament.hu/irom39/00029/00029.pdf>

The members of parliament modified the law about Hungarian citizenship on the session held on 26<sup>th</sup> May 2010 of the National Assembly, approving it by 344 yes, 3 no votes and 5 abstentions.<sup>100</sup> The act entered in force on the 20<sup>th</sup> August 2010, but its provisions could only be applied in proceedings initiated after the 1<sup>st</sup> January 2011. Namely the execution decrees were ready only by this date.

With the passing of the act, the Hungarian National Assembly opened the way for the Hungarians living across the borders to obtain citizenship through the simplified naturalization process, healing the spiritual offence they had to bear after the 2004 referendum. At the same time it created the opportunity to reunite the Hungarian nation which was torn apart by the Trianon peace treaty.

### *9. The creation of the national cohesion*

After the modification of the act regarding the Hungarian citizenship, preceding just by a few days the 90<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Trianon peace treaty signings, the Hungarian National Assembly declared the 4<sup>th</sup> of June as the national day for remembrance, and enacted the 2010 year XLV. act about the “Testimony Along the National Cohesion”.<sup>101</sup>

The introduction of the act reminds the reader about the negative effects imposed by the Trianon peace treaty upon the Hungarian people, the conflicts created by the peace treaty, which directly resulted in the region’s fall first into the sphere of influence of Nazi Germany, and after 1945, becoming the dependency of the communist Soviet Union. The introduction declares that the suppressed problems weren’t debated for decades and the interests of the minorities couldn’t find a resolution in this atmosphere. The closing thoughts are for the present and the future. The solution of the problems won’t come from the territorial revisions supported by mayor powers, or from the totalitarian utopia. The offence based politics, or the tragic-like attitude towards the issue can’t be the solution. Instead, it highlighted the unity of the Hungarian nation, a national self-building program which spans across the borders and it’s not aimed against any other neighboring state. On the contrary: together with

<sup>100</sup> The modification of the 1993 year LV. act by the 2010 year XLIV. act was published in the *Magyar Közlöny* official state newspaper on the 1<sup>st</sup> June 2010, Ed. Nr. 89. <http://www.kozlonyok.hu/nkonline/MKPDF/hiteles/mk10089.pdf>

<sup>101</sup> 2010 year XLV. Act about the “Testimony Along the National Cohesion”. <http://www.vajma.info/docs/Nemzeti-osszetartozas-torveny.pdf>



the neighboring states' mutual cooperation it wishes to achieve the unity of Europe, which was disintegrated by the tragedies of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

The act, which consists from five paragraphs and beyond the Hungarian language, it was translated into nine other languages. The first paragraph remembers and pays tribute for all those people, who after Trianon "with their sacrifices and achievements made possible that the Hungarians, even after this tragedy, managed to strengthen spiritually and economically, and managed to survive the tragedies which came afterwards". It honors those, who suffered offence because of their Hungarian origins. Especially those people, who sacrificed their lives because of this, and at the same time, the act gives homage for those who undertook solidarity with the Hungarians.

The second paragraph fixates that the "the historical solution attempts to the questions imposed by the Trianon peace-ultimatum – the border modifications with assistance from mayor powers, or the elimination of national identification because of the internationalist ideology – were all failures". As a consequence it stresses that the solutions of the Trianon problems could only be achieved according to the international laws, trough a "cooperation based on mutual respect" between democratic, sovereign countries which guarantee legal equality. The base of this could only be "the individual's liberty – including the choice of national identity – and the right of the national community for self-determination". Simultaneously "it condemns any attempt of assimilation of the minorities living on the territories of given states".

The third paragraph of the act declares that "the Hungarians living under the authority of other countries are also part of the unified Hungarian state, which is united above state borders and at the same time it is a defining element of the individuals' and the communities' self-identification". It confirms that Hungary is committed in supporting the nation's members to maintain and cultivate the relations between each other, and also supports the ethnic autonomy practices accepted in Europe.

The fourth paragraph of the act provides about remembering Trianon as a national tragedy in the present and in the future as well. It isn't allowed to forget about it, and the future generations must be reminded about it as well. Learning from the mistakes of the past, getting inspiration from co-operations of the past decades, we must work to strengthen the national cohesion. To this end that the National Assembly declares the 4<sup>th</sup> June, the day of the 1920 Trianon peace-ultimatum, to be held as the National Cohesion Day.

The fifth paragraph of the act has a symbolic content, as it makes the act coming into force on the 4<sup>th</sup> June 2010.

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The “Testimony Along the National Cohesion” act ends a ninety-year long rugged process. It faced the tragedy of Trianon, and the decades long national crises caused by it. It summarized the dead-end like solution alternatives, and at the same time it offered a solution for the entire Hungarian nation: the program of national cohesion, and the national self-development above the state borders.

## THE FEMINIST MOVEMENT FOR WOMEN'S SUFFRAGE

The origo of the Hungarian bourgeois parliamentary system was the Act V of 1848, which nevertheless did not provided any suffrage to women. Moreover, it was a kind of backward step. Before 1848 widows of peers has the right of appearance and expression in the House of Delegates through their representatives; but the Act V of 1848 abrogated it.<sup>1</sup>

During the 1870s the question of women's suffrage was on the agenda of the Hungarian Parliament three times, however without any result.<sup>2</sup> The Feminist Association (Feministák Egyesülete) was established in Hungary in the 18<sup>th</sup> of December, 1904. Its chairwoman was Vilma Glücklich, a teacher from Budapest, the vice-chairman was Dezső Márkus, judge of the supreme court (Kúria).<sup>3</sup> From that date the Feminist Association was actively struggled for rights and better circumstances for women. They organized a Practical Advisor, which became popular soon. It helped women to find place on the job market, to educate their children, to deal with health problems, or it gave them legal advices. Vocational guidance was another activity of the Association,

<sup>1</sup> VÁZSONYI Vilmos beszédei és írásai. II. Budapest, Ed. by Országos Vázsonyi-Emlékbizottság. 1927. (Hereinafter referred as: VÁZSONYI, 1927.) 155-156.

<sup>2</sup> During the session of the 13<sup>th</sup> March 1871. Pál Madocsai (1807-1865), MP of the Szabadelvű Párt (large-minded – liberal – party) presented a petition “signed by numerous widows” to the House, in which he asked for women's suffrage. *Képviselőházi Napló*, 1869/72. XV. k. (Session 308. 13. March 1871.) 5.

A similar petition was brought in by István Majoros, MP of the city Zenta, member of the Függetlenségi Párt (Party of Independence) in 20<sup>th</sup> of November, 1871. In his address he called for equal rights of men and women. VÁZSONYI, 1927. 156.

During the session of tabling the bill of suffrage in 1872, Ödön Kállay (1815-1879), MP of the Függetlenségi Párt argued again for the generalization of suffrage to women as well. *Képviselőházi Napló*, 1869/72. XXI. k. (Session 308. 13<sup>th</sup> March 1871.) 240-241.

<sup>3</sup> The feminist movement was active in Hungary between 1904 and 1942, when it was banned by the political power. After the war the organization was re-established, and in turn banned again in 1949. See ACSÁDY Judit: *A mozgalom előzménye és kibontakozása a századelőn*. Online: [www.feminista.hu/node/78](http://www.feminista.hu/node/78). *Feminista Almanach*. Ed. CSAPÓ Ida – TÖRÖK Mónika. MINők Egyesülete és Nőtárs Alapítvány. Bp., 2005.; LICSKÓ György: *A nők a közéletben. Összefoglaló a nemzetközi és a hazai szakirodalom alapján*. In: *A nő és a politikum. A nők politikai szerepvállalása Magyarországon*. Ed. PALASIK Mária. Napvilág Kiadó. Bp., 2007. 17- 44.

particularly popularized by Vilma Glücklich. Vocational guidance still had not any scientifically elaborated method in that time, so the activity of the organization was even more important. Women understood the importance of this advisor soon, and visited it in huge numbers.<sup>4</sup>

Nevertheless, struggle for political equality, the women's suffrage was in the centre of interest of the Feminist Association. With their organized activity the feminists wanted to reach that "the woman would not remain bounded and dependent as she is today in her role and competence would not be confined to an eternal infancy even in the family."<sup>5</sup>

Having a job, women became autonomous gainers, hence their situation has changed both in society as a whole, and in the smaller community of the family as well. They reached a place that was condignly equal with men's place. Besides their duties they also became aware of their rights. Beyond basic literacy, now they got possibilities to study the sciences as well.<sup>6</sup>

More and more women proved that they are able to occupy responsible posts in new branches of occupation, and their job could become their calling. The results of their experiences and activity became visible among others in the fields of managing social problems, education of children or the organization of healthcare.<sup>7</sup>

Their modified situation and economic independence compelled the women to obtain their political rights. In the struggle for suffrage the feminist movement represented and supported their demands. They stressed that based on human and citizen rights for equality and justice, they are entitled to suffrage, which gives them an opportunity to participate in the decisions about their own fate and the future of the country as well.

The feminist movement called the attention to extreme importance and urgency of granting women's suffrage, since "...by this only justice and right are triumphing, the principle of equality is realizing; philanthropy and universal abundance will reign our Hungarian homeland".<sup>8</sup>

The realization of these aims of the feminist movement was helped by several articles published in the press. In the beginning of the century the feminist movement was encouraged in its struggle for suffrage in the columns of the *Huszadik Század* (Twentieth Century). Rózsa Schwimmer accounted

<sup>4</sup> GÁRDOS Mariska: *Feminista mozgalom Magyarországon* (előadás). Politikatörténeti és szakszervezeti levéltár – Archive of Political History and Labour Union (Hereinafter referred as: PIL) 940. fond. 11.ő.e. 244.

<sup>5</sup> JÁNOSSY Gábor: *A feminizmus Magyarországon*. Szombathely. 1911. (Hereinafter referred as: JÁNOSSY, 1911.) 16.

<sup>6</sup> JÁNOSSY, 1911. 41-42.

<sup>7</sup> JÁNOSSY, 1911. 51-52.

<sup>8</sup> JÁNOSSY, 1911. 105-108.

the Women's Congress that was held in June 1904 in Berlin with delegates participated from all the five continents. The main point was equal political rights for women, the international recognition of their suffrage. To assure this an international association was founded with the participation of Hungary as well. In its program the association declared that "...all governments that codifies laws and lays taxes without granting general suffrage, are misuses their power and just slaps justice's face".<sup>9</sup>

The study of Rózsa Schwimmer entitled "Principle demand of the women's movement" was also published in the *Huszadik Század* – Schwimmer demonstrated in it that movements for equality, demand for suffrage are present everywhere from America through South Africa until the Balkans. She mentioned the example of the northern countries, where women's suffrage was already a natural, self-evident phenomenon.<sup>10</sup>

The Feminist Association published a brochure entitled *Opinions about women's suffrage* in 1906. The feminists surveyed in it those politicians, jurists, lawyers, public actors, who were against or for the women's suffrage, or accepted it only with some reservations. Here we will mention some interesting argumentations against the emancipation.

Árpád Bozóky, representative of the Függetlenségi és 48-as Párt (Party of Independence and 1848 Platform) declared that "...all activity beyond maternity and family care are against the nature-given craft of women".

Count Albin Csáky, chairman of the Upper House (1900-1906 and 1910-1912) argued that he is not completely against the extension of rights, since he is convinced that a female doctor or teacher with university degree could be more mature politically than "a voting railway flag-man". However, he added, to give suffrage to graduated women "would be so far-reaching and complex in its consequences that only time could mellow the necessity and possibility of the expansion of such rights on women as well". In the concrete situation he did not supported women's suffrage, nevertheless he did not excluded the possibility that in the future he will be more supportive in this matter.

According to Ferenc Darányi, MP of Néppárt (People's Party) "... suffrage is not a human right – if it would had been such a right, it would have been valid for women as well – instead, it is a political right, only for [appropriate] persons. It would divert women from the adequate accomplishment of their duties as mothers and wives."<sup>11</sup>

<sup>9</sup> *Huszadik Század*, vol. V. tom. X. July-December, 1904. 144.

<sup>10</sup> *Huszadik Század*, vol. XI. tom. XXI. January-June, 1910. 174.

<sup>11</sup> Cited by *Vélemények a nők választójogáról*. Ed. SCHWIMMER Rózsa. Published by the Feministák Egyesülete. 1906. (Hereinafter referred as: SCHWIMMER, 1906.) 8-9.

Count István Tisza, member of the Upper House, prime minister in 1903-1905 and 1913-1917: "With two words: I am a confirmed enemy of women's suffrage. I loathe the idea that our women could turn into a branch of voting citizens." "With such a reform we, poor men, would lose, just as the women, I suppose."<sup>12</sup>

However, in the brochure edited by Rózsa Schwimmer the supportive opinions were in majority. Sándor Giesswein, MP of the Néppárt considered the women's suffrage absolute righteous because of the role of women in the society.<sup>13</sup> Gyula Justh, liberal politician of the Függetlenségi Párt (Party of Independence), chairman of the House of Representatives (1905-1909) deemed natural the expansion of universal suffrage also on women. "In several cases, women are more intelligent than men", and if we consider citizen rights as something man was born with, then it is equally right for women as well. "Hence that they do not have it, it is only because of the egoism and tyranny of men."<sup>14</sup> Vilmos Mezőfi, MP of the Szociáldemokrata Párt (Social Democratic Party) emphasized that women must have just the same political rights as men.<sup>15</sup> Bódog Somló, jurist, university professor advanced: universal secret suffrage equally pertains to women as well. The expansion of political rights to both men and women implicates that also women could directly exercise these rights, they have the right to be elected, and could equally participate in the government of the country.<sup>16</sup>

Zoltán Szász, writer, journalist of *Pesti Hírlap* (Pest News): "Women are not only women, but also humans. To be a woman is strictly a personal matter." Suffrage "must be secured on the basis of general human values", so it could not be different for men and for women."<sup>17</sup>

The editors of the survey collected the opinions of the ones as well who had some kind of reservations concerning emancipation. Ferenc Bonitz journalist, editor of *Alkotmány* (Constitution) did not support the expansion of the suffrage to women, and considered it possible "at the outmost case only for mothers living in canonically legal marriage". Géza Földes, director, editor of *Nemzeti Iskola* (National School) supported equal conditions for both sexes: literacy.<sup>18</sup> Aladár Zichy, MP, chairman of the Néppárt supported women's suffrage. Nevertheless, he wanted to give it with the condition that "it should

<sup>12</sup> Cited by SCHWIMMER, 1906. 10.

<sup>13</sup> Cited by SCHWIMMER, 1906. 12.

<sup>14</sup> Cited by SCHWIMMER, 1906. 13.

<sup>15</sup> Cited by SCHWIMMER, 1906. 14.

<sup>16</sup> Cited by SCHWIMMER, 1906. 16.

<sup>17</sup> Cited by SCHWIMMER, 1906. 17.

<sup>18</sup> Cited by SCHWIMMER, 1906. 19-20.

not lead women to choose such professions that erase the feminine charm from their souls". Hence his main condition was not graduation – he wanted women “to gain the highest appreciation of political rights in the field of womanish calling”.<sup>19</sup>

There were a lot of opinions that suffrage must be based on predetermined conditions of wealth or education (census). Let us show some of these apprehensions. Oszkár Farkas, lawyer wanted to give suffrage only those women, who were independent in their existence, since if somebody is not independent, than she could not vindicate her opinion in political matters.<sup>20</sup> For Béla Laszlovszky, MP of the Szabadelvű Párt (Liberal Party), all wealthy, independent, adult women, who has Hungarian nationality and able to read and write, were qualified for suffrage.<sup>21</sup> Károly Zipernowsky, teacher of the technical university, inventor, wanted to give suffrage for those women, who had independent income, paid their taxes and excised some major intellectual work.<sup>22</sup>

The official organ of the Feminist Association, *Nő és Társadalom* (Woman and Society) published the official program of the organization on the 1<sup>st</sup> of July, 1909. The article argued for women's suffrage in 31 points. Let us quote some. “Why women need suffrage?”

“Because women are obliged to keep the laws just as men; so they have to participate also in the creation process of these laws. Because women are taxed as well, but they have no words in how to use these taxes. Because until women are could not elect or be elected, nobody will ask them what they need. They are treated like children, who do not understand what is good or bad for themselves. But the parliament must express the will of the people, and this is impossible, until women, more than half of this people, are not allowed to directly express their will. Since a lot of jobs are closed for them, some of the best paid and most comfortable offices are kept for men only. They are not prepared enough even for the jobs that are open for them, since only boy's education is secured enough from the taxes that are paid by women as well. Since the insufficiently educated women are restricted to the worst paid jobs only. Since a mother has not equal rights with his husband in the family. Since children are not in their mother's parental power; it depends on the father how much a mother can govern or not her children's fate. She is humiliated in front of her children, since she has lesser rights in the family than her husband. Since politics affects all aspects of family life, it is necessary to

<sup>19</sup> Cited by SCHWIMMER, 1906. 20-21.

<sup>20</sup> Cited by SCHWIMMER, 1906. 22.

<sup>21</sup> Cited by SCHWIMMER, 1906. 23.

<sup>22</sup> Cited by SCHWIMMER, 1906. 24.

woman to affect politics to save their interests in the family. Since in litigations between men and women both accusants and judges are men; because all juridical occupations are reserved for them. Since in all those states, where women are electors and could be elected (Wyoming since 1869; European Man Island since 1880; Colorado since 1893; New Zealand since 1893; the sates of Australia since 1895-1909; Utah and Idaho since 1896; Finland and Norway since 1907) politics is more clear, more honest and sensitive to the needs of the people. Since Hungarian women already had an old right to send delegates, and used it with excellent political sense (even Lajos Kossuth entered the parliament as a woman's delegate). Since suffrage is the best tool to help all women, who are interested in the problems of society, to participate in healing of these problems, which is nevertheless not possible with money begged in charity balls. Since suffrage is not an aim in itself, but a weapon of self-defense in the hand of those, whose interests are not defended by anybody; the best tool for those, who want to honestly serve the common good. Since the lack of suffrage is such a humiliation, which could not be accepted by any self-conscious woman, who is proud of her gender. Since the life of a free-minded woman will be far more noble, if she deals with important public matters, than is she wastes her time on vacuous nesses.”<sup>23</sup>

It is important to quote these points, since in this paper the members of the feminist movement might were among the firsts to articulate the situation of women in details and in all spheres of society in that age, and to summarize the necessary actions, that supports the need for women's suffrage.

The newspaper *Nő és Társadalom* searched for more arguments to support women's suffrage. It published foreign statesmen's opinions in the issue of 1<sup>st</sup> April 1910. The politicians had to answer three questions: “1. Do you think it is possible now, when women's suffrage is triumphantly entering into European parliaments that we could call “universal” an electoral system that not embraces women's suffrage as well? 2. Is it possible in your country to effectuate an electoral reform that not covers also the women? 3. Do you believe that your country would enter women's suffrage within a reasonable time?” Let us see some interesting arguments from the answers. Sir Charles McLaren, leading politician of the British liberal party emphasized that one

<sup>23</sup> Miért kell a nőnek a választójog? *Nő és Társadalom*, 1<sup>st</sup> July 1909. 114-115. The *Nő és Társadalom* (Women and Society) was the official organ of the Feminist Association and National Association of Female Office-bearers, a predecessor of the national newspaper *ANő* (The Woman) between 1907-1913. The first editor was Róza Bédy-Schwimmer. See in detail: LAKATOS Éva: *Magyar Irodalmi Folyóiratok*. A Petőfi Irodalmi Múzeum Bibliográfiai Füzetek. Published by Petőfi Irodalmi Múzeum, Budapest, 1981. Serie A. 17-19.



could not call universal a suffrage without the women's right to participate elections. In Britain an electoral reform would only be valid if it embraced women as well. He expressed his hope that women will get suffrage soon in his country.

The previous prime minister of the Netherlands, S. van Houten, liberal MP, said: "We only could call men's suffrage "universal" until women's suffrage was not on the agenda". In his country there are a lot of supporters of women's suffrage already, so the next modification of the constitution would comprehend it. The Spanish radical MP P. Arsuaga thought that one could not call a suffrage "universal" if it not embraces women as well. The last electoral reform still not embraced women in Spain. Helmut von Gerlach, German liberal politician also said that without women a suffrage could not be called universal. "The situation in Germany is still unfortunately so obscurant nowadays that it is possible in some member states of the empire to have some reforms of suffrage without the introduction of women's." He said that he could only auspicate the extension of rights in Germany, but he did not want do it.<sup>24</sup>

Among the American answers the opinion of the governor of Colorado, John F. Shafroth is rather interesting. Without women there is no universal suffrage. 16 years earlier women got the electoral rights in Colorado. Colorado, Idaho, Utah and Wyoming "gave the suffrage to women with really fruitful results". He emphasized that women ought to have the right to participate in all decisions in which men have right. He wished that "the Hungarian women's movement would win in this matter soon".<sup>25</sup>

On the 30<sup>th</sup> July 1912 the Feminist Association brought in an address to the Ministry of Interior, in which they argued for women's suffrage. The text of this address was published in September 1912 in *Nő és Társadalom*. As it said, in the first decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, according to the spirit of the modern era, legal status of the women must be changed. It is an undeniable fact that women became indispensable helpers of men in several spheres of economy, offices, intellectual life. The suffrage is essential for them, since only through that they could directly defend their juridical, economical and social interests.

The address emphasized that the members of the feminist movement did a lot in the social and cultural life of the country, and made huge propaganda work for the women's suffrage. They hoped that "the next parliamentary reform will allow Hungarian woman into the fortress of constitution".

<sup>24</sup> Az „általános” választójog új fogalma. *Nő és Társadalom*, 1<sup>st</sup> April 1910. 49-50.

<sup>25</sup> *Nő és Társadalom*, 1<sup>st</sup> April 1910. 51.



The address enumerated all the countries where women already got suffrage, and argued that these countries are the ones in which the most advanced parliamentary system reigns.

Women's suffrage is not only "the glory of the legislature, but also the advance of the country", the article said, since the expansion of rights could unleash the energies, which before that were used to gain suffrage itself; hence these energies could turn into "creative parliamentary work that creates culture and civilization".

The authors of the address enumerated the results of their surveys and polls, proving that the public opinion generally advocates women's suffrage. So they hoped that the minister would reckon with the general will, and bring in a bill to generalize suffrage to give "the equal civil rights for the women who already have equal civil duties with men".<sup>26</sup>

The 7<sup>th</sup> Congress of the World Association of Women's Suffrage was held in Budapest, 15-20 June, 1913, in the building of the Academy of Music. From the side of the Hungarian Association Countess Mrs. Sándor Teleki saluted the participants in Hungarian and French, while Vilma Glücklich in English and German. The delegates were welcomed also by Béla Jankovich, minister of religion and education, and by István Bárczy, the major of Budapest as well.<sup>27</sup>

An important event of the congress was the admission of new member states into the World Association of Women's Suffrage in the 17<sup>th</sup> of June. Galicia, Rumania, South-Africa and Portugal were these new members; their status was voted univocally. On the next day the delegates discussed the question "what should be the position of the pro-suffrage organizations towards political parties"? Following ardent debates, the resolution committee worked up a resolution plan of the meeting, in which "the World Association of Women's Suffrage expresses its conviction that the question of women's suffrage is above political parties, so the Suffrage Associations of each country are obliged to keep their neutrality.

In the name of political neutrality, as it was understood by the World Association, the Suffrage Associations:

1. have to accept the followers of each party;
2. are not allowed to participate in party politics as a body and are not allowed to work for pure party interests. Exceptions could be only such

<sup>26</sup> Kérvények a nők választójoga érdekében. *Nő és Társadalom*, 1<sup>st</sup> September 1912. 158-159.

<sup>27</sup> The 7th Congress of the World Association of Women's Suffrage in Budapest, 15-20 June, 1913. PIL. MM/16.b./263. 12. p. (The documents of the 7th congress: Magyar Országos Levéltár. 999.15.d.51.)

countries, where women's suffrage is a decisive question in practical politics. In such countries

a. the Suffrage Association could allowably struggle against political parties that are categorically against women's suffrage and oppose the parliamentary act for that purpose;

b. during elections it could allowably support such political parties that have women's suffrage clearly in their program.”<sup>28</sup>

The Feminist Association continued its activity, hence the struggle for suffrage, also after the outbreak of the war. In their press almost all of their events were reported. They presented the severe changes of women's situation caused by the war. The biggest change – wrote the paper *A Nő* on 5<sup>th</sup> April 1915 – is in the everyday life and work of the women. The majority of the work formerly done by men, who were already in the frontline, now became the task of women. “Now all the antifeminist men and women wish we had more female doctors, teachers and trained incumbent to fill the gaps” – emphasized Jolán Pflanczer, the author of the article.<sup>29</sup>

In the Hungarian House of Representatives Count Mihály Károlyi addressed a proposal, in which he asked the members of the house to give suffrage to the heroes, since during the war they proved to be politically reliable.<sup>30</sup>

The Christian Socialist Sándor Giesswein advised a modification of Károlyi's proposal – wrote the newspaper *A Nő* on the 18<sup>th</sup> December 1915. “Forasmuch as during the present war the widest strata of the people of Hungary gave bright evidences of their patriotism, devotion and reliability without any gender differences, all distrust should subside into silence: the house of representatives orders the government to address a new bill based on universal suffrage, without any census of wealth or gender, with a considerable reduction of the unprecedentedly and unduly high age limit – before the present parliamentary session is over.”

In the preamble of his modification the politician emphasized that in the hinterland everybody follows the heroic struggle of men with respect and compassion, as they had to rip away their families and abandon their future hopes. But not less compassion is justified towards the mothers, who gave their husbands and sons to the war, or to the girls, who lost their fathers and brothers.

After the war – said the MP – men and women together will have to recover the damages of war. Wages must be equal, just as working time, “men and women alike needs the defense of their individual rights; hunger, fatigue,

<sup>28</sup> PIL. MM/16.b./263. 13-15.

<sup>29</sup> A háború és a nő érvényesülése. *A Nő*, 5<sup>th</sup> April 1915. 57.

<sup>30</sup> *Képviseelőházi Napló*, 1910-1915. tom. XXVII.. Bp., 1916. 318-319.

injustice brings equal misery for both sexes; it seems unbelievable to us that not everybody understands it and feels it already.”<sup>31</sup>

Mrs. Sándor Szegvári wrote an article in *A Nő*, 5<sup>th</sup> January 1916 about parliamentary debates of the women’s suffrage. She emphasized that most of the opposition parties asked for the expansion of suffrage to wider strata of male population, because “these strata made huge sacrifices for the homeland during the war”.

The leaders of the opposition are aware of the fact – she wrote – that “also women suffered in the war; moreover, they worked instead of men, kept on the continuity of the economy”.

The leaders of the opposition parties “give us an inexorable rebus”, wrote the author. Mihály Károlyi, Vilmos Vázsonyi, István Rakovszky, Albert Apponyi “one by one, severally said that they are persuaded adherents of women’s suffrage”. “Notwithstanding they are afraid that during their cooperation this could be the point of discord between them.” Mrs. Szegvári cited Sándor Giesswein as a positive example, since he stood up for women’s suffrage among all circumstances. As example of the enemies of the suffrage, she mentioned Gyula Andrássy, who “does not think that the question of suffrage should be timely neither for men nor for women”.<sup>32</sup>

In April 1917 the Feminist Association sent questionnaires to the members of the parliament with four points to answer. The aim of the leaders of the movement was to survey that if there was any change in the opinion of the representatives in the issue of women’s suffrage. “1. Are you ready to address a proposal about women’s suffrage? 2. Would you vote such a proposal in somebody else would address it? 3. Are you in favor of general women’s suffrage? 4. If you promote women’s suffrage based on conditions, how do you want to change it and with what preamble?” Documents of the Feminist collection of the Hungarian National Archive keeps the resent questionnaires; even the exterior of these could be informative. All of the resent questionnaires are filled somehow. A lot of MPs gave their name to their opinion. Some of them answered with one word, others wrote lengthy explanations. For example Mátyás Skrovina, a lawyer from Zólyom county connected all the four questions with braces and wrote NO! with full capitals. After the exterior let us analyze the content. 66 MPs sent back the questionnaires. They wrote either their opinion, or the opinion of their parties. The ones, who wrote party standpoints, put on emphasis on that fact. We present some of these opinions of both parties and deputies, to illustrate how they considered the importance

<sup>31</sup> Dr. Giesswein Sándor a nők választójogáért. *A Nő*, 18<sup>th</sup> December 1915. 12. Képviselőházi Napló, 1910-1915. tom. XXVII.. Bp., 1916. 361-362. p.)

<sup>32</sup> Háború és választójog *A Nő*, 5<sup>th</sup> January 1916. 2-3.

of the issue of women's suffrage. There was a deputy who was unable to answer the question, since his party not yet positioned itself in the problem.

Count Albert Apponyi: "He do not make a party question from it. He is for conditions." János Baross, independent, did not answer to question 4. His opinion was: "we should give suffrage for the wives of all male voters if they are able to read and write in Hungarian". He took into consideration the suffrage of mothers with large families. Sándor Gisswein, MP of the Christian Social Party wrote for the first two questions that he supports all proposals for women's suffrage as he already did that before. Further he explained that he is adherent of universal suffrage and demands it for women as well. If it is not possible to come through for universal suffrage, than he would demand equal electoral rights for men and women.

Károly Huszár chairman of the Keresztény Nemzeti Egyesülés Párt (Christian National Unity Party) wrote for the first question he is not ready to propose women's suffrage, but ready to support the proposal of somebody else. He does not support general suffrage for women. In the fourth point he explained his opinion supporting the suffrage based on census conditions. He wrote he would give suffrage to women with higher degrees, general degrees and if they are independent wage-earners.

Margrave György Pallavicini, MP (without party in that period) answered only the third question. He thinks that first men's suffrage must be secured. Theoretically he was not against women's suffrage, but judged it to be an immature question, "sooner or later it will be created" he wrote.

Vilmos Sümegi, Függetlenségi és 48-as Párt; he would not propose it himself, but he would support and vote any proposal for women's suffrage.

György Szmercsányi, lawyer, MP of the Szabadelvű Párt (Liberal Party). He would address and support all proposals about women's suffrage, but only wanted to give suffrage to women "who work on intellectual fields, and maintains themselves or their families".

Gábor Ugron, MP of Alkotmánypárt (Constitution Party); did not answered the first three questions. He would based suffrage on educational conditions – eight classes or higher degree. If it is not possible, than he proposed conditions of wealth, with a minimum of 20 koronas state taxes.

Sándor Wekerle (three-times prime minister) did not answer the first and the third questions. He would support a proposal of somebody else. He would link suffrage to intellectual conditions.<sup>33</sup>

The Feminist Association held a national meeting on 11<sup>th</sup> September 1917. The aim of this meeting was to make clear to everybody that to take part in

<sup>33</sup> MOL. P 999. 14. d. 37. l. 49-56.p.

public matters is not only the privilege of a narrow stratum of women, or urban women, but it is the duty of all citizens with full rights. The participants wanted to convince the society that the representatives of women with different skills are all aware of their political tasks. The speakers arrived from different strata, but all argued for the expansion of rights. Mrs. Imre Turcsányi, chairwoman of the Feminist Association of Szeged talked about the rights of the mothers in her speech. She enumerated all the urgent measures that were necessary to ensure better circumstances for the women in the family and in safer upbringing of her children. Mrs. István Bordás, chairwoman of the Peasant Women's Association of Balmazújváros "described the situation of the female farm workers with soul-stirring words: the miserable wages, the unbearable expensiveness, the pains caused by the war, the injustice of the war-aid matters, and the immovable cruelty of the administration". She considered suffrage as the only viable path to solve these enormous problems. If women would have suffrage, she said, they would prevent future wars, "as they would have prevented the previous one if they had had the right to vote."

Janka Gergely, chairwoman of National Association of Female Incumbents enumerated statistical data to prove that existing laws served the interests of the social classes that have representatives in parliament, and the interests of women are out of considerations. The delegates of the national meeting met Minister Vilmos Vázsonyi, who certified them that "during the preparation of the proposal bill honest goodwill will twinned with great creating power". He also told that for the preparation of the bill he considers some data of foreign examples to ensure success.<sup>34</sup>

Based on these opinions we could state that the majority of those personalities, who shaped politics: jurists, enlightened thinkers, supported women's suffrage. Nevertheless, among aristocrats we could find more politicians against it. Their arguments were based mainly on the old-fashioned opinion that women's primary duty is to care for the family and breed the children. A lot of opinion was in favor of women's suffrage, but almost without exception these wanted to link it to some conditions, mainly intellectual, or lesser extent financial.

However, the struggle for equal rights for women was already an unstoppable movement, and the effective activity of the Feminist Association played an important role in it. The organization uproused the Hungarian public opinion, it managed to draw a lot of supporters to its camp. They conceived their opinion bravely and confidently in their addresses to the government, the leaders of the political parties, or different organizations of the society. They

<sup>34</sup> Az ország asszonyai a választójogért. *A Nép*, 15<sup>th</sup> September 1917. 139.

collected arguments and data about how women's suffrage had been realized in some European countries or some states of the USA.

The excerpts from their press show that even during the war they undertook to present the circumstances of women in the hinterland. Reviewing their organs we conclude that their main concern was not the fate of women belonged to the upper classes; more the rugged everyday of working women, peasant women, or maids were in the centre of their care.

They organized mass meetings, discussions, conferences all over the country, where they stood by the universal, equal and secret suffrage of women without discrimination. For these purposes they did not hesitate to offer financial sacrifices.

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The first result of the struggle for suffrage was the Act I of 1918, which included women's suffrage. However, elections were cancelled because of the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. During the reign of the Council Republic age limit was reduced to 18 years of age, and women also received suffrage.

Following the fall of the Council Republic, in the autumn of 1919 the program of the government led by István Friedrich included the universal and secret suffrage. On the 17<sup>th</sup> November 1919 a new elective franchise was introduced by the executive decree no. 5985. During the 1920 elections the first woman representative, Margit Slachta could enter the Hungarian parliament.

On the 2<sup>nd</sup> March 1922 count István Bethlen modified the suffrage with a decree, and it was enacted without any major alterations by the national assembly on the 7<sup>th</sup> July 1925, with the Act XXVI.



THE FIRST LAWS ON EMIGRATION AT THE  
BEGINNING OF THE 20<sup>TH</sup> CENTURY (1903)

Our country has been the full member of the EU for nearly a decade and can experience the positive and negative effects of the free flow of people. Besides the opportunity to ease the domestic unemployment, the migration of Hungarian workers to other EU member states make some social branches impossible (e.g. health care). This motivated me to study how it formed previously, especially at the turn of the 19/20<sup>th</sup> century and in the first decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, when by quoting the Hungarian poet Attila József: “*and one and half million of our people staggered to America.*”

The exodus from Hungary started from 1880–81, mainly from Upper Hungary.<sup>1</sup> Due to the evolved situation, Zemplén County turned to the parliament with a petition to achieve that the soldiers on furlough, the family men, and those who are liable for military service cannot be given a passport at least for one year, to punish the tempting agents, to decrease the land tax, to regard usury as a crime, to introduce moveable loan, and to provide furlough for at least half of the peasant soldiers serving in the army annually once in

<sup>1</sup> The most important literature used in this article are: BENCSEK Péter: *Az útlevélkérés története Magyarországon a törvényi szabályozástól a második világháborúig*. Dissertation, manuscript. Pécs. 1999.; BENCSEK Péter: A kivándorlás jogi szabályozása 1903 és 1910 között. *Rendvédelmi–történeti Füzetek* XIII. évf. 2007. 13–31.; FEJŐS, Zoltán: Kivándorlás Amerikába a Zemplén középső vidékéről. *A Herman Ottó Múzeum évkönyve*. 19. (1980) 293–328.; HAUTZINGER Zoltán: Az első idegenjogi törvény. In: *A modernkori magyar határrendszert százttíz éve*. Bp. 2013. 179–192.; HEGEDŰS Lóránt: A magyarok kivándorlása Amerikába I–II. *Budapesti Szemle*, 99. köt. (1899); KIRÁLYFI Árpád: A kivándorlásról szóló törvényjavaslat. *Jogállam* 1908. 40–71.; LÖHERER Andor: *Az amerikai kivándorlás és a visszavándorlás*. „Patria” Irod. Váll. és Nyomdai Részvénytársaság Könyvkiadó hivatala, Bp., 1908.; NEMÉNYI Bertalan: *A magyar nép állapota és az amerikai kivándorlás*. Budapest 1911. Athenaeum, 1–156.; PÁLVÖLGYI Balázs: A magyar kivándorlás politika kezdete (1881–1903) – Kivándorlási törvények és a amerikai kivándorlás. *Jogtörténeti szemle* 2010/4.; PUSKÁS Julianna: Kelet-Európából az USA-ba vándorlás folyamata 1861–1924. *Történelmi Szemle*, 27. (1984) no. 1–2. 145–164.; WETZEL Tamás: *A bevándorlás kérdése Magyarországon*. Dissertation, manuscript. Budapest NKE, 2009.; *A magyar szent korona országainak kivándorlása és visszavándorlása 1899–1913*. Magyar Statisztikai Közlemények. Új sorozat, 67. köt. M. K. Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, Bp., 1918.



a summer month.<sup>2</sup> The Hungarian Economic Association handed over a memorandum to the Parliament in August 1882 in which it had described in details the reason for exodus from Upper Hungary and made suggestions to solve the problem.<sup>3</sup>

Firstly the increasing emigration was handled locally (at regional level), thus at the end of the 1880s the counties made an own legislation in order to hinder the exodus. Later, from 1887, in order to prevent emigration without a passport, only those people could receive a train ticket towards the way to America who possessed valid passport. The temptation for emigration enhanced in the 1890s, so even the postal values were checked. In 1890 the authorities turned to the Home Office in mass, in order to inhibit emigration.

Kálmán Széll, the former Minister of Home Affairs handled the situation in his circular the following way: *“Emigration cannot be prevented by forceful measures, as that would be against the basic human rights of the citizens, but otherwise it is believed that such a problem can only be solved effectively with the aid of adequate economic and administrative measures; until these measures are not implemented it is ordered to investigate agents, confiscate documents and announcements, to renew protestations, and finally to provide careful instructions to prevent the imposition of passports.”*<sup>4</sup>

In the last years of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the topic of emigration to America was continuously in the centre of public discourses in media and in domestic public life<sup>5</sup>. Due to low domestic salaries and unequal developments, some regions (remained without industry (workplaces), and the news coming from America, especially home transfers, encouraged people who still lived in Hungary to emigrate from their country in the hope of finding better living and working conditions. Besides, it was constantly debated, on what basis the police<sup>6</sup> hindered emigration, when they make our compatriots get off trains or after checking their identities at railway stations they were forced back to our country. The case became more complicated as a passport<sup>7</sup> was not required

<sup>2</sup> Magyar Országos Levéltár – National Archives of Hungary: 150 -8-XI-1928 without no.3610. The history of Hungarian emigration.

<sup>3</sup> National Archives of Hungary: 150 -8-XI-1928 without no.3610. The history of Hungarian emigration. p.9.

<sup>4</sup> 5<sup>th</sup> July 1900. No. 59207 BM körrendelet (Home Office Circular)

<sup>5</sup> The counties were informed about the immigration law of the USA in 1875 in a circular, according to which the following people are not allowed to enter the territory of the USA: people accused of committing serious felony (except political reasons) and courtesans.

<sup>6</sup> The Hungarian Minister of Home Affairs did not support too radical measures but increased the control of the police and asked his Austrian colleague to do the same in order to act seriously against those who trespass the borders at the rail lines of Kassa/Košice, Bohumín and Galicia.

<sup>7</sup> *Magyar Közigazgatás*, 23<sup>rd</sup> August 1891, Vol. 34.

for leaving the country that time. That situation justified that besides migration control, passport control should be legislated. Therefore, when the police inhibited emigration without any other reason, it restricted the rights for free movement of persons illegally.

In the same year the number of commissioned agents – who came from America to attract the cheap Hungarian workforce to emigrate – multiplied on the territory of Hungary, and according to existing statistical data they did their job extremely well. On the basis of the statistics of the USA the following composition of Hungarians arrived in the USA from the 1880s until 1901: altogether from Hungary: 774 thousand people, broken down by ethnic groups:

- Hungarians: 180 thousand
- Slovaks: 441 thousand
- Croats: 92 thousand
- Ruthenians, Serbs: 49 thousand

It is demonstrated clearly that the dominating ethnic group – emigrating from Hungary to the USA – was Slovakian, that was justified by the underdevelopment of Upper Hungary and the lack of industry, the topic of which frequently reappeared during the parliamentary debates of the regulations.

Besides the statistics about emigration, to be precise, I have to mention the number of those who returned, of which proportion fluctuated annually between 8-12%. These were those who became disillusioned or got rich already, or who were homesick and simply missed their family and their home country, thus they returned to Hungary. Naturally many of those who emigrated, e.g. those who came to grief, or who made a career, in addition to those who simply did not have enough money to buy a cruise ticket for the way back home have never returned to their homeland.

Besides the significant emigration to the USA (over ten thousands annually)<sup>8</sup> an increasing number of people emigrated from Hungary towards the direction of Romania, especially the Székelys of Transylvania, due to the geographical conditions.

Kálmán Széll saw through the whole problem of emigration, and delegated Lajos Lévy, former Member of Parliament, to the USA to study the local situation and the migration there.

The questions, problems raised in the field of emigration made the parties and the other civil organizations regulate – and preferably decrease – the

<sup>8</sup> "Emigration mainly directed towards two directions: states overseas, particularly in North-America and the mainland Romania." Source: *Magyar Közigazgatás*

emigrating process existing more dominantly in public life. The bill on emigration was justified, but not limited to the forthcoming facts:

- The former regulations were deficient and could not inhibit emigration.
- *“Even if the economic and industrial conditions, namely the living conditions were excellent at our country – until such a big difference exists between the amount of wages paid in our homeland and overseas; and travelling, due to the development of the means of transportation along with the decreasing prices of fares, would cause less trouble than now – emigration would not cease, as there always be such citizens in our country who are dissatisfied with their domestic wages and in the hope of better chances they emigrate to farther countries.”*<sup>9</sup>
- *“To settle the case of emigration we have to strive to achieve the following: the emigration for public or individual interest should be restricted in particular cases; its main reason should be finding a job, and to prevent all types of appeal or urge for emigration or the unwary emigration; the emigration should direct towards countries which are preferable both for the emigrants and for the state and should avoid such places where the possessions or health of the emigrants are endangered; the entrepreneurs and their agents dealing with the transport of the emigrants should be under a strict control of the state authorities; to acquire adequate information about the economic conditions, welfare state, climate and other conditions of the destinations for the emigrants to become well-informed about the circumstances of the states they are planning to emigrate; the emigrants should be supported, defended and guided by the state from their first intentions during the whole process of emigration, and even at their settling place; to preserve the sense of belonging to Hungary and patriotism in the emigrants, to facilitate the return of the emigrants.”*<sup>10</sup>

The debate of the proposed bill<sup>11</sup> chaired by the earl Albert Apponyi took place on the session of 16<sup>th</sup> December 1902. The first words were given to József Kristóffy, who presented the opinion of the Committee of Administration. He did not provide detailed exploration of the reasons of emigration and ignored highlighting the necessity of the bill, as, according to him, these are known by everybody. *“The loss of national blood we have suffered due to emigration so far is a sufficient loss on its own”*... that is enough to deal with the issue substantively. According to the MP the basic issue for emigration is that *“the concerned Hungarians want to benefit from emigration especially for themselves to*

<sup>9</sup> Justification of the Act VI of 1903., p. 3. *Corpus Juris Hungarici*.

<sup>10</sup> Justification of the Act VI of 1903., p. 3. *Corpus Juris Hungarici*.

<sup>11</sup> Documents of *Képviseelőházi Irományok* no. 195, *Képviseelőházi Napló*. No. 238 X. Bp. 1902

*satisfy the increasing needs and to create a better life condition far away. It cannot be an acceptable approach of a modern state to hinder or prevent such inspirations for a better life by coercion, as such a procedure would cause conflict of interests as regards the principal conditions of civil liberty*".<sup>12</sup> In his opinion the bill on emigration has the forthcoming two fundamental values:

1. The state does not want to hinder or prevent emigration; it does not tie the inhabitants forcefully to their homeland.
2. The state intends to restrict and control emigration without violating the liberty rights for the interest of the state and in order to maintain the safe and sound operation of the state.

In the MP's point of view the bill "*is striving to achieve a possible restriction of emigration for the purpose of public- and individual interest; its main reason should be finding a job, and to prevent unwary emigration and all types of appeal or urge for emigration. The bill tries to achieve that emigration should direct towards countries which are preferable both for the emigrants and for the state and should avoid such places where the possessions or health of the emigrants are endangered. The bill aims that the entrepreneurs and their representatives dealing with the transport of the emigrants should be under a strict control of the state authorities; moreover the bill aims to acquire adequate information about the economic conditions, welfare state, climate and other conditions of the destinations for the emigrants to become well-informed about the circumstances of the states they are planning to emigrate; The bill aims to provide the emigrants support, defence and guidance by the state from their first intentions during the whole process of emigration, and even at their settling place; The bill aims to preserve the sense of belonging to Hungary and patriotism in the emigrants, to facilitate the return of the emigrants in any possible way and method*".<sup>13</sup> As far as I am concerned I do believe that the speaker of the Committee managed to grasp the gist of the bill on emigration relatively well, no wonder it was followed by an applause in the Chamber.

Many felt the need to add something to the proposed bill, or to submit further modifications.

Ödön Barta commented among the firsts, according to whom it is impossible to provide workplaces for millions of people without increasing the earning segments, and providing permanent resources. He added that we had achieved the first place in Europe in the statistics of emigration. The majority of the emigrants came mainly from among the indebted smallholders and crackers so as to get money for getting the land. The law on emigration is required in

<sup>12</sup> *Képviseelőházi Napló*. X. 1902, p.58.

<sup>13</sup> *Képviseelőházi Napló*. X. 1902, p.62.

order to prevent the agents to get rich. We have to highlight in the law that we do not intend to make foreign shipping companies and railway undertakings rich. As for him: *“if the person moves from the territory of one country to another in order to find a decent job and to gain experience, and then he returns with the results and experiences of his honest work, it cannot be regarded as a loss for the country.”*<sup>14</sup> Furthermore, he considered risky that the Hungarian emigrants got under foreign influence during the voyage on a foreign ship. Thus they can be alienated from their religion and homeland, so the significance of Hungarian ships and Hungarian coast has to be enhanced! Fiume is only 600 kilometres far, therefore MÁV (Hungarian State Railway Company) can also profit from it. The Hungarian emigrants should not fill the pockets of Hamburg, Bremen, Le Havre, Triest (Austria). He considered it very important to support the Hungarian entrepreneurs, who can only get a commission if the food provided for emigrants during the journey and all the other necessary tools, etc. are goods of Hungarian origin. Finally he proposed to strengthen the role of the Hungarian state and church in America.

According to the MP János Csernoch (the later Cardinal of the Roman Catholic Church and Archbishop of Esztergom) the main reason for the emigration is the incorrect behaviour of the local authorities in Upper Hungary and their treatment with the public, thus there is no wonder that the majority of the emigrants are from this region. This phenomenon is supported by the fact that there are no factories in Upper Hungary and that the emigrants can easily cross the border and head to America. In his opinion the point of the bill is that – if patriotism is raised in the individual and he wants to return to his homeland – it provides help.

The MP Lóránt Hegedűs (who visited the emigrants from America to Etelköz within 6 years) referred to the international practises and statistics according to which emigration decreased in the last decade in: France, England, Portugal, Switzerland, Norway, Germany. From Italy to Argentina annually 200 thousand people emigrated, but the Italians there, even have educational institutions. The number of emigrants is increasing from: Russia and Austria-Hungary. An English experience: the emigrants are informed free of charge in libraries and by billboard advertisements where they can emigrate. As for him, Hungary is left by 70 000 people annually towards the sea, but the border statistics is not correct. Currently, there is an economic upturn in America, new mines are opened, the exchange rate of US dollar is high, which all enhance the mood for emigration to the USA. He firmly believes that the people should be informed more profoundly what to expect in America.

<sup>14</sup> *Képviseelőházi Napló*. X. 1902, p.110.

Furthermore, employment agencies would be needed! According to his experiences, the Hungarian settlements in America are dispersed and not protected adequately, thus more Hungarian consulates would be reasonable.

In the view of the MP Pál Mandel the objective of the law on emigration is: to control emigration within legal frames. According to him the solution is simple: *"We possess good land for cultivation, we have liberty, we have a free constitution, the opportunity to develop is provided, just try to introduce a different public spirit to the society and there will not be emigration."* Besides, MP Mandel mentioned one of the biggest loss of emigration, the temptation of the intellectual capital to emigrate, the so called brain drain.

MP Nándor Szederkényi mentioned a mysteriously similar problem to our current situation, when he talked about the adverse effects of foreign capital and goods which eliminates the domestic goods and commodities from the domestic market.

During the debates of the law on emigration the practises of other countries were always mentioned, though their experiences were rarely regarded to be adoptable. Such as the Italian practise of South-American emigration (annually around 180 000 people) to establish educational institutions for the emigrants, which was considered to be impossible.

MP Ferenc Kossuth (son of Hungarian revolutionary Lajos Kossuth) disapproved that the law on emigration does not prevent the temptation for emigration, i.e. the agents can still accomplish their duties as previously.

Besides the above mentioned ones, there were much shorter and longer comments in the field, but substantively, I only considered the previously detailed ones important to mention. The raised questions and proposals were reacted continuously by the prime minister Kálmán Széll – who was present at the session –, who insisted on the previously submitted proposal, and noted that the laws mentioned during the debate, e.g. Master and Servant Act, would remain in effect. The main objective of the bill, according to him, was the restriction of emigration. He did not consider the possibility to cease emigration realistic. According to him the main reasons for emigration resided also (in accordance with the mentioned speeches of the other MPs) in our countries economic situation and the foreign appeal. The Prime Minister found it extremely important to mention that human rights cannot be restricted, as for him it would be impossible to prevent people from emigration with any means of prohibition. Emigration cannot be prohibited but it can be restricted which can be possible after the pass of the new law, which would be taken care of by Kálmán Széll after it entered into force.



Later, the chair put the modifications to vote then the law on emigration was approved with the following content.<sup>15</sup>

- The law defined the term of emigrant.<sup>16</sup>
- Enlisted restrictions according to which a Hungarian citizen can not emigrate.<sup>17</sup>
- Emigration is prohibited without a passport.<sup>18</sup>
- The government is obliged to provide adequate guidance for the emigrant, and has the right to restrict emigration to particular countries.
- The activities of entrepreneurs and agents were bound to ministerial permission and to 10-100 000 koruna guarantee. Their activities can be supervised by the minister and their license can be withdrawn<sup>19</sup>.
- The deliverer is obliged to make a contract with the emigrant, including the direction and the route of transport, the class on train, the place on ship, and the fare. The contractor takes full responsibility (E.g.: in case of illness, death!). The ship in use has to be impeccable.
- The law established Emigrant Funds.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>15</sup> Act IV of 1903 on Emigration. *Corpus Juris Hungarici*.

<sup>16</sup> In accordance with the law such a person is regarded to be an emigrant who moves abroad for an uncertain period of time for earning a permanent salary.

<sup>17</sup> As far as emigration is concerned the following restrictions are in effect:

- a) those who are under the obligation and service of the national armed force can only emigrate with the permissions of the competent authorities;
- b) those cannot emigrate against whom there is prosecution in progress with the sentence of imprisonment, similarly to the convicted criminals before the fulfilment of their sentence;
- c) underage children with their father or guardian's authorized consent in writing by a competent authority; the male citizens under the age of 15 and underage female citizens can emigrate in such case only if they travel under the guidance of a reliable adult and their accommodation is arranged at their destination; Furthermore cannot emigrate:
- d) those parents who want to leave their child - under the age of 15 - behind without ensuring adequate nurture for the child;
- e) those who do not possess enough money to get to their destination, or those who do not meet the defined immigrant requirements of those states they want to emigrate to;
- f) Finally those for whom partially or totally free transport or deposit for the transport charges were envisaged by the government of a foreign state, or a colonizer or similar association or an individual in order to a planned settlement.

<sup>18</sup> This motivated the establishment of the Passport Act.

<sup>19</sup> The first permission was given to the Cunard Line Steamship Co. of Liverpool, which was called by the Hungarians as *Lina Gúnár* because of its complicated pronunciation. 14<sup>th</sup> November 1903. – The first cruise from Fiume to the USA. Source: National Archives of Hungary, K-150, 8.XI.1928, without no. 3610 The history of emigration, p.12

<sup>20</sup> Particularly for covering the partial of total costs of the fare of those penniless emigrants who are striving to return to their homeland, furthermore for guiding emigrants abroad, providing workplaces and founding shelters for them, for charity purposes, for regional and spiritual needs a separate Fund is to be established.

*The first laws on emigration at the beginning of the 20th century (1903)*

- It set up the Emigration Committee.<sup>21</sup> Furthermore, it ordered about the scope of the Emigration Commissioner's authority<sup>22</sup>.
- It set criminal regulations.<sup>23</sup>
- In accordance with the Art 34. of the Act to realize the objectives of the Emigrant Funds 80. 000 koruna was approved for the year 1903.
- As soon as the Act entered into force the Act of XXXVIII. of the year 1881 and all the other regulations, directives issued concerning emigration were repealed, and the Minister of Home Affairs was commissioned to implement the Act.

In the meantime of the legislative procedures the life was also going on. The foreign and domestic citizens had better mood and chances to travel in that period, since the mobility and the information exchange accelerated in the concerned era, as a consequence of the first and the second industrial revolution. *"A foreigner is not always motivated to move to another country because of honest intentions but to escape from criminal justice of his own country and to continue his illegal actions in a foreign state with ease, where nobody knows him, or he comes with the deliberate intention to harm the interests and threaten the security of the concerned state."*<sup>24</sup> That was the reason why law<sup>25</sup> on foreigner's accommodation became required<sup>26</sup>, which also took place in 1903.

To handle the excessive emigration<sup>27</sup> and the influx<sup>28</sup> of people from the neighbouring countries the government decided to establish a new - in European sense, a modern - organization, the new Border Police in 1903,

<sup>21</sup> An Emigration Committee is to be set up to discuss the issues concerning emigration professionally, and to support the Minister of Home Affairs in this scope of activities. The structure and regulations of the Emigration Committee are defined by the Minister of Home Affairs.

<sup>22</sup> Lajos Lévy was the first Emigration Commissioner,

<sup>23</sup> If the entrepreneur or his deputy violates the regulations of the law, he can be sentenced to two month in custody and to pay a penalty up to 600 koruna.

<sup>24</sup> Justification of the Act IV. of 1903 on Emigration, *Corpus Juris Hungarici*.

<sup>25</sup> The Act V of 1903 and its justification on Foreigners' accommodation in the territory of the countries of the Hungarian Crown, Act IV. of 1903 on Emigration, *Corpus Juris Hungarici*. The political elite then did not prefer it to be called immigration law.

<sup>26</sup> Directives: foreigners can stay in any settlement but their arrival and departure have to be reported. Within 24 hours! At the notary, civic master. Within two weeks it has to be reported to the chief constable! The foreigner can be checked according to the register of the chief constable. Who lives here for two years can apply for residential settling.

<sup>27</sup> The Act V of 1903 and its justification on Foreigners' accommodation in the territory of the countries of the Hungarian Crown, Act IV. of 1903 on Emigration, *Corpus Juris Hungarici*.

<sup>28</sup> See the justification of the Act on Border Police: *'The Border Police service has a rather significant role in controlling the movements of immigrant and penniless people which are adverse*



which was completely organized and set up by 1906. After the establishment of the Border Police in 1906 it took a significant share in preventing illegal emigration.

To be able to regulate the emigration there was a great need for the establishment of the Passport Act, which was also regulated for the first time at legislative level. The principle of the Passport Act is that anybody in Hungary can travel freely, but passports are not issued to particular categories in order to emigrate.<sup>29</sup>

The Act on Emigration in effect did not decrease the mood for emigration according to the experiences. Moreover, the statistics clearly indicated the increase (this only shows the emigration to the USA):

- in the year of 1900, which concerned 54 767 people,
- in the year of 1901, 71 474 people,
- in the year of 1902, 91 762 people,
- in the year of 1903, 119 944 people,
- in the year of 1904, 97 340 people,
- in the year of 1905, 170 430 people,
- in the year of 1906, 185 337 people,
- in the year of 1907. 203 332 people.<sup>30</sup>

The figures clearly show that the number of emigrants from Hungary did not decrease after the ratification of the first law on emigration, but increased significantly. Being familiar with the statistics of the last decades of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, it can be stated that the emigration, then, can be regarded modest in comparison to the first decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The significant emigration assumed alarming proportions even on national, defence and economic (e.g. paying tax) aspects. That is why it is understandable that the government dealt with the issue of emigration again in 1908. Although the basic aspects and the objectives of the Act IV. of 1903 was theoretically correct, the experiences of the forthcoming period after the law entered into force and the enhanced mood for emigration justified that it is not enough to make amendments or other regulations but a there is a need for a new law. I reckon, that this was

*to the state as for the aspects of economy and judiciary guard, and in restricting the immigration within adequate frames.” Act IV. of 1903 on Emigration, Corpus Juris Hungarici.*

<sup>29</sup> Act VI. of 1903 on Passport issues, its justification, Act IV. of 1903 on Emigration, *Corpus Juris Hungarici*. Justification of the Act: “in order to prevent illegal emigration it is entitled to ban free departure.” The issue of passports is restricted to those: who are restricted by military service against whom prosecution is in progress; who are prohibited by Emigration Law; who are underage or under guardianship.

<sup>30</sup> Act II. of 1909 on Emigration, Act IV. of 1903 on Emigration. *Corpus Juris Hungarici*.

the most serious criticism concerning the first law on emigration, which ideas were later realized in 1909 by the authorities.

The Act IV of 1903 and the following Act II of 1909 can be regarded modern in its era, which, in my opinion, was owing to profound preparation and high quality professional debate. The fact that law would not be able to prevent emigration could be suggested even during the preparatory phase of the legislative procedures, as an economic, social problem cannot be solved in an administrative way.



## II. International Relations



## WHO LIKES WHO? FRIENDLY AND HOSTILE NATIONS IN EUROPE

### *1. Introduction*

For centuries Hungary has been an issue of conflicts of great empires in Europe. The occupational forces often pillaged the country and caused sufferings over generations. In peaceful times, imperators though colonized new nationalities, mostly from foreign countries onto the inhabitants exterminated space. All of these interrupted our inherent development, our continuity of history; the population of the country has changed wherefore the mentality, habitude, culture and the nation's consciousness of the population has become diverse.

In our following study, we are looking to answer the question: where is Hungary located between the European nations, and what is the role of Hungary? We examine this question in a network approach, on the one hand we want to clear who likes Hungarians and who doesn't; on the other hand we asked the question which nation is mostly liked and which is disliked by the Hungarians.

Our starting position is that a nation should not be judged purely on the basis of its self-picture, because every nation is a part of the network of time and place; for this reason it is important to take in mind the opinion of other nations about that country. As an explanation it has to be examined, what kind of historical experiences the opinions are based on. Our situation is not easy, if we would like to examine a nation's self-picture and identity with professional methods and independent data, because we crash into serious hindrances: next to the methodological sketchiness and lack of resources there are often data gaps during a longer period.

### *2. What kind of opinion we can find about Hungary in the past?*

In this first part of the study we take a look at some historical data: what was written and said about character, habitude, fate of Hungarians in the past centuries?

The well-known values, which were given by the Hungarians to the world in an intellectual way, would be a benefit for many great nations. Let us just refer to the records in science, music and sport. Here you will find some quotes on Hungary from the standout personalities of the previous centuries. However it is well known that the official history of Hungary was mostly written by its enemies: foreign occupiers, imperators of foreign dynasties and the traitor-attendants had no interest in the teaching and researching of the real Hungarian history. The foreign systems could not endure the Hungarian nation which had a strong and unified national self-awareness and a specific traditional historical consciousness. The methods of the foreign occupying powers were the same during the different historical periods: to force a foreign political system on Hungary and to vanquish the Hungarian spirit they tried to oppress the Hungarian intellectuality, to adulterate our history, to break and wither the national consciousness. The Habsburgs did this after 1849 and it was continued after WWII during the communist system. This is happening even right now in the present post-communist political system. Albert Kovács (in 1941) and Károly Domonyi (in 2011) collected the opinions and positions about Hungarians in many historical epochs.<sup>1</sup> The following quotes refer to their collection.

Theophylactus Simocatta, a Byzantine historian (early 7th century): „The Hungarians extremely respect air and water, praise Earth and fire is sacred for them. But they bless and name as God only the One who created the Universe. For him they are sacrificing horses, oxen and sheep, and they have priests, from who they believe to have the ability of fortune-telling.”

Bishop William Tyrus, (around 1130-1186), who noted the passage of the army of crusaders, writes in his chronicle: „The Hungarians are Christians, peaceful, benevolent and wealthy people.”

Otto Freising, a Cistercian monk, an Austrian-born German bishop had been in Hungary in the year of 1147, as one of the leaders of the second holy war in the age of Géza II. We know that he disliked the Hungarians, but he writes in his works: „Everyone’s behavior is determined by the King. All of them obey to the prince, they see it as sin to open contradict his will ... In this long-range country no one dares to coin money or take toll besides of the King ... And when the King wants to lead the army, all of them unite in one body without any contradiction.”

<sup>1</sup> More in detail: KOVÁCS Albert: „Külföldi vélemények rólunk” A magyar öntudat tükre. (Szerk. Dr. BARÁNSZKY-JÓB László) Felsőkereskedelmi Iskolai Tanárok N. Sz. 3. kiad., Budapest, 1941. 36-45. and DOMONYI Károly: Vélemények rólunk, Magyarokról. Online: <http://domonyi.aries.hu/velemeneyek-rolunk-Magyarokrol.html> and <http://zeitgeisthungary.wordpress.com/tanulmanyok/nyugati-velemeney-a-magyarokrol/>

Abu hamid al-garnati Andalusian Moorish (1080-1169) an Arabian/Moor writer, traveler, geographer from Andalusia had been in Hungary in this time and he was writing with great respect about the Hungarians: „Brave people, there are uncountable many of them. The country consists of 78 cities, and each of them comes with a myriad of fortress associated granges, villages, mountains, forests and gardens... Hungary is one of those countries where the life is the easiest....”

Michael the Syrian Patriarch (1196): „The Hungarians are plain-hearted, honest, and smart in their subsistence...do not like a lot of speech.” Pierre Vidal the troubadour from Provence had been in the Court of King Imre (1196-1204) in the 12<sup>th</sup> century and wrote about our homeland: „To amuse my life, I went to Hungary, to the great King Imre. There I found good homing, plain-hearted and kind friends and servants.”

Dante Alighieri (1265-1321) the greatest Italian poet, the father of the Italian literary language, sent a message to Hungary at a time of conflicts, when the Árpád-dynasty was extinguished during the interregnum: „Hungary is a paradise of the Saints”. „ Oh, blessed Hungary, don't let yourself agonize any further!”

Murad II. Sultan of the Ottoman Empire (1404-1451), the great Turkish strategist declared: „Who will occupy Hungary, will be the Lord of the whole world!” In 1449 Pope Nicholas V. and in 1455 Pope Callixtus III honoured Hungary with the title “Shield of Christianity” because of its heroism and self-sacrifice. Pope Pius II. wrote in his letter to Emperor Frederick III. after the Siege of Belgrade (1456): „Hungary is the shield of Christianity and the protector of the western civilization.”

Galeotto Marzio (1427-1497) Italian humanist and the historian of King Mathias Corvinus saw the false accusations and the reason for anti-Hungarian thoughts in the jealousy. According to him Hungary is the richest country in Europe, Hungary is blessed in fish, there is a large amount of bread and the wine is excellent. The people of Europe are grudging the territory of the Carpathian basin from the Hungarians, grudging the richness and for this reason hatred is taking them all the way around.

According to Montesquieu (1689-1755), one of the fathers of the french enlightenment: „ Hungarians are famous for their love of freedom and independence, for their noble and generous character and for heroic courage. Their hospitality is legendary famous.” Prince Eugene of Savoy (1663-1736), who was an Austrian-born French statesman and leading general of the deliberation of Buda in the year of 1686, said the following: “If they would win, that would be a win for Europe, however they will lose and that will be only their disaster.”



The so called “engraving of Steiermark” was made in the middle of the 18<sup>th</sup> century and contains characteristic drawings on certain European nations, contemporary analyses on nation- characteristics. If we consider that we are talking about a heavily biased, loyal region to the Austro-Habsburg Empire, then it’s easy to understand their anti-Hungarian attitude: while contemporary descriptors find the best and richest land in Europe in Hungary, the engraving considers the Hungarians to be “disloyal”, “rioters” and bloodthirsty” We can add quickly, that these attributes can be interpreted from a Hungarian point of view as “an undiminished desire for freedom” and as “patriotism”, meaning positive features. The artists of the engraving compared the European nations to different animals based on their main characteristics, just to make the culture behaviors of certain nations more expressive: the Germans were compared to lions, the Spanish to elephants, the French to foxes, while the behavior of Hungarians was more wolf-like.

Mary Montagu, wife of English ambassador Wortley, remarked about Hungarians in 1717: „The Hungarian women are much more beautiful than Austrians, and all the other beauties in Vienna came from Hungary.” But we can read similar praises about men almost 200 years later from the French anthropologist, Paul Topinard (1830-1911), who wrote in his first anthropological book: „Nowadays, the more educated Hungarian families facial features are including to the most beautiful ones the whole of Europe. A bit taller than the average, they have a stalwart body, with regular lineament, brownish or whitish skin color and have brown hair and eyes.”

G. Herring English traveler wrote in his book released in 1838: „Hungary was the obstacle of Turkish expansion, cradle of constitutional liberty and religious tolerance.” According to Eduard Sayous (1842-1898) the well-known French historian: „Western Nations should be grateful for the services that Hungary has done for civilization, at first when She sacrificed Her own body to stop barbarism, and then when She clung with unwavering courage to Her freedom.”

Count Charles Talleyrand (1754-1838), French statesman and diplomat had said to Napoleon: „Majesty! It is a Hungarian old habit to look up to their heroes and to be proud of their past. Take away the history of this nation and You will do with them whatever you want!”

Bonaparte Napoleon (1769-1821) French commander and politician was trying to win the Hungarians with his proclamation before the battle of Győr in 1809; he allude to their glorious predecessors: „You should deservedly be proud of Your glorious ancient origins.”

Victor Hugo (1802-1885), French poet and writer also wrote about the different nations, according to him Germany represents virtue, France

represents liberty, Italy represents glory. „Hungary is the nation of heroes; Hungary is the incarnation of valour.”

According to Jules Michelet (1798-1874) the well-known French historian: „The Hungarian nation is the aristocracy of heroism, grandeur and dignity. When will we pay back our debt to this blessed nation, which saved the West? If it could have been approved by the French historiography has expressed his pleasure at the time of the country. This nation's heroic example is raising and ennobling us. The Hungarian heroism is a manifestation of high morals.”

Theodore Roosevelt (1858-1919), President of the United States, declared his opinion during his visit in Hungary in 1910, not far before the first world war: „The whole civilized world is in debt towards Hungary for Her past.”

James Louis Garvin (1868-1947), English journalist wrote about the peace dictate of Trianon in 1925: „Of all the defeated nations, the superior Hungarian nation has been given the most evil fate.”

Lord Rothermere (1868-1940) wrote in the Daily Mail on the 27th of July in 1927: „The injustice of the new European borders is a constant threat to peace in Europe, and those hands, who have created today's political situation, have scattered the seeds of a future war.”

Vautier French politician writes thus in the beginning of the 20. century: „Hungary's past is glorious, but the future holds the promise of even more glory. This nation, who deserved so much more, was detached from Europe by Austria, mainly for the reason to be able to exploit Her more easily, but also to be able to silence the voices of Hungary crying out for freedom and independence.”

Jean Cocteau (1882-1963) French poet and painter, challenged the Hungarians in his book called „Hommage des poètes français aux poètes hongrois” (1957): „Dear Hungarians! You are all stars between planets, you are all made poets by the tragic lyric poetry of the acts.”

Albert Camus (1913-1960) French Nobel Prize winner, existentialist writer praised in his speech on October 23, 1957 the Hungarians, who have been left alone: „The Hungarian blood is such a treasure of Europe and freedom, that we must save every drop of it. ... The conquered and bound Hungary has done more for freedom than any other nation in these past 20 years. For this historical lesson to be heard by the blind and deaf West, much Hungarian blood had to be spilled – and this torrent of blood is now drying up in the memory of the public. ... The Hungarian workers and intellectuals, before whom we stand now with so much helpless sorrow, know this, and they are the ones who taught us the deeper meaning of everything. Therefore if we share their tragedy, we may also share their hope. Regardless of their suffering, their chains, and their exile, they have given us a royal legacy, which we have

to earn: freedom, which they have not achieved for themselves, but in a single day have given back ours.”

Isaac Asimov said about us in an unguided moment: „A rumour involves in the USA, that two intelligent races exist in the world: people and Hungarians” Enrico Fermi Italian atomic physicist (1901-1954) was once asked, do extra-terrestrial beings exist? He answered: „Of course, they are already here among us, they are called Hungarians...”

Helmut Kohl (1930-) German conservative politician, chancellor from 1982 to 1998: „The Hungarians made the biggest blow to the communism and the Hungarian heroism removed the first stone from the Wall of Berlin.”

Zbigniew Kazimierz Brzezinski (1928-) U.S National Security Advisor wrote the followings in the 70's: „Who wants to gain control over the world, has to occupy the heart of the world. Who occupied the heart of the world, took the possession of Europe. Who once took the possession of Europe, that will be the Lord of the whole world.” The heart-chakra of the world is beating Hungary.

After these kind of self-mystifying praising words let us quote prediction of a parish clerk, the prediction of the Italian Capuchin friar canonized Padre Pio (1887-1968): „Hungary is a birdcage, once a time is a beautiful bird will fly out. Many of them remain to suffer, but the whole of Europe, unparalleled glory will enjoy. I envy the Hungarians, because they emanate and the great happiness of mankind. Few nations have a powerful guardian angel, as the Hungarians and certainly it would be appropriate to ask a more effective protection of their country!”

After all, let's look at today's Hungarian reality, and how contemporary nations consider the Hungarians and how the Hungarians consider contemporary nations!

### *3. What is the international opinion about Hungarians nowadays?*

#### **3.1. Why is it important to know our friends and enemies?**

There can be various manifestations of the political culture; one of this appears in the relationships between the citizens of certain nations. What the members of one nation know about the other nation, how they have been judged, and how they behave against each other – in the background there are always cultural or historical experiences, or knowledge, language and life-world relationships, socialization experiences, which are also the part of the political culture. Some combinations of these are counting on true or false judgments

and prejudices, attractions and pushes, aid cuts, friendly behaviors and hostilities. We consider the examination of interpersonal relationships between the citizens of certain countries to be important, however, the knowledge of the world of attractions and shoves do not only help to strengthen the pillars of democracy, but it helps to maintain the peace and the cooperation between the nations in 21<sup>st</sup> century's Europe. This is a cardinal task for everyone.

It is well known that many various things can influence the decisions, like next to the contemporary family or institutional socialization the experiences play an important part, which are rooted in the historical past or in the undercurrent of culture, perhaps in the mother language.<sup>2</sup>

Hereinafter we are looking what kind of picture has been evolved about the Hungarians by the citizens of certain European countries to the 20<sup>th</sup> century, and inversely. We got caught up with work the representative of the national replies to the questionnaire requests made by Hungarian and Czech citizens. But all above we have been looking for the answers to the questions: who can counted to be friends, indifferent and foemen against us, Hungarians, and we have been curious about how we, Hungarians are feeling sympathy to whom and to whom not, and which nations can be considered as pure friends or hostile nations.

### **3.2. Who does like us and who does not?**

When we are analyzing the international dimension, we are examining the durability, existence and the power of the citizens memory. We are aware of the fact that every country is a part of a complex international system, therefore, the interpretation of the perception of a network approach is needed, which shows the back and forth. It is not enough only to consider that how they judge us, but also we should see how we judge the others. We have kept in mind these aspects, when we asked the people in a nationwide questionnaire research in 2010, that how they extend the citizens of certain European countries, and how friendly or hostile they are against us.

The Table No.1 contains the answers of the research. We consider to be the most friendly nations the Polish, Italian, German and the Dutch. (Let us add that probably Austria has its place in this enumeration, although it did not include that in the list in 2010, just in 1999). We consider as the most hostile nations the Slovak, Romanian, Serbian, Ukrainian and the Russian

<sup>2</sup> See in detail: SIMON János: „Barátaink és ellenségeink” In: *A demokratikus politikai kultúra pillérei Magyarországon. Codebook*. CEPoliti, 2013. 107-119.

nation, so the „nations of Trianon” around our country, those who took out a significant area of the historical Hungarian site.<sup>3</sup>

The history has left us this as a legacy, the perceived or real enemy-picture is still linked to the tragic experience of Trianon, the unresolved problems of Hungarians who were stranded beyond the border, and the infringements and atrocities against them. After the Great War the winner powers accompanied a considerable Hungarian population to the neighboring nations, the absence of rights of the minorities, the collective iniquity, the unequal treatment against them is still feeding the anti-Hungarian sentiment.

One thing is well known about the Russians, that they occupied our country twice, destroyed almost everything and had been bullying the population in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The picture as if it would show a reversal regionalist approach, in which we push the proximals and attract the distals, so the far living people are our friends, and in the neighboring nations of Hungary our enemies.

Overall, the data about the evaluation of the nations to us shows that the relationship between the Hungarians and other nations stands behind a strong historical memory, that kind of past lived memories, which still get continual affirmation from both side of friends and enemies. We could draught that, the historical experiences of Hungarians are still living with acting force.

Table No.1: Friendly and hostile to us? (in 2010, 1-5 scale)

Question: „Which countries citizens are the most friendly and the most hostile to us?”

<i>Countries</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Hostile</i> <i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>Friendly</i> <i>5</i>	<i>St.dev.</i>	<i>N=</i>
<i>Our friends</i>								
1. Poland	3.77	1	4	34	39	22	.85	882
2. Italy	3.54	0	1	51	40	8	.67	881
3. Germany	3.51	1	6	42	45	6	.73	882
4. Netherlands	3.45	0	2	53	39	5	.63	868
5. Spain	3.42	0	2	57	38	3	.58	862
6. Great Britain	3.28	1	7	58	31	3	.67	866
7. Bulgaria	3.25	0	4	67	28	1	.55	853
8. Slovenia	3.20	3	7	58	30	2	.71	864
9. USA	3.19	3	10	57	25	5	.80	867
10. Mexico	3.15	1	3	78	16	2	.54	825
11. Czech Republic	3.10	4	14	52	28	2	.80	866

<sup>3</sup> VIZI László Tamás: Narratives of the Hungarian Neutrality in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century. *Central European Political Science Review*. Vol. 14. No. 53. (2013) 21-32.

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12. France	3.10	3	17	50	27	3	.81	872
13. Russia	2.86	7	21	53	17	2	.84	850
14. Ukraine	2.81	4	26	55	14	1	.74	849
15. Serbia	2.45	16	35	36	13	0	.91	856
16. Romania	2.17	23	46	23	7	1	.88	884
17. Slovakia	1.73	47	37	12	4	0	.82	902
<i>Our enemies</i>								

If we compare the data of the year of 2010 with the year of 1999, then we see that just only a few displacement were in the sequence during the last 10 years, but no significant changes concerning friends and enemies: none of the previous friendly nations had become hostile and none of the hostile nations had become friendly. (Table No.2.)

The only change that happened is more referring to the intensity, which can be ensue on sampling, but it is possible that there are some real changes in the background. Both of these examples can construe that the French are deprecated and got closer to the Russians. In addition to a reduction in the intensity of the hostile nations there was a clear change in the sequence of anti-Hungarian hostile nations. After the wars on the Balkans, Serbia has been consolidated, and although it is still on hostile carriers list, but not insomuch as it has been before during the wars. At the same time Slovakia, with its anti-Hungarian laws and manifestation of politicians, came off to the category of the most hostile countries to us.

Table No.2: Our friends and enemies in time-serie (change between 1999 and 2010)

Question: „Which country's citizens are hostile or friendly to us in which intensity?”

<i>Countries</i>	<i>1999</i>	<i>2010</i>	<i>Change 1999-2010</i>
<i>Our friends</i>			
1. Austria	4.00	-	-
2. Poland	3.90	3.77	-13
3. Italy	-	3.54	-
4. Germany	3.97	3.51	-46
5. Netherlands	4.03	3.45	-58
6. Spain	3.87	3.42	-45
7. Great Britain	-	3.28	-
8. Bulgaria	3.50	3.25	-25

9. Slovenia	-	3.20	-
10. USA	-	3.19	-
11. Mexico	-	3.15	-
12. Czech Republic	3.07	3.10	+03
13. France	3.68	3.10	-58
14. Russia	2.58	2.86	+28
15. Ukraine	2.69	2.81	+12
16. Serbia	1.70	2.45	+75
17. Romania	2.29	2.17	-12
18. Slovakia	2.33	1.73	-60
<i>Our enemies</i>			

### 3.3. Which nations do we like and which don't?

The coin has another, talkative side, and that is how we are relating to other nations. What kind of results we get if we turn the question upside down on the issue: which country's citizens will Hungarians find friendly or hostile in which intensity? Table No.3. gives the answer for this question by the data of the year of 2010.<sup>4</sup>

Table No.3: Our friends and enemies: they and we? (2010 – mean: 1-5)

Question: „How much are Hungarians friendly or hostile to other nations?”

<i>Countries 2010</i>	<i>I. They are friendly in front of us Mean, (st.dev)</i>	<i>II. We are friendly in front of them Mean, (st.dev)</i>	<i>Difference</i>
<i>Very friendly</i>			
Poland	3,77 (,852)	3,81 (,798)	+04
Netherlands	3,54 (,638)	3,60 (,651)	+06
Italy	3,54 (,671)	3,63 (,681)	+13
Germany	3,51 (,816)	3,74 (,710)	+23
Spain	3,42 (,584)	3,51 (,625)	+09
UK	3,28 (,671)	3,57 (,665)	+29
Bulgaria	3,25 (,559)	3,38 (,601)	+13

<sup>4</sup> The data are from the Civic culture Repeated – CCR survey. The research of 2010 was led by János Simon and funded by the OTKA. See: SIMON János: „Barátaink és ellenségeink” In: *A demokratikus politikai kultúra pillérei Magyarországon. Codebook*. CEPoliti, 2013. 107-112. Austria has not appeared in the research of 2010, just in the year of 1999.

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Slovenia	3,20 (.718)	3,35 (.655)	+15
USA	3.19 (.808)	3,73 (.839)	+54
<i>Friendly</i>			
Mexico	3,15 (.544)	3,29 (.600)	+14
Czech Republic	3,10 (.806)	3,39 (.675)	+29
France	3,10 (.816)	3,43 (.730)	+33
<i>Hostile</i>			
Russia	2,86 (.841)	3,17 (.880)	+31
Ukraine	2,81 (.742)	3,09 (.790)	+28
Serbia	2,45 (.916)	2,91 (.844)	+46
Romania	2,17 (.888)	2,86 (.966)	+69
Slovakia	1,73 (.830)	2,52 (.985)	+77
<i>Very hostile</i>			

The aggregated data have important edification. We, Hungarians feel that that we are friendlier to every nation than them to us. This dissymmetrical feeling is remarkable in any case, because the „unrequited friendship”, the „being alone” and the „just our self we can count on” feeling is present in the assistance of Hungarian intellectuals for centuries. (Table No.3) This would need for more comments, but for this we should do a deeper analysis, which outgrows from this study’s chase. Anyway we have to assume, that the „pique”, the „injustice”, the „illegitimacy” feeling is really strong, the „kinless” and the „just our self we can count on” consciousness have a really important function in our history, present and our international relations.

If we see the friendly nations to us, than we get the following sequence: Polish, Dutch, Italians, Germans, and Spanish. But if we analyse our relation to others, than the sequence is: Polish, Germans, Americans, Italians, and Dutch. Both approaches are clearly demonstrating that we have a really strong friendship to Poland. The most strange information in the friendship sequence is the American data queue, because according to this the Hungarians feel that the Americans are much less friendly to us, than we are to them (the difference between the two is more than half a point: 0.54). But it is also surprising that the greatest difference is in the category of the most hostile nations where Romanians and Slovaks are, they are considered more favorable in 0.69 and 0.77 points, as we assume about them (Table No.2)

Of course we just could assume that the citizens of the neighboring countries suppose likewise their relationship to Hungarians, than the Hungarians about



them (if we remove the Hungarian minorities from the list). However, there are no data about this, just only Czech and Polish sources.<sup>5</sup>

#### 4. Who are the friends and enemies of the Czechs?

In 2010 a Hungarian questionnaire drawn up by the author himself for the research called Civic Culture Repeated coordinated by Sidney Verba, was used also by Czech and Polish researchers – with some small modifications – under the leadership of Jan Cherny and Krzysztof Zagorski. This included the questionnaire called „assessment of Nations”. We have summarized the results of the survey in Table No. 4.<sup>6</sup>

Table No.4: The attitude of other nations towards Czechs (sequentially according to Czechs)  
Question: „Which countries citizens are friendly or hostile to us?”

<i>Attitude towards Czechs</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>Average</i>
	<i>Friendly nations</i>					
Slovakia	1	4	15	47	34	4,0799
Poland	1	3	24	58	15	3,8383
Croatia	1	2	31	53	13	3,7544
Bulgaria	0	3	35	53	9	3,6654
Italy	0	2	42	48	7	3,6043
Slovenia	1	2	44	45	7	3,5576
Spain	0	2	52	41	5	3,5025
France	1	7	41	46	5	3,4883
Netherlands	0	2	53	40	5	3,4754
Hungary	1	7	47	41	5	3,4260
Great Britain	0	6	56	33	5	3,3731
USA	1	9	53	32	5	3,3075
Ukraine	1	14	43	38	4	3,2946
Mexico	1	3	70	23	3	3,2447
Serbia	2	12	52	32	4	3,2418
Austria	1	16	46	33	4	3,2243

<sup>5</sup> ZAGORSKI, Krzysztof: Political Affiliation, Civic Society and Support for Democracy – Poland. In: *A 50 Anos de la Cultura Cívica – En Honor al Prof. Sidney Veba*. Ed.J.I. Flores. Mexico, UNAM, 2011. 123-158.; CERVENKA, Jan: Civic Culture Revisited 50 Years Later: Czech National Study. In: *A 50 Anos de la Cultura Cívica – En Honor al Prof. Sidney Veba*. Ed.J.I. Flores. Mexico, UNAM, 2011. 177-232.

<sup>6</sup> For more information: *A 50 Anos de la Cultura Cívica – En Honor al Prof. Sidney Veba*. Ed.J.I. FLORES. Mexico, UNAM, 2011. 213-157. and 177-232.

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Romania	2	11	53	31	3	3,2155
Germany	2	19	44	31	4	3,1468
Russia	2	21	44	29	4	3,1297
Israel	3	15	57	21	3	3,0645
	<i>Hostile nations</i>					

We can see in the answers of the Czechs, that their best friends are the Slavic countries, as follows the Slovaks, the Polish, the Croatians and the Bulgarians, just the Italians could get into the most friendly countries of the Czech's list before the Slovenians. We should see, the they considered their two neighbors as the most friendly countries in a complete contrast to Hungarians, namely Slovakia (4.07) and Poland (3.38).

Today, approximately one million is the number of Slovak nationals who are living and working in the Czech Republic, that is why is not an accident that they consider the Slovaks as their best friends next to the Polish. The following countries have the same characteristics, they all have sea side which have been visited by the Czechs with love: the Croatian, Bulgarian, Italian, Slovenian, Spanish hospitality have been awarded as the bests. Of course the Hungarians got left by the French, who are just in the midfield (3.42).

We would find the Serbs, the Austrians and the Romanians in the end of the list, and the Germans and the Russians are tie in the second last place. Germany, Russia and Austria for historical reasons, has been placed to the block of hostile but Romania's and Serbia's bad image is probably also motivated by contemporary experiences. Between the most hostile countries we can find Israel on the last place (3.06), which is surprising because there is no significant Jewish community in the Czech Republic, and historical reasons do not justify the discrimination of Jewish or Israel; this last place can be explained mostly with Israel's current bad press and/or politics. With the decision of the Czechs to give the last place in the list to Israel, which means they find the Israelis to be the most hostile nation towards the Czech Republic, they break their promoted myth of tolerance.

We see that the relationships of other countries to the Czechs is less determined by the memory of the past and of grievances than we have experiences in the case of the Hungarians, maybe because they got a lot less to suffer. The history of the Czech Republic is a success story till nowadays, because the country has never held such a large area during its history than it is holding today. Moreover three million indigenous Germans have been displaced from the attached Sudetenland countryside after WWII; the memory of this action is still kept in a special form of fear, which – besides of the memories of the German occupation during the Hitler-era – is still motivating

the reservations of the Czech about Germans (3.14). Perhaps we have found out the only strong imprint of the past.

### 5. *Who are the friends and enemies of Poland?*

The available Polish data are about fewer countries and unfortunately the Hungarians are not in their sequence (see Table No.5).<sup>7</sup> The answers to the question show that their southern neighbors are the most friendly, it means the Czechs (4.78), the Slovaks (4.75) followed by their eastern neighbors: the Latvians (4.62) and the Belarusians (4.55). In the end the enemies were among the historical opponents: the Ukrainians (4.34) and the Russians (4.32), but they have added even less score to the Germans (4.22).

The Polish listed the Jews to the category of hostile nations just like Germans, who got the same scores (4.22). Far from everyone the Roma are the most hostile minority (3.87). The Polish research also confirms, that the historical memories are living strongly in the consciousness and the value-judgment of Polish people. (Table No.5.)

Table No.5: Attractions and unattractiveness in international comparison (2010)

	Czechs		Hungarians		Poles
<i>Countries</i>	<i>Them to us</i>	<i>We to them</i>	<i>Them to us</i>	<i>We to them</i>	<i>Them to us</i>
Bulgaria	3,66	3,58	3,25	3,38	-
France	3,48	3,69	3,10	3,43	-
Germany	3,14	3,35	3,51	3,74	4.22
Czech Rep.	-	-	3,10	3,39	4.78
Hungary	3,42	3,52	-	-	-
Netherlands	3,47	3,55	3,54	3,60	-
Italy	3,60	3,69	3,54	3,63	-
Poland	3,83	3,82	3,77	3,81	-
Mexico	3,24	3,31	3,15	3,29	-
Romania	3,21	3,12	2,17	2,86	-
Russia	3,12	2,97	2,86	3,17	4.32
Serbia	3,24	3,19	2,52	2,91	-

<sup>7</sup> STASZYNSZKA, Katarzyna: Attitudinal and Behavioral Aspects of Polish Civic Culture. In: *A 50 Anos de la Cultura Cívica – En Honor al Prof. Sidney Veba*. Ed.J.I. FLORES. Mexico, UNAM, 2011. 159-176.; ZAGORSKI, Krzysztof: Political Affiliation, Civic Society and Support for Democracy – Poland. In: *A 50 Anos de la Cultura Cívica – En Honor al Prof. Sidney Veba*. Ed.J.I. FLORES. Mexico, UNAM, 2011. 123-158.

*Who likes who? – Friendly and hostile nations in Europe*

Slovakia	4,07	4,11	1,73	2,52	4.75
Slovenia	3,55	3,55	3,20	3,35	-
Spain	3,50	3,57	3,42	3,51	-
UK	3,37	3,57	3,28	3,57	-
Ukraine	3,29	3,04	2,81	3,09	4.34
USA	3,30	3,60	3.19	3,73	-
Austria	3,22	3,50	-	-	-
Croatia	3,75	3,85	-	-	-
Lithuania	-	-	-	-	4.62
Belarus	-	-	-	-	4.55
Israel	3,06	3,17	-	-	4.22
Roma	-	-	-	-	3.87

*6. A short conclusion*

Overall, we can say, the main conclusion of our inter-ethnic research is that the Hungarians and the Polish resemble each other: in both countries the political culture is based on a strong pillar of the collective historical experiences, namely the memories remain through generations and are a legacy to the further socialization processes. In the Czech Republic there are much weaker signs of the past, as follows cultural factors, subjective impressions and experiences gained are dominating their judgment about other nations.



## RUSSIAN POLICY TOWARDS CENTRAL EUROPE AND HUNGARY<sup>1</sup>

Within 25 years since the beginning of reforms, relations between Russia and Central European countries<sup>2</sup> underwent dramatic changes: from their merely entire destruction, till the decisive break through at the threshold of the 2000's that steadily and persistently draws the path towards a new type of relations.

The most tragic years in bilateral and regional relations had been 1990's, marked by the fall of trade relations merely till the bottom. The major trend in Russian foreign policy in the 1990's had been the summing up and the closing up of all the mutual economic debt issues. There practically remained no place for common ground in political interests. Even cultural ties had fallen dawn to the lowest level as compared to the whole of the after war period. It seemed then, that the only interest of East-Central European countries, as well as of former USSR republics towards Russia had concentrated itself around compensation claims. Consequently, Russia in early 90's had started the search for new trade partners, political allies and new role in the region and world geopolitics. Thus, the paths of the former allies since the beginning of the 1990's went in different directions.

When we speak about such country as Russia, possessing nuclear armaments, controlling space and thus responsible for the general international climate, we should understand that its geopolitical interests lie far beyond traditional continental ties. After an evident defeat in continental relations in early 1990's,

<sup>1</sup> The project on Russia- East-Central European countries' relations after joining the European Union has been carried out under the financial aid of Russian Foundation for Humanities. Project N 12-03-00650.

<sup>2</sup> Some remarks on terminology: Russian political science more frequently uses the term East-Central Europe which seems more corresponding to Russian geopolitical vision. The times when both the East and West had called this part of Europe "Eastern" has gone. And the time when we could see it geopolitically "Central" did not come yet, at least as we see it from Russia. The region did not manage yet to undertake the mission of a bridge between East and West and is rather drifting towards it with a changing speed, which rather indicates the category of movement which is not bad at all. At the same time, we in Russia are not certain about whether we are that very "Eastern Europe" that would give the region the full right to call itself "Central".

Russia, for more than a decade, had concentrated itself on the more remote interests of World geopolitics.

As to the countries of East-Central Europe, the situation of political uncertainty and economic degradation eastwards, that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, put these countries in front of the necessity to search for the new alliances. All the pre-reform discussions about possibility of neutrality had faded away very quickly. Slovakia was the last country of the region that in the beginning of the 1990's had tried and gave up the efforts in reaching the neutral status. Global situation towards the end of the 80's – beginning of the 90's with an evident trend towards unipolarity and worldwide interdependence, had excluded completely the possibility of other choice than joining the existing political and economic integration for post-socialist states.

Thus, both the sides in the 90's undertook a serious effort to change the strategic vector of their foreign policies towards intensifying the Western ties. However, it was the West, namely the European Union, which in the beginning of the 2000-ies had stopped this process of alienation. Parallel with improvement of bilateral relations between Russia and leading West European countries like France, Italy and Germany, Central Europeans had to integrate into the general wave of improvement of transcontinental relations. Besides, by the moment when they had to join the European Union it had become clear for EU that the East-European countries, and especially the former USSR Baltic republics, did not manage to fulfill all the necessary criteria. Already during the first years of EU membership it turned out that the so called „conditional compliance” of the East-Central European countries to Maastricht criteria had much more consequences that it could be adopted by the European Union. The countries of East-Central Europe- in their turn - came to conclusion, that eastern - i.e. Russian - market is inevitable for them. Further – more. Within the following merely ten years of EU membership, it became clear that factors of traditional geopolitics, as well as inherent differences of political character with Western partners, had begun to drive Russia and Central Europe closer to each other. Both had understood that the old pattern of relations had been inappropriate any more, and the search for the new one had been blocked by many factors.

Among these we can mention:

- the prevailing stereotypes and offends of the past;
- reserved attention towards the new political forces that had emerged in the countries during the reform period;
- the absence of the joint border, the negative impact of which is being multiplied by instability in the Ukraine;

- the factor of new alliances (EU and NATO) and the necessity to comply with their general political line.

In majority of the post-socialist countries the new state holidays began to associate with revolts against USSR and Russia. Historians involved the mass media in discussing the new archive documents revealing the negative sides of the common past. In many cases these had become the background for restitution claims towards Russia. In relations between Russia and Hungary this had revealed in re-estimating the events of 1956, of the events of the II World War on Hungarian side, and on Russian side, as a response, – in starting the discussion about the role of Hungarian internationalists like Béla Kun in the revolutionary events and 1918-1920 Civil war in Russia.

Last generation of socialist elites, namely socialist-reformers, on both sides, had much more in common, and personally knew each other. Thus, they became more successive in building up new relations than new political forces of conservative or radically liberal character. Quite in this line had been Russia's attempts to build relations and cooperation presumably with Hungarian socialists and to restrain from relations with conservative politicians. Hungary, in its' turn, had relied in its political preferences on Russian liberal politicians that in the course of time formed an opposition to state power. It became a surprise for Russia that Hungary did not share Russia's anxiety about its conational minorities that occurred in the former USSR republics after the dissolution of the USSR, though Russia had demonstrated an inclination to study and follow the patterns of Hungarian diasporal policy towards Hungarians in the neighbouring territories.

Eastern enlargement of the EU had got its continuation in the Eastern partnership policy that had turned the former USSR republics into territories of the ambitions of the enlarging West, symbolized by the EU and NATO, performing here against the interests of the East, embodied in Russia. Thus, instead of sphere of cooperation, the territories of former USSR republics – the objects of this policy - had turned into the areas of rivalry and confrontation between us. As to our relations with Hungary, in the times of USSR we had been neighbours and all bilateral issues had been settled without the participation of the third side. Currently the questions of transfrontier trade and cooperation belong to the spheres of our relations with Ukraine. Consequently many of the issues of bilateral trade like transit of oil and gaz depend rather on the will and politics of the Ukraine, than on our's.

All this added to mutual mistrust. Many of the Central European countries had been afraid of the Russia's attempts to restore its influence in this region,



even then, when Russia's foreign policy strategy - in 2000 - had ranged the relations with the region among the last in the list of priorities, devoting to the description of it less space in the document than for the countries of the African continent.<sup>3</sup>

Towards the end of the 90's new schemes of relations had become restricted to entirely economic spheres and only to a little extent had spread to cultural spheres.

Reality of confronting interests - due to participation of Central European countries in NATO had arisen for the first time in full scale during the Balkan war of 1999. Though the countries of the region restrained from direct participation in the conflict, they definitely acted as the allies of the side, opposite to Russia, who, from the very beginning, rejected the idea of any kind intervention and war. Merely the same situation had repeated at the background of the conflict in Iraq.

The first breakthrough in relations between Russia and Central European countries had happened on the eve of their membership in the European Union and - as we have already mentioned - due to the efforts of the leading western countries. Russian foreign policy establishment in 2001 had formulated its new trend in policy towards East European countries as "no initiative on Russian side, but correct response to constructive proposals coming from the countries of the region."<sup>4</sup>

However the development of events had brought its corrections into this line. Since Central European countries had entered the European Union, their relations with Russia had become predetermined by the rules of the membership, that had made them much more problematic and not only in the economic sphere. Nevertheless by the beginning of the second decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century they did manage to restore the volumes of pre-reform trade with Russia and started exploring the Russian market more intensely. Still, the time - merely two decades - had been lost and in front of the Central European countries had arisen much more difficult aims as rivalry with dozens of world trade marks, the search for the new forms of cooperation as well as the necessity to fight the negative trade balance, that had appeared due to Russia's enormous gas and oil supplies to the region.

<sup>3</sup> In Foreign policy conception adopted on April 23<sup>rd</sup> 1993 by President Boris Yeltsin, Russia's relations with the countries of Eastern Europe as to priority had occurred at the 5<sup>th</sup> place. In President Vladimir Putin's foreign policy conception adopted on June 28<sup>th</sup> 2000, these relations had been mentioned in 4,5 lines, while relations with the countries of Africa - in 5,5 lines.

<sup>4</sup> Vice Foreign Affairs minister Alexander Avdjeev' speech at the 4<sup>th</sup> International Scientific Conference "Russia and Central Europe in the New Geopolitical Realities." Moscow, June 14-16. 2001.

In 2006 Russian president Vladimir Putin had visited Hungary and Czech Republic. That had been followed by numerous visits of the heads of these states to Russia. These summits gave start to new business relations, to participation of Central European companies in Russia's transcontinental projects.

Still, there had been serious differences in relations between Russia and the countries of the region. The widely spread opinion that modern Russian foreign policy tries to revive using the schemes of pan-Slavic union, are too much exaggerated. If we shall compare the volumes of Russia's trade with the countries of the Balkans and the countries of Visegrad, we shall see more than six time dominance of the trade with the latter.<sup>5</sup> This tendency had only strengthened during the last decade.

On the background of mass joining the European Union and queuing up for NATO of the non-Slavic and Slavic countries of the region, Russian illusions about exclusive character of pan-Slavic fraternity are quickly fading away. New geopolitical realities do not leave place for sentiments about alliances based solely on ethno-cultural ties. Mercantile pragmatic interests of business are ruling the main trend of Russian policy as well. They leave no space for sentiments and spiritual-ideological content of relations. Russia in a certain sense remains dramatically alone as cannot find the allies even after numerous gestures towards the outer world and the vague understanding from the latter, that not all reserves of Russia had been shown and used up to now.

Russian-Hungarian relations had been mostly developed according to the general pattern, having both the periods of draw back and new impetuses. One thing is evident, that that was not Russia that initiated the new stage in our relations, but rather the general understanding that Hungary cannot fly having one wing only. Like in relations with other countries of the region, regional relations to a certain extend overweighed the intergovernmental ones. In case of Hungary they had been supplemented by ethno-national line. Having once found Finno-Ugric relatives, lately there is seen the renaissance of the Turanic line in Hungarian policy towards Russia. Though Russian and Hungarian sense find much in common ideologically: striving for preservation of Christian and national interests, new responsibilities within global NATO and pro-Atlantic EU, do not afford these relations to rise above them. This, however does not exclude, that common understanding might sooner or later bring us to establishing a really new type of prosperous bilateral relations.

<sup>5</sup> Дрыночкин А.В. Восточная Европа как элемент системы глобальных рынков. М., Олита, 2004, стр.186.



## ANALYZING THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: KEY PRINCIPLES

### *1. Introduction*

The enlargement is one of those political processes that characterises the whole story of the Community. Having grown from six members in the 1950s to 28 since 1 July 2013, the European Union is after 6 enlargement rounds now home to over 500 million people. The transformative power of the Community has been proven through successive enlargements.

Till the period of democratic transformation neither the intensity nor the number of accessed states (6 new members) was remarkable. From the end of the cold war on accession gained more and more importance and has been on the political agenda on regular basis. In 1995 three former-EFTA member states were accessed followed by eight Central and Eastern European states plus Cyprus and Malta, then Bulgaria and Romania gained membership status on 1<sup>st</sup> January 2007 and finally Croatia became the member of the EU on 1<sup>st</sup> July 2013. In a nutshell, 13 new member states within 18 years and the Union came to be a 28-member-state Community. The Eastern enlargement opened new phase in the history of the Community, as it was not only bigger but also more transformative than previous enlargement rounds.<sup>1</sup> In addition it formally ended the political and economic division of Europe after World War II. Though, the end of the process is very far, and the EU maintains that the enlargement door remains open to any European country that fulfils the criteria for membership. Currently, five countries – Iceland, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey – are recognized as official candidates for membership, but all of them are at very different stages of the accession process. The remaining Western Balkan states – Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo – are considered potential EU candidates, but it will likely take many years before any of these countries are ready to join the EU.

<sup>1</sup> SCHIMMELFENNIG, Frank: Europeanization Beyond Europe. *Living Reviews in European Governance*, Vol. 7/2012 No. 1. 5.

## *2. The enlargement timing*

It seems to be evident that the whole process of European integration can be separated into two main phases. The first period begins in 1973 and lasts till the accession process in 1995 when only those states were accessed to the Union that belonged to the 'West' side of the old continent regarding their political institutions, economic potential and ideological background. Thus their integration did not mean any difficulties as enlargements were based on the similar character and common roots of the states. Between 1973 and 1995 the Community was enlarged four times. Although the process generated several questions and disputes, the necessity of enlargement was out of question. It was so much indisputable that the EC signed the Accession Partnership even with Turkey (1963), Malta (1970) and Cyprus (1972) that countries were far from the European model.<sup>2</sup>

The next phase began with the democratic transition and concerns Eastern and Southern European countries. For the Community it lasted till 1993 to decide over the Eastern enlargement and 5 another year passed before they started the accession negotiations. The root of the Union's anxiety can be detected in the instable political system, the incomplete democratic and economic transition of these countries. This threat was intensified by the fact that the CEE (Central and Eastern European) countries hoped to be able to finish the transition successfully due to their EU membership. As a result of the comparative analysis of the two phases several differences came into focus, like the longer term and stricter criteria, the insecure end of the accession, the stop of opt-out chance, the introduction of new instruments and techniques, furthermore, the negotiating position of the Union strengthened, meanwhile that of the candidate countries weakened. Therefore, the Eastern enlargement is not the pursuance of the previous expansion, but it should be considered as the new phase of the integration process.

In the first phase of the enlargements EU member states emphasized the positive, democratic effects – in case Greece (1981), Spain (1986), and Portugal (1986) –, as well as the positive economic effects – Ireland (1973) and Finland (1995). But, in the run-up to the Fifth Enlargement, the rhetoric of democracy and economic development was not applied to the newest candidate countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe. Instead, many EU members emphasized the negative aspects that each new candidate would have on the organization.

<sup>2</sup> WALLACE, William: Enlarging the European Union – An Overview. In: *Perspectives on the Enlargement of the European Union*. Ed.: CAMERON, Ross. Leiden – Boston – Köln, Brill. 2002. 1-18. (Hereinafter referred as: WALLACE, 2002.)

In addition during the whole integration process the EU had to face the dilemma of deepening when admitting more and more states to the Community, which is also of high relevance in case of Eastern and Southern European countries integration. What is more, the EU has to cope with the challenges of the accession of new member states from Eastern Europe regarding the institutional and financial system and political questions so that the enlargement would not generate contra-productive processes.<sup>3</sup> Thus, enlargement depends largely on the integration capacity of the EU. The whole process is continuously and dynamically questioned by the euro-scepticists. All these result in tiredness about the enlargement and 'reflection' period, which hinders the accession of the Western Balkans. The EU influenced by two contradictory parts forgets about its inner problems in order to demonstrate strength in the world arena and to support the full integration of the region. Though, it is also clearly seen that the EU does not want to get engaged to the region as much as to the Central and Eastern European region, it refrains from concrete promises regarding membership or its date, there is a lack of schedule for each candidate state, not to mention that the amount and time of pre-accession support are also unknown. An example of this statelessness can be detected in such expressions in the European rhetoric like it is an "*open ended process whose outcome cannot be guaranteed beforehand*" and "*the date of the accession is not defined till the end of the accession negotiations*".<sup>4</sup>

The enlargement proceeds in different stages and the affects of each enlargement rounds vary depending on the timing of the accession process.<sup>5</sup> It means the state of EU's political order, the size of the EU at the time of enlargement, as well as the number of the acceding countries influence the course and the length of the enlargement process. Accession negotiation is a long and complex process in which the candidate country must adopt and implement a massive body of EU treaties, laws, and regulations. The process of enlargement is a lengthy and complicated affair, and becomes more and more complicated.

<sup>3</sup> AVERY, Graham – CAMERON, Fraser: *The Enlargement of the European Union*. Sheffield Academic Press, 2001. and WALLACE, 2002. 1-18;

<sup>4</sup> COM: Stabilization and Association Agreement with Croatia. *Official Journal of the European Union* L 026. Volume 48. 28 January 2005.

<sup>5</sup> GOETZ, Klaus: Beyond Differential Impact – Territory, Temporality and Clustered Europeanization. In: *Deepening and Widening in an Enlarged Europe: The Impact of the Eastern Enlargement*. Ed.: ÁGH Attila - FERENCZ Alexandra. Together for Europe Research Centre and Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, 2006. 137-160.

### *3. The enlargement of the European Union in the respect of integration theories*

According to theoretical studies' logic it is the analysis of the stabilisation of the integration that should stand in the focus at the establishment of the Community and they totally disregard the option of further enlargement. This perfectly fits to the European Economic Community. By the first enlargement of the EU in 1973 the classical theories had already done their work and were in the declining phase. Afterwards, neither the cohesion theories in the 1990s nor the theoretical dispute about supranational versus intergovernmental Europe dealt with the question of enlargement, but they all insisted on deepening.<sup>6</sup>

The other reason for the classical integration theories not coping with the adaptability of the Western European model, since it did not even come to their mind till the structural change and social-economic-political transformation of CEE countries. This is due to the fact that till the democratic transition only those states were accessed to the Union that belonged to the 'West' side of the old continent regarding their political institutions, economic potential and ideological background, thus their integration did not mean any difficulty. Therefore, the geographical expansion of the Community counts to be one of the black holes of the classical theories.

Even if the integration theories of the EU have partially dealt with the question of enlargement, for a long time they were only focusing on economy, since the ECC was born as an economic integration. Accordingly, in case of enlargements only the economic advantages and disadvantages were taken into account. After Maastricht, by the deepening of the cooperation the political integration intensified, thus the dimension of the integration multiplied and more theories – like the rationalist institutionalism and constructivism – extended their research to the enlargement. Related to the accession of new member states several new factors came into being, like the question of autonomy, the chance of re-election of governments after the accession, the power of different groups of interest, national identity and the collective identity of the continent.

It proved to be true that scientists dealing with European integration theories only marginally tackle the question of background of enlargement. The classical approaches focused only the geographical growth of the

<sup>6</sup> SCHIMMELFENNIG, Frank – SEDELMEIER, Ulrich: Theorizing EU enlargement: research focus, hypotheses, and the state of research. *Journal of European Public Policy* 9:4, August 2002, 500-528. 502. (Hereinafter referred as: SCHIMMELFENNIG – SEDELMEIER, 2002.)

Community, and even the new integration. Therefore, nowadays there is a need to extend the theoretical research of enlargements, the comparison of different accessions, and to detect new fields of research, like the politics of the member and the candidate states, the substantive dimension and the results of the enlargement.<sup>7</sup>

The enlargement of the European Union is a phenomenon that represents a “*process of gradual and formal horizontal institutionalization of organizational rules and forms*”<sup>8</sup> Proving the process-like nature of enlargement was not a hard task to do. The enlargement of the EU is a process that accompanies the whole history of the Community, since 1961 – from the British application on – it is continuously on agenda, and now new aspirants are knocking on the doors. Another proof of the process-centred character is that the accession of new member states is always longish, an each-time more time-consuming way on which the applicants should go along step by step. The other element of the definition is progressivity as the process is gradual one. The would-be member states have to adopt the EU’s norms and criteria progressively: this begins well before applying, and does not finish at the moment of accession and with the full-member status since the admission and adaptation of the community law is a very long process. The progressive and horizontal institutionalisation during the enlargements process means that institutions spread beyond the incumbent actors and there is such a relationship between member states and candidate states that could lead to accession. Horizontal institutionalisation means the enlargement of the Community, and vertical integration means strengthening and deepening the relationship between different layers of the Union. Therefore horizontal versus vertical integration is equal to enlargement versus deepening, one of the most difficult dilemmas of the day. According to the principle of horizontality an institution remains the same throughout the enlargement, and only the group of stakeholders extends. Institutionalisation is a permanent process that could be present in relation to any third country.

#### *4. The legal framework for the enlargement*

The legal background of the enlargement defines the accession of new member states as a complex and ever-changing factor. This is based on the changes in the codified law and in the Treaties of Accession, not to mention the constant

<sup>7</sup> Dr. Edit LŐRINCZNÉ BENCZE: *Az európai uniós bővítések elmélete és gyakorlata a horvát csatlakozás tükrében*. Aposztróf, Budapest, 2013.

<sup>8</sup> SCHIMMELFENNIG – SEDELMEIER, 2002. 503.



growth of soft law. In case of non-codified law the changes in the criteria and rules of accession, in the stakeholders and their roles and in the schedule of the enlargement is proved. The Copenhagen Criteria and related documents, the Pre-Accession Strategy, the yearly progress reports of the Commission highlight the expansion the system of requirements that is also affected by the fact that the Union itself changes constantly as well. Though the Community has previously also laid down some political criteria for the candidate countries, these did not affect the substantive elements of the accession never before. In case of the countries after the democratic transition the criteria have changed and become stricter. To top it all, the Union even insisted on the strict and consistent adherence to them, which also resulted in changes in the inner policy of the Union.

The EU enlargement is regulated on one hand by number of relevant EU Treaty articles, and the other hand by soft law, including the Copenhagen criteria and so called the Copenhagen related documents, Stabilization and Accession Agreement, benchmarks, some of them falling in between legal and political regulation. Based on the treaties there are six main stages of development of enlargement law of the European Communities. The first is the Coal and Steel Community Treaty. According to Article 98 of the ECSC Treaty regulation any *“European state may apply to accede to this Treaty”* and it gave the Council almost exclusive powers to deal with such application. The only criteria of becoming member were statehood and being European state.<sup>9</sup>

The European Economic Community and EURATOM created in 1957 did not change the basic principle, as any European state was allowed to apply. However the Article 237 of the EEC Treaty and Article 205 EURATOM Treaty were based on the principle of intergovernmentalism as the Member States were given much more powers to regulate the process. The accession named as the *“agreement between the Member States and the Applicant State”, the Accession Treaty had to be ratified by ‘all the Contracting States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements’*.<sup>10</sup>

The third stage of enlargement law was the Single European Act 1987 in which the Parliament’s powers were strengthened through its assent needed on enlargement and association agreements.

In some cases the Community introduced Association Agreements used with Turkey in 1963, Malta in 1979 and Cyprus in 1972 and renewing this method and introducing their second generations of in case of Central and

<sup>9</sup> Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community. Article 98. Paris, 1951.

<sup>10</sup> Treaty establishing the European Economic Community. Article 237. Treaty establishing European Atomic Energy Community. Article 205 Rome, 25 March 1957.

Eastern European Countries (CEES) called them European Agreements and third generations named Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA) with Western Balkans countries. All these Agreements were based on Article 310 (ex 238) EC Treaty according to which “*the Community may conclude with one or more States or international organizations agreements establishing an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special procedures*”.<sup>11</sup> The aim of these agreements is to provide for comprehensive cooperation in political, economic, trade, cultural areas between the Community and the aspirant country as well as the framework for rapid progress towards trade. The European Agreements were concluded between 1991 and 1993 with the CEES making explicit provision for full membership of the Union, but do not guarantee it.<sup>12</sup>

The third revision of the written enlargement law was introduced by Maastricht Treaty in 1993. Before Maastricht, a country planning to become a member had to make three applications, namely to each of the three Communities. Membership in one or two Communities was theoretically possible, although it never happened. After Maastricht, membership in the European Union is governed by one single Article, namely Article O TEU, which consequently had small influence on the previously existing practice. In this way the next enlargement round in 1995 already governed by Article O TEU was no different from the previous ones.<sup>13</sup>

The fifth reform of the enlargement law was brought about by the Amsterdam Treaty, which renumbered Article O to Article 49 TEU. The Copenhagen membership criteria used in case of Central and Eastern European countries are not quoted explicitly but reference is made to them in Article 49 namely “*the criteria of eligibility approved by the European Council are taken into account*”.

Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union states that “*any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union*.”<sup>14</sup> These democratic values are “*freedom, democracy, respects for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law*”<sup>15</sup>, so from the moment on the country applying to Community

<sup>11</sup> Treaty establishing the European Economic Community. Article 238. Rome, 25 March 1957.

<sup>12</sup> CAMERON, Fraser: *The European Union and the Challenge of Enlargement*. Halki International Seminars, 1996. 9.

<sup>13</sup> Treaty on European Union Article O. Official Journal C 191 Maastricht 29 July 1992.

<sup>14</sup> Treaty on European Union Article 49. Official Journal of the European Union. C 83/15, 30.3.2010

<sup>15</sup> Treaty on European Union Article 6, Official Journal of the European Union. C 83/15, 30.3.2010

should accept these common norms. In addition the EU ought to be guided only by stated democratic and human rights performance of the target countries and it ought not to discriminate against any country either positively or negatively on the basis of other considerations.

The sixth and the last Treaty reform to deal with enlargement regulation was Lisbon Treaty in 2009. The Lisbon Treaty in the Article 2 added some other values to the list introduced in Amsterdam as it says „*the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.*”<sup>16</sup> It was the first time when such values as equality and minority rights were mentioned and candidate states must respect all these values listed in Lisbon Treaty. It means that European values were added to the originally established conditions.

The current treaty includes some other changes regarding enlargement, such as increasing role of the European Parliament in the whole enlargement as well as in the EU decision making process. However it was the Constitutional Treaty (Article I/58) that established obligation to inform the European Parliament and national parliaments about any new membership application the Lisbon Treaty has maintained this clause. So far the European Parliament has been given limited role as it gave assent for enlargement decision (Single European Act). Since Lisbon Treaty on the European Parliament whose members are elected directly by the EU's citizens instead of its 'assent' has to give its 'consent'<sup>17</sup>

Before Lisbon the role of national parliament was to ratify the accession treaty after having been signed according to the national law. The aim to strengthen the role of EP and national parliaments to increase the legitimacy of the whole process, to bring decision making closer to the national constituencies and to reduce of democratic deficit of the EU.<sup>18</sup>

There have been no changes in role of the Council as “*the applicant state shall address its application to the Council, which shall act unanimously after consulting the Commission and after receiving the consent of the European Parliament, which shall act by a majority of its component members. The conditions of eligibility*

<sup>16</sup> Treaty on European Union Article 49. Official Journal of the European Union. C 83/15, 30.3.2010

<sup>17</sup> Treaty of Lisbon, Amendments to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty Establishing the European Community Art. 1., 57.

<sup>18</sup> PIEDRAFITA, Sonia: The Treaty of Lisbon: New Signals for Future Enlargements. *EIPASCOPE*. 2008/1. 4.

*agreed upon by the European Council shall be taken into account.*" In addition the accession agreement should be go under ratification process by all the member states as well as by applicant state in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.<sup>19</sup>

It is seen that treaties introduce just very few substantive conditions for the applicants. The most important two substantive conditions existing since 1951 are that the applicant must be a State and it must be the European one. The term European however was never fixed and it aroused huge debate in 1987, when Turkey applied for the membership to the Community as only 96 percent of the country territory belongs to the continent. To define European we have to take into consideration geographical, historical and cultural elements as well that according to the European Commission constituted European identity.<sup>20</sup>

The third substantive criterion that the candidate should accept European values was *de facto* applied to all previous accessions, but was only the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 which formally included it and Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 which strengthened it. To sum up the enlargement criteria were statehood, Europeaness and fundamental freedom.

## *5. Substantive enlargement criteria – conditionality*

It was the European Assembly which in 1962 in Birkelbach Report set the first out-of-law enlargement criteria and interpreted that the applicant state must be a democratic one.<sup>21</sup> On the bases of this statement the EC did not accept Spain as a candidate, as the country was not a democratic one when applied for membership on 9 February 1962. In the Declaration on Democracy issued by Copenhagen Council in 1978 with strong connection changes taking place in Southern Europe the similar approach was stated: "*the respect and maintenance of representative democracy and human rights in each member states are essential elements of membership in the European Community*".

However, the real change happened in case of Central and Easter European countries. After the collapsing of the Communism and gaining back their independence 10 former socialist countries – Hungary, Poland, Slovenia,

<sup>19</sup> Treaty of the European Union Article 49. Official Journal of the European Union. C 83/15, 30.3.2010

<sup>20</sup> COM: Europe and Challenge of Enlargement. *Bulletin of the European Communities*, Supplement 3/1992. Luxembourg, 11.

<sup>21</sup> EUROPEAN ASSEMBLY: *Birkelbach Report*. 1962. Archives of the European Communities. 07. 515:32, X3. 075. 15.

Slovakia, Czech Republic, Rumania, Bulgaria and the Baltic States – expressed their willingness to become member of the European Communities. The Community has never before been faced with such candidate countries having an economic and political background entirely different to Western standards. Commission's report 'Europe and the Challenge of Enlargement' adopted in June 1992 Lisbon<sup>22</sup> submitted that the Community had never been a 'closed club', its open for new candidates who in order to become a member should meet several criteria, namely to share European values, to be a democracy, to respect human rights, to adopt objectives the EC including CFSP and all the *acquis* and to assume all the membership obligations. Next year the Commission introduced a report titled 'Towards a Closer Association with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe'.<sup>23</sup> On the bases of this document the Council introduced new substantive principles for the Eastern European countries so called Copenhagen criteria in 1993. These criteria specify the conditions, which each candidate country has to fulfil in order to become a member of the EU.

According to Copenhagen criteria membership to the Union requires:

- *"that the candidate has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities (new!):*
- *the existence of a functioning market economy, as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union, and*
- *the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic, and monetary union."*<sup>24</sup>

Even though it was not till June 1993 that the Copenhagen European Council first stated criteria namely *"the Union's capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum of European integration"*.

The Madrid European Council in December 1995 not only confirmed these criteria but also introduced some new one, as the development of the market economy, the adjustment of their administrative structures and the creation of a stable economic and monetary environment.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>22</sup> COM: Europe and the Challenge of Enlargement. *Bulletin of the European Communities* Supplement Luxembourg, 3/1992.

<sup>23</sup> COM: *Towards a Closer Association with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe*. Brussels, 18 May 1993.

<sup>24</sup> EUROPEAN COUNCIL: *Presidency Conclusions*, Copenhagen, 1993 June 21-22. 13.

<sup>25</sup> EUROPEAN COUNCIL: Madrid European Council. 15-116 December 1995. *Bulletin of the European Communities*, No. 12/1995

On the bases above it is clear that substantive elements of the enlargement criteria have been introduced in Copenhagen. The EU clearly demanded adaptation and clearly implementation to EU rules and thus stable democracies and prosperous economies measures of liberalisation and deregulation. Eastern enlargement was and all the forthcoming enlargements will be – as it could be seen in case of Croatia – regulated with a due regard to the Copenhagen criteria.<sup>26</sup>

To strengthen the conditionality number of other documents were added to Copenhagen criteria. The Commission according to Article 49(1) TEU(71) not only releases the Opinions on the Application for membership but also on the bases of Agenda 2000 issued in 1997<sup>27</sup> it introduces annual reports on the candidate countries. These reports contain the candidate country's progress towards accession, summarising documents<sup>28</sup>, as well as recommendations concerning the opening of negotiations and the general assessment of the situation with fulfilment of the Copenhagen Criteria.<sup>29</sup> In addition the role of the Copenhagen-based conditionality in all the cases of further enlargements (Central and Eastern European countries and Western Balkans countries) was increased with the introduction of Accession Partnerships.<sup>30</sup>

Now it seems to be evident that the principle of conditionality lies at the heart of the enlargement process, as the Community sets of requirements in order to gain full EU membership. According to Smith, two types of conditionality can be separated, positive and negative ones. In case of positive conditionality, on the bases of the candidate country's progress the EU offers the applicant the chance of carrying on the negotiations, to start a new stage in the accession process. Negative conditionality means that when the EU is

<sup>26</sup> GRAHAM, Avery – FRASER, Cameron: *The Enlargement of the European Union*, Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998. 23.

<sup>27</sup> COM: *Agenda 2000: For a Wider and Stronger Union*. COM (97) 2000 final, 13 July 1997. Official Journal of the European Communities, Luxembourg;

<sup>28</sup> Such as Composite Paper Reports on Progress towards Accession by Each of the Candidate Countries, COM(1998) 712 final; Composite Paper Reports on Progress towards Accession by Each of the Candidate Countries, COM(1999) 500 final; Enlargement Strategy Paper Report on Progress towards Accession by Each of the Candidate Countries, COM(2000) 700 final; Making a Success of Enlargement Strategy Paper and Report of the European Commission on the Progress towards Accession by Each of the Candidate Countries, COM(2001) 700 final, SEC(2001) 1744-1753. etc

<sup>29</sup> The first regular Reports from the Commission on Progress towards Accession by Each of the Candidate Countries were released on 4.11.1998.

<sup>30</sup> The criteria was introduced just in case CEES's, but it regulates further enlargements as well, as it was used in case of Croatia.



unsatisfied with the efforts made by the aspirant the accession process could be halted or slowed down.<sup>31</sup>

Using *Copenhagen Criteria* of the Copenhagen European Council in June 1993 and Madrid Criteria in 1995 as a pre-accession conditionality it is revealed that the EU strengthened the criteria of admission and decreased its financial instruments at the same time when the accession of the post-communist countries after the democratic transition came on the agenda. It was the first time when the EU clearly acknowledged the requirement for potential member states. In addition the fact that the EU made the accession process harder after Eastern enlargement, Western Balkans countries – as it could be seen in case of Croatia – have to face with three generations of the enlargement criteria. According to the first wave of criteria Central and Eastern European countries as well as Western Balkans countries should fulfil all the named *Copenhagen Criteria*.

The second generation of enlargement criteria was introduced for the first time in case Western Balkan region including Croatia. During the 1990s EU enlargement leverage did not have any particular effect on developments in the Western Balkans. It was only in 1996 that the EU General Affairs Council introduced Regional Approach aimed at strengthening stability, good-neighbourhood and economic recovery in South-East Europe. Next year the EU fitted the Regional Approach with political and economic conditionality for the development of bilateral relations with the five Western Balkan countries including Croatia.<sup>32</sup> In fact, the Council complemented the Copenhagen Criteria with an additional condition, i.e. ‘regional cooperation’. In order to make closer relations with both the EU and the NATO, cooperation with the ICTY was established as a key condition by the Dayton countries (Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia-Montenegro). In fact, one of the biggest obstacles of the Croatian accession was that the ICTY claimed jurisdiction over the Croatian military, particularly in relation to the operations Flash and Storm in Krajina.<sup>33</sup>

It was just at the end of the decade when the EU had simultaneously adopted a ‘coherent strategy’ called Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) for the Western Balkans. The SAP pursues three major aims, namely stabilisation,

<sup>31</sup> SMITH, Karen E.: The use of political conditionality in the EU’s Relations with Third Countries: How effective? *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 2012. Vol. 3. 253-274. 256.

<sup>32</sup> COM: *Regional Approach to the countries of South-Eastern Europe*: Compliance with the conditions in the Council Conclusions of 29 April 1997 – Commission Communication on Operational Conclusions COM (1998) 618 final

<sup>33</sup> JOVIĆ, Dejan: Croatia and the European Union: a long delayed journey. *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, 8/1 (2006) 85-103. 2.

the promotion of regional cooperation and the prospect of EU accession. The SAP is the most important element of the specific criteria for the region. It is considered to be the second generation of European agreements launched in 1999 that established a more detailed list of EU accession criteria for candidates through the Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAA). The SAAs were very similar to the European Commission's Association Agreements with the CEE countries, although they added some new and specific elements of conditionality such as stabilisation, regional cooperation, democratisation, commitment to respect human rights and the right of return for all refugees and displaced persons, the development of civil society and institution-building.<sup>34</sup> SAA included economic and financial assistance and cooperation, political dialogue, harmonisation with the *acquis communautaire*, as well as the development of a free trade agreement between candidate country and the EU. In addition to the SAA introduced a new assistance mechanism for the region. Croatia's SAA negotiations began in early November 2000, and less than a year later, on 29 October 2001, the Croatian government signed the SAA in Luxembourg. On this bases the country hoped shortened and 'fast-tracked' harmonisation procedure and accession process.

Eventually, the third wave of conditions accompanied Croatia's accession process starting in 2005, embodied a specific criteria, called 'benchmarks'. After experiences with Bulgaria and Romania the European Commission decided to make the negotiation process much stricter with the introduction of benchmarks, instrument used for the first time in case of Croatia. In the European Commission's own words, benchmarks constitute a „*new tool introduced as a result of lessons learnt from the fifth enlargement, to improve the quality of accession negotiations, by providing incentives for the candidate countries to undertake necessary reforms at an early stage.*”<sup>35</sup>

These are strict obligations and they require a considerable effort by all the candidates. For example, assuming the *acquis communautaire* applicants are expected to accept the detailed laws and rules adopted on the basis of the EU's founding Treaties, mainly the treaties of Rome, Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon. The *acquis* is subdivided into 35 chapters and involves implementing over 100,000 pages of Community legislation. Using conditionality as the major principle allows the Union to choose the most successful applicants and to differentiate – as it could be seen in case of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007, and Croatia in 2013.

<sup>34</sup> COM: Stabilization and Association Agreement with Croatia. *Official Journal of the European Union* L 026. Volume 48. 28 January 2005.

<sup>35</sup> COM: *Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2006-2007*. COM (2006) 649 final, Brussels, 10.



The EU's conditionality has changed after 2004 as it has undergone a three-dimensional evolution. The first one is based on the specific features of SAP, as SAP countries should implement all the SAA conditions before being considered by the EU as membership applicants. This is the so called *pre-accession conditionality*.<sup>36</sup> The second evolutionary dimension of the pre-accession conditionality regards the introduction of the tool of benchmarking. The third stage of conditionality is in the post-accession period's specific safeguard clauses, later being reinforced by the „*cooperation and verification mechanisms in the area of judicial reform and the fight against organised crime and corruption*”.<sup>37</sup>

The enlargement as the EU's most successful policy was placed on new grounds after regime changes. As José Manuel Durão Barroso, President of the European Commission said „*EU enlargement is about credibility: Credibility from the candidates in respecting all criteria and enforcing the required reforms, but also credibility on the EU's side in moving forward once the agreed conditions have been met*”.<sup>38</sup> Ulrich Sedelmeier names two sides of credibility from another point of view. On one hand „*the candidates have to be certain that they will receive the promised rewards after meeting the EU's demands*”. On the other hand “*they also have to believe that they will only receive the reward if they indeed fully meet the requirements*”<sup>39</sup> The EU's credibility had to be reinforced through strict membership criteria, in order to remain the most important tool for democratisation, for strengthening stability and prosperity.

Christopher Preston says that the EU follows four main principle in pursuing its objectives for enlargement and for imposing requirements on the candidate countries. The first principle is that the EU insists on the full acceptance of the *acquis communautaire* which must be integrated into a candidate's national law before membership is granted. The second principle is about creating new policy instrument by the EU that tends to address diversity. According to the third one, the EU integrates new member states with institutional adjustments resulting in long and often acrimonious treaty negotiations. Hardly any institutional reforms have occurred in parallel with enlargement until the

<sup>36</sup> PIPPAN, Christian: The Rocky Road to Europe: The EU's Stabilisation and Association Process for the Western Balkans and the Principle of Conditionality, *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 9/2 (2004) 219-245. 227.

<sup>37</sup> COM: Commission Decision establishing a mechanism for cooperation and verification of progress in Bulgaria to address specific benchmarks in the areas of judicial reform and the fight against corruption and organised crime. Brussels, 13/XII/ 2006. C (2006) 6570 final

<sup>38</sup> BARROSO, José Manuel Durão: Statement by President Barroso following his meeting with Ivo Josipović, President of Croatia. Press point Brussels, 17 June 2011 SPEECH/11/447,

<sup>39</sup> SEDELMEIER, Ulrich: Europeanization in new member and candidate states. *Living Review. European Gov.*1/3. (2006) 12.

summit meeting in Nice in 2000 and the Lisbon Treaty of 2007 aimed to make the Union ready for future enlargements. The EU's fourth principle is that the Community prefers to negotiate with groups of states that already have close relations with one another. This principle is a coherent issue throughout all EU enlargement processes, with the notable exception of Greece in 1981 and Croatia in 2013.<sup>40</sup>

## *6. Summary. Challenges and perspectives of EU enlargement in the future*

The current enlargement agenda has two main drivers: safeguarding stability and security within wider Europe, and achieving economic prosperity and growth. Unfortunately the latter one is strongly affected by the current EU economic crisis which possibly marks a long-term economic and political stagnation accompanied with the Community's decreasing international role both from the perspective of the EU member states and the candidate countries. Therefore, the EU has to solve its inner problem while maintaining the process of European enlargement. This could be difficult due to several fatigues. The enlargement fatigue appeared after Eastern enlargement has been partially resolved by introducing absorption/integration capacity of EU in the EU Enlargement Strategy. But after the 'big bang' enlargement the EU's enlargement fatigue has had its new phase with different meaning. It would be more productive to speak of 'enlargement reticence'. In addition this EU's enlargement fatigue accompanied with aspirant countries' accession fatigue could seriously threaten the future of the enlargement agenda.

By end of 2008, after world financial crisis, EU faced serious financial fatigue, which is now harming the future enlargement. Between 2004 and 2009 the EU faced the institutional fatigue after long political battles pro et contra of EU constitution, but this has been solved by Lisbon Treaty entering into force. Apart from these EU fatigues, the Community's sceptic feelings are increasing every year within aspirant countries, creating new fatigue so called commitment fatigue, or tiredness of delivering, and not receiving aspiring status of relations with EU.

EU should change its enlargement policy toward Western Balkans, Iceland and Turkey, being more flexible and more associative; and the Community has to find the way of keeping the process open; the promise towards aspirants is unlikely to be broken. But the when and how are not secondary questions, and this is where more ingenuity is necessary.

<sup>40</sup> PRESTON, Christopher: *Enlargement and Integration in the European Union*. London: Routledge, 1997.



THE DANUBE CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE  
ASSOCIATION'S ACTIVITY FOR RECOVERING  
FROM THE ECONOMIC CRISIS AND INCREASING  
THE COMPETITIVENESS OF ENTERPRISES IN  
THE DANUBE REGION

*1. Introduction: The role of chambers in Central-Europe*

The Danube is the second longest river in Europe after the river Volga, so it has a decisive role in the economy and history of the people living in this area. Within the European Union, the Danube Region gives home for more than 115 million citizens, and at the same time is one of the most important economic areas of the EU. This area has always had a leading role in the creation and transformation of new political ideas. Because of changes in the acceptance of the political decisions nowadays a greater involvement of non-political organisations into opinion-forming and decision-preparing processes is needed in order to preserve, or possibly, increase the credit of a democratic state system. In our opinion democracy is not just a mere implementation of formal organisational structures, but also assumes that citizens take part in decision making actively (participation). Therefore our view is that the opportunity to have a legal representation of interest – and the appearance of neocorporatist efforts<sup>1</sup> in political life – is not contrary to the notion of democracy. We think that this opinion is justified by the federal structure of the European Union, which suggests that the possibility of citizen participation and local decision-making should be created. With the Maastricht Treaty the principle of subsidiarity has been elevated into community law and gathered ground in the economic and social sectors, and liberal-democratic societies also show signs of cooperation with self-organisations, chambers and municipalities. This system of criteria also shows signs of Community efforts to find partners in all-European umbrella organisations representing EU employers and employees (that is, the majority of societies) with the appropriate emphasis.

↔ See on the idea of neo-corporate state: ZACHAR Péter Krisztián: A „klasszikus neokorporatizmus” elméleti háttere. In: *A gazdasági és társadalmi érdekérvényesítés stratégiai és szervezeti modelljei a 20. században*. Ed.: DOBÁK Miklós. L'Harmattan, Budapest, 2011. 221-239.

The notion of self-government (mostly created by Lorenz von Stein's philosophy) did not consider the regulation of the autonomous operation of a certain sector as the extension of state power, but the limitation of state power and „privatizing” certain sectors as a result of creating the intermediate level of power. Namely, „self-governance” can only be created as a certain kind of antithesis: the existence of self-governing groups falls in place as an opposite to all-powerful government or state administration. Political liberties, self-determination and the theory of one's own responsibility are only significant in view of this theory.

In this sense, the technical literature contrasts three „sectors” or levels: a macro level or macro sphere, a micro level or micro sphere, and an intermediate level or mezzo sphere. Macro sphere incorporates politics as the state level with legislative and executive power. Micro sphere, however, is the level of individual citizens, or employees, small enterprises etc. in a broader sense. Mezzo sphere is the „intermediate level” between macro sphere and micro sphere, consisting of institutions and representative bodies, embracing the whole society or some of its layers or groups. We consider the first two spheres the primary levels, while the institutions, organizations and activities of the mezzo sphere (as the intermediate sphere) are secondary. Macro sphere and micro sphere both exist and operate according to their own definitions and structures. „The organizations and institutions of secondary mezzo sphere, however, are created and operated in an environment defined by the macro sphere or the micro sphere, and fulfil tasks defined by them.”<sup>2</sup>

In the course of history several sweeping plans were drawn up for a tighter cooperation of mezzo-sphere organizations. The Danube basin gave a solid ground for these ideas. There were even plans of a long-lasting state-cooperation between the countries of this area, even for their confederation. Beside this, the first traditional international organization in Europe was formed in connection with the river Danube: the European Danube Commission, which was founded 30th March 1856.<sup>3</sup> Recently the demand for tighter coordination between the area's economic, social and ecologic processes was drawn up likewise. During the European Council's June 2009 session, 8 EU member states and 6 candidate states and third party states respectively requested the European Commission to elaborate the European Danube Strategy, similarly

<sup>2</sup> FARKAS György: *Kamarák és vállalati érdekképviselések az integrációs felkészülésben*. Budapest, 2000. 13.

<sup>3</sup> On the history of the commission: KREHBIEL, Edward: The European Commission of the Danube: An Experiment in International Administration. *Political Science Quarterly*. Vol. 33, No. 1, Mar., 1918. 38-55.

to the Baltic Sea Strategy.<sup>4</sup> The aim was to determine the Danube region as a common research and development area during the new EU budget period starting from 2014. On this basis, during the 2011 Hungarian EU presidency they managed to elaborate the European Union's Strategy for the Danube Region (EUSDR).<sup>5</sup> The region itself was defined broadly by the EU: 14 states were involved. Out of them there are currently 9 EU member states, 3 are member states candidates, 2 are defined as third party states.<sup>6</sup> In the realization of the strategy, the chambers of commerce of the area have taken a serious part.

European Union's Strategy for the Danube Region became the macro regional development and action plan for the states and regions inherent to the Danube's drainage basin. The drafted aims are based on 4 pillars: the connection of the Danube region with other regions, protection of the environment, welfare and economic development, the strengthening and interconnection of the region's institutions.<sup>7</sup> Out of these general aimed pillars, the chambers of commerce, who have a role in the region's economic development, can contribute to all of them with their institutional abilities. The Danube is a sort of symbol in this strategy: it's not only a strategy for the development of the river itself, but the connection of the joint interests of the states along the river's way. The chambers of commerce can have a lead role in this, as the unification of economic interests will have an important part.

The chambers of commerce have a long history in the region. The joint forces of different professions and social groups, their concordation and aggregation, and their participation in the guidance of the society and the economy is a fundamental part of the West European modern day social market economy.<sup>8</sup> Accordingly, the chambers of commerce nowadays are situated in the – above mentioned – mezzo sphere of the societies, between

<sup>4</sup> See in detail: The EU Strategy for the Danube Region - A united response to common challenges. Ed. by European Commission, Directorate-General for Regional Policy. Panorama Inforegio Online: [http://ec.europa.eu/regional\\_policy/sources/docgener/panorama/pdf/mag37/mag37\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/panorama/pdf/mag37/mag37_en.pdf) (Downloaded: 15. Sept. 2013.)

<sup>5</sup> About the creation of the strategy in details: SZATMÁRY Kristóf: A Duna Stratégia. *Polgári Szemle* Vol. VI. Nr. 6. December 2010. (Hereinafter referred as: SZATMÁRY, 2010.)

<sup>6</sup> Germany – the lands of Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria – Austria, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Romania, Bulgaria, Moldavia, Ukraine.

<sup>7</sup> See also: *Danube Region Strategy*. Ed. by the Hungarian Presidency. Online: [http://dunaregiostrategia.kormany.hu/download/5/a9/10000/Duna\\_Regio\\_Strategia\\_sajtoanyag\\_0.pdf](http://dunaregiostrategia.kormany.hu/download/5/a9/10000/Duna_Regio_Strategia_sajtoanyag_0.pdf) (Downloaded: 25. Sept. 2013.)

<sup>8</sup> See in detail: STRAUSZ Péter – ZACHAR Péter Krisztián: *Gazdasági és szakmai kamarák Magyarországon és az Európai Unióban*. L'Harmattan, Budapest, 2008.

the micro sphere of the citizens and the macro sphere of the political decision-making. Their main duty is the bilateral mediation; thereby the interaction (cooperation or confrontation) with the government is constant.

In the evolution history of these organizations, during the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the principles of self government and subsidiarity already appear which is today's preferred idea in the European Union.<sup>9</sup> The chambers of commerce regarded themselves as such organizations set up by the law (and today we can still partly asses this about them), which manage their own affairs independently and in an autonomous way, represent the interests of their members, and takes over certain tasks from the state administration concerning their own professional field.

Two factors had contributed significantly over the region's chamber development: the centralized French state administration (the new civil service) and the philosophy of Lorenz von Stein, the local self-government principle that evolved from him (in his works *Lehrbuch der Volkswirtschaft*, 1858 and *Lehrbuch der Nationalökonomie*, 1887) and had a deep impact on the development of chamber organisations.<sup>10</sup> The chambers of commerce that evolved on the European continent were created by the central authority; their powers, tasks, and responsibilities were granted by the monarch's decree, later by the law. Generally they were organized with a compulsory membership system. Their main tasks were to assist with recommendations and petitions the preparation of laws concerned with the represented groups, as well as the representation of the given economic-professional groups' interests towards the government and the society.<sup>11</sup>

The chambers organized according to the continental model became such legal interest groups, which incorporated the entire economic-professional community. They maintained a systematic connection with the government, so by this way they influenced the law creation process and the development

<sup>9</sup> See: KLUTH, Winfried – RIEGER, Frank: *Grundbegriffe des Rechts der Industrie- und Handelskammern. Eine Darstellung nach Stichworten*. Institut für Kammerrecht, Halle an der Saale, 2004. and HENDLER Reinhard: *Geschichte und Idee der funktionalen Selbstverwaltung*. In: *Handbuch des Kammerrechts*. Hrsg.: KLUTH, Winfried. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden. 2005.

<sup>10</sup> Compare with: FRITZ Péter: *A magyar kereskedelmi és iparkamarák keletkezésének, fejlődésének és működésének története 1850-1896*. BKIK, Budapest, 1896. and STRAUZ Péter – ZACHAR Péter Krisztián: *Die Autonomie- und Rechtsgeschichte des ungarischen Kammerwesens – Ein Abriss*. In: *Jahrbuch des Kammer- und Berufsrechts*. Hrsg.: KLUTH, Winfried. Peter Junkermannverlag, Halle an der Saale, 2009.

<sup>11</sup> KLUTH, Winfried: *Entwicklungsgeschichte und aktuelle Rechtsgrundlagen der Kammern im Überblick*. In: *Handbuch des Kammerrechts*. Hrsg.: KLUTH, Winfried. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden. 2005. (Hereinafter referred as: KLUTH, 2005.) 41–108.



of the society as well. Beyond this, they regularly received and committed themselves to tasks regarding the professional civil service, relieving the central government. The self-governance and self-maintenance of smaller groups can contribute to the primary tasks of state administrations including efficient economic management and minimizing the number of state roles and functions. This may facilitate the decrease of the state administration agenda and the increase of efficiency. Regional or local self-government means that the special needs of each group can be taken into greater consideration, and – following the principle of subsidiarity – the balance of internal interests may have a positive effect on each social group.<sup>12</sup> In this regard – due to their extensive structure and century-long experience – the chambers are predestined to take an intermediary role between the state and community institutional systems and the civil sector.

We can classify the European chambers as commercial and industrial chambers, craftsmanship and agricultural chambers, as well as the employee (labor) chambers in certain European areas. These organizations deal with the internal interest-equalization and interest representation work, and they also deal with the easement of production and distribution difficulties, with the promotion of internal and external trade relations, with issues of training and professional consultancy, and they have taken over certain state administrative functions as well.<sup>13</sup>

It is necessary to differentiate between the public tasks and the service activity of the chambers. Pursuing public tasks is an activity which aims at satisfying the overall social needs of citizens, and which – partly or completely – should be carried out by the state and local government organisations. The public task becomes the assignment of the chamber when the law makes it the task of this organisation (with the funds necessary for performing the task), or the state authorities hand it over to the chambers by law or through public law agreement. As opposed to this, the service activities of the chambers, which aims at satisfying the special needs of the chamber members, are activities performed – for a fee – within the available legal framework.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>12</sup> See: KISZELLY Zoltán: Interessenorganisationen, Vereinswesen, Gewerkschaften und Politik in Ungarn – eine politikwissenschaftliche Annäherung. in: Aktuelle Entwicklungen des Kammerwesens und der Interessenvertretung in Ungarn und Europa. Ed.: DOBÁK – GERGELY – KLUTH. L'Harmattan, Budapest – Halle an der Saale, 2009. 139-149

<sup>13</sup> KLUTH, 2005.

<sup>14</sup> KLUTH, Winfried: Verfassungs- und europarechtliche Grundlagen des Kammerrechts. In: *Handbuch des Kammerrechts*. Hrsg.: KLUTH, Winfried. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden. 2005. 89-199.



# The chambers of commerce in the institutional system of economic planning<sup>15</sup>

The direction of the activity outside the chamber	Duration of the activity	The main place of the activity in the chamber
Macro sphere, institutions	1) Mediation for power, political organizations, to the government, with special regard for the economic guidance, economic policy, economic planning	Elected officials and chamber directors
	2) Representation of interest, assertion of interest The recognition of the interests of the (member) enterprises, and their constant visualization	Officers and leading employees
Micro sphere, enterprises	1) Civil service tasks Activities according to the law and regulations	Chamber experts and leading employees
	2) Services Maintain, attendance, activities helping the constant functioning, especially: „business development” within this for example the enterprises-development (unique, it deals with certain enterprises), economic development (macro and mezzo levels, as well as collective), and other special development activities (for example: innovation, trade, area-planning etc), education, professional training, development of international relations	Chamber bureaucracy

The oldest, “so-called traditional activities”<sup>16</sup> of the chambers of commerce include the management of broad international cooperation. The economic

<sup>15</sup> TEMESI Sándor: *A Budapesti Kereskedelmi és Iparkamara 160 éve 1850–2010*. BKIK, Budapest, 2010. 281.

<sup>16</sup> DUNAI Péter: A Magyar Kereskedelmi és Iparkamara nemzetközi kapcsolatai, európai jelenléte. In: *A kamarai tevékenység Magyarországon és az Európai Unióban*. General editor: GERGELY Jenő. Ed.: STRAUSZ Péter – ZACHAR Péter Krisztián. Budapest, 2007. 17.

chambers has a determining role in national economic development programs; establishment of economic diplomacy; formulation of economic foreign strategy; furthermore they have an essential role in internal market protection and economic regulation. In the relationship with foreign chambers of commerce, an important professional link is guaranteed by company profiles, business meetings, trade and tariffs, industrial intellectual property protection and the compliance with ethical codes.<sup>17</sup> This is one of the oldest tasks of chambers, because the basic claim of enterprises of any country and any age is to be supported in reaching foreign markets. External organizations are often used to fulfill this aim and the chamber is one of these instruments. Besides of that law mostly defines the improving of external economic relations as a task of chambers. This work can be observed in two different levels: in regional and national level.

The regional chambers have the direct connection to its members so they give information to the members and enterprises, organize different events, businessman meetings and they support them in participating in foreign exhibitions and fairs etc. Besides the regional chambers have an own extensive foreign connection net as well by signing cooperation treaties with the regional chambers of other countries. The cooperation within the framework of the Danube Strategy, the creation of the DCCA is one of the best examples.

## *2. The formation of the DCCA and its organization*

During the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the region's chambers of commerce were in a variable intensity relationship with one to another. There was a time after First World War when all connections had broken. During the cold war, the soviet dictatorship abolished most of the chambers of commerce.

After these events, the formation of the Danube Chambers of Commerce Association – DCCA – was an important chapter in the European institutional macro-regional cooperation.

The creation of the alliance was being planned for several years, but for the implementation, the necessary kick was provided by the adoption of the Danube Strategy.<sup>18</sup> The founding of the organization occurred in June 2010 at Budapest, where the chambers of Germany, Austria, Slovakia, Hungary, Croatia, Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria decided to cooperate with each other. The host of the event was Kristóf Szatmáry, president of the Chamber of Commerce

<sup>17</sup> DUNAI, 2007. 18-19.

<sup>18</sup> KISS Ervin: A Duna-stratégia a Duna Menti Kamarák Szövetsége szemszögéből. *Európai Tükör*. 2011. Nr. 1. 44-53. (Hereinafter referred as: KISS, 2011.)

of Budapest, who was also elected to be the first president of the organization. The vice-presidents of the organization, according to the founding assembly, are delegated by the Vienna and Belgrade chambers of commerce (namely Brigitte Jank and Dr. Milan Janković). The official language of the initiative became English, although Otto Salze from the chamber of Ulm proposed to accept German as second official language. This proposal wasn't supported by the founding members.<sup>19</sup>

The purpose of the DCCA is to coordinate the functioning of the chambers in the Danube region with supranational instruments, especially in favour for the implementation of the Danube Strategy.<sup>20</sup> The organization aligns to the traditional mesosphere role of the chambers: it intends to act as an intermediary between the civilian initiatives and the decision making organs of the Danube Strategy. This is why at the first assembly after the Budapest founding they have given high priority for the collection and summarization of the proposals and economic stimulus plans related to the Danube Strategy.<sup>21</sup> The first assembly was held in Pécs, the European capital of culture, where they have adopted the final constitution. This was signed by the representatives of the chambers of:

- Budapest (BKIK),
  - Győr (GYMSKIK),
  - Pécs (PBKIK),
  - Vienna (Wirtschaftskammer Wien),
  - Linz (Wirtschaftskammer Oberösterreich),
  - St. Pölten (Wirtschaftskammer Niederösterreich),
  - Ulm (Industrie- und Handelskammer Ulm),
  - Passau (Industrie- und Handelskammer Niederbayern),
  - Belgrade (Privredna Komora Beograda),
  - Novi Sad (Regionalna privredna komora Novi Sad),
  - Osijek (Hrvatska gospodarska komora, Županijska komora Osijek),
  - Bucharest (Camera de Comert si Industrie a Municipiului Bucuresti)
- and

<sup>19</sup> *Memorandum of the Inaugural meeting of the Danube Chambers of Commerce Association.* [http://www.danubechambers.eu/container/container\\_attachments/download/6](http://www.danubechambers.eu/container/container_attachments/download/6) (Downloaded: 25. Sept. 2013.)

<sup>20</sup> Megalakult a Duna Menti Kereskedelmi Kamarák Szövetsége. BKIK Online (1. July 2010.): <http://www.bkik.hu/hir/593-Megalakult-a-Duna-Menti-Kereskedelmi-Kamarak-Szovetsege>

<sup>21</sup> Compare with: Minutes of Meeting. DCCA General Assembly. 10. September 2010. [http://www.danubechambers.eu/container/container\\_attachments/download/7](http://www.danubechambers.eu/container/container_attachments/download/7)

- Timisoara (Camera de Comert, Industrie si Agricultura Timis).<sup>22</sup> In the following period the chamber of
- Ruse (Русенска Търговско-Индустриална Камара),
- Szeged (CSMKIK),
- Székesfehérvár (FMKIK),
- Varasd (Hrvatska gospodarska komora, Županijska komora Varaždin),
- Bratislava (Bratislavská regionálna komora SOPK),
- Arad (Camera de Comert, Industrie si Agricultura a judetului Arad) and
- Constanta (Camera de Comert, Industrie, Navigatie si Agricultura Constanta) also joined the organization.<sup>23</sup>

According to the resolution of the assembly, the yearly due of the member chambers was set in 800 Euros. The member chambers who pay the due can delegate 2-2 members into the assembly. The assembly elects the presidency of the organization, which controls the tasks of the organization between the assemblies.<sup>24</sup> During the year 2013, two additional Bulgarian chambers signed the constitution and joined as members of the DCCA:

- Vratsa /Търговско-Промислена Палата – Враца/ and
- Vidin /Видинската търговско-промишлена палата/.<sup>25</sup>



<sup>22</sup> Compare with: SZATMÁRY, 2010.

<sup>23</sup> *The Danube Chambers of Commerce Association. DCCA Brochure 2012.* Online: <http://www.danubechambers.eu/66-DCCA-Brochure>

<sup>24</sup> Minutes of Meeting. DCCA General Assembly. 10. September 2010. [http://www.danubechambers.eu/container/container\\_attachments/download/7](http://www.danubechambers.eu/container/container_attachments/download/7)

<sup>25</sup> New membership application of DCCA: Vidin CCI. <http://www.danubechambers.eu/1-News/87-New-membership-application-of-DCCA-Vidin-CCI>

### 3. *The DCCA's Strategy*

The organization has already started the process of its strategy and its short-term action program in 2010. The strategy is focused mainly on 4 principles and 9 action areas. Basically all of these areas are connected to the aims and priorities of the Danube Strategy.<sup>26</sup>

The first principle includes the participation in the joint development of the goals of the Danube Strategy. Throughout this cooperation access to available EU funding for participating chambers will be possible; enabling cooperation between DCCA-members. The DCCA is working that new sources will be incorporated into the Danube Strategy's program after 2014, which can be used by the chamber of commerce members in projects initiated by them. In addition, the priority of the Association is to initiate necessary research to explore potential areas of cooperation between its member enterprises, and also to find out obstacles hindering the exploitation of those business opportunities.<sup>27</sup>

The second principle of the DCCA Strategy is about the flow of information, about integration and cohesion. To initiate projects and trade between the members of the chambers it is important to ensure the proper flow of information as a central element. „The tool of this can be a modern, internet-based ‘business Wikipedia’, which can be edited by the membership, and just as where the DCCA can publish its own traditional professional publications.”<sup>28</sup> Creating that kind of B2B-plattform<sup>29</sup>, which is also included here, can help for setting up an intensive network of contacts between the participating chamber members. This includes the organization of exhibitions and trade fairs in the macro-region, and furthermore the opportunities given by the social networking. Different clusters and research networks are also divided into this principle.<sup>30</sup>

Another action area of the second principle is the propagation of knowledge transfer, education and business culture. The cultural differences are very strong in the region, in this case the cooperation crescendo helps for the business cultures development and it is impressing into the integration direction. In the field of education the student exchange programs and the

<sup>26</sup> Compare with: Danube Chambers of Commerce Association Strategy. DCCA Online: <http://www.danubechambers.eu/5-Strategy>

<sup>27</sup> KISS, 2011. 50.

<sup>28</sup> KISS, 2011. 50.

<sup>29</sup> „Business to business” network helping business contacts.

<sup>30</sup> Danube Chambers of Commerce Association Strategy. DCCA Online: <http://www.danubechambers.eu/5-Strategy>

successful training methods (best practices) may be referred as a serious development.<sup>31</sup> On the other hand the situation of the education of foreign languages cannot be ignored either: one of the biggest issues of the Danube cooperation is the mutual high-level knowledge of the region's languages.<sup>32</sup>

The fourth action area of the second principle is the participation in different civil society's negotiation forums. With the help of the chamber members, civil initiations can appear in the economic interests. In accordance with the role of the mesosphere of the members of chambers, the DCCA would like to work like a moderator between the initiations of the civil society and the Danube Strategies decision-making bodies.<sup>33</sup>

The third principle is a strategy for environment, commerce and tourism. In this case the advantaged mission for the DCCA is participating in a new type of collaboration of the Danube Strategy, namely in the „Danube macro-regional program”. In connection with this point the DCCA is pushing for better exploitation of the single market. The DCCA has an important role in investment and trade enhancement and it helps for the formation of the common venture, and the evolving of common standards.<sup>34</sup>

The fourth principle of the DCCA Strategy is the implementation and promotion of the efficient representation of interests, common aims and projects. If DCCA wants to effectively launch the above mentioned strategic paths, “it has to become a major advocacy association, working with the proper economic weight in order to successfully lobby for the allocation of development resources in Brussels, during the formulation of EU rules and regulations, and at the designation of infrastructure improvements.”<sup>35</sup> The alliance has started yet this advocacy work in 2010 before they adopted the eventual form of the Danube Strategy.

<sup>31</sup> KISS, 2011. 50-51.

<sup>32</sup> FEKETE Balázs: *A kamarák nemzetközi szerepvállalása. A Duna Menti Kereskedelmi Kamarák Szövetsége*. Thesis, Kodolányi János University of Applied Sciences, 2011. (Hereinafter referred as: FEKETE, 2011.)

<sup>33</sup> Danube Chambers of Commerce Association Strategy. DCCA Online: <http://www.danubechambers.eu/5-Strategy>

<sup>34</sup> KISS, 2011. 50-51.

<sup>35</sup> Danube Chambers of Commerce Association Strategy. DCCA Online: <http://www.danubechambers.eu/5-Strategy>

#### *4. The DCCA' activity for recovering from the economic crisis and increasing the competitiveness of enterprises in the Danube Region*

During the first general assembly a proposal was made in order to facilitate the economic recovery of the macro-region: the first mission for the members of DCCA is to assert the bilateral government relations. Moreover, a demand was formalized about the necessity to open an office in Brussels for the above mentioned successful lobby-activities formulated in the Strategy. Until the beginning of this proposal, every chamber tried to increase their influence throughout their own representation in Brussels.<sup>36</sup> The common office was opened successful in 2013 in Brussels: the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Budapest, the Hungarian Industrial Association, and the Public Benefit Non-profit Ltd. have created together the DCCA's common advocacy in Brussels.<sup>37</sup>

From the first year the most important initiation of the Association has been to create an information network which is related of the business developments. This would help for the small-and medium-sized businesses to see through the Member States' tax systems, just as it would help for the legal and economic knowledge transfer network would assist the company cross-border businesses. Behind this proposal, the hurdle of the Danube business cooperation is the lack of the information.

The other pursuit of the DCCA is to transfer the dual training system which has been developed successfully in German and Austrian territories for the rest of the region's countries. If the formation of apprentices would be in line with labor market needs, it could help to exit from the economic crisis.<sup>38</sup> For doing this during the first year of the operation of the chamber alliance, several conferences were held in Hungary (Budapest, Győr, Szeged).<sup>39</sup> The SEEDual program, which was presented under the South-East European Transnational Cooperation Program, was a standout momentous during the Association's progress. During this program 9 chambers submitted a common application: Vienna, Budapest, Győr, Pécs, Bucharest, Timisoara, Ljubljana,

<sup>36</sup> Minutes of Meeting. DCCA General Assembly. 10th September 2010. [http://www.danubechambers.eu/container/container\\_attachments/download/7](http://www.danubechambers.eu/container/container_attachments/download/7)

<sup>37</sup> Representative office in Brussels. DCCA Online: <http://www.danubechambers.eu/1-News/89-Representative-office-in-Brussels>

<sup>38</sup> Helyzetbe hoznák a Duna menti vállalkozásokat. Magyar Hírlap Online, 2011. március 1. [http://www2.magyarhirnap.hu/gazdasag/helyzetbe\\_hoznak\\_a\\_duna\\_menti\\_vallalkozasokat.html](http://www2.magyarhirnap.hu/gazdasag/helyzetbe_hoznak_a_duna_menti_vallalkozasokat.html)

<sup>39</sup> *Umsetzung der EU Donaustrategie. Antrag der Abg. Friedlinde Gurr-Hirsch u.a. CDU und Stellungnahme des Staatsministerium.* Drucksache 15/749. 19<sup>th</sup> October 2011. [http://www9.landtag-bw.de/WP15/Drucksachen/0000/15\\_0749\\_d.pdf](http://www9.landtag-bw.de/WP15/Drucksachen/0000/15_0749_d.pdf)



Osijek and Belgrade. The aim of this project to investigate the Austrian and German structure of the dual training, to expand of its assets and based on these issues creating proposals to the members of DCCA. All of these proposals may lead to a law, which helps for the successful reception and implementation of the dual training model into the economically weaker regions. The first step of this progress is that they are following the German and Austrian model of this dual training system in 12 selected occupational and professional lines in Hungary. If it is successful, then the aim is to expand this model for 200 occupations and professions in the rest of the countries!<sup>40</sup>

While in 2011 the Ulm chamber would have hosted the DCCA annual meeting, because Hungary took over the presidency of the EU Council and because the Hungarian presidency program was based on the Danube Strategy, the general meeting was held in Budapest again in July 2011. The discussion has made it clear that the chambers should be in contact with the national coordinators of the Danube Strategy and with this they should try to increase their lobby-activities for attaining their common aims. The key element of the Danube Strategy is the number 8 priority for the chambers, which means to support the competitiveness of enterprises.<sup>41</sup> The Baden – Wurttemberg area of Germany and Croatia are responsible for doing the reporting and coordinating functions of this element. For this reason, the furtherance of

<sup>40</sup> Compare with: DCCA. SeeDual Brochure. [www.dcca.eu/container/container\\_attachments/download/27/](http://www.dcca.eu/container/container_attachments/download/27/)

<sup>41</sup> The signatory states have formulated 11 joint priorities. To achieve all of them, two countries were nominated for each priority as liable for the implementation of them:

P1: Mobility, development of inter-modality, inland waterways (responsible: Austria and Romania), railways, motorways, air transport (Slovenia, Serbia, Ukraine is interested)

P2: the support of sustainable energy use (Hungary, Czech Republic)

P3: to promote culture and tourism, people to people contact (Bulgaria, Romania).

P4: to restore and maintain the quality of waters (Hungary, Slovakia).

P5: to manage ecological risks (Hungary, Romania).

P6: to preserve the biodiversity, landscapes, the quality of air and soils (Germany - Bavaria, Croatia).

P7: to create a knowledge-based society with the help of research, education, and information technology (Slovakia, Serbia).

P8: to support the competitiveness of the enterprises (Germany – Baden-Wurttemberg, Croatia).

P9: to invest in human resources and skills (Austria, Moldova).

P10: to broaden the institutions and strengthen the collaboration between them (Austria - Vienna, Slovenia).

P11: joint collaboration to tackle challenges posed by security issues and organized crime (Germany, Bulgaria).

Compare with: Danube Region Strategy. Hungarian Presidency. Online: [http://dunaregiostrategia.kormany.hu/download/5/a9/10000/Duna\\_Regio\\_Strategia\\_sajtoanyag\\_0.pdf](http://dunaregiostrategia.kormany.hu/download/5/a9/10000/Duna_Regio_Strategia_sajtoanyag_0.pdf)



the Croatia's join to the EU has begun the most important priority for the DCCA.<sup>42</sup>

Likewise the member states wanted to strengthen the overall integration of the Western Balkans, especially the furtherance of Serbia and Montenegro's accession to the EU. As a result of this thoughts the DCCA started its own project of the Western Balkans. Its purpose is the redevelopment and stabilization of the non-EU member states through the joining of forces of the region – renovation of „the process of Szeged” („Szeged + process”): contributing for the consolidation of the stability, for strengthening the confidence and security, for creating democratic societies, strengthening the interregional connections, for transferring Hungary's integration of experiences.<sup>43</sup>

Another important strategic task is that the DCCA should launch researches for expanding the opportunities for the cooperation of member enterprises. These research projects will also help to find out obstacles hindering the exploitation of business opportunities in the Danube area. During the researches the local higher educational institutions of the concerned areas can be involved, just as the professional collaborations between universities of the Danube region.<sup>44</sup>

The DCCA – under the direction of the Vienna chamber – helped to start the events of the Danube Region Business Forum in 2011. During the businessmen-meeting the aim is to bring together companies, especially small and medium enterprises via B2B meetings as well as the private sector with academia and the public sector of the Region to stimulate growth, innovation and competitiveness in the Danube Region. During the event the enterprises and political-scientific organizations arriving from the countries along the Danube River had a special opportunity for the formation of cooperation.<sup>45</sup> So far the topics were the environment-protection technologies, the development of information and communication technologies, and the implementation of the Danube Strategy aims. Furthermore, in 2012 the first financial meeting was also held in Vienna (1st Danube Financing Dialogue), where the issues

<sup>42</sup> Minutes of Meeting. DCCA II. General Assembly. 9th June 2011. DCCA Online: [http://www.danubechambers.eu/container/container\\_attachments/download/18](http://www.danubechambers.eu/container/container_attachments/download/18)

<sup>43</sup> „Szegedi Folyamat – Európából Európába” projekt a kelet- és a délkelet-európai térségek demokratikus átmeneténélősegítésére. Online: Szeged Biztonságpolitikai Központ. <http://www.scsp.hu/test/open.php?lang=hu&dir=p-szf&doc=01>

<sup>44</sup> See also: FEKETE, 2011.

<sup>45</sup> Minutes of Meeting. DCCA III. General Assembly. 11th July 2012. DCCA Online: [http://www.danubechambers.eu/container/container\\_attachments/download/107](http://www.danubechambers.eu/container/container_attachments/download/107)

and the financial relations built for the micro, small and medium enterprises were discussed.<sup>46</sup>

According to the constitution the annual assemblies must be held in different chambers following the Danube's stream direction. However in the last few years, this rule wasn't applied. The first assembly was held in Pécs (the cultural capital of the EU), the second in Budapest (EU presidency), and in 2012 the assembly was located in Bucharest. The investment forum between the DCCA and China was held here as well, which gave a crucial possibility for network and relationship-building for the organization. This was preceded by the first businessmen meeting, which was held in Vienna with the Latin American region. ("Latin-America meet Central and Eastern Europe").<sup>47</sup> This was followed by the American – Central European Business Forum, and then in 2013 – in accordance with the Hungarian foreign policy's eastern opening plan – a meeting was held in Budapest, which incorporated the entire ASEAN-area member states.<sup>48</sup>

The fourth assembly was held in Vienna. Between the invited lecturers there were national coordinators of the Danube Strategy P8 priority (the support of competitiveness of the enterprises).<sup>49</sup> Additionally, the Danube's regulation was a central issue as well. Because of the great European 2013 floods, already 19 members of the DCCA have turned towards the European Commission and requested the elaboration of a joint flood-protection concept for the Danube Region and set aside resources for it. The natural disasters cause a great deal of serious negative effects on the region's population and economy. In case new resources will be involved in it, according to the DCCA, the strengthening and the development of the infrastructure along the river will not only protect the inhabitants and the economy, but will make the region more attractive from the point of view of business.<sup>50</sup>

<sup>46</sup> 1st Danube Financing Dialogue – a successful premiere in Vienna. DCCA Online: <http://www.danubechambers.eu/1-News/56-1st-Danube-Financing-Dialogue-a-successful-premiere-in-Vienna>

<sup>47</sup> Minutes of Meeting. DCCA III. General Assembly. 11<sup>th</sup> July 2012.

<sup>48</sup> ASEAN Business Forum in September 2013. DCCA Online: <http://www.danubechambers.eu/1-News/88-ASEAN-Business-Forum-in-September-2013>

<sup>49</sup> 4<sup>th</sup> DCCA General Assembly in Vienna. DCCA Online: <http://www.danubechambers.eu/1-News/95-4th-DCCA-General-Assembly-in-Vienna>

<sup>50</sup> A Duna menti Kereskedelmi Kamarák összehangolt árvízvédelmi stratégia szükségességére hívják fel a figyelmet. FMKIK, 19<sup>th</sup> June 2013. <http://www.fmkik.hu/hu/een/cikkek/a-duna-menti-kereskedelmi-kamarak-osszehangolt-arvizvedelmi-strategia-szuksegessere-hivjak-fel-a-figyelmet-62892>

## *5. Summary*

The DCCA is one of the most important international co-operations in the Danube region. As an international association it can promote the aims of the EU and contribute to development of the single market and of the cross-bordering social and economic co-operations. Extending these programs to the non-EU member countries will contribute to stabilization and development of the Eastern and South-Eastern European regions. In connection with the Danube Strategy's aims the organization can assist with its activity for recovering from the economic crisis as well. The new type of dual training programs has an important function for its development and implementation, furthermore for increasing the competitiveness of enterprises.

As a result it can be said, in the midst of today's economic challenges one of the most important key issues are through networking, which has prominent opportunities among the chambers. This is particularly true for the joint forces collaboration of the cross-bordering and the border areas. Therefore, it is essential for each territorial chamber to recognize their common interests and missions and with it help for expanding the opportunities of the small-and medium-sized enterprises in the Danube-area.

It is important to realize the chambers have a community building function in the micro-region and for the macro-regions the mediator function between different actors (governments, businesses, associations) is essential. It is unambiguous if chambers belong to the civil sector or not, because they have manifold links with the state creating them and its administration structure. However, it is not only their right but their duty to operate autonomously and independently from the power at all times, therefore their perspectives and views often coincide with those of social and civil organizations. All this – besides their extensive structure and century-long experience – almost predestines them to take an intermediary role between the state and community institutional systems and the civil sector (which is closer to citizens). This may open new alternative perspectives for the political power and the various representatives of society.

More and more people in Europe notice that a greater involvement of non-political organizations into opinion-forming and decision-preparing processes is needed in order to preserve, or possibly, increase the credit of a democratic state system and to find ways out of the recent crisis. To solve today's difficulties the assistance of civil organizations and the partial enforcement of their views is needed, because these measures could bring about a greater social acceptance of sometimes painful decisions. It seems that the European Union has also shifted towards this direction as various supra-national umbrella organizations

of interest groups now give voice to their opinions in a wider range of forums. Furthermore, methods allowing the articulation and consideration of the opinions of communities affected by EU decisions have developed (and are still developing). In this regard the work of the DCCA, which has started yet, seems important and successful in the future.



## THE LEGAL NATURE OF COMMUNICATIONS IN THE EU LAW

When we want to deal with any kind of legal case in connection with EU law, it is inevitable to be aware of the effect of several types soft law materials in the EU. These standards can be learnt from several documentations of legal nature including the “acquis” which contains information of such kind. However, their legal effects are not unambiguously clear. The objective of this study is to clarify these ambiguities in order to solve a legal issue of the EU law in our national environment as professionally as possible. Being a judge whose field mainly covers regulated markets including telecommunication, energy law, etc, I have come up with instances from these legal fields.

My topic is about such sources of law within the EU which have no binding force. It might appear to be a little bit strange for Hungarian lawyers since we have learnt about law that legal rules always have binding force. In many areas of law, a lot of important issues are decided on as a recommendation which has no binding force according to the EU Law. For instance, in the area of electronic communications we can talk about the fate of sums well over 100 billions of Forints which depends on a Recommendation. The Electronic Communications Act specifies what to do in accordance with the applicable guidelines and recommendations issued in the topic as well as the governance of the Commission which must be taken into utmost account by National Regulatory Authority (NRA). It is difficult to work out from the text whether the expression “utmost account” is quasi-obligatory or it means something else. According to the act, the task of the National Regulatory Authority is to define the electronic communications markets and they have to profoundly carry out this analysis. At the same time, the recommendation clarifies exactly what kinds of electronic communications markets exist according to the Commission. There is a guideline about the nature of analysis of this issue. However, the Authority can deviate from the identification of the markets in the recommendation only with the permission issued of the Commission and the fact whether any of the service providers has got Significant Market Power (SMP) depends on the broader or narrower definition of the markets in general. If any of the service providers receives an SMP status, it means that their prices can be regulated by the authority. Thus,

milliards of Forints can be rearranged into other service providers or consumers. It is worth noting that the court judgements of the national judges cannot be intervened by the Commission due to the lack of the proper legal means therefore it is highly important for the judge that the Institutions of the EU should not communicate that the recommendation is not binding when they in practice apply it as such and they expect it from the independent national courts, too. The basic principles of the independence of courts are that jurisdiction can only be affected by binding legal norms and nothing else. This way of Commissions' practice raises several issues in connection with constitutionality, the principle of separation of powers and the Rule of Law. The example I have mentioned above is not a unique issue, I could list several other cases.

First of all it is worth examining the legal acts within the EU from the aspect of its binding nature in order to define the nature of the non-obligatory legal power.

According to the article 288 of the Treaty there are two distinct legal source types of all legal acts in the EU. One of them carries binding force and the other doesn't.

There are three kinds of legal acts within the binding type. Regulations which are to be applied generally and directly, directives which are not applied directly, therefore they only exceptionally have direct effects and it is up to the member states which will define the choice of form and method of implementation. Finally there are the decisions – which by contrast to the Hungarian term – don't mean specific decisions in individual cases, but they are normative. It is not for specific application or specific addressees. We're not dealing with this type now.

Recommendations and opinions have no binding force. Recommendations define certain conduct and actions of the addressee, whereas opinions describe the standpoint in a given issue, usually on request.

The fact of non-binding legal acts is unknown in Hungarian law. Therefore it raises the question how we should interpret them, what about their legal effects.

It is even more interesting to determine the nature of communications (typically the communications by the Commission) since they are as non legal acts but in practise they often act as if they were seen to be compulsory law. They can be referred to in court cases so it would be useful to see if they had any legal effects. If they don't have legal effects in theory, but in practice they do, then we should clarify the nature of the legal effect.

My specific topic is this issue. Of course, I know I could further explain the nature of recommendations and opinions along this line, but there is no

need to explain, because legal effects, however, as we will see, don't stay away from each other, since recommendations, opinions and communications are all called as means of soft law in the terminology, because their legal effects will be very similar.

The European Court has several times clarified the legal effects of non binding legal acts, although these communications are still controversial among the different institutions of the EU including the European Parliament, the Council as well as the Commission. The intention of the Commission is to make these legal means very similar to the existing, binding norms, while the Parliament strongly opposes this view. We don't have time to analyze these opposing opinions, but I guess we all are aware of the driving forces behind each opinion.

According to the Grimaldi-judgement<sup>1</sup> of the European Court – of course, in a simplified way, only looking at the message of the judgement – “soft law” cannot create such rights which individuals can refer to at courts. In the specific case of France versus the Commission<sup>2</sup> the European court stated that the communication which defined new obligations compared to the specific directive examined by the court can be the issue of nullification.

This precludes such measures from having direct effect, it does not immunize them from the judicial process<sup>3</sup>. Soft law legal means therefore cannot define rights and obligations. It is a general rule, however, we will see later that in certain cases this communication is not applicable. It is due to this general rule that the (interpretative) communications of the Commission state that the announcement bears no generative force, so no rights and obligations will come into force based upon the announcement. Furthermore, it has no future binding force for the Commission, for example the European Court can come up with a different standpoint in the future.

In case of the communications it is perplexing that since there is no provision in the Treaty regarding the official form, therefore communications can appear in various styles, titles and formats. The two most common titles are 'notice' and guidelines, but there are many others. From time to time the title might refer to its legal content, but it is not always the case. Furthermore, there are numerous soft law legal documents with different titles, for instance publications, speeches, expert reports, working paper, Annual Report of the Commission, etc.

<sup>1</sup> C-322/88, Grimaldi [1989] EBHT,4409

<sup>2</sup> C-325/91, France v. Commission, EBHT 1991., I-5315

<sup>3</sup> CRAIG, Paul– de BÚRCA, Grainne: *EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials*. 4<sup>th</sup> ed. Oxford University Press, 2008. 86.



Examining only the communications, I would draw attention to distinguishing at least three basic types according to their legal nature.

The first type is when the announcement has no legal nature including various reports which describe the execution of a certain type of task. The addressees are usually the institutions of the EU in general. Secondly there are the green book (discussion initiating communications), the white book (propositional communications) and action plans, etc. The style and text of these communications unambiguously make it clear that these communications have no normative content. Rather they are political papers or preparatory documents of a decision.

In certain cases they behave as "hard law". An example is when the obligatory legal acts order to issue a communication about implementation. The regulation of the council which is a rigorous provision of TFEU concerning state aids calls on the Commission to publish the interest rates applicable at the repay of illegal aids<sup>4</sup>. This communications<sup>5</sup> was carried out in the form of a notice. The legal theory analysis of this issue would be the topic of another lecture. Hungarian written law refuses – as against the constitutional principles – such legal regulations which authorize certain organizations to regulate issues in a non-legal form, although these cases are becoming more and more common in the Hungarian legal system. The so called regulatory authorities apply normative actions from time to time on the regulated markets such as the electronic communications which are classified as non legal. However, their stand/place in the hierarchy of the source of law is not clear yet.

The third group of communications which is the most often used group in the practice of law. It includes interpretative communications and/or guidelines, notices etc. These acts contribute to the better understanding of the hard law provisions, sometimes they can make clear the way the Commission wish to use its discretionary power in the particular area.

An interpretative communication as such is a document with normative content created during the natural work processes, referring to the practice and interpretation of law of the institutions of the EU. I have to note that any other forms of document mentioned earlier are also created during the natural processes of work. The difference lies in the fact that they are not intended to summarize or legally interpret the practice of law application.

It is quite unusual for the Hungarian authorities that the institutions of the EU make these documents public in the name of transparency –

<sup>4</sup> VÁRNAY E. – TÓTH T.: Közlemények az uniós jogban. *Állam és Jogtudomány* Vol. L. (2009) Nr. 1. 417-472. 420.

<sup>5</sup> HL C.85, 2010.03.21. 11.

furthermore, because it is the most efficient tool to orientate the authorities executing the EU law within the member states.

Making these documents public is the decisive circumstance which makes us clear how these documents become suitable for evoking legal effects. Making these documents public lend them some legal nature by being available, therefore they awake certain rightful expectations in the clients.

The consequence of these rightful expectations is that the issuer of the communication or the state institutions responsible for execution can only deviate from the content only by justifying why such general principles of law as the principle of equal treatment, legal certainty or protection of legitimate expectations are not violated.

It means that the communications are binding for both the issuer and the addressee as well as the state institutions responsible for execution, lacking in any justification concerning circumstances of deviation.

The authority can refer to the recommendation in its decision, but the client has a right to argue that interpretation is coherent with the law. It means that if interpretation clashes with hard law, the court – either the European Court or the national court – can disapply it.

These are undeniably relevant legal effects which have significant role in the decision making process of each and every court case nowadays. It is vital for the future that the debate whether soft law should become harder or not among the various EU institutions would be settled. Since the Commission during numerous actions bring considerable pressure on the authorities and national courts to handle the communications of the Commission as binding norms. However, this point of view brings on several problems concerning the rule of law and legal certainty.



## NEW ELEMENTS OF NATO'S NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT

*„If we are together, nothing is impossible.”*

Sir Winston Churchill

In recent decades a wide variety of opinions has emerged about NATO. I have never considered myself belonging to either the sceptics or the pessimists, because in spite of all the difficulties the Alliance has always shown that it is able to adapt to realities and new circumstances. This is exemplified by the new strategic concept accepted in Lisbon on 11 November 2010, which is regarded as the sixth NATO strategy but according to some experts this is the seventh. I agree with the previous group since the strategy accepted in 1952<sup>1</sup> is not significantly different from the previous one.<sup>2</sup>

The strategy preceding the one accepted in Lisbon was created in April 1999 during the period of the Kosovo crisis and the NATO air operations with the approval of the top leaders of 19 states including Hungary.

However, the international events soon raised the necessity of a revision but at the same time they also encumbered the development of a new strategic concept. The security political situation significantly changed; the only remaining questions were when the circumstances would be mature enough and when NATO would have the capacity for developing a new document.

Although experts had already been urging for a solution it came into being only at the NATO summit organized for the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of its creation. After that, proceedings speeded up, a document including several new items was developed, and one and a half years later a decision about the adaptation of this new strategy was made.

The aim of my paper is to examine how the changes in the international situation and the birth of the new strategy influenced each other. Overviewing the most important elements of the previous concept, the international situation and the decisions made by NATO during the period between the two strategies

<sup>1</sup> MC 3/5(Final) – 3.12.1952. The Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area. In: PEDROW, Gregory W.: *NATO Strategy documents 1949-1969*. Online: <http://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/intro.pdf> XV (31. August 2013.)

<sup>2</sup> „Overall the wording of MC 3/5 was quite similar to DC 6/1.” PEDROW, Gregory W.: *NATO Strategy documents 1949-1969*. Online: <http://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/intro.pdf> XV (31. August 2013.)

I will analyze the basic views regarding the dilemmas related to the concept. Then I will examine the proceedings characterizing the preparation of the concept in detail. After that, I will analyze the new and innovative elements of the new strategy in terms of both content and format. Throughout the paper I will concentrate on the cause-effect relationships. At the end of the study I will summarize the basic characteristics of the preparation and those of the new document.

### *1. Basic characteristics of the 1999 strategy, and other important developments*

The basic features of the strategy<sup>3</sup> accepted on 24<sup>th</sup> April 1999 in Washington are as follows:<sup>4</sup>

1. Basic security tasks are security, consultation, deterrence and defence, crisis management and partnership.
2. The security challenges and risks are multifold ranging from instability, regional crises, ethnic and religious rivalries, the spread of weapons of mass destruction and that of military technologies to terrorism, organized crime, the obstruction of resource transfer and migration.
3. To ensure the safety of the 21st century, the Alliance takes cares of the transatlantic link, for the sake of deterrence and defence it maintains effective military capabilities, which adapts to the challenges of the 21th century; it builds the ESDI<sup>5</sup> within the Alliance; it develops capabilities for conflict prevention and crisis management including crisis response operations; it endeavours for partnership, cooperation and political dialogue; and it also aims at developing a new phase of PfP<sup>6</sup>. It declares the continuation of open door policy (and develops a Membership Action Plan). To achieve its goals it highlights arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation; furthermore, it defines a Guidelines for the Alliance's Forces.

<sup>3</sup> The Alliance's Strategic Concept. NATO Press Release NAC-S(99)65 on 24<sup>th</sup> April 1999. [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_27433.htm?selectedLocale=en](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm?selectedLocale=en) (31. August 2013.)

<sup>4</sup> The Alliance's Strategic Concept. NATO Press Release NAC-S(99)65 on 24<sup>th</sup> April 1999. [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_27433.htm?selectedLocale=en](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm?selectedLocale=en) (31. August 2013.)

<sup>5</sup> European Security and Defence Identity

<sup>6</sup> Partnership for Peace

However, very soon and almost continuously significant and different changes occurred in the international events:

1. A terrorist attack was committed against the United States on 11<sup>th</sup> September 2001. Nevertheless, international terrorism could hardly be found in the concept.
2. As a result of the terrorist attack, the US launched armed actions<sup>7</sup> against both the terrorists and their host Taliban government and its forces in Afghanistan. Shortly after this, an unprecedented crisis management operation in the history of NATO<sup>8</sup> was launched which mobilized large forces and has come to its latest phase recently.
3. In March 2003, unauthorized by the United Nations Security Council, the US waged war against Iraq led by Saddam Hussein, which caused a stir within NATO. The war, a rapid military success, was followed by a long period of protracted crisis; the American forces left the country only in December 2011. NATO aided consolidation with its Training Missions from the summer of 2004.
4. The Russian-Atlantic connection was marked with a lot of ups and downs: it was greatly improved around the events at 9/11, but after the Iraqi invasion it reached its lowest end. The Russian-Georgian armed conflict having started in August 2008 poisoned the relationship, while the START-3 contract signed in April 2010 could be regarded as a positive sign. One of the main problems during the Bush administration was how to deploy some elements of the Alliance's European missile defence system into the territory of the former socialist states.<sup>9</sup> The negative consequences of this non-harmonic relationship can still be seen today in several areas of the international arena (Iraq, North Korea, Syria).

The Alliance rapidly followed the most important changes without altering its strategy. 24 hours after the terrorist attack, the Alliance enacted the collective defence provision of the Washington Treaty (5th Article) for the first time in the history of the Alliance; however, the USA only selectively required that. After that NATO also showed an exceptional activity against terrorism. In October 2001 the Alliance started its operation called Active Endeavour, which has not been finished yet. In August 2003 it took over the leadership of ISAF forces in Afghanistan; in the beginning of 2004 it started

<sup>7</sup> Operation Enduring Freedom

<sup>8</sup> International Security Assistance Force – ISAF

<sup>9</sup> This was revised by the Obama administration and found a different solution.

to set up PRTs,<sup>10</sup> which mission is in its last phase with significant changes but still being carried out today.

The effect of 9/11 resulted in a lot of serious changes at the Prague Summit in November 2002.<sup>11</sup> They made a decision about changing the priorities of the challenges in a way that international terrorism became the number one priority followed suit by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The third most important priority became the co-occurrence of these two. They stressed the necessity of new missions, during which the out of area could no longer be questionable. This was the rationale behind the decisions about the developments of military capabilities<sup>12</sup> as well as the set-up of a quick reaction force<sup>13</sup> with air, land and sea components. They called the transformation of the Alliance as a process of prime importance. They also aimed at changing the system of leadership. Two fundamental documents dealing with terrorism came into being.<sup>14</sup> An important element of the new connections was to create the NATO-Russia Council.<sup>15</sup>

In November 2006, during the Riga Summit a new Comprehensive Political Guidance was accepted.<sup>16</sup> In this document they laid the foundations for the transformation of NATO over the next 10-15 years. According to this document, the most important threat is the concentration of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. The basic security task of the Alliance is to maintain guaranteeing safety through dialogue, deterrence and defence, crisis management and partnership. They confirmed the Level of Ambition<sup>17</sup>, which was jointly developed by the Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group in June 2006.

Another important aspect to be taken into consideration was that after 1999 the Alliance was expanded by 9 new countries reaching the present number of 28 member states; and the problem of financing the different tasks was also raised.

<sup>10</sup> Provincial Reconstruction Teams

<sup>11</sup> Prague Summit Declaration issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Prague, Czech Republic [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_19552.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_19552.htm) (31. August 2013.)

<sup>12</sup> Prague Capabilities Commitment

<sup>13</sup> NATO Response Force

<sup>14</sup> Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism and Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism

<sup>15</sup> On 28 May 2002

<sup>16</sup> Comprehensive Political Guidance. Endorsed by NATO Heads of State and Government on 29 November 2006 [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-6034BEA0-E2B7C194/natolive/official\\_texts\\_56425.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-6034BEA0-E2B7C194/natolive/official_texts_56425.htm) (1. September 2013.)

<sup>17</sup> NATO sets new level of ambition for operations. *NATO Update*. (2006.) 6. <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2006/06-june/e0608b.htm> (1. September 2013.)

Based upon the abovementioned aspects it can be stated that NATO developed a good strategy in 1999, which NATO was basically able to stick to. Changes in the international situation, the strong appearance of international terrorism, the danger caused by weapons of mass destruction, the changes in the practical activities and role of the expanded NATO, and several heated debates all required implementing a new strategy.

## *2. Characteristic features of preparing the new strategic concept*

The turn in terms of developing the new strategic concept took place in the 2009 jubilee summit. This, however, was preceded by a long series of arguments and seminars where researchers and experts analysed the past and the possible forthcoming events in the international arena, the feasible future of NATO and formed their opinion about the new strategy. Among other things, they discussed the legitimacy of the organisation, the current state of Article 5, the enlargement (open door), the possible global role of NATO, the situation in Afghanistan and other issues.

The most characteristic opinion of experts about the interest groups within NATO was summarised by the authors<sup>18</sup> who distinguished three groups within NATO. Having analysed<sup>19</sup> the features of these groups it was concluded that they emphasize very different elements in a series of issues. These differences obviously made it difficult to develop the new strategic concept.

The groups and their characteristics are the following:

1. The group called “status quo” emphasizes the maintenance of collective defence and the regional (European) character of the organisation. It does not support NATO to become a global alliance. At the same time the regional character of the organisation does not mean that it limits its activities exclusively to the North-Atlantic region. They claim that NATO can receive a global mandate as a regional organisation too; however, it does not have to become the world's policeman as an organisation with a global membership. The principal aim of enlargement is strengthening the stability of Europe. They raise serious concerns about Georgia's and Ukraine's access to NATO since it would make NATO's relationship with Russia harder. By emphasizing European

<sup>18</sup> NOETZEL, Timo – SCHEER, Benjamin: Does a multi-tier NATO matter? The Atlantic Alliance and the Process of Strategic Change. International Affairs 85 (2009.) 2. 215-223. [http://www.gg2020.net/fileadmin/gppi/Noetzel-Schreer\\_-\\_Does\\_a\\_multi-tier\\_NATO\\_matter.pdf](http://www.gg2020.net/fileadmin/gppi/Noetzel-Schreer_-_Does_a_multi-tier_NATO_matter.pdf) (4. September 2013.)

<sup>19</sup> NOETZEL - SCHEER, 2009.



- interests they question the exceptional role of the USA. They regard NATO as part of a multilateral security architecture, which, integrating Russia, would create a global region of security. They consider operations in Afghanistan mainly stabilisation and reconstruction tasks. Its representatives: Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Turkey.
2. The aim of the group called “reformer” is to harmonize NATO interests to the requirements of the American strategy. Its starting point is that it is only NATO with a global membership that can cope with global threats. They claim that the Alliance may become able to renew its strategic function by its global position. Its new role is to become the world’s policeman. The Alliance needs to keep its door open for all the democratic countries of the world in opposition to Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, even if the candidate countries are politically unstable. They would proceed with the ISAF mission as operations against the rebels. Its representatives: United States, Britain, Canada, Netherlands.
  3. The aim of the Central European group called “reversal” is to reverse the organisation towards its original goals and they view the legitimacy of NATO in its original anti-Russian character. They regard Russia as the main source of danger due to their historical experience of Soviet imperialistic politics. Because of the perception of the Russian threat they focus on emphasizing Article 5 but they do not oppose participating in crisis management operations outside Europe either. Its representatives: Poland, the Czech Republic, the Baltic states.

On 7<sup>th</sup> July 2008 a seminar was held in Brussels where apart from NATO members, UN, EU, EAPC, MD, ICI representatives, leading security policy NGO<sup>20</sup> experts as well as scientists and global company managers<sup>21</sup> participated.

During the summit held on 3<sup>rd</sup>-4<sup>th</sup> April 2009 in Strasbourg and Kehl heads of state and government determined to develop the new strategy for which they accepted a Declaration on Alliance Security. For the new NATO Secretary General, Rasmussen, the development of the new concept became a priority issue.

In the Declaration on Alliance Security they defined the principles and normative regulations of the future strategic concept dissolving certain dilemmas and integrating some new elements:<sup>22</sup>

<sup>20</sup> Non-governmental Organization

<sup>21</sup> SHELL, ENI, Lloyd’s

<sup>22</sup> Declaration on Alliance Security. Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Strasbourg/Kehl on 4<sup>th</sup> April 2009. <http://>

- Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty remains a cornerstone,
- the door of the Alliance is open for all European democracies,
- global threat terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyber assaults (the order was determined at the Prague summit complemented with cyber assaults), energy security, climate security and unstable and fallen states mean a further security challenge,
- capability development (flexibility, crisis management),
- developing strategic connections with international organisations (UN, EU, OSCE,<sup>23</sup> AU<sup>24</sup>) and especially with Russia,
- Afghanistan is main priority, there are activities proceeding in the Western Balkans too,
- developing partnership for the sake of cooperative security (where the term appears without any further explanation).

At the request of Secretary General Rasmussen a 12-member Group of Experts<sup>25</sup> was formed in September 2009, as a novel innovation. In the first phase called Reflection activities<sup>26</sup> meant a series of seminars and a discussion of recommendations in several venues (Luxemburg, Brdo, Oslo, Washington) relating to important issues of the Alliance (core tasks and functions; role in the era of globalisation; security environment, partnership, threats, transformation, abilities). It was followed suit by the consultation phase, where the issues were discussed with responsible government officials of NATO member countries as well as with the representatives of the civilian sphere.

Summarizing all of these the Group of Experts published its report in May 2010. The 57-page document called NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement<sup>27</sup> is the working document for the would-be strategic concept. The Summary of Findings states that NATO's fundamental task, collective

[www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news\\_52838.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_52838.htm) (5. September 2013.)

<sup>23</sup> Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

<sup>24</sup> African Union

<sup>25</sup> Madeleine K. Albright - Chair (United States), Jeroen van der Veer - Vice-Chair (The Netherlands), Giancarlo Aragona (Italy), Marie Gervais-Vidricaire (Canada), Geoff Hoon (United Kingdom), Ümit Pamir (Turkey), Fernando Perpiñá-Robert Peyra (Spain), Hans-Friedrich von Ploetz (Germany), Bruno Racine (France), Aivis Ronis (Latvia), Adam Daniel Rotfeld (Poland), Yannis-Alexis Zepos (Greece). In: <http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/experts-strategic-concept.html> (20. September 2013.)

<sup>26</sup> A Roadmap for the New Strategic Concept <http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/roadmap-strategic-concept.html#group> (20. September 2013.)

<sup>27</sup> *NATO 2020: Assured security; Dynamic engagement. Analysis and recommendations of the group of experts on a new strategic concept for NATO*. Online: [www.nato.int/strategic-concept/expertsreport.pdf](http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/expertsreport.pdf) (19. September 2013.)

defence, is unchanged. It supposes that the Alliance will get into the limelight of international attention fewer times than earlier. It states that collectively the member states are able to face challenges more effectively, among which weapons of mass destruction comes in the first place followed by terrorism and cyber assaults. It also states that maintaining transatlantic relations, strengthening partnership and effective consultations must be prioritized to prevent crises. The open door policy, the transformation and the reforms have to be maintained. It is necessary to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and NATO needs to make efforts to create a world without nuclear weapons. They need to keep cooperating with Russia, the main areas of which are nuclear non-proliferation, rocket defence and measures against terrorism. New partners have to be found. As a vision to the future it states: "*For NATO 2020, the twin imperative is assured security for all its members and dynamic engagement beyond the treaty area to minimize threats.*"<sup>28</sup> The so-called Further Analysis and Recommendations deals with security environment, core activities, partnership, political and organisational issues, reforms, and civilian-military operations. The recommendations aim at making the operation of NATO more effective.

The last phase of the development called Drafting and final negotiation phase was less open to public since the summer of 2010; a four-member group was working on the project headed by Jamie Shea, Head of Policy Planning Unit. The first draft was introduced to NATO ambassadors by the Secretary General at the end of September, then the draft was discussed on 14 October at the joint meeting of foreign and defence ministers in Brussels.<sup>29</sup>

It was the third version that heads of state and government encountered at the Lisbon Summit, which was approved on 24<sup>th</sup> November 2010 after a short debate.

To summarize, it can be seen that the new strategic concept came into being under special circumstances after long theoretical arguments and a half-year international open social debate. The 12-member unique Group of Experts summarized the findings, defined the recommendations and a four-member group made the planned draft of the concept. During a short political debate the foreign and defence ministers agreed on the document, which was finally accepted by the heads of state and government in November. As a novelty, the process was organised by the NATO Secretary General throughout the whole time.

<sup>28</sup> NATO 2020. 12.

<sup>29</sup> It is interesting to note that a joint NATO meeting like this was convened only 11 years earlier.

### *3. The principal elements of the new strategic concept and its differences from the earlier concepts*

The new strategic concept is different from its predecessors in terms of having a concrete title: Active Engagement, Modern Defence.<sup>30</sup> So far strategic concepts were not called by a certain title. An interesting fact is that the original title earlier given by the Group of Experts was also changed in a way that the original “security” was replaced by the more concrete and narrow “defence”.

The new concept is half as long as the previous one, which represents its to-the-point and transparent nature. This is a basic requirement for strategic documents. Its structure more emphatically highlights the content; therefore, defence and deterrence, crisis management<sup>31</sup> and cooperation<sup>32</sup> appear as independent chapters. However, there is no chapter on forces,<sup>33</sup> which should by all means have its place in the strategy. Instead, there are certain references to the capabilities of armed forces in different chapters.<sup>34</sup>

Similarly to the previous document the Preface summarizes the most fundamental elements primarily the case of defending one another against attack (Article 5) as a reaction to previous dilemmas. It stabilizes post-conflict situations, the content of which is elaborated on in a forthcoming chapter. An interesting fact is that crisis management is planned in close cooperation with the UN and the EU. OSCE, which could be found in the earlier concept and also in the version worked out by the Group of Experts, did not find its place in the document. The reason for this may be that Russia has been planning to develop a modified function to this organisation for years. As a new element, it mentions the goal proposed by President Obama, which is namely the creation of a world without nuclear weapons. It states that the subjects of enlargement are the European democracies dissolving a dilemma this way. It confirms the importance of transformation first defined at the Prague Summit.

The chapter called Core Tasks and Principles deals with the importance of transatlantic link twice, it summarizes the fundamental tasks of the Alliance

<sup>30</sup> Active Engagement, Modern Defence. Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the NATO adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_68580.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68580.htm) (22. September 2013.)

<sup>31</sup> Security through Crisis Management

<sup>32</sup> Promoting International Security through Cooperation

<sup>33</sup> Guidelines for the Alliance's Forces Principles Of Alliance Strategy (1999.)

<sup>34</sup> It was compensated by the Alliance with the documents approved at its 2012 Chicago Summit: Summit Declaration on Defence Capabilities: Toward NATO Forces 2020; Deterrence and Defence Posture Review; NATO declares interim missile defence capability.

which are collective defence (Article 5 for the new challenges too), crisis management (for which it has its own capabilities), and cooperative security (as a declared new element), which, as a prevention feature, means:

- an active role to strengthen (international) security beyond the borders of NATO with the help of its partners,
- contribution to arms control, prevention of proliferation and disarmament,
- open door policy.

As opposed to the previous concept the peculiarity of the main tasks lies within their content and order. Collective defence, which was preceded by security and consultation in the earlier concept, comes in the first place in the new concept; however, defence is not mentioned together with deterrence in spite of the fact that in the separate chapter of the strategy these two terms are used together. It is worth noting that as compared to the earlier concept their order was changed too<sup>35</sup>. The main tasks defined in the new concept are better tailored to the challenges of the contemporary world and perhaps they are stricter in their nature. It commits itself to transformation, which has been a continuous and meaningful task since the Prague Summit.

The chapter called The Security Environment prioritizes proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and only after this comes terrorism, followed by instability and conflicts beyond NATO borders as a new element and cyber-attacks. The latter issue has been continuously on the agenda since the Prague Summit, but it is the first time it has appeared in a strategy. The fundamental communication, transport and transit routes on which international trade, energy security and prosperity depend are not new elements. Nevertheless, mentioning key environmental and resource constraints (health risks, climate change, water scarcity and increasing energy needs) is a novelty. Naturally, answers to these threats must be formed and conducted within the Alliance. The question that remains is how they are supposed to proceed with that. It is worth mentioning that migration as a challenge is missing despite the fact that it is an issue the world is facing today.

The next chapter called Defence and Deterrence takes a stand in developing NATO's capability of defending against ballistic missile attack taking into consideration Russia's sensitivity as well as defining global tasks for the sake of capability improvement (perhaps due to the missing Guidelines for the Alliance's Forces chapter).

<sup>35</sup> In 1999 deterrence and defence, in 2010 defence and deterrence.

After briefly outlining the tasks of stabilization to be carried out after a conflict the chapter titled Security through Crisis Management deals with the tasks of setting up civilian crisis management capability and integrated civilian-military planning as a new element. The document does not make a reference to that, but the Alliance obviously counts on EU's experience related to this issue.

The long chapter bearing the title Promoting International Security through Cooperation summarizes the tasks to be performed in the areas of cooperation including a new element stating that a goal of the cooperation with Russia is to move nuclear weapons from NATO countries to more distant territories. While Russia is referred to several times (altogether 11 times) OSCE is not mentioned here at all. Ukraine and Georgia are taken into consideration only as partners. It states, however, that suitable (financial, military and human) sources are necessary, which have to be used in the most effective ways possible, which is a new approach. ESDI is not even mentioned since its importance seriously decreased due to the Berlin Plus agreement.<sup>36</sup>

Based upon the discussion above it can be stated that the new strategic concept fulfilled the expectations attached to that. It briefly and on a strategic standard defined the core tasks and contains guiding and novel elements in several areas. It can rather be called a political document in its nature, which points out the significance of continuing the transformation of the Alliance.

#### *4. Conclusions*

The document was created as a result of a manifold and most thorough preparatory work, in which even those countries that did not delegate members into the Group of Experts – like Hungary – participated.

NATO proved in 2010 that it is the world's most powerful political and military alliance as well as the most effective collective defensive organization of the European and North American states. During the past decade, it has been able to adapt to the changes of the security environment and to the threats which significantly differ from the previous ones. Today, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism are on the first place, but threats in the cyber space and challenges of sustainable development are also highly significant. In some cases such as terrorism, energy safety, electronic warfare and the security effects of climate change, security questions are so complex

<sup>36</sup> On 17<sup>th</sup> March 2003.

that it is extremely hard to draw a line between military and non-military tasks.

The 5<sup>th</sup> article was really important in strengthening the main task of NATO, collective defence, but it also needs to be stressed that by today the Alliance has become a regional organization with global responsibility and security interests.

The strategy declared a whole range of new elements (cooperative security, world without nuclear weapons, stabilize post-conflict situations, civilian crisis management capability), which confirm that based upon its current and future capabilities it meets the requirements.

In order to retain its authenticity and significance in the future and to continue maintaining an effective force, it is necessary to continuously renew the Alliance in a modern and cost-effective way by building upon its previous operational, mission-related and partnership experience. This modernization process needs to be carried out in a way to cover the whole spectrum of the capabilities of the Alliance from the deterring strength of its nuclear weapons through the traditional forces to ballistic missile defence.

It is important that the military force of each member state be able to meet all the requirements of the organisation. It is necessary to develop the capabilities in a harmonious way both in the NATO and the EU by avoiding simultaneous decisions. The development of civilian capabilities is strongly emphasized; therefore, the intensification of the connections with the UN and the EU is specifically justified.

It is still important that NATO be open and receptive. States in the Western-Balkans are important partners (Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Serbia), and they are developing their cooperation with the Alliance. It is necessary to leave the perspective of the membership open for them. The new strategic concept has justified NATO's "open-door" policy providing a real chance for all European countries which are able to meet the accession requirements.

The Alliance cannot operate in isolation; therefore, it is necessary to build further partnerships with countries playing an important role in the security environment such as India and China and the regional actors of the African Union. Strengthening the cooperation with Russia is of extreme significance in a system of mutual trust, cooperation, consultation and dialogue.


However, it remains an important question whether there will be a common political will and enough resources for a true renewal of NATO. The Chicago summit indicates that the first steps are promising into this direction.



## THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE SAHEL REGION – FOCUS ON THE CRISIS IN MALI AND THE EUTM MALI

The Sahel Belt is running from west to east, from Mauritania and Senegal in the east to western Sudan. From an institutional point of view, nine states belong to the Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel: Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Chad. However, one has to note that human and geographical realities of the region do not correspond to the political borders.<sup>1</sup>

The Sahel region<sup>2</sup>



<sup>1</sup> More details: DG Policy Department: The involvement of Salafism/Wahhabism is the support and supply of arms to rebel groups around the world, 23. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/delegations/lt/studiesdownload.html?languageDocument=EN&file=94079> (Downloaded: on 18<sup>th</sup> October 2013.)

<sup>2</sup> <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21150066> (Downloaded: on 3<sup>rd</sup> September 2013.)



Mali is a landlocked west-African country – one of the poorest<sup>3</sup> in the world – experienced rapid economic growth after the 1990 years, coupled with a flourishing democracy and relative social stability.<sup>4</sup> It is one of Africa's major cotton producers, and has lobbied against subsidies to cotton farmers in richer countries, particularly the United States. Item Mali is Africa's third biggest gold producer.<sup>5</sup> A chronic foreign trade deficit makes it nonetheless heavily dependent on foreign aid. Mali is one of the most aid-dependent states in Africa,<sup>6</sup> it is true, not a unique case in this region.

Despite the desert's inhabitants are poor, there are rich natural resources to be found under the sands. It (see above the map) can be seen Algeria has oil and gas, Niger has one of the world's largest uranium reserves, which power France's nuclear plants. Such when the attack on an Algerian gas plant was in January, 2013 and the UK Prime Minister David Cameron said that „the Sahara desert has turned into a haven for militant Islamists who are waging a jihad against the West”.<sup>7</sup>

It is not surprising that the questions are raised ... what really happened in the region, in Mali? Why Mali is every day in the headlines?

### *1. Mali panorama*

Mali became independent from France in 1960, thereafter 23 years of military dictatorship period followed until the democratic election in 1992. The problems started in the 1990 years, when the nomadic Tuareg<sup>8</sup> of the north

<sup>3</sup> Mali is among the 25 poorest countries. This country is dependent on gold mining and agricultural exports, for example cotton. According to World Bank data, the richest 20% of Mali's population controls 46% of total disposable income, while the poorest 20% controls only 5.6%. BTI 2012 Mali Country Report. The full article can be read: <http://www.bti-project.de/fileadmin/Inhalte/reports/2012/pdf/BTI%202012%20Mali.pdf> (Downloaded: on 1<sup>st</sup> March 2013.)

<sup>4</sup> More details: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13881371> MALI profile. (Downloaded: on 7<sup>th</sup> March 2013.)

<sup>5</sup> Mali is Africa's third largest gold producer after South Africa and Ghana. Mali produced 53,7 t of gold in 2009. Gold mining in Mali <http://www.mbendi.com/indy/ming/gold/af/ml/p0005.htm> (Downloaded: on 21<sup>st</sup> March 2013.)

<sup>6</sup> BTI 2012 Mali Country Report, pp. 25-27.

<sup>7</sup> Gold Mining in Mali: <http://www.mbendi.com/indy/ming/gold/af/ml/p0005.htm>

<sup>8</sup> Who are the Tuareg people? The Tuareg people are Berber-speakers, who trace their ancestry to the indigenous peoples of North Africa in ancient times. They share the same language family as the Berber-speakers of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya. Tuaregs live primarily in Niger, Mali, Algeria and Libya, with diasporas in many surrounding countries. More details: <http://tuaregcultureandnews.blogspot.hu/2008/07/who-are-tuareg-people.html> (Downloaded: on 24<sup>th</sup> March 2013.)

began an uprising over land and cultural rights. (There is an interesting and unique aspect connection with them, namely the issue of migration. So, the Tuareg have not country of their own, but instead migrate throughout the western Sahel, crisscrossing the countries of Algeria, Burkina Faso, Libya, Niger, and Mali. Their popular culture has romanticized the indigo-blue veiled Tuareg as outlaws, “Blue People”, *hommes de nulle part* – men from nowhere, and *chevaliers du désert* – knights of the desert...)⁹ After all they persist to this day, despite central government attempts at military and negotiated solutions. But the uprising became faster in 2007, and was „exacerbated”¹⁰ by an influx of arms from the 2011 Libyan civil war. Tuareg nationalists, alongside Islamist groups with links to al-Qaeda, seized control of the north in 2012.

So, that we can say, this is a long-standing problem in northern Mali. It emerged more recently in North African countries that saw Arab Spring uprisings, including Libya and Tunisia, allowing militant groups to gain ground. As William Lawrence, North Africa director for International Crisis Group said: „Right now we are not seeing as much an uptick in the strength of these groups as much as we are new areas that they are able to operate in because of the weakening of states.”¹¹

No mention of the touch of national and international terrorists, jihadists and narco-traffickers over the population in the north keeps consolidating. „The “sanctuarisation” of a terrorist zone, development of criminal economy, gross violations of human rights and the deterioration of the humanitarian situation are making the population increasingly vulnerable.”¹² All these developments might have a spill-over effect on neighbouring countries and compromise lasting peace and development throughout the Sahel.

⁹ JALALI, Merise: Tuareg migration: a critical component of crisis in the Sahel. Online: <http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=953>. (Downloaded: on 29<sup>th</sup> September 2013.)

¹⁰ Fact is that the Libyan crisis and the fall of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi in October 2011 has been the disruptive factor that upset the extremely „delicate” geopolitical balance of the region.

¹¹ Why the Sahara is not the ‘new Afghanistan’ by Aidan Lewis. Online: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21299153> (Downloaded: on 24<sup>th</sup> March 2013.)

¹² Mission background. [http://www.eutmmali.eu/?page\\_id=222](http://www.eutmmali.eu/?page_id=222) (Downloaded: on 29<sup>th</sup> September 2013.)

## 2. What really happened in Mali...

A short history in 2012 without claim of being exhaustive – the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), in collaboration with the United States, Europe, the African Union, and other like-minded parties, with one voice approved on December 20, 2012 a resolution aiming to restore Mali's territorial integrity by confronting terrorism and disrupting criminal networks in the region. The resolution authorized the creation of an African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA), consisting of a 3,300-strong force, to be deployed by fall 2013. In light of this global strategy, AQIM<sup>13</sup> (*Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb*) has already accused France, a key mission partner, of unsafe the lives of six of its citizens who were kidnapped separately in Niger (2010) and in Mali (2011), rather than negotiating for their release. Additionally, MUJAO (Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa) abducted a seventh French national in Mali; and in Nigeria, the terrorist offshoot Ansaru kidnapped an eighth Frenchman.<sup>14</sup> ... the security situation in Mali is deteriorating even further.

And 2013 – in January 2013 Islamic forces advanced southward from their northern base and captured the key strategic city of Konna, dealing a major setback to the central government. Mali's interim president, Dioncounda Traore therefore declared a state of emergency and appealed to France for military support. An Ansar al Dine<sup>15</sup> spokesman immediately condemned the request and declared: „...while Dioncounda asked for help from France, we ask for guidance from Allah and from other Muslims in our sub-region because this war has become a war against the crusader”.<sup>16</sup> At the end France

<sup>13</sup> Mali's rebels: The five main Islamists groups in Mali are Ansar Dine, Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (Mujao), al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Signed-in-Blood Battalion and the Islamic Movement for Azawad (IMA). More details: Mali crisis: key players <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17582909> (Downloaded: on 16<sup>th</sup> October 2013.)

<sup>14</sup> More details: Yonah Alexander: Terrorism in North Africa & the Sahel in 2012 Global Reach & Implications, ILI, February 2013, pp. 12-13. <http://moroccoonthemove.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/AlexanderTerrorisminNASahel2012.pdf> (Downloaded: on 16<sup>th</sup> October 2013.)

<sup>15</sup> The two main Islamic militant movements operating in northern Mali are Ansar al Din (“Defenders of the Faith”) and Jama’at Tawhid Wal Jihad fi Garbi Afriqqiya (“Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa,” or MUJWA). Ansar al Din was formed at the end of 2011 by Iyad Ag Ghali, a former Tuareg rebel leader, who is often described as „a pragmatic opportunist”. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/ansar-al-din.htm> (Downloaded: on 18<sup>th</sup> October 2013.)

<sup>16</sup> More details: ALEXANDER, Yonah: Terrorism in North Africa & the Sahel in 2012 Global Reach & Implications, ILI, February 2013, 12-13. <http://moroccoonthemove.com/>

has sent about 550 troops to the Mopti and to Bamako, which is home to about 6,000 French nationals.<sup>17</sup> The main problem was that the thousands have fled their home – more than half the northern population has fled south or across borders into neighbouring countries (11 January–3 February 2013, in neighbouring countries due to conflict 21,986 refugees).<sup>18</sup> This number continuously rises, see later.

### *3. ... and what was the European Union's response?*

High Representative Catherine Ashton, who chaired the Council meeting, stressed the „tremendous importance” of this mission to support Mali's army.<sup>19</sup> For now, it lacks the capacity to protect the country's territorial integrity against the rebels who had invaded part of Mali. The 27 ministers endorsed the principle of the mission yet in December 2012. Its launch was accelerated following the surprise intervention by French forces on location on 11 January (Operation Serval). Some 16 member states plus Norway will participate in the mission.<sup>20</sup>

On the 17 January 2013 the Council of the European Union established a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) Military Training Mission (EUTM Mali) to specifically train and reorganise the Malian Armed Forces (MAF), in order to contribute to the restoration of the country's territorial integrity. From the beginning of Mali's events Europe with the United States, has backed the French-led military intervention in Mali which since 11 January has driven al Qaeda-allied Islamist insurgents out of the main northern towns into remote mountains near Algeria's border. The EU is providing a „500-strong multinational training force” that will give military instruction to Malian soldiers for an initial period of 15 months at an estimated cost of 12.3 million euros, \$16.45 million,<sup>21</sup> (nota bene each country finances its own troops – the salaries and living expenses).

wp-content/uploads/2013/08/AlexanderTerrorisminNASahel2012.pdf (Downloaded: on 16<sup>th</sup> October 2013.)

<sup>17</sup> Mali crisis: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21042561> BBC news Africa, Mali crisis. (Downloaded: on 25<sup>th</sup> March 2013.)

<sup>18</sup> More details: [http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Mali\\_Snapshot\\_en\\_20130206.pdf](http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Mali_Snapshot_en_20130206.pdf) OCHA Humanitarian Snapshot. (Downloaded: on 25<sup>th</sup> March 2013.)

<sup>19</sup> <http://www.europolitics.info/eu-politics/eu-launches-training-mission-in-mali-art348330-46.html> Foreign Affairs Council. (Downloaded: on 21<sup>th</sup> March 2013.)

<sup>20</sup> Ibidem

<sup>21</sup> <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/20/us-mali-rebels-eu-idUSBRE91J1B320130220> French general urges EU to equip „impoverished” Mali army by Pascal Fletsher. (Downloaded: on 25<sup>th</sup> March 2013.)

Then the 27 (since 1 July, 2013 have been 28 members of the EU) member states launched the European Union mission to support the training and reorganisation of Mali's armed forces, adopting the decision to this effect at the Foreign Affairs Council, on 18 February in Brussels.

The operation, launched in the framework of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2085 (2012), forms an integral part of the EU's comprehensive approach to the situation in Mali and the Sahel. In more general conclusions on Mali, the Council states that „the EU supports the efforts of the international community to achieve stability and security in Mali, most notably Operation Serval and the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA), and reaffirms its commitment to the fight against the threat of terrorism”.<sup>22</sup> The EU also reiterates its „full support for the implementation of the road map for transition in Mali” with a view to „free and transparent elections” this year and the creation of a National Dialogue and Reconciliation Commission.

The Council welcomes the gradual resumption of EU development aid and states that the Union will maintain its humanitarian commitment to the populations affected by the crisis, both in Mali and in the neighbouring countries. The ministers nevertheless add that „the EU remains concerned by the potential risks to regional and international security posed by the crisis in Mali. It particularly reiterates its concern regarding international trafficking, illicit financial flows and their ties with extremist groups in the Sahel”.

#### *4. EUTM in Mali – Mission description*

##### **4.1. Political Control and Strategic Direction**

Under the responsibility of the Council and of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) shall exercise the political control and strategic direction of the EU military mission. The PSC will, at regular intervals, receive reports from the chairman of the EU Military Committee (EUMC) regarding the conduct of the EU military mission, and will report to the Council.

Generally speaking, the situation increases the threat to the safety of EU citizens in the Sahel (hostage-taking, attacks) as well as in Europe, notably through the influence of extremists and terrorists networks over the diasporas, training, and logistical support from Al-Qaida affiliates in the north of Mali.

<sup>22</sup> Ibidem

It also threatens the EU's strategic interests, including the security of energy supply and the fight against human and drugs trafficking. European intelligence agencies have already crossed attempted attacks on the European territory. In order to overcome these threats and address these challenges, the Malian authorities have requested the EU's support. The EU's strategic objective, as expressed in its Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel (see above), remains the promotion of stability, connecting security, development and governance through the integrated and coordinated use of all relevant EU instruments in order to address the root causes of insecurity, under-development and conflicts at local, national and regional levels.

So a CSDP mission is a very significant part of this EU global approach to restore the state's authority throughout Mali and bring a durable solution to the current crisis.<sup>23</sup>

#### **4.2. Military direction**

Brigadier General Bruno Guibert<sup>24</sup> from France has been appointed as EUTM Mali Mission Commander. The EU Military Committee will monitor the proper execution of the EU military mission conducted under the responsibility of the Mission Commander. The chairman of the EUMC will act as the primary point of contact with the Mission Commander.<sup>25</sup>

EUTM Mali firstly was commanded by French General François Lecointre and from the first moment already will include a staff of around 500 (200 trainers from France, the UK, Ireland and 19 other countries<sup>26</sup> and has an initial brief to train 2,000 Malians, so to create four new battalions capable of defending the West African country) as I have already mentioned it. The headquarters is in Bamako, while training is to take place in Koulikoro. An initial group of 70 troops arrived in Mali, on 8 February, and military instructors will be deployed by the end of March. The British and Irish troops

<sup>23</sup> EUTM in Mali: Mission background [http://www.eutmmali.eu/?page\\_id=222](http://www.eutmmali.eu/?page_id=222) (Downloaded: on 14<sup>th</sup> October 2013.)

<sup>24</sup> See more at [http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/documents/pdf/cv\\_bruno\\_guibert\\_en.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/documents/pdf/cv_bruno_guibert_en.pdf) (Downloaded: on 4<sup>th</sup> October 2013.)

<sup>25</sup> EEAS HOME [http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eutm-mali/mission-description/index\\_en.htm](http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eutm-mali/mission-description/index_en.htm) (Downloaded: on 4<sup>th</sup> October 2013.)

<sup>26</sup> Sizes per countries: „France 207, Germany 71, Spain 54, UK 40, Czech Republic 34, Belgium 25, Poland 20, Italy 19, Sweden 14, Finland 12, Hungary 10, Ireland 8, Austria 7, Greece 4, Bulgaria 4, Latvia 2, Slovénia 4, Estonia 2, Lithuania 2, Portugal 1, Romania 1 et Luxembourg 1.” <http://www.eutmmali.eu/?p=211> (Downloaded: on 17<sup>th</sup> October 2013.)

are largely carrying out infantry training; the Greeks handle intelligence classes; and Germany has built a field hospital at the training camp at Koulikoro, about 60km north of Bamako. In April 2013 the first specialist trainers arrived in Mali.

The multinational force was born. But who is responsible for what? A few examples: the first of them was the Hungarian team, numbering 6 in total. They are in charge of teaching the elite shooters. They arrived in Bamako along with 4 Greek intelligence trainers. 15 Spanish soldiers will be responsible for instructing of the commando units of the Waraba battalion. The Spanish platoon of the force protection. The contingent of 10 Polish trainers and all of their material. These soldiers will be in charge of the logistics training. 17 German trainers, namely, sapper specialists. They were accompanied by 2 Latvian Commanding Officers who will be reinforcing the Command Team at Koulikoro camp.<sup>27</sup>

The main and specific tasks during the training are including on command and control, logistics and human resources as well as on international humanitarian law, the protection of civilians and human rights. The mission will not be involved in combat operations.

The Training Mission long term aims to build cohesion among the soldiers who are of different ages and ranks and do not know each other as they have been hand-picked for the course from across the country by the Malian armed forces. Moreover the soldiers are ethnically mixed – both pale and dark-skinned – but the „Malian authorities have not given details of how they were selected”.<sup>28</sup> Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch say that Malian soldiers have been guilty of human rights crimes against civilians they suspect of having hidden rebels. The EUTM says<sup>29</sup> it has asked civil society groups to come forward with names of any soldiers suspected of abuses.

The EU has indeed been concerned by the deteriorating political, security, humanitarian and human rights situation in the Sahel region since early 2000. It was earlier than the Libyan crisis, but was further aggravated by its consequences. Since the beginning of the crisis in Mali, the Council has repeated the EU's purposes to accelerate and enhance the implementation of this Strategy in order to help tackle the regional consequences of this crisis.

It was a useful tool to enhance the coherence of the EU approach to the crisis, with a particular focus on Mauritania, Niger and Mali. The EU has

<sup>27</sup> More details: <http://www.eutmmali.eu/?m=201304> Arrival of the specialist trainers on 15<sup>th</sup> April 2013. (Downloaded: on 14<sup>th</sup> October 2013.)

<sup>28</sup> Alex Duval Smith's article, BBC News: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-22391857> (Downloaded: on 14<sup>th</sup> October 2013.)

<sup>29</sup> Ibidem



allocated over € 660 million to the region under the 10th European Development Fund (2007-2013).<sup>30</sup> In the framework of its Sahel strategy, the EU has further mobilised additional financial resources for development and security related projects worth € 167 million along the four lines of action of the strategy:

- Development, good governance and internal conflict resolution;
- Political and diplomatic action;
- Security and the rule of law; and
- countering violent extremism and radicalisation (this latter aspect is the main reason for the Mission).

Since fighting emerged in early 2012 in northern Mali, groups of various affiliations – most of them with well documented links to Al-Qaida – are expanding their influence and establishing safe havens for terrorist and criminal activities. „Violence has forced 436,000 Malians to flee their homes and further aggravated the food crisis. More than 18 million people are at risk of hunger throughout the Sahel region. In this context, the European Commission committed € 172 million under its humanitarian aid budget and launched an international partnership for resilience in the Sahel region (Global Alliance for Resilience initiative, AGIR).”<sup>31</sup>

The EU-led Global Alliance for Resilience Initiative was officially launched on 6 December 2012 in Ouagadougou<sup>32</sup> and is shaping up to be *a major long term strategy for building resilience in the fragile Sahel region*.<sup>33</sup>

In response to the chronic food insecurity in the Sahel the Alliance's objective is to promote greater resilience by creating synergies between the emergency response and long-term development strategies. In the Sahel region is Mali and the total number of Malian refugees in the surrounding countries is estimated to be 146,059 on 17th January, 2013.<sup>34</sup> But the number has increased already in May (see below):

<sup>30</sup> Factsheet: The EU and the Sahel <http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/documents/pdf/132802.pdf> (Downloaded: on 8<sup>th</sup> October 2013.)

<sup>31</sup> Factsheet the EU and the Sahel, more details: <http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/documents/pdf/132802.pdf> (Downloaded: on 8<sup>th</sup> October 2013.)


<sup>32</sup> Ouagadougou is the capital city of Burkina Faso.

<sup>33</sup> SAHEL-AGIR: [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/policies/resilience/agir\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/policies/resilience/agir_en.htm) (Downloaded: on 8<sup>th</sup> October 2013.)

<sup>34</sup> The MAP (facts) can be found: [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/images/photos/aid/20130122\\_mali\\_situationmap.jpg](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/images/photos/aid/20130122_mali_situationmap.jpg) (Downloaded: on 10<sup>th</sup> October 2013.)



Malian refugees<sup>35</sup>



### 5. Step by step towards stability in Mali

The Foreign Affairs Council adopted the following conclusion in Brussels, even on the 18th February 2013: „The European Union supports the efforts of the international community to achieve stability and security in Mali, most notably Operation Serval and the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA), and reaffirms its commitment to the fight against the threat of terrorism.”<sup>36</sup> It can be confirmed that by summer 2013, according to French President Hollande, about half of the nearly 4,000 soldiers, who have been in Mali since January, will be back in France. French troops, together with soldiers from ECOWAS and Chad, have driven the Islamist groups out of the big cities of northern Mali. Since then the French parliament has already decided to leave 1,000 soldiers in Mali until the end of 2013.<sup>37</sup> This work is helped by other things, such step by step Mali will be closer towards stability.

Thus the first step was when the agreement was born between the Malian Government and Tuareg rebels that paves the way for inclusive peace talks as well as presidential elections in July and August. “This is a crucial first step,

<sup>35</sup> Malian refugees: <http://www.dw.de/malians-refugees-in-their-own-country/a-16894443> (Downloaded: on 16<sup>th</sup> October 2013.)

<sup>36</sup> [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/135522.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/135522.pdf) (Downloaded: on 7<sup>th</sup> March 2013.)

<sup>37</sup> UN to send peacekeeping troops to Mali <http://www.dw.de/un-to-send-peacekeeping-troops-to-mali/a-16775375> (Downloaded: on 13<sup>th</sup> October 2013.)

it is now important that the signatories are looking to the future and continue their efforts, hand in hand, for a practical implementation of this agreement to begin immediately in a coordinated and peaceful manner” said Bert Koenders, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Mali.<sup>38</sup> Signed by the Malian Government, the National Movement for Liberations of Azawad (MNLA) and the High Council for the Unity of Azawad, the agreement was reached after nearly two weeks of mediated talks in neighbouring Burkina Faso’s capital Ouagadougou.

Such the second step was the summer election itself, when the new president is the former prime minister Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, who was born the son of a civil servant in 1945, emerged as the clear winner. It was the first presidential poll in Mali since 2007 (the next stage in the process will be the parliamentary elections in November). I think that the new president will face two major challenges: the negotiation of a settlement for the north, where the MNLA and its allies are lobbying for evident autonomy; and the reformation of the Malian state machine. Some experts, for example Paul Melly<sup>39</sup> say the new president believes a possible national unity. He thinks that Keita “needs to revitalize public services, improve transparency and restore public faith in politics. It is a daunting agenda”.<sup>40</sup> It sure that the presidential elections were considered the „key” step in the transition process and the UN and the European Commission have signed a financing agreement for €14.8 million in support of the electoral process.

And finally such the third step was the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). It was established by Security Council resolution 2100 of 25 April 2013 to support political processes in that country and carry out a number of security-related tasks. „Welcoming the swift action by the French forces, at the request of the transitional authorities of Mali, to stop the offensive of terrorist, extremist and armed groups towards the south of Mali and commending the efforts to restore the territorial integrity of Mali by the Malian Defence and Security Forces, with the support of French forces and the troops of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA).”<sup>41</sup>

<sup>38</sup> ALLAFRICA – MALI: UN Envoy welcomes accord <http://allafrica.com/stories/201306190892.html> (Downloaded: on 8<sup>th</sup> October 2013.)

<sup>39</sup> He is an Associate Fellow in the Africa Programme of Chatham House.

<sup>40</sup> Paul Melly’s article: Mali’s new hope for unity: <http://allafrica.com/stories/201308301204.html?page=2> (Downloaded: on 14<sup>th</sup> October, 2013.)

<sup>41</sup> [http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusma/documents/mali%20\\_2100\\_E\\_.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusma/documents/mali%20_2100_E_.pdf) (Downloaded: on 15<sup>th</sup> October 2013.)

To sum up the EUTM has been asked to support the transitional authorities of Mali in the stabilization of the country and implementation of the transitional roadmap, focusing on major population centers and lines of communication, protecting civilians, human rights monitoring, the creation of conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance and the return of displaced persons, the extension of State authority and the preparation of free, inclusive and peaceful elections.<sup>42</sup>

So, the training mission is running operation, therefore difficult exercise to give a good summary of its effectiveness. Once, when the operation was yet only plan the EU High Representative Catherine Ashton said: „My thanks go to the contributing member states and partner countries, whose decisive action has allowed the deployment of the mission. EUTM Mali will support stability in Mali and the Sahel, both now and in the future. Respect for human rights and the protection of civilians will be an important part of the training program.”<sup>43</sup>

I think all of these purposes are *still relevant* today, too and we hope so.

<sup>42</sup> MINUSMA mission: more details: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusma/> (Downloaded: on 15th October 2013.)

<sup>43</sup> <http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/documents/pdf/135524.pdf> (Downloaded: on 15<sup>th</sup> October 2013.)

## THE POLICING CHALLENGES OF GLOBALISATION

### 1. *The view of globalisation*

It unequivocally became clear that globalisation became our ordinary life, nobody can get out of this fact.<sup>1</sup> In some cases when for instance we purchase branded or modern electronic goods we have to face that China or other Asian countries are marked as distributors, due to this fact consumers think of globalisation as a swear-word. Today it is commonplace that a non-Chinese product is a sham. It became natural that we mainly come across with American films, while changing the TV-channels in vain (particularly comedies and thrillers with the same stories) We can rightly ask the question: Is this the globalisation or the result of globalisation?

In my view globalisation means more, which is a process of a long internationalization, now we can just suspect the terminal of it, but it cannot

<sup>1</sup> The most important literature used in this article are: BERNEK Ágnes – KONCZ István – LAMM Vanda: *Az új világrend és az emberi jogok – a globalizáció komplex hatásai.*; BERNEK Ágnes: *A globális világpolitikai földrajza.* Budapest 2005.; BODONYI Ilona: *Rendészeti politológia I.* Budapest RTF 2007.; BUKOVICS István: *A természeti és civilizációs katasztrófák elleni védekezés rendszertudományi szempontú elemzése. Előtanulmány az átfogó Rendészeti Stratégia társadalmi vitájához.* Budapest, 2008.; CSÉFALVAY Zoltán *Globalizáció 1.0 és Globalizáció 2.0.* Nemzeti Tankönyvkiadó, Budapest. 2004.; DEÁK Péter: *A globalizáció új erőszakformái.* [http://publikon.hu/application/essay/297\\_1.pdf](http://publikon.hu/application/essay/297_1.pdf); FINSZTER Géza: *A rendészeti rendszer alkotmányos és közjogi alapjai számú előtanulmány az átfogó rendészeti stratégia társadalmi vitájához.* Budapest 2008.; FÓRIZS Sándor: „Rendészeti kihívások – németországi válaszok” Konferencia előadás anyaga. Pécs 2013.; FÖLDES Gy. – INOTAI A.: *A globalizáció kihívásai és Magyarország.* Napvilág Kiadó, 2003.; HEGYALJAI Mátyás: *Az Europol új jogi alapja.* Konferencia előadás anyaga. Pécs 2013.; KÓNYA Csaba: Terrorizmus – biztonság a globalizáció tükrében. *Korunk* 2005/augusztus; RITECZ György: *Kockázat elemzés mint a kihívások megismerésének alapja.* Konferencia előadás anyaga, Pécs 2013.; SALLAI János (szerk.): *Gazdaságföldrajzi és gazdaságtörténeti alapok.* Székesfehérvár 2010.; TEKE András: *A változásokkal összefüggő kihívások kezelésének tipizálható problematikája korunk rendészetében.* Konferencia előadás anyaga, Pécs 2013.; VARGA János: A rendészeti kooperáció, koordináció és monitoring jelentősége. *Határrendészeti tanulmányok* 2012/2: 5-7.; VARGA János: A schengeni eszme uniós biztonsági rendszerré válásának kiteljesedése és távlatai. In: *Zborník z medzinárodnej vedeckej konferencie. Postavenie Schengenského acquis v systéme politik Európskych spoločností.* Bratislava, 2008. 77-89.

be predicted, however some of us tried to undertake it. For instance Robert Reich, who predicted the followings in 1991: „There will not be national products any more, technologies, national companies or national industries. There will not be national economies either in terms as it can be seen today. Almost every production factor- capital, technology, factories, and equipments- will move easily crossing out the borders and the definition of American economy will become meaningless such as the definition of American company, the American capital, the American products and even the American technology. Similar changes are happening in other countries, at some places faster or more spectacularly.”<sup>2</sup>

In my opinion Americans would outrage the best if their national products and industries had disappeared by 2013. In addition to I suppose that Bill Clinton’s former first commissioner of works sketched the future in the right way.

In addition to the represanter of globalist viewpoint, Robert Reich we have to mention David Held, who stands the mind of skepticals, in contrast with the hyper globalists. According to his view: „Those who consider the current globalisation as an existing and determing historical process are namely the hyper globalists and those who think that the globalisation is only an ideological and social buildup which posses a slight power of explanatory are the skepticals.” Concerning the definition of globalisation I suppose that Anthony Giddens’ definition gives for us the biggest help: „Globalisation is the growing of intensity of comprehensive social relationships, by means of it remote places link with each other so that processes which happen in distance of many kilometers influence the occurring event in other places.” According to Giddens, the „face to face” interaction which demands spatial and accrual presence is decreasing in our time, at the same time the social and economical relationships seceding from the fixity of time and place more and more are coming to the front. In our times it comes to natural that internet, getting in touch by cell-phone, making business or any other ordinary activity do not require personal attendance.( e.g. dealing with money, transactions etc.) However the meaning of globalisation is this changing. Interactions-seceding from the fixity of time and place- enable for geographical places, relationships between the local actors as well as bilateral suspension-systems to extend as a global scale. As a matter of fact world became a large village, where everyone depend on others and every equipment. Today it mustn’t be said that which happens in the USA or in China is far away from us and cannot concern us in Europe or in Hungary. Just think of the flood in Thailand which affected

<sup>2</sup> REICH, Robert B.: *The Work of Nations*. Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1991. 3.

the distributing of micro chips as it was stalled for a while, hereby the transportation to Japan has been canceled, which influenced the European car-construction.

After the above mentioned introduction, sketchily the main features of the globalisation are:

- linking of the world
- strengthening of forcing growing
- economical, cultural homogenization, consumer society
- economical polarization, growing of the incoming differences
- the concentration of political and economical power beyond the democratically controlled area
- growing of overpopulation
- strengthening of the environmental and social problems
- degradation of citizens rights
- developing and acceleration of information and communication technologies

Due to the industrial revolutions in the past two centuries societies, customs of people transformed entirely. Today it comes to natural that anyone can be available from any point of the world. The aim of the study is not the analysis of globalisation due to the limit of the extension but I think it is very important to overview it because of introducing and understanding of the challenges of law enforcement. It is essential to mention that due to the revolution of data transmission anyone is able to possess the newest, the most modern information-technology-equipment, which can be used for committing crime. As a consequence of the industrial-technological revolution, today using cars, flying, labeled sport, fashion and other equipments became available. Illegal users get the chance to fake and distribute labeled products without limits because of the result of this process. On the one hand (beyond the fact that it is a crime) it goes against the interest of the producers and the owners of the license, deceive the exacting consumers, moreover in some cases ( e.g. producing of fake medicines.) it threatens the personal safety.

Due to the industrial revolutions and permanently developing world we are able to meet a lot of new incidents which have been unknown previously, therefore it means new challenges and at the same time new chances for the offenders. Whilst earlier the coming out of money motivated the offenders to forge money, today by spreading of using credit cards the forging of credit cards or abusing of using cards mean a lot of chances for some crime groups. Cell-phones and internet are the symbolic products of globalisation. Now almost everyone possesses cell-phones, laptops and internet connection,

whereby they arrange their private, official and financial terms and handle their purchase. At the same time it is the hotbed of the most modern criminal incident. Simultaneously it multiplies the importance of the security of our personal dates. The using of cell-phones give assistance for the organised crime groups to achieve their goals. For instance in coordination of the act. The leader and coordinator of the crime need not to stay at the location of criminal act (moreover the leader of the organised crime group may live at any point of the Earth, the criminal network can extend to more countries, continent) he or she is able to organize, operate and control of the criminal act by different equipments.

These things exemplify well that the new incidents brought along new challenges, which come forward at policing as well.

In my view in the global world of 21st century, policing, criminal investigation have to face with the following challenges and risks:

- Due to the linkness of the world the growing of the organised crime and the cyber crime means new chances as the elite part of the criminality. The data-gatherers' aim is to acquire the well-useable datas-as a financial profit- in different ways as short time as possible for instance by sending e-mail<sup>3</sup>, text message, deception based internet calling (VoIP). Even sendings trojan programs<sup>4</sup>. The "borderless and faceless" cyber criminality<sup>5</sup> create unique and specific challanges of criminal investigation<sup>6</sup> Unfortunately internet gives opportunity for the child sex persecution.
- Because of the internationalization, the free flowing of persons, labor force and the different quality of life between South and North, migration means the wandering of more than hundreds of people. Migration is one of the biggest challenge for the policy of the whole world as it unfortunately contains human smugglings, prostitution, child trafficking,

<sup>3</sup> One of the data-gatherers' easiest and the most popular method is sending a warning email from a fake email on behalf of a bank, afterwards they ask a password-changing which helps to enter the careless and deluded users' bank account.. The improved version of this method is to guide the deluded user to a website by sending an email which includes a link that is a perfect copy of that bank or the page of the internet store. After that it is easy to carry out the crime namely they are able to purchase or transact money etc. from the careless user's bank account.

<sup>4</sup> The receipt is simple as all of us use internet and download files. Thus beyond the big-size "datapacks" a trojan program arrived on our computer unperceived. Then this trojan program handles the bank process easily, by means of it the transaction gets to the swindler's bank account by changing the target-account.

<sup>5</sup> One example: appropriating of almost 45 million dollar through the internet and by coordinated operation from 26 countries's bank ATM. Source: Conference of Interpol (ORFK) 2013.05.16

<sup>6</sup> Lecture at the Conference of Interpol (ORFK) on 16<sup>th</sup> May 2013.



organised and other significant crimes. The organised crime as the negative factor of migration makes the struggle difficult for the criminal investigation as the criminal groups make profit by means of it, they are able to obtain the most modern information-technology-equipments for forging documents.

- Due to the industrial- technological revolutions and development today almost limitless chances can be available for excellent( almost equivalent with the original one) forgery of any products, document, currency etc. Thus the identification of products, documents are serious challenges for the experts. In case of consumer goods for the ordinary consumer it is hopeless to realize the difference between the fake and the original products which can be disastrous for them( for instance in case of buying food, medicines.)
- Although the birth of terrorism cannot be associated with migration, but the global world ensure the chance for occurring of this type of crimes at any point of the earth.
- Policing challenges of danger situations, ensued disasters due to the effect of global warming. E.g. flood, migration, lack of freshwater etc. The population of the earth tripled, today it means more than 7 billion inhabitants. The evolved demographic crisis, also poverty are a significant challenge for the countries' governments. In several countries it created and are also going to create society conflicts in the future.
- The policing task of dangerous situations and disasters due to the growing of environmental harm and the lack of economical balance.
- The multinational companies, the MNCs remade the economic fields as well as acquired significant political influences, which weakened the influence and will of nation states.

## *2. Consequences and recommendations*

In my opinion today it is very hard to struggle with the process of globalisation. Therefore we rather have to take advantage of it and in favor of safety people must be prepared for the danger of globalisation. Remarkable informative work and crime prevention must be made for people to take care of their personal dates and to use the world wide web by appropriate caution and inform carefully in the course of using the equipments of modern payment.



It must be made more activities concerning the well using of computer and the using of safe internet mainly among children.<sup>7</sup>

It has to be laid stress on cooperation of policing extending over borders, continents which base is the language and info-technology-preparation of policing forces. “Towards the global and cross- border crime of the 21st century, the phasing of co-operation and activities between Interpol and other departmental authorities is essential both in the European region and beyond its borders”.<sup>8</sup> Statements to be delivered at the conference of Interpol regarding the future:

- The optimization of used equipments according to the Interpol Against Weapons Program.
- Promoting of cross-border actions and retrieving possessions and property which are originated from crime.
- Concerning the computer-crime, the enhancement of co-operation between Interpol and Europol.
- The enhancement of co-operation between the international criminal databases based on interoperability.<sup>9</sup>
- In favor of better co-operation and getting over language difficulties it would be essential to establish a programme like „Erasmus”, a 1-3 months international training which could be available for each police-officer.

<sup>7</sup> Learn the using of internet! After being aware of dangers they are able to compose and apply rules. Establish parental networks! Discuss about this theme with other parents and the shop assistants. For instance in Germany, where they take it into consideration in the elementary school.

<sup>8</sup> Statement was delivered at the Conference of Interpol (ORFK) on 16<sup>th</sup> May 2013.

<sup>9</sup> Statement was delivered at the Conference of Interpol (ORFK) on 16<sup>th</sup> May 2013.

### III. Social sciences



## TURNING POINTS OF EMIGRATION FROM HUNGARY – UNDERSTANDING THE PRESENT CHANGES IN MIGRATION STRUCTURES\*

### *1. Introduction*

In every part of history there is migration as a main cause of social changes including political, economic or any development. Despite of this statement our knowledge is quiet rare about migration in past history in general as well as in Hungary. Beginning of modern society goes back at least to the 19th century thus our interest of migration connected to the present conditions can't go older. Considering historical consequences our attempt is mostly to reveal current situation and components of the phenomena. A general shift occurred in the patterns of immigration in 2012 in Hungary. A series of structural changes happened we can include to a complete social transformation either since 1989 or since 2004, but as long as until 2012 all of them were economically based in the last years' institutional changes met with the cumulating social changes and social values' changes.

### *2. Historical Turning Points*

First modern effects of emigration can be seen after the Hungarian Revolution in the years 1849–1851. Great political pressure and asylum seeking appears just like in developing countries of today making move out not only the elites but a higher amount of population involved or feeling involved and suspected by involvement. Although real growth in Hungary eventuated only in the 1880's the first great emigrational wave from Europe to the overseas started in the 1830's even Eastern Europe connected to the process later. It doesn't mean that slow outflows couldn't have a character. Migration is not only economic or political process but might have individual importance of those contributing to a country's progress. Some examples are Michael Kovats de Fabriczy one of the founders of the US Cavalry, serving as an officer in the Continental Army during the American Revolutionary War.<sup>1</sup> He was born

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in Karcag, Hungary under name of Kovács Mihály in 1724. The nobleman after serving Maria Theresa's and Frederick the Great's cavalry offered his sword to Benjamin Franklin in France.<sup>2</sup> Or another example of economic and cultural importance: Ágoston Haraszthy, born at Pest, Hungary in 1812. The estate and crop owner nobleman travelled to America with his cousin just for to see this blessed country for himself. There he became the founder of the California vine culture as often called "Father of California Viticulture", the founder of the Buena Vista vineyards and the first planter in Wisconsin too.<sup>3</sup> These are quiet well-known examples the following might be less famous but more important for us to represent those were persecuted after the fall of the Hungarian Revolution in 1849. Tivadar Rombauer was born at Lőcse (present Levoča in Slovakia) in 1803. He became owner of a steel industry founder of another at Ózd and the main weapon supporter of the revolution and the war of independence. After the fall of Arad where his duty was the leading of the military defense he had to escape to America through London. His sons and grandsons settling down in St. Louis immediately assimilated growing up to engineers working on the transcontinental railroad or even planning Eads Bridge. Today descendant are owners of the Rombauer Vineyards in California.<sup>4</sup> The great outflow of Forty-Eighters resulted only 2 710 Hungarians lived in the US by 1860.<sup>5</sup> Wars, revolutions and a consequence misery were the most important factors behind emigration till the end of the 19th century and the main destination was the US. Target countries didn't change just economic reasons emerged in the last decades of that century.

About fifty million people shipped to the Americas since and before the First World War: 35 million to the US. Almost four million went there from the Austro-Hungarian Empire between 1861-1913 and most of them only after 1899. About one third of them came back to their home within 2-5 years. The circulation and the whole migration was influenced by pure economic reasons: a growing period pulled the labor force and from the other side a crisis pushed them individually even as interpreting on population level.

4.2.2.A-11/1/KONV-2012-0069).

<sup>1</sup> PÓKA-PIVNY Aladár – ZACHAR József: *Az amerikai függetlenségi háború magyar hőse – Kovács Mihály ezredes élete (1724-1779)*. Zrínyi Kiadó, Budapest, 1982.

<sup>2</sup> MAPPEN, Marc – LURIE, Maxine N.: Hungarians. In: *Encyclopedia of New Jersey*. Rutgers University Press. 2004 395.

<sup>3</sup> MCGINTY, Brian: *Strong Wine: The Life and Legend of Ágoston Haraszthy*. Stanford University Press 1998.

<sup>4</sup> KOUDELA Pál: *Négy város – Négy család a Felvidéken*. Ráció Kiadó, Budapest (Under publication)

<sup>5</sup> VIDA István Kornél: *Hungarian Émigrés in the American Civil War: A History and Biographical Dictionary*. McFarland, Jefferson. 2011.

*Turning points of emigration from Hungary – Understanding the present changes...*

Structurally the process can be characterized by two main components: peasants and Jewish craftsmen. Reasons extended from labor market and prices to political pressure, persecution.<sup>6</sup>

Hungarian citizens immigrated to the US between 1871-1913<sup>7</sup>

	<i>US Immigration Office Data</i>	<i>Harbors Data</i>	<i>Hungarian Statistical Office Data</i>
<i>1871-1879</i>	5 597	7 682	-
<i>1880-1889</i>	115 252	164 119	-
<i>1890-1899</i>	235 895	261 444	-
<i>1900-1909</i>	1 094 116	1 171 758	854 584
<i>1910-1913</i>	410 480	433 230	315 498

The war and the influenza epidemic slowed down out- or inflows but the real turning point in migration occurred when the Emergency Quota Act came into force in the US in 1921 excluding immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe by limiting their number year by year on their rate in the 1910 US census. The basis of the calculations changed to the 1890 census three years later.

Foreign Born Population by World Region in the United States<sup>8</sup>

<i>Regions population was born</i>	<i>1880</i>	<i>1890</i>	<i>1900</i>	<i>1910</i>	<i>1920</i>
Northern-Europe (Great Britain, Ireland, Scandinavia)	3 212 431	4 056 160	3 917 815	3 953 947	3 501 149
Western-Europe (Austria, France, Germany, etc.)	2 287 458	3 232 757	3 286 834	3 352 378	2 740 767

<sup>6</sup> PUSKÁS Julianna: Migráció Kelet-Közép-Európában 19. és 20. században. In: *Regio Kisebbségtudományi Szemle* 1991. Vol. 2. Nr. 4.

<sup>7</sup> PUSKÁS Julianna: *Kivándorló magyarok az Egyesült Államokban 1880-1940*. Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 1982. 443-446.

<sup>8</sup> GIBSON, Campbell – LENNON, Emily: *Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-Born Population of the United States: 1850 to 1990*. Population Division Working Paper No. 29. Washington, DC: U.S. Bureau of the Census 1999.

Southern-Europe (Italy, Spain, Greece, etc.)	248 620	728 851	1 674 648	4 500 932	5 670 927
Eastern-Europe (Russia, Poland, Hungary, etc.)	182 371	512 464	1 134 680	2 956 783	3 731 327
Asia	107 630	113 383	120 248	191 484	237 950
Africa	2 204	2 207	2 538	3 992	16 126
Australia, Oceania	6 859	9 353	8 820	11 450	14 626
Latin-America	90 073	107 307	137 458	279 514	588 843
Northern-America (Canada)	717 286	980 938	1 179 922	1 209 717	1 138 174

Comparing foreign born population in years 1910 (or even 1920, the relevant year for a law of 1921) and 1890 the intention of exclusion is clearly visible. The most preferred target country for centuries lost its position for Hungarians; emigration to the US suddenly fell down since 1921 but the overseas remained in minds as a possibility, a hope till today as we will see below.

Along with the US Australia and Canada were important destinations. Composition by gender shows classic picture of migration as long as 68.7 % of emigrants were male between 1899-1913, mainly active aged young men without their family, industrial and agricultural workers. From the viewpoint of the countries overseas immigration was basic element of demographic growth.

Census population at the end of and Immigrants during the decades in Canada (thousands)<sup>9</sup>

<i>Decades</i>	<i>1851- 1860</i>	<i>1861- 1870</i>	<i>1871- 1880</i>	<i>1881- 1890</i>	<i>1891- 1900</i>	<i>1901- 1910</i>	<i>1911- 1920</i>
<i>Population</i>	3 230	3 689	4 325	4 833	5 371	7 207	8 788
<i>Net immigration</i>	182	-150	-54	-144	-130	810	311

<sup>9</sup> Statistics Canada. Government of Canada. 1851-1920 Censuses.

As we can see the real turning point was the turn of the century. In 1880 only two Hungarians immigrated to the country, the next year only one, in 1883 their number was 38. In the following years 7 and 26 immigrants went there from Hungary (Austro-Hungarian Empire with birth place in Hungary). An interesting case of immigrants and a special individual influence on migration can be observed in the life of Pál Esterházy, born Johannes Baptista Vintetius Packh, commonly known as János Packh; in North America he signed Paul O. d'Esterházy. Obviously not an Esterházy only rumored at his birth in 1831 but used this name despite any protest of the aristocrat family. The non-real Esterházy fled to London and later to the US after his participation of the fallen revolution forced to do so and became a federal immigration officer until 1870 when the Government's new law restricted ability for a position as an officer for US citizens only. In the following years he founded the First Hungarian-American Colonization Company in the US but in 1885 the Canadian Pacific Railway invited him to assist in the relocation, from the United States to western Canada, of immigrants from Austria-Hungary. The same year he became a Government Official of immigration in Canada and started to organize a "New Hungary" in Canada. He established the Hungarian Immigration and Colonization Aid Society and recruited Hungarian miners from Pennsylvania and peasants from Austria-Hungary. In 1885 he established a settlement near Minnedosa, Manitba, at a place that later became known as Huns Valley. The following year an additional group of immigrants established a second settlement, which was soon called Esterhaz (later Esterhazy), in the Qu'Appelle valley of the North-West Territories.<sup>10</sup> As a result in 1893 eve 241 immigrants arrived from Hungary to Canada and altogether 1 081 until 1900. Between 1901 and 1914 the number of Hungarian immigrants in Canada boosted up to 6 506. Most of them settled down in Saskatchewan and several villages was named originally in Hungarian like Halmok, Otthon, Békevár (today Kipling) etc. The city of Esterházy counted 900 inhabitants by 1902 and Saskatchewan was called Little Hungary before the First World War although only 11 648 Hungarians lived in Canada by 1911 and 6 534 of them in Saskatchewan with a total population of 492 432 that year.

The Immigration Act of 1924 in the United States limited annual European immigration to 2% of the number of people from that country living in the United States in 1890. 62 435 Hungarian born lived in the US in 1890 but in 1920 the number of them increased to 397 283. The Act highly reduced

<sup>10</sup> WILLMOTT, Donald E.: Ethnic solidarity in the Esterhazy area, 1882–1940. In: *Ethnic Canadians: culture and education*. Ed. KOVACS, M. L. Canadian Plains Research Center, University of Regina, 1978. 76-167.



immigration from Eastern European nationalities that had only small populations in the US in 1890. The previous 0.7% of Hungarians in total population compared to the latter 2.9%. The most popular destination for emigration lost its place but not in minds as we will see. Despite the exclusion in the US Canada remained a target country for Hungarian emigration after the First World War a new wave begun to emigrate there, Canadian in the next decade Hungarian population in Canada increased with 37 000. Both political and economic factors motivated emigration; not only farmers to the western territories like before 1920 to Manitoba or Saskatchewan but rather to the industrialized eastern cities like Montreal, Toronto, Hamilton and Windsor. 40 500 Hungarian lived in Canada in 1931 and 54 500 a decade later. Integration developed as long as institutions like schools, churches, libraries and associations or even newspapers such as the *Canadai Magyar Farmer* (1910-1918) and the *Kanadai Magyar Újság* (1924-1976) came into existence. The third emigrational wave to Canada was after the Second World War. Refugees, asylum seekers, political persecution are dominant, officers, military officers had to flee but tradesmen and owners of companies the communist country socialized also fled abroad, many of them to Canada. The latter had asset in employment by knowing English unlike the former officers. Hungarians in Canada<sup>11</sup>

<i>Census year</i>	1901	1911	1921	1931	1941	1951	1961	1971	1981
<i>Number of residents</i>	1 549	11 648	13 181	40 582	54 598	60 460	126 220	131 890	116 395

Since 1924 and even now the most relevant target countries are Germany and Austria for Hungarian emigration but sub periods are not as easy to differentiate as was in the previous era. Between the two wars migration outflows decrease from Hungary mainly because of the political limitations of the German speaking territories. The prosecutions and the Second World War emphasized the political and religious refugees' role in migration and after the war about 250 thousand people fled from the fore coming communism, most of them to Western European countries and America. With the beginning of totalitarian governing and Russian rule outflows depressed, controlled and was forbidden until 1989 only the Revolution in 1956 resulted a higher number of emigrants

<sup>11</sup> DREISZIGER, Nándor F.: Research Note: Hungarians in the Canadian West. *Prairie Forum*. Vol. 10, No. 2. Fall 1985. 437.

approximately 200 000 of whom 36 637 fled to the US.<sup>12</sup> We can consider 1948 a turning point or even 1989 but the main courses didn't change then. Changing home was difficult, expensive; to know another language is rare, to travel is hard. Searching for better conditions lead to a general change in lifestyle, identity and relations. Thus interpretations emerged in sociology after the Second World War emphasized the chains of relations needed for and individual to emigrate and social factors mainly economic migration was embedded. Path dependence or structural changes could influence migration as well as family strategies.<sup>13</sup>

### *3. The last turning point*

Real turning point is hard to determine in recent years. After the fall of the communism few changed in emigration from Hungary. Employment was restricted, earning citizenship was hard in western countries thus only few tried to emigrate, most of them by reason of reuniting their family or looked occasionally for an illegitimate employment in agriculture or hotel trade or as an au pair. Enlargement in 2004 opened the labor markets of some EU countries especially the United Kingdom and Ireland, and in 2006 Finland, Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy let the A8 citizens into their labor markets. In the following year Luxemburg and the Netherlands in 2008 France, in 2009 Belgium and Denmark solved their restrictions. Finally in 2011 the two most relevant countries were open: Austria and Germany. Thus we cannot stipulate an exact year of changing circumstances. Before 2011 and even before 2004 Germany received many Hungarians by bilateral agreements in building industry and others or by family reuniting.<sup>14</sup> In the years before accession of Hungary the number of immigrants in Germany got over the ten thousand in every year while every other country was unimportant compared to this. Despite their labor force restriction the number of Hungarian immigrants reached 25 000 in 2008 in Germany and in 2010 the number was 29 220. In the same year 20 425 Hungarian left Germany so the net long term migration was 8 795. We became the fourth largest source country in that year by this

<sup>12</sup> U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. 1997. *Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1996*. Washington, DC. U.S. Government Printing Office. 2<sup>nd</sup> table.

<sup>13</sup> PORTES, Alejandro: Migration and Social Change: Some Conceptual Reflections. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*. Vol. 36, Iss. 10, 2010 1537-1563.

<sup>14</sup> SALT, John: *Current Trends in International Migration in Europe*. Council of Europe, CDMG 2005.

number after Poland, Romania and Bulgaria and overtook Turkey.<sup>15</sup> Comparing to the 16 900 immigrants in 2000 it means a 73 % growth. 2011 didn't mean as much as were expected<sup>16</sup> in Germany only in 2012 started to grow immigration again from Eastern-European countries in total. In 2012 the other main destination country Austria also received a higher number of Hungarians. 12 275 Hungary-born emigrated to Austria and 6 355 left the country thus in net migration Hungary (5 920) became the second in Austria just behind Germany.<sup>17</sup>

But not only EU enlargement influenced the rates of emigration from Hungary. The first cheap air flight company started to operate in 2003. Airport Ferihegy 1 was rebuild in 2005 and the traffic rate has grown 46 % from the year 2004 to 2005 because of the cheap ticket prices.<sup>18</sup> Finally with the bankruptcy of the Hungarian airways Malév in 2011 price competition became more unlimited and air transport turned into everyday occurrence. This change in aviation influenced the rate of migration especially circular migration but this is not the only effect of it. Easy travelling revolutionized the connection between countries in east and west. A trip to another country is not associated with lifelong decisions any more. Circular migration increased since and the difference between circular and long term migration is characterized in different way. Since the mid 2000's periodical working extended to a very wide range of the labor market. Circular mobility depends on previous experiences and self-interests. The larger context to understand these numbers is still economic. The propensity to emigrate is influenced by the level of unemployment in the home country and the percentage of the working population in that country that have gone e.g. to the UK. Gilpin identifies a very clear relationship between these factors.<sup>19</sup> The principal reason for emigration is the belief that employment prospects are better and living standards higher in the host country. In other words, the largest numbers of migrants migrate from those countries where unemployment is high and

<sup>15</sup> *Statistisches Jahrbuch. Deutschland und Internationales 2012*. Statistische Bundesamt. 40-49.

<sup>16</sup> Berufsausweis für Ausländer ängstigt deutsche Firmen. *Die Welt*. On 13<sup>th</sup> December 2011. retrieved from <http://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article13765842/Berufsausweis-fuer-Auslaender-aengstigt-deutsche-Firmen.html>

<sup>17</sup> International Migrations and Migrations within Austria acc.to Communes. 2013. Retrieved from <http://statcube.at/superwebguest/login.do?guest=guest&db=debevwan010>

<sup>18</sup> Repülőtér-forgalmi adatok Budapest Ferihegy. 2005. Budapest Airport Rt. Budapest Ferihegy Nemzetközi Repülőtér Üzemeltető Rt. Készítette: Stratégiai és Üzletfejlesztési Igazgatóság, November 2005.

<sup>19</sup> GILPIN, Nicola – HENTY, Matthew – LEOS, Sara – PORTES, Jonathan – BULLEN, Chris: *The impact of free movement of workers from Central and Eastern Europe on the UK labour market*. DWP Working Paper No. 29. 2006

relative incomes are low. Indeed, Lithuanians (with the highest unemployment and the lowest GDP per head) are the most likely to emigrate of all A8 citizens.<sup>20</sup> But composition of migrants has changed. Greater human capital translates into better opportunities in the labor market and easier entry into the host society's economic mainstream. That, in part, is why migration of professionals is seldom seen as a problem in the host societies. On the contrary, flows composed of poorly-educated workers can have a more durable impact because of their initial ignorance of the host language and culture and the tendency, especially among migrants from rural origin, to adhere tightly to their customs.<sup>21</sup> New target countries since 2004 show easy examples to understand this process. On the basis of the age at which individuals left full-time education, immigrants, especially new immigrants, generally appear to be more skilled than those born in the United Kingdom.<sup>22</sup> 66 per cent of the UK-born population has completed secondary school while 17 per cent have a degree. A smaller part of recent migrants but not just A8 migrants, 52 percent, have a secondary school qualification but a much higher proportion (36 %) have degrees. We have empirical evidence indicating that limited language usage restrains migrant workers' to find jobs at their most productive level in the economy. This means over-qualified workers are competing with low skilled UK-born workers, which may lead to displacement as well as the underutilization of migrants' skills.<sup>23</sup> 31.5 per cent of A8 migrants reported language difficulties in finding or keeping a job – compared with 25 per cent of all migrants.<sup>24</sup>

Considering these above the change in spoken languages in the last decades seems more important than before.

<sup>20</sup> COATS, David: *Migration Myths: Employment, Wages and Labour Market Performance*. London, The Work Foundation 2008. 31.

<sup>21</sup> PORTES, Alejandro - RUMBAUT, Rubén G.: *Immigrant America: A Portrait*. 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. 2006

<sup>22</sup> SALEHEEN, Jumana – SHADFORTH, Chris: The economic characteristics of immigrants and their impact on supply. *Quarterly Bulletin*. Q4 London, Bank of England, 2006, 374-385.

<sup>23</sup> DICKINSON, Scott et. al.: Migrant Workers Economic Issues and Opportunities. In: Viewpoint Series, Issue 2: Aug. 2008 London, England: SQW Consulting p. 13

<sup>24</sup> CLARK, Ken - DRINKWATER, Stephen: The labour-market performance of recent migrants. *Oxford Review of Economic Policy* 24(3), 2008. 495-516.

Command of Languages in Hungary<sup>25</sup>

	1990	2001	2011
<i>English</i>	228 956	941 139	1 356 307
<i>German</i>	416 215	957 289	923 423

Number of those speaking German in Hungary doubled in the last twenty years but the number of English speakers are almost six times higher thus the latter took the place of the former as a leading spoken foreign language in Hungary. The fact itself causes changes in migration destinations as we have seen in the growing role of the UK and Ireland of A8 emigration.<sup>26</sup> But the spread of speaking foreign languages makes easier travelling, getting a job, settlement or creating new connections as well. Thus we have to calculate up with not only the increase because of the abilities but with a growing and changing pattern in migration chains. Family and local communities had the leading role to achieve possibilities in the past but now new communication forms create new virtual and real communities and connection networks such as the very first forums appeared on internet after foreign employment emerged since 2004. Hungarian searched information and help eagerly and those had some experience shared it.<sup>27</sup> The difference between the Hungarian Club in London organized by György Krasso in the 80's and a Facebook group of Hungarians in the UK is more than only a difference between the numbers of their members.

But others changed too in the last years. Crossing borders, getting jobs, travelling are easier and studying is also easier. The number of students in West-European countries are still growing. The total number of A8 students in Higher Education in the UK has increased each year since accession. In the years 2007-2010 this increase was occurring at a slower rate than immediately after accession. There were about 17,000 students in Higher Education who were previously resident in an A8 country in the academic year 2008/09; this made up less than 1 percent of the total student numbers

<sup>25</sup> Censuses Hungary

<sup>26</sup> KOUDELA Pál: International Migration Outflows from Hungary, Inflows to the UK as A Typical East-West Direction in the EU. *Ege Stratejik Arastirmalar Dergisi (Ege Strategic Research Journal)* Vol. 4. No. 1. Izmir, Turkey. 2013. 1-14.

<sup>27</sup> KOUDELA Pál: A nemzetközi vándorlás motívumai (The Motives of International Migration). In: *A 21. század kihívásai és Magyarország jövőképe*. Ed. BESZTERI Béla. Komárom-Veszprém, MTA VEAB. 2011. 143-152.

in the UK (0.7 per cent in 2008/09 compared to 0.2 per cent in 2004/05).<sup>28</sup> But reforming higher education in Hungary the number of candidates decreased dramatically.

Number of applicants to higher education in Hungary<sup>29</sup>

2011	2012	2013
141 000	110 000	95 000

Considering all above we can state that general change occurred in the deep structure of migration. From one side we can interpret as the unification process of the EU: labor markets and borders are more permeable but from the other side cultural, language, economic differences still identify countries as independent places. Thus potentials in labor markets are still important factors of economic growth. Emigrating groups can still be characterized by those in the past: younger, more economically active, more educated in general. As internal migration drift away doesn't help a region's or a city's economic life international migration outflows don't help the economic life of a country. But as long as migration is based on pure economic reasons and can be connected to depressions and conjunctures the situation is quite simple: despite decreasing number of potential labor force causes decrease in economic potential there are many other factors like natural forces to explore, financial agreements and investments etc. to help economic growth. As long as economy was based on labor force of agriculture and industry with uneducated, poor workers migration was a compulsion of the circumstances and didn't reduce supply in labor market generally. But today the structural differences between labor markets and social stratification lead to anomalies and dysfunctions of economics. For example in case of the UK there is anxiety that there is a brain drain, whereby workers are being trained in their home countries resulting high costs for those governments, but their skills and talents are not being used in the domestic economy. This is often related to specific skills or sectors. In Hungary, for example, between 1<sup>st</sup> May 2004 and 31<sup>st</sup> December 2005, 2.2 percent of all doctors applied for the diploma notification and this

<sup>28</sup> GILLINGHAM, Emma: *Understanding A8 migration to the UK since Accession*. London, Office for National Statistics 2010. 13.

<sup>29</sup> [http://www.felvi.hu/felveteli/ponthatarok\\_rangsorok/elmult\\_evek](http://www.felvi.hu/felveteli/ponthatarok_rangsorok/elmult_evek)

proportion was even bigger (seven to eight percent) among anesthetists, pulmonologists and plastic surgeons.<sup>30</sup>

#### 4. *The Role of Education*

One of the most important factors of changes in migration is about education. Intentions to emigrate is measured for decades and in 2012 was at its peak. During the last two decades the rate of those want to emigrate and settle down in a foreign country has tripled in Hungarian adult population.<sup>31</sup> While in 1993 only 5 % planned any kind of emigration this rate in 2001 was 10 % and 15 % in 2011. In 2012 the rate was 19 % but the 2013 rate decreased to 16 %. Target countries are still Austria, Germany, and the UK but the US and Canada makes a big role in plans despite real outflows are much lower to these countries. About 1 000 persons immigrate to the US from Hungary annually and only 281 immigrated to Canada in 2011 but even the highest number of the previous decade was just 685 in 2004. (Facts and Figures 2011) The proportion of traditional destination countries is extremely high: 60 % of planned circular emigration said the first three countries mentioned above. Risk factors by social status shows the traditional picture: male (22%), younger cohorts (48% of those under 30), unemployed and higher educated are overrepresented. 56% of students planned to emigrate to one of the western countries. Emigrational aims can be experienced among students' applications for admissions to foreign universities. Despite there is no systematical data for every country but the directors of the leading secondary schools reported 20-25 % of their graduating students sent their application only to foreign universities in 2013.<sup>32</sup> In Austria the growing number of Hungarian students are measured every year by the Hungarian Student Association (Verein Ungarischer Studierender). The number of Hungarian students almost doubled: 1 141 in 2004 and 1 916 in 2012. The number of students boosted in the UK from the last year.

<sup>30</sup> CLARK, Nick – HARDY, Jane: *Free Movement in the EU. The Case of Great Britain*. Berlin, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. 2011. 19.

<sup>31</sup> SÍK Endre: *Kicsit csökkent, de továbbra is magas a migrációt tervezők aránya*. [http://www.tarki.hu/hu/news/2013/kitekint/20130220\\_migraciot\\_tervezok.html](http://www.tarki.hu/hu/news/2013/kitekint/20130220_migraciot_tervezok.html) (14. April 2013)

<sup>32</sup> IVANYOS Judit: *Több ezer diákot veszítettek a magyar egyetemek: a legjobbak mennek külföldre*. [http://eduline.hu/erettsegi\\_felveteli/2013/3/19/Egyre\\_tobb\\_diak\\_jelentkezik\\_kulfoldre\\_egyete\\_Q4SVQW](http://eduline.hu/erettsegi_felveteli/2013/3/19/Egyre_tobb_diak_jelentkezik_kulfoldre_egyete_Q4SVQW) (on 19<sup>th</sup> March 2013)



Students from Hungary in the UK<sup>33</sup>

	2008	2012	2013
<i>Applications</i>	310	519	719
<i>Admissions</i>	192	329	422

In the year of the highest migration aims and the introduction of the tuition in higher education I made an experiment.<sup>34</sup> My goal was to measure the confusion, the available information and associational field of the students: the most relevant population of forthcoming emigrational changes. As part of the experiment I asked 281 students of our College by a questionnaire. As I supposed above there are less and less difficulty in circumstances to change homeland and as a consequence the volume of migration outflows increased. But there is still other potential I wanted to reveal. I supposed that there are limitations, barriers in the deep of people's mind. Values, reactions don't change as fast as material or institutional circumstances, adaptation to environment is slow. Thus I wanted to know these fences in minds. My first question was a free association to migration. I asked only one word in a common situation: at the beginning of my lecture, of those we know each other well, on a test-like paper we used to write. Any other question about their intentions would had disturbed the sign of their deepest feelings of migration so I put behind the first association: demographic question, and about their experiences on migration, studies. After sixteen such questions we came to the next point of the experiment: if they have fears of emigration. I asked three final questions: first they had to guesstimate the price of the cheapest flight from Budapest to London (at any time or airways), second I listed ten EU countries and they had to underline those a Hungarian could get a job without restrictions. The question even instructed them that any could be underlined, and of course free employment was in all at that time. The last such question was to find out if it was able to get a job in Spain without speaking Spanish. I thought that the answers were obvious especially for those I taught about that. I was sure that wrong answers, the underestimates came rather from the fear of the unknown than their missing knowledge. The

<sup>33</sup> Egyesült Királyság Magyar Diákszövetsége (Hungarian Student Association UK): <http://hsauk.soc.srcf.net/>

<sup>34</sup> KOUDELA Pál: A fiatalok képe a nemzetközi vándorlásról és lehetőségekről. In: *A felfedező tudomány*. Ed.: BESZTERI, Béla) Győr, 2013. Online: <http://kgk.sze.hu/a-felfedezo-tudomany>



first of them about the prices searched for fears about their financial limits. I supposed that sign a high value means a high risk factor of this: the highest price the biggest fear that can't afford it. Ticking a high price doesn't mean a really missing money but the fear of that can restrain people to buy and go. Despite since 2003 tickets are cheap in people's mind to travel by airplane means something exclusive and expensive method. Thus the results were not very surprising despite the real cheapest price was that time under 10 000 forints.

Answers for the question: "How much does the cheapest flight ticket cost from Budapest to London and back at any time and by any company?"

<i>Options</i>	No answer/ doesn't know	1 10 000 Ft.	2 25 000 Ft.	3 50 000 Ft.	4 75 000 Ft.	5 100 000 Ft. or more	Together
<i>Number of answers</i>	1	55	137	53	26	9	281

Only 55 of 281 ticked the correct answer most of them put a sign to a value a bit higher than the average cost of an evening or morning ticket at the more expensive airways. Despite the average prices at the Easy Jet and Wizzair were 20-25 000 forints they had cheaper tickets anyway. 31 % of the answers were much higher than real prices after the breakdown of the nation airways Malév. From our viewpoint the 31 % of the answers showed great apprehension and 80 % of them only the lack of information. Imagining as a scale would be more expressive (only to illustrate): the mean value is 2.275 between 1 and 5.

The next question was rather like a test: tick the correct answers where can a Hungarian get job without restrictions? The situation was like an exam despite they didn't write their names on it and there were no instruction about score reduction because of wrong answers but I was their professor, we were in the biggest auditorium. Scarce of ticking wrong answers was embedded to the situation but isn't it not when they fill application documents to study or work abroad?

*Turning points of emigration from Hungary – Understanding the present changes...*

Answers to the question about free employment in EU countries

<i>Options</i>	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Together
<i>Answers</i>	5	6	24	29	55	49	33	31	18	14	17	281

We can consider the lack of any underline as to refuse answering or as an answer: “I don’t know” but this shows doubtfulness anyway. In any other case the scale measures the grade of lack of information or the presence of fears and doubts. Excluding zero underlines the average is 5.3 and 5.2 including them. Correct answer would have been 10 but only 17 ticked so and the modus was only 4.

45 of them had already working experiences abroad, filtering them the situation is the following.

Answers to the question about free employment in EU countries among those had working experiences abroad

<i>Options</i>	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Together
<i>Answers</i>	-	-	3	2	9	8	3	7	9	1	3	45

It seemed like experiences didn’t influence information and fears thus answers very much. This is possible that someone having been working in Germany didn’t know about other countries’ limitations or the lack of limitations and have a great chance to go there and work again or even settle in Germany. After all I think that the lack of information limits the options making a decision.

The last question about fears was if Spanish is needed to get a good job in Spain or not. The correct answer is not evident at all. I know some people working in Spain from the UK without Spanish for a good money but I suppose that with language it is much easier. But that’s not the point of this question that is why there were no option for „I don’t know”. This was not very likely that anyone knew or had any experience. I only wanted to know about their uncertainty or the rate of it. 61 % of them answered no but considering only males the rate is only 50 %. Lack of working experience decrease the rate to 58%, lack of working experience abroad to 55 %. This is hard to interpret this result. The fact that to enter employment is much easier

with the command of language - in the UK for example almost impossible without - in not sure how influences the answers. The media is full of this information and many know from their real experience. At least it comes from the difference between the rates above. But this was my goal to see how fear of unknown limits the decision-making. I could suppose that experience generally increase braveness and openness despite of knowing a country's limits. But the result proofed that to learn how difficult is without a fluent language of the receiving country leads to believe that the situation is similar everywhere. Analogical deduction is stronger based on negative experiences than to suppose the opposite even if it is auspicious. Answers in a semiofficial, stressed situation are considered to be signs of those limits can be found dug deep inside thus results can be interpret as the picture of the inner limits or burdens of emigration.

## *5. Conclusions*

Historical reasons and interpret by mainly political and economic factors such as structural differences in labor force or political, religious persecutions are partly out of date in the modern world. Changing technological, infrastructural and communication environment causes transformation in migration patterns too. New demographic groups are involved. In the past only two major kind of migration chain worked: the family outflow or the individual followed or not by family members. Today social distances decreased by fast and easy travelling and cheap communication. Individuals' relation also changed to governments thus understanding migration and potential migrants' intentions is a complex method of researching surviving values and emotions along with new preferences. Our aim was to stand side by side those historical elements and periods of emigration from Hungary can be characterized by typical patterns in the past and those newly emerged patterns we researched in recent years to show how differences evolved and migration is changing.

## THE ROLE OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISES AND THEIR PROJECTS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF STRATEGIC PLANS

### *1. Introduction*

Global macroeconomic imbalances have appeared due to the intemperate financial liberalization hitting mainly the emerging markets, though these damages have had their undermining impacts on all countries regardless they made some short term or long term measures to stabilize their economies.<sup>1</sup>

Lots of concerns have appeared about the adequacy of the present measures of economic performance, especially those concentrating on GDP figures, because they proved improper when measuring societal well-being or economic, environmental, and social sustainability. In the wake of the Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress based on the output of the Commission<sup>2</sup> chaired by Joseph Eugene Stiglitz and created on French government's initiative, seeking ways to a more intense participation of public in overcoming the crisis as soon as possible and in alleviating its destructive effects on the societies has been spreading recently.

The present crisis has highlighted many of the handicaps of the broadly accepted system of democratic operation of not only the members of The European Union, but other developed countries too. Civil movements have pointed out, that the "happy state of unawareness" is getting to its end and it is high time they have churned out their abilities to plan and control their strategies for life. In the meantime, the global processes leading to the preference of efficiency in the fierce global competition rather than democratic self-governance have their antipodes: the desire of more and more people to live in healthy and decent conditions, to have the chance to operate their communities and to take control over their lives.

Besides, alienation in the modern societies have evoked a kind of intention on behalf of civil organizations to form some more communities and operate them in the way that helps them weave the fabric of the society stronger. Consequently, they would like to have a share in self- and social care, consumers'

<sup>1</sup> STIGLITZ, Joseph Eugene: *Reforming the International Monetary and Financial Systems in the Wake of the Global Crisis*. The New Press, 2010.

<sup>2</sup> STIGLITZ, Joseph Eugene – SEN, Amartya – FITOUSSI, Jean-Paul: *Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress*. Brussels, 2009.

protection, local production and supply of goods, environment protection, preservation of traditions and culture, etc.

Other phenomena developed in the last quarter of the twentieth century: corporate social responsibility actions, which gained ground supporting marketing strategies of the actors of the global economy. These actions have driven the consumers' attention to distinct values of social and economic issues.

To solve the social and economic problems of the turn of the century – social enterprises came into life during the 1980s and 1990s with different targets, bearing different features and setup.<sup>3</sup> Even today it is not clear what the definition 'social enterprise' cover and what their role may be in the economic and social spheres. Truly enough, civilians have not gained enough force yet to have substantial influence on the process of elaborating strategies of settlements of different sizes or that of some regions, though we must say, that the experts involved in the planning process partly belong to the civil society, as well. The civil organizations' capability of the fulfilment of short term plans and projects is beyond question, but is it real fear, that they would fail in planning objectives for long term? Those ones who operate as a kind of social enterprise have already gained some experience of both the rat race

<sup>3</sup> Most recent literature on social enterprises used for this study are: ANDOR László: Szociális vállalkozások az Európai Unióban. *XXI. század – Tudományos Közlemények* 2012/28. 9-14. BORZAGA, Carlo – DEFOURNEY, Jacques: *The Emergence of Social Enterprise*. London. Routledge. 2001. GAËLLE, Pierre: *The Economic and Social Consequences of Unemployment and Long-term Unemployment*. PhD Thesis, University of Warwick. 2000. GERGEN, Christopher – VANOUREK, Gregg: *Life Entrepreneurs: Ordinary People Creating Extraordinary Lives*, Warren Bennis Books Series. 2008. *Hybrid Organizations in the Third Sector*. Ed.: BILLIS, David. Palgrave MacMillan. 2010. MARETICH, Martha – BOLTON, Margaret: *Social Enterprise: From Definitions to Developments in Practice*. European Venture Philanthropy Association. Alliance Publishing Trust. 2010. NICHOLLS, Alex: *Social Entrepreneurship: New Models of Sustainable Social Change*. Oxford University Press. 2006. PARK, Chisung – WILDING, Mark: Social enterprise policy design: Constructing social enterprise in the UK and Korea. *International Journal of Social Welfare*. 2013. 22(3): 236-247. RIDLEY-DUFF Rory – BULL, Mike: *Understanding Social Enterprise: Theory and Practice*. London. Sage Publication. 2011. *Social Enterprises in Europe: Between Market, Public Policies and Communities*. Ed.: NYSSSENS, Marthe, London, Routledge. 2006. SPRECKLEY, Freer: *Social Enterprise Planning Toolkit*. British Council. 2011. *Térületfejlesztési füzetek (1). Segédlet a közösségi tervezéshez*. Szerk.: SAIN Mátyás. Budapest, Nemzeti Gazdasági és Fejlesztési Minisztérium. 2010. YUNUS, Muhammad – MOINGEON, Bertrand – LEHMANN-ORTEGA, Laurence: Building Social Business Models: Lessons from the Grameen Experience. *Long Range Planning*, April-June 2010. Vol 43, n° 2-3. WOODIN, Tom – CROOK, David – CARPENTIER, Vincent: *Community and Mutual Ownership: A historical review*. York, Joseph Rowntree Foundation. 2010. WYLER, Steve: *A History of Community Asset Ownership*. London, Development Trusts Association. 2009.

and the success orientation. In addition, the European Union have allocated several million Euros to assist the civilians in their capacity building, i.e. they have been given grants to obtain strategic approach, develop and apply managerial skills, learn analyzing methods, find or create synergy between different activities, what is more: be real leaders - these results must be made use of or else they might be trifled. The experienced and the new 'emerging' civil organizations require their space in the solution to the worrisome present processes of economic, financial and social decline.

## *2. Definition of Social Enterprises*

Social enterprises can be positioned on half-way between the traditional private and public sectors, but there is no universally accepted definition of them, besides, they have some main characteristics that distinguish them from others, namely: their social and societal objectives are combined with the entrepreneurial spirit of the private sector; the common good is their main purpose.

Legislation of only a few countries determines the characteristics of a social enterprise. The UK Government's official definition of social enterprise developed in partnership with the sector, is: 'A social enterprise is a business with primarily social objectives whose surpluses are principally re-invested for that purpose in the business or in the community, rather than being driven by the need to maximise profit for shareholders and owners.'<sup>4</sup> This definition is commonly accepted in the European Union, though there is no official definition in Cyprus. Social enterprises have very wide scope of activities however, they have some common features: they fulfil social goals, have trading income, address a target group of population in need, may operate under different legal forms, apply voluntary work, have a non-profit orientation or reinvests profits and may be donated public funding.

In North America, Social Enterprise Alliance is a membership organization for the rapidly growing social enterprise sector. They regard social enterprises as the 'missing middle' between the traditional governmental, non-profit and business sectors. The alliance addresses social concerns, 'more efficiently than government, which no longer has the mandate or resources to solve every social problem; more sustainably and creatively than the non-profit sector, which faces declining funding streams and increased demands for innovation, proof of what works and collaboration; and more generously than business,

<sup>4</sup> HECKL, Eva – PECHER, Ingrid: *KMU Forschung Austria*. Austrian Institute for SME Research, Vienna, 2007. 11.

which is mandated to place pre-eminence on shareholder returns, but is also realizing it can't succeed in a decaying world.'<sup>5</sup> One of the main differences between the non-profit sector and social enterprises lies in the source of their income; non-profits gain their operating costs from donations and state subsidies, while social enterprises intend to make profit in order to cover their operating outlays.

EMES<sup>6</sup> defines and characterises social enterprises on the basis of four economic indicators such as a continuous activity producing goods and services, a high degree of autonomy, economic risk taking and a certain amount of other kinds of risk. These enterprises have social indicators as well, including as follows: they are a kind of initiative launched by a group of citizens, their decision making power is not based on capital ownership, they are of a participatory nature, which involves the persons affected by the activity, distribution of profit is limited and they have an explicit aim to benefit the community.<sup>7</sup>

The European Commission 'uses the term 'social enterprise' to cover the following types of business:

- those for which the social or societal objective of the common good is the reason for the commercial activity, often in the form of a high level of social innovation,
- those where profits are mainly reinvested with a view to achieving this social objective,
- and where the method of organisation or ownership system reflects their mission, using democratic or participatory principles or focusing on social justice.

Thus on the one hand, businesses providing social services and/or goods and services to vulnerable persons (access to housing, health care, assistance for elderly or disabled persons, inclusion of vulnerable groups, child care, access

<sup>5</sup> Webpage of the Alliance of Social Enterprises. <https://www.se-alliance.org/what-is-social-enterprise> (25 September 2013)

<sup>6</sup> EMES is a research network of established university research centres and individual researchers. It was formally established as a non-profit association (ASBL under Belgian law) in 2002 and named after its first research programme, on „the emergence of social enterprises in Europe”.

<sup>7</sup> *Emerging models of social entrepreneurship: possible paths for social enterprise development in Central East and South East Europe*. Seminar organised by the OECD LEED Trento Centre for Local Development and the Institute for the Development of Non-Profit Organisations (ISSAN) in co-operation with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). 28-29 September 2006. The Regent Esplanade Zagreb, Croatia)



to employment and training, dependency management, etc.), and on the other hand, businesses with a method of production of goods or services with a social objective (social and professional integration via access to employment for people disadvantaged in particular by insufficient qualifications or social or professional problems leading to exclusion and marginalisation) but whose activity may be outside the realm of the provision of social goods or services.<sup>8</sup>

Concerning organisational and managerial issues, social enterprises are most heterogeneous, whereas all their focus lies on a participatory approach, and therefore their relations (to clients, community, public institutions and other social enterprises) are based on partnership rather than on market principles. These enterprises have a multi-stakeholder structure and use regular employees as well as volunteers and co-operations with clients in order to achieve their results.

Returning to the question of the current crisis, social enterprises do and will certainly provide additional employment opportunities especially if policies strengthening the position of social enterprises, donating them assistance and outsourcing of social objectives continue. Apart from this, in the close future integration of long-term unemployed and disabled people as well as the provision of social services are expected to remain consorted by the importance of fair-trade, environment and local development. These combined with the required participation may provide the experience of common success, self-confidence and the need for democratic control over the community affairs.

### *3. High Potential of Social Enterprises*

Social economy is not only a tolerated sector; on the one hand, it contributes to the social well-being employing 11 million people Europe-wide, which accounts to 6% of the total European employment. According to the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor Report on Social Entrepreneurship the share of employment covered by the social economy is 4,1% in Belgium, 7,5% in Finland, 3,1% in France, 3,3% in Italy, 5,4% in Slovenia, 5,7% in UK, a quarter of all the enterprises launched in Europe is social enterprise and this rate is even higher in Belgium, Finland and France reaching one third.<sup>9</sup> On the

<sup>8</sup> *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Social Business Initiative Creating a favourable climate for social enterprises, key stakeholders in the social economy and innovation.* COM (2011) Brussels, 25.10.2011. 682 final. 2.

<sup>9</sup> TERJESEN, Siri – LEPOUTRE, Jan – JUSTO, Rachida – BOSMA, Niels: *Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) 2009 Report on Social Entrepreneurship*. GEM – Babson



other hand, social enterprises raise the moral status of the society, for they strengthen cohesion while ensuring appreciation on behalf of the others and giving everyday schedule of work for the ones who fall even if temporarily, out of the job market.

Appearance of social economy on our continent is a rapidly growing achievement of the European economic area. It was generated by two main phenomena: an increasing need for social, personal and community services on the one hand, and on the other it is related to the search of new ways aiming at cheap satisfaction of those needs in spite of budgetary limitations and the cuts of taxes. Another important argument supporting the rise of social economy was the high unemployment rate in the late nineties of the past century in West Europe where the formal economy was not able to create enough jobs to provide work for everyone, especially not for disadvantaged people, and the matters became worse with the crisis and its escalation. Then and now, the long-term unemployment has dangerous economic and social consequences that must be avoided. To mention just some of them, it results in the erosion of professional skills, the loss of economic and social gains and contacts, unwillingness of employers to hire a person unemployed for a long time, it may turn into psychological and behavioural deformations, so unemployed people become a vulnerable economic and social group – and the measured impacts of unemployment increase with the duration of unemployment.

At the very beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century social enterprise sector has grown rapidly mainly in Western Europe and North America and it has proved to be a model for public service innovation as well as a provider of local goods. According to Harvard Business School Professor Michael Porter, social enterprise sector will reshape capitalism and its relationship to society. This process has been speeded up due to the prolonged crisis resulting in massive losses of jobs. Since social enterprises are usually formed and lead by people of deprived communities – disadvantaged groups – these enterprises are more likely to be run by younger people than traditional SMEs, with a high proportion of minority ethnic directors, as well as female directors. They are accountable to their customers and communities and involve them in business decision, while they are turning away from public sector markets, in favour of consumers and private companies.

Seemingly, a new generation of businesses have appeared expecting to become increasingly independent of governments and needing to have a bigger

say in local and regional governance, which may serve as a germ of the new model of democracy. This model aims at rather social well-being than piling up wealth on behalf of transnational companies, which are losing their credit despite they are trying hard to catch the consumers with CSR (corporate social responsibility). Further governmental attention is to be paid to the deprived areas, so the public sector still has and will have its importance as their main trading partner. Meanwhile, social enterprises are bound to philanthropy and in this field they have a main role in leading the countries out of the moral crisis accompanying the financial and economic depression.

Concerning the reach of social enterprises, in the survey on the state of social enterprises in UK pointed out, that the majority of organisations work very locally, with 20% stating that they work in their neighbourhood, 19% stating they work within one local authority area and 16% saying they work in several local authority areas.<sup>10</sup> We might as well believe in the efficiency of this span, for British social enterprises have nearly twenty years of experience and are willing to transfer any kind of knowledge they gained from the operation of their organizations. These above mentioned two are the key cores regarding the abilities of social enterprises to play determinative role in the implementation of strategic plans. In some countries of Europe, the development of social enterprises is still hindered by an unfavourable policy climate therefore establishment and growth is blocked by rather a lot of regulatory hindrances.

#### *4. Participation in Planning and Implementation of Local Strategies*

Strategic planning needs a handful of abilities and skills, and the majority of them can and should be learnt. Social layers, which are in short of some basic skills of analysis and planning, are much more vulnerable than the ones who can plan and foresee their future and the latter ones may draw much more benefit from that.

Seemingly, economic and social development needs a kind of social capital that can be generated, used and built while promoting and operating the organizations of social economy. According to the CONSCISE project report made by the Directorate-General for Research of the European Commission, social capital involves the presence of high level of six elements - trust, reciprocity and mutuality, shared norms, sense of belonging and commitment, social networks and information channels, which may be used productively by individuals and groups to facilitate actions in order to benefit individuals,

<sup>10</sup> VILLENEUVE-SMITH, Frank: *Social Enterprise UK. Fightback Britain. A Report on the State of Social Enterprise Survey 2011*. Social Enterprise UK. London. 2011. 28.

groups and the whole community. 'Social capital is clearly an important resource for social enterprises in all phases of organisational and local development, as it reduces transaction costs, is appropriable (once built up for one action it becomes available for others), does not diminish with use, and enables social cohesion.'<sup>11</sup> These are the features, which are vital in planning and implementation of development strategies on local scale and besides, they result in social cohesion and inclusion. Social capital serves as a launching pad and catalyser to social economy mainly in isolated and disadvantaged areas, where regionally planned investments do not occur, but it has slighter impact on the development of urbanized or sub-urbanized areas. In other cases, multiple disadvantage, low skills levels and educational underachievement make human capital affective. In such circumstances social enterprises can play an important role in compensating for poor quality human capital by creating jobs and reaching financial assistance to do so. In this way, social enterprises have an effect on the local society opposite to the long-term unemployment: they emerge professional skills, build social and economic contacts and attract investors.

There appeared an increasing demand from different sides for more local participation in the planning of the environment of different settlements. This was the first field where people wanted to express their ideas about their closer or distant surroundings. Environmental issues were followed by other kinds of strategies that should be elaborated in a location in order at least to gain assistance from the European Union according to the principle of planning applied by the cohesion policy. This simple reason leads to the idea of making use of the experience collected on behalf of the different actors of strategic planning on the local level, such as experts, local councils, NGO-s, new types of different organisations and other civil people. Community planning has been evolving quickly - methods are continuously refined and new ones are invented. Different applications of strategic planning may include at least 50 methods from the Activity week to the Video soapbox and many of the implementation methods have been developed as well.

In the United Kingdom Localism Act was passed in 2011 in order to incorporate the growing need of local communities to take part in making their long-term plans and it launched a growing network of experienced practitioners who can apply those kinds of planning applications, which allow the interacting citizens to devise their own community planning strategy,

<sup>11</sup> *The Contribution of Social Capital in the Social Economy to Local Economic Development in Western Europe*. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, CONSCISE. Directorate-General for Research. 2003. 28.

which suit local conditions and needs and to highlight their goals for 5 or 10 years or even some longer.

Some principles, methods and scenarios of the community planning process are universally relevant and have been collected by the common wisdom of the participants. The above mentioned Localism Act as well as the other EU member states' legislation concerning local development requires developers to consult local communities before applying for planning permission, and it means that they must set up their Neighbourhood Plans as well. These Neighbourhood Plans are necessary to be made in order to become entitled to the European Union financial assistance, for these plans set out the community's proposals for the development of their area. A Neighbourhood Referendum will be required to ensure the approval of the Neighbourhood Plan, which after that is called a Neighbourhood Development Plan.

All development proposals made by the local communities are included in their Neighbourhood Plan and they must be attuned with local plans, titled as Local Development Frameworks and the National Planning Policy Framework. The Local Development Plans and the Neighbourhood Plans both have the necessity to involve all kinds of official and non-official, public and private status organisations and civilians in the planning and the implementation process, therefore their skills will develop as well as their need to be involved in the affairs of the local politics. This way, the participatory democracy can spread on local level and – especially in the case of smaller rural settlements – it can keep and attract the inhabitants.

The Commission's communication mentions some examples of European social businesses. In Italy, a medical centre provides high-level specialised assistance, including cultural mediation, particularly in areas poorly served by public services, with a particular emphasis on people in fragile socio-economic situations (such as immigrants). In Romania, a company has been working since 1996 to provide cultural services in the Romanian language to blind people by adapting media (especially audio books and adapted films) for an estimated 90 000 people. In France, a business launched an innovative concept of water-free car washing services. They use biodegradable products and employ unqualified or marginalised staff in order to reintegrate them in the labour market. In Hungary, a foundation set up a restaurant employing disabled staff and provided training and childcare to ensure the transition to stable employment. In the Netherlands, a company teaches reading using innovative digital tools and a method based on play. This method is particularly suitable for hyperactive or autistic children but can also be used for illiterate people and immigrants. In Poland, a social cooperative comprising two associations employs long-term unemployed and disabled staff and provides

a variety of services: catering and food services, small construction and handicraft jobs and employability training for disadvantaged people.<sup>12</sup>

When people are involved in shaping their local strategies, the benefits of this planning and implementation process can be outlined in different ways. In many cases governments do not have enough means to solve all the existing problems in the area, but local inhabitants can provide some essential additional resources, what is more, local people are the best source of knowledge and wisdom about their own surroundings. Besides, the process of working and achieving things together develops a sense of community, which contributes to the local cohesion. To make matters more comprehensive, since people take part in the decisions affecting their lives, it follows the trend towards democratisation of all aspects of society. In addition, involvement builds local people's confidence, skills and co-operative capabilities and this makes them able to tackle other challenges, which generate new abilities in them through these kinds of informal learning. Experts gain a better insight into the communities they want to serve while working closely with local people. So their research and advisory work will become more effective and will produce better results, besides, university students can be involved into this work and they can learn strategic planning and get organizational skills from practice and this will contribute to their higher qualification. People feel more committed to implement those plans that were elaborated with their involvement. These planning and implementation processes raise social innovation in social businesses and this impact can be 'recycled' into the civil society.

## 5. Conclusion

Around the turn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the concept of social well-being and the need for higher employment met the goals of the European Union. The Wim Kok mid-term report of the Lisbon strategy highlighted the importance of knowledge-based economy, that of the social capital and social innovation in the worldwide competitiveness. In the wake of the report, the EU as well as other developed economies urges the formation of social businesses and their involvement in local planning and development. Doing this, it helps the social fabric be woven stronger through capacity building of formal and informal

<sup>12</sup> *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Social Business Initiative Creating a favourable climate for social enterprises, key stakeholders in the social economy and innovation.* COM (2011). Brussels, 25.10.2011. 682 final

civil organisations and groups of civilians. All these processes have launched a faster development of the participatory democracy and a higher awareness of the civilians of their strategic planning and implementation. The ongoing financial crisis is not still indicating if the present situation can be improved and the market economy sustained, or it should radically change according to the economic and social expectations. Although rather a high rate of jobs is provided by the social economy, there have several fields left, where different kinds of social businesses ranging from non-profit businesses to social cooperatives can offer their services. Starting these kinds of businesses gives the biggest hardship, hence state subsidies and community grants can serve as a launching pad for them. Members of those businesses will acquire managerial and business skills, they may gain practical experience from the fulfilment and implementation of strategies and thus they can have higher potential of leadership and human resource on the job market, which generates a higher level of competitiveness as well.



THE CLARIFICATION OF INCOMPLETE AND  
MISINTERPRETED SOCIAL SCIENCE TERMS IN NATIONAL  
RELATIONS – THE NECESSITY AND LEGITIMACY OF A  
MONOLINGUAL DICTIONARY

*1. Basic issue*

We must emphasize that the international relations term has got two meanings: first one is the relationship between the parts of our dismembered nation, as a result of known historical events; the second is the relationships established with other countries.

In-between these two relationships, we can define a third meaning, which is related to both of them, as well as acting as a connection: our larger region, the Carpathian-basin, the commonwealth of the nations which once were united under the old Kingdom of Hungary.

This is why the international relations are so important, and everything must be done to maintain it: to cultivate it, amend it, expand it.

In the management of the traditional international relations and the relations between the partner nations, the emotional actions must be set aside, and emphasize must be on the sciences, especially on the human sciences, because only the instruments and the results of science can repair the superficial or even hostile relations, to avoid the disrupting disputes, and to require a constructive attitude, and implementation from the parties involved.

The direct heritages of Central Europe are two World Wars, and the unfair peace treaties that followed them, the aggressive dissemination of communism, the Cold War, the Iron Curtain, the asymmetric ending of the communist regimes, and the likewise asymmetric system<sup>1</sup> of the European Union.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> "The crisis of the Euro has dramatically changed the European Union. According to the original intention, it would have been constituted by equal states, who would have given up parts of their sovereignty for the common goal. By now, the EU is divided to creditors and debtors, and it became an unequal and non voluntary system. If an indebted country gets into trouble, the creditors will outnumber this country, and the rules imposed by them won't have any other role than to keep this condition forever" – according to George Soros (Soros sees the election of Merkel as the end of the crises. *Világgazdaság Online* (on 2<sup>nd</sup> October 2000) <http://www.vg.hu/gazdasag/makrogazdasag/soros-szerint-merkel-megvalasztasa-a-valsag-veget-jelentheti-412954>

<sup>2</sup> See the studies of HAMBERGER Judit: *Csehek és szlovákok a magyarokról és Közép-Európáról.* (The Czechs and the Slovaks about Hungarians and Central Europe.)



The victorious powers in WW II were roughly the same, as they achieved a massive victory, and other nations were unilaterally included among the victorious powers, and our country took an enormous sacrifice for the war reparations.

The victorious powers, even the smaller ones included among them, regarded the requirements of international laws and the humanity responsibilities to be less important to observe and to validate them.<sup>3</sup>

The international organizations didn't remedy the offences suffered by single nations, they declared them as bilateral and domestic affairs, even the European Union maintained this attitude, and so they betrayed their own principals.

This occurred primarily because the old international relations concepts – in a comfortable way – still follows the deformed practice inherited from the “dictate” period, still using double standards, namely the winner takes all, and woe to the vanquished (Vae Victis).<sup>4</sup>

## 2. Relevant Hungarian historical concerns:

When the national idea victoriously roams the world, breathing life into buried little states and maturing them: at the same time we are saddened to see that Hungarian society and legislature continues to ignore this world-shaking

SZILÁGYI Imre: Szlovének a magyarokról és Közép-Európáról. (Slovenes about Hungarians and Central Europe.) MOLNÁR Imre–SUTAJ, Stefan: A magyar-szlovák szociológiai kutatások érintkezési pontjairól. (The meeting points of the Hungarian-Slovak sociological researches.) SEBŐK László: A Kárpát-medence magyarságának mai jellemzői. (Present day attributions of the Hungarians living in the Carpathian basin.) GEREKEN Ferenc: A kisebbségi magyar társadalmak értékszemlélete. (The values of the minority Hungarians.) All In: *Magyar út és nehézségei a nemzetállamtól az övezetek Európájába a huszadik század fordulóján. Avarok onogurok – magyarok. A Hatodik Magyar Történelmi Iskola és a Tizenkettedik Magyar Őstörténeti találkozók előadásai és iratai Tapolca, 1997.* Ed. CSIHÁK György. Budapest – Zürich, Zürichi Magyar Történelmi Egyesület, 2005. 56–60., 61–64., 65–104., 105–122., 123–138. Online: <http://mek.oszk.hu/06800/06837/06837.pdf> (on 2<sup>nd</sup> October 2013)

<sup>3</sup> CSAPÓ I. József: Az 1919. december 9. Párizsi Kisebbségi Egyezmény Románia és a társult főhatalmak között. In: *Az első világháború és történelmi következményei. Szent István és a magyar államalapítás.* Ed.: CSIHÁK György. Budapest–Zürich, Zürichi Magyar Történelmi Egyesület, 2003. 61–74. Online: <http://mek.oszk.hu/06800/06802/06802.pdf> (on 2<sup>nd</sup> October 2013)

<sup>4</sup> The few sentences from György Csihák's letter to me unfortunately justify this cruel and uncivilized condition and are widely in agreement with this: “I want to call your attention to one thing: there are no ‘human rights’. It does not matter how many people talk about it. It is not in the UNO charter, in the Bible. It is not in the EU”. – So we are left with voluntary peaceful cooperation.

force” – laments István Hollósy in 1913. He explains this by saying that Hungarian society and legislature “still cannot completely let go of the misguided notion that ‘the unilingual nation is weak and fragile’,”<sup>5</sup> and in this regard we still must establish that Hollósy’s complaints still have not been corrected. However, we do not believe that Hungarian nationalism is weak, but rather that the original, unique and universal humanity serving Hungarian notion of a nation could not break out into the world, where even in Europe, and especially in neighboring nations, national forces were almost entirely moved by the vindication of self-interest.

That is, as Lóránt Bencze mentioned, “Europe is dumbfounded and irritated by the principles of St. Stephen of tolerance, a multi-cultural Europe, and ecological balance. The great powers, guilty of centuries of genocide and assisting in ethnic cleansing; and neighboring nations swaggeringly pride of their cultures, are dumbfounded and irritated in their own racial or lingual nationalism”. Now, “the principle is clear and unique, and when the country was independent, this principle was realized in Hungarian history”.<sup>6</sup> The principle of the Saint King is as follows: “Because when guests arrive from better regions and territories, they bring better languages and customs, better examples and weapons, the country flourishes, enlightening the court, and deters foreigners from flatulence. Because the unilingual and single cultured country is weak and frail”.<sup>7</sup>

At the beginning of our new age, the Austrian imperial restrictions did not allow the maturation of either real individualism or national collectivism, as it happened in other parts of Europe not stricken by the Turks. According to László Pusztaszeri, “during the periods of the Turk wars and the century and a half of subjection, much of the early written Hungarian sources have been destroyed, primarily in acts of war... Furthermore, the Turkish armies occupying Buda and other parts of the country, did not just destroy, but also

<sup>5</sup> HOLLÓSY, István: *Magyarország őslakói és az oláhok eredete tekintettel a nemzetiségi kérdésre és a magyarság történelmi hivatására*. Budapest. Ráth Mór, 1913. 5. Online: [http://mtdaportal.extra.hu/books/hollosy\\_istvan\\_magyarország\\_őslakoi.pdf](http://mtdaportal.extra.hu/books/hollosy_istvan_magyarország_őslakoi.pdf) (on 2<sup>nd</sup> October 2013.)

<sup>6</sup> BENCZE Lóránt: A magyar kultúrkör néhány alapvető jellegzetessége (vázlat). In: *Az első világháború és történelmi következményei. Szent István és a magyar államalapítás*. Ed.: CSIHÁK György. Budapest–Zürich, Zürichi Magyar Történelmi Egyesület, 2003. Online: <http://mek.oszk.hu/06800/06802/06802.pdf> (Hereinafter referred as: BENCZE, 2003.) 273–274.

<sup>7</sup> *Árpád-kori legendák és intelmek*. (Ford. Kurcz Ágnes.) Budapest, Szépirodalmi Könyvkiadó. 1983. 59. Online: <http://ehumana.hu/arpad/szoveg/eg03.htm> (on 3<sup>rd</sup> October 2013.)

took the treasures of libraries<sup>8</sup> and archives<sup>9</sup>. The otherwise overwhelming experience of losing independent Hungarian statehood was tragically linked to the erosion of national remembrance, which left our national consciousness defenseless against the intrusion of foreign ideas... The Habsburg dynasty, with the coronation of Ferdinand I. (1527-1564) reigned over an empire of many nations and territories, and the logics of ruling dictated to govern the economically, socially, and politically extremely colorful elements according to unified principles and methods. In this regard Hungary presented the greatest obstacle, because the outlining empire surpassed the German and Slavic territories on the road to independent statehood, and furthermore, the Hungarian orders that helped Ferdinand to the throne expected the ruler to rule the country according to the ancestral rule of the law, constitution and social customs of the Kingdom of Hungary, and his person should be the only connection between our country and the Habsburg territories beyond the Lajta. The Hungarian orders have denounced the global imperial approach and government intentions. Since the middle of the 13<sup>th</sup> century, the progress of Hungarian public law and social practice was kindred only to the English progress. The Golden Bull, as the founding document of the patrician constitution, has placed the rational and legally controlled progress of government and constitution against the image of sacral and paternal kingdom evolved from the Etelköz pact. At the same time, for centuries Hungarian society has accepted paternal rule based on personal suitability and charismatic transfer of willpower.<sup>10</sup> It rebelled against alienated, impersonal power represented by most rulers of the Habsburg dynasty with a series of uprisings and wars for independence”.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Compare: TERDZSÜMAN, Mahmud: *Magyarország története. Tarih-i Üngürüş vagyis Üngürüş története. A magyarok története. Tarih-i Üngürüş. Madzsar Tarih-i.* (Ford. BLASKOVICS József.) Budapest, Magvető Könyvkiadó, 1982. Online: <http://terebess.hu/keletkultinfo/lexikon/terdzsuman.html> (on 2<sup>nd</sup> October 2013.)

<sup>9</sup> Which will happen concerning the Austrians, the Corvinus manuscripts showing up in Vienna are well known. See: ANONYMUS: *Napló Buda avagy Ofen erős városának híres ostromáról.* Budapest, Balassi Kiadó, 1988. 84-85. Online: <http://www.balassikiado.hu/BB/netre/html/Buda/Buda.html> (on 3<sup>rd</sup> October 2013), where, according to notes, imperial engineer Marsigli found 800 damaged volumes in the burnt down ruins, and deemed 300 worthy of shipping to Vienna. Still, to this day, they teach in school that the Turks took all of them or burnt down this valuable library.

<sup>10</sup> Which at the same time meant the success of the primary principle, selection by suitability, as opposed to the ruling system based on handed down rights and the tending of the bloodline.

<sup>11</sup> PUSZTASZERI László: *Az élő Árpádok.* Változó világ 17. Budapest, Útmutató Kiadó, 1985. (Hereinafter referred as: PUSZTASZERI, 1985.) 107-108. (New edition:

However, according to Antal Pezenhoffer, the orders have excessively defied the Habsburg king, who did not use his powers to counter the violence, so necessary measures were not taken to benefit the country. He reports the serious persecution of Catholics in Transylvania, which lead directly to the Romanians assimilating the Catholics.<sup>12</sup> Pusztaszeri mentions that without charismatic abilities, “the Habsburg rulers, in order to enforce the government self-interest they represented, many times resorted to administrative enforcement, physical oppression, brainwashing, and the destruction of sources and customs, often by setting aside Hungarian constitutionality. As a result, conflicts between rulers striving for absolutism and the Hungarian orders have led to a crisis and armed conflicts, to which the Viennese powers primarily responded with bloody retributions, instead of re-establishing constitutional conditions”.<sup>13</sup> However, Pezenhoffer points out that starting with the Bocskai uprising, uprisings have been based on protestant interests, promoting civil war and helping the victory of Turkish interests.<sup>14</sup>

However, the contradicting nature or presentation of these questions by our historians requires some explanation. We found this with Dezső Dümmer, who writes that “the modern, critical approach to historical documents and sources of Hungarian historiography has evolved in the Habsburg monarchy, under the constant censorship and pressure of the Viennese government. This pressure wanted to enforce the recognition of original legitimacy of the Habsburg dynasty not only at the time, but also retroactively in the past. The Habsburgs have inherited this intention from their German imperial predecessors, all the way back to Otto I. Otto, the talented organizer of the re-establishment of the Charlemagne type empire, and as a result of such intentions, a dreamer; dreamt of spreading his suzerainty over Hungary, according to successful polish and Czech examples. He even found pretension referring to the former roman Pannonia – currently Transdanubia – becoming part of the Charlemagne Empire after defeating the Avars. After disgraceful defeats in the 11<sup>th</sup> century, future German emperors have time and again adopted the Hungarian king title without any legal or realistic grounds. The lengthy Habsburg rule tried to outright suggest to the Hungarians that they

PUSZTASZERI László: *Az élő Árpádok. Érvék és ellenérvek az Árpád-ház utóéletéről.* Budapest, Kairosz Kiadó, 2009.)

<sup>12</sup> See: PEZENHOFFER Antal: *A magyar nemzet történelme. A katolikus Egyház és a Habsburg-ház történelmi szerepe. Történelmi apologetika. I-XIII. kötet.* Pilisszentlélek, „Béke és Igazság Pilisszentléleki Modell” Alapítvány Út, Igazság, Élet Kiadója, 2006. (Hereinafter referred as: PEZENHOFFER, 2006.) I. vol. 205. Online: <http://mek.oszk.hu/04200/04245/pdf/> (2<sup>nd</sup> October 2013.)

<sup>13</sup> PUSZTASZERI, 1985. 108-109.

<sup>14</sup> PEZENHOFFER, 2006. I. vol. 496.

should not judge their history through their internal reality, but from imagined German claims, according to external aspects,<sup>15</sup> suggesting that this is 'objectivity' without nationalistic prejudice. Sure enough, some of our historians who were young during the Habsburg monarchy could not throw off this centuries long enforced influence – although mostly subconscious – even between the two world wars".<sup>16</sup>

After exposing the Martinovics conspiracy, all new ideas – and their propagators – were persecuted by the authority, while Austrian politics tried hard to create the look and practice of academic government. The labors of court librarian Adamus Kollar was disadvantageous for the Hungarian nation, and proved Austrian imperial intentions because Hungarian history was set up as a necessary process properly heading to incorporate western culture and governance, and which accepted this culture with German and Austrian mediation.<sup>17</sup> So the need of this extensive imperial politics was to weaken the nation building forces by vindicating interests that stood above the nation. Whereas Catholics were labelled as part of the former, and Protestants as part of the latter forces. While the imperial politics limited the patrician nation, it supported new roles for itself, including their over-valued supporters. János Érdy characterizes our situation at the time as "brainwashing from the extensive imperial politics deforms the character of the nation, and internal discordance destroys the nation's strength. Hungarian history-science, overrun and subjected to course aspects, has placed events of the past into completely conflicting positions by age".<sup>18</sup>

It is now easier to understand the great significance of falsifying history for the benefit of the Habsburgs and the Habsburg sympathizers, as well as the diminishing of the Árpád-house, the compulsion to delete traces of its grand reign, during and part of which not only the memory of Árpád, but the life of the old country's life was taken from us. For centuries, the enemy not only destroyed almost all of our medieval charters and written documents,

<sup>15</sup> According to Lóránt BENCZE, "Hungarian culture has maintained Asian features that oppose the *eternal evolution* concept (Jewish-Christian mixed with Greek-Roman) of the European culture. Hungarian thinking, unlike European thinking, does not want to change the world, make it better by any means, including even the destruction of nature and self. It does not want to force the world towards a single goal at any price (whether it be heaven, welfare society, utopist socialism, communist heaven on Earth, or even as colonizing oppression by right of civilization, etc.)."

<sup>16</sup> DÜMMERT Dezső: *Az Árpádok nyomában*. Budapest, Panoráma, 1977. 139-140.

<sup>17</sup> KOLLAR, Adamus F.: *Documenta in historiam Hungariae. Scriptores Rerum Ungaricum Istem Historemata, Bulla Pontificia Liteqs et Acta Publica ex MSS. Codicibus Cesareis collecta*. Vind. Bibl. Pal. Cod. 8799.

<sup>18</sup> Quote: PUSZTASZERI, 1985. 115.

but, as Kornél Divald writes, “Not a stone was left unturned of the monuments of Hungary’s most prosperous times”. Then, “since the invention of the gunpowder, after even more destructive historical catastrophes, for centuries new settlements arose, built on the ruins of the former age, making the devastation even more complete by using the materials of such ruins. If monumental architectural relics meant for the centuries also perished, nothing is more natural than the statues and paintings that adorned these were also destroyed. The number of relics left to us compared to those destroyed is extremely slim. No wonder that those, who are completely unfamiliar with our glorious past rigidly label Hungary as a place void of any significant culture and art, where any significant surviving relics are works of foreign masters”.<sup>19</sup> However, when the revolutionary works of Arnold Ipoly, Imre Henszlmann and Flóris Rómer breathed new life into the search for antiquities and a lot of art treasures were made public, the discrediting opinions that Hungary had no significant art life or that it was the works of third-rate foreign masters, which set us back centuries from the west, were proven false.

Then, “the peace treaty of Paris radically changed the map of Central-Europe. In 1919, the Danube-basin, unified until World War I, was split into seven small nations, each jealously protecting its economic and political independence. The independence they won could in reality only be an illusion, since the economy of countries drained by the world war – with the exception of Czechoslovakia – could only be revitalized with foreign loans and traditionally influential powers in the region were also expected to become active again. The economic rehabilitation of the region brought about a 4-5-year economic recovery. However, this only meant a step forward compared to the chaotic years of the war. None of the nations could reach the economic growth of the pre-war years, and the Western-European prosperity based restoration was ephemeral. Its shaky support beams were destroyed by the 1929 economic crisis”.<sup>20</sup>

This is why the 30’s are considered just as full of prominent Hungarian intellectual achievements, especially in culture, as the 1790’s, the 1840’s, the

<sup>19</sup> DIVALD Kornél: *Budapest művészete a török hódoltság előtt*. Művészeti Könyvtár sorozat (Ed. K. Lippich Elek). Illustrated by 10 original Károly Csányi architectural drawings and 49 pictures. Budapest, Lampel Róbert (Wodianer F. és Fiai) Cs. és Kir. Udv. Könyvker. 5-6.

<sup>20</sup> DIÓSZEGI László: “A nagyhatalmak és a Duna-medence az 1930-as években.” In: *Magyar út és nehézségei a nemzetállamtól az övezetek Európájába a huszadik század fordulóján. Avarok onogurok – magyarok. A Hatodik Magyar Történelmi Iskola és a Tizenkettedik Magyar Őstörténeti találkozó előadásai és iratai Tapolca, 1997*. Ed. CSIHÁK György. Budapest – Zürich, Zürichi Magyar Történelmi Egyesület, 2005. 30. Online: <http://mek.oszk.hu/06800/06837/06837.pdf>



1870's or the 1900's. Along with the relative economic growth, every cultural field had significant advances. Scientific research and technical application has put our industrial performance in front of Austria, at least in the field of global patents. There were significant achievements from economic theories, through historical and legal philosophy, to different branches of philosophy. Public education and universities were excellent, and the Hungarian public was almost up-to-date on the expatriate scientific achievements. And something only we can really appreciate: literature and the graphic arts have provided an incredible number of giants. The quality of periodicals matched any of the western ones. Book publishing created huge ventures: lexicons, encyclopedias, and scientific storehouses. The appreciation of scientists grew. High school teachers published their addresses and phone numbers for the public in almanacs. Coffee shop life gained incredible momentum. Cabarets surpassed Paris in their musical culture (operettas). Theater life was excellent, and the list goes on and on. The 30's have already started in the 20's, by which time the country got back on its feet from the trauma of Trianon, and mentally resolved the negative materialistic situation in record time with hitherto exemplary fervor. To this day we can use this impulse and national fervor as an example in tough situations. The scientific, cultural and other human achievements that represented the 30's can easily be announced as world standards. This is especially reasonable if we consider the following two decades when the nation was harboring Polish and French soldiers and refugees amid the snarling of Nazi Germany. It tried to save Jews labeled by the Nazis as to be persecuted, and was relatively successful until the last moments. The Hungarian people united in the 30's. A lot of refugees of Trianon finally had jobs. The entire nation was on an intellectual path, even if the great powers frowned at this.

And later, the nightmare of international socialism lasted far too long, where brother nations, in reality nationalist socialist states used to our disadvantage that proletarian internationalism was taken seriously in Hungary at government level. We already know what went on, if we only look at the disproportions and breaches of contracts in the COMECON. But the Hungarian people subjected to neighboring countries endured the greatest pains – as Gyula Illyés indicated – where Hungarians could not learn a profession in their mother tongue, were left out of collective rights, and individual rights did not prevail. And if, at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century there are crucial sociologic questions regarding international relations, we have to thank this collective madness. This madness wanted to institutionalize success for its own sake by limiting freedom through the elimination of human spontaneous growth. This is why we must deal with these questions in these

assumptions. While we have identified national awakening, the questions of national entity from a philosophical generalization aspect as the preceding step in becoming humanity, completely absolving facts about us that are difficult to manage.<sup>21</sup>

### *3. Conceptually hard to manage facts about us*

After the WW I<sup>22</sup> and WW II, and during the realization of the Trianon dictate half a dozen countries benefitted from the territories of the Kingdom of Hungary; since then, the succession states have broken down into many other countries, and the assets required to operate them, especially real estate, agricultural land, forests, etc. the newly formed states have taken, namely nationalized, primarily from Hungarians (private individuals and organizations).<sup>23</sup> The return of these to their owners or their heirs is stalling, or happens unsatisfactorily and unjustly.

Measures realized in the fields of cultural and intellectual possessions border on intellectual genocide, even in the case of countries such as Austria<sup>24</sup> where Hungarian language education at the primary school level has stopped in 1920. They have taken universities, theaters, etc. from the Hungarians, have banned associations<sup>25</sup>, even limited spiritual life, and in most neighboring countries the use of the Hungarian language is fined, and in certain places people are attacked on the streets for speaking in Hungarian.

<sup>21</sup> CSER Ferenc – DARAI Lajos: "Hét mondat Ember – Társadalom – Emberiség összefüggő kapcsolatáról — némi magyarázattal." *INCO. Első magyar internetes folyóirat az információs korról*. Nr. 12. (2007). <http://www.inco.hu/inco12/filo/cikk2h.htm> (on 2<sup>nd</sup> October 2013.)

<sup>22</sup> ZACHAR József: "A nagy háború és ami utána következett." In: *Az első világháború és történelmi következményei. Szent István és a magyar államalapítás*. Ed.: CSIHÁK György. Budapest–Zürich, Zürichi Magyar Történelmi Egyesület, 2003. Online: <http://mek.oszk.hu/06800/06802/06802.pdf> 17-30.

<sup>23</sup> See the studies: HORVÁTH Lajos: Trianon utáni földreformok a Kárpát-medencében. and CSAPÓ I. József: Az 1921. évi földreform Romániában. Jogtiprás, birtokfosztás, diszkrimináció. In: *Magyar történelem. Tízezer év – ezer oldalról. Oktatási segédkönyv*. Ed.: CSIHÁK György. Acta Historica Hungarica Turiciensia Vol. XVIII. Nr. 1. Zürich – Budapest, Zürichi Magyar Történelmi Egyesület Tudományos Tanácsa, 2002. 485-496. and 497-504. Online: <http://mek.oszk.hu/05900/05939/05939.pdf> (on 2<sup>nd</sup> October 2013)

<sup>24</sup> Hollósy's phrase. HOLLÓSY, 1913, 5.

<sup>25</sup> CSAPÓ I. József: Az önkormányzás múltja és jelene a történelmi Erdélyben. In: *Az első világháború és történelmi következményei. Szent István és a magyar államalapítás*. Ed.: CSIHÁK György. Budapest–Zürich, Zürichi Magyar Történelmi Egyesület, 2003. 51-60. Online: <http://mek.oszk.hu/06800/06802/06802.pdf>



József Takács, in a sincerely concise way, described our essential Hungarian characteristic as patience,<sup>26</sup> even if this notion has been discredited in the 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>27</sup> Including many other notions as well, since politics could perform the interpretation of notions and actions without any compatibility between the notion and its original meaning. Our patience could be explained by coordinating thinking and excellent cooperating activities. In the Principality of Transylvania, the spiritual and national patience law was in effect for the longest period in Europe, even when elsewhere tens of thousands were murdered in the name of true faith. Patience in the western and central part of our country ceased with the Habsburgs, and dreadful things started in the land of patience: inquisition, Christian internecine war, battles between foreign and Hungarian soldiers, and rivalries between mercenaries. The so-called liberating war by the Holy League was like genocide, even the Jesuits started to eliminate patience in Transylvania. Hungarian soldiers were fired because they would not turn on their people, and those who were looking for a leader found them in Tököly and Rákóczi. “Genocide started again after the Kuruc wars were suppressed. The protesting Hungarians were only protected by the swamplands. The entire country suffered from what was already taking place in the lands ruled by the Habsburgs since Ferdinand. They started to teach inciting, the disuniting of the Hungarian people. They incited Hungarian against Hungarian, catholic against protestant, neighbor against neighbor, brother against brother. The last survivors had to be taken by the foreigners. In certain places they had the population completely destroy itself, followed by the peaceful lie of settlement. Then they drew up the cadastral registers for the foreigners... After the events at Madéfalva the butchering of Hungarians and the genocide had to be turned into different direction in the interest of the catholic faith. French nationalism served as a good example. King Joseph II, who was not crowned with the Hungarian Holy Crown, used this opportunity. He hired the Romanian Horea and his partners to exterminate the Hungarians, which history recorded as a feudal conflict.”<sup>28</sup>

Takács sourly notes that while here “patience characterized the horse riding peoples before and during the Árpád-houses, the goal under the Habsburgs was teaching impatience. This changed after the genocide managed by Horea.

<sup>26</sup> Compare: “A régi magyar kultúra alapvonása a határozott tolerancia, emberrel, állattal, növénnel, egyáltalán az egész természettel, az egész világgal szemben.” BENCZE, 2003. 273.

<sup>27</sup> TAKÁCS József: Türelmesség. Türelmesség? Türelmesség! In: *Az első világháború és történelmi következményei. Szent István és a magyar államalapítás*. Ed.: CSIHÁK György. Budapest–Zürich, Zürichi Magyar Történelmi Egyesület, 2003. 141-150. (Hereinafter referred as: TAKÁCS, 2004.) Online: <http://mek.oszk.hu/06800/06802/06802.pdf>

<sup>28</sup> TAKÁCS, 2004. 144-145.

What followed was the age of forced patience”.<sup>29</sup> The Hungarian people saw that foreigners who served the Habsburgs were settled, placed at strategic locations around the country. A sudden revolution threatened with complete extermination. Not a single fully Hungarian populated county was left, and even the free royal towns had foreigners, but even Saxon towns had them because they supported the rebels. Székely land is the largest foreigner-free part of the country, with Romanians on its borders and a Romanian regiments “protected” the Székely people. In the reform age Hungarians were careful out of forced patience, the revolution was bloodless, but Jelačić quickly started the Habsburgs’ evil plan. According to this plan, the country had to be un-Hungarianized. The legislative act on the emancipation of the serfs was a divine gift. Without it, the foreign serfs would have been persuaded to massacre the Hungarians. This way, however, the serfs were divided, only a few listened to their masters, and many waited not knowing what to do, and still many supported the Hungarian revolution. If the foreign serfs stood by their masters, the Hungarian nation would have been finished. There was a reason the nation’s great men were thinking about the death of the nation. The nation was very close to it”.<sup>30</sup>

After defeating the 1848-49 revolution and war of independence, serf hood could not be restored because the serfs would have turned against the emperor. But what they could not accomplish during the revolution, they wanted to realize during the Bach age, free of all patience, while the foreign-speakers demanded their rights for defeating the revolution. After a lot of lies, the emperor concluded an apparent compromise with the enemy of all its creditors – the Hungarians. Politics wanted to assert its interests within the Catholic Church, incitement and impatience controlled through the church held the empire together. Since the emperor was forced to reach an agreement with the nation on death row, the primary directive was the country’s economic ruin. “The Jews prevented the Imperials’ plans. Some of the Jews were already sympathetic with the Hungarians, acted on this sympathy, and repaired the condemned country’s national economy. For this reason, the Viennese court practically suggested antipathy towards the Jews. This also happened through the catholic clergy. After the decline of the empire, the number one enemy of the Little Entente states were not the Jews, but the Hungarians. Although the Little Entente slaughtered more Jews than the Hungarians, they do not talk about it.”<sup>31</sup>

<sup>29</sup> TAKÁCS, 2004. 145.

<sup>30</sup> TAKÁCS, 2004. 145.

<sup>31</sup> TAKÁCS, 2004. 146.

Henceforth, Takács still considers impatience as the primary factor because impatient, greedy nations, who considered themselves nations and nation-states, even though most were fallacious and never referred to historical facts, divided a crumbling empire. "From one multinational empire ruled by evil, they created many little multinational states also lead by evil intentions. They did this by completely renouncing the then widely used slogan of *"Right of self-government of peoples and nations"*. The peace was signed in France, and every *"victor"* nation wanted to create a unilingual nation just like France. So all people speaking a different language had to be eradicated, followed by everyone thinking differently. They slaughtered the people while proclaiming grand catchphrases about democracy and equality before the law. They all did like the French. Historical holy places, villages, and cemeteries disappeared, and new villages were born along insubstantial borders. All form of patience towards difference has ceased to exist in the Carpathian basin".<sup>32</sup>

So for Hungarians, "this patient and multicultural mentality also had disadvantages in Hungarian history. For patience in the social-political life lead to the patiently accepted immigrants not being similarly patient. Also, the Hungarian social-political resistance always appeared to be passive resistance, whether against Habsburg oppression, or against German national socialism, or later Soviet international socialism. Naturally, this passive resistance – especially against the latter – did not prove to be successful, better yet, it could not be documented successfully. The long-lasting patience often times exploded in quick and unexpected uprisings, or revolutionary wars doomed to defeat from the outset (for example, in 1848 and 1956)".<sup>33</sup>

Takács does not conceal the fact that as a result of the trauma of Trianon, patience was on hold even in the broken up country, where at first the wave of refugees caused impatience: refugees from the torn away parts of the country benefitted over the unemployed in Pest. The brief period of communism intensified impatience, followed by the invisible communists under Horthy. Also, by the suddenly inflated number of gentlemen, military officers, railway personnel, etc. who could not find jobs in their own professions, and cheap labor was on the rise as well. "During the re-annexation certain military units arrived like they were entering a colony, but the people were expecting relief forces. The internal security personnel were searching for the traitor among everyday people... They were talking about family reunifications on the radio, but in reality they kept quiet about families separated by the new border. Impatience was present on both sides of the border, except where the God given border was restored... However, the period between the two worldwide

<sup>32</sup> TAKÁCS, 2004. 146.

<sup>33</sup> BENCZE, 2003. 275.

catastrophes and during the second one, was a period of patience. But this patience was different from the patience during the Árpád-age. While Jews were massacred all over Europe, the slightly enriched, broken up country was still a sanctuary for them. This is where things went too far the latest, and it seems horrible because it was quick. Whatever they say, this is where the most Jews survived. For at least three years, genocide, relocation and deportation followed the second division in Paris. Now Bucharest also followed the sweet-talking politics of Prague (precepts and proclamation of never fulfilled nice laws) and provided apparent rights. These included what appeared from the outside as municipalities for the Székely people. Then the command for patience came from world-saving communism. Be patient, hurt religion! Be patient, exterminate the others! Everyone will be the same! What this last one possibly means is there cannot be two people on Earth. Apparent revolutions under world-saving communism brought about freedom. This was not liberation, but rather free destruction. Unfortunately only impatience was freed. It will be very hard to put the genie of impatience back into the bottle.”<sup>34</sup>

#### *4. Legitimate demands: if we give in, nothing changes*

Every hour of every day we must judge all law defying, collective guilt judging and retaliating laws, measures and actions, demand their abolishment, and demand to stand apart from such in order for them to never happen again.

All individual grievances must be reviewed and redressed, justice must be dispensed, and fair treatment at last.

Earlier contracts arranging cultural goods, Viennese treasury materials, other national treasures that were moved there, and items significant for the Hungarian people that have already been arranged with earlier contracts must be renegotiated because they were signed and accepted in the shadow of the Red Army or under other pressure, often by surrendering Hungarian interests in the name of internationalism, and references to any obsolesces cannot be accepted.

In areas where possible, we must demand the restoration of pre-1920 ownership, language use, religious affiliation, etc. conditions.

We must demand restoration retrospectively. For example, regarding language use, we must pursue the conditions that would have come to pass if the injustices since 1920 did not take place.

<sup>34</sup> TAKÁCS, 2004. 147.

The good practice of dealing with the nationalities in Hungary can be a good example, but we must also consider the changes in direction we have experienced as necessities for the Hungarians as well.

### *5. Managing the existence of Hungarian national and partner-nation communities*

By the idea of a partner nation, it appears to be necessary to differentiate between two different internal and two different external international relationships.

The *first internal international relationship* is between the successor nations of the historically common country as partner nations. After all, the common historical past, the political and economic historical events, moral and social psychological effects, lingual and cultural similarities should appear as much more intimate relationships essentially with us. In fact every bilateral inter-regional relationship must also fulfill all-round aspects, and should be collated with the appropriate institutions from all aspects.

The *first external international relationship* is between the successor nations of the historically common country, as partner nations; and the other units, groups, alliances and institutions acting as European and global nations. We must include with this our historical manipulation by the victorious western and eastern powers of the two world wars – such relationships can only be created through common interests and values. Not with envy of the others' advantages, but by preventing long-term and comprehensive harming of interests.

The *second internal international relationship* is the relationship between the people of our nation and the partner nations and the other parts of the nation and ethnicities formed within its historical territory,<sup>35</sup> or with religious groups with their characteristics, if they have such weight.

The *second external international relationship* is the relationship between parts of the old common country split to different nations or the national, ethnic and religious groups formed in those parts, and the similar social groups under the authority of the neighboring nations, or in Europe and other nations around the world.

This recommended partner nation status does not indicate a backward position in the global processes, indeed it eliminates the introversive violent and co-destructive effects of the chauvinist nationalistic awakening – forced

<sup>35</sup> The concept of ethnicity must also be set right.

upon us from the outside – that can be considered a step back compared to the realization of the idea of a nation, similar to humanity. Surviving the natural, cultural and organizational limits that protect the organic processes of populating the great region (a quarter or third of Europe) could be our important task. At the same time, the common advantage of becoming one with and creating contact with neighbors at the far away borders of our great region can be the nature of the quality of the relationship chain. The emergence and advantage of this from the depths of history (for example, the ancestral cultural similarity of the Hungarian people with the East)<sup>36</sup> can serve as an example far into the future.<sup>37</sup>

The possible joint management with partner nations of the economic private interest emerging in today's world and wanting to grow to global proportions, and the partner nations, would mean the assertion of mutual and business activities in our region through large scale markets, technological, resource and energy efficiency, and increased consumption. This region's joint national intervention for its own social level interests, using opportunities provided by the European Union as well, against global bank and production private interests could provide serious results for us. Coordinating similar interest groups operating in this region could multiply the effective protection of their interests. The support of local national and social initiatives can open new perspectives, if they are advantageous.<sup>38</sup>

The assertion of the advantages of cultural uniqueness by a living chain connecting such partner nations would make it possible to silence conflicts by getting to know each other's past and present, culture, economic and social

<sup>36</sup> BARABÁSI László: Az eurázsiai birodalmak autonómiája és együvé tartozása. and CSER Ferenc: Életszimbólumok. In: *Magyar haditechnika és magyar hadjáratok a kora középkorban. A második világháború és történelmi következményei Magyarország szempontjából (1939–1949). A Tizenhatodik Magyar Őstörténeti Találkozó és a Tizedik Magyar Történelmi Iskola előadásai és iratai.* Szentendre, 2001. Ed.: CSIHÁK György. Budapest–Zürich, Zürichi Magyar Történelmi Egyesület, 2002. 83–88 and 33–39. Online: <http://mek.oszk.hu/06700/06790/06790.pdf> (on 3<sup>rd</sup> October 2013).

<sup>37</sup> DARAI Lajos: A magyar és az egyetemes őstörténeti időrend összehasonlító módszertana. In: *Magyar haditechnika és magyar hadjáratok a kora középkorban. A második világháború és történelmi következményei Magyarország szempontjából (1939–1949). A Tizenhatodik Magyar Őstörténeti Találkozó és a Tizedik Magyar Történelmi Iskola előadásai és iratai.* Szentendre, 2001. Ed.: CSIHÁK György. Budapest–Zürich, Zürichi Magyar Történelmi Egyesület, 2002. 19–28. Online: <http://mek.oszk.hu/06700/06790/06790.pdf> (on 3<sup>rd</sup> October 2013).

<sup>38</sup> See: *Magyar út és nehézségei a nemzetállamtól az övezetek Európájába a huszadik század fordulóján. Avarok onogurok – magyarok. A Hatodik Magyar Történelmi Iskola és a Tizenkettedik Magyar Őstörténeti találkozó előadásai és iratai* Tapolca, 1997. Ed. CSIHÁK György. Budapest – Zürich, Zürichi Magyar Történelmi Egyesület, 2005. Online: <http://mek.oszk.hu/06800/06837/06837.pdf>



lives through history and in the present. Informing each other with the elaborately unique information media, the synchronization and mutual verification of knowledge, the utilization of the advantages from multiple sources, are all steps forward. The mutually beneficial and efficient operation of training tasks and challenges could result in definite advantages. The protection and more social introduction of national and ethnic traditions, cultural customs, and social and community life could build mutual trust. Just as organizing infinite possibilities to raise the cultural level would strengthen the feeling of relationship and a successful, mutual future.

But here we also mean the disambiguation of ideas.<sup>39</sup> If we can achieve thinking similarly to neighboring nations, using similar terms to describe our relations and historical events, then the advantages of lasting and peaceful cooperation await us. With such mutual ideas we have to describe the historical process in which, together with neighboring partner nations and their ancestral nations in a common country, we have created something historical in this Carpathian basin and the surrounding great regions. The Kingdom of Hungary has real acceptable achievements from and for everyone. This is the place of “the first unified Christian kingdom, which still stands where it was founded”. Furthermore, “with our horsemanship we brought Europe the institution of delegate system based Parliament, and we own Europe’s oldest constitution beginning with the Blood Pact, summarized in the Corpus Juris Hungarici, the backbone of which are Saint Stephen’s Admonishments (1030), the Golden Bull (1222) and the Saint Crown ideology or thesis, which we can find in exact legal format in the so-called essential laws (1351).<sup>40</sup>

If we use the idea of dual culture, which at the beginning of the middle-ages differentiated the colonized population from the state-creating authoritative class who often settled over the base population like an army, then even in the old country’s name – Hungaria – we can see that the country was for the military class of the Huns, who ruled over several populations. As with the

<sup>39</sup> CSÁMPAI Ottó: Barangolás az alapfogalmak bűvkörében. Adalékok a nemzet és más etnikai közösségek szociológiai jellemzéséhez. In: *Magyar út és nehézségei a nemzetállamtól az övezetek Európájába a huszadik század fordulóján. Avarok onogurok – magyarok. A Hatodik Magyar Történelmi Iskola és a Tizenkettedik Magyar Őstörténeti találkozó előadásai és iratai Tapolca, 1997.* Ed. CSIHÁK György. Budapest – Zürich, Zürichi Magyar Történelmi Egyesület, 2005. 151-163. Online: <http://mek.oszk.hu/06800/06837/06837.pdf>

<sup>40</sup> CSIHÁK György: Magyar – nép – nemzet – kisebbség – autonómia, magyarul öngazgatás, önkormányzat, önrendelkezés. In: *Magyar történelem. Tízezer év – ezer oldalról. Oktatási segédkönyv.* Ed.: CSIHÁK György. Acta Historica Hungarica Turiciensia Vol. XVIII. Nr. 1. Zürich – Budapest, Zürichi Magyar Történelmi Egyesület Tudományos Tanácsa, 2002. 444-445. (Hereinafter referred as: CSIHÁK, 2002.) Online: <http://mek.oszk.hu/05900/05939/05939.pdf> (on 2<sup>nd</sup> October 2013)

Avars and the Hungarians, the country was named after the state-creating powers, while the population here preceded these nation organizing powers: pre-Hungarians were native;<sup>41</sup> the peasants who emigrated already appeared in the southern regions in the 7<sup>th</sup> century as Slavs; Bulgarians, Serbians, and Croats<sup>42</sup> below the Danube and Sava rivers; a little later the Moravians in their current region; and in the 12<sup>th</sup> century the Slovaks in the Tatra mountains<sup>43</sup>, and the Romanians in Transylvania.<sup>44</sup>

The Hungarian Holy Crown is not regal, but the Nation's Crown, and according to the Holy Crown idea, it is the source and root of all goods and rights. The Hungarian king elected in the Parliament or the National Assembly is the Head of the Holy Crown, and the Hungarian nation is the Member of the Holy Crown. The two together form the Body of the Holy Crown. For this reason, the idea of the Hungarian nation is unique and is not similar to the idea of nations established much later in other parts of Europe. From a religious aspect, the nation includes Roman Catholics, reformed, etc. From a nationality aspect, the nation includes Hungarians, Slavs, Germans, Romanians, etc., and within these, for example, the Germans include Saxons, Szepes Saxons, Swabians, etc. If we sort the Slavs, they include Ruthenians, Slovaks, Serbians, etc. The area of the Hungarian nation is the area of the Holy Crown; the residents of the nation are the citizens of the Holy Crown; the constitution is the Hungarian Historical Constitution – and these embody the Holy Crown. So the Holy Crown is “not a religious idea, but the blessed millennial symbol of Hungarian statehood (and not the kingdom, especially not some Habsburg kingdom). Sacra and not sancta, as the God, the Holy

<sup>41</sup> CSER Ferenc – DARAI Lajos: *Magyar folytonosság a Kárpát-medencében, avagy kőkori eredetünk és a sejtí tulajdonság-örökítő kutatás*. Pilisszántó, Frig Kiadó, 2005. Online: <http://www.eltevedtidoszamitas.hu/pics/folytonos.pdf> (on 3<sup>rd</sup> October 2013.)

<sup>42</sup> SZEGFÜ László: A Kárpát-medencei “szlávok”, különös tekintettel Megalé Moráviára. In: *Magyar történelem. Tízezer év – ezer oldalról. Oktatási segédkönyv*. Ed.: CSIHÁK György. Acta Historica Hungarica Turiciensia Vol. XVIII. Nr. 1. Zürich – Budapest, Zürichi Magyar Történelmi Egyesület Tudományos Tanácsa, 2002. 333-344. Online: <http://mek.oszk.hu/05900/05939/05939.pdf> (on 2<sup>nd</sup> October 2013)

<sup>43</sup> See: PÜSPÖKI NAGY Péter: “A tények erejével. Válasz Peter Ratkos, Dr. DSc vitairatára a germánok, szlávok, avarok és nagymorvák Csehszlovákia területét érintő több fontos kérdése ügyében. *Chicago Szivárvány* Nr. 14., 15., 16. First part: <http://www.magtudin.org/Puspoki%20I.htm> (3<sup>rd</sup> October 2013) Second part: <http://www.magtudin.org/Puspoki%20II.htm> (on 3<sup>rd</sup> October 2013)

<sup>44</sup> HERÉNYI István: A Kárpát-medence népei Álmos–Árpád honfoglalásáig. In: *Magyar történelem. Tízezer év – ezer oldalról. Oktatási segédkönyv*. Ed.: CSIHÁK György. Acta Historica Hungarica Turiciensia Vol. XVIII. Nr. 1. Zürich – Budapest, Zürichi Magyar Történelmi Egyesület Tudományos Tanácsa, 2002. 349-358. Online: <http://mek.oszk.hu/05900/05939/05939.pdf> (on 2<sup>nd</sup> October 2013)



Throne, the Holy Father, the saints, etc. Not the symbol of the ruler (rex), but *the country (regnum), the continuous existence of the Hungarian nation*. So the *Hungarian nation* is not an ethnic or lingual, but rather an *intellectual community and idea*.<sup>45</sup>

If we look for the roots of this idea, we must go back to the idea of the above mentioned patience by our first king. Because according to Lóránt Bencze, with the wording “King Saint Stephen did not compose a European, a teleological, a type of man, a language, a people, etc., namely a law that places a single factor above everything, but rather codifies some holistic a behavior characteristic of certain Asian nature people in which a sort of genetic diversity serves the survival of the whole principle converging at the social-political level. This is why they attack the so-called Hungarian nationalism obtusely and indignantly, saying that when they see anyone in Hungary, it turns out they barely have any Hungarian in their ancestral family names, only Hungarianized German, Slavic, etc. names. They simply cannot comprehend how villages on the plains that after Turkish subjection barely had ten percent of its original population and the rest were the result of domestic settlement, could have ancestral self-consciousness. How could Hungarian poet, Sándor Petőfi, the son of a Slovak waitress and Serbian butcher, be a patriot! How could it be, that in Northern Hungarian German towns from where the population was relocated by the then Czechoslovakian government – with Western-European approval – the centuries-old mentality was that their tongues never knew a word of Hungarian, their hearts never knew a word of German! So even the language could not eliminate their belonging to the Hungarian people, much less race as experienced in certain European and non-European nations. This is why Lajos Stúr could write about himself, I am a Hungarian with Slovak mother tongue. This is why a master baker named Hümpfner, one of the descendants of the famous Lechner architect family, could blame his grandchild when he bent down to pick up the music-sheet of a musician in a marching band, saying “a Hungarian does not help a German”; all this in German, since grandfather and grandchild only spoke German (based on a story told by Kamill Kismarty-Lechner). This is probably the same mentality that general Haynau, who had hundreds of Hungarian patriots executed and who was only surpassed in bloodshed by Kádár, adopted when he settled down in Hungary after 1849. After his slaughters, this general Haynau stunned everyone when he started one of his public speeches much the same as Ottó Habsburg and my neighbor the gypsy Jani Kolompár does today: “*We, Hungarians...*” The extraordinary aspiring

<sup>45</sup> CSIHÁK, 2002. 445-446.

effect of this mentality inspired Petőfi's outburst: "*Were I not born Hungarian, / I would join this nation now...*" ("Élet vagy halál" titled poem). This continued in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. When national socialists dragged away Miklós Radnóti during the German occupation referring to his Jewish lineage, he wrote that he was a descendant of János Arany – the greatest Hungarian poet. Then, to the amazement of his friends that "this land is my home". This is why in this culture being part of the Hungarian nation is similar to being part of Christianity. Being part of the Hungarian nation was never a question of lineage, but mentality, disposition and acceptance of fate".<sup>46</sup>

György Csihák further clarifies the concept by emphasizing that it is inaccurate to use the concept of "minority" for the Hungarian people in the Carpathian basin, because for approximately 50 years it is only used within the United Nations for people who do not have or never had a country. "The word minority is not used for native people in their own country." But, "according to our concepts, the Hungarian people cannot be a minority in the Carpathian basin, at best as a nationality".<sup>47</sup> Although we can use the concept of a minority, for example in international organizations, but it is not correct in our own case; something nationalities call our attention to.<sup>48</sup> Lest we believe, after repeating it so much and forget our real past, which defies the concept of minority relating to us. As well, we would not like for them to only have minority rights like refugees and immigrants, when they deserve the rights of natives.<sup>49</sup> For this reason, "*natives* everywhere in Europe protested when they were called a minority in their own countries. They fought to have 'minority' replaced primarily with 'ethnic group' or 'national community' in every significant, related, international legal document. They offer and ensure native ethnic groups self-government, autonomy, etc. The basic principle is that *the 'minority' is in a more difficult situation, so they deserve more rights than the majority*. In self-government cases regional election is not required; rather, internal elections, for example, in a geographic unit such as a town, a county,

<sup>46</sup> BENCZE, 2003. 274.

<sup>47</sup> CSIHÁK, 2002. 448.

<sup>48</sup> CSAPÓ I. József: Autonóm nemzeti közösség, vagy önfeladó nemzeti kisebbség. In: *Magyar történelem. Tízezer év – ezer oldalról. Oktatási segédkönyv*. Ed.: CSIHÁK György. Acta Historica Hungarica Turiciensia XVIII. Year, Nr. 1. Zürich – Budapest, Zürichi Magyar Történelmi Egyesület Tudományos Tanácsa, 2002. 105-108. Online: <http://mek.oszk.hu/05900/05939/05939.pdf> (on 3<sup>rd</sup> October 2013)

<sup>49</sup> SÁNTHA Pál Vilmos: A Székelyföld öngazgatási törekvéseinek történelmi háttere. In: *Magyar út és nehézségei a nemzetállamtól az övezetek Európájába a huszadik század fordulóján. Avarok onogurok – magyarok. A Hatodik Magyar Történelmi Iskola és a Tizenkettedik Magyar Őstörténeti találkozó előadásai és iratai Tapolca, 1997*. Ed. CSIHÁK György. Budapest – Zürich, Zürichi Magyar Történelmi Egyesület, 2005. 47-55. Online: <http://mek.oszk.hu/06800/06837/06837.pdf>

etc. In case of sectarian community, the specific group should vote and, for example, not the population of a specific geographic or municipal unit. The measures and political obligations displayed in international documents apply to all three – *personal, community and regional* – autonomies.”<sup>50</sup>

Finally, it is worth taking a look at the legal terms, resolutions, and recommendations quoted by Csihák regarding the autonomy of the national community: “According to article 35. of the Copenhagen document (1990) of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the participating nations undertake efforts to apply municipal – or local – autonomy, appropriate for the historical and regional conditions, to express the ethnic, cultural, lingual and religious identities of the nationalities. In its Geneva document (1991) participating nations acknowledge the importance of those measures that countries – according to historical and regional conditions – must take, where the solution to such problems requires significant attention. Participating nations note with interest the positive results achieved with democratic solutions, including: municipal or local autonomy, and regional autonomy, including advisory, legislative and executive bodies and institutions established through free and periodic elections.

Section 11 of Recommendation N. 1201/1993. of the Council of Europe specifies the rights of individuals belonging to nationalities to possess *autonomic or local authorities*, or *local status* appropriate for local historical and regional conditions, in regions where these individuals are a majority compared to the population.

In Section 3 of the 21<sup>st</sup> November 1991 resolution of the European Parliament regarding the Union’s citizenship, states that the Union and its members encourage the expression of the identities and the support of coexistence of ethnic and lingual communities historically present in their territories, guaranteeing the safeguard of actual equality of its citizens, warranting local, regional or group self-government formats to support inter-regional and cross-border cooperation.<sup>51</sup>

<sup>50</sup> CSIHÁK, 2002. 448. Compare: CSAPÓ I. József: “Az önkormányzás múltja és jelene a történelmi Erdélyben.” In: *Magyar történelem. Tízezer év – ezer oldalról. Oktatási segédkönyv.* Ed.: Csihák György. Acta Historica Hungarica Turiciensia XVIII. Year, Nr. 1. Zürich – Budapest, Zürichi Magyar Történelmi Egyesület Tudományos Tanácsa, 2002. 473-484. Online: <http://mek.oszk.hu/05900/05939/05939.pdf> (on 3<sup>rd</sup> October 2013)

<sup>51</sup> CSAPÓ I. József: Községi akarattal Székelyföld autonómiájáért. In: *Magyar út és nehézségei a nemzetállamtól az övezetek Európájába a huszadik század fordulóján. Avarok onogurok – magyarok. A Hatodik Magyar Történelmi Iskola és a Tizenkettedik Magyar Östörténeti találkozó előadásai és iratai* Tapolca, 1997. Ed. Csihák György. Budapest – Zürich, Zürichi Magyar Történelmi Egyesület, 2005. 139-146. Online: <http://mek.oszk.hu/06800/06837/06837.pdf>

We can find several examples of guarantees warranting the operation of local autonomy and the establishment of legal boundaries in European practice:

1. the autonomic statute (1972, 1992) of the Italian Bolzano and Southern-Tirol regions warrant self-government for the German language population of Bolzano (Bozen-Bolzano), and the bilingual – German and Italian – community of Trentino (South Tirol-Trento);
2. the autonomic law (1979) of Spanish Catalonia warrants self-government for the primarily Catalan populated regions;
3. the autonomic law (18.XII.1979) of Spanish Basque land warrants self-government for the Euskal Herria region;
4. the autonomic law (6.IV.1981) of Spanish Galicia warrants self-government for the Galician populated regions;
5. the autonomic law (30.XII.1981) of Spanish Asturias warrants local self-government to protect the Bable language;
6. the autonomic law (1.VII.1982) of Spanish Valencia warrants self-government for the primarily Valencian populated Alakant, Castello and Valencia regions;
7. the autonomic law (10.VIII.1982) of Spanish Aragon warrants self-government for the region and its people;
8. the autonomic law (10.VIII.1982) of Spanish Navarra warrants self-government for the regions populated by Castilian and Basque language speaking citizens;
9. the autonomic law (1.III.1983) of Spanish Balearic Islands warrants self-government for the primarily Catalan populated regions;
10. according to paragraph 1. of section 227. of the Portuguese Constitution, the political-economic autonomy of the Portuguese Madeira Islands is based on the regions' geographic, economic, social and cultural features, as well as the historic wish of the islands' population to ensure autonomy for themselves;
11. the Finnish Aland island has Swedish autonomy.

It is worth noting that paragraph 1. of section 3. of the Spanish Constitution states: the nation's official language is Castilian; and paragraph 2. reveals that the other languages of Spain are also official within the specific autonomic communities in accord with the regulations of the statutes. Moreover, this Constitution includes a separate chapter on the rights of the autonomic community.

Section 1. of Chapter I. of the Swedish Constitution states: *The sovereignty of the Swedish nation, among other things, is realized through the autonomic self-government of the regional communities.*

According to section 14 of the Finnish Constitution, the language of the republic is Suomi and Swedish.<sup>52</sup>

<sup>52</sup> CSIHÁK, 2002. 449-450.



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