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On What It Is:
Perspectives on Metaphilosophy

*On What It Is:
Perspectives on Metaphilosophy*

Edited by Megyer Gyöngyösi, Zolt
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EÖTVÖS JÓZSEF COLLEGIUM | *Budapest, 2016*

The publication of this book was supported by the
Student Union of ELTE University and the Student Union of the
Faculty of Humanities at ELTE University.

Published by the
PHILOSOPHY WORKSHOP OF EÖTVÖS JÓZSEF COLLEGIUM
BUDAPEST, 2016

Director of publication: Dr. László Horváth
Edited by Megyer Gyöngyösi, Zsolt Kapelner, Zsófia Ádám,
István Faragó-Szabó

Cover design by Hunor Gyöngyösi
Designed by Zsófia Machó

ISBN 978-615-5371-71-4

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EÖTVÖS LORÁND TUDOMÁNYEGYETEM
HALLGATÓI ÖNKORMÁNYZAT

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Acknowledgements

This volume is the result of a conference held at Eötvös József Collegium in Budapest, Hungary on 13–15 February 2015. We are greatly indebted to the scholars who have travelled from all around the world to give outstanding presentations as well as to the keynote speakers and chairpersons leading the individual sections of the conference. We would like to further acknowledge the support of the Eötvös József Collegium, the Student Board of the Collegium, the Student Union of ELTE University, Budapest, the Student Union of the Faculty of Humanities at ELTE University, Budapest, and the members of the Philosophy Workshop at the Eötvös József Collegium, especially Olivér István Tóth, and Ferenc Takó for their invaluable contribution to the success of this event.

Introduction

Zsolt Kapelner

Philosophy is unique in that its metadiscipline, metaphilosophy, belongs to it. While the theoretic tools and principles of physics cannot reveal what physics is, it has to turn to the philosophy of science for such insight, the corresponding question in the case of philosophy can and should be answered through philosophical reasoning. From Plato's *Sophist* (and his missing dialogue the *Philosopher*) to Deleuze and Guattari's *What is philosophy*, and Timothy Williamson's *The Philosophy of Philosophy* philosophers have been implementing vast theoretical resources to characterize the properties and methods of philosophy, and the nature of philosophical knowledge.

When the world in which philosophers need to work and on which they ought to reflect starts changing rapidly, asking such questions becomes especially pressing for the philosopher. When new scholarly disciplines pop up radically restructuring the academic world, problems concerning the place of philosophy among other disciplines need to be addressed. When new kinds of problems enter the world and the public consciousness, philosophers have to be able to tell whether their conceptual tools make them suitable to deal with those. And when the very purpose and nature of academic research and scholarship transforms due to technological, social, and economical advancements, philosophy has to redefine its place in academia and society.

Today these changes seem to take place more rapidly and more frequently than ever before, which makes it necessary again to reconsider the very foundations of philosophy, and to put on the table ancient as well as novel puzzles and questions concerning its purpose, methods, and the possible directions it might take in the coming decades. Upon observing this, the students and teachers of the Philosophy Workshop of Eötvös József Collegium in Budapest decided to bring together senior experts and young scholars from all over the world to discuss issues in metaphilosophy. The *On What It Is?* conference took place in Budapest in February 2015, on occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the foundation of the Philosophy Workshop. The three-day event is among the major successes of the Workshop as it attracted scholars from 11 countries and 4 continents.

The papers in this volume are based on some of the most outstanding talks delivered in Budapest. As the conference itself, these articles address a wide range of topics all connected to the ultimate question: what is philosophy and how should it be done? This multi-layered question is approached from many different angles. Some take into account the connection between philosophy and other disciplines and types of inquiry, such as natural science, art, or even theology. Others attempt to provide answers to the much investigated question: is philosophical knowledge possible at all? Should we even bother studying philosophy? Yet others take a historical approach arguing that the inquiry of past philosophers' conception of their discipline may provide useful lessons even today. In this short introduction we provide a brief overview of the colourful multitude of these papers which may serve as a guide for the reader.

According to received wisdom, philosophy is, for almost a century now, divided into at least two large camps (the so-called analytic and continental tradition) with a few rogue ones fitting to both or none. Nenad Miščević addresses the problem that according to some authors, we are far from being able to identify any real difference between the two contemporary "incarnations" of philosophy, or identify their defining characteristics. He proposes another approach according to which these two belong to "family resemblance" types; their differences are to be anchored in some key characteristics not necessarily shared by all members of the groups,

but still connecting them through Wittgenstein's familiar notion of family resemblance.

Thomas Spiegel's article investigates a strange philosophical stance rooted in, though usually thought of as foreign to the analytic tradition. Stemming from Ludwig Wittgenstein's later thought, the philosophical stance of quietism holds that philosophical questions (or at least a significant subset of them) necessarily lack answers or even meaning, thus the best we can do is to stay quiet about them. Spiegel investigates quietism in the light of one of the most widespread metaphilosophical theories today, naturalism, showing that they are incompatible, due to their differing concept of nature, and "that quietism poses an alternative which is worth to be considered as a metaphilosophical stance, against the dominance of naturalism."

The question concerning the possibility of solving philosophical problems is framed today most often in terms of skepticism. In recent years many have argued that the current abundance of philosophical theories and arguments, and the seeming inability of philosophers to decide between them gives rise to a form of skepticism. On this view, it is impossible to have philosophical knowledge because for any philosophical statement one can find, apparently, equally strong arguments and counterarguments, and there is no way for one to decide which one to believe. This stance of metaskepticism is addressed by Tamás Paár's paper. His aim is to show that metaskepticism is deeply connected to two other views of what philosophy is, namely, cartography and experimentalism. By arguing that these two views ultimately lead to the untenable conception of metaskepticism, he attempts to show that these notions are dead-ends for philosophical inquiry.

The problem of skepticism is approached rather differently by Vitor Schvartz. A devoted skeptic himself, he rejects Paár's claim that metaskepticism is an untenable stance. However, the kind of consistent skepticism Schvartz defends is from a different breed than most of his contemporaries'. He argues for a neo-Pyrrhonian view derived from the works of Sextus Empiricus according to which one must suspend judgement concerning all matters, including philosophical and everyday ones. Schvartz also sets out to defend this idea against a serious criticism according to which neo-Pyrrhonian skepticism is a metaphilosophical theory par excellence. If that is so,

by accepting this theory, the skeptic refuses to withhold judgement at least on one issue, thus her project collapses into contradiction.

Those who hold onto the idea of philosophical knowledge need to answer the question: what is the nature of such knowledge? Tamás Hankovszky's essay attempts to shed light on this issue by comparing philosophy, and a discipline often neglected in today's literature, theology. His erudite argument attempts to show that philosophy, despite the many shapes it has taken during the last two and a half millennia, retained its claim for an all-encompassing coherent body of knowledge, while it is at the very essence of theology to embrace apparent paradoxes as resolvable, or at the very least bearable, only through faith.

The most frequently raised questions about the nature of philosophical knowledge concern its relationship to science. Two papers in this volume are dedicated to this topic. Tolgahan Toy investigates the idea of scientific philosophy in the context of the history of analytic philosophy comparing the views of W. V. Quine, and an alleged follower of his, Theodor Sider, arguing that while both are driven by the idea of a scientific method, their conceptions of what it is to be scientific are quite dissimilar. Serdal Tümkaya invokes an old, but unquestionably relevant question: are there any overlaps between philosophy and science? Giving a positive answer to this question, he advocates the view that the absence of scientific elements in the philosophical investigation could have detrimental consequences.

In addition to philosophy and science, art is often cited as one of the highest achievements of human intellect. Indeed, for many authors the relationship between philosophy and art has just as great significance as that of philosophy and science. In this volume Adrienne Gálosi's and Botond Csuka's papers address questions concerning this topic. Gálosi argues that philosophy and art are tied by far stronger ties than scholars usually believe, for it is art by which "philosophy can come to realize the nature of its essential problems." In the light of this statement she investigates Arthur Danto's idea of the end of art and its consequences to philosophy.

Csuka brings into play the notions of aesthetics and history, and sets out to unearth fundamental methodological problems of aesthetic theory through historic examination. His basic aim in this paper is to show how historical investigation can fertilize contem-

porary debates about aesthetics illustrating a more general point, namely, that “Historical studies can show us previously unseen or long forgotten potentials of certain questions, fields of study, ways of thinking, methods or approaches, throwing new light upon our concepts, offering novel perspectives and inspiring further work.”

Smrcz is largely in agreement with Csuka and urges us to reconsider the ways in which we are thinking about the history of philosophy. In doing so, he underlines the importance of canonization processes in telling our stories about the history of philosophy. The concept of canonization has been a pivotal point of discussion in literary studies while the same cannot be said of philosophy. What are the reasons for that and who should be regarded as the personae of the history/histories of philosophy – Smrcz is dealing with these questions by accurately analyzing Lipsius’s attempt at self-canonization.

This theme is further explored by the following three papers in this volume which set out to discuss the metaphilosophical themes in the works of historic figures of philosophy, namely, Edmund Husserl, Max Weber, and Rudolf Carnap. Bence Marosán, in his contribution discusses the parallelisms between Husserl’s and Hegel’s notion of philosophical truth. He argues that both authors uphold the idea that as finite beings philosophers can only access truth in a limited sense, they are necessarily always on the way to gain absolute knowledge, but never quite there. What his skilful discussion of Husserl and Hegel shows is that philosophers ought to view themselves in the light of this limitedness: not as rivals, advocates of opposing views only one of which corresponds to the absolute truth, but rather as collaborators who are working with different pieces of the same puzzle. Their job is not to refute the views of each other, but rather to find the place of these views, these fragments of truth, in the larger body of absolute knowledge.

Ferenc Takó engages in a detailed discussion on Max Weber’s very influential work on the methodology of history and the nature of historic knowledge. In particular, he sets out to answer the question whether Weber has a universal view of history, whether he posits an inherent structure and direction in history, or rather he remains true to his scientific project leaving such remnants of the history of philosophy behind. Takó argues that Weber’s standpoint in this issue is to be understood within a (neo-)Kantian framework

in which universal history needs to be posited so that we human beings can make sense of it: reason is in fact operative in history, but it is not the absolute reason of Hegel, but rather the critical reason of Kant.

Ádám Tuboly sets out to address a problem of utmost importance for our understanding of the history of philosophy in the twentieth century, namely, the analytic-continental divide. As Nenad Mišćević has already shown, this distinction plays a crucial part in analysing today's philosophical landscape. Yet the history of this distinction is still not very well understood. Tuboly discusses one of the early masterpieces of analytic philosophy, Rudolf Carnap's *Der logische Aufbau der Welt*, and shows that in this foundational work of the analytic tradition one can discover a deep connection to the contemporary neo-Kantian philosophy, and social theory. Tuboly reminds us that the analytic-continental distinction has been by and large superimposed upon the history of early twentieth century philosophy, and that Carnap was just as much an heir to continental neo-Kantianism as many advocates of what we call today 'continental philosophy'.

In the last two papers we turn back to contemporary philosophy. Josef Ehrenmüller presents the results of his unique empirical research diving into the psyche of philosophers. During a period of 10 years Ehrenmüller interviewed some 300 philosophy students in Vienna inquiring about their motives and reasons for deciding to do philosophy. He shows that many who choose this path suffer from the feeling of being an outsider and of not being valued and held in esteem by others. He argues that attitude has been characteristic of philosophers throughout the history of philosophy. He emphasizes, however, that these emotions are by no means unique to philosophers – philosophy is not the result of pathologic psychological developments, rather it is an answer to the struggles we all face in the modern world.

The closing article by myself addresses the problem of the worth philosophy, the question, "what is philosophy good for?" Philosophy is often considered today to be a discipline for academics only – using rigorous academic language and toolsets, not easily accessible to the layperson. Yet traditionally philosophy have been conceived as a project aimed at the amelioration of human life, an examination

of the problems we as human beings, both as individuals and as a society, need to face. Philosophy, closed in the ivory tower, is unable, then, to do what it's meant to be doing. Instead of being apologetic, I take these accusations as being absolutely justified. I urge for a radical reconsideration of the ways philosophy is being done, so that we as philosophers can fulfil our obligations to ourselves and to society.

The papers of this volume are very multi-faceted: they vary with regard to their background, their topics, and their argumentative strategies. Yet they are connected by the single aim of shedding light on what philosophy is. They all try to put a piece to the right place in the gigantic puzzle of what we call "philosophy" today. In this respect they represent what philosophy is, and has become during the last century. Today there are more philosophers than ever before. From Hungary to Brazil, from Russia to the USA and to Turkey, philosophers working on history, metaphysics, and ethics, are all striving towards a shared end, pursuing knowledge and wisdom together.

The question "what is philosophy?" raises a plethora of problems, gives rise to numerous various standpoints, arguments and counterarguments, innumerable opportunities to disagreement. Nonetheless through this shared effort we are more bound together than set apart. Through space and time the mission to find truth and gain insight into the most fundamental questions of human existence connects us, regardless of the differences in opinion, faith, and conviction. This aspect of what philosophy is, maybe the most important of all, is also testified by the present volume.

1

History as the Fundamental Reality Limning the Continental- Analytic Divide

Nenad Mišćević

The division of philosophy in the last two hundred years into continental and analytic is not arbitrary; there are important differences, and trails that characterize the two philosophical families. One of the most important ones is the tendency of many (but not all) great continental philosophers to connect issues of history, language and other human matters with “history” of Being, Spirit, life-world and similar basic ontological items. Human matters are thus presented as being extremely close to the fundamental ontological ones, if not identical with the later. Several versions of the trail are present in various philosophers, an absolute idealist one, in German Idealism, and a more realist one in Heidegger. Others fall in between the two. The trail is absent from analytic philosophy, and also from very moderate continental traditions, like the one of Brentano or in the realistic stage of phenomenology. The trail often intersects other continental trails, for instance a sympathy for the a-rational, producing ideas and works that stand in a marked contrast with the analytic tradition.



Introduction

Philosophy is these days divided between its continental and analytic incarnations.¹ However, despite strong institutional disunity, it is far from being clear whether there is a real philosophical difference. Like some other authors and manuals, Constantin V. Boundas starts by denying the existence of a serious contrast, but then, on the same page, proceeds to list ten quite demanding criteria distinguishing the two.² Brian Leiter minimizes the difference, adding that “analytic philosophy as a *substantive* research program—is dead.”³ In this paper I would like to propose a contrary view: there are substantial differences between the two. They are not iron clad, but belong to the “family differences” vs. “family resemblances” type.⁴

Analytic philosophers are very much in favor of rationality, and most of them also see logic as a paradigm of rational thought. There is a strong tradition, a historical trail in continental philosophy quite critical of reason and rationality, with authors like Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Kierkegaard at the origin. A lot of skepticism about the positive role and power of reason is present in Heidegger and his followers. French post-structuralists often contrast reason with desire and drive, appealing to the Freudian tradition, and mostly opt for the later.

Since Kierkegaard and Nietzsche there has been a strong current in continental philosophy combining the stress on the a-rational with the style favoring literary presentation over strict logical argument: the aphoristic style, poetic imagery and passage to genres like

1 I want to thank the organizers and the participants, for hospitality and discussion. On the philosophical side, the biggest thanks go to David Weberman, who kept warning me off simplifications and schematizations, and who remains for me the paradigm of analytically trained interpreter of continental philosophy.

2 Constantin V. Boundas, *The Edinburgh Companion to Twentieth-Century Philosophies* (Edinburgh University Press: 2007), 367.

3 Brian Leiter, “Analytic” and “Continental” Philosophy, <http://www.philosophicalgourmet.com/analytic.asp>. Italics in the original.

4 For sources see H-J. Glock, *What is Analytic Philosophy?* (Cambridge University Press: 2008); and chapter five of **Søren Overgaard, Paul Gilbert and Stephen Burwood**, *An Introduction to Metaphilosophy* (Cambridge University Press: 2013). For a longer discussion see Nenad Mišević, “Continental Philosophy-Trails and Family Resemblances,” EUJAP, Forthcoming.

novel (*Either/Or*) and prophetic discourse (*Thus spoke Zarathustra*). Heidegger suggested that philosophy should turn to poetry, without himself always following the turn, and Derrida in his later works tried to combine philosophy and literary vanguard-inspired “writing”.

A temptation of turning philosophy into something else has been present throughout the 19th and 20th century. The analytic temptation was science; the continental was politics (Marx and his followers), or poetry, or both (present-day post-modernist French scene).⁵ So, some family differences are around. In this paper I would like to talk about another central difference, concerning the metaphysical status of matters we normally mostly care about. Start with the most extreme example, the important historical political events. No analytic philosopher would dream of ascribing them more than moral and political significance; politics is a human matter, and human matters are a small, probably local, although humanly very interesting, island in the richness of the physical universe. Not so with continentals: for Hegel, the great historical events are crucial events in the biography of the most fundamental reality, the Spirit, for Heidegger they happen to the Being itself, for some French authors, like Badiou, they mark the deep ontological reality. When one founds a state (as Croats and Slovaks did recently after the downfall of Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia) the Being itself participates in the event: its Truth sets itself into the open space. When Davidson writes about events, he looks for complete generality; any event would do. For Alain Badiou, when it comes to the ontology of events, it's great political revolutions, and Mao's Cultural Revolution, to boot.⁶

The tendency is valid for other similar matters, anthropological in the wide sense. Take the fact that we are aware of ourselves and (hopefully) free to act. Sartre famously turns it into a criterion for demarcating nothing less than two kinds of being: being-in-itself vs. being-for-itself. Or the fact that we usually give presents. Derrida will connect the giving of gifts with Heidegger's idea of Being “giving itself” as a present, and project the complication of human

5 See overview in Nenad Mišćević, “Philosophy as Literature: The non-argumentative tradition in continental philosophy,” <https://www.unige.ch/lettres/philo/publications/engel/liberamicorum/miscevic.pdf>

6 Cf. Alain Badiou, *Being and Event* (New York: Continuum, 2006).

exchange of gifts onto the Being's activity itself (see below, section on Derrida). Language is the next anthropological item that has been projected onto the Being itself, and its various incarnations.

In the reminder of the paper, i.e. *Section Two* I would like to point to crucial historical examples of this strategy, and then to systematize briefly the idea. The first sub-section offers a more precise idea of the strategy, and the principle underlying it, focusing on its appearance on the scene of philosophy, in Hegel's work. The second subsection looks at Heidegger's version of AHO, and its vicissitudes up to the present time.

The anthropological and historical is deeply ontological

a) Why is history ontologically fundamental?

Let us start with history, one of the characteristic central topics of continental philosophy. Just a quick reminder: the early philosophical discovery of history as philosophical topic did keep it in the vicinity of matters divine. With authors like Eusebius and Orosius the history of Christianity is interpreted as the testimony to the truth of the Christian faith, and with Augustine, the story of Fall, Redemption and Salvation, becomes the philosophical model for understanding history. After the important secularizing and naturalizing interlude Hegel will stress again the man role of the transcendent, in a way re-transcendentalizing the story of the Fall and Salvation. Hegel is aware of the basic tripartite ontological structure of basic matters dividing them those pertaining to subjectivity, those to object or external reality (and the foundation), and the third, intermediate layer, tied to the subjectivity – the phenomena, or the veil-of-perception, or something similar, that threatens to alienate our minds from reality. But his interest is different. It is not only that the deep reality is somehow spiritual; this has already been proposed by Fichte. The new idea is that the basic structure itself is historical. History is the medium of fundamental ontology. Subject (mind) and the external world do not stand in a basically static, structural relation; their relations change with history. And the history is at the same time cultural, political and spiritual. *The deep ontology of the world changes with historical events*; to mention the

event favored by Kojève, one of the most successful interpreters and popularizers of Hegel in the 20th century, the success of Napoleon changes, so to speak, the very ontological structure of the world. Of course, such events are not contingent, they are part of the deep history of Spirit, and its journey to itself.

Let me illustrate the claim with a few very famous passages from Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, taken from the very beginning and very end each. In the well-known opening section of the Preface, Hegel first talk about "the true shape in which truth exists",⁷ namely "the scientific system of such truth." He speaks of his goal of bringing "philosophy closer to the form of Science, to the goal where it can lay aside the title 'love of knowing' and be actual knowing".⁸ Then he passes to implicit criticisms of those who would replace knowledge of the Whole with feeling or intuition, and continues with criticising their demand:

If we apprehend a demand of this kind in its broader context, and view it as it appears at the stage which self-conscious Spirit has presently reached, it is clear that Spirit has now got beyond the substantial life it formerly led in the element of thought, that it is beyond the immediacy of faith, beyond the satisfaction and security of the certainty that consciousness then had, of its reconciliation with the essential being, and of that being's universal presence both within and without.⁹

A naive reader might think at this point that Hegel is talking metaphorically of the spirit of time, or some such framework for thought. What follows will free her from her naiveté:

Besides, it is not difficult to see that ours is a birth-time and a period of transition to a new era. Spirit has broken with the world it has

7 G. W. F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology Of Mind* (Blackmask Online: 2001), 3.

8 Ibid.

9 Hegel, *Phenomenology...*, 4. Here is the continuation: "It has not only gone beyond all this into the other extreme of an insubstantial reflection of itself into itself, but beyond that too. Spirit has not only lost its essential life; it is also conscious of this loss, and of the finitude that is its own content. Turning away from the empty husks, and confessing that it lies in wickedness, it reviles itself for so doing, and now demands from philosophy, not so much knowledge of what it is, as the recovery through its agency of that lost sense of solid and substantial being."

hitherto inhabited and imagined, and is of a mind to submerge it in the past, and in the labour of its own transformation. Spirit is indeed never at rest but always engaged in moving forward.¹⁰

Later, he continues:

But just as the first breath drawn by a child after its long, quiet nourishment breaks the gradualness of merely quantitative growth—there is a qualitative leap, and the child is born—so likewise the Spirit in its formation matures slowly and quietly into its new shape, dissolving bit by bit the structure of its previous world, whose tottering state is only hinted at by isolated symptoms.¹¹

Clearly, the history just briefly narrated is the history of the Spirit with capital “S”; it is the Absolute. And the Absolute has a biography and a history, which happens to culminate in our time. The Absolute itself, the very ground of all things, “has broken with the world it has hitherto inhabited”; and is working on its own transformation. Moreover, this dynamics is not accidental to the Absolute: it “is indeed never at rest but always engaged in moving forward”. We know from context and later development, that Hegel really means his historical time, roughly the turn of the century, and arguably the time of Napoleonic wars and even particular battles, at Jena and vicinity. We shall return to Hegel in a moment, but now let us put the thesis in a wider context.

The radical character of the thesis is clear if we consider any, I repeat *any*, contemporary analytic metaphysics or indeed the classical Aristotelian, or materialistic, or Spinozistic, or Berkeleyan or Kantian idealistic ones, and contrast it with the view proposed. Imagine a mainstream physicalist arguing that the fundamental structure of space-time plus fundamental forces, has drastically changed with September 11th, given the radicalness of the US response to it. And that with the advent of the first Afro-American president of the US the space-time has suffered another transformation.¹² Or,

¹⁰ Hegel, *Phenomenology...*, 6.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² To illustrate the force of habit, from Hegel to the present days, let me note that a continental French colleague has described September 11th as changing the very nature of the possible and actual; see Jean-Pierre Dupuy, *Avions-nous oublié le mal ? Penser la politique après le 11 septembre* (Paris: Bayard, 2002).

imagine an Aristotelian metaphysician arguing that the very nature of four causes has undergone a dramatic change with the death of Alexander the Great (or Richard Nixon, if you prefer the later). Or with some cultural change, the birth of avant-garde art, for instance. Hegel's move is a dramatic and spectacular announcement of a radical alternative to these ways of thinking, the start of a geological rift of spectacular dimension. He was not alone. So, let me immediately bring in another great philosopher, standing in many respects at the opposite pole than Hegel, but sharing the idea that human history is intimately connected to the history of the fundamental reality. The philosopher is Martin Heidegger. Here is how he sees the history and the future of Being, the most fundamental reality there is.

Before Being can occur in its primal form, Being as the will must be broken, the world must be caused to collapse, the Earth must be driven to desolation, and men to mere labor [...]. In the decline everything, that is beings in the whole of the truth of Metaphysics, approaches its end.¹³

The decline has already taken place. The consequences of its occurrence are the events of the world history of this century.¹⁴

The two world wars are part of the scenario, important parts of the history of the whole truth of Metaphysics; fortunately they do prepare for us the occurrence of Being in its primal form! What is common to Hegel and to Heidegger is the principle linking the anthropological-cum-linguistic, historical and the deeply ontological. Let me call it Anthro-Historico Ontological (AHO) principle:

(AHO): The anthropological and historical are deeply ontological.

The idea is that *human life, language and history (politics included) belong to the fundamental level of reality*, not to a higher-level of supervenient additions and embellishments. Call for the moment the fundamental level "Being", as Heidegger does. Then a weaker form of AHO, typical, say of Heidegger's *Being and Time*, will claim that human states (emotions, and the like) reveal the Being itself, that language does the same, and that the process of revealing is

13 Martin Heidegger, *The End of Philosophy* (University of Chicago Press: 1973), 68.

14 Heidegger, *The End...*, 69.

deeply and essentially historical. The stronger form will go a step further: historical, linguistic and philosophical “interaction” with us is part of the very history of Being itself, something that happens to it. The strong AHO looks like the converse of AHO: the ontological is (immediately) anthropological and historical. For example, Being has a history, the history of Being is closely tied to human history, it has to do with humans forgetting Being, and so on. Now, one crucial methodological consequence of the acceptance of the strong AHO is the following: if anthropological matters, including the linguistic ones, and historical processes play a fundamental ontological role, then we, philosophers, can use, without further ado, *various such human phenomena as direct models for understanding the fundamental reality*. For Heidegger, the very Being itself acts in a humanly understandable way, it hides from human beings or reveals itself to them, typically in the history of art, including primarily poetic expression, or in great political events (the grounding of a state), or in piety and experience of the sacred (*Work of art*). Post-structuralists, above all Derrida, have taken seriously the idea that phenomena having to do with language, discourse and writing, serve as the model of the ultimate reality. The structuralist ideas about network of differences defining various levels of language, from phonology to syntax, are radicalized and projected onto the reality itself.

The other consequence is still more spectacular: not only do various aspects of human reality (thought, language, art, etc.) stand in proximity to the fundamental reality itself; human historical understanding of these aspects is the very history of the aspects themselves and thereby the history of the fundamental reality itself. For Hegel, the history of philosophy is the most sophisticated level of the history of the Spirit itself, for Heidegger of the history of Being in its relation to human beings. For Derrida, the history of our understanding of language, from Plato through Rousseau to de Saussure is the history of language itself, the sad saga of logocentrism. The apparent meta-level of understanding coincides with the object level of the historical process itself, and the process is somehow part of the very history of the fundamental reality.

Let me restate the connection with history of philosophy. For Hegel it is the grand final stage of the history of the fundamental reality, the Spirit itself, when Presocratics present being as some-

thing material, the Spirit itself is thereby taking a material form, when Hegel presents it as spiritual, being itself returns to its own nature. This corollary plays a crucial role in legitimizing history of philosophy as part and parcel of philosophy itself, in a sense never dreamt of by analytic colleagues. It returns triumphantly in Heidegger, and marks almost the whole of German history of philosophy in the 20th century as well as the deconstructivist French current(s).

b) The varieties of AHO

AHO is very typical of continental tradition, and practically absent from the analytic one. It is not shared by some moderate continental authors, like Meinong or Habermas, but is shared by the most high-profile continental philosophers. It has appeared in several varieties, each of which deserves attention. Let me therefore point to some of its appearances, starting with its birth in Hegel, and then sketch some of its non-Hegelian incarnations, that have marked the great deal of continental philosophy, from mature and late phenomenology, through Heidegger to Derrida, (de-)constructivists and post-modernists.

b1) Hegelian idealism and the birth of AHO

How did AHO enter the German idealism? In Kant metaphysically basic matters are ahistorical. But, the interest in history was alive in philosophers, and Herder is the author closest to Hegel. On the metaphysical side, we have Fichte; in his work the foundational role is played by Self (Ich), in tension with the world, the Non-self (Nicht-Ich). The interest in ethics, theory of right and justice and in history is very much alive, but in Fichte the ontological fundamentals, Self and its contrary are still ahistorical. But, there is just a step from pasting the three together. For instance, there is the original positing of Non-self by Self: when does it happen? One answer is atemporal, but one is tempted to think of some original time of the grand event. Why not, after all; maybe the positing occurs in time, even in historical time.

Now, young Hegel is obsessed with history, encompassing religious, political, and then cultural history and history of philosophy. From the Protestant tradition he takes over the idea that great events around the life of Christ, birth, death, resurrection and the appearance of the Holy Spirit on Pentecost, are events that belong to the life of God himself. He makes a step further: the narrative shows that God in a way has a history, intertwined with human history. Next comes the interest in political history, with French revolution and Napoleonic wars in the focus. Now, how does one put together fundamental ontology, religious history of God himself and political events of one's time? Well, declare that God and fundamental reality, which is, of course spiritual (we are at the peak of German idealism) are the same. If God has a history, then fundamental reality, the Spirit, has one too. And if the two are closely connected to human reality, then the human reality is closely connected to the ontologically fundamental history of God-Spirit.

The resulting, idealist version of AHO will feature the idea of closeness, analogy and continuity between (a) human history, political, religious, and cultural, (b) history of the Absolute/Spirit (*Geist*) and (c) development of Concept/Ideas concerning metaphysical matters and human historical matters.¹⁵ First, human history, and the temporal dimension having to do with historical and anthropological (=self-)consciousness related), matters, in particular tensions -conflicts-contradictions arising in relation to such matters: self-interest vs. social interest, family vs. state. These tensions and contradictions are the very driving force of the deepest and most spectacular development of the foundation of social reality. The tensions lead to progressively higher stages of social organization. The history often goes from one extreme (one side in the tension) the other, and then to a higher arrangement reconciling both. Interestingly, there is a continuity between

15 For a detailed account of the role of God in Hegel's philosophy, see, for example Emil L. Fackenheim, *The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought* (Indiana University Press: 1967). In particular Chapter Four. For a wider framework, see Mulhall, who summarizes the basic Hegelian dialectical path, from being-in-itself of Spirit, through its alienated forms to the final reconciliation and glory. Stephen Mulhall, *Philosophical Myths of the Fall* (Princeton University Press, 2007).

- (1) the actual history of mankind,
- (2) the self-consciousness that mankind has of its history
- (3) philosopher's "scientific account" of (a) and (b).

in fact, the account (c) is the culmination of (a) and (b). This idea will be one of the most persistent in continental AHO-tradition, re-emerging in various forms in central authors like Heidegger and Derrida. So, let us just mention Hegel's formulation of the matters. Start from some given X, say family or nation. Consider X as such; Hegel calls it "X-in itself". Then pass to X that knows itself, is aware of itself: a family that functions well, with full awareness of the common ties, a nation of the same sort; Hegel calls it "X-for itself". For him, awareness of X is somehow X's self-awareness, as the background of idealism would suggest. Finally, the union of the two, X-in-and-for-itself is the final stage of the development of X. Now, this works with Hegel's primary examples from society and history. A big problem for the account is the non-human nature: our consciousness of plants is simply not plant's self-consciousness. A possible reply is that nature is somehow part of human history (= strongly anthropomorphic, either idealist or realist), or of a super-human plus human one, involving the Geist and thereby God).¹⁶

Second, we now come to the formulation of AHO itself: most importantly and most dramatically, the central historical and anthropological ((=self-)consciousness related), matters are in fact stages in the development of the very foundation of reality, of Spirit/God. The historical configurations from our (1) the actual history of mankind, together with the corresponding forms of their (self-) understanding, from our element (2) the self-consciousness that mankind has of its history give one "History (intellectually) comprehended (*begriffen*)", writes Hegel in the famous poetically formulated conclusion of the *Phenomenology of the Spirit*; the two taken "[...] [t]ogether, or, form at once the recollection and the Golgotha

16 Perhaps the young Marx and some Marxist Hegelians stuck to the nature<human history schema and to strongly anthropomorphic realism.

of Absolute Spirit, the reality, the truth, the certainty of its throne, without which it were lifeless, solitary, and alone.¹⁷

This is the idealistic AHO at its fullest. We now need to point to the connection with the other and related strategy deployed by Hegel, and this is his methodology of logical analysis. Let me very briefly propose a way of understanding it. Anyone who is in the business of analyzing concepts would proceed by picking up candidate truths concerning some X, collating intuitions and organizing them. Usually, at early stages one will encounter inconsistencies, sometimes even straight contradictions. We all point out to our students that ordinary concept contain mutually contradictory elements, or elements that are hard to reconcile with each other. Some possible groupings will be more extreme, others less so. The familiar options include picking up one of the extremes, and defending it, or picking up one of the extremes, and making it more moderate, enriching it with some items from the “middle ground”, and finally, looking at the middle ground, organizing it, and claiming that it represents the right concept of X. If the elements form a group of mutually supporting elements, others another group, the standard analytic technics include selecting some elements and pruning out others, or, in cases where elements are in tension but not literary contradictory, assigning greater weight to some, and lesser to others. Hegel’s proposal is exactly the opposite of these strategies, and enjoins us to do the following:

1. When analyzing the concept of X stress the extreme, mutually contradictory elements, and organize the relevant propositions into two or more mutually contrasting groups, G1, G2,...GN (or into a couple of mutually contradictory ones, <G1, not-G1>)
2. organize the groups into a sequence: G1→G2→...GN
3. describe the whole ordered by “→” as the development of the object itself, and then pass to something even more radical:

17 Hegel, *Phenomenology...*, 216. Here is the full statement by Hegel: “The goal, which is Absolute Knowledge or Spirit knowing itself as Spirit, finds its pathway in the recollection of spiritual forms (*Geister...*) Their conservation, looked at from the side of their free existence appearing in the form of contingency, is *History*; looked at from the side of their intellectually comprehended organization, it is the Science of the ways in which knowledge appears.” Hegel, *Phenomenology...*, 296.

4. if possible, describe this development as something taking place in time (or at least, in time, as one of the possible media of development).
5. depict the development as having a historical counterpart in outside reality, and as being ultimately unified with it.

This logical-metaphysical strategy, enjoins the philosopher to look for contrasting standpoints concerning X, but then to ascribe the contrast and contradictions to the very concept “X”, not to our fallible “conceptions” then, the tensions are ascribed to the X itself, where the account oscillates between the two, conflict and contradiction. Mere concepts are one-sided and we should take all the sides together.¹⁸ A famous example comes from the beginning of his *Logic*. (Chapter 1 Being, § 132), where being will be equated with its contradictory concept, nothing or non-being.

Being, pure being, without any further determination. In its indeterminate immediacy it is equal only to itself. It is also not unequal relatively to an other; it has no diversity within itself nor any with a reference outwards. It would not be held fast in its purity if it contained any determination or content which could be distinguished in it or by which it could be distinguished from an other. It is pure indeterminateness and emptiness. There is nothing to be intuited in it, if one can speak here of intuiting; or, it is only this pure intuiting itself. Just as little is anything to be thought in it, or it is equally only this empty thinking. Being, the indeterminate immediate, is in fact nothing, and neither more nor less than nothing.¹⁹

The first conclusion follows in § 134

Pure Being and pure nothing are, therefore, the same. What is the truth is neither being nor nothing, but that being—does not pass over but has passed over—into nothing, and nothing into being.²⁰

18 Philosophy has to do with ideas or realized thoughts, and hence not with what we have been accustomed to call mere concepts. It has indeed to exhibit the onesidedness and untruth of these mere concepts, and to show that, while that which commonly bears the name “concept,” is only an abstract product of the understanding, the true concept alone has reality and gives this reality to itself. (Hegel, *Outlines of the Philosophy of Right* (Oxford University Press, 2008), 17).

19 G. W. F. Hegel, *Logic* (Blackmask Online: 2001), 35.

20 Hegel, *Logic*, 36.

Now, what do we do with this contradiction? Hegel suggests that it is preserved-cum-abolished in the next stage:

But it is equally true that they are not undistinguished from each other, that, on the contrary, they are not the same, that they are absolutely distinct, and yet that they are unseparated and inseparable and that each immediately vanishes in its opposite. Their truth is therefore, this movement of the immediate vanishing of the one into the other: becoming, a movement in which both are distinguished, but by a difference which has equally immediately resolved itself.²¹

Now, what is the relation of this concept (or concepts) to reality itself? Hegel's answer is in the spirit of AHO: the true concept of X is just an aspect of X itself:

The concept and its existence are two sides, distinct yet united, like soul and body. The body is the same life as the soul, and yet the two can be named independently. A soul without a body would not be a living thing, and *vice versa*. Thus the visible existence of the concept is its body, just as the body obeys the soul which produced it. Seeds contain the tree and its whole power, though they are not the tree itself; the tree corresponds accurately to the simple structure of the seed. If the body does not correspond to the soul, it is defective.²²

Philosophical science itself bifurcates into the account of the more concrete and historical development and the more abstract logic-cum-general metaphysics.²³ Hegel thus offers at least two strategies for a meaningful deployment of contradictions: first, the ahistorical, "logical-metaphysical" one (exemplified most thoroughly in his *Science of Logic*), second, the temporal-historical strategy: conceptual contradictions turn into stages of a development of (self-) consciousness which is essentially historical. A famous examples are contradictions of self-consciousness that find their historical implementation and solution in the master-slave relation from

²¹ Ibid.

²² G. W. F. Hegel, *Outlines of the Philosophy of Right* (Oxford University Press: 2008), 17.

²³ *Consciousness is spirit as a concrete knowing*, a knowing too, in which externality is involved; but the development of this object, like the development of all natural and spiritual life, rests solely on *the nature of the pure essentialities which constitute the content of logic*. Hegel, *Logic*, 4.

Phenomenology). The temporal-historical strategy organizes the whole of his work, and has been immensely influential in continental philosophy, up to the present time.

Let us now pass to the opposite, analytical side. Hegel's dialectical conceptual analysis is most often seen as quite exotic, but it has found an impressive analytic defender, Graham Priest. In his *Contradictory Concepts* he explains that since there are true statements of the form A and $\neg A$ then there are facts, or fact-like structures, corresponding to both of these. But this is not our main topic here.²⁴

We have mentioned the basic Hegelian dialectical path, from being-in-itself of Spirit, through its alienated forms to the final reconciliation and glory. Indeed, this pattern is the typical pattern of understanding of history and of politics in Continental tradition, of course with a wide range of variations. Analytic philosophers are less prone to this pattern of thinking. For one thing, rather little is written in analytic tradition about the general shape of human history. The topic itself is far from the center of philosophical interest, with a view that is almost an anti-AHO line: human history has relatively little to tell us both about the basic general structure of the world and about the basic general structure of human cognition and knowledge. Second, when authors like Rawls or Gaus comment on history it is much more in spirit of continuity, than in the spirit of radical break with alienated past or anything of this sort: the dominant Rawlsian current in contemporary political philosophy focuses on the tradition in which the liberal (overlapping) consensus has been gradually formed, and even more narrowly, say on American tradition from the Founding fathers to the present moment. (For a popularizing, not really philosophical recent version of the attitude see Pinker's *The Better Angels of Our Nature*.) Most importantly, reservations about AHO is common to all analytic philosophers.

So, what does an analytically trained Hegelian do when confronted with such claims? Remember the above quoted passage claiming that Spirit has entered a new phase of its history, just in our (Hegel's) time. Robert Stern, in his Routledge *Guidebook* wisely chooses to stress the understandable and acceptable. For him, Hegel

24 For further discussion see Nenad Mišćević, "Hegel – Dialectics: Logic, Consciousness and History-For Graham Priest," to appear in EUJAP.

is here talking just about the way people of his time react to new insights,

Hegel declares that thankfully the period of such irrationalism has passed, and that 'ours is a birth-time and a period of transition to a new era' (PS: 6). However, he also states that when it first appears on the scene, this renewed commitment to reason is flawed by a certain intellectual immaturity, as this new way of thinking is 'no more a complete actuality than is a new-born child [...]'.²⁵

He does not mention that ours is supposed to be a period of transition of the Spirit itself to a new era; it is more spirit-of-time than the Absolute Spirit that is discussed here, and this is perhaps the best way to introduce the book to contemporary English-speaking reader.

Kenneth Westphal talks about Hegel's collective or social epistemology, without ever mentioning that the ultimate bearer of knowledge and self-consciousness is the Absolute itself (or Himself).²⁶ The same holds for otherwise excellent overview by Terry Pinkard in his entry "Hegel" in Nenon's *Kant, Kantianism, and Idealism*.²⁷

Here is another illustration: presents a series of stages of the development of consciousness and self-consciousness, before passing to cultural-political history. Take the most famous example, the dialectic of self-consciousness in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. How is development of self-consciousness to be placed in a historical context: how is my basic self-knowledge affected by historical political (and cultural and religious) changes? His famous sketch of an answer is provided by his view that self-consciousness essentially depends on recognition by other humans, and by the idea that recognitional process is the matter of master-servant relation(s) and their history.

Several readings are possible; let me list three contrasting ones. First, the existential(-ist) reading stressing the type-relation between (just) two individuals, with tokens of the relation recurring in countless situations (love relationships (Sartre), political domi-

25 Robert Stern, *Routledge Philosophy Guide Book to Hegel and the Phenomenology of Spirit* (Routledge: 2002), 31.

26 Westphal, Kenneth R. *Hegel's Epistemology. A Philosophical Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit*. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2003.

27 Ed. Thomas Nenon, *Kant, Kantianism, and Idealism: the Origins of Continental Philosophy* (The University of Chicago Press: 2010).

nation, parent-child relations etc.) It keeps generality but sacrifices historicity.

The second is the historical reading. Alexandre Kojève has made the actual-history proposal into the heart of his enormously popular and influential exposition of *Phenomenology*, and the influence of it has then developed in two directions: existentialist and more Marxist, with class-struggle as the relevant specification of the history of master-servant relation. Robert Stern in notes the problem

In bringing in Stoicism here, and in the subsequent transitions to Scepticism and then to the Unhappy Consciousness, it is notable that Hegel is referring to actual historical episodes (as he will do later, in referring to the French Revolution, for example). Indeed, as many commentators have pointed out, in mentioning that the Stoic aims at freedom ‘whether on the throne or in chains’, Hegel surely meant us to think of the late or ‘Roman’ Stoics Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus, the former an Emperor, the latter a (liberated) slave. This then raises the question of how far the development of the *Phenomenology* more generally should be seen in historical terms, and how much it should be read as a form of speculative history, of the sort Hegel was later to present in his *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*. Attempts have been made to read the *Phenomenology* this way (cf. Forster 1998: 291–500), but my own view is that the two enterprises should be distinguished, and that in this text historical episodes have the place they do because they relate to particular stages in the conceptual development that Hegel is tracing out for consciousness. I think it would therefore be wrong to try to build up Hegel’s account of this (and other) historical episodes into a historicist reading of the *Phenomenology* as a whole.²⁸

The third is the “allegory” reading, recently proposed by McDowell

[...] the suggestion I am making, that only one biological individual is really in play. The description of the struggle to the death works as an allegorical depiction of an attempt, on the part of a single self-consciousness, to affirm its independence, by disavowing any dependence on “its objective mode”, which is the life that has come to stand in for the otherness of the world whose scene that life is. So far, the life that is the “objective mode” has revealed itself as the

²⁸ Robert Stern, *Routledge Philosophy Guide Book to Hegel and the Phenomenology of Spirit* (Routledge: 2002), 85–86.

life of a consciousness, indeed a self-consciousness. In fact it is the very same self-consciousness that here tries to disavow it. It is that self-consciousness not qua attempting to affirm its independence but qua living through “the whole expanse of the sensible world”. But the subject that is undergoing this experience is not yet aware that those are two different specifications of what is in fact itself. Unassimilated otherness now takes the form of an alienation from what is in fact its own consciousness as living through its world, its own empirical consciousness.²⁹

The impression is that the commentators try to bypass AHO. The principle that was crucial for Hegel is often simply not mentioned, and the attention is focused upon less demanding ideas. How much is left from Hegel in such reinterpretations is an open question.

b2) From Hegel to the contemporary scene

i) Introduction

The AHO principle has been one of the central tenets in the continental tradition; not shared by all, but shared by some central thinkers. Of course, the alleged deeply ontological status of mankind's historical adventures has been variously interpreted by various key thinkers. On one reading, faithful to Hegel, these matters constitute what is, in the literal, objective sense the World Spirit (Geist); we can speak of idealist AHO. It is the dominant form of the thinking in terms of AHO in the early 19th century. The academic philosophical establishment in the second part of the 19th century turns away from it, with the stress on Neo-Kantian project on the one hand, and on Brentano and schools deriving from him on the other.

Still, within Kantian tradition one can speak of a *constructivist minimalist AHO*: our capacities, individual or intersubjective-social construct our, human reality, which is then proclaimed to be the only one worthy of philosophical study. This line of thought will play a crucial role at the intersection of philosophy with social sciences and humanities, producing in more recent time the idea of

29 John McDowell, “The Apperceptive I And The Empirical Self Towards A Heterodox Reading Of ‘Lordship And Bondage’ in Hegel’s *Phenomenology*,” in *Hegel: New Directions*, ed. Katerina Deligiorgi (Acumen: 2006), 43.

the “social construction of reality”, crucial for the whole post-modernist thinking.

A philosophically deeper and more interesting continental development had come from phenomenology. Initially, phenomenology was realistic and not congenial to the AHO family of views. With the turn to reduction and *epoché* a new door is cracked open. The classical mature phenomenological works of Husserl (and his immediate followers), from *Ideas* to *Cartesian meditations*, leave no place for AHO, since the issue of the fundamental reality of the outside world is not addressed at all; what counts is the (inter-)subjective space of our experience. However, this approach leaves open an enticing possibility: consider this space of experience as the only humanly relevant kind of world, and treat *it* as fundamental or equi-fundamental with human subject. This was the road to the *Lebenswelt*. If this life-world is a world, and if it is co-constituted with the subject the AHO is back in play, indeed a phenomenological minimalist AHO. The line is close to Heidegger's moderate AHO views from *Being and time*, and there is no wonder that a dialogue took place in the next generation between the proponents of minimal phenomenological AHO and of realistic full AHO. Philosophers like Merleau-Ponty move towards realism about the life-world, and such a life-world is indeed the world of human capacities, interests and projects. In contrast to the Heideggerian project that places Being in the center of interest, the phenomenological minimalist AHO, as exemplified, for instance, in Merleau-Ponty's *Phenomenology of perception*, points to no item beyond human being(s) and human life-world. (In later work Merleau-Ponty tried to integrate elements from Heidegger into his work).

We thus have three varieties of AHO so far:

1. the Hegelian, idealist one.

Next, non-idealist options:

2. constructionist, with social construction as the central process bringing mind and reality together.
3. phenomenological minimalist option.

We stay with non-idealist options and pass to the one that has played the crucial role in 20th century continental philosophy, namely the one due to Heidegger.

ii) *The realist- positive AHO - Heidegger*

On the realist reading, famously proposed by Heidegger, human history just *is* the history of Being (Seinsgeschichte), and at the very least it reveals Being in a particularly intimate, non-objectivist way. Heidegger speaks about the happening of truth as essential for the history of Being: truth sets itself into a work of art, or it occurs through “the act that founds a political state”, then in the act of sacrifice, and finally in the thinker’s questioning.³⁰ So the painting of a picture, say of Mona Lisa, or founding of a state, belong to essential events in the history of Being and truth. Here is the claim about dependence of the anthropological (Dasein) and the fundamental ontological (Sein):

Of course only as long as Dasein is (that is, only as long as an understanding of being is ontically possible), “is there” being. When Dasein does not exist, “independence” “is” not either, nor “is” the “in-itself.” In such a case this sort of thing can be neither understood nor not understood. In such a case even entities within-the-world can neither be discovered nor lie hidden. In such a case it cannot be said that entities are, nor can it be said that they are not. But now, as long as there is an understanding of being and therefore an understanding of presence-at-hand, it can indeed be said that in this case entities will still continue to be.³¹

Another example from Heidegger: Being gives itself to us; the trace of it is recorded in German idiom “Es gibt”, meaning word-by-word “It gives”, for “There is”. The giving is essential to the history of Being itself. What is given is a further question; we shall later encounter a reading that stresses time as the element given by Being. “The forgetfulness of Being belongs to the essence of Being which by its nature veils itself.”³² And “Being itself withdraws itself in its truth.

30 Martin Heidegger, “The origin of the work of art,” in *Twentieth century theories of art*, ed. J.M. Thompson (Carleton University Press: 1999), 401.

31 Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1967), 212. My translation.

32 In German: “Die Vergessenheit des Seins gehört in das durch sie selbst verhüllte Wesen des Seins.” Martin Heidegger, *Holzwege* (Frankfurt a.M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977), 336. Cf. also Martin Heidegger, *Der Satz vom Grund* (Bern: Francke, 1953), 111–114. My translation with help of various English ones.

It conceals itself in its truth and hides itself in its concealing.”³³ The same holds then for human forgetting of the authentic Being: “Hence the forgetfulness of Being is not due to a mistake, or simple negligence on the part of metaphysics or metaphysicians, but constitutes an event (Ereignis) [...]”³⁴

With the acceptance of this principle history is seen as permeating ontology; in some version the former replaces the later. There is no wonder that continental tradition is very interested in the issues of meaning of life, since meaning of human life is, by AHO, directly ontological. It is important to note how dramatic the move of accepting the AHO principle and taking it as fundamental in one’s philosophy. The move is unthinkable for early modern philosophers; but even the Enlightenment and anti-Enlightenment authors, from Condorcet and Voltaire to Rousseau and Burke, who were obsessed by history, both political and cultural, didn’t dream of it. Equally importantly, once the move is made, these earlier authors can be integrated into the new picture. The most naïve version would be to integrate the story of linear progress, the Whig history, into the deep ontology of Spirit and world; nobody to my knowledge did this. A more exciting move has been to harness Rousseau-style ideas about history as alienation from the original, natural state, and his dreams about the quasi-return to it, the rebuilding of the natural within the culture, properly at its very end and fulfilment.³⁵

Let me now turn to the anthropological phenomenon that has been crucial in the later history of AHO, from late Heidegger to post-structuralism, the phenomenon of language. For Heidegger language is “the house of Being”, the medium through which Being speaks to us, in philosophy, and above all in poetry. Linguistic understanding (Verstehen) is different from scientific (even logic based) thinking (as suggested by Schleiermacher and Dilthey). The paradigm of Verstehen is understanding of works of art. We grasp Sein by Verstehen, indeed by its highest mode, *Seinsverstehen*, claims Heidegger. The consequences for philosophical meth-

33 “Das Sein selbst entzieht sich in seine Wahrheit. Es birgt sich in diese und verbirgt sich selbst in solchem Bergen.” Heidegger, *Holzwege*, 244.

34 Thomas A. Fay, *Heidegger: The Critique of Logic* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), 19.

35 Mulhall, *Philosophical Myths...*

odology are significant. First, anthropomorphism in metaphysics: you understand Being as you understand me. Second, the non-argumentative style of understanding to be enhanced with the paradigm from art. Finally, the central place of history of philosophy: understanding history of philosophy you understand being through its (his?) history. An interesting and original counterpart to Hegel, indeed! So here is then the last version of non-idealist AHO to be briefly discussed.

iii) The post-structuralist negative AHO - Derrida

The origin of Derrida's version of AHO is interesting. His early work concerns Husserl, including the stage in which the life-world joins the human subject in the phenomenological minimalist version of AHO. Heidegger's thought is always in the background. However, the specifically French context is the one of structuralism, first linguistic, and then structuralism in human sciences. Linguistic structure is already a model for thinking about reality for the older generation thinkers like Levi-Strauss and Althusser, and almost-peers like Foucault. Language is a system of differences, these being more important than any positive qualities a linguistic item might have. The focus is upon the signifier and the meaning-sense; the referent is put into brackets.

Derrida builds his negative ontology first by focusing on writing in contrast to spoken language. Written text has a plurality of meanings that cannot be controlled by the presence of the writer; Derrida will suggest that the plurality is virtually inexhaustible. The system of signifiers responsible for these meanings is nothing ontologically positive, but the pure network of differences. And this is the model in accordance to which we should think of reality, both of the life-world, and of what is going to be the negative, un-expressible counterpart of Being: the reading/writing addresses the question of being, claims Derrida (*Margins*, chapter Three, "Ousia and Gramme"), and it does it "en creux", in the absence and in the negative way. Reading/writing is specific, it is of course language-based, but it is the deepest linguistic phenomenon there is. Writing (*écriture*) covers all that is philosophically important – call it issues of being or whatever. The ultimate difference, un-namable in our language, the ultimate "trace" and the "writing without presence and absence" play,

in a negative way, the role that Being plays in Heidegger. And, like in Heidegger, the poetic reading/writing is paradigmatic.

In his later work, Derrida multiplies models from human reality for the understanding of the (negative) fundamental reality. Let me mention such a more recent source, originally, from 1991, his meditation on gift from his *Given Time I: the Counterfeit Money*.³⁶ In the chapter on Heidegger he draws direct analogies between clearly human matters of gift, present and exchange and matters of the activities of the Being itself, using as the connecting thread the resources of language, including ambiguities, play with literal versus idiomatic meanings, all this on the spur of Heidegger and his idea of Being giving something (perhaps even itself) to us humans, that we mentioned at the beginning. Here is the first step to an interesting paradox of the gift:

For there to be a gift, there must be no reciprocity, return, exchange, countergift, or debt. If the other gives me back or owes me or has to give me back: what I give him or her there will not have been a gift, whether this restitution is immediate or whether it is programmed by a complex calculation of a long-term deferral or difference. This is all too obvious if the other, the one, gives me back immediately the same thing.³⁷

The underlying argument probably has something like the following form (Derrida would not be happy with the division into premises and conclusions):

Assume that A is giving G to B at some time t. Condition of possibility CP, for this is

CP1: If G is to be a gift, then there must not be reciprocity, exchange, countergift *at any future time*.

When we take context into account a stronger demand appears:

CP2: If G is to be a gift, there must not be expectations of reciprocity, exchange, countergift *at any future time*.
i.e.

If A expects countergift from B, then G is not a gift.

36 Jacques Derrida, *Given Time I: the Counterfeit Money* (University of Chicago Press: 1992).

37 Derrida, *Given...*, 12.

If the one gives the gift back, it is annulled. p. 12

(E) It is impossible not to expect a counter-gift. Therefore

(C1) It is impossible that G is a gift.

Here is the conclusion:

For this is the impossible that seems to give itself to be thought here: These conditions of possibility of the gift (that some "one" gives some "thing" to some "one other") designate simultaneously the conditions of the impossibility of the gift. And already we could translate this into other terms: these conditions of possibility define or produce the annulment, the annihilation, the destruction of the gift...³⁸

Derrida then extends the paradox to a wider area, appealing to the famous and classical anthropological study by Marcel Mauss on the gift.... Many crucially important social practices rest on (social demands of) gifts. Therefore, many crucially important social practices are almost impossible (and philosophically deeply problematic). We now pass to AHO: some central philosophical topics and doctrines are articulated in terms of gift and giving.³⁹ Therefore, Derrida thinks, these topics are deeply problematic.⁴⁰

38 Ibid.

39 Here are a few meta-philosophical remarks, to be found in the same book: Theory, i.e. the distanced, non-mad reflection about gift is powerless. Thinking about the gift means entering the "destructive circle" of the transcendental illusion. It involves giving "gages", not just tokens of faith, but guarantees, acts of taking "personal risks". Derrida, *Given...*, 30ff.

40 An analytically inclined reader would be tempted to offer the following defense of the notion of the gift: first, counter-gift has a strong and a weak reading, *strongly, as blocking any reciprocity* (e.g. B being better disposed to A after receiving G), and weakly as blocking the immediate counter-gift. -The use of the term "gift" with relatively literal meaning entails that there is no immediate and clear expectations on A's side of a well delimited counter-gift (but in this case B being better disposed to A after receiving G does not count as counter-gift).

(Although a sorites is in waiting here: If there is a return in $t+10$ seconds, G is not a gift. If there is an expectation of a return in $t+10$ seconds, G is not a gift. But it can be handed in the usual ways.) So, Derrida's conclusion rest on too strong a reading, as if the notion of gift as *blocking any reciprocity*, and this is clearly a misinterpretations of ordinary judgments. The everyday use of the term "gift" is vague, and has to be artificially sharpened when we do philosophy (or economics, or psychology). The sharpened versions do not produce contradiction. Also, the everyday use of the term "gift" has persisted for millennia, without big

Derrida then uses the established paradoxical nature of the gift in order to claim that forgetting is the condition of there being gift(s); it would block expectation of reciprocity. To reiterate, he claims that there is a paradox in the very idea of giving and gift, that makes gift, in a sense impossible. He has given examples of ordinary human giving in our culture, then of “gift as a form of exchange”, de-constructing the ideas of Marcel Mauss about primitive societies, but then he turns to Heidegger and give to the paradox a straightforwardly ontological reading.

This reading turns around the German expression “Es gibt” (normally translated as “there is”), to which Heidegger has given a deep ontological meaning. As we mentioned “Es” means “It”, and “gibt” means “give”, so the Google translation of “Es gibt” would be “It gives”. Heidegger sees in the expression the trace of a deep truth: It, i.e. the Being gives, and above all it gives itself. But there is more. “There is time” is in German “Es gibt Zeit”, literally, “It gives time”. Heidegger will read it in his fundamental ontological fashion as claiming that Being gives (to us and to the world) the time.

Derrida will now apply the paradox of giving to these fundamental ontological claims. He will suggest that the nature of time is paradoxical, since time is something that is “given” and giving is paradoxical. Equally, we shall learn that forgetting Being belongs to its very “nature”, since Being gives itself, and giving is possible only if it is immediately forgotten, otherwise it degenerates into reciprocity, exchange and economic reason. The paradox or alleged paradox tied to the narrowly human practice of giving present is projected into the structure of the Being itself. (Another application will be to show the implausibility of the myth of the given.) This is how the strong AHO encourages somewhat strange analogizing between anthropology and fundamental ontology. So much about Derrida.

There are other examples of AHO in recent continental philosophy. Some Western Marxists have also been very much in favor of AHO, building it into their view of alienation and revolution. We

disadvantages. So, there is no point in criticizing it for its inability to deliver deep philosophical conclusions.

have mentioned the most recent avatar of the AHO theorizing is Alan Badiou's ontology of events: the ontologically central events are, of course, political revolutions.⁴¹

Indeed, the principle has dominated continental tradition for two centuries. It shows its teeth even when implied only implicitly. For instance, Foucault's early works make reference to some sort of objective, Sein-like factor of history that shapes history and forms of our discourse and episteme. When he later turns to issues of power, he claims that subject is produced and fashioned by power. Here, suddenly, the link with his earlier interest appears: "subject" is a deep ontological category, and of course, deep ontology is historical and sensitive to power-struggle, i.e. politicized. The history of being is transformed into history of power, without thereby being betrayed.

Of course, in the actual history of continental philosophy AHO occurs in combination with other trails and characteristics. Here we have to skip the long story of interaction with the preference for the a-rational; just think of Schopenhauer as an idealistic example, and Nietzsche as, very probably, a not so idealistic one. To pass to another characteristics, let me just mention that the preference for the literary and non-argumentative interacts in a very intense manner with the strong AHO. The key to interaction is the fact that the preference brings in poetic metaphors, figures in the widest sense, and that the figures provide an anthropological, not to say anthropomorphic reading of fundamental ontological categories. The preference allows, enjoins, and perhaps even forces figurative language; the philosophically central role of this language is translating ontological (metaphysical) categories into a human-centered language. I will try to show that it leads to a self-enforcing circle. First, starting with slightly anthropomorphized ontological categories the philosopher applies anthropocentric metaphors to them. The result is a much more anthropomorphic and anthropocentric picture of basic ontology. This picture prompts new figurative work, and blocks more literal readings needed for an argumentative discussion. The new figurative work results in a more anthropomor-

41 Cf. Alain Badiou, *Being and Event* (New York: Continuum, 2006); and Alain Badiou, *Logics of Worlds. Being and Event II* (New York: Continuum, 2009).

phic and – anthropocentric picture, with stronger effects of the same kind. This is quite obvious in the realistic, Heideggerian tradition and in Derrida. There, in addition to this self-enforcing circle, an important role is played by the primacy of interpretation over critical discussion. One may start with a quote from a Greek classic, featuring an anthropomorphic scenario (e.g. with Heraclites’ “*Physis* likes to hide itself”, or with Anaximander’s claim that things of elements “give to each other justice and recompense for their injustice In conformity with the ordinance of Time”). One then proposes a reading of it, apparently as a hermeneutical hypothesis, but one also suggests that the reading points to a deep truth. The reading introduces new anthropomorphic figures, and produces an even strongly personal picture of, say, Nature. (If a dissenter asks with what right nature is being re-enchanted in such a dramatic way, one answer is that “we are just interpreting Heraclites”). Hermeneutics thus plays an immunizing role for the strengthening of the AHO theorizing, guided and protected by poetic, figurative form of discourse.

Conclusion

Anthropological and historical is deeply ontological, and what is deeply ontological (Spirit, Being) can be modelled on anthropological and historical paradigms. This is a trail we called for short AHO, that is common to a great deal of continental philosophers, and practically absent from analytic philosophy. We have distinguished several historical versions of it, starting from the absolute idealist version formulated by Hegel, and then passing to less idealist or squarely realist versions. Historically, the next one is probably the phenomenological minimalist option, putting together the Subject and his/her life-world, without inquiring into the trans-subjective reality behind the later. The minimal constructivist AHO, present in a discreet form in Foucault and openly in many post-modernist authors claims that anthropological (linguistic) –historical practices form-construct the world, which is Human World, and the Human World is the only reality we can talk about and cognize. The realist- positive AHO, due to Heidegger, especially in his later phase claims that the anthropological and historical is ontological, since Being reveals itself in human history (but Being is not clearly

anthropomorphic). We ended with the post-structuralist negative AHO promulgated by Derrida, where the history of writing and of philosophical understanding of it somehow coincides with the events of the ultimate difference, un-namable in our language, the ultimate “trace” and the “writing without presence and absence”.

Of course, a skeptic might question our approach, and argue that the importance of AHO is way smaller than claimed here; unfortunately, a proper response, involving reading and interpreting crucial texts, would take a book. Here, we must rest content with what can be done in a space of a paper.

We have noted two crucial methodological consequence of the acceptance of AHO. The first is that various human phenomena (hiding/showing oneself, giving gifts, painting shoes and so on) can be used as direct models for understanding the fundamental reality. Second, *human historical understanding of various anthropological and historical aspects of human reality is the very history of the aspects themselves and thereby the history of the fundamental reality itself*. The apparent meta-level of understanding coincides with the object level of the historical process itself, and the process is somehow part of the very history of the fundamental reality.

Both the idea and its methodological consequences are quite foreign to analytic philosophy. Is there a possible rapprochement? What is to be done on the analytic side? Some human phenomena have been central to both continental and analytic philosophy; language is the case in point. On the other hand, the analytic tradition has had little to say about history and related matters. Perhaps one lesson from the continental enthusiasm for history is that we should be offering a more systematic account of it. Agreed that metaphysically it is a local phenomenon, at some high level of supervenient matters (supervening on the psychological, and social, and so on...), it deserves more philosophical attention, above all on the ground of its human interest. And here analytic philosophy might learn a lot from its continental sister, setting aside all the exaggerations of AHO, and looking for a kernel of truth perhaps hidden amidst all of them.

What about other anthropological matters? Philosophy of language and of mind are central to both traditions; still, analytic philosophers might learn something from their continental colleagues, again, exaggerations aside; and indeed, a dialogue is going on, for

instance between cognitive science and phenomenology. But certainly, more is to be done.

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2

Naturalism, Quietism, and the Concept of Nature

Thomas J. Spiegel

In this paper I reconstruct the intrinsic connection between the two metaphilosophical concepts of quietism and (scientific) naturalism. Rooted in Wittgenstein's late philosophy, quietism is the view that theoretical explanations in philosophy are nonsense or misguided. Naturalism is the view that only those entities exist which are countenanced by the natural sciences. I show that quietist views reject the notion of nature implied by naturalism and, subsequently, the felt need to give theoretical explanations to supposedly 'non-natural' entities. Ultimately, the difference between quietism and naturalism turns out to be a disagreement about the proper philosophical conception of nature.



Introduction

Both Brian Leiter and Richard Rorty have voiced the view that current philosophy in the Anglophone world represents a stand-off between naturalist philosophy and quietism,¹ the latter being a minority position, having “the upper hand only in four major graduate departments (Harvard, Berkeley, Chicago, and Pittsburgh).”² However, neither Leiter nor Rorty delve much further into the relation of quietism and naturalism. In their common formulations, naturalism and quietism are not complementary. When confronted with such a supposed standoff, one can ponder about the logical relation of these concepts. Three options are available: (i) either naturalism or quietism is true, (ii) both naturalism and quietism are true, (iii) neither naturalism nor quietism are true. Before one can consider picking one of these options, it is imperative to first understand these notions. The problem is here that neither one of these notions is usually introduced and described in a comprehensive manner. So what are naturalism and quietism, respectively? And how exactly do they hang together? In what follows, I shall investigate further into what constitutes this standoff.

Naturalism is the current metaphilosophical orthodoxy in Anglo-American philosophy, determining to a great extent the understanding of how philosophy ought to be done. “For better or worse”, David Papineau writes, “‘naturalism’ is widely viewed as a positive term in philosophical circles—few active philosophers nowadays are happy to announce themselves as ‘non-naturalists.’”³ There is in fact some empirical evidence for this. In a survey for philpapers.org, David Chalmers and David Bourget asked 931 philosophers the decisive question: “naturalism or non-naturalism?”; the result: 49,8% endorsed naturalism, 25,9% rejected, and 24,3%

1 Brian Leiter, *The Future for Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 2-3.

2 Richard Rorty, “Naturalism and Quietism,” in *Naturalism and Normativity*, ed. Mario de Caro and David Macarthur (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 57.

3 David Papineau, “Naturalism”, *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, (Spring 2009 Edition), eds. Edward N. Zalta, accessed March 27, 2015, <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/naturalism/>.

indicated “other.”⁴ A result like this is almost unprecedented in philosophy, given that dissent about most ideas is so commonplace in the discipline. The popularity of naturalism is also credited by a magnitude of projects of naturalization, for example the naturalization of the mind, of semantic content, of action, of normativity, modality or virtually any other philosophical topic. However, both the philpapers.org survey and the manifold projects of naturalization mask a serious problem. Namely the fact that naturalism itself is rarely specified by most self-professed naturalists, to the effect that the term “naturalism” tends to encompass many different notions to which merely the same label is attached.

In recent years the notion of philosophical quietism has garnered increasing attention. Quietism is a metaphilosophical view developed by interpreters of Wittgenstein’s late philosophy.⁵ Leading proponents and scholars of quietism are John McDowell, Huw Price, Richard Rorty, and David Macarthur.⁶ In this paper, quietism is understood as the rejection of theoretical explanations in philosophy. Given this context, this paper aims to demonstrate two things: first, that quietism and naturalism are incompatible views, because naturalism employs the notion of theoretical explanation while quietism rejects theoretical explanation. And secondly, that quietists and naturalists disagree about what counts as natural, i.e. the proper conception of nature (which is ‘responsible’ for the disagreement about the notion of theoretical explanations).

I will proceed in the following manner. As a first step, I explicate the content of naturalism. This leads, secondly, to introducing the terminology of “hard-to-place phenomena” and “theoretical explanations.” Hard-to-place phenomena are those phenomena that do not, just by themselves, count as part of the natural world in a naturalist setting. Theoretical explanations are explanations used in philosophy in order to somehow integrate hard-to-place phenomena back into a naturalist world-view. In a third step, I will introduce

4 “The PhilPapers Surveys”, *PhilPapers.org*, accessed 10 July 2014, <http://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl>.

5 Crispin Wright, *Truth and Objectivity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).

6 John McDowell (1992, 1996, 2009), Price (2004, 2011, forthcoming), Macarthur (2009), Macarthur&Price (2007), Rorty (2005, 2010).

quietism, leading up to, fourth, an elucidation of the way naturalism and quietism hang together, or rather, in what fundamental way they differ. This difference is marked by differing conceptions of what it means to be natural. To be clear, there are several pressing questions which cannot be answered in this paper. Apart from explicating its content, I will not provide arguments for quietism. Also, I shall not try to argue whether one should prefer quietism over naturalism as a metaphilosophical stance. Moreover, I shall not attempt to explain why naturalism is still so much more popular. These questions are better left for another occasion.

1. What is Naturalism?

The term “naturalism” has widely and confidently been used in a wide array of areas in philosophy. But only in rare instances do philosophers take the time to explicate what is implied by identifying as a “naturalist.” One can account for most usages of this term by bifurcating naturalism into *modest naturalism* and *scientific naturalism*.

Modest naturalism is characterized by two aspects. First, modest naturalism implies *science’s independence* from philosophy. In contrast, the traditional notion of philosophical foundationalism attributed to philosophy a foundational role. According to philosophical foundationalism, philosophy is an a priori inquiry into the nature of reality, and stands in a foundational relation to the sciences. That idea is at least a minimal criterion for the notion of naturalism: philosophy does *not* provide the foundations for the scientific disciplines. It is indeed hard to find philosophers in the 20th and 21st century who assert that philosophy has authority over the sciences. Instead, virtually any philosopher will assert that the sciences work well without philosophical guidance of any sort. In the current intellectual environment, it seems indeed hopeless to defend the claim that philosophy is in a position to dictate to the sciences *ex cathedra*. Note that this is a negative claim about what the relation between philosophy and science is *not*, but not a positive claim about how to conceive this relation.

Second, modest naturalism implies a *rejection of supernaturalism*. Naturalism shuns supernatural things from philosophy. Supernaturalism is the belief that “there are entities that lie outside of the

normal course of nature.”⁷ Supernatural entities are those “whose existence cannot be countenanced by (natural) science.”⁸ Common examples for such supernatural entities are: ghosts or goblins or fairies or other kinds of things connected to magic or witchcraft. But it also includes “immaterial minds or souls, vital fluids, angels, and deities.”⁹ But there are two problems with setting this up. First, the conception of what counts as supernatural is not clear-cut in a way that makes it interesting for philosophy. For example, although the latter examples given are immaterial phenomena, supernaturalist entities cannot be identified with immaterial things since numbers and governments are also immaterial, but not supernatural. Someone wanting to classify numbers and governments as supernatural (because they are not physical) would have to offer substantial argument to make this view plausible. Clearly, naturalism has to allow for numbers, at least, since numbers are necessary tools in any natural science which, according to naturalism, enjoy a privileged position. It is simply not sufficient to reject supernatural entities if one wants to call oneself a “naturalist.” Second, it is indeed hard to find a philosopher who would assert the existence of witchcraft or deities at all. Just like with a supposed superiority of philosophy over science, defending this form of supernaturalism today seems hopeless to most. So while the vast majority of philosophers will deny the existence of supernatural entities, the attitudes towards abstract objects are more complicated. Most philosophers, including self-identifying naturalists, will somehow want to account for abstract entities rather than deem them supernatural. In short: A working, substantial notion of naturalism needs to feature a criterion that specifies what it means for something to be natural.

Ultimately, modest naturalism is uncontroversial, and hence useless when trying to substantiate the term “naturalism.” If “naturalism” just meant “modest naturalism” almost everybody was a

7 John Dupré, “The Miracle of Monism,” in *Naturalism in Question*, ed. Mario de Caro and David Macarthur (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2008), 36–58.

8 Henrik Rydenfelt, “Naturalism and Normative Sciences,” in *Pragmatism, Science, Naturalism*, ed. Henrik Rydenfelt and Jonathan Knowles (Bern: Peter Lang, 2011), 115.

9 Dupré, “The Miracle of Monism,” 36. Another, nowadays rather unpopular example would be: God.

naturalist by default. This leaves scientific naturalism up for consideration. Scientific naturalism, too, is characterized by two different aspects: a methodological and an ontological aspect. The first, *methodological aspect* states that scientific naturalism, too, rejects philosophical foundationalism. Philosophical foundationalism is the view that philosophy provides epistemological and metaphysical foundations for science. Instead, scientific naturalism claims that philosophy has no authority over science. So far, this amounts to the same methodological claim as that of modest naturalism. But beyond that, scientific naturalism claims continuity of philosophy and science by claiming generality of the scientific method such that philosophical inquiry is in principle continuous with science. While philosophy should cede areas of inquiry to the sciences whenever possible, philosophy and science work on the same project, with similar means and ends.¹⁰ In this sense, philosophy “is science in its general and abstract reaches.”¹¹ By assuming this substantial relation, a scientific naturalist diverges from a modest naturalist regarding metaphilosophical views. The second, *ontological aspect* states: all that truly exists in the world are those basic entities discovered by (the methodologies and practices of) science. All other phenomena must be in some way related to scientifically respectable entities in a suitable way.¹² In a diagrammatic representation, scientific naturalism can be characterized as follows:

Scientific naturalism = ontological aspect + methodological aspect

The methodological aspect given here is a refined phrasing of the Quinean denial of first philosophy, the idea of “abandonment of the

10 Papineau, “Naturalism.”

11 Mario de Caro and David Macarthur, Introduction, “The Nature of Naturalism,” in *Naturalism in Question*, ed. Mario de Caro and David Macarthur (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2008), 6.

12 A similar, yet more specific description is: “every real entity either consists of or is somehow ontologically grounded in the objects countenanced by the hypothetically completed empirical sciences [...]” See Paul Moser and David Yandell David, “A Farewell to Philosophical Naturalism,” in *Naturalism: A Critical Analysis*, ed. William Craig and J.P. Moreland (London: Routledge, 2000), 4.

goal of a first philosophy prior to natural science,”¹³ meaning that science “is not answerable to any supra-scientific tribunal, and not in any need of justification beyond observation and the hypothetico-deductive method.”¹⁴ This claim be rephrased such that “science cannot be based on a foundation more secure than itself.”¹⁵ The Ontological aspect on the other hand is a simpler phrasing of Sellars’ *scientia mensura*-statement already alluded to above: “Science is the measure of all things, of what it is that it is, and of what is not that it is not.”¹⁶

I do not purport that only he or she who undertakes the methodological and ontological commitment jointly is a scientific naturalist, and that someone who – overtly – only accepts one of them is not. Not every scientific naturalist overtly endorses both commitments. In practice, it may be harder to group together those philosophers who either endorse only one of these commitments with those philosophers who endorse all of them respectively. But for the current purpose, a higher grade of exactness is not needed here.

2. Placement Problems and Theoretical Explanations

The ontological aspect just outlined leads to what Huw Price calls *placement problems*. Scientific naturalism only accepts those entities as natural which are acceptable by the (natural) sciences. Primarily, those are spatiotemporal objects: rocks, organisms, chemicals, the earth crust and so on. But there certainly are more entities

13 Willard van Orman Quine, *Theories and Things* (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1986), 67.

14 Quine, *Theories and Things*, 72.

15 Rydenfelt, “Naturalism and Normative Sciences”, 115. Some people add more content to the methodological part of scientific naturalism. For example, Huw Price thinks that “natural science constrains philosophy, in the following sense. The concerns of the two disciplines are not simply disjoint, and science takes the lead where the two overlap. At the very least, then, to be a philosophical naturalist is to believe that philosophy is not simply a different enterprise from science, and that philosophy properly defers to science, where the concerns of the two disciplines coincide.” Huw Price, “Naturalism without Representationalism,” in *Naturalism in Question*, ed. Mario de Caro and David Macarthur, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 71.

16 Wilfrid Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1997), §41.

than those directly researched by the natural sciences. For example, the mind, norms, abstract objects, causality, modality, numbers – concepts or objects that are typically taken to beget problems that are distinctively philosophical.¹⁷ The term “placement problems” denotes a metaphor expressing this issue: objects of this sort are difficult to assign a spot in the natural world, if what counts as natural is determined by scientific naturalism. Call phenomena of that kind *hard-to-place phenomena*.

How do philosophers who endorse scientific naturalism then try to solve placement problems? There is a wider array of explanatory strategies in philosophy that aim to assign a place to hard-to-place phenomena. Call such strategies *theoretical explanations*. Theoretical explanations are quasi-scientific explanations used as explanatory devices in philosophy in order to “place” the hard-to-place phenomena in a natural world. They are supposed to do this by linking entities respectable by scientific standards with hard-to-place phenomena. In other words, theoretical explanations stipulate a base and a target phenomenon, and bridge the gap between them by postulating a certain metaphysical relation. The target phenomenon is thereby found to be in some way dependent on the base phenomenon. If successful, the target phenomenon has been assimilated into the naturalistic world-view qua theoretical explanation. It is thereby ‘explained away.’ In other words, theoretical explanations can assign a place to the hard-to-place phenomena after all. As such, theoretical explanations are the main tool of scientific naturalism to remedy the awkwardness expressed by its placement problems. In short: naturalism implies the claim that *philosophy produces theoretical explanations*.

A common example for this is the phenomenon of linguistic meaning. Philosophers with a naturalistic proclivities view meaning (implicitly or explicitly) as something that warrants an explanation. The leading question behind this explanatory endeavor is “what does meaning consist in?” In order to deal with such a question, philosophers have developed a variety of different theories of mean-

17 This list is merely exemplary and can be extended.

ing, for example truth-conditional theories,¹⁸ internalist theories,¹⁹ externalist theories,²⁰ normativist theories,²¹ causal theories,²² and expressly naturalist theories of meaning.²³

3. What is Quietism?

Philosophical quietism is a recent field of inquiry. While the doctrine or attitude of quietism may have been around in one or more forms in the history of philosophy, making it a direct subject of debate and elaborating it has been a thing of the very recent past. This is credited by the fact that the term “quietism” was introduced in the last chapter of Crispin Wright’s *Truth and Objectivity* in the year 1992.²⁴ With a past this recent, it is not always easy to speak in a qualified and substantial manner about quietism. “Quietism” proves to be a difficult and elusive term since, unfortunately, there is little consensus or canonical literature on this topic which one could refer to as an authority.

What then can be said about quietism? Simon Blackburn states that quietism is the “doctrine (associated with Wittgenstein) that there is no standpoint from which to achieve the traditional philosophical goal of a theory about some concept or another (e.g. truth,

18 Alfred Tarski, “The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages,” in *Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923 to 1938*, ed. John Corcoran (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1983).

19 Noam Chomsky, *New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

20 Hilary Putnam, “The meaning of ‘meaning,’” *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science* 7 (1975).

21 Not all normativistic explanations of meaning can be qualified as naturalist. This is dependent upon whether one believes that norms themselves can be reduced to non-normative entities. See Anandi Hattiangadi, “Is Meaning Normative?” *Mind and Language* 2:2 (2006) and Daniel Whiting, “The Normativity of Meaning Defended,” *Analysis* 67:2 (2007).

22 Saul Kripke, *Naming and Necessity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972).

23 Ruth Millikan, *Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984).

24 Wright (1992), 202.

experience).”²⁵ As such, quietism is a metaphilosophical view about what philosophy ought *not* to do. This characterisation of quietism is helpful, but requires some adjustment for the present context. Blackburn does not further state what is meant by “theory.” Theory can turn out to be a notoriously difficult concept within the domain of philosophical thought. However, “theory” here is best understood as what I have introduced as theoretical explanation above. In a slightly refined phrasing then, quietism is the *rejection of theoretical explanations* in philosophy.²⁶ So “keeping quiet” about a given question of philosophy means not to engage in theoretical explanations in the context of that question. What does it mean to reject theoretical explanations in philosophy? Consider again the example of linguistic meaning. A naturalist assumption results in proposing theoretical explanations in order to account for meaning by stating what meaning consists in, and how meanings are individuated. Being quietist about meaning, to the contrary, means holding the view that meaning is not in need of being explained at all, at least not in a way that would be distinctly philosophical. Instead, a quietist about meaning holds the view that meaning is a basic feature of the makeup of the world which is precisely why it does not warrant an explanation. Everything that remains then to do is maybe to investigate how it came to be philosophers find that meaning would require theoretical explanations.

4. The Conception of Nature

We are now in a position to state the logical connection between naturalism and quietism. Naturalism, I have shown, necessarily employs theoretical explanations to a certain class of phenomena. Quietism, on the other hand, is the rejection of theoretical explanations. As such, *quietism and naturalism are incompatible metaphilosophical views*. One cannot be a naturalist and a quietist at the same time because the

²⁵ Blackburn, *Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy*, 315.

²⁶ Left like this, quietism is only a negative thesis: it states what ought not to be done in philosophy. This is quietism’s negative aspect. Yet, one can ask what remains to do for philosophy once we substract the idea of theoretical explanations. Answering that question specifies quietism’s positive aspect. This, however, cannot be done in the present context.

way these positions are understood, one implies the production of theoretical explanations while the other rejects them. So the standoff between naturalism and quietism manifests itself in the notion of theoretical explanations. But what exactly is it that brings this difference about? It is, I propose, a different conception of what is natural.

In order to get this into view, we have to consider naturalism again. There is a tacit assumption that underlies naturalism. That assumption codifies the conception of nature that is implicit in naturalism. The assumption can be expressed as follows: only that is part of nature which is investigated by natural sciences. All other things are hard-to-place phenomena, as seen above. And hard-to-place phenomena can be qualified as a part of nature only by suitably relating them to already natural entities through theoretical explanations. This assumption codifies the concept of nature that is implicit in naturalism because it expresses what counts as natural. In other words, this conception of nature entails naturalism's idea that philosophy proposes theoretical explanations for hard-to-place phenomena. Conversely, quietism rejects this assumption about nature. Hence, the fundamental difference between naturalism and quietism is the concept of nature, i.e. the acceptance of what is natural.

This leaves us with the question of what exactly "nature" and "natural" mean in a quietist framework. Unfortunately, quietists tend not to be very explicit about what entities are natural; the quietist literature rarely deals with that question. But this should not come as a surprise. For, *prima facie*, being quietist and proposing a developed conception of nature is potentially self-refuting. This is for the reason that proposing such an account would most likely operate with theoretical explanations of some sort. But quietism is characterized as the rejection of theoretical explanations as a tool in philosophy. It is at least hard to see how one could propose a notion of nature that is coherent with quietism. At the very least, such a notion would be severely limited regarding the types of statements it is "allowed" to feature.

The task is then to say something illuminating about nature without propounding theoretical explanations regarding the concept of nature. The quietist has two options when dealing with the challenge. The first one is to remain quiet about nature, thereby honoring the name of the doctrine itself. It is questionable how satisfac-

tory this would be, however. For those not convinced of quietism and demanding an answer will soon move on. It seems that if quietists remain quiet about nature they have to do so to the effect of convincing no one. Thus, quietism becomes something like a mere unmotivated attitude instead of a satisfactorily argued position.

The second way is more arduous, it requires saying something about nature, but without theoretical explanations. John McDowell's notion of *second nature* is the most prominent attempt at doing exactly that. McDowell introduces the notion of second nature as an answer to the awkwardness adumbrated above: what is the mind (meaning, rationality, understanding) if it is not part of nature? How is the mind not somehow supernatural? McDowell's answer is that the mind is indeed part of nature, but not of nature as conceived as naturalism ("bald naturalism," in his terminology). Instead, it can be understood as second nature: having a mind, that is, being introduced in to all minded activities by developing one's conceptual capacities, just is "normal part of what it is for a human being to come to maturity."²⁷ By asserting this, McDowell hopes to have achieved two things: to have said something substantial about nature – substantial in the sense that soothes the worries of those who find the mind to be "spooky."²⁸ And to have said this without himself offering a theoretical explanation that would be in alignment with naturalist ideas. McDowell's conception of second nature has provoked critical responses by a number of people,²⁹ but it is not the current aim to assess its plausibility. Second nature here figures as an example in what way a quietist may say something about nature.

The contrasting views concerning what is natural mark the decisive difference between quietism and naturalism. As such, what kind of philosophy one wants to do is, in this case, determined by what one considers to be part of nature. Ultimately, which approach is more plausible turns out to be a question about the concept of nature.

27 John McDowell, *Mind and World*, New Edition. (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1996), 84.

28 McDowell, *Mind and World*, 82.

29 Christoph Jedan, "Nature or Natures? Notes on the Concept of Second Nature in John McDowell's *Mind and World*", in *Reason and Nature*, ed. Markus Willaschek (Münster: LIT-Verlag, 1999), 71-72. Charles Larmore, "Attending to Reasons," In *Reading McDowell*, ed. Nicholas Smith (New York & London: Routledge, 2002).

Concluding Remarks

I began by mentioning Leiter and Rorty who both agree that current philosophy can be characterized as a standoff between naturalism and quietism. Responsible for this disagreement is, as it turned out, the difference in their conception of nature. One striking feature is that naturalists have not provided arguments or some form of elucidation as to why one should hold the view about nature that is implied by naturalism. To be sure, quietism might be in the same boat, as quietists have not directed massive effort into describing what counts as natural either. However, the asymmetry of credibility that is attributed to naturalism and quietism respectively, is striking. In other words, although quietism and naturalism are in a similar dialectical situation (both would have to substantiate a conception of nature), naturalism has garnered a following of unusual magnitude in philosophy. None of this resolves the dialectical stalemate between quietism and naturalism. However, I hope to have shown that quietism poses an alternative which is worth to be considered as a metaphilosophical stance, against the dominance of naturalism.

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3

Meta-Skepticism, Experimentalism, Cartography: the Dead-Ends of Philosophy

Tamás Paár

In the first part of my paper I try to show that meta-skepticism is a dead-end of philosophy. By meta-skepticism I mean meta-philosophical skepticism, the view that is skeptical about every philosophical theory. Meta-skeptics often build on the principle according to which one should suspend judgment in case of peer disagreement. The most serious challenge for any form of meta-skepticism is that its supporting arguments call this very principle into question. After noting this, I argue against three defenses of meta-skepticism. The thesis to be defended in the second and third parts of my paper is that experimentalism and cartography lead to meta-skepticism. I dub the radical stream of experimental philosophy experimentalism: according to this project, the presently abundant reference to intuitions in philosophy is a flawed practice. I characterize the meta-philosophical view that sees the appropriate aim of philosophy in working out a map of consistently acceptable positions as cartography. If the arguments presented in the first part succeed and my strategy can be generalized to every form of meta-skepticism, it will imply the untenable nature of meta-philosophical skepticism. Given that the connections shown in the second and third parts of the paper hold, this implies that the approaches of the experimentalists and the cartographers is mistaken.



Introduction

The aim of the present paper is to show that meta-skepticism, cartography and experimentalism are untenable metaphilosophical positions: they are dead-ends for philosophical enquiry.¹ Since these labels are somewhat idiosyncratic, let me first explain what I mean when I use these terms. By meta-skepticism I mean metaphilosophical skepticism, the view that is skeptical about every philosophical theory.² Typical forms of meta-skepticism entail that we should suspend judgment about every philosophical thesis. I dub the most radical stream of experimental philosophy experimentalism:³ according to this project, the presently abundant reference to intuitions in philosophy is a flawed practice, it is to be abolished. Finally, cartography is the meta-philosophical view that sees the appropriate aim of philosophy in working out a map of consistently acceptable positions. It is also part of this view that after we have finished drawing this map, one's philosophy depends only on mere intuitions understood as opinions or beliefs. A dead-end, by definition, is a point where one has no other option but to stop and return to one's previous position. My strategy in this paper is, first, to show that meta-skepticism is untenable, and secondly, to point out that since both cartography and experimentalism lead to meta-skepticism (or at least to problems that are similar to the main problem of meta-skepticism), they are dead-ends of philosophy themselves. In the final part I draw some more substantiated and some admittedly premature conclusions from this diagnosis.

1 I owe my thanks to the organizers of the conference originally titled "On what it is... The philosophy of philosophy" and to the extremely supportive audience present at that occasion, especially to László Bernáth, Vitor Schwartz, Thomas J. Spiegel and Tímea Takács.

2 So meta-skepticism here is not used exactly the same way as it is used in Shaun Nichols, Stephen Stich and Jonathan M. Weinberg, "Meta-Skepticism: Meditations in Ethno-Epistemology," in Stephen Stich: *Collected Papers Volume 2* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 224–245.

3 I take this term from Gábor Forrai, "Filozófiai intuíciók és az experimentalista kihívás," in *Filozófiai intuíciók – filozófusok az intuíciónról* (Budapest: L'Harmattan, 2013), 129–145.

1. Meta-Skepticism

The gist of every version of meta-skepticism is that philosophical beliefs seem to be deeply problematic. They are either unjustified, unwarranted, irresponsible, irrational or epistemically blameworthy etc. This point is most often brought out by meta-skeptics through using an argument from disagreement, similar to the one below, which I take from János Tőzsér:⁴

1. There is disagreement about the solution of all (or almost all) philosophical problems.
2. Philosophical disagreements hold between philosophers who recognize each other as epistemic peers.
3. If philosophical disagreements hold between philosophers who recognize each other as epistemic peers, then philosophers have to suspend their judgment.

Therefore:

4. Philosophers have to suspend their judgment about the solution of all (or almost all) philosophical problems.

Though many philosophers (and non-philosophers) advocate similar arguments, apparently there is a puzzling difficulty with it. First of all, it is too similar to any regular philosophical argument. Therefore, it is suspicious that it is a solution of a philosophical problem itself; it involves the solution to the epistemological problem of peer disagreement. The deviser of this particular argument was careful enough to add a parenthetical restraint to his argument: perhaps not all philosophical problems are like the ones that we should suspend judgment about.⁵ But, according to this argument, what is it that distinguishes the philosophical problems that are exempt from the problematic ones? The answer is, that the former ones have to be the objects of consensus. Now, is there consensus concerning this very issue among philosophers? The fact is that there is none: many argue quite uncompromisingly against this kind of arguments from

4 János Tőzsér, "Maradok szkeptikus, tisztelettel," *Magyar Filozófiai Szemle* 2 (2013): 142–143.

5 Not all similar arguments are this careful. See, for example, János Tőzsér, "Hihetünk-e komolyan és őszintén filozófiai elméletekben?" *Magyar Filozófiai Szemle* 1 (2013): 169–170.

disagreement⁶ and many are less committed, but still unwilling to accept the conclusion.⁷ Now that we learned this, the adequate response to the argument from disagreement seems to be obvious. Let's call it the argument from self-refutation:

1. If philosophical disagreements hold between philosophers about a philosophical position, then philosophers have to suspend their judgment about it.
2. Philosophers disagree about the position of the meta-skeptics.
3. Philosophers have to suspend their judgment about the position of the meta-skeptics.

The first premise of the argument is seldom accepted by those who oppose meta-skeptics, so this argument bears a problem only for the proponents of that position. The outcome of this argument seems to be that meta-skepticism is self-referentially inconsistent. If you accept meta-skepticism, you should not accept meta-skepticism, in the light of your own standards, that is. And what happens to the meta-skeptic after she has reflected on this problem and suspended judgment about the viability of meta-skepticism? She seems to be free to endorse philosophical claims that are actually disagreed by peers.⁸

Why, then, are there meta-skeptics, if the refutation of their view is so easy? I imagine that after noticing the difficulty of their view, instead of abandoning it, they desperately start to look for a good

6 E.g. Alvin Plantinga, "Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism," in *The Philosophical Challenge of Religious Diversity* edited by Philip L. Quinn and Kevin Meeker (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 172–192. And Thomas Kelly "The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement," in *Oxford Studies in Epistemology 1*, edited by Tamar Szabo Gendler and John Hawthorne, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005), 167–196.

7 I think especially of Peter van Inwagen "It is Wrong, Everywhere, Always, and for Anyone, to Believe Anything Upon Insufficient Evidence", in *The Possibility of Resurrection and Other Essays in Christian Apologetics* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998) 29–44.; G.A. Cohen, *If You're an Egalitarian, How Come You're So Rich?* (Cambridge – London: Harvard University Press, 2000), 7–20; and Thomas Kelly, "Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence," in *Social Epistemology: Essential Readings*, edited by Alvin I. Goldman and Dennis Whitcomb (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 183–217.

8 Cf. Russ Shafer-Landau, "Ethics as Philosophy. A Defense of Ethical Nonnaturalism," in *Metaethics after Moore*, edited by Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), 223–224.

defense. So, after all, in their first moments of hesitation they continue to believe that there could be a way out – they don't immediately shrink back because of the deep disagreements in this field. Neither should we: so let's see what kind of defenses the meta-skeptics could find!⁹ I'm going to consider them mainly from the angle of the above given argument, that is, what I'm going to investigate now is whether the following proposals of skeptics about philosophy can save the argument from disagreement from the self-refutation objection.

Consider first the defense of Bryan Frances, since it is, I think, the most faithful to the spirit of skepticism. Frances's argument implies that when people who are epistemically superior to you in a given topic disagree about something that is within that topic, you should suspend judgment about the question. He is quite skeptic about the possibility of epistemic peerage, but let's consider one of his points that a regular meta-skeptic could take as an advice from him – although by doing this, elements of Frances's case that would be worth investigating are unfortunately ignored. That is, I merely focus on what he would say in the place of our meta-skeptic.

Stepping into the shoes of a skeptic of this kind, Frances argues¹⁰ that his position is consistent. He suspends judgment about the soundness of the argument from disagreement, but still remains a meta-skeptic. He is a meta-skeptic because of the argument from disagreement, but he suspends judgment about it because he follows a rule of thumb that tells against quite ambitious, worrisomely self-applying principles – which tells against the epistemic principle featuring in the meta-skeptic's argument (3). But he does not endorse the truth of this rule of thumb, so even if one disagrees with him about it (and some philosophers do, I think), he doesn't have to suspend his belief in it, because he has none.

9 Here I only set out to summarize the defenses of meta-skepticism shortly. In the following paper of mine I give a more complete treatment to the proposals of Brennan and Frances: Tamás Paár, "Disagreement, Self-Refutation and the Minority Report of the Meta-Skeptics," *KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy* 3 (2015): 23–44.

10 Bryan Frances, "The Reflective Epistemic Renegade," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 2 (2010): 439–41.

If this summary of his argument is correct, then I think its case can hardly be taken seriously. If he takes a rule of thumb to be good enough to be followed and others do not, then that is a case of disagreement, isn't it?

I, for one, think that some of Alvin Plantinga's points against those who take a stance similar to the meta-skeptics apply well to the case of Frances. He defines disagreement as follows: "adopting conflicting propositional attitudes with respect to a given proposition".¹¹ But then in a situation where some people who believe that the argument from disagreement is sound, and others, who believe that it is not sound (so there is disagreement of the kind that Plantinga calls "contradicting"), the one who suspends judgment also disagrees (this kind of disagreement is called "dissenting" by Plantinga).

The second point raised by Plantinga that seems to be applicable here is this. The further and further one goes in withholding judgment about this case, the less and less reason one can have either to hold her position or to be critical about those who do not follow her. Can Frances take this route at all? Plantinga's answer would be:

Well, yes, he can; then he has no *reason* for his abstention [i.e., suspending his judgment]; he doesn't believe that abstention is better or more appropriate; he simply does abstain. [...] But then, of course he can't, in consistency, hold that there is something wrong with *not* abstaining.¹²

Secondly, consider Jason Brennan's answer to what he calls "the argument undermines itself" defense. Brennan is not concerned as much with epistemic peers, as with the philosophically uncommitted: he argues that because of the amount of peer disagreement in the field the outsider has every reason to stay uncommitted – and that's fairly bad news for philosophy. His case rests on the point that widespread disagreement in philosophy shows the unreliability of its method. But didn't he come to this conclusion using philosophical methodology? He used a thought-experiment (featuring a philosophically uncommitted agnostic), he devised parallels, made distinctions (between sorts of skepticism), constructed arguments

11 Plantinga, "Pluralism...", 177.

12 Ibid, 178.

and he responded to objections that he took from existing material on closely related issues. This displays a striking similarity with how he identified philosophical methodology: “studying arguments, making new arguments, creating new distinctions, reading texts, debating, etc.”¹³ He answers this suspicion in the following way:

One might argue that the sceptic used philosophical reasoning to arrive at this conclusion, and so the sceptic cannot consistently be a sceptic. However, it may just be that a small set of philosophical issues is answered and that philosophical methodology works reliably on a small set of issues, i.e., just in the areas needed to make the sceptic’s argument. For instance, perhaps the sceptic needs probability, an account of the notion of an epistemic peer, some notion of reliability, and not much else.¹⁴

His answer is not a very convincing one and at least for two reasons, both directing attention to why Brennan’s stance is not in a better disposition compared to many other philosophical views. The first reason is that he did not, in this passage, identify any features of his account that a first-order philosophical position cannot have. Philosophers often try to keep their theories neat and simple: relying only on intuitively plausible or common-sense propositions that they suspect to be readily accepted, using as few concepts as possible and, well, not much else. Just like Brennan, they could also say that *it may just be* that philosophical methodology works reliably only on one set of issues, i.e., theirs.

The second reason why Brennan’s answer fails is that it is subject to disagreement in a handful of respects, just like many philosophical theories he criticizes. It presupposes a notion of truth, it also presupposes that the main aim of philosophy is truth, that there is a unified philosophical methodology, that the three notions enlisted by him or their general relevance is not disputed by philosophers and it is assumed by him that an agnostic is not entangled in disagreements (we have seen a reason above for the contrary belief). Probably other things featuring in Brennan’s line of argument are also disputed by philosophers, but I presume this much is enough to show that his case is not as flawless as it might appear to an outsider.

¹³ Jason Brennan, “Scepticism about Philosophy,” *Ratio* 1 (2010): 1–16.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 8–9.

Finally, I am going to consider Tőzsér's answer to the self-refutation objection. During his skeptical project, he came to work out a theory concerning the nature of philosophical problems and he used it to amend his argument from disagreement. What I'm going to focus on here is whether his theory is able to help his argument from disagreement or not, and, since even this is quite dubious, whether the two are compatible at all or not.

He argues¹⁵ that all philosophical problems come from the ineliminable inconsistency of our fundamental commitments or intuitions. In connection with the argument from disagreement, Tőzsér¹⁶ uses this account first to show that meta-skepticism is not like this, so it is not related to philosophical problems in any problematic way: since it is not addressing a philosophical problem, meta-skepticism is not a philosophical theory.¹⁷ It is not just one more ($n+1$) among the controversial philosophical positions.¹⁸ Therefore, as Tőzsér appears to claim, it is left unharmed by the meta-skeptic's argument. Secondly, he uses this account to explain and predict intractable and persistent disagreements in philosophy,¹⁹ and this motivates pessimism about the future of philosophy. If philosophical problems arise from the source he points at then hopes for a significant agreement about any substantial philosophical theory seem rather dim.

15 János Tőzsér, "Filozófiai nézetkülönbség és a filozófiai problémák természete," *Magyar Filozófiai Szemle* 4 (2014): 60–75.

16 In conversation at our debate organized by the Department of Philosophy of the Pázmány Péter Catholic University on the World Philosophy Day, 20 November 2014. Cf. Dávid Such, "Becsődölt-e a filozófia?" *Mindennapi Filozófia*, March 8, 2015, accessed June 26, 2015, <http://mifil.hu/node/125>.

17 This marks a significant departure from a former period of his project, when, under the pressure of his critics, he finally came to admit that his skepticism is a "full-blooded philosophical doctrine". (Tőzsér: "Maradok skeptikus..." 143.)

18 Tőzsér, "Filozófiai nézetkülönbség...", 65. Plus, he uses this to find such an answer to anti-skeptics which they would not deem irrelevant, as they often deem the meta-level evidence of disagreements prevailing in the given field irrelevant (*ibid.*, 69).

19 And to explain why there are not as many solutions to philosophical problems as many philosophers try to solve them (Tőzsér, "Filozófiai nézetkülönbség..." 71–72). He thinks that solutions of different philosophers regarding each problem clearly belong to a few, neatly identifiable positions. Though I'm unconvinced, let's assume that this is so.

What if we accept that the nature of philosophical problems is such that Tőzsér's diagnosis is true? What if all of them stem from the inconsistency of our most fundamental beliefs regarding an issue, beliefs "that we cannot help thinking outside the philosophy room"?²⁰ Does this help the case of the meta-skeptic? I don't think so. There's a hidden tension between his claim concerning the fundamental irreconcilability of basic philosophical intuitions and his claim regarding the peer dissensus of philosophers, so I'm not surprised that Tőzsér is so ambivalent about the relationship of the two parts of his skepticism.²¹

Notice first, that while the meta-skeptical argument is framed in terms of epistemic peerage, now the skeptic seems to aspire to be an epistemic superior of those experts who disagree about a philosophical matter. There are arguments, rather good ones, to the effect that the meta-skeptic's position implies that she is an epistemic superior of the others who still did not suspend judgment, who still disagree.²² But at least she holds herself (either implicitly or explicitly) an epistemic superior because she pays attention to a kind of meta-level question, the evidence of peer disagreement. Tőzsér's case is different: he points to evidence that is not on a meta-level, it is part of the first-order issue.²³ The skeptic is now superior to all the experts in a given field in the very problem they dispute. His vantage point grants him a better insight into the nature of the question itself, better than the perspectives of the experts involved. That's why, at least according to his own conviction, he is entitled to say that those experts are – in van Inwagen's terms²⁴ – "comic figures".²⁵

Furthermore, I don't agree that in the light of this account, meta-skepticism is not an answer to a philosophical problem. It is

20 David Lewis, *Philosophical Papers Volume I* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), x.

21 See Tőzsér, "Filozófiai nézetkülönbség...", 68, where he seems to state that the point is "not, or not only" the problem of disagreement.

22 See Plantinga, "Pluralism...", 178.

23 Cf. Tőzsér, "Filozófiai nézetkülönbség...", 69.

24 Peter van Inwagen, "Listening to Clifford's Ghost," *Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement* 84 (2009): 35.

25 Tőzsér, "Filozófiai nézetkülönbség...", 69, 71, 74.

not only that our first-order intuitions may be inconsistent – our meta-level insights might also clash with them. And that's what meta-skepticism amounts to: its purported insights demand you to suspend judgment about various issues. But the first-order commitments stand in the way. You might have a commitment that *c* is true, but, according to the meta-skeptical argument you should suspend judgment about *c* because there is peer disagreement about it. Gábor Forrai rightly claims²⁶ that “believing something, and believing that this belief is unjustified, is a kind of inconsistency.”²⁷ Therefore, apparently, there is inconsistency between your commitment and your meta-level (meta-skeptic) considerations.²⁸ So meta-skepticism itself is constituted by the clash of commitments. To use another consideration to this effect, as we have seen, some philosophers' intuition is that considerations about peer disagreement are relevant, while other philosophers' intuitions tell against this – and most probably many others find a tension in themselves because they are committed to both. Isn't this a clash of commitments? The affirmative answer is evidence for the case that Tőzsér's account does not support the claim that meta-skepticism is not a philosophical position.

If either or both points discussed in the previous two paragraphs is true, then Tőzsér's position and those of the (other) experts still clash: there's disagreement between them, just like the one between the experts themselves. From someone's perspective they might all seem to be epistemic superiors. For a person like this, the question remains whether she should follow one of them or become a meta-skeptic. To go one step further, the diagnosis above cannot save meta-skepticism from the self-refutation objection: after all, the main problem with arguments from disagreement is that they are disagreed by peers, not that they are philosophical problems. Nevertheless, the nature of philosophical problems is itself a philosophical problem and it also likely leads to dissensus.

26 Forrai Gábor, *Kortárs nézetek a tudásról* (Budapest: L'Harmattan, 2014), 70.

27 I would add that these two beliefs are inconsistent, even if they belong to different persons.

28 There are other philosophical problems of this sort; see, for example, Joel Pust, “Against Explanationist Skepticism Regarding Philosophical Intuitions,” *Philosophical Studies* 3 (2001): 227–258.

Meta-skepticism and its argument from disagreement demand us to give up many of our fundamental commitments, or at least, that's what I've attributed to them. Do they really do that? One could say that they only demand suspension of belief about complete theories, complete solutions of philosophical problems. But in philosophy, not only whole theories are disputed, but stand-alone propositions as well, and intuitions that come in themselves are disagreed. Many supporters of arguments from disagreement attack these.²⁹

But now it seems that we just can't do what meta-skepticism wants us to do: many things that meta-skepticism demands us to suspend might be members of the set of our fundamental commitments that we – according to Tőzsér – cannot help thinking (at least most of the time).³⁰

But wait a second... doesn't Tőzsér's very description of philosophical problems itself demand us to give up fundamental beliefs? To shed more light on this matter, consider what Moore writes with regard to common sense. Answering the criticism of those who objected that common sense propositions entail incompatible propositions, he argues the following way: "All of the propositions in (1) [i.e., common sense propositions] are true; no true proposition entails both of two incompatible propositions; therefore, none of the propositions in (1) entails both of two incompatible propositions".³¹ He rehearses this point again, against the criticism of those

29 E.g. Roger Crisp, "Intuitionism and Disagreement," in *Rationality and the Good: Critical Essays on the Ethics and Epistemology of Robert Audi*, edited by Mark Timmons, John Greco and Alfred Mele (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 31–39.

30 To see this, let's consider the following case in which I use one of the examples of Tőzsér, "Filozófiai nézetkülönbség...", 72. Suppose that I don't believe at all that every physical event has sufficient physical cause, I strongly believe that this is false. One day I learn that according to Tőzsér, this is one of "*our*" most fundamental commitments. So now I know that lots of people, whom I take to be epistemic peers of mine, believe that every physical event has sufficient physical cause. Now, according to the argument from disagreement I should suspend judgment about this issue, just like those who have the contrary belief, if they learn about me and if they take me to be their epistemic peer. It should be clear that suspension of fundamental commitments of ours is indeed demanded by the argument from disagreement in similar cases (cf. Tőzsér, "Hihetünk-e...", 170).

31 G. E. Moore, "A Defence of Common Sense," in *Philosophical Papers* (New York: Collier Books, 1962), 42.

who deny the truth of any subset of common sense propositions.³² I think Moore is quite right about this point, at least to the extent that common sense, or rather, the set of our most fundamental commitments seems to imply that *all* the fundamental commitments of ours are in fact true. Tőzsér's diagnosis implies the contrary: they *can't* all be true at the same time, they are inconsistent. But then this means that he has already given up one of them.

Moreover, there seem to be, in Tőzsér's account, some fundamental commitments that are just impossible (or at least extremely hard) to give up. He sketches a philosophical debate, regarding the existence of physical objects in time, in which all of our fundamental commitments are denied by one party or another. But one of them is kept intact, no one gives it up. This is Leibniz's law. About this one, Tőzsér seems to go as far as to say that we simply can't give it up,³³ not even in the philosophy room, I would add. And most probably Tőzsér would credit a similar immunity to the principle of non-contradiction.

The cases of Moore's dictum and Leibniz's law suggest that there are in fact some fundamental beliefs that we can give up more easily and some are hardly disposable. Now that we have noted this, shouldn't we also concede that we might try and see which ones are more easily given up and which ones are impossible to part with? And in due course, we might try to convince others that they should follow us. So there seems to be hope for the philosophical endeavor, after all.

The upshot is that Tőzsér's account of the nature of philosophical problems cannot amend his argument from disagreement, since it is inconsistent with it and, most likely, it is not a good way to defend skepticism about philosophy even in itself. The conclusion of this section is, then, that meta-skepticism is untenable, and many attempts to save it fail.

2. Cartography

Cartography seems to be a widespread stance towards philosophy in analytic philosophy, though this is often implicit. According to this meta-philosophical view, the proper aim of philosophy is to

³² Ibid.

³³ Tőzsér, "Filozófiai nézetkülönbség...", 70.

draw maps, maps that tell us which theories or assumptions lead to which assumptions or theories, and making sign-posts (in the form of conditionals like this: “If you accept this, then you should accept that...”). What philosophers have to do most of the time, according to cartographers, is to check the coherence of belief-systems.

What I’m going to tackle here and take to be the paradigmatic example of this meta-philosophy is Lewisian cartography, David Lewis’s version of it. It is characterized by the following statement: “Our common task is to find out what equilibria there are that can withstand examination, but it remains for each of us to come to rest at one or another of them”.³⁴ Lewis famously goes on writing: “Once the menu of well-worked-out theories is before us, philosophy is a matter of opinion”.³⁵ The first part of this sentence, that at one point in the future we can have the complete map of the philosophical terrain is quite dubious, but it doesn’t need to be discussed here. Lewisian cartography implies, among other things, this contention: “Our ‘intuitions’ are *simply* opinions, our philosophical theories are the same”.³⁶ This “simply” suggests that intuitions do not constitute evidence for our theories, they are of the same kind. Peter van Inwagen seems to have taken this view of intuitions from Lewis, saying: “Our ‘intuitions’ are simply our beliefs [...] Philosophers call their philosophical beliefs intuitions because ‘intuition’ sounds more authoritative than ‘belief’”.³⁷

According to this view, coherence is the only requirement of philosophical theories. What you might do for yourself is to price theories: which ones require you to discard intuitions that you are quite attached to, that is, which theories are too counterintuitive to you, which are those that fit well with your commitments. Different philosophers will quite necessarily find different theories to rest with, because they price intuitions differently.

This picture has lead relative outsiders of analytic philosophy to conclude about it the following ways. Rorty apparently acknowledged that in this light the “ideal of philosophical ability is to see the

34 Lewis, *Philosophical...*, x.

35 Ibid, xi.

36 Ibid, x. (My italics.)

37 Peter van Inwagen, “Materialism and the Psychological-Continuity Account of Personal Identity,” *Philosophical Perspectives* 11 (1997): 309.

entire universe of possible assertions in all their inferential relationships to one another, and thus to be able to construct, or criticize, any argument".³⁸ At the same place where MacIntyre quotes Lewis and Rorty, he writes:

analytic philosophy has become a discipline – or a subdiscipline? – whose competence has been restricted to study inferences. [...It] can show in a few cases that just too much incoherence and inconsistency is involved in some position for *any* reasonable person to continue to hold it. But it can never establish the *rational acceptability* of any particular position in cases where each of the alternative rival positions available has sufficient range and scope and the adherents of each are willing to pay the price necessary to secure coherence and consistency.³⁹

Cartography in this version entails that all coherent philosophers are peers, and that there are lots of coherent philosophies. But it also implies that none has any evidence in favor of its truth. It depends only on your intuitions which system you choose (and, I guess, even the pricing of intuitions is done by intuitions), but intuitions are denied to have an evidentiary role. They do not justify you in your theory, or, perhaps neither justifies the other.

It is notable, then, that cartography, conceived this way, gives force to premise 2. and premise 3. of the argument from disagreement presented above. It gives force to premise 2. (more concretely, it gives force to the idea that philosophers are epistemic peers) since all (coherent) philosophers have the same amount of evidence for their theories. And it gives force to premise 3. (more concretely, to the idea that the philosophers who are disagreeing epistemic peers should suspend judgment) since, according to Lewisian cartography, no philosophers have any *epistemic* reason to believe what peers disbelieve, all their beliefs seem to be *epistemically* arbitrary. Cartography then really leads to the argument from disagreement, and thus, to meta-skepticism.

38 Richard Rorty, "Philosophy in America Today," in *The Consequences of Pragmatism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), 219.

39 Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 267.

One could object at this point: coherentism saves cartography from this problem that I've just raised against the latter. But it is not clear to me how coherentism is not just a further *opinion* according to this view. If you are both a cartographer and a coherentist, then you should think that foundationalists are in the same boat with you: their theory is just as coherent as yours, and you stick to coherentism just because this is what keeps you rested. Your theories are justified to the same extent, they rest on common sense in a similar way, what differs is only mere opinion. Why aren't you taking the opposite theory? I don't think this could be answered by the cartographer, who is also a coherentist, in a way to justify her position. She can't give a reason that is epistemically significant in any important way. And if she reflects on this, she should very well conclude that since it is not at all rationality (or any epistemically significant reason) that requires her to occupy a position, it would be more rational to stay away from any position as much as possible. So my sign-post for cartography is that it is a dead-end.

3. Experimentalism

Experimentalism, in my terminology, is the radical stream of experimental philosophy, or rather a stream that has grown out from experimental philosophy. According to experimentalists, philosophers should get rid of intuitions entirely. Intuitions should never be given the role of evidence, since they were proved to be extremely unreliable by experimental philosophy. Experimentalists often seem to use arguments from disagreement, like the following one:

1. Intuitions diverge significantly (they vary from culture to culture, from one socio-economic group to another, from one situation to another, etc.).
2. A philosophical method that has significantly different input produces significantly different output.
3. Philosophers should not rely on methods that produce significantly different outputs.
4. The present method of philosophy uses intuitions as input.
5. Philosophers should not rely on the present method of philosophy.

This, I think, is sufficient in itself to produce the desired outcome for the experimentalists. But they also point out that experimental philosophy has not only substantiated the case for premise 1. in this argument, it also made a convincing case for the claim that intuitions are influenced by factors that are irrelevant to the questions they concern. So things are even worse than this argument suggests. Abandoning every intuition should be the directive for future philosophy.

But as far as philosophy is concerned, all philosophical theories are fed by intuitions – as this was plausibly implied by Tőzsér's account cited above and Lewisian cartography. Therefore, if we shouldn't rely on intuitions, we should suspend judgment about philosophical theories. Experimentalism clearly seems to lead to meta-skepticism.

In my opinion, this is the least supported attitude from the three that I'm considering here. Problems of it are abundant. It's not only that friends of intuitions made insightful attacks against this radical wave, but it also rests on confusions regarding the nature of experimental philosophy. Let's list first some points of intuitionists that could be used against this position.⁴⁰

George Bealer argues⁴¹ that intuitions are used in the application of epistemic concepts, the considerations of Joel Pust suggest⁴² that the justification of many epistemic principles is likely to rest on intuitions (at best), and Laurence Bonjour made⁴³ a case to the effect that the justification of any argument comes from intuition. A philosopher like Selim Berker would, I presume, argue that the judgment that the factors that influence intuitions are irrelevant

40 A more detailed account should distinguish at least between intuitionists who want to rely only on folk-intuitions and intuitionists who permit trusting intuitions more generally. Since the attack of the experimentalists is rather unrestricted (as this shall be apparent in a moment), this distinction is unnecessary for the present purposes.

41 George Bealer and P. F. Strawson, "The Incoherence of Empiricism," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume* 66 (1992): 99–143.

42 Pust, "Against Explanationist..."

43 Laurence Bonjour, *In Defense of Pure Reason: A Rationalist Account of A Priori Justification* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

to the matter in question is also an intuition.⁴⁴ These points, taken together or one by one, create a very strong motivation for the claim that the experimentalists' arguments can't be constructed without relying on intuitions.

But one doesn't even need to look at the arguments of those whom I called intuitionists. According to Gábor Forrai,⁴⁵ it is perfectly enough to check what experimental philosophers mean by intuition, because even that can be turned against them. Their definition is this: "an *intuition* is simply a spontaneous judgment about truth or falsity of a proposition".⁴⁶ But surely, Forrai argues, experimental philosophers rely on this kind of spontaneous judgment when they collect and assess their results: e.g. in judging that the thought-experiments featured on their vignettes are relevantly similar to the ones used by philosophers, or in noting that the intuitions of their subjects are divergent.

What gave me a real headache about experimentalism is that experimental philosophy is partly influenced by the research of Richard Nisbett. Nisbett argues⁴⁷ that intuitions vary from culture to culture. This, of course, accords well with the experimentalists' claims. But Nisbett also argues with the same force that not only intuitions, but forms of reasoning vary from culture to culture, too. So not only intuitions are problematic in this light, but even the reasoning that is supposed to show the suspicious nature of intuitions is endangered, since the patterns of reasoning are different in different cultures. If you shouldn't rely on intuitions because of this, then you shouldn't rely on reasoning, so you can't even conclude against intuitions, reasoning, or, for that matter, philosophy.

So experimentalism apparently defeats itself, just like meta-skepticism. We could perhaps play the same game of arguments and counter-arguments as in section 1., but it is needless now; I think I have given it a rather convincing demonstration that there is nowhere to hide from the argument from self-refutation.

44 Cf. Selim Berker, "The Normative Insignificance of Neuroscience," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 4 (2009): 293–329.

45 Forrai, "Filozófiai intuíciók..." 137–138.

46 Nichols, Stich and Weinberg, "Meta-Skepticism..." 245.

47 Richard Nisbett, *The Geography of Thought* (New York: Free Press, 2003).

One might ask the following question. Aren't experimental philosophers aware of all these problems of their enterprise? In fact, they are. Though Alexander and Weinberg admitted that something "like this position can also be found in the paper by Jonathan Weinberg, Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich",⁴⁸ experimentalism, as far as I can see, is only a misinterpretation of some waves within experimental philosophy. But there are actual philosophers who interpret some experimental philosophers as experimentalists,⁴⁹ and some philosophers themselves, influenced by experimental philosophers, were happy to become experimentalists instead of them.⁵⁰

Real experimental philosophers are, at least most of the time, quite aware of the fact that they also rely on intuitions. The trio that is many times accused of experimentalism, Nichols, Stich and Weinberg wrote the following: "We are not, we should stress, defending a generalized skepticism that challenges the use of *all* intuitions in philosophy."⁵¹ Just like any old armchair philosopher, they seem to use thought-experiments, relying on Stich's *The Fragmentation of Reason*. Stich argues there the following way, quite clearly putting intuition into use:

I think the most intuitive way to see [my] point is to begin by noting how the specter of culturally based cognitive diversity lends a certain urgency to the question of which cognitive processes we should use. [...] imagine that we have located some exotic culture that does in fact exploit cognitive processes very different from our own and that the notions of epistemic evaluation embedded in their language also differ from ours. Suppose further that the cognitive processes prevailing in that culture accord quite well with their evaluative notions, while the cognitive processes prevailing in our culture accord quite well with ours. Would any of this be of

48 Joshua Alexander and Jonathan M. Weinberg, "Analytic Epistemology and Experimental Philosophy," *Philosophy Compass* 2 (2007): 78

49 E.g. Forrai, "Filozófiai intuíciók...", especially 132, 133, 134.

50 E.g. Bence Nánay, "Filozófia és tudományok – vitaindító," *Magyar Tudomány* 12 (2011): 1493–1498; and Bence Nánay, "A filozófia a tudományok mellett, előtt, után – vitazáró," *Magyar Tudomány* 9 (2012): 1121–1127. There are, of course, many other arguments against intuitions, philosophers only count to be experimentalists insofar as they endorse an argument like the one above and base that on the results of experimental research.

51 Nichols, Stich and Weinberg, "Meta-Skepticism...", 242.

any help at all in deciding which cognitive processes we should use? Without some reason to think that one set of evaluative notions was preferable to the other, *it seems clear that for most of us* it would be of no help at all.⁵²

So the original case explicitly invoked by Weinberg, Nichols and Stich⁵³ employed thought-experiment and built on (apparently folk) intuition,⁵⁴ and not only at this point.

Alexander and Weinberg correctly note that the “peculiar and esoteric intuitions that are the philosopher’s stock-in-trade [the ones featuring in typical thought-experiments] represent a fairly small portion of the entire human intuitive capacity, and it hardly impugns the latter if the former turn out to be untenable.”⁵⁵ And they add: “Contending that squinting in dim light is a poor way to see the world accurately would, likewise, not be to cast doubt on perception on the whole.” So wholesale anti-intuitionism, just like anti-philosophy, is not supported by experimental philosophy. Not even experimentalism is supported by it.

4. Tentative conclusions

Throughout this paper I tried to establish a solid conclusion: that meta-skepticism, cartography and experimentalism are dead-ends of philosophy. The adherents of these views should give up their positions and return to a kind of philosophical enquiry that is more constructive. In this section I’m going to jump to further conclusions, less solid, less supported by the arguments above, or, skeptics are likely to point out, by any arguments at all. They are supported mostly by intuition. After all, denying the role of evidence caused a lot of harm to cartography and experimentalism and indirectly even to (at least some versions of) meta-skepticism. I suggest there-

52 Stephen Stich, *The Fragmentation of Reason* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990), 91–95. (My italics.)

53 Jonathan M. Weinberg, Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich, “Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions,” in Stephen Stich, *Collected Papers Volume 2* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 165.

54 This should indicate the problematic nature of their conclusions: it is not excluded that not all agents (real or imaginary) share the same intuition.

55 Alexander and Weinberg “Analytic Epistemology...,” 71.

fore that we should grant intuitions some evidentiary, justificatory or entitling role.

A phenomenon might appear at this point to be problematic. As soon as one allows an evidentiary role for intuitions, they may seem to defeat themselves. At least many people (cartographers, experimentalists, etc.) have rather strong intuitions that tell them that intuitions should not be relied on. Intuitions therefore can turn against themselves. For anyone who has this kind of rebelling intuitions, the principle according to which one should allow some kind of evidentiary or justificatory role for intuitions defeats itself indirectly, since it grants this role to intuitions that bury this principle. She can't accept the principle in a consistent way, just like the argument from disagreement cannot be endorsed consistently if there are acknowledged peers dissenting to it.

My suggestion is that we should not trust these rebellious intuitions. By focusing on arguments from self-refutation and on other intuitionist arguments (about the function and importance of intuitions), one might overcome these skeptic intuitions. And this is because intuitions can overpower and outnumber each other. This might, of course, lead to a picture of the philosophers' autobiography that is quite frequently filled with struggles. Struggles of intuitions, in which sometimes this side seems to be winning, sometimes the other side. And therefore, one might become a skeptic or an agnostic quite justifiedly because of her intuitions, just as well as she might overcome this state and become a justified true believer – just to fall back later. This is a possibility that my suggestion of giving intuitions a significant epistemic role opens up.

I'm not giving the term "intuition" here any definition. All I want to suggest is that we should keep this definition comparably wide, while not falling into obstacles like Weinberg, Nichols and Stich. Unlike van Inwagen's concept of it, the definition of intuition should be wide enough to accommodate what he talks about in this passage:⁵⁶ "Well, as with philosophy, I am inclined to think that I must enjoy some sort of incommunicable insight that the others [like

56 Though he wrote in that paper that this was "the view I find most attractive, or least unattractive" (van Inwagen, "It is Wrong...", 41), ten years later he argued against this account (see van Inwagen, "Listening to...", 31).

Lewis], for all their merits, lack. I am inclined to think that ‘the evidence and arguments I can adduce in support of my beliefs’ do not constitute the totality of my justification for these beliefs”.⁵⁷

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57 Van Inwagen, “It is Wrong...,” 34. Compare this to Plantinga who writes that if “John Calvin is right in thinking that there is such a thing as the Sensus Divinitatis and the Internal Testimony of the Holy Spirit, then perhaps [...certain beliefs that are subjects of disagreement...] are produced in me by those belief-producing processes, and have for me the phenomenology that goes with them” (Plantinga, “Pluralism...,” 181).

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4

The Challenge of Rustic Skepticism as Metaphilosophy

Vítor Hirschbruch Schwartz

The aim of this paper is firstly to present a contemporary version of skepticism, inspired by a so-called “rustic” interpretation of the works of Sextus Empiricus, and secondly, to comment on a major objection that could be raised against neo-Pyrrhonism: the metaphilosophical charge that it, too, is a philosophical position subject to debate and in conflict with other philosophies, since it shares many characteristics with other philosophies and presents itself as a philosophical option. In the first part of this paper, I argue for the rustic interpretation of the philosopher’s work and I try to make sense of a coherent rustic skepticism – that is, a philosophical position of someone who claims to have no beliefs whatsoever (in contrast to a more mitigated ‘urbane’ skepticism directed only against complex beliefs). Secondly, I explore the account of the skeptic school by Sextus and comment on the aforementioned objection.¹



¹ This ongoing research on skepticism would not be possible without the support of a FAPESP grant.

1. The relevance of Sextus' skepticism

The writings of Sextus Empiricus are at the center of the growing interest in ancient skepticism, in the context of an intense growth in the studies on the Hellenistic schools of philosophy. Naturally, the more they are studied, the greater the amount of exegetical problems that rise. The importance of skepticism in the history of philosophy is admittedly vast, despite the existence of different narratives about it. The works of Richard Popkin in particular showed the enormous influence of Pyrrhonian ideas in the European philosophical world that gave rise to modern philosophy.¹ The first translations of Sextus into Latin in the early modern era, following the rediscovery of manuscripts of his philosophy, encouraged the appearance of rows of philosophers who, regardless of the different ways in which they reconciled faith and reason, developed works partially or fully skeptical. Montaigne is one example, and also is Descartes, whom Popkin calls a *skeptique malgré lui*.² Popkin describes how the Cartesian hyperbolic doubt had an impact beyond its solution within the Cartesian system.

It is true that since the rediscovery of the work of Sextus, the frequent objects of debate related to skepticism are arguments, doubts, assumptions and skeptical objections – and rarely the much-discussed “skepticism” takes the form of a skeptical philosophical system. But it is also true that the ancient sources have bequeathed us with only one complete skeptical work, depriving us of the direct reading of the texts of the great philosophers from the Platonic Academy in the following centuries after the death of Plato. These philosophers, especially Arcesilaus, Carneades and Clitomachus, formulated a theoretical basis without which Pyrrhonian skepticism could not have been founded as a school by Aenesidemus in the first century BC (he is said to have left the Academy, thus founding the school known as “*Sképsis*” or Pyrrhonism).

1 Cf. Richard Popkin, *História do ceticismo de Erasmo a Spinoza*, trans. Danilo Marcondes de Souza Filho, ed. Francisco Alves (Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Francisco Alves, 2000).

2 Popkin, *História...*, Chapter X.

One cannot emphasize enough that the origin of the term “skeptical” has nothing to do with the idea of “doubt” that so frequently defines modern varieties of skepticism. In Greek, the word *skeptikós* simply means “investigator”. These philosophers, from Aenesidemus onward, also called themselves “Pyrrhonians” because they saw in the character of Pyrrho a pioneer of skepticism.

Sextus Empiricus, the one of whom we have a few complete books, was a physician and philosopher who lived in the second half of the second century AD in Rome, Alexandria or Athens, and was an important skeptic philosopher. Today, his work is our main source for the study of Pyrrhonian skepticism. It consists of the *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* (henceforth PH) and a series of other texts, best known by its Latin title *Adversus Mathematicos* (Against the Men of Science). The *Outlines* are a general introduction to Pyrrhonism, and the rest is a more detailed questioning of dogmatic philosophies in different fields of knowledge.

Since Sextus’ *oeuvre* is the only set of books by an ancient Pyrrhonian author which we have access to, by “skepticism” in the present paper I mean the philosophy of that author and its contemporary readings and versions, regardless of what was or was not original in his work when compared to previous skeptics and rival philosophers. My opinion is that we find in Sextus a defensible and fully articulated skeptical philosophy, whose study could be shown useful to the contemporary philosophical debate. The objectives here are two: to present a specific interpretation of Sextus thus defending its strength as a philosophical position, and also to address what I consider to be a major critic to skepticism.

The impact of Sextus’ works went even beyond its role in the genesis and in the development of modern philosophy and in the establishment of many contemporary epistemological problems. More recently, when the contemporary exegetical debate about the Greek skepticism began, starring scholars such as Michael Frede, Myles Burnyeat and Johnathan Barnes, the philosophical community witnessed an interpretive discussion of Sextus’ work that embarked on philosophical paths and configured a good example of the thin line between philosophy and history of philosophy, where it is almost impossible to distinguish the exegetical work from the philosophical reflection of each scholar. Issues such as the “problem of insulation”,

introduced by Myles Burnyeat,³ which pointed an alleged divorce between philosophy and life as a feature of the contemporary way of doing philosophy, made of the interpretation of the Greek sources a pretext for wider judgments about the entire history of philosophy as well as the introduction of new philosophical problems.

The exegetical and philosophical debate over the old skepticism of the Greeks is often of great impact to scholars. When met with a complete skeptical philosophy such as Sextus', the contemporary philosopher is faced with the possibility of adhering to skepticism. This is reflected in the habit, common to many experts in the subject, to argue in favor or against Pyrrhonian skepticism, a habit that culminates in a growing number of scholarly and creative reconstructions of Pyrrhonism. The contemporary debate offers us a huge formulation and reformulation of objections, going much further than just arguing against a caricature of skepticism never actually defended by any actual philosopher, but against a very interesting Greek philosophy rebuilt and sometimes updated. And thus the philosophical citizenship of the skeptic school, obscure for centuries among other reasons due to the shortage of systematically skeptical philosophers, has been rescued by both the studies on Sextus and the work of contemporary philosophers.

2. What could, after all, such a thing as a *skeptic school* be?

Ancient skepticism, unlike its modern counterpart, can arguably be considered an essentially metaphilosophical stance. It is not by chance that the main work of Sextus Empiricus, the *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, begins with an assessment of the three types of philosophy: skeptical, academic, and dogmatic (PH I, 1: 1976). This sort of overview of philosophy in general was a natural concern for ancient Pyrrhonists, since they were proponents of a suspension of judgment about everything (*epoche peri panton*), thus regarding themselves as adhering to a philosophical stance preferable, at least apparently, to all others.

3 Myles Burnyeat, "The sceptic in his place and time," in: Richard Rorty, J. B. Schneewind and Q. Skinner, ed. *Philosophy in History* (Cambridge University Press, 1984).

The question of whether skeptics have a doctrine is an interesting issue and is addressed by Sextus himself in PH I, 16, where we find Sextus emphasizing that the skeptic way (*hairesis*) is totally free of any *dogma* or specific belief, thus making the skeptic school a very peculiar philosophy – one that holds no thesis whatsoever, one that does not argue for the truth (or falseness for that matter) of any proposition.

“Rustic” skepticism is what scholars have taken for a radical form of skepticism in which suspension of judgment is directed against every sort of belief, even the simplest everyday belief that, for instance, “the wall is white”. Urbane skepticism, on the other hand, is the sort of skepticism in which the beliefs rejected by the skeptic are only of a specific sort – complex beliefs, theoretical or scientific ones put forward by dogmatic thinkers, for instance. In a previous paper, I have argued for a rustic interpretation of the skepticism of Sextus Empiricus.⁴ The core of my argument has always been that, in light of the expressed suspension of judgment that we see in Sextus insofar as the opinions of the plain man, and also in light of the skeptic path towards the suspension of judgment, the rustic interpretation was more convincing than its rival, the urbane interpretation. But I believe that one could go further and reflect about the reach and depth of a rustic skeptical philosophy.

Unlike in modern philosophy, skepticism was a complex school of thought and scholars have a hard time making sense of one of its main notions, which has a central role in the *Outlines of Pyrronism*: the concept of *phainomenon*. Sextus says that the skeptic does not pretend to affirm that things are just as he says they are, but, in PH I, 4: “we report (*apangellomen*), like a chronicler, that which appears to us at the time” (*to nun phainomenon hemin*).” And the skeptic will say that the scope of “that which appears” is immune to suspension of judgment. The *phainomenon* is the criterion of action of skepticism (PH I, 21), and what we could call a “positive” and doctrinal side of Pyrrhonism is permeated by what I shall call here “phenomenism”.

4 Vitor Hirschbruch Schwartz, “*Epokhé e lógos no pirronismo grego*,” in *As consequências do ceticismo*, edited by Waldomiro J. Silva Filho and Plínio Junqueira Smith (São Paulo: Alameda Editorial, 2012). 75–94.

The skeptic philosophical position of not having any belief whatsoever has traditionally been understood as an “adherence to appearances”. Many translators and commentators of Sextus have opted to translate *phainomenon* as “appearance”. I do not intend here to fully assess the merit of such an option, but this translation bares the risk of attributing to Sextus a few anachronistic theses, that may originate from the mind of a reader influenced by the millenary history of the concept of “appearance” in the history of philosophy, and not so much in the spirit of ancient skepticism – and this is often pointed out by people who choose that translation. Such a translation does not reflect the reach of the skeptic notion of *phainomenon*, a scope that has Sextus’ work and life as witnesses (since he was a physician and, I assume, saw no contradiction between his practice and his ordinary life, in one hand, and his philosophy, in another). Even a superficial reading of the *Outlines* and of Sextus’ other books would reveal a very large amount of descriptions of customs, of places, of people and of arguments, and a very strange philosophical maneuver would be required to define it all as a mere “expression of appearances”.

Any reader of the *Outlines* that wishes to take *phainomenon* for “appearance” will find discomfort in the large scope of things Sextus is happy to write under the umbrella of a phenomonic language. Thus it would be interesting for us to explore what sort of things Sextus is talking about when he speaks of the apparent things or *ta phainomena*. This warning by Sextus about the whole exposition of skepticism, that the skeptics are only reporting, like chroniclers, that which appears to them at the time, is too short to answer the questions about the coherence of the statements of a skeptic that claims to have no opinions or beliefs whatsoever. The appearance of the verb “*apangello*” causes some perplexity: would Sextus have chosen by chance a verb that, after two thousand years, would allow parallels between skepticism and concepts of the contemporary philosophy of language? Or the use of this verb by Sextus may merely be accidental, and, if it were to be switched for a synonym, it would not mean any relevant philosophical change. Those are questions that transcend the scope of this paper, which nevertheless tries to deal partially with some problems of a skeptic philosophy.

The problem of the scope of the skeptic suspension of judgment rises from an ambiguity already present in Sextus' writings, and it is centered in the apparently different restrictions we find in respect to the scope of the skeptic assent: sometimes the restriction is enormous and sometimes it's apparently smaller. Sextus restricts the scope to which the skeptic gives assent, stating that the skeptic is restricted merely to *phainómena*, but we also find restrictions to skeptic inquiry and suspension of judgment as being restricted to *lógos*, or to the non-evident matters investigated by the sciences, for example. Barnes and Hankinson distinguish between four classes of propositions that, at a glance, help us to understand the alleged ambiguity:⁵

A proposition is of *type (A)* if it contains a term purporting to refer to something 'by nature non-evident'; for example: (1) The tower is composed of atoms—where atoms are those non-evident corpuscles hypothesized by some schools of belief.

Propositions of *type (B)* refer to evident objects and describe their evident characteristics; for example: (2) The tower is square.

Propositions of *type (C)* again refer to evident objects, but report on how they seem (how they look, feel, etc.); for example: (3) The tower looks round.

Finally, propositions of *type (D)* make no reference to any objects, but merely state how things seem to be; for example: (4) It looks as though there's a round tower.

The problem rests in the fact that Sextus sometimes seems to reject only propositions of type A (in a so-called "urbane" way), and sometimes he seems to accept only propositions of type D, in an "extreme" way, to use Hankinson's word, of Pyrrhonism. Hankinson also writes that the fact that we frequently find in Sextus an epistemological boundary falling between B and C would indicate that his skepticism is of the "essential" type, as opposed to "existential skepticism", and its target would be only the knowledge of essences of objects, not going so far as to question their existence as a whole.⁶

5 Robert James Hankinson, *The Sceptics* (Routledge: 1998), 23.

6 Hankinson, *The Sceptics*, 24 and 272.

The examples we find in Barnes and Hankinson are useful, on the one hand, to formulate the problem of the scope of the skeptic suspension of judgment, but they are also useful to illustrate what I think could result in anachronisms in the interpretation of Sextus' philosophy. Hankinson uses those examples to explain why we do not find a Cartesian type of skepticism there, doubting the existence of the external world, and endorses the reading according to which Sextian Pyrrhonism is of an "essential type" and therefore less radical. But parallels with modern philosophy might make the text even more obscure than it already seems. There is something lacking in the frequent comparison between Sextus and Descartes, where the latter is supposed to be more radical. Even the simplest beliefs of the ordinary man in external things, like, for instance, in the existence of the Island of Delphos or in the fact that the wall is white, are strongly shaken by the Sextian reflection on physics in the third book of the *Outlines* and in *Against the Physicists* (PH III and M IX-X). It is hard to imagine what sort of beliefs about external objects would survive the suspension of judgment about the existence of time and space. A belief in an object that is nowhere and never is? One could say that we find in Sextus a radical "deconstruction" of external objects. One could ask, by inquiring on the presuppositions that are intrinsic to a doubt in the external world, if Sextian skepticism is not even more radical than Cartesian skepticism. Doesn't the formulation of modern skepticism rest on premises such as the postulate of an immaterial soul, which would be necessary to raise such a doubt?

The irony here is, of course, that from the "rustic" interpretation we may find in ancient skepticism a rich and radical skeptical thought, a philosophical position with much more weight and much harder to criticize than what is usually thought of as skepticism. An example, of how resourceful this thought is, is the passage in the very beginning of the *Outlines* where Sextus defines skepticism as an ability or disposition (*dynamis*) of opposition. Since antiquity, skeptics were known to be great debaters, as is known for instance from Arcesilaus' visit to Rome, when senator Cato tried to expel the philosopher for persuasively defending different and contradictory positions and thus corrupting Roman youth. The passage where Sextus first defines skepticism goes as follows, on Mates' translation (1996):

What skepticism is? The Skeptic Way is a disposition to oppose phenomena and noumena to one another in any way whatever, with the result that, owing to the equipollence among the things and statements thus opposed, we are brought first to epoche and then to ataraxia. We do not apply the term “disposition” in any subtle sense, but simply as cognate with “to be disposed.” At this point we are taking as phenomena the objects of sense perception, thus contrasting them with the noumena. (HP I 8-9)

And Sextus explains further more:

Does the skeptic deny appearances? And even when we do present arguments in opposition to the appearances, we do not put these forward with the intention of denying the appearances but by way of pointing out the precipitancy of the Dogmatists; for if the theory is so deceptive as to all but snatch away the appearances from under our very eyes, should we not distrust it in regard to the non-evident, and thus avoid being led by it into precipitate judgments? (HP I, 19-20)

A large number of things could be said and were written about those passages. I wish to emphasize here that the ability to oppose what, according to Sextus, defines skepticism, opposes that which appears to things said – of course this opposition is made within language. For example, some Eleatic philosopher raises an argument against the reality of motion: the skeptic will use such an argument to confront the ordinary belief in motion and also the more complex Aristotelian account of motion, thus suspending judgment. That is what Sextus means by opposing *phainomena* to *noumena*, things that appear to things that are thought. The important thing here is that, although motion appears and this fact is a good point in favor of its existence, it is not sufficient to establish its existence and the arguments against its existence leads the skeptic to a complete suspension of judgment about everything she or he sees. The skeptic, therefore, has no opinion on those things, but acts without opinion according to the way in which things appear. When Sextus says he does not abolish appearances, he means that he will act, in the above example, according to the existence of motion, even though he knows it might be an illusion. The existence of motion, in this example, can be thought of as a *phainomenon* in two senses of the word. In a way it is a perceptual *phainomenon*, since sense impression leads us to

believe in the reality of motion. But it is also a common sense belief, and in this sense it is also a *phainomenon*, something that appears (to everyone). Insofar as her criterion of action, the skeptic will act accordingly, but insofar as it is a matter of truth or falseness, the skeptic will suspend her judgment. Dogmatists, skeptics and ordinary people share the *phainomenon* of motion, but the skeptic is the one who refrains from hypostatizing it. The rustic interpretation of the ancient skepticism of Sextus Empiricus accounts for the enormous distance between the Pyrrhonists and the ordinary people: the skeptic knows that things can always be different from the way in which they appear, while the plain man usually trusts her experience to formulate her everyday beliefs about reality.

Also, the passages, on one hand, help us to grasp how shy the skeptic definition of skepticism is, but also lead us to think that Sextus was already aware of the problems involved in arguing for a philosophical stance that has no philosophical opinions whatsoever. That is the great challenge for any skepticism as a philosophy – it might not be a philosophy in terms of a list of opinions, but it definitely is a philosophical option and therefore it is a philosophy in terms of a general approach to philosophy, and may even be considered a metaphilosophical stance. Is this stance of being totally free of opinions really coherent?

3. The metaphilosophical objection

A very interesting debate has been going on for the last decades amongst some Brazilian philosophers on the coherence of skepticism, ancient or contemporary, as a school of thought, a discussion which was partially inspired by the work of Brazilian neo-Pyrrhonist philosopher Oswaldo Porchat.⁷

Prompted by an article by Roberto Bolzani,⁸ this debate has a profound metaphilosophical character, since the strategy of Bolzani is not so much in the line of a refutation of skepticism, but consti-

7 Pereira Oswaldo Porchat, *Rumo ao Ceticismo* (São Paulo: Editora Unesp, 2006).

8 Roberto Bolzani Filho, "A epokhé cética e seus pressupostos." *Discurso* 27 (1996): 37–67.

tutes a critic from the standpoint of metaphilosophical remarks.⁹ Making reference to the so-called “structural method” in the history of philosophy, attributed to Victor Goldschmidt, a central figure in the French circles of history of philosophy in the 20th Century, Bolzani distinguishes between a “formal truth” and a “material truth”, when we are dealing with philosophical systems. For the proponents of the structural method, a philosophy is not merely, as one may think, a collection of opinions, but it is the very discourse that articulates those different claims, its “concrete movements” and its “rules”.¹⁰ In philosophical systems, the “material truth”, that is, the truth of its propositions, could even be considered subordinated to a “formal truth”, since the system, much beyond hypostatizing its opinions, hypostatizes itself. Those general characteristics of philosophical stances make the case for a very interesting critique against the skeptic way, since it also shares these characteristics, namely, those involved with affirming itself as a philosophical position while expressing no opinion whatsoever. The skeptic may not profess any dogma or any belief, but her philosophy would still retain some sort of formal truth. Bolzani writes: “Skepticism, with its therapeutic function and intention, presenting itself as the ‘healthy’ philosophy, reveals its ‘exclusivist autonomy’. Its universality of posture and intentions is found in its very origin, the search for the truth [...]”.¹¹

Thus is the metaphilosophical challenge for a skeptic school, rustic or urbane: the strongly metaphilosophical yet brilliant charge that Pyrrhonism, too, is a philosophical position subject to debate and in conflict with other philosophies, since it shares many characteristics with other philosophies and inevitably presents itself as a philosophical option. This sort of critique that avoids the arduous and often aporetic task of directly refuting the skeptic is some-

9 Roberto Bolzani Filho, “Oswaldo Porchat, a filosofia e ‘necessidades de essência’. *O filósofo e sua história: uma homenagem a Oswaldo Porchat*. Edited by P. J. Smith and J. Wrigley, 2003: 11

10 Roberto Bolzani Filho, “Oswaldo Porchat, a filosofia e ‘necessidades de essência’. *O filósofo e sua história: uma homenagem a Oswaldo Porchat*. Edited by P. J. Smith and J. Wrigley, 2003: 13

11 Roberto Bolzani Filho, “Oswaldo Porchat, a filosofia e ‘necessidades de essência’. *O filósofo e sua história: uma homenagem a Oswaldo Porchat*. Edited by P. J. Smith and J. Wrigley, 2003: 27

times overlooked, and may present some of the best sort of criticism that Skepticism has to confront. Of course there are many ways in which a Pyrrhonist could respond to that charge, but my objective here was to simply present both this objection and what a rustic neo-Pyrrhonism inspired in Sextus would be.¹²

4. Suspension of judgment about everything

A coherent rustic neo-Pyrrhonism faces, as we saw, an even fiercer objection than the traditional *apraxia* charge: one of the features of skepticism (both rustic and urbane) which makes it such an interesting philosophy is the first of the five modes of Agrippa leading to suspension of judgment – disagreement (*diaphonia*). According to this mode, we find such a variety of opinions about every subject that may arise that we are forced to suspend judgment about everything, and hence to be skeptics. As we see from the account of the skeptic school, skepticism itself is not part of a variety of philosophical stances in conflict in this particular sense, since there is no opinion whatsoever defended by a Sextan skeptic, who is therefore not subject to the mode of *diaphonia*. (PH I, 165)

The skeptic phenomenic language has no claim of truth or knowledge whatsoever, and even though ordinary people do not have a complex epistemology to explain their beliefs in things, they are willing to maintain that they know at least some of them. Thus, a tower that seems square at a distance, but is verified to be round with closer observation, is judged by both the stoics (for example) and by ordinary people to be really square. The skeptics, however, do not make judgments: neither complex opinions nor the simplest belief.

Contemporary skeptics that defend any version of Pyrrhonism are usually keener to the urbane interpretation, and argue that their philosophies do not depend on a historically correct interpretation of the neo-Pyrrhonism of Sextus Empiricus, since the mere historic imprecision would neither affect the strength nor the coherence

12 A good example of a skeptic response to Bolzani Filho's critic is Plínio J. Smith, "Ceticismo dogmático e dogmatismo sem dogmas," *Integração* 45 (2006): 171–185.

of their philosophies. But one could see how the old skepticism, rustically understood, can also be a source of inspiration for contemporary philosophical reflections, since it offers a philosophical position aligned with the current tendency of praising the ancient schools of thought for not insulating their philosophies from ordinary life (the problem of *insulation* mentioned above).

The original Pyrrhonist, as I see him, is pretty far from any positivistic anti-metaphysical view, since she is someone much more susceptible to metaphysical reflections, embarks on them and only implodes them by chance and from the inside. Within her dialectic ability of opposing things that appear and thoughts, the rustic Pyrrhonist therefore in fact suspends judgment about the proposition “the wall is white”, as well as about any other proposition, because she recognizes no privilege of the senses over opinions, or vice versa.

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5

Incongruence of Philosophy and Theology

Tamás Hankovszky

According to the widely held classical view among theologians whilst Theology analyses its objects in the light of Godly revelation, Philosophy analyses its objects in the light of natural reason. This conception supplemented with the typically philosophical idea according to which human reason is nearly related to Godly reason can encourage the hope that if Philosophy and Theology do their job good, they are in accordance with each other regarding their results, however they get to the same conclusion from different premises. Fundamental thesis of my paper is that if we put up with the interpretation that whereas among final premises of Theology there are some which are verified by the revelation, fundamental assumptions of Philosophy miss a foundation like this we are not attentive to the complete significance of the metaphoric conception about the light of reason and revelation. We should pay respect to the fact that from Thales' Arche Philosophy in general is characterized by seeking of unity whilst Theology during the interpretation takes care of not to eliminate antinomies of faith: such pairs of statements as however compose antinomic unity, each of them is qualified as true. The most important antinomies resist even the Aristotelian method of contradiction treatment namely to show that the opposite features describe the examined object in different respects. Hence it is the sign of *over philosophizing* of Theology if it dissolves every contradiction in the statements of faith. My aim is not to examine the techniques with the help of a successful Philosophy evades to be unfaithful to the unreducible multiplicity by which it is confronted

in revelation and become philosophical dualism (halfway blocked monism) or Dialectics (sophisticated monism). In the major part of my paper by means of some typical philosophical phenomena (e.g. authority of scientific parsimony, popularity of iteration) I try to demonstrate the thesis that Philosophy is essentially monistic. It is a series of footnotes to Thales. However Christian Theology preserves something from the characteristic of Faith whereby the faith is monotheistic but not monistic because by the only God it postulates a Creation which not just differs from but directed towards God at the same time.

A filozófia és a teológia különmeműsége

A teológusok köreiben elterjedt klasszikus felfogás szerint a teológia az isteni kinyilatkoztatás, a filozófia viszont az ész természetes fényében vizsgálja a tárgyait. Ez a tétel kiegészítve azzal a tipikusan filozófiai elképzeléssel, hogy az emberi ész közeli rokonságban áll az istenivel, azt a reményt bátoríthatja, hogy a filozófia és a teológia, ha jól végzik a dolgukat, eredményeiket tekintve összhangban állnak egymással, csak más-más premisszákból jutnak ugyanahhoz a konklúzióhoz. Dolgozatom alapgondolata, hogy nem ragadjuk meg az iménti metaforikus tétel teljes értelmét, ha úgy értelmezzük, hogy a teológia végső premisszái között olyanok is szerepelnek, amelyeket a kinyilatkoztatás hitelesít, a filozófia axiómái azonban nélkülözik az ilyen megalapozást. Számításba kell venni azt is, hogy Thalész archéja óta a filozófiát az egység keresése jellemzi, míg a teológia gondosan vigyáz arra, hogy az értelmezés és magyarázat közben fel ne számolja a hit antinómiáit: tételek olyan párpait, amelyek ellentmondásos egységet képeznek, de egyaránt igaznak minősülnek. A legfontosabb antinómiák még az ellentmondások kezelésének bevett fogásának is ellenállnak, vagyis hogy kimutassuk, az ellentétes tulajdonságok más-más szempontból illetik meg a vizsgált dolgot. Ezért a teológia túlzott átfilozofizálódásának jele, ha minden ellentmondást felold a hit tételei között. Nem célom annak vizsgálata, milyen technikákkal kerüli el a sikeres teológia, hogy hűtlen legyen ahhoz a redukálhatatlan sok-szerűséghez, amellyel a kinyilatkoztatásban szembesül, és filozófiai dualizmussá (félúton megrekedt monizmus) vagy dialektikává (körültekintő,

árnyalt monizmus) váljon. Dolgozatom nagyobbik részében inkább néhány tipikus filozófiai jelenség (pl. a takarékosági elv tekintélye, az iteráció kedveltsége) segítségével próbálom szemléltetni a tételt, hogy a filozófiai lényege szerint monisztikus: Thalészhoz írt lábjegyzet. A keresztény teológia azonban őriz valamit a hit azon jellegzetességéből, hogy a hit, jöllehet, monoteista, nem monisztikus, mert az egy Isten mellett egy tőle különböző, de rá irányuló teremtést is feltételez.



A teológusok körében elterjedt klasszikus felfogás szerint a teológia az isteni kinyilatkoztatás, míg a filozófia az ész természetes fényében vizsgálja a tárgyait (vö. DS 3015).¹ Ez a tétel kiegészítve azzal a tipikusan filozófiai elképzeléssel, hogy az emberi ész közeli rokonságban áll az istenivel, azt a reményt bátoríthatja, hogy a filozófia és a teológia, ha jól végzik a dolgukat, eredményeiket tekintve összhangban állnak egymással, csak más-más premisszákból jutnak ugyanahhoz a konklúzióhoz. Úgy gondolom azonban, hogy nem ragadjuk meg az ész, illetve a kinyilatkoztatás fényéről szóló metaforikus tétel teljes értelmét, ha beérjük azzal az értelmezéssel, hogy a teológia végső premisszái között olyanok is szerepelnek, amelyeket a kinyilatkoztatás hitelesít, a filozófia axiómái azonban nélkülözik az ilyen megalapozást. Számításba kell azt is venni, hogy Thalész archéja óta a filozófiát általában az egység keresése jellemzi, míg a teológia legtöbbször gondosan vigyáz arra, hogy az értelmezés és a magyarázat közben fel ne számolja a hit antinómiáit: tételek olyan párpait, amelyek ellentmondásos egységet képeznek, de egyaránt igaznak minősülnek. A legfontosabb antinómiák még az ellentmondások kezelésének arisztotelészi fogásának is ellenállnak, vagyis hogy kimutatjuk, az ellentétes tulajdonságok más-más vonatkozásban illetik meg a vizsgált dolgot. Ezért a teológia túlzott átfilozofizálódásának – kudarcának – jele, ha minden ellentmondást felold a hit tételei között.

A filozófiának és a teológiának is sok válfaja, irányzata van, és ha általánosságban filozófiáról, illetve teológiáról beszélünk, ingoványos talajra lépünk, mert nehéz bármit is mondani, ami annyira sokszínű jelenségekre igaz lehet, mint ezek a tudományok. Mégis azt hiszem, hogy legalábbis nagy vonalakban igazam van abban, amit a következőkben állítani fogok. Egy nagyon formális és tartalmilag szegény tételt fogok ugyanis képviselni, amely többé-kevésbé érvényes a filozófia és a keresztény teológia minden változatára, vagy legalábbis azokra, amelyek történetük fő áramlataihoz tartoznak, és nagyobb igénnyel lépnek fel annál, mint hogy részelemzéseket végezzenek. Ezt a reményemet a fogalmak logikájának egyik belátásával szeretném szemléltetni

1 Az egyházi tanítóhivatal megnyilatkozásai, szerk. Fila Béla és Jug László (Kisternye-Budapest, Örökmécs, 1997), 532.

és ugyanakkor meg is alapozni. Eszerint mennél szegényebb egy fogalom konnotációja, annál tágabb a terjedelme; mennél üresebb és meghatározatlanabb, mennél kevesebb jegyet foglal magában, annál több minden tartozik alá.

Tételem így hangzik: *A filozófia és a teológia lényegileg különböznek egymástól, sőt ellentétesek egymással, mert a filozófia, még az analitikus filozófia is, alapvetően az egységet keresi, a teológia ezzel szemben elkötelezett az antinómiák mellett. Míg a filozófia feloldani igyekszik az antinómiákat, a teológia utat téveszt, ha ezt teszi: hol súlytalanná, hol filozófiává, hol eretnekké válik.*

A filozófia egységkeresése

Tételem filozófiára vonatkozó részét először két filozófiai problémán szemléltetem. Nemcsak az utca embere teszi fel egyes számban a „mi az élet értelme” kérdést, hanem a filozófus is, ha egyáltalán értelmesnek tudja még látni azok után, hogy oly sok kísérlet vallott kudarcot, hogy egyes számú válasza leljen. Érdekes, de cseppet sem meglepő módon ez a kérdés többes számban érdektelen a filozófia számára. A válasz megtalálása viszont már csak azért is kilátástalannak tűnik, mert még azt sem sikerült eldönteni, hogy objektív vagy szubjektív kritériumok (a világban megvalósuló értékek vagy pozitív mentális állapotok) alapján ítéljük meg az élet értelmét.² A filozófus úgy érzi, választania kell, vagy ha ez nem lehetséges, az ellentétes filozófiai érdekeknek megfelelő tételek valamilyen szintézisét kell megvalósítania. Mindenképpen olyan válasza van szüksége, amely felülemelkedik a kettősségen. A filozófiai válasz az volna, ha megnyugtató módon feloldódna a dilemma.

Hasonlóképpen, nemcsak az utca embere, hanem a filozófus is késztetést érez, hogy válasszon az osztó igazságosság különböző koncepciói között. Teljesítményük vagy rászorultságuk mértékében részesüljenek az emberek a közös javakból? Mivel pedig egyik lehetőség választása sem tűnik elfogadhatónak, mert mindegyik mellett erős érvek szólnak, John Rawls például mindkettőt elveti, és egy harmadikat állít a helyükre. Még azzal sem elégszik meg, hogy vala-

2 Vö. Bernáth László, „Az értelmes élet néhány feltételéről,” *Elpis* 9 (2011): 63–92. Különösen: 67–72.

miféle kompromisszumot javasoljon, vagy az osztó igazságosság valamiféle vegyes felfogásával álljon elő, hanem egyetlen, egységes koncepcióját kívánja kidolgozni.³

A példákat lehetne szaporítani. További konkrét filozófiai problémák felsorolása helyett tételelem filozófiára vonatkozó részének némiképp absztraktabb és általánosabb tárgyalására térek át. Négy tényt említek a filozófia világából, amelyek tételelem mellett szólnak.

1. Ha két különböző elmélet áll rendelkezésre, amelyek ugyanazt a jelenséget próbálják értelmezni, és amelyek ugyanakkora magyarázó erővel rendelkeznek, akkor a filozófia (és a belőle kivált tudományok) azt részesítik előnyben, amelyik egyszerűbb, amelyik kevesebb princípiumra támaszkodik. Rendszerint azt az elméletet tartjuk jobbnak, amelynek kevesebb redukálhatatlan fogalma, axiómája, levezetési szabálya van. Hasonló szellem nyilvánul meg itt, mint Ockham borotvája esetében: szabaduljunk meg minden feleslegestől. Miért kellene például két külön elvre visszavezetni az emberi jelenség teljességét, ha a test vagy a lélek/szellem önmagában is elég arra, hogy mindent belőle kiindulva magyarázzunk meg?

2. A filozófusok körében nagyon népszerű az iteráció. Az olyan téziseket például, mint hogy csak az a szintetikus tétel értelmes, amely verifikálható, diadalmasan söprik félre azon az alapon, hogy maguk nem verifikálhatók. Az ilyen eljárásban egyfajta módszertani monizmus nyilvánul meg, amennyiben ugyanazt az elvet alkalmazza minden lehetséges esetben. Nem magától értődő azonban, miért vonatkoznak azonos kritériumok például a tárgynyelv és a metanyelv tételeire. Azokra a tételekre, amelyek egy elmélet tárgya-iról tesznek állítást, talán más szabályok érvényesek, mint azokra, amelyek magára az elméletre vagy annak tételeire vonatkoznak. Ezt a lehetőséget azonban általában elvetik, és azt gondolják, hogy minden tételre ugyanazok a szabályok vonatkoznak, vagyis hogy alapvetően csak egyféle tétel létezik. Így ha például a verifikacionizmus igaz volna, minden tételnek, így a verifikáció elvének is verifikálhatónak kellene lennie.

3 John Rawls, *Az igazságosság elmélete*, ford. Krokavay Zsolt (Budapest: Osiris, 1997), 34. Bár itt és a további, részletezőbb megfogalmazások alkalmával két elvről esik szó, a javak elosztására csak a második vonatkozik közülük.

3. A filozófia (néhány kivételtől eltekintve) elfogadja az ellentmondás elvét. Ennek alapján megköveteli, hogy feltétlenül kerüljük az ellentmondásokat. Meggyőződése szerint két egymásnak ellentmondó tétel közül csak egy lehet igaz. Egyesek ezt az elvet meglepően radikális módon érvényesítik. Eszerint ha egy tétel az A predikátumot tulajdonítja egy tárgynak, egy másik tétel a B predikátumot, akkor nem egyszerűen különböző tulajdonságokat tulajdonítanak neki, hanem ellentéteseket. Hiszen ami B, az egyszersmind nem-A is. Ha tehát – mondja például Fichte⁴ – a tárgyat A és B predikátummal is felruháznánk, akkor ellentmondás keletkezne, amit semmiképpen nem hagyhatunk jóvá. Számomra itt csak annyi a fontos, hogy a filozófus még a legáttételesebb formában sem fogadja el az ellentmondásokat, hanem két ellentmondó tétel esetén vagy hamisnak nyilvánítja az egyiket, vagy kimutatja, hogy csak látszólag mondanak ellent, vagy pedig szintetizálni próbálja őket. A filozófia fellép az ellentmondások ellen, és velük együtt a bennük rejlő sokféleség ellen is.

4. A filozófia olyannyira az egység elkötelezettje, hogy akár még messzebb is mehetünk, mint Whitehead, aki szerint: „Az európai filozófiai hagyományt méltán lehet általánosan úgy jellemezni, hogy nem más, mint Platónhoz írt lábjegyzetek sorozata.”⁵ A filozófia története szerintem inkább Thalészhez írt lábjegyzetek sorozata. Thalész olyan útra lépett, amelyet a filozófusok azóta is hűségesen követnek. Azt kérdezzük például, mi tesz valamit rózsává. Hogyan beszélhetünk ugyanarról a rózsaszálról, ha alig van olyan érzékelhető tulajdonsága, amelyet létezése során mindvégig megőriz, sőt egyidejűleg is különböző (ellentmondó) tulajdonságai vannak, hiszen részben piros, részben zöld? Azt is kérdezzük, mitől van az, hogy a sok különböző rózsza mindegyike rózsza, és hogy a rózsza más virágokkal együtt egyaránt virág. A filozófia újra meg újra ugyanazt válaszolta: van valami, ami azonos a rózsaszál különböző állapotaiban, valami, ami azonos a különböző rózsákban, valami, ami azonos a különböző virágokban stb.. Még ha ezt az azonos valamit

4 Vö. pl. Johann Gottlieb Fichte, „Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre,” in *Fichtes Werke. I. kötet*, szerk. Immanuel Hermann Fichte (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1971), 139–141.

5 Alfred North Whitehead, *Folyamat és valóság*, ford. Fórizs László és Karsai Gábor (Budapest: Typotex, 2001), 57.

a filozófia történetében különböző fogalmakkal ragadták is meg, az alapgondolat változatlan maradt. Ha különböző állapotok vagy létezők viszonyát meg kívánjuk érteni, közös nevezőre kell hozni őket. Meg kell találni, mi az, amiben éppen hogy nem különbözők, hanem azonosak. A filozófia olykor odáig is elment, hogy nyíltan kijelentette, minden jelenség esetében végső soron csak egy közös alap, princípium, arché létezhet.

Az elmondottakhoz még hozzá kell tennünk, hogy nemcsak a filozófia, hanem egyáltalán a megértés is mindig az egyesítés lehetőségét keresi. Mindkettő a közöset szeretné megtalálni az egymással szemben állókban. Ahol maradt még valami egyesítetlen kettősség, ott a megértés még nem tökéletes.

A filozófiáról felállított tételek tartalmilag rendkívül szegény, mert nem mondja ki, mi a keresett egység. Más szempontból viszont nagyon erős, mert többé vagy kevésbé szigorú értelemben minden filozófiával kapcsolatban érvényesíteni szeretném. Tétel maga is filozófiai tétel, amennyiben ugyanazt csinálja, mint amit a filozófiákról állít, vagyis közös nevezőre hozza a tárgyait, a különböző filozófiákat. A metafilozófia maga is filozófia, így nem csoda, hogy úgy jár el, mint ahogy állítása szerint minden filozófia. Csakhogy filozófiai jellege folytán tétel sem tarthat igényt több igazságra, mint a többi jelenség sokféleségét egységesíteni próbáló filozófiák. Neki is szembe kell néznie az egységes rendbe csak üggyel-bajjal besorolható már-már kivételes esetekkel. Úgy vélem azonban, hogy némi jóindulattal még ezekben is meg lehet látni a filozófiáknak tulajdonított, lényeginek tekintett közös vonást. Így a filozófia itt adott jellemzése alól például a dualizmus vagy a dialektika sem jelentenek igazi kivételt. A dualizmus félúton megtorpanó monizmusnak a dialektika körültekintő, árnyalt monizmusnak tekinthető. Még Leibniz monáosztana is monista, holott egyszersmind a pluralista metafizika tankönyvi példája lehetne, amennyiben azt állítja, hogy a világ háttérében végtelen sok monász van. Éppen az teszi azonban monistává, hogy minden dolgot, legyen az élő vagy élettelen, ember vagy Isten, ugyanolyan fajtájú valóságra vezet vissza. A monások persze nagyban különböznek egymástól, és csak absztrakt szinten azonosak: abban, hogy mindegyik egység. Ez sem változtat azonban azon, hogy Leibniz is elfogad egy végső elvet a valóság magyaráza-

tára. Hasonlóképpen az egység igénye felől lehet értelmezni még a wittgensteini családi hasonlóság fogalmát is.

A teológia antinomikus gondolkodása

Amikor a teológiát meg szeretnénk különböztetni a filozófiától, nem szabad elfelejteni, hogy a teológia is a megértés egy módját testesíti meg, és ennek megfelelően a teológusok is keresik az egységet. Az ellentmondásokat, amennyire csak lehet, a teológiában is kerülni kell, és Ockham borotvája itt is haszonnal alkalmazható. Ám a teológus a hitet kívánja megragadni, feldolgozni, magyarázni és kifejteni, a hit viszont antinomikus. Ezért a teológiai magyarázat sem tüntetheti el a megmagyarázandóból az antinómiát. A hitben megnyilvánuló antinómiák példaként elég csak azt felidézni, amit a kereszténység a Szentháromságról gondol. Még szemléletesebb Jézus Krisztus személyének misztériuma. A hit egyforma súllyal vallja, hogy Jézus Isten, és hogy Jézus ember. E tételek között nincs mód közvetítésre, ezek menthetetlenül szemben állnak egymással, nincs olyan (magasabb) tétel, amelyben egyesíthetők volnának. Nem mondhatjuk arisztotelészi mintára azt sem, hogy Jézus más szempontból ember és más szempontból Isten. Nem jutunk előbbre akkor sem, ha kijelentjük, Jézus istenember, mert nem tudjuk pontosan, mit jelent az „istenember” szó, illetve mert jelentésében ellentmondó elemek rejlenek. Ha a két egymásnak ellentmondó hittétel mégiscsak összebékíthető valahogyan, akkor csak Jézus Krisztus *személyében*, akiről azt *hisszük*, hogy valóságos Isten és valóságos ember, vagy (egy másik értelemben) a hívő *személyében*, aki mindkét tételt *hiszi*, aki, bár elgondolni nem tudja, hogyan lehet jelen egy személyben két természet, beéri ezzel a magyarázattal.

Ám a teológia nem érheti be azzal, hogy a hívő hitaktusát, Jézus Krisztus személyét vagy az istenember homályos fogalmát mutassa fel egyesítési pontként vagy szintézisként, hanem – már amennyire ez lehetséges – megértésre törekszik. Megérteni pedig azt jelenti: az ellentmondásokat feloldani, a különbözőket egyetlen elvre visszavezetni. Éppen erre nincsen azonban lehetőség a hit titkai esetében. A teológiatörténet korábbi szakaszaiban minden lehetséges módot kipróbáltak, hogyan lehet például a Jézusról szóló két tétel ellentmondását megszüntetni. Az eredmény többnyire eretnekség volt.

Minden eretnekség alapvető struktúrája, hogy szétválasztanak két összetartozó, egyaránt igaznak minősülő, egymásnak mégis ellentmondó tételt (ezeket nevezem antinómiának), és csak az egyiket tekintik igaznak, a másikat elvetik, esetleg részben vagy látszólag tartják csak igaznak. Azt mondták például, hogy Jézus valójában Isten, és csak látszólag ember, vagy fordítva, hogy Jézus valóságos ember, akit Isten fiává fogadott. Minden eretnekség túlságosan filozofikus, mert túlságosan komolyan veszi az egységet. Az ortodoxia ezzel szemben elviseli a feszültséget, amely abból fakad, hogy két tétel egymásnak ellentmond, mégis egyaránt igaznak számít.

A hit is keresi a megértést, de tudomásul veszi, hogy megértése behatárolt, és nem lehet maradéktalan, mert mindig lesz egy terület, ahová a megértő gondolkodás során az ellentmondás koncentrálódik és ahol teljességgel feloldhatatlannak bizonyul, sőt olyannak, amit nem is szabad megszüntetni. Ilyenkor a hívő semmi egyebet nem tehet, mint hogy hisz, mert képtelen megnyugtató egységet teremteni a hittételei között. Hiába tartozik a hithez a hittételek révén a kognitív szféra is, a hit soha nem válhat tudássá vagy teljes megértéssé, hanem mindig megmarad benne az elfogadás, a tudomásulvétel egy mozzanata.

A vallásokban és a kereszténységben sok antinómia van, amelyet nem lehet kifilozofálni belőlük. A teológiának éppen hogy ragaszkodnia kell az antinómiákhoz, és teljes élességükben kell kidolgoznia és felmutatnia őket. Filozófiai szempontból az egyik legfontosabb antinómia Isten és az ember (és egyáltalán a teremtés) viszonyára vonatkozik. Idézzük fel először is Fichte egyik tételét, hogy világossá váljon, mitől kell óvakodnia a hívőnek és a hívő teológusnak. „Az volt minden filozófia nehézsége, amely nem kívánt dualizmus lenni, hanem komolyan vette az egység keresését, hogy vagy magunkat kellett felszámolnunk, vagy Istent. Magunkat nem akartuk, Istent nem volt szabad.”⁶ Fichte világosan látta, hogy amíg egymás mellett állhat Isten és ember, hiányzik a kívánatos egység. Komolyan vette az egység keresését, és úgy vélte, hogy az embernek az abszolútum képévé nyilvánítása révén kései filozófiájában mégiscsak talált olyan megoldást, amely Istent is és az embert is megóvjá. Ez a megoldás

6 Johann Gottlieb Fichte, „Die Wissenschaftslehre (1804/2),” in *Fichtes Werke*. X. kötet, szerk. Immanuel Hermann Fichte (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1971), 147.

azonban elégtelen, mert az embert megfosztja az önállóságtól, és mintegy feloldja Istenben, egyúttal megszünteti Isten és ember partneri viszonyát, szeretetközösségét. Úgy gondolom, ebben a kérdésben a teológusnak – szemben a filozófussal – egyszerűen nem szabad túl komolyan vennie az egység keresését. Hiszen a hívőnek mint hívőnek minden koncepciót vissza kell utasítania, amely megszünteti a távolságot Isten és ember között, mert szabad dialógus csak úgy valósulhat meg, ha a partnerek különböznek, és némiképp távol állnak egymástól – filozófiai nyelven: szemben állnak egymással. Ez persze nem jelenti azt, hogy a teológusnak mindjárt dualistának kell lennie, mert Isten és az ember egységét szintén állítania kell, és egyébként is csak azért különböznek egymástól, hogy szeretetviszonyba léphessenek. Nincs szeretet azonosság és ugyanígy nincs különbözőség nélkül.

A keresztény ihletésű filozófia – éppen csak mert filozófia, és így alaptendenciáját tekintve monista – általában az azonosságot hangsúlyozza, azonban ezáltal gyakran szem elől téveszti a különbséget. Megkockáztatom, hogy ha egyáltalán a filozófia területére akarjuk vinni Isten és ember viszonyának kérdését, keresztényként egyenesen a különbségük megragadásán kell fáradoznunk, ahogyan ezt például Kierkegaard is tette. Hiszen mihelyt egy „csipetnyi filozófia”⁷ keveredik a gondolkodásba, az egész menthetetlenül átjárja az egység szelleme (mint ahogy Kierkegaard *Filozófiai morzsák* című műve valóban túlságosan is filozofikusra sikerült, és nem volt képes konzisztensen felmutatni Isten abszolút különböző voltát).⁸ Ezért Isten és ember viszonyáról gondolkodva a teológusnak és a keresztény ihletésű filozófusnak erőnek-erejével a különbségük meglátására és érvényesítésére kell törekednie. – Persze csak azért, hogy így teremtsen antinomikus egyensúlyt a magát a gondolkodásra kényszerítő egység és a magához a dologhoz legalább ennyire illő különbség gondolata között.⁹

7 Søren Kierkegaard, *Filozófiai morzsák*, ford. Hidas Zoltán (Budapest: Göncöl, 1997), 7.

8 Vö. Hankovszky Tamás, „»Ugyanazt mondjuk«: Kierkegaard és Szókratész,” in *Kierkegaard 1813–2013*, szerk. Gyenge Zoltán (Budapest: L’Harmattan, 2014), 221–229..

9 Az antinómia második tagját azért is meg kell erősíteni, mert a magát nagyszerűnek, isteninek látni kívánó ember számára jóval kevésbé hízelgő, mint az egység.

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6

Advocacy of Science vs. Scientific Methodology A Comparison between Quine and Sider

Tolgahan Toy

In this paper I make a comparison between Quine's and Sider's scientifically oriented philosophy. I will argue that these two philosophies are not good friends but more like enemies due to two reasons. Firstly, their notion of reality is different. Sider rejects any human contribution to the notion of reality while Quine adopts a conceptual scheme thesis. Secondly, Quine appeals to empirical work on ordinary language while Sider appeals to speculative a priori metaphysics. I am doubtful as to which way is more friendly with science: adopting scientific methodology or advocating science. But I know that advocating science and adopting scientific methodology two different things just as defending democracy and being a democratic are two different things.



In contemporary analytical philosophy taking sides with science or being called a naturalist is highly popular. It is similar to reporting oneself as democratic in contemporary politics.¹ The similarity is not a coincidence, because these are the virtues of our age. However, the point is not to report ourselves as virtuous but to be virtuous. But how? How can a philosopher take sides with science? There has been a lot of debate about it in the history of philosophy. When we examine the effects of scientific milestones like Newton's three laws or Darwin's theory of evolution on Western thought, we see a great variety of ways to be scientific. Kantians, logical positivists, rationalists, empiricists, romanticists, postmoderns, analytical philosophers, and historicists are all attempted to be scientific in their very own way. In this paper, I will not give a historical account of different ways of calling oneself scientific. Instead, I will narrow my work to contemporary analytical philosophy. I will make a comparison between Quine's and a contemporary analytical metaphysician's, Sider's, scientifically motivated philosophy. I think such a comparison is crucial within the analytical tradition.

It is crucial because Quine's criticism of logical positivism is a watershed in the history of analytical philosophy. It is said that the revival of metaphysics in analytical philosophy was due to Quine's criticism. So naturalism in Quine's philosophy and in contemporary analytical metaphysics is one of the main points to understand about analytical philosophy. To represent contemporary analytical metaphysics, I will appeal to Theodore Sider's philosophy as he is a very prominent metaphysician within the analytical tradition. I will show that these two scientifically oriented philosophies are indeed two rivals.

To show that Sider's and Quine's scientific philosophies are not only different but also opposed, I will focus on Quine's place in the history of analytical philosophy. To do so, we will start with logical positivists' rejection of metaphysics. Then we will deal with Quine's criticism of logical positivism. Then we will interpret Quinean pragmatism as an alternative to both "metaphysical jungles"² and

1 I am grateful to Irem Kurtsal Stephen, Stephen Voss, Sandy Berkovski and László E. Szabó for the helpful discussions and their insightful comments.

2 Quine, W.V.O. "Three Grades of Modal Involvement", *Proceedings of the 11th International Congress of Philosophy*, Brussels, 1953, Volume 14: 176

logical positivism. This will help us to understand Quine's rejection of metaphysics. After we are done with Quine, I will move to contemporary analytical metaphysics. Specifically I will focus on Theodore Sider. The aim of this paper is to shed light on the difference between Quine and Sider in two different ways. Firstly, their notion of reality is different. Sider rejects any human contribution to the notion of reality while Quine adopts a conceptual scheme thesis. Secondly, Quine appeals to empirical work on ordinary language while Sider appeals to speculative a priori metaphysics. I would hesitate to decide which way could offer more to science: adopting scientific methodology or advocating science. However, I am sure that these two ways are not compatible to each other.

Metaphysics is interested in the fundamental nature of reality: the nature of time and space, existence, necessary laws, causation, abstract entities, etc.³ To solve these problems, Kant argued that the world is not mind independent. This means that there is a world out there but that the world we are talking about is the one formed by the categories of mind. So these metaphysical questions are about the formation of our mind.⁴ Time, space, objecthood, modality, etc. are all related to working principles of our mind.

Even though the Kantian transcendental approach seems to be able to solve these metaphysical problems, it postulates a distinction between the real world and our phenomenal world. This subjective account made many philosophers discontented. Later logical positivists rejected the Kantian account of metaphysics and proposed another solution.⁵ Largely following Hume, they distinguished factual and conventional questions. Factual questions are about the facts out there; conventional questions are about our conventions.

Early Wittgenstein and Carnap are examples of this approach. Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus* claimed that a sentence's meaning is its truth condition since language is the logical picture of the world. A real proposition always says something about the world. This means that we can always go and check a proposition in the

3 E. J. Lowe, *A Survey of Metaphysics* (New York: Oxford, 2002), 2–3.

4 Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* (Cambridge: Cambridge, 1998), xvi–xvii.

5 John Skorupski, "Later Empiricism and Logical Positivism," in *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic*, ed. Stewart Shapiro (New York: Oxford, 2005), 51–53.

world. But there are two other sorts of expressions. The first ones are the tautologies and contradictions whose truth or falsity does not depend on the world. Wittgenstein calls these expressions pseudo-propositions because they do not really depict the world.⁶ They are about our conventions. The second ones are those metaphysical expressions which cannot be decomposed into propositions corresponding to atomic facts if atomic facts are configurations of objects. As I said above, Kantian metaphysics explains both sorts of expressions through the mind dependency thesis. Logical expressions are analytic a priori due to the containment relation. Mathematical expressions are synthetic a priori since the mind synthesizes two distinct concepts. Similarly metaphysical expressions are also synthetic a priori because in metaphysics we also synthesize two distinct concepts. But since in the *Tractatus* language depicts the world, our expressions must correspond to facts in the world to convey real propositions.

Since Wittgenstein proposes his own realist metaphysics, Carnap is a better example of the rejection of metaphysics. Carnap claims that we adopt a semantic system to deal with facts out there. A semantic system as a tool also has its own truths. So-called metaphysical questions are actually about the semantic system. For example, to deal with pain a scientist uses a scientific language in the first place. When you ask what pain is she just gives you the definition from her system. This would make the question trivial. Similarly, a poet or someone in the street answers you by appealing to her own semantic system. However, philosophers are perennially asking such questions without constraining themselves in a certain semantic system. As a consequence they never have any success with their answers. Carnap claims that this has been the fundamental mistake of philosophy through the ages. His solution is to relativize so-called metaphysical questions to semantic systems.

[... W]e must distinguish the external question of the reality of the thing world itself. [...] This question is raised [...] only by philosophers. Realists give an affirmative answer, subjective idealists a negative one, and the controversy [...] cannot be solved because it is framed in a wrong way. To be real in the scientific sense means to

6 Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus*, 6.2–6.21.

be an element of the system; hence this concept cannot be meaningfully applied to the system itself. Those who raise the question of the reality of the thing world itself have perhaps in mind not a theoretical question as their formulation seems to suggest, but rather a practical question, a matter of a practical decision concerning the structure of our language. We have to make the choice whether or not to accept and use the forms of expression in the framework in question.⁷

So questions like whether the world is four-dimensional or three-dimensional, the nature of mental states, modality, and the existence of numbers, etc. are given within the system. This means that we don't need to think about them. Instead, we can just look at our arbitrary decisions or conventions. Metaphysics is nothing but arbitrary decisions and conventions.

This solution seems charming when we consider the harmful effect of metaphysics through the ages. The nature of reality, why-questions, substrata, the ontological structure of the world, the fundamental nature of the mental and many others are pseudo-questions of metaphysics. They are not real problems according to Carnap. These questions arise from our confusion of facts and conventions. He says that there are two kinds of truths: language determinate truths and language indeterminate truths. Language-determinate-truths (L-truths) are the truths about the adopted semantic system. Language-indeterminate-truths are the factual truths whose truth value cannot be assigned merely by looking at the semantic system adopted. Language-indeterminate-truths are revisable given factual reasons. For example, the truth value of the sentence "there are five objects on the table" can be revised on the basis of facts out there. But classification of the entities as objects can be revised given pragmatic reasons. "If certain events allegedly observed in spiritualistic séances, e.g., a ball moving out of a sealed box, were confirmed beyond any reasonable doubt, it might seem advisable to use [the conventional device of] four spatial coordi-

7 Rudolf Carnap, "Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology," in *The Philosophy of Science*, ed. Richard Boyd, Philip Gasper and J. D. Trout (Mit Press, 1991), 86.

nates [instead of the customary three].”^{8,9} This means that L-truths cannot be revised due to facts.

Quine in his paper “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” claims that his approach is more pragmatic than Carnap’s. The aim of Quine is to show that there is no way to justify Carnap’s L-truths. If one would appeal to definitions, modality, and semantic rules to justify them she wouldn’t be able to avoid circularity. So there is no way to justify analyticity or Carnap’s L-truths. This means that logical positivists’ distinctions such as the distinctions between scheme-content, analytic-synthetic, language-determinate/language-indeterminate truths are untenable.

What follows from this claim? Does Quine propose that all claims are synthetic? No, Quine’s view is more complex than this. He proposes a holistic model in place of the logical positivists’ scheme/content distinction. We have a holistic model of the world. Propositions based on that model are justified within the system.

However, there is still a similarity between the logical positivists’ scheme-content model and Quine’s holistic model. Quine’s holism is a center-periphery model. Propositions at the center are less subject to revision while propositions at the periphery are more likely to be revised. Propositions of mathematics, logic, and adopted semantic systems take place at the center while propositions conveyed by observation statements take place at the periphery. Overall revisability is not something distinctive to Quine. For Carnap, too, all propositions are revisable. The difference is that for Carnap some propositions can be revised due to pragmatic reasons and others due to factual reason.

Quine shows [...] that [for] a scientist [...] no statement is immune to revision, not even the statements of logic and of mathematics. There are only practical differences, and these are differences in degree [...]. With all this I am entirely in agreement. But I cannot follow Quine when he infers from this fact that it becomes folly to seek a boundary between synthetic and analytic statements. I agree that “any statement can be held true come what may”. But the concept of an analytic statement which I take as an explicandum is not

8 Gila Sher, “Is there a place for philosophy in Quine’s theory?,” *Journal of Philosophy* 96 (10):497.

9 Carnap, “Empiricism Semantic Ontology,” 6.

adequately characterized as “held true come what may”. First of all, I should make a distinction [...] between a change in the language, and a mere change in or addition of, a truth-value ascribed to an indeterminate statement [...]. A change of the first kind constitutes a radical alteration [...], and it occurs only at certain historically decisive points in the development of science. On the other hand, changes of the second kind occur every minute. A change of the first kind constitutes, strictly speaking, a transition from a language L_n to a new language L_{n+1} . My concept of analyticity as an explicandum has nothing to do with such a transition.¹⁰

Nevertheless, for Quine, I think, all propositions are revisable due to pragmatic reasons. There are not two different kinds of revision, there is only pragmatic revision. I think this is a necessary conclusion of a holistic system. In a holistic system revision must be done due to pragmatic reasons.

Quine’s philosophy leads to the revival of metaphysics in analytical philosophy. Philosophers started to work on the nature of reality, objecthood, three/four dimensionality. Unlike the logical positivist program, metaphysics plays an important role in today’s analytical philosophy.

Theodor Sider is a good example of a metaphysician in analytical philosophy. He says “metaphysics, at bottom, is about the fundamental structure of reality.”¹¹ He continues, “no one other than a positivist can make all the hard questions evaporate. If nothing else, the choice of what notions are fundamental remains. There’s no detour around the entirety of fundamental metaphysics.”¹² Sider in his works tries to solve metaphysical problems. He is not interested in mere conceptual analysis but in discovering the metaphysical truths.¹³ As I said, with the collapse of logical positivism due to Quine’s criticism, metaphysics revived. In this respect we can agree that Quine and Sider are on the same side.

10 Rudolf Carnap, “WV Quine on Logical Truth,” in *The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap*, ed. P.A. Schlipp (La Salle: Open Court, 1963), 920.

11 Theodore Sider, *Writing the Book of the World* (Oxford: Clarendon, 2011), 1.

12 Theodore Sider, “Ontological Realism,” in *Metametaphysics new essays on the foundations of ontology*, ed. David J. Chalmers et al. (Oxford: Clarendon, 2009), 420.

13 Sider, *Writing the Book of the World*, 1.

What is the structure that Sider is interested in? Structure is the joints of reality. Apart from its medieval roots in the realism/nominalism debate on universals, a new debate introduced to the literature by Nelson Goodman. Goodman, contrary to the metaphysicians, claims that there is no ready-made structure out there.¹⁴ Instead we make structures. We might apply the predicate “green” to the world, but in another culture people can apply the predicate “grue”, which means green until time t , blue after that time. Goodman says grue’s translatability in terms of green doesn’t make green primitive because green can be translated in terms of grue too. For Goodman it is a matter of choice.¹⁵ However, Sider says it is not a matter of choice. The world has an objective structure. We can find out which predicate is more primitive. Similarly, “two cows” might seem more primitive than “two cows or one electron” because one contains *or* while the other doesn’t. However, if we name “two cows or one electron” as A and “two cows or not one electron” as B, then we can rewrite “two cows” as “A or B”.

Sider, following David Armstrong’s theory of universals and David Lewis’ naturalness constraint proposes that the notion of objective structure solves Goodman’s problem. In a sense, Sider’s point here is motivated by Quine’s criticism of logical positivism. It seems that Sider’s criticism of Goodman is analogous to Quine’s criticism of Carnap. Carnap says ontological questions are a matter of choice. Similarly Goodman says the choice between green and grue is up to us. However, the analogy is misleading because it says nothing about the content-scheme relation in Goodman’s philosophy. I will touch on that issue later.

So for Sider, “fundamentality is a matter of structure: the fundamental facts are those cast in terms that carve at the joints. The truly central question of metaphysics is that of what is most fundamental. So in my terms, we must ask which notions carve perfectly at the joints”.¹⁶ He says that while the opponents of metaphysics think that metaphysical questions are like “the question of whether the pope is

14 Nelson Goodman, *Ways of Worldmaking* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1978), 1–5.

15 Nelson Goodman, *Fact Fiction and Forecast* (Cambridge: Harvard, 1983), 96–98.

16 Sider, *Writing the Book of the World*, 5.

a bachelor”, metaphysical questions are, indeed, similar to the questions of physics, or chemistry.¹⁷

Now, does Sider follow Quine’s criticism of Carnap? Does Quine say that questions of ontology are not matter of choice but about facts out there? His answer is as follows:

Ontological questions, under this view, are on a par with questions of natural science. Consider the question whether to countenance classes as entities. This, as I have argued elsewhere, is the question whether to quantify with respect to variables which take classes as values. Now Carnap has maintained that this is a question not of matters of fact but of choosing a convenient language form, a convenient conceptual scheme or framework for science. With this I agree, but only on the proviso that the same be conceded regarding scientific hypotheses generally.¹⁸

I can rewrite the sentence through some healthy substitution:

With this I agree, but only on the proviso that the same be conceded regarding scientific hypotheses generally.

Here is the substituted version.

With (this) *Carnap’s pragmatism on philosophical questions* I agree, but only on the proviso that (the same) *this pragmatic approach which Carnap considers for metaphysical questions* be conceded regarding (scientific hypotheses generally) *science too*.

It means that Quine doesn’t mean to treat metaphysical questions as you treat scientific questions. Instead, he advises treating scientific questions as you treat metaphysical questions. Elsewhere, he says that

Carnap has long held that the questions of philosophy, when real at all, are questions of language [...]. [...] He holds that [...] philosophical questions are only apparently about sort of objects and are really pragmatic questions of language policy. But why should this be true of the philosophical questions and not of theoretical questions generally? Such a distinction of status is of a piece with the notion of analyticity, and as little to be trusted. After all, theoretic-

17 Ibid, 6.

18 W.V.O. Quine, *From a Logical Point of View* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), 45.

cal sentences in general are defensible only pragmatically; we can but assess the structural merits of the theory which embraces them along with sentences directly conditioned to multifarious stimulations. How then can Carnap draw a line across this theoretical part and hold that the sentences this side of the line enjoy non-verbal content or meaning in a way that those beyond the line do not? His own appeal to convenience of linguistic frameworks allows pragmatic connections across the line.¹⁹

Here he broadens the logical positivist notion of conceptual scheme to include all sorts of propositions. He doesn't limit it to metaphysical and ontological questions. So he doesn't mean that metaphysical questions are not about convenient conceptual schemes when he says that metaphysical questions are on par with scientific questions. Instead, he says scientific questions are also a matter of choosing a convenient conceptual scheme. That is how the outcome of Quine's position is "a blurring of the supposed boundary between speculative metaphysics and natural science."²⁰ This blurring as I said above is not a shift toward metaphysical realism but toward pragmatism. He says "in repudiating such a boundary I espouse a more thorough pragmatism."²¹ To note, I am aware of that my point here is far from the orthodox interpretation of Quine. However, I am not the only one at this camp. I think Huw Price's and Scott Soames' interpretation of Quine-Carnap debate is similar to my point here.^{22,23} This doesn't mean that Quine is not a realist. He is a realist for sure. But his realism is not a metaphysical one. Quine's notion of reality and Sider's notion of reality are completely different. In this part I will show that Quine's notion of reality is humanistic while Sider's notion of reality is anti-humanistic.

19 W.V.O. Quine, *Word and Object* (Cambridge: MIT, 1960), 271.

20 Quine, *From a Logical Point of View*, 20.

21 Ibid, 46.

22 Huw Price, "Metaphysics after Carnap The Ghost Who Walks," in *Metametaphysics New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology*, ed. David Chalmers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2009).

23 See Scott Soames, "Ontology, Analyticity and Meaning: The Quine-Carnap Dispute," in *Metametaphysics New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology*, ed. David Chalmers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2009).

Sider many times proclaims that he is not interested in anything humanistic. Conceptual schemes, conventions, choices are not what he is seeking. He is interested in the reality which is completely independent of our conceptualizations, conventions and choices.²⁴ So, in no way is the reality Sider is working on related to us. Aside from our culture, life form, and language even the biological facts about our species have nothing to do with the reality he seeks. When Sider claims that reality consists of A's and B's, he holds that such a classification has nothing to do with our categorizations through a million years of evolution.

However, Quine's notion of reality is not like that. It is humanistic. He says that the notion of reality is a human contribution. "Even the notion of a cat, let alone a class or number, is a human artifact rooted in innate predisposition and cultural tradition. The very notion of object at all, concrete or abstract, is a human contribution, a feature of our inherited apparatus for organizing the amorphous welter of neural input."²⁵

I don't think that Sider's notion of objecthood would be consistent with this claim. Sider's notion of reality is independent of our conceptual schemes, cultures, and neurological structures. What is more interesting is that Quine's realism is more akin to logical positivism, as he says "to ask what reality is really like, however, apart from human categories, is self-stultifying. It is like asking how long the Nile really is, apart from parochial matters of miles or meters. Positivists were right in branding such metaphysics as meaningless."²⁶

As I said above, Quine's blurring of the distinction between metaphysics and science shouldn't be interpreted as if Quine was saying that not only scientific questions but also ontological and

24 Cf. "I am after the truth about what there is, what the world is really like. So, I do not want merely to describe anyone's conceptual scheme, not even if that scheme was thrust upon us by evolution. Nor am I trying to read off an ontology from the pages of the latest physics journals. Even the quickest scan through this book will make it clear that the reasons I provide for my conclusions are largely a priori... Let's not kid ourselves: metaphysics is highly speculative." Sider, *Four Dimensionalism* (Oxford: Clarendon, 2001), xv.

25 W.V.O. Quine, "Structure and Nature," *Journal of Philosophy* 89 (1):6.

26 Ibid, 9.

metaphysical questions are independent of our conceptual schemes. Instead, he says that not only ontological and metaphysical questions but also scientific claims depend on our conceptual schemes. Today's culture might be better for pragmatic reasons but it is still *culture*.

As an empiricist I continue to think of the conceptual scheme of science as a tool, ultimately, for predicting future experience in the light of past experience. Physical objects are conceptually imported into the situation as convenient intermediaries [...] simply as irreducible posits comparable, epistemologically, to the gods of Homer. For my part I do, qua lay physicist, believe in physical objects [...]; and I consider it a scientific error to believe otherwise. But [...] the physical objects and the gods differ only in degree and not in kind. Both sorts of entities enter our conception only as cultural posit.²⁷

Atoms, molecules, neurons, quarks are all cultural posits of our culture just as gods are the cultural posit of another culture. Quine doesn't make a sharp ontology-epistemology distinction here. He doesn't say that there is a reality apart from our cultural posits. Cultural posits are not something inferior to what is real. Instead, as he says, "to call a posit a posit is not to patronize it".²⁸ By calling gods, atoms, and molecules posits we do not patronize them. And we do not distinguish them from reality. He explains this in the following words.

Must we then conclude that true reality is beyond our ken? No, that would be to forsake naturalism. Rather, the notion of reality is itself part of the apparatus; and sticks, stones, atoms, quarks, numbers, and classes all are utterly real denizens of an ultimate real world, except insofar as our present science may prove false on further testing."²⁹

Therefore, for Quine the notion of reality is humanistic. Atoms, gods, objects, etc. are nothing but cultural posits. So reality consists of cultural posits.

27 Quine, *From a Logical Point of View*, 44.

28 Quine, *Word and Object*, 22.

29 W.V.O. Quine, "Naturalism; or Living Within One's Means," *Dialectica*, 49, 2-4 (1995), 260.

The main difference between Sider and Quine is their method of being a scientific philosopher. For Quine, it is empirical work on ordinary language; for Sider it is a priori speculative work.

Quine considers philosophy to be in the same boat with science.³⁰ So our approach to meaning must be naturalistic. What I understand by naturalism is starting from observations in the case of meaning about how a term is used. Similarly a physicist uses all the relevant observations for her research. A social scientist observes a society and derives conclusions from her observations. For Quine, philosophers should appeal to observations relevant to their subject. To understand what meaning is, we have to make relevant observations and not just any observations. For example, observing the street or observing the motion of a certain object is irrelevant when it comes to understand meaning. Similarly, chemistry, physics, biology, sociology, and psychology all have their own distinct observations. To understand meaning we should observe language. How can we observe language? We can observe behaviours, sounds, etc. "When a naturalistic philosopher addresses himself to the philosophy of mind, he is apt to talk of language. Meanings are, first and foremost, meanings of language."³¹ However, philosophers for two thousand years have been working on serious theoretical issues instead of working on practical issues. To understand the meaning of 'existence', 'truth', 'experience', 'mind' and many other fundamental items that philosophers have been working on; they are not interested in observing language. Of course, an exception to that have been the "ordinary language philosophers." But their influence is decreasing. Even today, many philosophers are following the classical tradition. For example, as we said above, Sider claims that his metaphysics is "largely a priori."³² However, Quine's naturalism wants not only science but also philosophy to appeal to observations.³³ Let me elaborate this Quine-Sider comparison in terms of

30 W.V.O. Quine, "Natural Kinds", *Ontological Relativity and Other Papers*, in ed. W.V.O. Quine (New York: Columbia University, 1969), 126–127.

31 W.V.O. Quine, "Ontological Relativity," *Ontological Relativity and Other Papers*, in ed. W.V.O. Quine (New York: Columbia University, 1969), 26.

32 Sider, *Four Dimensionalism*, xiv.

33 "When a naturalistic philosopher addresses himself to the philosophy of mind, he is apt to talk of language." Quine, *Ontological Relativity and other essays*, 26.

methodology. First of all, I am aware that Sider is also a naturalist in one sense. He doesn't appeal to supernatural beings. He appeals to natural sciences. In this sense Sider is one of the most prominent naturalists. However, by naturalism what I mean is the methodology we follow when we do *our job*.

Naturalism as I understand it is about how we do our job, not about what we defend. As I see it, defending naturalism and being a naturalist are quite different things, just as defending democracy and being a democratic are two different things. One might defend democracy in antidemocratic ways. Suppose a revolutionary politician is trying to introduce democracy to a kingdom. Usually in those kinds of events she would not use any democratic method to establish democracy. Instead, she would revolt against the monarch. Similarly, consider another example where a group of citizens are trying to protect democracy in non-democratic ways. Here I do not use democracy analogy to prove my point. Instead, with the democracy analogy I am trying to clarify what I mean by the distinction between advocating science and being scientific. To provide something more than an analogy, we can appeal to the distinction between methodological naturalism and ontological naturalism. What I mean by ontological naturalism is advocating science; what I mean by methodological naturalism is being scientific. Quine's naturalism is not ontological naturalism³⁴ according to which only physical objects exist, but methodological naturalism. Quine defines naturalism as "the recognition that it is within science itself, and not in some prior philosophy, that reality is to be identified and described."³⁵ So, Quine thinks that it is not up to some prior philosophy to give the picture of reality. He implies that even if the picture given by some prior philosophy defends science, it would still be anti-naturalist. The quotation above might seem too weak to ground such a claim. But later in the same book Quine provides a better definition of naturalism: "abandonment of the goal of a first philosophy. It sees natural science as an inquiry into reality, fallible and corrigible but not answerable to any supra-scientific

34 See Gilbert Harman, Ernest LePore. ed., *A Companion to W.V.O. Quine* (Oxford, Wiley Blackwell), 114–147.

35 W.V.O. Quine, *Theories and Things* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 21.

tribunal, and not in need of any justification beyond observation and the hypothetico-deductive method.”³⁶ Here, Quine’s naturalism does not imply a metaphysical, armchair defence of science, instead it assimilates epistemology to “empirical psychology”.³⁷ As “science itself tells us that our information about the world is limited to irritations of our surfaces”, the naturalist philosopher (epistemologist) works on “the question how we human animals can have managed to arrive at science from such limited information.”³⁸ Quine’s naturalism does not rule out a scientific study of our evolution and our concept of reality. This is an important point because a metaphysical defence of physics and its posits might not allow us to study the relation between *Homo sapiens* and their sciences but methodological naturalism does allow us to do this.

Science tells us that our only source of information about the external world is through the impact of light rays and molecules upon our sensory surfaces. Stimulated in these ways, we somehow evolve an elaborate and useful science. How do we do this, and why does the resulting science work so well? These are genuine questions, no feigning of doubt is needed to appreciate them. They are scientific questions about a species of primates, and they are open to investigation in natural science, the very science whose acquisition is investigated.³⁹

There is a very important point in this quotation. What is most fundamental here is the scientific method; we can investigate or doubt science, but only by appeal to the scientific method. There is no circularity here once one grasp the epistemology/ontology distinction above.

To conclude, for sure both Sider and Quine are motivated by science. They are knowledgeable in science. They do not believe in ghosts, or spirits. But there are crucial distinctions when it comes to their epistemological views. Epistemologically, Quine is the enemy of the absolute. He calls our body of scientific knowledge “myth” and for him the epistemological superiority of one myth to another

36 Quine, *Theories and Things*, 72.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.

39 Samuel D. Guttenplan, ed., *Mind and Language* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 258.

is only due to pragmatic reasons. For Sider, metaphysics is about the absolute. It is about the fundamental structure of reality. Within that field nothing is pragmatic but all is metaphysical.

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7

The Overlaps between (Proper) Philosophy and (Actual) Science

Serdal Tümkaya

There are many overlaps between actual science and the best examples of philosophical theorizing. Herein, I argue that the following overlaps in fact do exist and that their existence is good but that their absence is harmful to the success and reputation of philosophical investigation: (i) both of their theories are, or could be, formulated in a testable form; (ii) there should be an easy exchange between them instead of an icy isolation; (iii) both of their theories are full of practical assumptions and background beliefs in addition to explicitly stated propositions or arguments; (iv) both of their theories are full of simplifications, abstractions, and idealizations; (v) both of them are heterogeneous in their methods, subject-matters, and the degree of evidence; (vi) systematic reasoning is *the most basic character* of the best examples of both perspectives.



I. Introduction

Geoffrey Warnock excellently characterizes the nature of *proper* philosophy: “To be clear-headed rather than confused; lucid rather than obscure; rational rather than otherwise; and to be neither more, nor less, sure of things than is justifiable by argument or evidence. That is worth trying for”.¹ The phrase in the main title of this paper refers to that kind of philosophy. *Actual* science refers to all the best examples of the practices of scientists regardless of the subject-matter and techniques used. Thus, here lies the relationship between these two branches of knowledge.² Think about the most interesting philosophical questions posed throughout history. Almost all of them have been about the world; living beings as one of the significant parts of it. Now think about scientific problems. Their primary focus is on the world as well. That is the basic overlap between philosophy and science. This overlap, I call *thematic overlap*. Another overlap is that both of them employ *systematic* reasoning. My overarching purpose throughout this work is to attack the widespread presumption, in academic philosophy, that there is a categorical distinction between philosophy and science and that it is good for philosophy. One might ask whether these general similarities are superficial. Here I argue that these apparent similarities are genuine and *very* significant for philosophical practice. In the first section of this paper, I explain what I precisely mean by philosophical naturalism and the thematic overlap. In the second, I discuss whether philosophical reasoning is actually *systematic*. In the third, I try to capture the current variety of sciences. Following this, I turn to discuss the proper role of philosophy in science and continue on to explain the homonymy fallacy. In the last section (prior to the conclusion) I argue that these similarities are the grounding of the need for a truly *naturalistic* philosophy.

1 Quoted by Shand, see John Shand, *Arguing Well* (New York: Routledge, 2001), v.

2 Hereafter, unless otherwise indicated, I use the short terms for both phrases, philosophy and science, not the long ones, respectively proper philosophy and actual science.

II. Philosophical Naturalism

One of the too many definitions of philosophical naturalism, to which I am most close, says that “philosophy is continuous with science”. This continuity is the continuity of the methods, subject-matters, precision, evidence types, objectivity, fact relevancy, aim, scope, mission, and generality. Firstly in this section, I briefly sketch the frequently ignored subtleties of the arguments of the most influential naturalists of the last century. Secondly, I turn to the discussion of the word “naturalism” and its misperceptions. The latter part of this section is devoted to a discussion of the meaning of being systematic, both for sciences and philosophy.

Quine, a half-century ago, argued powerfully against any kind of metaphysics for science. I fully agree with him in the following quotation:

I see philosophy not as an a priori propaedeutic or groundwork for science, but as continuous with science. I see philosophy and science as in the same boat – a boat which, to revert to Neurath’s figure as I so often do, we can rebuild only at sea while staying afloat in it. There is no external vantage point, no first philosophy. All scientific findings, all scientific conjectures that are at present plausible, are therefore in my view as welcome for use in philosophy as elsewhere.³

Quine, as one of the most pronounced naturalist philosophers of the last century,⁴ claims that in philosophy we should welcome all plausible *scientific* conjectures. But what is a scientific conjecture? For the former question, it can be roughly said that if a conjecture is made by the ways exhibiting the methods of science, then it is scientific. But what are the methods of science? For starters, I believe

3 Quine, W. V. O., “Natural Kinds,” in *Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel*, edited by Nicholas Rescher, 5–23 (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1969), 14.

4 Philosophical naturalism is an umbrella term. Under that umbrella, there are numerous similar yet distinct theories. Though Quine is one of the most famous of all naturalists, in fact, the subsequent philosophers are much more radical and scientifically informed. For a ruthlessly reductive naturalism, see e.g. the first and third chapters of: John Bickle, *Philosophy and Neuroscience: A Ruthlessly Reductive Account* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003). John Bickle argues that all the philosophical theorizing on the nature and structure of sciences must be guided by the actual practices of the relevant sciences. I largely agree with his claim.

that the word ‘science’ should include natural, behavioral, and social sciences.⁵ Confining the word ‘science’⁶ to natural sciences would be a destructive error.^{7,8} We should not restrain ourselves with the connotations of the word ‘science’ and ‘nature’. Since the courses typically titled “science” in many English-speaking countries are

5 Though this idea seems highly controversial, and indeed it is, in fact it has been defended by many philosophers of science such as Dewey and E. Nagel (cf. Matthew J. Brown, “John Dewey’s Logic of Science,” *HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science*, 2012 (2): 258–306.) or explicitly assumed by some others (cf. Carl G. Hempel, *Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science* (New York: The Free Press, 1970), section 7. This section was originally published in 1952.) More recent ones are abound in naturalistic philosophy of science and sociology of science (see e.g. Knorr Cetina in Werner Callebaut ed., *Taking the Naturalistic Turn, Or, How Real Philosophy of Science Is Done* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993.) Cf. also W. V. O. Quine, *Quintessence: Basic Readings from the Philosophy of W. V. Quine*, edited by Jr. Roger F. Gibson (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004), 275; David Papineau, *Philosophical Naturalism* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 1993), 2; Mario DeCaro and David Macarthur, “Introduction: Science, Naturalism, and the Problem of Normativity,” in *Naturalism and Normativity* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 9.

6 Unfortunately, there is a great problem with this word and its Western connotations. Western school systems typically teach physics, chemistry, and biology under the heading of ‘science’. This might be one of the major reasons people intuitively are resistant to my usage of the word. But we cannot make philosophical theorizing by confining ourselves to the names of the courses taught in primary or secondary schools. On the other hand, I should also add that for example in my native language, *Turkish*, the heading of the analogous courses in primary and secondary schools is ‘fen’. Here is a rough translation of the (*Turkish*) dictionary definition of that word into *English*: “the common name for physics, chemistry, and biology” (“Fen” 2016). However, we also have the word ‘bilim’, which is the most usual translation for the *English* word ‘science’. That is we have two distinct but frequently inter-changeably used words in *Turkish* for the word ‘science’: fen versus bilim. The former is limited to the natural sciences but the latter is much broader.

7 Cf. “In embracing a relaxed naturalism, philosophy can cooperate in a reciprocal fashion not only with the natural sciences but also the arts, humanities, social sciences and other fields.” Daniel D. Hutto, “21st Century Philosophy: In Crisis or New Beginning?”, https://www.academia.edu/19875314/21st_Century_Philosophy_In_Crisis_or_New_Beginning.

8 See this chapter for an extensive discussion of the negative sides of confining science to natural sciences: Paul K. Moser and David Yandell, “Farewell to Philosophical Naturalism,” in *Naturalism a Critical Analysis* (New York: Routledge, 2001), 3–23.

confined to the teaching of physics, chemistry, and biology, most people automatically assume that science is the general name for these natural sciences. Commonsensical usage should not be the drive of our argumentation here. What is important for the argument in this paper is what is meant by science in the philosophical debate on the scope of science. In fact, it is much too ambiguous. It would be wise to elaborate on what I assume to be science, and what is not, to explore the overlaps between philosophy and science.

Objectivity, in the broadest sense, is at the heart of any scientific investigation. I believe that trying to define the necessary and sufficient conditions of this concept is futile. However, some general properties of the concept can be made explicit. First, by objectivity I mean inter-subjectivity, at least. That is, there should be a possibility of strong and community-specific agreement. Thus, the absolute, or Platonic, form of external objectivity is not my concern. It is an ontological issue, to which I attribute no significance. I am rather interested in epistemological inter-subjectivity. The subject of how a particular scientific community reaches an agreement, though a very important topic, is beyond the scope of this paper. I confine myself to saying that in practice, the degree of the agreement within a scientific community varies across the dimensions of subject-matter, geographical location, and time. Nonetheless, we cannot talk about a scientific activity in which there is no possibility of a considerable amount of agreement. In the last edifice, the most critical characteristic of science is “its institutional error-eliminating filters”.⁹ By this way comes agreement.

Then, by defining science in this broader way, it becomes clear that since these sciences have somehow highly different techniques and hugely varying levels-of-certainty in evidence, there is nothing intrinsic and time-independent (i.e. eternal) to scientific method. Different sciences use different methods in gathering evidence and different styles of reasoning. Yet, in whatever fashion, these styles of reasoning are *systematic*. So is philosophical investigation's. There are several philosophical methods such as analytic or hermeneutic.

9 Don Ross, James Ladyman and David Spurrett, “In Defense of Scientism,” in *Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 28–29.

Yet philosophical thinking is *methodical*. Surely, the method is not the same as the methods of empirical sciences. In fact, most philosophers, let alone doing experimental work themselves, do not even *regularly* read the review papers of the experimental sciences. Daniel Nolan nicely sketches the current situation of mainstream Anglo-American analytical philosophers by stating:

Among the a posteriori activities done in the armchair are assembling and evaluating commonplaces; formulating theoretical alternatives; and integrating well-known past a posteriori discoveries. [...] Observe many philosophers at work, and you will see them sit and think, and then write. Philosophers do many other things as well when they research—they talk to each other, they read things others have written after sitting and thinking, and so on. But most of them can rarely be found in a laboratory, nor can they be found out on the streets with surveys. Furthermore, in most cases, they are not regularly reading lab reports or survey results in order to inform their theorizing. Many philosophers give at least the appearance of being cut off from scientific evidence-gathering.¹⁰

This description greatly fits the actual mainstream philosophical theorizing, but not the practice of highly naturalist philosophers such as the Churchlands, Bickle, Bechtel, Ross, Spurrett, or Wimsatt. As the above passage shows, despite that most philosophical practice has nothing to do with the actual practices of the empirical sciences, they should nevertheless be regarded as systematic since they include the following: formulating, integrating, judging, classifying, using conceptual analysis, and giving clarification. All six of these regular philosophical activities are conducted according to well-established criteria. By well-established criteria, I mean the following: your arguments should be inferentially valid, they should also be sound and they should hold importance, at least to other philosophers. I think that is the core set of criteria for a *proper* philosophy: sound argumentation, importance, systematic reasoning, clarity, rationality, and evidence-based justification. The welcoming point is that all of them are also among the basic characteristics of *actual* science. Concerning such a broad level of analysis, philoso-

¹⁰ Daniel Nolan, "The A Posteriori Armchair," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 2014 (2): 211.

phy and science are on an equal footing. All these properties can be grouped under the name of *ordered thinking*. Ordered thinking requires systematic reasoning, which excludes sham reasoning.¹¹

Generally we do not see disordered thinking as an example of good philosophy. Typically a philosopher strives for coherence. Thus, (academic) philosophy is systematic.¹² Non-systematic philosophy is academically not desirable because philosophy is the love for truth so it must be committed to intellectual vigor and honesty. Philosophical reasoning shall not be sham reasoning. Rigorous reasoning is at the very heart of philosophical theorizing. Each of us might be holding conflicting theories of truth and justification. We might be using different methods in analyzing. However, we are all in the pursuit of truth in this sense or in another. Our ways of justifying our philosophical claims might be influenced by the society or might otherwise involve a subjective component. But it is the same with sciences. I am absolutely not trying to argue for the patently false claim that actual or ideal philosophical theorizing is the *same* as the actual or ideal scientific practice. They are surely not *identical*. But we do not have to claim that they are identical to maintain that there are no *categorical* differences between their scopes, levels of generality, or methods. By categorical difference, I mean those differences which are absolute, unconditional and unqualified like a law given by the pure reason. Those kinds of a categorical differences I deny categorically. The most important problem with accepting a categorical difference between philosophy and science is that it blocks the huge benefits that philosophical theoriz-

11 see e.g., Haack, 1998, chap. 2, for Peirce's emphasis on the exclusion of sham reasoning from philosophy

12 One of my teachers at METU asked the following question: if you are right, does it mean that we can *objectively* reconstruct the arguments of great philosophers to the extent that most of us could agree upon that reconstruction? Indeed this is an excellent question because if the answer is mostly negative, then the main thesis of this paper becomes highly dubious. However, my answer to that question is affirmative in the broadest sense. But I am excluding some highly ambiguous philosophical works such as Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* (to see the harsh critique of Frege against the manuscript of *Tractatus* see, Frege 2011, esp. the letters from 1918 to 1920). But we can find similar problems among the life scientists. That kind of examples will be given later in the paper. For the question above, I greatly appreciate Tahir Kocayigit of METU Department of Philosophy.

ing could gain from the findings, concepts, and methods of science. The claim that there is no categorical difference does not entail that there are no practical differences in degree. Of course there are. And some differences in degree indeed might be huge. The point is that sometimes differences between science and philosophy become narrower than the differences within and among the sciences themselves in terms of precision or methods of justification. Then, what is the benefit of maintaining the claim that “science and philosophy are categorically or by their nature different”? Intuitively one might oppose by saying “but science is much more systematic”. Here it would be unnecessary to argue that scientific reasoning is systematic. It is almost a truism. The problem is with characterizing the various forms that systematic thinking does/could take. (We can see differences even among the branches of physics itself: cosmology, astrophysics, engineering mechanics, mathematical physics, or quantum theory). Below I offer a discussion on the various forms of being systematic.

III. What is Science? What is not Science?

There are too many inter-related or distinct meanings of the word science. Many philosophers believe that the extension of the concept of science is limited to natural sciences. For a moment, let us accept that. Then what is the extension of the word *science*? Are they physics, chemistry, and biology? But what is biology: the science of life? But what is life: the living things, organic things, thus also the consciousness? This questioning might seem to be red herring. However, since it cannot be said that each and all philosophers are using the word in the same or in a similar way, we need to pose this question. Let me elaborate on the so-called characteristics of science. Maybe I can list the following characteristics which frequently come to mind when people are talking about science: generalizability of facts expressed in law or law-like statements, methodical study implying that the methods which have been used are trustworthy,¹³

13 The existence of trustworthy methods might be regarded as *the most important* criteria for claiming a branch of knowledge to be science. (Thanks to Berk Yaylım, of METU, for pointing out this point to me.) Indeed, even for Charles Peirce, Frege, and the others truth is something like a product of a reliable method. Since

inter-subjectivity or otherwise objectivity, factuality, observation, falsifiability, productivity, connected body of facts or demonstrated truths, systematic classification, clearly defined technical terms, attempts to represent the existing reality, value-free thinking, all accepted truths are subject to revision in principle, exclusion of theological, teleological, metaphysical, and supernatural explanations or concerns, not contaminated by subjectivity, rational skepticism, respect for evidence, objectivity, and quantitative thinking.¹⁴ Indeed, this list is too long to carefully check all the criteria in order to decide whether all of the so-called sciences meet them. But this difficulty should not stop us to make the necessary explorations. Let me start with biology. I will take one of the most closely associated branches of biology to chemistry, namely molecular genetics. I have chosen this discipline because it seems sufficiently similar to chemistry, of which (natural) scientific status is not questioned by most of the philosophers. Now think about, for example, evolutionary biology. We can immediately see the natural-science-like characteristics of molecular genetics. For example, its subject-matter are genes. These genes can be duplicated artificially by researchers. Genes are physical objects, though some define them as functional units (but functional units are also realized in physical molecules). It is an experimental discipline using very advanced techniques and involves complicated mathematics. There are observed and inter-connected facts in molecular genetics. There is nothing theological, teleological, metaphysical, or supernatural in it. Gene types are systematically classified. All these characteristics suggest that molecular genetics satisfy almost all criteria for being a real science. Furthermore, as easily understood from above, it is highly similar to chemistry, which is indubitably a hard natural science.

On the other hand, we have evolutionary biology or psychology. Some topics of the former are experimentally un-testable, especially the historically unique ones such as the original formation of *Homo sapiens* as a species. For the latter, things are even worse. Even some

these philosophers believed that “the goal of sciences is truth” (Gottlob Frege, “The Thought: A Logical Inquiry,” *Mind* 65 (1956): 289.), science is implicitly equated with having trustworthy method.

14 For the last four properties see P. E. Meehl, “Philosophy of Science – Help or Hindrance,” *Psychological Reports*, 1993 (3): 707–33.

biologists claim that it is just a little more than story-telling.¹⁵ The moral of this is that, even within well-established sciences, not all scientists could agree on whether some theory or method is scientific or just a story. But yet we reasonably talk about evolutionary biology or psychology as scientific disciplines because we rightly assume that “if it is really false, it will turn out to be false in virtue of institutional error-eliminating filters of the scientific community”. In other words, we believe in the institutional structure and intellectual honesty of scientific practice (compared to other ways of knowing). And also we should be able to believe in the institutional structure of philosophy to attain the truth. Otherwise, philosophy becomes worthless. I fully agree with Bernard Williams in claiming: “Quite certainly, no philosophy which is to be worthwhile should lose the sense that there is something to be got right, that it is answerable to argument and that it is in the business of telling the truth”.¹⁶ Williams adds that the task is not to imitate science but cultivating the same intellectual virtues that both philosophy and science share. This is exactly the core of my approach to the relation of, and the overlaps between, worthwhile philosophy and actual science.

Certainly there are significant methodological differences within, and among, scientific disciplines. An obvious question immediately arises at this point: to which sciences is philosophy closer? In fact, there might not be a context-independent answer to this question since there are various ways of doing philosophy. For some philosophical subject-matters, philosophy might be closer to social sciences such as history, whereas for another it might be true for formal disciplines such as logic. To illustrate, what logical positivists were really close to, or aimed to imitate, are the methods of formal dis-

15 Just to mention a few out of many see Steven R. Quartz and Terrence J. Sejnowski, *Liars, Lovers, and Heroes: What the New Brain Science Reveals about How We Become Who We Are* (New York: Quill, 2003); or Richard Lewontin, “The Spandrels Of San Marco Revisited: An Interview With Richard C. Lewontin,” <https://evolution-institute.org/article/the-spandrels-of-san-marco-revisited-an-interview-with-richard-c-lewontin/>

16 Bernard Williams, “Contemporary Philosophy: A Second Look,” in *The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy*, edited by N. Bunnin and E. P. Tsui-James (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002), 24.

ciplines (e.g. modelled after mathematics). On the other hand, the 2000s style naturalistic philosophy of science (of biology especially) *resembles* to theoretical biology itself. Obviously, philosophical treatises on biology are usually highly general. But there are also many pieces of theoretical biological works that are interested in general questions such as Charles Darwin's great book *On the Origin of Species*. One might say that this book is, for example, full of empirical examples. Thus, it does not resemble to philosophical works. It might be so. The point is not the number of empirical examples found in the books, but the general character of the investigation. If the example changes from evolutionary biology to neuroscience, we can pay attention to the neurophilosopher Patricia Churchland:

The questions, whether asked by philosophers or by neuroscientists, are all part of the same general investigation, with some questions finding a natural home in both philosophy and neuroscience. In any case it is the same curiosity that bids them forth, and it is perhaps best to see them all simply as questions about the brain and the mind – or the mind-brain – rather than as questions for philosophy or for neuroscience or for psychology. Administrative distinctions have a purpose so far as providing office space and salaries is concerned, but they should not dictate methods or constitute impedimenta to easy exchange. This is not to deny that there are divisions of labor- indeed, within neuroscience itself there are divisions of labor- but it is to argue that such divisions neither imply nor justify radical differences in methodology.¹⁷

Churchland acknowledges the division of labor among academic disciplines. So do I. But she also argues that the division should not impede the easy exchange among them. To put the quotation above even more plainly, I state the following: there are differences, but not always radical; there are commonalities which are very important such as the same curiosity; the questions can be considered as the common-land of philosophy and science, thus, there is a thematic overlap; do not chase the formal labels but follow the questions; do not let any difference to dictate a pre-fixed method in philosophy and in science; attack the pre-established impedimenta in order to facilitate easy exchange; do not search for the justification

¹⁷ Patricia Smith Churchland, *Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1986), 2.

for seemingly radical differences between philosophy and science in the relative division of labor between them. In fact my summary is half-descriptive and half-prescriptive following Patricia Churchland herself. Now, let me focus on the prescriptive part of my paper. Below is my approach regarding the proper role of worthwhile philosophy in actual science.

IV. The Proper Role of Philosophy in Science

Perhaps what is said at the end of the section above is the real meaning of the claim that “philosophy is continuous with science”. But why do we need to be in an exchange with the scientific world as philosophers? Here is an excellent answer:

For neuroscientists, a sense of how to get a grip on the big questions and of the appropriate overarching framework with which to pursue hands-on research is essential—essential, that is, if neuroscientists are not to lose themselves, sinking blissfully into the sweet, teeming minutiae, or inching with manful dedication down a dead-end warren.¹⁸

The passage above expresses the potential benefits of philosophy to science, especially to neurosciences. Practicing scientists frequently tend to miss the big picture, which is occasionally decisive to having a good solution even to the smallest parts of the picture. Churchland asserts that philosophy has a potential to steer them away from some deadly cliffs. The passage below, on the other hand, strikingly pictures the repercussions of science-ignorant philosophy.

For philosophers, an understanding of what progress has been made in neuroscience is essential to sustain and constrain theories about such things as how representations relate to the world, whether representations are propositional in nature, how organisms learn, whether mental states are emergent with respect to brain states, whether conscious states are a single type of state, and so on. It is essential, that is, if philosophers are not to remain boxed within the narrow canyons of the commonsense conception of the world or to content themselves with heroically plumping up the pillows of decrepit dogma.¹⁹

¹⁸ Churchland, *Neurophilosophy*..., 3.

¹⁹ Churchland, *Neurophilosophy*..., 3.

In this way, both philosophy and science can gain benefit from co-operation. Scientifically uninformed philosophy might remain boxed in a decrepit dogma. Being non-dogmatic is one of the distinguishing marks of philosophical activity and also of science. But is there any scientifically-uninformed philosophy in the 2000s? If it is true that naturalism is “now *the* philosophical orthodoxy within Anglo-American analytic philosophy”,²⁰ then scientifically-uninformed philosophy might be a minority position, at least in Anglo-American analytic philosophy. However, I believe that it is not the case. As Putnam puts it, most scientists are unsympathetic to analytic philosophy since it is regarded as “scientifically-uninformed hairsplitting”.²¹ Anyone who doubts the observation of these scientists should count the number of science articles in the bibliographies of the most-cited analytical philosophy papers. It would certainly become clear that current analytical philosophy is highly uninformed scientifically. Conversely, the naturalistic philosophy articles of the last two decades are full of scientific journals or textbook references. Which leads me to discuss what can be meant by homonymy fallacy in the context of the interaction between science and philosophy.

V. Homonymy Fallacy

Some would say that the continuity claim of philosophical *naturalism* is relevant only to the relationship between philosophy and *natural* science. These critics assert that according to philosophical naturalism, we can only benefit from natural sciences. It is a paradigmatic case of a *homonymy* fallacy. Nature comprises everything that exists. Societies do exist. So do cultures. Both of them are genuine parts of the furniture of our universe. And the relevant sciences which explore their structures are not natural but *social* sciences.

20 Mario DeCaro and David Macarthur, “Introduction: Science, Naturalism, and the Problem of Normativity,” in *Naturalism and Normativity*, edited by Mario DeCaro and David Macarthur (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 8–9. Italics are from the original.

21 Hilary Putnam, “Science and Philosophy,” in *Naturalism and Normativity*, edited by Mario DeCaro and David Macarthur (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 90.

Thus, the sciences that conduct investigations about *nature* are not only natural sciences but also *human* and *social* sciences. Some may object to my understanding in the following way. She would say that “practically naturalists do mean natural sciences but not social and human sciences since natural sciences are fundamental for all the other sciences”. It is just a pedantic mumpsimus. Neither Quine nor the Churchlands have claimed such a ridiculous limit to what science *is*, but even contrary to it:

The guiding aim of the book is to paint in broad strokes the outlines of a very general framework suited to the development of a unified theory of the mind-brain. Additionally, it aims to bestir a yen for the enrichment and excitement to be had by an interanimation of philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience, or more generally, of top-down and bottom-up research.²²

Philosophy and psychology are not natural sciences. In fact, even neuroscience is *not* incontestably regarded as a natural science, if by natural science only those sciences are meant which are exploring the *physical* world. Thus, nature might be divided into *two* worlds: physical and social ones. It happens that even the Churchlands, who are known to be eliminativist, become socially-oriented naturalists since their attitudes toward the importance of social and human sciences are crystal clear:

My aim here is to explain what is probably true about our social nature, and what that involves in terms of the neural platform for moral behavior. As will become plain, the platform is only the platform; it is not the whole story of human moral values. Social practices, and culture more generally, are not my focus here, although they are, of course, hugely important in the values people live by.²³

In this particular book, Churchland is interested in our *social nature*.²⁴ It suggests that many criticisms of philosophical naturalism are really ignorant of original naturalistic texts. There is noth-

22 Churchland, *Neurophilosophy*..., 3–4.

23 Patricia Smith Churchland, *Braintrust: What Neuroscience Tells Us about Morality* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 3.

24 for a criticism of the Churchlands on this stipulated and then forgotten fact see Serdal Tümkaya, “Is a Cultural Neurophilosophy Possible?” METU, 2014. Chapter 6. <http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/12617708/index.pdf>.

ing intrinsic to naturalism which limits its understanding of what nature is to just *directly* physical things. The problem in fact is not about whether non-physical things such as cultures or relations do exist but being informed by the latest scientific findings. And for Quine, here is the scope of scientific findings: "In science itself I certainly want to include the farthest flights of physics and cosmology, as well as experimental psychology, history, and the social sciences. Also mathematics, insofar at least as it is applied, for it is indispensable to natural science".²⁵ Quine explicitly includes non-natural sciences to his treatment of *science*.

More concretely, there should be no *categorical* distinction between academic disciplines, including philosophy. What we should do is tracing the problems, not the academic borders. Great philosophers, such as Aristotle and Kant, had always engaged in the sciences of their time. After all, philosophy has always been done under dynamic change. For this reason, it is reasonable to anticipate that philosophy will continue to change. The direction of this change cannot be "precisely" predicted in advance. However, there is every reason to think that forthcoming philosophy will be more science-friendly:

Philosophical problems were once thought to admit of a priori solutions, where such solutions were to be dredged somehow out of a "pure reason," perhaps by a contemplation unfettered and uncontaminated by the grubbiness of empirical facts. Though a convenience to those of the armchair persuasion, the dogma resulted in a rather anti-intellectual and scoffing attitude toward science in general, and when the philosophy was philosophy of mind, toward neuroscience in particular.²⁶

Philosophical problems cannot be addressed only by the resources of a priori reasoning, let alone by pure reason. They need messy empirical facts to be deeply illuminated. The old, but venerable, philosophy of positivism believed that formal disciplines are the best models for philosophy to follow. However, that project seems not to

25 W. V. O. Quine, *Quintessence: Basic Readings from the Philosophy of W. V. Quine*, edited by Jr. Roger F. Gibson (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004), 275.

26 Churchland, *Neurophilosophy...*, 2.

be so successful. Today's intellectual virtues held for philosophical theorizing is not to imitate mathematics or logic, but to be in easy exchange with empirical sciences. That is, worthwhile philosophical naturalism should be in contradistinction to the non-naturalistic philosophies such as logical empiricism or continental philosophy or post-modern ones. It is important since, if it were correct that philosophical problems merely admit a priori solutions, it would be a central and literally categorical distinction between science and philosophy, which would be a sufficient refutation against the thesis of this paper. The reason is simple. Although it is a fact that a priori reasoning, in the broadest sense of the term, is a very important part of scientific theorizing, any (interesting) conclusion also needs to be *experimentally* tested, not necessarily now and here, but sometime and somewhere. Some philosophers such as Giere, even, claim that "a naturalized philosophical theory can be more or less identified with a *testable* theory."²⁷

VI. Concluding Suggestions

Philosophy is frequently said to utilize highly top-down methods to address the problems in its subject-matter. Conversely, sciences are said to be bottom-up researches. Both of these claims are partially correct and partially false. Scientists in practice use whatever methods or tools they think useful, regardless of those being bottom-up or top-down. To a lesser extent, this is also true for the actual practice of the greatest philosophers. It is certain that there are important differences between them. However, that they are different (i.e. difference in degree) is not equal to saying that they are *categorically* different or *should* be different. Philosophy should be a reliable and venerable branch of knowledge, not the rotter of the academic world. Icy isolation between them should not exist anymore. They have never been enemies, but now they should also be close allies.

27 Werner Callebaut, ed., *Taking the Naturalistic Turn, Or, How Real Philosophy of Science Is Done* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 42. Italics are from the original.

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8

Philosophy without Art

Adrienne Gálosi

Arthur Danto's philosophy of art often and emphatically asserts the strong relatedness of art and philosophy. His "end of art" thesis, based on a Hegelian thought, is not only a strong statement about the history of art, but it also gives account of the changing relationship between art and philosophy. In this paper I will attend to the question of what the end of art means, in order to see what consequences it has got for the state of philosophy, since it is as much about philosophy as about art. Danto gives a special understanding of art history, which logically concludes in the end of the linear historical narrative whose stages manifest the divergent relationship between art and philosophy. His philosophy of art history is the necessary precondition for his arriving at an ontology of art. This ontology is not in contradiction with the contemporary art, which he identifies as the age of pluralism, but he considers it reconcilable with the autonomy of art and with an essentialist notion of it. I will provide three possible interpretations of the dis- or re-enfranchisement of art by philosophy. I will also look into the question in what sense Danto maintains the deep relatedness of art and philosophy after their ways have parted. I will argue that in Danto's theory it is by art that philosophy can come to realize the nature of its essential problems, and in this sense the philosophy of art is a kind of metaphilosophy.



The unimaginative title of this paper could point at different approaches of the philosophy and art relationship. Perhaps the most obvious would be to examine the intricate relation of two modes, let us say methods of writing philosophy – one that sees its highest vocation in its being a “rigorous science” (e.g. Husserl), and the other which rather considers the only possible methodological character of a treatise of philosophy a “detour”, a kind of artistic presentation of truth.¹ This investigation, especially if focused on 20th century philosophy, could reveal much about how philosophers understood the nature of truth and the ensuing task of philosophy.

However in this paper I follow an easier path, insofar as I focus on Arthur C. Danto’s explicate views, as he repeatedly discussed the relation between philosophy and art in detail. It is possible to take Danto’s philosophy of art, which is basically in the vein of analytical philosophy, though with some “continental drift”, as one possible settlement of the “old dispute” between art and philosophy.² He speaks about philosophical disenfranchisement of art, and asserts that art has reached its end. At the first sight it seems, and is often interpreted like this, that according to this perspective of their relationship, philosophy has overtaken art. Obviously, this has not been

1 „Detour” – Umweg, artistic „presentation” – Darstellung are Walter Benjamin’s terms that I use only as examples here, since he was one of those great philosophers whose work is also a great prose. At a more fundamental level this division between philosophy “with” or “without art” is obviously needless, as all philosophical writings are structured forms using special well-chosen language and they all provide the pleasures of (philosophical) imagination. (I deliberately use a weighty term of aesthetics.) From this standpoint it is only a matter of degree how much and whether methodologically intentional and purposeful “art” a given philosophical text reveals. This paper has its centre around Arthur C. Danto’s philosophy of art, were it not to fall under suspicion of obscurity due to a literary term, I would willingly call him the protagonist of this writing. To set the stage for him and also for my paper let me quote him about the literariness of philosophy: “[...] the concept of philosophical truth and the form of philosophical expression are internally enough related that we may want to recognize that when we turn to other forms we may also be turning to other conceptions of philosophical truth.” Arthur C. Danto, “Philosophy as/and/of literature,” in *The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 140.

2 “Old dispute” – παλαιά διαφορά – this is what Socrates calls the tension between philosophy, the realm of truth and poetry, or mimesis, the realm of illusion in the *Republic*. Plato, *Republic*, 607b.

the only philosophical resolution of this dispute. In a simplifying manner, we can say that there has been another tendency in the philosophy of art, starting from Schelling, perhaps best represented by Heidegger, which has come to apparently opposite insights. While Danto asserts that art needs philosophy to know itself, for Heidegger art is a medium where the unfolding of truth takes place, thus art has a certain superiority as a revealer of truth over philosophy. Surely, it would not be advisable to bring these two philosophers into closer contact, but in spite of their radical differences they both seem to obliterate the distinction between art and philosophy, they share the intention to seek for certain essence of art. They seem to find it in something independent from the sensual, and they both relate to Hegel's thesis about the "end of art", however, differently. Heidegger basically accepts Hegel's judgement on the end of art, which remains in force for us, but it is only a diagnosis for the present, and whether great art may yet return is an undecided question for Heidegger.³ For Danto the end of art means the end of the possibility of internal progressive development of arts.

I will focus on this infamous "end of art" narrative (infamous inasmuch as the artworld is still flourishing), and I intend to detect what this dictum means for philosophy, since already in Hegel's thought it was as much about philosophy as about art. If art and philosophy are so closely connected, it is worth attending to the question again what the end of art means to see what consequences it has got for the state of philosophy.

It is almost the thirtieth publication anniversary of Danto's book *The End of Art* that contains two provocative papers.⁴ One "The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art" gives an understanding of art history as its suppression by philosophy, the second, "The End

3 See: Martin Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," in *Off the Beaten Track*, trans. and eds. Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 50–52.

4 The volume in which both papers appeared is *The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986). "The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art" was written as a plenary address delivered before the World Congress of Aesthetics in Montreal, 1984, and "The End of Art" was the lead essay in "The Death of Art", ed. Berel Lang (New York: Haven Publishing, 1984).

of Art” offers a Hegelian model of art history, attesting to the end of art, meaning that we cannot understand contemporary art by describing it in terms of historical development. In their reception, these treatises were mainly considered apart, the critical response mostly focused on “The End of Art”, attempting to prove that art really has not ended.⁵ In the last decades “the end of art” has been re- and over-interpreted many times, a complete interpretative business flourished around the possible ends, and by seeing the unprecedented prosperity of art institutions, nobody thinks any more that this thesis would say anything about the everyday practice of the artworld. As we witness it lives happily ever after.

All these considered, we seem to have a double task: First we have to clarify the relationship of art and philosophy within Danto’s theory, then we can ask how we understand the role and the possibilities of philosophy if one of its subjects is over in one sense, but the other sense leaves us with enough to investigate.

There is no need to here enlist the main stages of the long and concussive history of the philosophy and art relationship, but it can easily be the case, that they never really existed without each other. Danto once stated that art emerges only in those societies which make a distinction between reality and appearance, meaning that true art arises together with philosophy which provides the conceptual viewpoint necessary to embrace the possibility of simultaneous reality and appearance. What is required for the birth of art is a conception of the world and a conception of its representation. We find, writes Danto, that “philosophy has arisen only twice in the world, once in India once in Greece, civilisations both obsessed with a contrast between appearance and reality”.⁶ Not only when Danto conceptualizes the end of art, but already when he strives to find the “origin of the work of art”, he recourses to a conceptual condition, namely that reality and the representation of it, as it is put at

5 It was fifteen years later when the “smoke began to clear” when Jane Forsey wrote a paper with the joint interpretation of the essays seeing them as integrate parts of one narrative. Jane Forsey, “Philosophical Disenfranchisement in Danto’s ‘The End of Art,’” *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* Vol. 59, No. 4 (2001): 403–409.

6 Arthur C. Danto, *Transfiguration of the Commonplace* (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981), 79.

a distance, should be conceptually available. The art proper does not cover magical re-presentations, for instance statues of gods which do not stand for and denote the deity, but make it to be present as part of the reality; but artworks proper presuppose this distinction, and entail the interpretation of the reality and representation relationship.⁷ So for Danto both at the beginning and at the end of art history, there is a history of “before” and “after” which we categorize in our cultural practice as art – we displace the objects of these eras in museums and art biennales – but which do not fall under the art history proper which, as we can see, seems to be always connected to philosophy. Let us turn to the end of this story, because here I am interested in what happens to philosophy after the “end of art”.

Danto explicitly cultivates his philosophy of art out of Hegelian thought. He states that “my thought is that the end of art consists in the coming to awareness of the true philosophical nature of art. The thought is altogether Hegelian.”⁸ For Danto, in my view, the most appealing in Hegel’s philosophy is that he connected metaphysics and history. I am not saying that he subscribes to the metaphysical commitments involved, but used Hegel as a model combining history and a principle that can give unity to it, so while Danto acknowledges that “essentialism and historicism are widely regarded as antithetical”,⁹ he argues, in a Hegelian vein, that essentialism and historicism are compatible in the philosophy of art. “There is a kind of transhistorical essence in art, everywhere and always the same, but it only discloses itself through history.”¹⁰ This means that Danto

7 For Danto representation is not only the key term for talking about arts, but in general for philosophical purposes he defines human beings with the fact that we form representations, through which we make connections to the world. See: Arthur C. Danto, *Connections to the World* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997, 1989).

8 Arthur C. Danto, *After the End of Art: Contemporary Art and the Pale of History* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997), 31.

9 Arthur C. Danto, “The End of Art: A Philosophical Defense,” *History and Theory* 37 (1998): 127–143, 128. Michael Kelly examines the compatibility of the two in Danto’s theory, focuses mainly on “*The End of Art*” and he blames Danto for resolving the conflict in exactly the same disenfranchising way that he criticized. Michael Kelly, “Essentialism and Historicism in Danto’s Philosophy of Art,” *History and Theory* 37 (1998): 30–43.

10 Danto, *After the End of Art*, 28.

understands the history of art from the view of the present as it has developed into its final stage, and holds that only this linear history leading finally to pluralism, to the extreme differences among artworks, gave the possibility of defining art with a universal concept. Talking about essentialism may sound unusual in contemporary philosophy, but not for Danto. By essence he understands the necessary and sufficient conditions to fall under a concept, and working out of these conditions is the eminent task of philosophy. In the contemporary artworld essentialism seems impossible, because works of art hardly seem to have anything in common. On the contrary, Danto needed precisely this ultimate pluralism to ask the question concerning the essence of art properly. And once the essence is found, this makes pluralism possible, because a real philosophy of art must be so general and abstract that it should be applicable to any kind, style, movement, era etc. of art. So on the one hand pluralism is presupposed for the essence, and on the other hand it is guaranteed by the essence.¹¹

In Hegel's system "art occupies a unique position between abstract conceptual thought and sensuous immediacy, participating in both but functioning as a 'middle term' [Mittelglied] that brings cognition and sensibility together without giving priority to either."¹² This double nature grants art its unique character that it cannot be reduced to other forms of knowledge, however its inseparability from sensuous intuition makes it to be a subordinate stage of the absolute spirit (Geist), since the ultimate, most adequate understanding of the spirit is attained by philosophy, the explicitly conceptual understanding of the Idea. Consequently, art recognises the same truth as philosophy does, but it expresses the spirit's self-understanding through sensuous objects, not in concepts. History as a progression of the spirit to grasp itself conceptu-

11 Danto refers to Clement Greenberg, saying that he was one of those who gave essentialism a bad name, because Greenberg understood the concept of essence as something that is identifiable only with some of its instances which have the privilege to embody that essence, so instead of defining the essence that is true for all art, Greenberg's essentialism derived from his particular critical perspective. See: Danto, "A Philosophical Defense", 128.

12 Janson Gaiger, "Hegel's Contested Legacy: Rethinking the Relation between Art History and Philosophy" *The Art Bulletin* 93, No. 2. (2011): 178–194, 187.

ally, its evolution of self-knowledge, out of an inevitable historical necessity, leaves art (and later religion) behind, because art is an inadequate manifestation of the current modality of the spirit. In the highest sense, there is no need for art, if we can have philosophy. So Hegel conceives of art's contribution as a prehistory to philosophy and when this pre-history is closed, the spirit generously leaves art to itself. But it does not mean that art would lose its functions all together. Art still has a function in the modern (post-Reformation) age, namely to explore the contingencies of finite human life in a more prosaic way, and in this capacity of it "art will always rise higher and come to perfection".¹³ For Hegel the greatest achievement of art had already been attained in Greek classical art, the art proper, for it is the fulfilment of the concept of art in that it is the perfect sensuous expression of the freedom of spirit. Greek gods in their divine subjectivity, who took the form of individuals, could be sensuously portrayed not as symbols but as visible embodiments of the freely self-determining spirit. "Classical art became a conceptually adequate representation of the Ideal, the consummation of the realm of beauty. Nothing can be or become more beautiful."¹⁴ In the historical unfolding of art, a new level of consciousness is reached, and the history of post-classical art – romantic art in Hegel's terms – is nothing but the history of the process of art "transcending" itself as art, a "progression of art beyond itself" because the content that is to be expressed "demands more than the representational form of the work of art can achieve."¹⁵ "That is to say, the shadow of the 'end of art' has been looming over art since antiquity."¹⁶ From here art is superseded (ist aufgehoben – in the double sense of preserved

13 G. W. F. Hegel, *Aesthetics. Lectures on Fine Art*, trans. T.M. Knox, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 1: 103.

14 Hegel, *Aesthetics*, 1: 517.

15 For Hegel's description of Romantic art as "progression of art beyond itself [ein Fortschreiten der Kunst über sich selbst]," see Hotho (1823), 36. His claim that "in romantic art the content goes beyond the form, demands more than the representational form of the art work can achieve," is to be found in Hotho (1823), 119. Heinrich Gustav Hotho's transcription from the 1823 series is published as Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Kunst*, ed. Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1998). quotes: Gaiger, *Hegel's Contested Legacy*, 194.

16 Robert Kudielka, "According to What: Art and the Philosophy of the 'End of Art,'" *History and Theory*, Vol. 37, No. 4. (1998): 87–101, 92.

and overcome) by philosophy, while the former “considered in its highest vocation is and remains for us a thing of the past. Thereby it has lost for us genuine truth and life and has rather been transferred into our ideas instead of maintaining its earlier necessity [...] art invites us to intellectual consideration, and that not for the purpose of creating art again, but for knowing philosophically what art is.”¹⁷ Art is only a stage in the internal development of the consciousness of the spirit and as that, it is no longer the most adequate way of expressing truth, there is no more space for thinking outside reflexivity, no chance for a thought to emerge out of sensuous experience. Though, art still has the function of giving expression to our finite humanity.

For Danto this Hegelian model of art history in which art comes to an end with losing its function to satisfy the needs of the spirit is a clear disenfranchisement of art by philosophy as the latter makes the former redundant. As Danto says, Hegel gives, “a degree of validity to art by treating it as doing what philosophy itself does, only uncouthly.”¹⁸ Art is only a weak form of philosophy, thus this must take over the job of art, and art becomes only a pretext for philosophy. However the question remains, how Danto adapts the role of philosophy, whether he reinforces it in its oppressing position, or rather regards it as the means of re-enfranchising art?

As Hegel set a pattern for the philosophical appropriation of art, Danto rewrites the history of art as a quasi-Hegelian history of the growing self-consciousness of art, culminating in Duchamp and Warhol. But it is important to emphasize that what is a metaphysical thesis for Hegel, becomes purely historical for Danto. It is an often voiced criticism against Danto that he ignores the aspect of Hegel's thesis, that there the highest vocation has something to do with art being connected to other realms and functions of the spirit thus serving other than its own autonomous ends.¹⁹ Art is “past in its

¹⁷ Hegel, *Aesthetics*, 1: 11.

¹⁸ Arthur C. Danto, “The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art,” in *The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 7.

¹⁹ See e.g. Brigitte Hilmer, “Being Hegelian After Danto”, *History and Theory*, Vol. 37, No.4, (1998): 71–86. She claims that it is an open question for Danto whether art ever had its “higher” vocation, and finally she emphasizes the merit

highest vocation”, says Hegel, and for Danto art has no other vocation – though it may sound “disappointing” – than to learn what art is. So it is important to consider the shift of the subjects of the two lines of development: while in Hegel’s work, it is the spirit that has to come to self-consciousness in art as well, in Danto’s case, art is the subject of its own self-knowledge. We can say that Danto formulates his Hegelian thesis from a post-Hegelian position with a completely autonomous art in mind.²⁰ So much the more the doctrine of autonomy has to be presupposed as he wants to make an ontological distinction between art and the “commonplace”, or the “mere thing”, showing that the criteria of interpretation and judgement of these two spheres are incommensurate.²¹ So for Danto, art history, the philosophy of art history is the necessary precondition for arriving at an ontology of art, because it is precisely in the unfolding pursuit

of this “reverse concerning the overall Hegelian project”, as she interprets Danto’s rendering art’s historical vocation as to learn about itself, as a “legitimate expansion of the ultimate purpose of Hegel’s philosophy: progress in the consciousness of freedom”. p. 74. (Supposing that knowing yourself makes you free.)

20 Broadly speaking since the 18th century art gradually gained autonomy from the traditional social institutions, thus when Hegel’s spirit leaves art it is just about the time when art emerged as a distinct field of practice. During the 19th century with the accomplishment of autonomy, artists had to cope with the burden of defining their work. So autonomy has a double, though not separable meaning here: the “weak” version is that art is autonomous as its values and functions do not depend on external institutions, and the “strong” autonomy means that the artwork is independent from any external terms in its representation, everything not *essential* to it is subtracted from it. This claim of autonomy led to the formalist idea that the content of a work of art should be dissolved into the form so that it could not be reduced anything that is not itself.

21 In the Theme Issue of *History and Theory*, Vol. 37, No. 4, “Danto and His Critics: Art History, Historiography and After the End of Art” (Dec., 1998), Danto answered his critics in an article where he asserted that “the ‘highest reality’ of art is its own essence, brought to self-awareness”. Arthur C. Danto, “The End of Art: A Philosophical Defense”, *History and Theory*, Vol. 37, No. 4, (1998): 134. It is interesting enough that Danto replaces Hegel’s “vocation” with “reality”. Danto’s whole philosophy is centred around the reality (or world) and representation dichotomy, art being on the side of representation. When he speaks about the reality of this representational being, instead of emphasizing the presence, the material or sensuous properties of artworks, he concludes to its essence that requires philosophical considerations. So the “highest reality” for art is when art is what it is and it knows what it is.

of autonomy that art reaches the state where the artistic problem of self-definition shifts to be a philosophical one.

Fascinated by the end of the story, namely the possible philosophical readings of Warhol's *Brillo Box*, Danto divides the history of art since the High Middle Ages into three phases which also sign three intersecting periods of the relationship between art and philosophy. The first phase is dominated by the problem of the accurate mimetic representation of the world, conformed to the Vasarian model that the history of art is determined by progress in the development of depiction, of better attaining pictorial correctness. Exactly in this endeavour of art has philosophy seen art as an enemy, and tried to "ephemeralize" it as illusion, being detached from reality.²² In the second phase beginning in the 1880s, with the rise of photography, and more importantly with the invention of moving pictures, the task of imitation was challenged, or rather it was better attained by other means, so art had to find its identity, its autonomy as an object in its own right.²³ This identity crisis compelled art to address its self-definition, and in doing so it was increasingly compelled to resort to its enemy, philosophy. The principal activity for arts – painting playing a particular role in this endeavour – became the search for identity by making the medium of representation to be their main subject matter. "[...] painting and sculpture realized that they had to define their nature if they were to continue. And this is the crisis to which I refer: paintings and sculpture, as art, become objects for themselves."²⁴ Danto reads the history of Modernism as a series of efforts at self-definition, as a real "Bildungsroman" (in the sense of search for one's true identity), where each subsequent artistic movement was increasingly philosophical in nature.²⁵

22 Danto, "The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art," 7.

23 Interestingly, Danto later is not so certain about the causes of this crisis, he admits that he does not know the answer to the historical question why traditional art gave way to modernism. Each time he details this, he mentions photography, but he also says that "perhaps it came from a complex loss of cultural faith in western values". Danto, "A Philosophical Defense", 139.

24 Arthur C. Danto, "Art, Evolution, and History," *The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 206.

25 Arthur C. Danto, "The End of Art," *The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 110.

While in the first phase philosophy tried to defuse and supersede art from an external position, during Modernism with the internalization of the philosophical question of identity, art voluntarily surrendered to philosophy, as philosophy was needed to provide the essence of art in the form of a definition.²⁶ The direction of the self-defining program was set by Duchamp – namely “to extrude the aesthetic from the artistic”²⁷ – and came to a logical conclusion in 1964 with Warhol’s *Brillo Box*. As his work of art was perceptually indistinguishable from a “mere thing” thereby demonstrating, that if philosophy wants to define art, it must depend on nonperceptual qualities. If works of art cannot be differentiated from their non-artistic counterparts by perceptible properties – as the *Brillo Box* in the Stable Gallery looked exactly the same as the containers in the supermarket – then the definition of art is actually a philosophical issue, because the problem of indiscernibility, says Danto, is a purely philosophical question. Danto assumes this position in many of his writings saying that the appearance of readymades and Brillo boxes in the artworld “meant that as far as appearance were concerned, anything could be a work of art, and it meant that if you were going to find out what art was, you had to turn from sense experience to thought.”²⁸

No matter how provocative, Warhol’s ultimate “question-object” was not enough in itself to close the history of art, but it was the answer that did the job. Danto writes: “Until the form of question came from within art, philosophy was powerless to raise it, and once it was raised, art was powerless to resolve it.”²⁹ When the series

26 In my view, one of the most problematic aspects of Danto’s thesis is the assertion of an art history where the problem of identity and self-definition does not play a role until the late 19th century. However, from the Renaissance on, it was problematic for artists how to define their work; artistic decisions, ideals were not only guided by the improving means of naturalist representation. For an interesting refutation of Danto’s conception of art history see Clark Buckner, “Autonomy, Pluralism, Play: Danto, Greenberg, Kant, and the Philosophy of Art History,” *Journal of Aesthetics & Culture*, Vol. 5, (2013) accessed January 20, 2015, <http://dx.doi.org/10.3402/jac.v5i0.20226>.

27 Danto, *After the End of Art*, 84.

28 Danto, *After the End of Art*, 13.

29 Arthur C. Danto, *Beyond the Brillo Box: The Visual Arts in Posthistorical Perspective* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press,

of artistic attempts to answer the problem of art's definition was carried to its limits, the philosophical definition-answer meaning that nothing essentially new could come, was provided by Danto.³⁰ "Acting in the space between art and life' could be seen as an effort to reverse the philosophical disenfranchisement of art that was so central an item in Plato's agenda. [...] In overcoming the gap between art and life [...] Rauschenberg and his intrepid peers were not merely beginning a new era of art history – they were at the same time beginning a new era in the philosophy of art".³¹ This new era meant that time was ripe for defining art, all that needed was a philosopher-hero who could read the signs of the time.

Without interpreting Danto's definition, just let me summarize it in one sentence: a work of art must be about something, i.e. must have a meaning, and it must somehow embody that meaning in its self-presentation to the viewers. Danto sloganized this in the form that works of art are embodied meanings, claiming that this definition holds for all instances. So the new era of art history meant the closing of the earlier periods, linear, progressive history has come to an end in a narrative sense, as art has achieved a philosophical sense of its own identity, consequently no further breakthroughs can come from the artworld.

What does the art after the end of art look like? Bad question, because the answer is evident: it can look like anything. So instead, what characterises this art? Art after the end of art is post-modern, because according to Danto's narrative, it was the search for self-definition that made art modern, and art is no longer self-de-

1992), 8. To voice a criticism, Michael Kelly asks the question "But why is art incapable of answering a question it is capable of asking[...]", and argues that Danto does not provide an answer and uses it to substantiate that instead of liberation, Danto's thesis amounts to disenfranchisement. Michael Kelly, "Essentialism and Historicism in Danto's Philosophy of Art," *History and Theory* 37 (1998): 30–43, 38. As I understand Danto, the fact that works of art and everyday objects can be indistinguishable entails that art cannot be defined aesthetically – aesthetic mostly stands for matters of vision, appearance in Danto's dictionary – therefore it is not the artists who can define it.

30 Just as Hegel's spirit leaves behind and rises above all earthly boundaries and comes to its fullest self-knowledge in the philosopher's, i.e. Hegel's thought.

31 Arthur C. Danto, *Unnatural wonders – Essays from the Gap Between Art and Life* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005), xi.

fining; it is post-historical, because there can be no further historical development per se. This is the third phase of the history of art, pluralism when no art form is historically privileged, “[w]hen one direction is as good as another direction, there is no concept of direction any longer to apply.”³² The relationship between art and philosophy in this third, pluralistic era is not an easy problem, as it seems that Danto himself describes it in ways that are hard to reconcile. At the beginning of the end it was their interdependence that made Danto so “intoxicated”³³ as a philosopher. “[...] in the advanced art of the 1960s and 70s, art and philosophy were ready for one another. Suddenly, indeed they needed one another to tell them apart.”³⁴ Especially in *The End of Art* this interrelatedness means that philosophy gradually absorbs art, “the objects approach zero as their theory approaches infinity”,³⁵ says Danto, meaning that art must be reflective in the sense that it must relate itself to the concept of art. The often minimal objects require a complex theory for their “transfiguration.” By doing so, the artwork seems to become similar to philosophy in its reflectivity. It is not easy to tell them apart in our times “[...] for the object in which the artwork consists is so irradiated by theoretical consciousness that the division between object and subject is all but overcome, and it little matters whether art is philosophy in action or philosophy is art in thought”.³⁶ This is exactly the line of thought that is almost unanimously regarded by his critics as the new, highest expression of the disenfranchisement of art – instead of a re-enfranchisement project that Danto seemed to offer. As philosophy was powerless to pose the right philosophical question concerning the essence of art, it could only formulate

32 Danto, “The End of Art,” 115.

33 Danto, *The Transfiguration of the commonplace*, vi.

34 Danto, *The Transfiguration of the commonplace*, vii–viii. One of his commentators, Brigitte Hilmer rightly muses over the question whether the *Brillo Box* is art or philosophy, calling Warhol an “appropriation philosopher”. Hilmer, “Being Hegelian After Danto,” 86.

35 Danto, “The End of Art,” 111.

36 Danto, “The End of Art,” 113. Having read these lines one does not wonder any more if she hears that Danto himself is said to be one of the leading conceptual artists – thanks to his famous series of merely imagined artworks. But if we consider his definition of art, Danto cannot be an artist philosopher, since his “art” would not fall under his own concept.

premature generalizations about art as such, until those works of art were created that were indistinguishable from ordinary objects, and these objects were nothing else but philosophical questions in embodied artistic form, then art handed over itself to philosophy; “the task must be transferred finally into the hands of philosophers”.³⁷ I think one is not mistaken if she reads this process as the philosophy of art attaining self-consciousness, because philosophy of art could come to the full awareness of its task only at the end of the long series of definitional attempts.

However, Danto opens an equally important line of interpretation, when he tries to explain in many of his latter writings that the end of art is meant to be a liberationist thesis. As art is now liberated from history, anything and everything is available for the artists. “What makes the end of art is not that art turns to philosophy, but that from this point on, art and philosophy go in different directions.”³⁸ In this sense we can say, that art after the end of art is not only post-modern and post-historical, but it is also post-philosophical, because art is philosophical only as long as the quest for its essence lasts. Danto has much to say about the post-philosophical state of art,³⁹ but, quite interestingly, he does not depict the solitary life of philosophy without art.

Art without philosophy is pluralism. The open-ended diversity of contemporary art, the perfect freedom lies in the indifference towards the aesthetic properties of artworks. If art can be anything, the art of pluralism slowly gravitates to less and less, and Danto’s observations, at least initially, were undoubtedly coloured by a sense of loss.⁴⁰ He almost uses a Hegelian tone about the pastness of

37 Danto, “The End of Art,” 111.

38 Danto, “The End of Art: A Philosophical Defense,” 134.

39 But not as a philosopher, rather as an art critic. Danto the philosopher is concerned with defining art, and once that job has been done, he escorts the works of art by interpreting them. Here I cannot deal with the connection of philosophy of art and criticism, though it is one of the crucial, and most interesting problems in connection with Danto’s work. About this see: Gregg Horowitz and Tom Huhn, “The Wake of Art – Criticism, Philosophy, and the Ends of Taste,” *The Wake of Art, A. C. Danto’s Essays*” selected and with critical introduction Horowitz and Huhn (Amsterdam: G+B Arts), 1–56.

40 For the Whitney Biennial 2008 one of the curators, Henriette Huldish writing for the catalogue borrowed Beckett’s title to characterize Zeitgeist – “Lessness”.

art when he writes “artworks may still be produced post-historically [...] in the aftershock of a vanished vitality.”⁴¹ Art for him also “is a thing of the past” and thus beyond the pale of history because it no longer has the power that it owned in the earlier ages.

Obviously, this does not entail that art would cease to endure as an enjoyable cultural practice. It continues to be distraction, relaxation, entertainment, or cultivated interest of the professional and social elite. The illusion of an unending novelty will be maintained by external causes, eminently by the art market. This liberation of art from philosophy, from history – artists can do whatever they want to do – is meant to be the guarantee of art’s re-enfranchisement, because now art can speak for itself without the mediation of philosophical reflection. But in another sense, it is an even fuller or trickier disenfranchisement of art than its absorbing by philosophy. Art is liberated at the expense of its successful marginalization. Art is free to pursue whatever ends seem important to the artists, it can be a vehicle for whatever concepts, or it can function as a quasi-sociology. Finally it turns out that the completion of art’s historical mission may liberate it from the oppression of philosophy, but when the weight of self-understanding is cast off, art becomes insignificant. We can see again that the double sense of autonomy applies differently: on the one hand, with the philosophical definition art gains total autonomy, since it is always at its essence, and Danto’s nonexclusive definition is pluralistic enough, so that in principle nothing can be ruled out as art. If an object is a piece of art then it is autonomous at the same time. However, this autonomous art can dissolve into whatever heteronomous functions.⁴²

41 Danto, “The End of Art,” 83.

42 I should emphasize here that the quest for the essence of art can conclude to regarding autonomy and pluralism as opposed. Briefly let me mention the very intricate relation between the views of Danto and Clement Greenberg. According to Danto, they both see self-definition as the central historical truth of modernist art, but they differ from each other in every other respect. Danto criticizes Greenberg for responding dogmatically to the crisis in art’s autonomy, as he understands it in terms of purity, thus pluralism as opposed to it. Greenberg defends modern art’s reflexivity, since the breakdown of cultural conventions – “A society, as it becomes less and less able, in the course of its development, to justify the inevitability of its particular form, breaks up the accepted notions upon which artists and writers must depend in large part for communication with their audiences.” – it has been

Perhaps Danto's views can be interpreted as disenfranchisement at a third level as well: In his narrative, Plato's project was to transfer art ontologically to the sphere of secondary entities and as art was relegated to mere appearances, illusions, reality was logically "immunised" against art, thus philosophy managed to defuse art through this. Danto interprets Modernism, the period of radical philosophical experimentation as the endeavour to fill "the gap between art and life" – with the often quoted expression by Robert Rauschenberg –, which concluded in works of art that really cannot be perceptually differentiated from "real", everyday objects. However closing this perceptual gap does not eliminate the difference between art and life, but it makes it deeper as even this perceptual, sensual similarity, sameness does not make up for the ontological difference. When Danto defines art once and for all – as a true philosophy of art is true for all art – he also joins Plato in saying that art is ontologically different from reality. As objects they may be indiscernible but in their interpretation they are fully shown to be ontologically distinct.

reflecting on the conditions of its own practices. (Clement Greenberg, 'Avant-Garde and Kitsch,' *The Collected Essays and Criticism*, vol. 1, Perceptions and Judgments, 1939-1944, ed. John O'Brian (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 6.) Unlike Danto, Greenberg thinks that modernism's self-reflection does not take the form of philosophy but rather of practical investigation. "The essence of modernism lies [...] in the use of the characteristic methods of a discipline to criticize the discipline itself" (Clement Greenberg, 'Modernist Painting,' in *The Collected Essays and Criticism*, vol. 4, Modernism with a Vengeance, 1957-1969, ed. John O'Brian (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 85.) He conceives this method of self-criticism of art as the thematization of the formal conditions that he considers the depositary of meaning. So Greenberg's story of modernism can also be seen as a search for an answer to the question of what art is, and his answer is the determination of medium-specificity, which each artwork must embody as its essence, eliminating any other effects that better belong to another medium. In 1960 Greenberg stated that even with the invention of abstraction art found itself struggling with the illusoriness of pictorial space, thus painting could achieve autonomy only by embracing absolute flatness. "He sees self-definition in terms of purity, and hence the history of Modernism as the pursuit of painting in its purest possible state." Arthur C. Danto, "Art After the End of Art," *The Wake of Art* eds. G.M. Horowitz and T. Huhn, (Amsterdam: G+B Arts, 1998), 121. For both of them artists of the 1960s present the project of self-definition, but they come to opposing conclusions in terms of autonomy and pluralism.

Here I cannot deal with the problem whether this process really means for Danto the ephemeralization of art. He writes about the posthistorical state of art in many of his writings in quite different tones, but as I see it, he has finally come to relish in it. But independently from his appreciation of contemporary art, there are philosophical reasons why he cannot take his own story as a long decline, consequently cannot approve of the disenfranchisement. He does not consider art insignificant, "there is reason after all to be afraid of art", he writes, as the work of art, having the same structure as rhetoric, can modify the minds and then the actions of people by co-opting their feelings.⁴³ So the ontological distinction here is the potential of the work of art to be appropriated differently than mere things, even in case of indiscernible objects. What the aesthetic experience is confronted with is the difference in itself. So the gap remains open, producing both the feeling of connection as well as the awareness of inaccessibility. As neither of them can be assumed, the gap is to be explained and justified. If we understand a situation that we are in the presence of art, then the engagement with the work of art is also accompanied by the different being of the artwork, by its "concealment". And it is this "withdrawal" of the art that makes it impossible to be disenfranchised.

But how is philosophy to continue? As already mentioned, Danto does not give a coherent account of the philosophy without art, nonetheless we can infer it by tracing the deep structure of the philosophy and art connection. If art and philosophy were so tangled, one could suppose they also share the end. But instead of that, "the post-historical period is marked by parting ways between philosophy and art."⁴⁴ No matter how closely connected they are, art and philosophy are not the same: art has no future, the present state of pluralism will continue for indefinite time, out of history. But philosophy still has a future of its own history until it finds truth. But after that, unlike art, it must stop as an intellectual practice. Philosophy has no post-historical period, because philosophy's *raison d'être*, the search for truth, will end once the truth is found. When the truth is found there is nothing further to do, it makes no sense

43 Danto, "The Disenfranchisement of Art," 21.

44 Danto, *After the End of Art*, 47.

to philosophise without an end if we know the truth. That is why “pluralism is a bad philosophy of philosophy.”⁴⁵

One possible interpretation of this art and philosophy relatedness can be seen as good and bad news at the same time: as I argued above, with the long historical trajectory of increasing fusion it was not only art, but the *philosophy* of art that also attained self-consciousness. Not philosophy in general, but the philosophy of art. It finally has found its proper task, and luckily Danto successfully defined art, and now that “mission complete”, truth is found, the same holds for art philosophy as for art: nothing essentially new can be said. Certainly, it entails that philosophy of art has also arrived in the post-historical age, if there are some who wish to continue research in a totally discovered land. From now on, Danto’s witty saying that philosophy of art within the discipline of philosophy is like military music for musicians – a noisy pastime for less talented amateurs – should be taken seriously. (Bad news for those philosophers who are still attracted to arts, and good news for the other philosophical disciplines, there is one less member to share the annual conference budget with.)

If we accept this script, we have a simple answer to Danto’s question “what would philosophy be without art”.⁴⁶ Philosophy of art as a sub-branch of philosophy has found its truth and thus has ended, but all the other interests of philosophy are still open questions, all the other “truths” are still to be found. But Danto does not seem to divide philosophy into branches with their distinctive truths to find. On the contrary, all areas of philosophy he regards to be all of a piece. So it is its singular, general scope of philosophy that he sometimes parallels with art, or “cures” them with each other, or states that the two enterprises have something deep in common. If we are to understand this something common to them, again we have to attend to the problem of their differing ends. We have seen that though art has reached its self-consciousness, has been given a definition, it can stay alive, because it is not only self-reflexivity that adds up to its life. Art is not dead with its end, it can keep on thriving

45 Danto, “Art, Evolution and History,” 210.

46 Danto, “The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art,” 7.

in its heteronomous functions related to the world, to reality.⁴⁷ But Danto says that philosophy will have no post-historical life, which means that the “truth” of philosophy does not only lie in its self-reflexivity, but it has to say something about the truth of the world. When this truth is found it will have nothing else to do. So while art finds its “highest reality” in philosophical self-consciousness, the “highest reality” for philosophy is truth. When Danto claims that the suggestion that philosophy and art are one is irresistible, and the definition of art cannot escape being the definition of philosophy as well – “There is a philosophy of art [...] because philosophy has always been interested in itself”⁴⁸ –, what he has in mind is not the “truth” of philosophy connected to the reality, but its self-reflexivity. Not the *what*, but the *how*. Philosophy has to turn to art if it wants know itself. Art is more than just one segment of reality that needs to be understood philosophically; it is rather the demand of self-understanding that turns philosophy to art, looks into it as into its own mirror that delivers nothing but philosophical problems in a difference. And this difference is what philosophy needs to understand. Art in this sense is a kind of displacement of the essential philosophical problem, say in the form of objectivised philosophy, or philosophy at work. What philosophy can learn from art, from the philosophical consciousness of art is the deep structure of all philosophical questions. Because for Danto, it is definitive of philosophical problems that they treat issues of indiscernibility. Warhol has bestowed on philosophers that you cannot base a definition of art on anything visual, and this is where philosophy can come to its own, when it realizes this is the form of all classical philosophical questions, as they arise in connection with indiscriminable pairs. So when the question arises if Danto’s philosophy of art can be considered as a form of answer to the question what philosophy is, my answer is that this is what is at stake here.⁴⁹ His philosophy of

47 Let me emphasize again that in my view Danto always remains within the Platonic tradition, not only in the sense that this is where he locates the origin of the adversarial relation of philosophy and art, but also in the sense that he speaks about the “world”, the “reality” as originary and posits art as subsidiary.

48 Danto, *The Transfiguration of the commonplace*, 57.

49 “Could this lifework of an ‘appropriation philosopher’ (or artist, or both) be considered as an embodied contribution to the question, ‘What is philosophy?’”

art aims to clarify problems in philosophy (not in art), and as the field where philosophy can come to realize the nature of its essential problems, it is a metaphilosophy. As a philosopher he is interested in the very basic structures, “[...] philosophy is just the effort to understand the relationship between subjects, representations and reality”.⁵⁰ Representation is the core concept of Danto’s overall philosophy. His attentiveness to representation comes from the interest in the Platonic and Cartesian anxiety about how mind, image, and language connect to reality, given that human consciousness exists in a “gap”. He conceives of philosophy as a discipline whose character is given by the repetition, “in which in the nature of the case the same structures appear and reappear like the figures on a carousel”.⁵¹ The form of the question concerning the essence of art has the same form as that of the vexing question with which Descartes opens *Meditations*, or as the Leibnizian problem of what makes a hand moving an “action” as opposed to a mere reflex.⁵²

Now we understand that as a philosopher Danto’s interest lies in the philosophical problem of art, which yields a very thin, abstract, austere picture of the truth of art. But still I would hesitate to take a stand on how Danto interprets the connection between the post-historical art having come to realize its own philosophical truth, and the “truth”. If we do not want to label art after the end of art as “post-art” incurred to whatever minor functions, we may suppose that art has had other ends than finding its essence in the form of a definition. It is not only by conceptual, determinate judgements that we understand contemporary art, though Danto could abstract art’s integrity to a point of philosophical principle, but aesthetic judgements still have persistent relevance. And the aesthetic judgement that is to be articulated amidst the commonplace repeatedly poses the question of artistic autonomy. And precisely now, when art is on the one hand irreducible to any other social institution, practice,

Hilmer, “Being Hegelian after Danto,” 86.

⁵⁰ Danto, *Connections to the World*, 40.

⁵¹ Danto, *Connections to the World*, 20.

⁵² It is the concept of representation that synthesizes the different philosophical problems; at the most abstract and basic level in the case of art, scientific theories, historical sentences and philosophy of action and mind, we must understand these forms as modes of re-presentations.

but on the other hand it is more intermingled with ordinary life and with the aesthetics of the “mere thing”, the question of autonomy does not seem to be a closed one. And as far as artistic practices still strive to work out their autonomy anew, despite the found definition, philosophy might learn something new from art concerning the relationship between subjects and the world. In the closing paragraph of his “disenfranchisement” book Danto states something surprising: The question of the day, he writes, “is what philosophers to breed for, and my answer is, those who can give us the philosophy that art has prepared for us. I am but their prophet.”⁵³ We can only have guesses about the real meaning of this declaration. But this sentence may hint at an even deeper and more essential relatedness of art and philosophy, since the definitional problem is already a *passé*, and still there might be something philosophically important coming from art.

53 Danto, *Art, Evolution, and History*, 210.

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9

Aesthetics and Its Histories

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The paper examines what kind of historiography enables the histories of aesthetics to contribute to contemporary philosophical aesthetics, which needs to permanently reconfigure itself to adjust new requirements, but also has an inclination for determining the borders of its field of study or concepts. Since the historical terrain and subject of these histories evidently depend upon how one defines what “aesthetics” is, I briefly delineate two plausible definitions of the term with two corresponding historical conceptions. According to its exclusive sense, aesthetics is the study of the theoretical domain determined by the concept of the aesthetic, which confines the histories of aesthetics to Western modernity. According to the broader, pluralistic inclusive sense of the term, it is a permanent task of historical research to find the adequate meaning of aesthetics when facing historical materials, thus the concept of the aesthetic and the historical terrain of Western modernity lose their central positions. The paper argues that both the exclusive and the inclusive histories of aesthetics can provide contemporary theories with new orientations, fields of concern, approaches and concepts, and that they can also oppose the policing tendencies, but only if they grasp the alterity and the specificity of the various aesthetic discourses, letting the past challenge our own understanding of the concept of the aesthetic or the field of aesthetics instead of appropriating it. Rejecting both the appropriationist and the strict contextualist view,

I argue for a third approach that ensures the exchange between past and contemporary aesthetics by accepting our own historicity, reflecting on our initial interests, concepts and assumptions, and by refining or overwriting them if it becomes necessary.



There is nothing sacred in the word "aesthetics".
Arnold Berleant

Today, when interdisciplinary co-operations, socio-political and academic needs are urging the representatives of the humanities to reconsider their fields of study, methodological approaches or conceptual repertoires, so basically to permanently reconfigure their disciplines, gaining *historical self-transparency* (in a Gadamerian sense) may help them in carrying out this task. Historical interpretations that (re)construct various arguments or theories, map different traditions, establish possible contexts and open up horizons can show us the previously unseen or long forgotten potentials of certain problems, fields of study, or ways of thinking that offer novel perspectives on our contemporary problems and concepts, which makes these stories crucial for the self-understanding of a discipline as well. This paper will examine what kind of historiography is able to positively contribute to contemporary philosophical aesthetics. After suggesting a plausible distinction between the *exclusive* and the *inclusive* sense of *aesthetics*, I will delineate how these definitions mark off two corresponding conceptions of the *histories of aesthetics* in order to point out the methodological problems they pose but also their potential to animate contemporary theories. I argue that the historiography of aesthetics, whether it is exclusive or inclusive, is able to revitalize contemporary discussions but only if it lets the past challenge our own assumptions by grasping the specificity of the various aesthetic discourses instead of appropriating them.

1. On "aesthetics"

It is a commonplace that the histories of *aesthetics* cannot be confined to the history of the philosophical discipline called aesthetics, a product of the German Enlightenment, and that it is a particularly difficult endeavour to determine the proper subject matters of these histories since aesthetic theories exhibited great variety in this respect throughout history. Thus, given the interesting state of affairs that a significant part of its histories is constituted by texts that originally were not written as part of aesthetics, the scope of the historiography of aesthetics (i.e. our answers to the question of

what we label “aesthetics”) will mostly depend upon the circle of plausible subject matters. One may try to draw this circle by turning to the capacious field of contemporary philosophical aesthetics, and simply say that the historical study of philosophical aesthetics will encompass “works and discussions that are in some way continuous with the topics of aesthetics as it is currently pursued in philosophy departments, whether written by people who in their own lifetimes taught philosophy or otherwise conceived of themselves as philosophers or not.”¹

However, if one seeks to give a theoretically grounded answer to the question of subject matters, then there are two plausible definitions of aesthetics at hand that can help: a broader, pluralistic definition, and a narrower one. I will call the former the *inclusive*, the latter the *exclusive sense of aesthetics*. According to the exclusive sense of the term, aesthetics embraces the study of the theoretical domain determined by the concept of *the aesthetic*,² a concept that is often considered to be a product of Western modernity. The aesthetic domain is constituted by different categories such as aesthetic experience, aesthetic pleasure, aesthetic judgment, aesthetic attitude, aesthetic object, the aesthetic concept of art, aesthetic quality, aesthetic value, etc. The definitions of these categories, the question of what exactly makes them aesthetic, and thus the scope of the aesthetic (its relation to other practical and theoretical fields) have always been subjected to intense debate. In its quest for definitions, philosophical aesthetics often regards these categories inter-definable, and tends to choose one of them, not independently from historical tendencies,³ to be a “basic category” whose role is to ground

1 Paul Guyer, *A History of Modern Aesthetics. Volume I: The Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 2. Note that Guyer’s history has a theoretically supported organizing principle, which I will examine later in this paper. This remark only serves as a preliminary orientation for the historical study of “philosophical aesthetics” differentiated from, though not opposed to, literary or art criticism.

2 For such a traditional analytic definition based on three *interrelated* central problems (aesthetic experience, aesthetic properties, art), see for example Jerrold Levinson, “Philosophical Aesthetics: An Overview,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics*, ed. Jerrold Levinson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 3–24.

3 James Shelley has recently argued for a historical division between eighteenth-century “judgment theories”, post-Kantian “experience and attitude

the aesthetic domain without reference to other aesthetic categories. Some contemporary philosophers even claim that a “set of definitions” constituted by the definitions of the different categories in terms of a basic category would “encapsulate the essence of the aesthetic”.⁴ As I intend to point out later in this paper, this contemporary fascination with definitions and essences – and the general trend of atemporal and universal thinking in analytic philosophy – can be misleading regarding historical studies,⁵ which, in turn, can challenge this tendency.

The broader, inclusive sense of aesthetics encompasses all types of philosophical inquiries into (1) our sensate life or sensory experiences, (2) all kinds of our productive or receptive encounters with the various arts (in the broadest sense), or with our natural and/or artificial surroundings, and also (3) the different qualities that can be considered significant during these encounters. Thus, the inclusive sense of aesthetics embraces even those theories that do not operate with, or are straightforwardly hostile to the concept of the aesthetic. These three definitions constitute the foundation of this

theories” (such as Schopenhauer’s aesthetics), and “various experience theories” (experience theories that survived the debate between George Dickie and Jerome Stolnitz in the second half of the twentieth century). This simplistic periodization is based on the categories theorists tended to choose in different historical periods, but despite the historical dimension, Shelley seems to work with an ahistorical concept of the aesthetic – the only thing that changes historically is which category is chosen to be the “basic item”. See James Shelley, “The Aesthetic,” in *The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics*, ed. Berys Gaut and Dominic McIver Lopes (London – New York: Routledge, 2013), 246–256.

4 See Malcolm Budd, “Aesthetic Essence,” in *Aesthetic Essays* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 31–47. For Budd’s own suggestion for a “sound” set of definitions based on “intrinsic reward,” see 46–47.

5 There have been many philosophers who noticed that “in Britain and America, the historiography of philosophy has recently been less self-conscious than it ought to have been. In particular, the influence of analytic philosophy has worked against self-consciousness of the desired sort. Analytic philosophers have seen no need to situate themselves within Gadamer’s ‘conversation which we are’ because they take themselves to be the first to have understood what philosophy is, what questions are the genuinely philosophical ones.” Introduction to *Philosophy in History. Essays on the Historiography of Philosophy*, ed. Richard Rorty, J.B. Schneewind, Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 11.

broad sense of the term, which is not only more comprehensive and more general than the former, but is also inherently historical and pluralistic. According to this view, one cannot project a certain definition of aesthetics upon every historical and cultural tradition, but it is always the given period or philosophy that refines these definitions and determines the proper meaning of aesthetics.⁶

Non-modern or non-Western theories force us to expand the field of aesthetics beyond the concept of the aesthetic, but relatively recent artistic developments have also had such impact. The avant-garde and conceptual art of the twentieth century, for example, made it clear that the aesthetic theories of art, i.e. theories that conceive art in terms of aesthetic experience or aesthetic properties,⁷ cannot give a proper account of *all* types of art forms and of *all* types of appreciation.⁸ This compelled theorists to leave behind the

6 Recently Julian Nida-Rümelin has proposed such a broad definition of aesthetics based on its possible subject matters: 1) the general theory of beauty 2) the philosophy of producing and receiving art, and 3) the theory of sensory cognition. Nida-Rümelin has suggested this broad definition precisely because of its plausibility in historical research: it is the historical period that can offer a proper definition and refine the meaning of the term. See Julian Nida-Rümelin, Vorwort zur ersten Auflage to *Ästhetik und Kunstphilosophie: in Einzeldarstellungen von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart*, ed. Monika Betzler et al., 2nd Edition (Stuttgart: Kröner Verlag, 2012), ix–x.

7 The identification of aesthetics with the philosophy of art has been criticized, amongst others, by Peter Osborne who traced back the tendency of “art as aesthetic” to the reception of Kant’s third *Critique*: “The nineteenth and twentieth century tradition of ‘art as aesthetic’ – artistic aestheticism – covertly perpetuated by the very term ‘aesthetics,’ when used to refer to philosophy of art, rests upon a self-contradictory absolutization of Kant’s conception of ‘aesthetic art.’ Contrary to Hegel’s acceptance of it as a mere ‘name,’ the term ‘aesthetics’ functions as much more than a name here: it seals and legitimates the exclusion of art’s other aspects from the philosophical concept of art, reducing it to a single plane of significance – namely, its capacity to appear as ‘a product of mere nature’ and hence as the object of pure judgements of taste.” Osborne analyzes how the “supra-aesthetic artistic regime of truth” of Jena Romanticism opposed this tendency and how it ran into the tradition of “art as (historical) ontology” resulting in the “anti-aestheticism” of today’s “transmedia condition of postconceptual art”. Peter Osborne, *Anywhere or not at all. Philosophy of Contemporary Art* (London – New York: Verso, 2013), 38–51, quotation from 43.

8 In his above mentioned article, Shelley also distinguishes a post-Dantonian phase that is characterized by the decline of the aesthetic and some attempts to

aesthetic for novel domains – sometimes to discover a whole world (Arthur Danto), sometimes only an institutional setting (George Dickie). These approaches resulted not only in the revaluation of the concept of the aesthetic (and its significance)⁹, but also in a twofold conceptual development: either the philosophy of art has come to be a broader discourse than aesthetics, or it is still identified with aesthetics, but in this case the meaning of aesthetics had to be extended to embrace art forms, experiences and values beyond the concept of the aesthetic.

One may oppose that both of these briefly outlined conceptions of aesthetics still exclude a whole fertile terrain of research by reducing aesthetics to the traditional, textual forms of philosophy. Not independently from the insights gained from non-Western aesthetics, various efforts have recently been made to widen the borders of aesthetics in order to annex different artistic, everyday or somatic *practices* as well. The most recent example is perhaps the comprehensive neo-pragmatist project of Richard Shusterman's somaesthetics, according to which the various practices of somatic self-cultivation constitute an integral part of aesthetics and its history. Aesthetics in this broad sense is not only a philosophical discipline, but also a way of forming our bodily experiences in our everyday life and during our encounters with artworks, which self-formation is intertwined with philosophical insights as well.¹⁰ Needless to say, the inclusive sense of aesthetics is attentive to these practical dimensions as well.

rehabilitate it. See Shelley, "The Aesthetic," 253–255. For another recent attack on the aesthetic theory of art that differentiates between philosophy of art and aesthetics, see Noël Carroll, *Art in Three Dimensions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

9 Osborne, for instance, argues that even though "[c]onceptual art demonstrated the radical emptiness or blankness of the aesthetic in itself, as an ontological support", it also revealed the *indispensability* of the aesthetic dimension (there can be no purely conceptual work of art without any kind of materialization) but only as ontologically "relational" and "partial" among other (cognitive, political, ideological, etc.) aspects of artworks – which artistic aspects are related to wider non-art cultural forms as well. See Osborne, *Anywhere or not at all*, 45–51.

10 See Richard Shusterman, "Somaesthetics and the Limits of Aesthetics," in *Thinking through the Body. Essays in Somaesthetics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 139–144.

2. On the histories of aesthetics

2.1. The exclusive/inclusive divide will evidently influence the way one thinks about the historical and cultural domain and the possible subjects of the histories of aesthetics as well. However, before turning to these different historical conceptions, it seems necessary to take into consideration some general questions concerning the historiography of aesthetics if we want to answer the original question of this paper: what kind of historiography can become relevant to contemporary aesthetic theories? For guidance, one can turn to the recent debates regarding the historiography of philosophy, as far as one considers the historiography of aesthetics to be a part of the historiography of philosophy. It does not mean that historical inquiries can only comprise interpretations of philosophical texts: the historiography of aesthetics, as well as the historiography of philosophy, can encompass the study of other theoretical, scientific, practical, and even “symbolically dense” material domains, so basically of “all the other exosomatic mental traces from a given region and period”, which pushes the historiography of aesthetics towards intellectual history, and even archaeology.¹¹ It is especially important if one considers various artistic or somatic activities or practices, as I have mentioned earlier, to be integral parts of aesthetics.

It seems however that contemporary discussions on the subject query the relevance of my initial question concerning the kind of historiography that can contribute to contemporary aesthetic theories: many historians of philosophy argue that historical inquiries should not even *attempt* to contribute to contemporary theories, and that there is no need for apologizing for this lack of relevance. It is partly because many historians agree, to an extent that it has become some sort of a truism, that one of the indispensable values of historical inquiries consists in venturing into foreign intellectual terrains, revealing the specific, alien features of the past, which

11 For this view of the historiography of philosophy as new archaeology, see Justin E.H. Smith, “The History of Philosophy as Past and Process,” in *Philosophy and Its History. Aims and Methods in the Study of Early Modern Philosophy*, ed. Mogens Lærke, Justin E.H. Smith, and Eric Schliesser (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 30–49. The quotations are from 35, 42.

not only makes us aware of our own historicity, but also challenges our own entrenched beliefs or assumptions, which makes historical knowledge “the key to self-awareness itself”.¹² Opposed to the so called “appropriationist” approach, the one that retrospectively expands contemporary interests, concepts and goals, and digs up the past for useful ideas or arguments inviting the great dead philosophers to partake in our current debates, this “contextualist”, “disinterested” approach (Daniel Garber) or “unapologetic antiquarianism” (Mogens Lærke) aims at avoiding these conversations and the “use of criteria of description and classification not available to the agent himself”.¹³ Instead, it seeks to interpret historical texts “in their own terms”, and “for their own sake” in order to reconstruct a historically accurate meaning (and not necessarily to seek philosophical significance or truth).¹⁴

Quite remarkably, if one accepts that one of the significant values of historical studies consists in revealing the alterity of the past as it gives us new perspectives on our own position, beliefs and assumptions, then this antiquarianism, in an indirect way, proves to be more conducive to the stimulation of contemporary theories than the appropriationist approaches that admittedly start out to *use* history for their own purposes in current debates (which interpretive maneuvers imply that they were concerned with the same questions as we are today). There is one problem, however, with the rigid and confident contextualist historiography outlined above: it is based on the presumption that there is “some principled interpretive technique allowing us to assume such a disinterested stance, i.e., an interpretive vantage point from which the interpreter can be said to have bracketed his own interests.”¹⁵ However, to say that one can (or

12 Quentin Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas,” *History and Theory* 1 (1969): 53. See also Mogens Lærke, “The Anthropological Analogy and the Constitution of Historical Perspectivism,” in *Philosophy and Its History*, 11–12.

13 Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding...,” 29.

14 For a recent argument for such a rigid contextualist approach, see Lærke, “The Anthropological Analogy...”. For his requirement of an unapologetic historiography of philosophy, see 8–10.

15 Lærke, “The Anthropological Analogy...”, 29. Lærke goes on to argue that “Historical perspectivism is one such technique. According to historical perspectivism, the true historical meaning of a past philosophical text can be

should) “bracket his own interests” during historical interpretations is highly problematic.

Besides the obvious *selective* character of every interpretation, i.e. the influence of entrenched canons and present-day philosophical debates on what counts as aesthetics or a genuinely aesthetic problem, what are the possible contexts for interpretation, which parts of a theory will prove to be important etc., it is crucial to emphasize that our interests and preconceptions are not things that we can simply bracket. Philosophical hermeneutics even claimed that these factors are essential in the very structure of understanding, since every “interpretation begins with fore-conceptions” based on our interests and expectations. This led Gadamer to challenge the objectivity of interpretation: the historian has to carefully revise the initial “fore-projections”, which process should be “guided by the things themselves”, but “[t]he only ‘objectivity’ here is the confirmation of a fore-meaning in its being worked out.”¹⁶ We have an initial understanding, formed by the historical traditions we belong to, of what art or beauty is; and even personal experiences, our encounters with artworks, natural or artificial environments, determine how we think, for example, about aesthetic experience. We are also quite aware of the historical contingency of our horizon of interpretation, and perhaps even familiar with other cultural or historical ways of living or understanding art or beauty. This transcultural or historical knowledge helps us to remain “open” to the various historical materials we want to understand and to recognize when our initial understanding or our very questions turn out to be inadequate. In Gadamer’s own characteristic style: “a hermeneutically trained consciousness must be, from the start, sensitive to the text’s alterity. But this kind of sensitivity involves neither ‘neutrality’ with respect to content nor the extinction of one’s self, but the foregrounding and

defined as the sum of the internal perspectives on that philosophy deployed within the relevant context, i.e., the set of historically immanent interpretations of it actually developed. Relevant context is here circumscribed by a sphere of contextual agents contributing to a determined historical controversy about that text and the corresponding cluster of texts that constitute their contributions to that controversy.”

16 See Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (London – New York: Continuum, 2004), 269–270.

appropriation of one's own fore-meanings and prejudices."¹⁷ The "principled interpretive techniques" offered by contextualist historiography can never lead to true objectivity or a neutral stance (the bracketing of the historiographer's own interests), but can be crucial for "working out" or revise our fore-conceptions. For these and other reasons many philosophers have argued that the difference between "appropriationist" and "contextualist" historiography should be rather conceived as a difference between possible coexistent orientations that have different motives and can offer different advantages for us – including the revitalization not only of "complacent doxographies" but also of present-day philosophical thought in both cases.¹⁸

I agree with the contextualists inasmuch I believe that the value of historiography consists in providing encounters with the alterity of the past, which is crucial for self-awareness and can offer us novel perspectives on ourselves. However, I do not share a contextualist/positivist fallacy and would like to argue that a historical research that is organized by contemporary interests, concepts or goals is not necessarily misguided, only if these auxiliary tools prove to be too rigid or unbending, making the inquiry unable to cope with the historical material and resulting in the retrospective expansion of certain anachronous definitions or assumptions that impoverish the past instead of revealing its richness. As we shall see, this will be particularly important when it comes to labels as "eighteenth-century British aesthetics" or "medieval aesthetics". In short, I argue for a methodologically conscious and self-reflexive approach to the historiography of aesthetics, one that acknowledges and reflects on the origin and legitimacy of its preconceptions, interests, and vocabulary, and is ready to utilize or revise them if the historical material under scrutiny forces it to do so.

17 Ibid., 271.

18 See, for instance, Introduction to *Philosophy in History*, 8. For another sympathetic and comprehensive discussion of the various genres of historiography as coexistent and fruitful approaches (while also questioning the distinctness of philosophical truth and historical meaning), see Richard Rorty, "The Historiography of Philosophy: four genres," in *Philosophy in History*, 49–75, especially 67–68.

2.2. If aesthetics in the exclusive sense is the philosophical study of the domain of the aesthetic then it is evidently this concept that determines the subject (the theoretical reflections on aesthetic experience, various aesthetic qualities, aesthetic art, etc.) and demarcates the historical terrain of the research. It is generally acknowledged among historians that the domain of the aesthetic is the product of Western modernity,¹⁹ since it was in the eighteenth century that a new discourse gave rise to a novel kind of experience and susceptibility with corresponding new qualities or objects (such as the new, integrating concept of fine art or even later that of the autonomous artwork). Thus, such histories are confined to this cultural and historical terrain, excluding pre-modern and/or non-Western traditions as “pre-histories” and/or “parallel histories”. For this reason, I will call these inquiries *exclusive histories*.

With the aesthetic as their subject matter and a relatively homogeneous historical and cultural terrain as their field of operation, it might come as a surprise that it is not at all clear what the proper subject matter of these histories should be (what is aesthetics or what counts as a genuine aesthetic problem). Similarly, considering that aesthetics is sometimes considered to be “a predominantly Germanic affair”²⁰ while other historians complacently assert that “its origins can be traced unequivocally to eighteenth-century British philosophers,”²¹ the idea of a continuous or homogeneous tradition becomes problematic. In short, it is not clear *on what grounds* these histories exclude different pre- or non-aesthetic discourses while incorporating others, or why they single out certain authors

19 Analytic aesthetics has had to deal with the historical objection according to which it is guilty, among other things, of a “dubious attribution of a characteristically modern Western experience to pre-modern and/or non-Western people”. These objections resulted in new definitions, which are thought to be beyond or above historical objections by avoiding, for example, art-centred approaches or psychological myth-making. For a brief survey of these attempts, see Gary Iseminger, “Aesthetic Experience,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics*, 106–111.

20 Kai Hammermeister, *The German Aesthetic Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), x.

21 Timothy M. Costelloe, *The British Aesthetic Tradition: From Shaftesbury to Wittgenstein* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 1.

or problems instead of others; and even if they make their organizing principles explicit, there is hardly any consensus regarding this issue.

A possible explanation lies in the peculiar “versatility” of the “amphibious concept” of the aesthetic, the historical flexibility of its meaning and scope that made it possible for various philosophies or ideologies to appropriate it during its relatively short history making the aesthetic a particularly important category of Western philosophical thought whose significance reaches far beyond the delights of art and beauty.²² Modern aesthetics also had an inclination towards defying its own limits from the very beginning in a sense that it ventured into the sensuous beyond conceptual cognition, into a wider range of qualities beyond the beautiful, and then, due to the Hegelian turn, was confined to the field of art, etc.²³ However, as Shusterman has argued, this “limit-defying trend” has been forgotten due to the “demarcational police” of twentieth-century analytic aesthetics interested in determining the limits of the aesthetic and of aesthetic inquiries, confining them to the terrain of the merely perceptual, the artistic, or separating them from other fields of practice or theory, etc.²⁴

The subjects of the exclusive histories depend not only on which aesthetic category is chosen to be the basic category (i.e. whether the history of aesthetics is written as the history of the philosophy of art or of aesthetic experience), but also on the particular historical or contemporary conception of the aesthetic that organizes how the object is selected, ordered, evaluated and contextualized in the interpretive process. However, the tendency of contemporary analytic theories to narrow the scope of the aesthetic – even though their quest for definitions and essences is often philosophically inspiring and can generate vivid discussion – opens up a deeply problematic horizon when it comes to historical interpretations. Again, the problem is not necessarily the presence of an anachronous organizing principle (a present-day interest) itself: it only becomes problematic if it remains unreflected and if it is not revised

22 See Terry Eagleton, *The Ideology of the Aesthetic* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), 3, 9.

23 See Shusterman, “Somaesthetics and the Limits of Aesthetics,” 129.

24 For a brief overview of the opposition between the “transgressive” past and “demarcational” present of modern aesthetics, see *Ibid.*, 129–138.

when it turns out to be inadequate, i.e. if it impoverishes and effaces the rich historical complexity of the aesthetic rather than revealing and illuminating it.

Thus, the greatest methodological difficulty for exclusive histories seems to be the retrospective extension of a certain concept of the aesthetic *if it narrows the scope and effaces the transgressive character of its history*. These difficulties become more salient when it comes to questions like how to begin an exclusive history or what to incorporate into such inquiries. The versatility of the aesthetic makes it difficult for exclusive histories to reconstruct the beginnings of the Western modern aesthetic tradition, i.e. the emergence of the concept of the aesthetic, and also to *unequivocally* exclude early modern theories without retrospectively projecting an anachronous definition. It seems that the choreography is always the same: the construction of an interpretation based on a single core principle, sometimes with an agenda to support the historian's own aesthetic theory, which is followed by the attack of the contextualist who reveals the flaws of the interpretation.²⁵ Furthermore,

25 Jerome Stolnitz's famous narrative and its afterlife are excellent examples. Stolnitz's history, with his own theory of the aesthetic attitude in the background, founded almost every aspect of the modern aesthetic domain on the single principle of "disinterestedness" as a distinctive mark of aesthetic experience, and located its origins in Shaftesbury's and other eighteenth-century British authors' works, despite the fact that they wrote "in the mode of taste" (G. Dickie). According to Stolnitz, disinterestedness distinguished a new mode of experience, thus provided the new discipline with a proper field of study. Stolnitz also defined the autonomy of art and the later concept of "aesthetic object" in terms of disinterested perception. See Jerome Stolnitz, "On the Origins of 'Aesthetic Disinterestedness,'" *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 2 (1961): 131–144. In his famous 2002 article, several decades after Dickie's criticism of the aesthetic attitude, Miles Rind points out that Stolnitz's historical essays are misguided since aesthetic disinterestedness as "a mode of attention and concern in which the perceiver's interest is in perception alone and terminates upon the object" cannot be found in the eighteenth-century British theories of taste. It is not so say, of course, that the idea of disinterestedness was missing from the works of Shaftesbury, Addison or Hutcheson; it only means that it appears in its ordinary meaning: a judgment/pleasure is disinterested inasmuch it is not motivated by personal interest, prospects of advantage or desire for possession, and not if it is "interested solely in perception". Rind ruthlessly states that "Stolnitz's account is an exemplar of how the reliance on anachronous terms can prejudice historical

the question of how a study (re)constructs the beginnings is particularly significant since it reveals how it answers the most fundamental questions concerning the aesthetic, such as which category should be given a crucial role (e.g. aesthetic experience) and why (e.g. disinterested contemplation), how the various aesthetic categories are inter-related (e.g. an aesthetic attitude constitutes an aesthetic object or vice versa), etc. For these reasons, I will confine the remaining part of this section to the problems concerning the beginnings of modern aesthetics.

Theorists usually agree that the historical study of the origins of the aesthetic has to go back before the term itself was coined by Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten in his 1735 thesis,²⁶ which, followed by his popular lectures in Halle and Frankfurt an der Oder, his *Metaphysica* (1739) and his influential two-volume fragment entitled *Aesthetica* (1750/1758), founded aesthetics as a distinct, systematic branch of philosophy and led to the quick spread of the term,²⁷ and also to the rise of an academic institutional frame in Germany and Central Europe. So where should one start? What makes the reconstruction difficult is that the concept of the aesthetic emerged as a limit-defying, transgressive notion: it was a product of a multidisci-

inquiry, and can lead the inquirer (and his readers) to think that he has discovered evidence of doctrines and concepts that simply are not there.” Rind argues that one of the biggest flaws of this interpretation is that Stolnitz seems to forget that the British discourse he interprets is built around the concept of *taste* and not that of the aesthetic. Miles Rind, “The Concept of Disinterestedness in Eighteenth-Century British Aesthetics,” *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 2 (2002): 85–86.

26 In his *Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus*, Baumgarten points out that the discipline of logic in its current state fails to “guide the faculty of sensate cognition”, and thus it cannot be useful in “philosophical poetics”, which he defines as “the science guiding sensate discourse to perfection” (a perfect sensate discourse being a poem). For this reason, argues Baumgarten, we need a discipline besides that of logic: “a science which might direct the lower cognitive faculty in knowing things sensately”, “the science of perception, or aesthetic”. Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, *Reflections on Poetry*, trans. Karl Aschenbrenner and William B. Holther (Berkeley – Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1954), §115–116, 77–78.

27 For an informative account of the early history of the term in Germany, see Hans Reiss, “The ‘Naturalization’ of the Term ‘Ästhetik’ in Eighteenth-Century German: Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten and His Impact,” *The Modern Language Review* 3 (1994): 645–658.

plinary process – endeavours to understand our aesthetic encounters incorporated insights from epistemology to theology, from medicine and physiology to moral and political philosophy.²⁸ A historical inquiry that confines itself only to the views of ‘professional’ philosophers will probably miss a great part of the process.

In many historical inquiries that aim to extend the history of aesthetics beyond the history of the term, Baumgarten’s founding gesture is regarded as “an adult baptism”,²⁹ implying that his achievement merely consists in organizing a novel, dynamically evolving *discourse* into a philosophical *discipline*. However, the metaphor is simplistic because it suggests a kind of homogeneity and continuity: it is important to emphasize that this (quasi)aesthetic discourse was constituted by various theoretical programs and traditions (from the French discourse of *delicatessen* to the British philosophies of taste), encompassing various philosophical, literary and scientific discourses, but also institutions, cultural forms and everyday practices. Similarly, it is often overlooked that the central concerns, ideal method and style of aesthetics remained highly controversial even after Baumgarten (just think of Herder’s, Kant’s, or later Hegel’s critical remarks on the term). The histories of modern aesthetics depart from one another according to what they consider to be the main concern of this early aesthetic discourse or what they single out to be the first work in “philosophical aesthetics” (with candidates like Crousaz, Hutcheson and, naturally, Baumgarten).

There are several narratives that (re)construct this discourse:³⁰ a well-known narrative attributes the emergence of the aesthetic to German rationalist philosophy, often linked to French philosophers and the influential seventeenth-century discourse of *delica-*

28 See Endre Szécsényi, “Francis Hutcheson and the Emerging Aesthetic Experience,” *Journal of Scottish Thought*, 7 (2016): 178.

29 Guyer, *A History of Modern Aesthetics*, Vol. I., 7.

30 Surveying the various narrative models, Endre Szécsényi has pointed out in several of his writings that many influential histories of aesthetics lack methodological or terminological self-reflection. For his revealing remarks, see Endre Szécsényi, “Francis Hutcheson and the Emerging Aesthetic Experience,” 173–177, and also see Endre Szécsényi, Review of *The British Aesthetic Tradition: From Shaftesbury to Wittgenstein*, by Timothy M. Costelloe, *Canadian Journal of History* 49 (2014): 508–510.

tessen that brought forth concepts like *esprit*, *sentiment* or *je ne sais quoi* and revealed the individual and ineffable character of certain qualities and their experiences, which eventually led to the constitution of the “aesthetic subject”.³¹ Another famous narrative ascribes the emergence of the aesthetic to the British,³² to the “marriage of the new [Lockean] way of ideas and the most venerable of ancient philosophies, Platonism”,³³ despite the fact that they did not use the term itself. Of course these aesthetic traditions are not self-contained developments, they are intertwined in many ways, and they form a larger-scale framework of thought, but they reveal how the scope of the aesthetic necessarily depends on the scope of past and present-day aesthetic theories.

The incorporation of the authors who did not use the term itself probably meets with the disapproval of the contextualist. But is a historical interpretation that retrospectively expands the concept of the aesthetic necessarily flawed? I would like to argue that neither the unquestioned projection, nor the strict opposition seem to be fruitful, and often not just the former, but also the latter manoeuvre is based on a narrow and anachronistic application of the concept.³⁴

31 This narrative was explicated in Alfred Baeumler's 1923 work, which – following Karl Heinrich von Stein's 1886 *Die Entstehung der neueren Ästhetik* – linked the German and French discourses, locating their fountainhead in Leibniz. See Alfred Baeumler, *Das Irrationalitätsproblem in der Ästhetik und Logik des 18. Jahrhunderts bis zur Kritik der Urteilskraft* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1967). For a more recent take on this narrative see Jeffrey Barnouw, “The beginnings of ‘aesthetics’ and the Leibnizian conception of sensation,” in *Eighteenth-Century Aesthetics and the Reconstruction of Art*, ed. Paul Mattrick Jr. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 52–95.

32 Among the early historians of the aesthetic, Ernst Cassirer devoted significant space to the British discourse in the aesthetic chapters of his influential book on the Enlightenment. Cassirer examined not only the “intuitional” aesthetics of Lord Shaftesbury, but also the “subjective turn” attributed to empiricist psychology based on the groundbreaking epistemology of Locke. See Ernst Cassirer, *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment*, trans. Fritz C. A. Koelln and James P. Pettegrove (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 297–330.

33 Peter Kivy, *The Seventh Sense. Francis Hutcheson and Eighteenth-Century British Aesthetics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003), 11.

34 It seems that the analytic reading of the eighteenth century is rather interested in the former, while the hermeneutic reading in the latter procedure. It was Peter J. McCormick who distinguished an analytic and a hermeneutic reading

I agree with Miles Rind who asserts that since there are common features³⁵ between early modern (quasi)aesthetic thought and ours that can justify the expansion of the concept, “the mere use of the adjective ‘aesthetic’ or the noun ‘aesthetics’ to talk about the thought of writers who did not use such words need not be ruinous, if proper caution is taken not to confuse our terms or concepts with theirs”.³⁶

But where should one draw the line? Digging deeper into history than the briefly mentioned grand narratives, some recent inquiries have revealed the various early or pre-modern roots of the aesthetic with convincing erudition and with inspiring and enriching terminological anachronisms. As for theology, Niklaus Largier traced the aesthetic to the early modern transformation of mystical experience to an “experimental poetic mysticism” that provided “models of an experimental poetic understanding of experience and sensation”, while Endre Szécsényi followed the history of the concept of “gustus

of eighteenth-century aesthetics. The first reading (represented by Stolnitz or Beardsley) (re)constructs a continuous process of subjectivization through which the theories of beauty were transformed into the theories of the aesthetic (culminating in Kant’s theory), while the second reading (represented by Gadamer) emphasizes the various humanistic resources before the negatively evaluated subjectivization of aesthetic consciousness (attributed to Kant and Schiller). Nevertheless, these readings are similar in many regards, for instance, “[e]ach attempts to use an interpretation of this history to advance particular claims or theories inside the quite different historical space of contemporary aesthetics.” The analytic reading, especially Stolnitz’s, uses the historical texts to ground the concept of aesthetic attitude, while the hermeneutic reading aims at regaining the cognitivity of art that was implicit in the humanistic tradition, and was lost with the aesthetic theory of art. See Peter J. McCormick, *Modernity, Aesthetics, and the Bounds of Art* (Ithaca-London: Cornell University Press, 1990), 39–82, for the comparison of the two reading see 82–97, the quotation above is from 91.

35 Although he uses Stolnitz’s problematic account of the aesthetic in his criticism, Rind provides us with a short comparative analysis of the aesthetic and the concept of taste that reveals not just their differences, but also their common features. They consist in the fact that both concepts approach the *seemingly* immediate, sense-like, “authoritative” and pleasurable perception of the beautiful and other qualities “in terms of something in or about *us*, be it how the bearers of these values affect us, how we perceive them, how we judge them,” i.e. in terms of a perceptual, subjective, introspective, etc. paradigm. See Rind, “The Concept of Disinterestedness...,” 86–87.

36 *Ibid.*, 85–86.

spiritualis”, a spiritual sense of the soul, within the Jesuit tradition as an antecedent of modern (aesthetic) taste.³⁷

Instead of guarding an anachronistic theory of the aesthetic (either by its unquestioned expansion or segregation), the histories of aesthetics can merit from the “creative redescrptions” of its formative terrains. Retrieving to the *historical borderlands* of the quasi- or pre-aesthetic discourses of early modernity can not only help us to unravel the origins of our present assumptions, but also to make transparent something that sank “to the level of an unquestionable background assumption” and eventually to widen our horizons beyond present-day debates.³⁸ I argued that the retrospective expansion of the term does not lead to irretrievable damage, but only if is done by self-reflexive and cautious inquiries. Such histories can even refine the meaning and readjust the scope of the concept, remaining attentive to its transgressive character and offering an example of an historically sensitive and philosophically inspiring historiography.³⁹

Surveying the attempts to reconstruct the emergence of the aesthetic has revealed that in order to be able to grasp the alterity of

37 See Niklaus Largier, “Mysticism, Modernity, and the Invention of Aesthetic Experience,” *Representations*, 1 (2009): 37–60. Quotations from 48, 39; Endre Szécsényi, “*Gustus Spiritualis*: Remarks on the Emergence of Modern Aesthetics,” *Estetika: The Central European Journal of Aesthetics* 1 (2014): 62–85.

38 For an argument for such “creative redescrptions”, see Charles Taylor, “Philosophy and its History,” in *Philosophy in History*, 17–30, quotation from 20–21.

39 Szécsényi’s *Gustus Spiritualis* is a good example as it offers a plausible and refined definition of the aesthetic, widening its scope and illuminating its historical richness: “In what follows, the aesthetic is understood as a special modern experience of the connection between the sensible and the transcendental, in which the former is not a disposable ‘means’ towards the latter, but an indispensable and constitutive ‘frame’ for it; and this new form of experience reconfigures and shapes both the ‘nature’ of transcendence and the self of the beholder. Its origins can be explored mostly in seventeenth-century texts, and its main streams have much less to do with the theories of fine arts and literature, or with the metaphysics of beauty, than is usually supposed.” (63) The theological interest of many influential texts from early modernity is usually neglected in aesthetic narratives, and “[t]he concept of *gustus spiritualis* apparently offers itself for an inquiry into the theological ‘burden’ of modern (aesthetic) taste.” Szécsényi, “*Gustus Spiritualis*,” 64.

the past, the exclusive historiography of modern aesthetics has to be on guard against monism and essentialism much more than against anachronisms: the retrospective projection of concepts are not necessarily misguided, only if it impoverishes the history of the aesthetic. The transgressive character of the aesthetic and the versatility of aesthetic programs compel us to permanently reflect on our initial conceptions and assumptions, and to work out an historically plausible interpretation by foregrounding or revising its fore-meanings, in which process the “principled interpretive techniques” offered by contextualist historiography may come at handy even if they cannot result in the desired objectivity of proper historical meaning. After discarding essentialist or monist definitions of the aesthetic, such a historiography has to find a practically and methodologically useful, not too rigid and narrow, but theoretically sufficient (initial) definition of the aesthetic to work with, which can reveal the richness of the modern aesthetic tradition.⁴⁰

2.3. In contrast to the exclusive conception, the *inclusive histories* that are built upon the pluralistic, inclusive sense of aesthetics embrace pre-modern and non-Western traditions as well. Thus,

40 One can think of the working definition of Paul Guyer’s recent monumental exclusive history as an example, since even though he builds his narrative on the idea that aesthetic experience constitutes the core of modern philosophical aesthetics, his approach is in principle pluralistic (it differentiates between three underlying principles of aesthetic experience), and more elastic (it leaves space for the struggle or interplay between the principles). Thus, his pluralistic organizing principle takes into consideration not just the transgressive character of the history of aesthetics, but also the volatile scope of the aesthetic itself, together with its possible relations to other theoretical and practical domains. According to Guyer’s exclusive history, the history of modern Western aesthetics “can be captured by following the intertwining trails of the three [eighteenth-century] ideas that aesthetic experience is an experience of key truths, of the most fundamental emotions of human experience, and of the free play of the imagination.” As a result of the tension and interplay between these three principles in various authors, it is also a history of “a struggle between those who think aesthetic experience engages all our faculties and those who think it engages a distinctive one”. The first group desiring the engagement of aesthetic experience and art with other spheres of knowledge and practice, while the other their segregation or purification. See Guyer, *A History of Modern Aesthetics*, vol. 1, 27–28.

the inclusive historiography of aesthetics overthrows the central role ascribed to Western modernity by the exclusive histories, and brings forth new and unmapped fields of study. However, these histories are endangered by the possibilities (1) of becoming all-inclusive, and (2) of preserving the remnants of the exclusive (aesthetic) preconceptions.

If the inclusive definition becomes all-inclusive (which often reveals an obscure or missing definition) the historical field of aesthetics becomes borderless. An all-embracing history of aesthetics can easily turn into a container of various authors' various statements on artistic practices or products, beauty or human sensate life, thus the history of aesthetics can merge into intellectual history, offering histories of certain concepts, interesting hints, or allusions. In the worst case, it turns into a grandiose cabinet of curiosities. Even this broad, inclusive sense of aesthetics has to imply some sort of exclusion, but as I have mentioned earlier, it is a permanent and necessary task of historical inquiries to find the adequate question and field of study, i.e. *the right sort* of exclusion. Inclusive histories, when facing various historical texts and traditions, have to find the adequate and refined meaning of aesthetics, even if it means admitting the inadequacy of our Western and modern perspective determined by the concept of the aesthetic.

In his previously quoted article, Justin Smith writes that "[h]istorians of philosophy can help current philosophers to gain perspective on their projects by showing them the scope and range of what has been able to pass as an important philosophical question in different times and places, thereby providing a picture of the flexibility and contingency of what ought to count as a philosophical question."⁴¹ However, this argument is more complicated in the case of the inclusive histories of aesthetics. In the case of philosophy the word itself was used, although some of the activities and the results of those activities are not considered to be parts of philosophy today. In the case of the inclusive historiography of aesthetics, however, it is often the historian herself who labels some texts or traditions as part of aesthetics, even if these were not called aesthetics before (e.g. ancient Greek aesthetics, Japanese aesthetics,

41 Smith, "The History of Philosophy as Past and Process," 39–40.

etc.). There is a similar problem in the case of exclusive histories when they incorporate discourses that did not use the term (e.g. British philosophies of taste), but while their question was “on what grounds can this incorporation be justified, i.e. how does the given subject relate to the concept of the aesthetic?,” the question of inclusive historiography is “in what sense is it ‘aesthetics’ and what do we gain by this labelling?”

The second danger appears when a history of aesthetics incorporates pre-modern and/or non-Western traditions without abandoning the questions or pre-conceptions inherited from the aesthetic tradition of Western modernity (e.g. by searching for forerunners or “aesthetic issues” without being attentive to the differences between contexts or terms), since it is the concept of the aesthetic itself that becomes extremely problematic when it comes to earlier ages or different cultural backgrounds. If due to lack of historical self-transparency the abandonment of the aesthetic is not fully achieved, the concept of the aesthetic will become meaningless, and the interpretation will miss the specificity or alterity of pre-modern/non-Western texts or practices: in the worst case, it will depreciate whole ages and cultures as traditions that have nothing to say about human sensate life, beauty, or art just because they do not work with the modern concept of the aesthetic.

If, for example, a historian wants to find a full-fledged philosophy of art in medieval philosophical texts, she will go home empty-handed. Besides, she will miss what “medieval aesthetics” can offer. Based on Nida-Rümelin’s cited proposal for a broader, pluralistic definition of aesthetics, Ákos Cseke claims that since medieval aesthetics can be conceived as (1) the philosophy of beauty, encompassing the connection between the beauty of sensual reality, the beauty of the divine and the beauty of the soul and (2) the philosophy of love, since it was mainly the context of love in which the questions raised by beauty were treated medieval aesthetics can offer various perspectives on the pre-Cartesian body-soul nexus, the theological implications of the experience of beauty, the connection between the sensual and the transcendent, etc.⁴² What once

42 See Ákos Cseke, *A középkor és az esztétika* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 2011), 67–68 and *passim*.

seemed to be a barren land and sometimes a field of limitless possibilities for contemporary theories to build an “aesthetic dream”, now becomes an intellectual landscape that is worthy of our attention on its own merits.⁴³

For another example of the limited scope of the aesthetic gaze of Western modernity, one can turn to “Japanese aesthetics”. Before the nineteenth-century Western influence that resulted in the need for comprehensive philosophical aesthetic theories, Japanese aesthetics primarily comprised discipline-specific texts, which provided techniques and rules for the production of artefacts, but also for a proper way of living, an open, sensitive attitude considered necessary for an artist/craftsman. The Japanese concept of art does not make up a distinct, autonomous sphere and it does not exclude the various crafts. Japanese arts can be considered “ways” or “pathways” (*dō*): flower arrangement (*ikebana*), calligraphy, martial arts or tea ceremonies (*chadō*) but also the professional arts in some aspects are ways of self-cultivation, “ways of being in the world”, forms of spiritual enlightenment. Thus, aesthetic practices and theories are inseparable from the “ethical” or the “religious” aspects of their Confucian, Shintō and Buddhist cultural context.⁴⁴ Furthermore, if

43 Cseke gives some examples of how the teleological pre-histories of modern aesthetics almost completely neglected or retrospectively misinterpreted medieval aesthetics, which tendency is represented by the seminal narratives of William Knight, K. E. Gilbert and H. Kuhn, and also by contemporary “companions to aesthetics”. Cseke also mentions different narratives, which on the contrary, emphasize the central role of the middle ages in aesthetic thought, listing the works of the Neo-Scholastic and Neo-Thomist Jacques Maritain, Étienne Gilson, and later authors like Rosario Assunto, Edgar de Bruyne, Umberto Eco or Władysław Tatarkiewicz. Cseke points out the problematic aspects of the four latter narratives: the meaning of “aesthetics” is often limitless, thus every mentioning of beauty or art gains importance, turning the history of aesthetics into cultural history. The various texts these authors analyse are taken out of their original context, which makes it easier for them to build an “aesthetic dream”, which is executed from the perspective of modern aesthetics. Finally, he names some positive examples as well, who, according to Cseke, managed to respect the specific “aesthetic” approaches of the Middle Ages, like Hans Urs von Balthasar’s “theological aesthetics” (1961-69) or Wilhelm Perpeet’s *Ästhetik im Mittelalter* (1977). See *Ibid.*, 44–65.

44 See Robert E. Carter, *The Japanese Arts and Self-Cultivation* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2008).

one looks at the Japanese crafts/arts I have just mentioned, it will be clear that Japanese aesthetics (philosophical understanding *and* everyday practice) concentrates on multisensory experiences in our somatic encounters with artefacts or other things in the world. While delineating the above mentioned characteristics, Yuriko Saito points out a kind of “egalitarianism” in Japanese aesthetics, not just among the senses or of specific properties, but also among the arts, crafts, natural objects or the everyday.⁴⁵ And finally, it is also significant to emphasize that one probably reduces the complexity and possible relations of the specific qualities of Japanese aesthetics, such as *wabi* (austere beauty), *sabi* (desolateness, rusticity) or *iki* (refinement),⁴⁶ if they are approached in terms of the qualities Western aesthetics regards to be “aesthetic”.

3. Conclusion

Determined by the concept of the aesthetic, the exclusive histories operate within the relatively restricted historical terrain of Western modernity, which might suggest that the different exclusive inquiries are in accord with one another and that they reveal a homogeneous aesthetic enclave. However, the different narratives and interpretive orientations disclose the historical versatility of the concept of the aesthetic and the transgressive character of aesthetics, and thus the biggest danger for the exclusive histories seems to be the unquestioned retrospective expansion of an essentialist or monist interpretation of the aesthetic. This problem becomes more salient in the case of the study of historical borderlands such as the early modern discourses of taste. If a historical study is based on the retrospective expansion of an essentialist definition of the aesthetic, unable to see its own limits and what lies beyond them, it might fail to recognize the richness of the beginnings of Western modern aesthetics and of the later complexity of the modern aesthetic tradi-

45 For her short summary see Yuriko Saito, “Japanese aesthetics,” in *A Companion to Aesthetics*, ed. Stephen Davies et al. (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 384–387.

46 For these qualities see Graham Parkes, “Japanese Aesthetics,” *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Winter 2011), accessed June 21, 2015: <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/japanese-aesthetics>

tion. I argue that instead of discarding aspects of certain discourses, theories or practices that do not suit a particular, anachronous definition of the aesthetic, maybe it is the applied definition, i.e. our “fore-projection”, that should be revised.

The inclusive histories explode the cultural and historical terrain held together by the concept of the aesthetic and bring forth new and unmapped fields of study. Nevertheless, the inclusive conception of the history of aesthetics does not mean that everything will be given a place in these histories that has something to do with human sensate life, art (in the broadest sense) or certain properties. It is a permanent task to define the proper meaning of aesthetics and the plausible subject of historical research: it is always the text, tradition, author, period, etc. that determines what can be regarded as aesthetics, what is relevant to its historical study and what can we gain from labelling something as “aesthetics”. These histories have to overcome the Western and modern perspectives, and let the historical materials help them gain a better one. It is not to say that we can leave ourselves behind in an interpretation, but the least we can do is to be ready to do so.

One may point out that the inclusive narratives obscure the specificity of Western modern aesthetics (the rise of the aesthetic). My answer to this is that it should not be the case, since the inclusive conception is based on the respect towards the specificity of every aesthetic tradition, and that it can only happen if an inclusive history (e.g. a study of medieval aesthetics) keeps an exclusive perspective (e.g. a search for a full-fledged philosophy of art). Nevertheless it is true that as a result of the inclusive histories the oppressive political/theoretical dominance of Western modernity collapses. However, this loss of power implies many advantages at the same time. Venturing into non-modern or non-Western terrains beyond the concept of the aesthetic is a *provocation* for contemporary Western aesthetics: inclusive historical narratives can compel it to rethink what it is, or maybe even to reconfigure itself. It seems extremely important now, when not only a trans- or intercultural atmosphere, but also a certain anti-aestheticism dominate the philosophy of art. By facing different ideas and concepts, inclusive histories have the potential to dynamize contemporary aesthetic theories, but only if they grasp the alterity of their subject. The expanded historical horizon (inter-

estingly, much more than the study of Western historical borderlands) has already given strong impetus to contemporary aesthetics, including its orientations, interests, and approaches: opposing the art-based research of twentieth-century analytic philosophical aesthetics various fields of study have been (re-)discovered and institutionalized. As an example, one can mention the crucial insights that the aesthetics of the environmental,⁴⁷ the everyday,⁴⁸ and the somatic⁴⁹ have gained from Eastern aesthetic traditions.

It seems that the inclusive histories of aesthetics have many advantages, political and hermeneutical, since they can make us aware of the great variety of philosophies and practices by which various traditions aimed at understanding or developing human sensate life, and our productive or receptive encounters with our arts, natural environments and their various qualities. Similarly, a more nuanced and sensitive historical study of the transgressive and rich aesthetic tradition of Western modernity could also dynamize contemporary aesthetics by revealing the historically changing, volatile character of the modern concept of the aesthetic. The “creative redescription” of the historical borderland of the formation of the aesthetic is particularly important in this respect, since its study can challenge our understanding of the aesthetic and make us reconsider the scope of the concept. What is needed is a self-reflexive, open and attentive historiography that admits its own concepts, assumptions and interests, but is ready to revise them by following the lead of the historical material it wants to understand. Various aesthetic discourses – be they closer or further from us in time or

47 See for example Allen Carlson's chapter on the appreciation of Japanese gardens as examples of the “dialectical interaction” between art and nature, but more importantly, Carlson's remark on Japanese aesthetics in arguments against art-centred analytic aesthetics and in support of certain modes of appreciating nature. Allen Carlson, *Aesthetics and the Environment: The Appreciation of Nature, Art and Architecture* (London – New York: Routledge, 2000), 165–175, 8.

48 See Yuriko Saito, *Everyday Aesthetics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

49 See Richard Shusterman, “Body Consciousness and Performance: Somaesthetics East and West” and “Asian *Ars Erotica* and the Question of Sexual Aesthetics,” in *Thinking through the Body*, 197–215, 262–287.

space – can make us see our own concepts, methods, traditions or contemporary orientations in a different light, but only if we let them do so.

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Philosophers' Salon des Refusés
On How Much Extracanoncal
Thinkers Matter

Ádám Smrcz

The notion of the history of philosophy can be grasped – broadly speaking – in two different ways: firstly, as a mere catalogue of ideas, and secondly, as a narrative constructed upon them. In the first case, the history of philosophy is mainly used as a sceptical argument by showing that different theories can provide equally plausible solutions to the same questions and these solutions mutually refute each other. However, in the second case, the history of philosophy is incorporated into the philosophy of history.

In my paper I will argue that the history of philosophy has traditionally been “conservative” and this has been so – at least in large part – due to the fear from scepticism. In the first part of my essay I shed light on the strong correlation between scepticism and the beginnings of writing the history of philosophy. In the second part, I will refer to an early modern approach for self-canonization dealing with Justus Lipsius’ account of the history of philosophy in order to show that it was first of all the spectre of scepticism against what the “dogmatic” authors had to fight in order to find their way into the canon. Finally, I will show that concerning their method the extracanoncal thinkers like Lipsius, were not at all far from contemporary approaches aiming at the widening of the current canon of thinkers.



Introduction

The notion of the history of philosophy can be grasped – broadly speaking – in two different ways: firstly, as a mere catalogue of ideas, and secondly, as a narrative constructed upon them. In the first case, the history of philosophy is mainly used as a sceptical argument by showing that different theories can provide equally plausible solutions to the same questions and these solutions mutually refute each other.

However, in the second case, the history of philosophy is incorporated into the philosophy of history. Attempts of the latter type were labelled by Paul Ricœur as “eclectic”. Their aim is to give account of the previous theories by telling a narrative of progress. According to Ricœur such attempts – the most famous of which was obviously Hegel’s – lacked a creative genius, and merely “put the pieces of truth together.” Even if this could be an attractive solution to the riddle of the sceptics Ricœur calls us to take courage, and make history of philosophy without philosophy of history”.¹

Ricœur’s solution to the riddle (which might be called *historical personalism*) is that any historian should suspend her judgement concerning the truth-value of any claim she ever comes across (an *epoché* must be carried out in a somewhat Husserlian sense of “bracketing”), and her task is to confront the theory with others, by treating it with “equal sympathy”, in order to understand its motives. Ricœur’s attempt would not simply entail an atomistic catalogue of *personae*, but would rather construct a chain of communication between thinkers of the past and present, and hence replace philosophy of history with historical understanding of the past: we should “move from the ‘monadic’ [concept of] truth to the truth of monadology by a kind of mental addition of all perspectives.”²

It must be noted, however, that Ricœur does not give us any criterion to decide who can be considered the *personae* of the history of philosophy: when he speaks about the history of philosophy as a conversation between great thinkers, he does not tell us who these

1 Paul Ricœur, “The History of Philosophy and the Unity of Truth,” in *History and Truth* (Northwestern University Press: Evanston, 1998), 56.

2 Ricœur, “The History of...,” 52.

great thinkers are, or on what grounds they can be identified. Secondly, while trying to confront “the eclectic” philosophy of history Ricœur still presupposes the unity of one single chain concerning the history philosophy, and fails to reflect on the possibility of multiple lines.³ This can be seen in the case of Ricœur’s rejection of using such labels as “rationalism” or “empiricism” by claiming that the accidental meaning they may add to a certain thinker can distort our image of her oeuvre. For example, considering Descartes merely as a rationalist thinker will necessarily entail the overestimation of certain parts of his oeuvre and the underestimation of some others. The conclusion follows, that the subjects of the history of philosophy should be persons instead of labels.

This question raises the problem of canonization in the field of the history of philosophy. Famously, the name, *Salon des Refusés* was given to an exhibition space in 19th-century-Paris, where artefacts, not acknowledged by academic standards, were shown. However extra-canonical might have been at their origin, some of the exhibited works have found their way into the canon later – as some well-known cases suggest. Even if there is no completely stable canon, the dynamism of the various canons significantly differs, e.g. the mere fact that canon theory plays an important role in literary criticism or in art history reveals the fact that these fields are shaped by significant changes.

No such changes can, however, be observed concerning the history of philosophy, which remains a rather neglected discipline. As for example Lisa Shapiro has pointed out, the contemporary canon of early modern philosophy has been steadily consisted of seven authors (Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, Hume and Kant), and only very recently has been considerable attention turned to such thinkers as Malebranche, Gassendi, Newton or Thomas Reid.⁴ We could hence assume that philosophical canons are somehow more static than the canons of other historical disciplines.

In my paper I will argue that the history of philosophy has traditionally been “conservative” and this has been so – at least in large

3 Gábor Boros, “Filozófia, történelem, történetek”, *Élet és Irodalom* 7 (2013): 13.

4 Lisa Shapiro, “What is a philosophical canon,” draft.

part – due to the fear from scepticism. In the first part of my essay I shed light on the strong correlation between scepticism and the beginnings of writing the history of philosophy. In the second part, I will refer to an early modern approach for self-canonization dealing with Justus Lipsius' account of the history of philosophy in order to show that it was first of all the spectre of scepticism against what the “dogmatic” authors had to fight in order to find their way into the canon. Finally, I will show that concerning their method the extracanonical thinkers like Lipsius, were not at all far from contemporary approaches aiming at the widening of the current canon of thinkers.

History of philosophy and scepticism

Before focusing on the ways of canonization one should ask what kind of benefit could be expected from dynamizing philosophical canons by following the examples of literary ones. At the same time one should not forget the fact that the relationship between the history of philosophy and “philosophy proper” is much less harmonious than, say, between literary history and literary criticism, and hence comparing the two might seem arbitrary.

The situation is even more confusing if we look back at the beginnings of writing history of philosophy: while some contemporary theories would consider the history of philosophy as merely useless,⁵ many ancient (and some modern) authors regard the history of philosophy as a legitimate and straightforward assault on “philosophy proper”. In antiquity the harmless, merely descriptive narratives of the so called *diadochographers* were developed into sceptical arguments by some *heresiographers* (historians of sects), whose attempt was to demonstrate the impossibility of any philosophical knowledge by pointing out that there are plenty of seemingly convincing philosophical standpoints and they are mutually refuting each other.⁶

5 Tom Sorrel, “On saying no to History of Philosophy,” in *Analytic Philosophy and History of Philosophy*, eds. Tom Sorrel and G.A.J. Rogers (Oxford University Press, 2005), 43–61.

6 Lucien Braun, *A filozófiatörténet története*, trans. Kornél Steiger (Budapest: Holnap kiadó, 2001).

The contrast is further strengthened by the fact that Pierre Bayle – who is considered as both the pioneer of modern historians of philosophy and the emblematic figure of early modern Pyrrhonism – can be regarded as the follower of the above mentioned heresio-graphic tradition: the immediate goal of his *Dictionnaire Historique et Critique* was not only to provide a grandiose catalogue of thinkers and theories but also to reveal the contradictions between them. It is not at all clear what the final goal of Bayle’s project was. Some hints, however, suggest that his aim was to replace philosophy with philology as the only means providing certainty:⁷

I have decided that, as far as it is possible for me, I would compile the greatest collection of errors [recueil des fautes] that can be found in dictionaries, and that, no matter how extended these are, I would not confine myself to a smaller latitude, but I would go through any author on occasion.⁸

Bayle did not intend to provide a *canon* of philosophers, he aimed at providing a *catalogue* of past writers, presumably for the sake of making his reader uncertain about the truth value of any philosophy. Since human abilities are not at all satisfactory for obtaining the truth, Bayle’s work was not supposed to serve this goal either. According to the previously mentioned dedicatory letter attached to the *Dictionnaire*, the noblest thing such a work can aim at is some kind of “decent diverting” of the reader.

It is absolutely true, that there are things the value of which are determined regarding their contribution to the soul’s decent diverting [*honnête divertissement*], or serve as simply its ornament.⁹

Self-canonization – The early modern version

It was obviously not only at the end of the seventeenth century when the spectre of scepticism started haunting. The early modern period provides us with numerous examples, in which thinkers needed

7 Adam Smrcz, “Bayle és a ‘belles lettres’ – egy szkeptikus érvei a bölcsészettudományok mellett,” *Elpisz* 2 (2014): 33–44.

8 Pierre Bayle, “Projet d’un Dictionnaire Critique á M. du Rondel”, *Dictionnaire Historique et Critique*, XV (Paris: 1820), 223.

9 Pierre Bayle, “Projet...”, 239.

to justify their claims for being considered as legitimate philosophers. Such motivation can be seen in Pierre Gassendi's legitimizing approaches concerning Epicureanism, Ralph Cudworth's similar intention concerning ancient atomism or Justus Lipsius' rehabilitation of ancient Stoicism.¹⁰ The enumeration of thinkers could be continued at great length, but since Lipsius' case is a striking example, it will be enough for our purposes.

After creating a significant oeuvre in philology Lipsius made his debut on the philosophical scene with his 1584 work, *De Constantia*. The dialogue, which consensually marks the beginning of Neo-Stoicism, mainly deals with the ethical question of how one should endure the so-called *publica mala*. According to the Lipsian suggestion, *recta ratio* can enable us getting rid of such false affections as *caritas* (which is in reality nothing else than *amor*), and helps us focus on determining whatever in fact depends on us.

Even if it was a revolutionary claim already it still would not have sparked such a great controversy as the so-called "Stoicism debate." They were rather the deterministic implications of the Lipsian theory of causation, which were mostly unacceptable for many. The main difference between Neo-Stoicism and its ancient forerunners was also based on Lipsius' subtle distinction between his and others' theories of causation. In a brief historical overview in *De Constantia*, the author drew a distinction between three types of fate: *fatum mathematicum* (a concept borrowed from the Hermetic tradition according to which agents are considered to be heavenly bodies), *fatum naturale* (defined by Alexander of Aphrodisias as a chain of natural causes in which the same agents always necessarily produce the very same effects) and *fatum violentum* (an unbreakable chain of causes where effects are necessarily produced). Seemingly being eager to rule out all the previously mentioned conceptions Lipsius acknowledges the difficulties involved in the Stoic theory of *fatum violentum* as well: (1) while the first two systems did leave some space for contingent liberty,¹¹ the Stoic view subordinated even God himself to fate. (2) According to the Stoic theory of fate, an eternal

10 Adam Smrcz, „General Consent and Universal Morality,” in *Is a Universal Morality Possible?* (Budapest: L'Harmattan, 2015), 104–115.

11 “If someone dies due to some internal cause lacking any external impetus that is due to fate [...]. [But] that is beyond fate's borders [praeter fatum] if someone

order of causes exists.¹² (3) The Stoic concept of fate rejects the idea that human beings might have contingent liberty.

The above outlined theory of causation was so scandalous, that labelling someone as a Stoic became an insult in the 17th century. The Hobbes-Bramhall debate on free will, for example, bears testimony of such insults. In his debate with Thomas Hobbes, John Bramhall accused the “Malmesbury monster” of defending Stoic claims. Bramhall suggests that the Stoics had to distinguish between “Stoic fate” and “Christian fate” in order to maintain their determinism.¹³ Although Hobbes expressly denies to even have heard about this distinction,¹⁴ it is obvious that he was well-versed in Lipsian Stoicism which is the source of Bramhall’s distinction.¹⁵ Even more interestingly, he approves of the major claims which Bramhall rightly associated with (Neo-)Stoicism.

The stake of Stoic causation will be even clearer if one recalls its implication concerning the restriction of divine agency. Those who intended to refute determinism had to defend the freedom of both human and divine will. Ralph Cudworth, one of Hobbes’ opponents, emphasizes that God cannot be blamed for human errors. He claims that the theory of responsibility depends on a notion imprinted into our souls. This notion is responsible for determining which agents are responsible for their actions. We intuitively should not blame, for example, the clock for its malfunction, only its manufacturer. Still, the same intuition suggests the opposite in the case of human beings: for their wicked actions they must be blamed not their manufacturer.

Though the Lipsian Neo-Stoicism was extremely popular is also became the target of many high-ranking opponents, and was at the

dies due to a sword or because of fire.” Justus Lipsius, *De Constantia libri duo* (Antwerp), 55–60.

12 “[Something can be inconstant only] from our point of view, since everything flows according to a fixed and unchangeable order.” Lipsius, *De Constantia...*, 52–55.

13 Vere Chapell ed., *Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity* (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 6.

14 “[b]ut this distinction I have not used nor indeed ever heard before [...]” Chapell, *Hobbes and...*, 29.

15 Christopher Brooke, *Philosophic Pride: Stoicism and Political Thought from Lipsius to Rousseau* (2012), 59–76.

heart of many debates. Lipsius' 1604 treatise, *Manuductio ad Stoicam Philosophiam* can hence be interpreted as mainly apologetical. Compared to other works of the Lipsian oeuvre, it mainly bears resemblance to the *De Constantia* concerning its genre and theme, but there is at least one significant difference as well: the dialogue begins with a brief survey of the different philosophical schools (sects), and the question, to which school should one adhere. This question is posed by an unnamed student, Auditor, in the very beginning:

Although hesitantly, but I have decided to learn what you call the truth. [But] since I see several schools [sectas] or ways of philosophers, which way is what could I safely take? And which one will lead me [to my goal] in a shorter and safer way?¹⁶

Lipsius affirms the legitimacy of this question, since "each school has its own leader, a principal figure, a great man, who should be revered,"¹⁷ and this makes the decision complicated.

„[N]ullius nomen fero" – or the curse of labelling

Lipsius begins with giving a catalogue of the current sects. According to him, there are two contenders for the principal role among these: the Peripatetics and the Stoics. The two other candidates would have been the Epicureans and the Academists (referring here to the Sceptics, rather than the Platonists), but general consent ["*communis consensio*"] had turned against the former group while the latter were abandoned by most of their students since they did not offer them any knowledge any more. So returning to the two remaining contenders, Lipsius acknowledges that the Peripatetics are more popular and accepted than the Stoics, but being so, they can barely offer any novel answer to philosophical questions. Introducing the Stoics (or any other school) to the canon would hence provide the dusty libraries with some fresh air. But how would it be possible?

16 Justus Lipsius, *Manuductio ad Stoicam Philosophiam libri tres* (Antwerp, 1610), 12.

17 Lipsius, *Manuductio*..., 12.

Lipsius' answer is similar to some contemporary approaches aiming at the revision of philosophical canons.¹⁸ The current typology of philosophical schools should be – even if not completely abolished, but – strictly reduced to a propedeutical function:

The youth need a teacher and some theses, which they can get used to. Just like the leaves – says Seneca – cannot live by themselves either, so they strive for a branch, to which they can adhere, and from which they extract humidity as well: the same is true concerning theses, which are weak while alone, and schools want them stuck.¹⁹

A single thesis hence, needs a particular school as a background in order to provide it with both authority and argumentative basis. It can be useful as far as it serves educational or propedeutical purposes, but adult men should no longer be restricted – according to Lipsius – by such paradigms because it would hinder the canonization of new theses or arguments: in a quasi Kuhnian way Lipsius calls the protection of elder paradigms “selfishness or shyness”:

As I have said, this is what the youth need: what selfishness or shyness would it be, if we would not let adult men go farther? How many extraordinary things were said by Pythagoreans or Stoics about theology, ethics or physics itself? And there were certainly others as well [who did so]. This is what I shouldn't approach, what I shouldn't vindicate to myself and shouldn't regard it as my legitimate heritage from my ancestors? [...] I myself will begin to keep the inventions and inventors of wisdom in honour, but only as a man does regarding men, who are not his lords, but only his leaders. Who can be considered to be wise so happily, indeed in a divine way, that he 'would have always said truth in whatever came out of his mouth'. There has never been such a person, and will not be either.²⁰

The way how Lipsius intended to clear the way for his new philosophy was eclecticism, not in Ricoeur's sense but much closer to the sense in which Cicero and other ancient eclectics used it:

My purpose was solely not to adhere to any single man or detached school. What serfdom that would be! Someone else should take that burden: you rather should dare to say it with me, or with Seneca: I

18 Cf. Ricoeur, “*The History...*”; or Boros, “*Filozófia*”.

19 Lipsius, *Manuductio...*, 12.

20 *Ibid.*, 12.

have not devoted myself to be the property of any man [mancipavi],
and I do not bear anyone's name [nullius nomen fero].²¹

Hence, in Lipsius' case eclecticism is dictated by the principles of Stoicism itself. In this case emancipation ("ex manu capere" – "freeing oneself from something") is conceived of as freedom from any kind of labelling: not by telling a progressive narrative of the history of philosophy, but merely by *deconstructing* the labels.

If it is permitted at all to be partial, there is only one school which we can safely subscribe to [nomen demus]. This is ἐκλεκτική) which could be translated as eclectic), [and] which was introduced by a certain Potamo of Alexandria in almost the same sense I am using it.²²

4. Conclusion

What the Lipsian theory of "self-canonization" has in common with some contemporary approaches to the history of philosophy is its eagerness to "deconstruct" the labels of historical lines. In Lipsius' case, there was an imminent danger in this attempt, since this "deconstruction" could have ended up in the trap of the Sceptics by reducing the history of philosophy into a mere catalogue of thinkers and theories. He had to burst the preexisting canon but also remain a dogmatist. Still, regarding contemporary approaches aiming at the reformation of canons, no such fear of scepticism is any longer justifiable: since the historian of philosophy has become the ally of the historian of ideas, and hence has to regard philosophical theories or arguments not merely *qua* theories or arguments, but as historical facts, the spectre of scepticism can haunt him no longer. Ricœur's epoché is employed here instinctively or in an unreflected way.

Being so, the question remains open: why are philosophical canons so conservative, and how much do extracanonial thinkers matter? Lipsius's example shows the difficulties which must be faced by any extracanonial thinker in order to legitimate her project. Historians of philosophy may have learned the lesson of history too well, and may render any extracanonial thinker suspicious without giving a second thought to her position.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 12.

²² *Ibid.*, 12.

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11

The Optics of Philosophy On the Method of Philosophy Following the Hegelian and Husserlian Path

Marosán Bence Péter

There is no period in the history of philosophy which is free from sceptical doubts. Scepticism calls into question the meaningfulness and solvability of philosophical problems, i.e. the so-called “last questions”. Although one cannot deny that there are important differences between the Hegelian and the Husserlian philosophy, it must also be noted that both of them were trying to overcome the challenge of scepticism and, in doing so, they attempted to redefine the philosophy as a strict science that is immune to scepticism and is capable of answering the last questions of human existence. Since one cannot speak about the “last questions” without facing the problem of the nature of the “philosophical truth”, in the first part of my study I try to point out which presuppositions must be met in order to enable us to speak about philosophical truth. After that, I am dealing with Hegel’s and Husserl’s concept of the philosophical truth by pointing out some important similarities and differences between them. Then, in the third part of my paper I would like to propose some thoughts on this topic, e.g. I will introduce the concept of “the optics of philosophy” which might be useful in thinking about the nature of philosophical truth. In the final part of the paper I am reflecting on some normative elements of the philosophical research, because these normative elements might have an influence on the results or final conclusions of the

philosophical research. I am trying to shed light both on the self-responsibility (Selbstverantwortung) of the philosophers and on the intersubjective components of normativity.

Filozófiai optika: A filozófia módszeréről Hegel és Husserl nyomán

A filozófia történetét végigkíséri a szkepticizmus, mely végső soron azt teszi kérdésessé, hogy a filozófia kérdései, az úgynevezett végső kérdések értelmesek-e, és adható-e rájuk egyáltalán értelmes válasz. Jelen tanulmányban amellet érvelek, hogy ugyan Hegel és Husserl filozófiája között jelentős különbségek vannak, mégis, mindketten osztoztak abban az alapvető célkitűzésben, hogy választ adjanak a szkepticizmus kihívására, és egyúttal kísérletet tegyenek a szkepticizmus ellen „immunizált” filozófia szigorú tudománnyá alakítására, mely képes választ adni a filozófia és az emberi létezés végső kérdéseire. Minthogy a „végső kérdésekre” adott válasz lényegileg összefügg a „filozófiai igazság” problémájával, ezért a tanulmány első részében azzal foglalkozom, hogy milyen előfeltételeknek kell teljesülniük ahhoz, hogy filozófiai igazságról egyáltalán értelmesen tudjunk beszélni. Ezt követően a filozófiai igazság husserli és hegeli felfogásával foglalkozom, párhuzamosságokat és különbségeket keresve a két gondolkodó között. Ezután, a harmadik szakaszban szeretnék néhány saját megfontolást megfogalmazni, így bemutatnám a „filozófiai optika” fogalmát, amely segíthet eligazodni ebben a kérdésben. Végül, a befejező, negyedik részben szeretnék kitérni a filozófiai kutatás bizonyos normatív elemeire és vonásaira; melyekről úgy gondolom, hogy a kutatás tartalmi eredményeire, konkrét végkifejletére is hatással lehetnek, így például a filozófus személyes felelősségére (Selbstverantwortung) vagy a normativitás interszubjektív vonatkozásaira.



Bevezetés

A filozófia történetét végigkíséri a szkepticizmus, mely végső soron azt teszi kérdésessé, hogy a filozófia kérdései, az úgynevezett végső kérdések értelmesek-e, és adható-e rájuk egyáltalán értelmes válasz. A filozófia története legalább annyira a szkepticizmus története is, a filozófia hasznosságával és hatékonyságával kapcsolatos szkepszis története. Hegel és Husserl filozófiája, bármennyire is különbözzék egyébként, osztozott abban az alapvető célkitűzésben, hogy választ adjon a szkepticizmus kihívására, és egyúttal kísérletet tegyen a szkepticizmus ellen „immunizált” filozófia szigorú tudománnyá alakítására, mely képes választ adni a filozófia és az emberi létezés végső kérdéseire. A „végső kérdésekre” adott válasz lényegileg összefügg a „filozófiai igazság” problémájával. Alább többek között azt próbálom megmutatni, hogy Hegel és Husserl elképzelése a filozófiai igazság természetéről bizonyos lényegi pontokon érintkezett egymással.

Az alábbi tanulmány négy nagy részre oszlik. Az elsőben azzal foglalkozom, hogy milyen előfeltételeknek kell teljesülniük ahhoz, hogy filozófiai igazságról egyáltalán értelmesen tudjunk beszélni. Ebben az első részben már szóba hozom Hegel és Husserl ezzel kapcsolatos bizonyos megfontolásait is. A második rész témája a filozófiai igazság husserli és hegeli felfogása lesz. Ennek során kiemelek bizonyos párhuzamokat és különbségeket, melyeket a jelen írás szempontjából a leginkább fontosnak érzek. A harmadik részben a korábbi eredmények alapján szeretnék megkockáztatni néhány saját megfontolást a vizsgált kérdéssel kapcsolatban. Itt teszem vizsgálat tárgyává a „filozófiai optika” fogalmát, melyről úgy érzem, segíthet eligazodni ebben a kérdésben. Végül a befejező, negyedik részben szeretnék kitérni a filozófiai kutatás bizonyos normatív elemeire és vonásaira; melyekről úgy gondolom, hogy a kutatás tartalmi eredményeire, konkrét végkifejletére is hatással lehetnek.

A filozófiai kutatás előfeltételei

Azzal a sajátos paradoxonnal szembesülünk a filozófiai kutatás kezdetén, hogy a filozófusnak előfeltételeznie kell bizonyos konkrét filozófiai tézisek, elképzelések igazságát, melyekről joggal jelenthet-

jük ki, hogy maguk is filozófiai bizonyításra szorúlnak, de amelyek igazságának előfeltételezése nélkül a filozófiai kutatás mint olyan el sem kezdődhetne. A filozófus tehát, munkája kezdetén, körköröségekbe botlik; ahogy erre egyébként mind Hegel, mind Husserl felfigyelt munkája során.¹ Ilyen tézisnek tartom, hogy létezik tudattól független valóság (tehát a szolipszizmus mint filozófiai pozíció téves), valamint, hogy nyelvünk szavai végső soron ugyanannak a mindannyiunk által osztott közös valóságnak az elemeire és tényeire referálnak (tehát a radikális nyelvi relativizmus álláspontja ugyancsak téves). Ha *tagadjuk* azt, hogy egyazon nyilvános világban élünk, mely világ gondolkodásunk és nyelvünk számára hozzáférhető, és hogy gondolatainkat a kommunikáció útján sikeresen meg tudjuk osztani a többi emberrel (tehát, hogy valóban megértenek, és nem félreértenek), akkor tagadnunk kell a filozófiai megismerés, végső soron egyáltalán bármiféle megismerés lehetőségét is. Ezen a ponton nyitva hagyjuk a kérdést, hogy a szolipszizmus különböző fajtái (ebben az esetben az érzetmonista és a nyelvi szolipszizmus) hogyan és milyen mértékben cáfolható, illetve filozófiailag egzakt módon hogyan haladható meg (Hegel és Husserl egyaránt cáfolha-

1 Körköröség Hegelnél: Pl. Hegel, *Előadások a filozófia történetéről III.* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1977), 394. Kant kapcsán: megismerni azelőtt, hogy ténylegesen megismernénk, olyan, mintha meg akarnánk tanulni úszni anélkül, hogy vízbe merészkednünk. Még: *A logika tudománya II.* [német: Werke 6: 567]. Ld. erről még: Tom Rockmore, *Hegel's Circular Epistemology* (Indiana University Press, 1986); Michael Forster, „Hegel's Dialectical Method,” in Frederick Beiser (szerk.), *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel* (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 130–170, Csikós Ella, *Élő gondolkodás. A folyamatfilozófia klasszikusai: Hegel és Whitehead* (Budapest: L'Harmattan kiadó, 2008), 104–115, 241–271.

Körköröség Husserlnél: pl. Husserliana, Edmund Husserl *Gesammelte Werke* (a továbbiakban *Hua*) 19/1: 22sk vagy „Egyfajta körben találjuk magunkat. A kezdeteket csak a tudomány mai alakja alapján, fejlődésére visszapiillantva érthetjük meg teljesen. A *kezdetek* megértése nélkül viszont ez a fejlődés mint *az értelem fejlődése*: értelmetlen. Nincs más hátra: »cikkcakkban« kell hol előre, hol hátrafelé haladnunk – a lépéseknek egymással kölcsönhatásban kell segíteniük egymást.” Edmund Husserl, *Az európai tudományok válsága és a transzcendentális filozófia I-II*, ford. Mezei Balázs (Budapest: Atlantisz kiadó, 1998), 83. Ld. még ehhez: Varga Péter András, »Mintha egy találóskép lenne« - Edmund Husserl kései filozófiájának módszertani és történelmi megközelíthetőségéről,” in *Kortársunk Husserl. Tanulmányok a 150 éves Edmund Husserl filozófiájáról*, szerk. Varga Péter András és Zuh Deodáth (Budapest: ELTE-Eötvös, 2013), 89–114.

tónak és meghaladhatónak gondolta), azt mindenesetre tényként szeretném rögzíteni, hogy a szolipszizmus elfogadása megakadályozza, hogy a filozófia egyáltalán elkezdődhessen. Ha abból indulunk ki, hogy a szolipszizmus hamis, akkor egyfelől elkezdhetünk filozofálni, másfelől, egy magasabb szinten, visszatérhetünk a szolipszizmus elvi igényű cáfolatára, amennyiben ez lehetséges.

Szkepticizmusként interpretálva a szolipszizmus a közvetlen bizonyosságok olyan szűk körébe próbál bezárni bennünket, amelynek alapján a valóban égető, bennünket létünkben érintő filozófiai kérdéseknek (test-elme probléma, az akarat szabadsága, Isten létezése – ha nagy tétekben akarunk játszani) a közelébe sem mehetünk. Hegel és Husserl némileg hasonló stratégiával él, hogy ezen a radikálisnak mondott szkepticizmuson túllépjen, és az érdemi filozófiai elemzések területére térjen. Ami Hegel és Husserl stratégiájában közös, az itt mindenekelőtt az a momentum, hogy mindketten felhasználják a szkepticizmus radikális formáját, hogy általa védetté tegyék a filozófiát a szkepszis ellen. A szkepticizmus saját eszközeit fordítják a szkepszis ellen.

Hegelnél az ember már eleve benne van a tudásban, benne van a világban, és nem elválasztott tőle. Ebben a tekintetben a Kant által meglehetősen lenézett² Thomas Reidre, a *common sense* skót filozófusára támaszkodik.³ Az érzéki bizonyosság álláspontján már eleve tudunk valamit a világról, már eleve túl vagyunk képzeteinken, érzeteinken, odakint a világban.⁴ Az érzéki bizonyosság azonban egy korlátozott álláspont, melynek megvannak a maga határai, melyeken szükségszerűen túl kell lépnünk, ha valódi filozófiai ismeretekhez akarunk jutni. Abszolút álláspontra emelve az érzéki bizonyosság, a *common sense* filozófiája csupán a maga előfeltevéseiről, a maga korlátairól tudni nem akaró filozófia.⁵ A szkepticizmus elleni ellenszerként kiindulópontnak viszont jó. A szkepticizmus végső soron az igazságtól való félelemként lepleződik le, és „ez a tévedéstől való félelem már maga a tévedés”;⁶ illetve öncélú perlekedésként

2 Vö. Kant, *Prolegomena minden leendő metafizikához, amely tudományként léphet majd fel* (Budapest: Atlantisz Kiadó, 1999), 11sk.

3 Csikós, *Élő...*, 261skk.

4 Hegel, *A szellem...*, 47–64.

5 Csikós, *Élő...*, 259.

6 Hegel, *A szellem...*, 48.

és ellenkezőként ott, ahol az ellenkezés logikailag lehetséges, noha tökéletesen motiválatlan, alaptalan.⁷ Hegel szerint már eleve benne vagyunk az Abszolútumban, minden megismerés az Abszolútum valamilyen szempontból történő megismerése. Megismerés nélkül tévedés sem volna lehetséges, igazság nélkül nem volna hamisság vagy nem-igazság.

Husserl stratégiája a radikális szkepszissel szemben bizonyos mértékig hasonló. Azt mutatja meg, hogy a külvilág létezésével és a nyelvi jelentések objektivitásával kapcsolatos előfeltevések olyan mélyen beépültek a tapasztalatba és a nyelvhasználatba, hogy ezek nélkül értelmesen nem is beszélhetnénk tapasztalatról, illetve kommunikációról, nem tudnánk megmagyarázni azokat.⁸ A tévedés, a hallucináció, az álom „parazita” tapasztalati formák, melyek a világgal közvetlen kapcsolatban lévő, „veridikus” tapasztalaton „élősködnek”. Tévedésről, hallucinációról, álomról stb. csak ott beszélhetünk, ahol van igazi, a tárgyat ténylegesen „eltaláló” tapasztalat.⁹ Tapasztalat csak azáltal van, csak azáltal lehetséges, hogy a világbeli tárgy vagy tény úgy jelenik meg, mint egy egység a sokaságban, mint ami objektivitással és azonossággal bír, és éppígy: a nyelvi jelentés is ideális egységként mutatkozik meg a rá irányuló kommunikatív és gondolati aktusok sokaságában.¹⁰ Az alapeset az, hogy van veridikus tapasztalat, hogy megértjük egymást egymással való kommunikációnk során; bármiféle tévedés, érzékcsalódás, káprázat, kommunikatív félreértés vagy nem-megértés csak ennek alapján válik érthetővé, sőt, szigorúbban szólva, lehetőségé.

7 *i.m.*, 112sk.

8 Ezen a helyen röviden Husserlnek arra az elképzelésére szeretnék utalni, mely szerint a világkonstitúció (és ezzel összefüggésben: az objektív nyelvi jelentések konstitúciója) szükségszerűen hozzátartozik a transzcendentális egóhoz. Husserlnél a transzcendentális ego lényegileg világkonstituáló lény, vö. Hua 39: 251–258, magyar: 161–169.

9 Vö. Robert Sokolowski, *Introduction to Phenomenology* (Cambridge University Press, 2000), 14sk.

10 Vö. ezzel kapcsolatban: Hua 20/1: 2810–3284, magyar: 67–74.

A megismerés és az igazság kontextualista felfogása

A realista álláspont, a közös világ és a világban található dolgokra és eseményekre vonatkozó nyelv nyilvánossága és objektivitása tehát mind Husserl, mind Hegel filozófiájában a kiindulópont. Olyan kiindulópont, melyre lehet alapozni, de amelyen túl kell lépni. A filozófiai igazságok szférája a közvetlen bizonyosság, de még a pozitív tudományok igazságainak szféráján is túl van. A filozófiai igazságok természetével kapcsolatban Hegel és Husserl meghökkentően hasonló álláspontot vallanak. Ez az egyén szintjén a „korlátozott racionalitás” pozíciója, a filozófiatörténet, illetve általában az egyetemes emberi történelem szintjén pedig a végtelenbe tartó fejlődés állapotában lévő történelmi racionalitás álláspontja.¹¹

Hegelnél a kiindulópont a filozófiai megismerés síkján a történetiség. Minden egyes filozófiai álláspont az Abszolútum lenyomata egy véges nézőpont szerint. Minden filozófiai pozíció az Abszolútum megismerésének számít. A filozófia története nem más, mint az Abszolútum önmegismerésének a története, melynek során egy kirakós játék (az abszolút igazság) darabkáit illesztik egymáshoz az egymással vitatkozó filozófusok. Az abszolút igazság csak ennek a történetnek a folyamán, Hegel szerint szigorúan véve csak a történet végén állva tárul fel. Sokat idézett szavai szerint: „Az igaz az egész. Az egész pedig csak a fejlődése által kiteljesülő lényeg. Az Abszolútumról azt kell mondani, hogy lényegileg *eredmény*, hogy csak a *végén* az, ami valójában”.¹² Hegel az Abszolútumot általában és speciálisan minden konkrét tárgyat a maga történetiségében fog fel: a tárgy története az maga a tárgy. Ez vonatkozik a filozófiára is. Ennek a gondolatnak az összefüggésében kell értelmeznünk azt a hegeli elképzelést, mely szerint „még egyetlen filozófiát sem cáfoltak

11 Ez Hegel felfogása legkésőbb *A szellem fenomenológiájától* kezdődően. Ld. ezzel kapcsolatban: Csikós Ella, 2008: 87–103. Husserlnél ennek az elképzelésnek a szisztematikus kifejtésével leginkább a kései, harmincas évekbeli, az életvilág problémakörét kifejtő írásaiban találkozunk (mindenekelőtt Hua 6, Hua 29, Hua 39). A szóban forgó elmélet gyökereit azonban már korábban is megtaláljuk nála; így legkésőbb a B II 2-es mappa kézirataitól kezdve (1907/08, részben: Hua 13: 5–9, Hua 42: 137–168).

12 Hegel, *A szellem...*, 18.

meg”.¹³ Minden koherens filozófiai elképzelés egy korlátozott felfogást nyújtott az Abszolútumról. Mivel korlátozottat, ezért szükségszerűen túl is kell lépnünk rajtuk; magának a filozófiatörténetnek a belső logikája diktálja azt, hogy az egyes történetileg kialakult álláspontokon túllépünk, illetve magának a filozófiatörténetnek a logikájából következik az egyes álláspontok összeütközésének szükségszerűsége.

Hegel szerint az egyes korlátos, véges nézőpontok összeillesztésével jutunk közelebb az Abszolútumhoz mint végső konkrétumhoz. Nála csak az Abszolútum az igazán konkrét létező (illetve létezésen túli abszolút adottság), mi mindannyian véges és önállótlan mozzanatok vagyunk benne. Amikor két, egymással antinomikusan szembenálló filozófiai állásponttal találkozunk, akkor szembenállásuk csupán azért tűnik abszolútnak számunkra, mert nem találjuk meg azt a magasabb nézőpontot, amely felől láthatóvá válik a szóban forgó két álláspont kölcsönös, szükségszerű összetartozása. A filozófia, a dialektika mozgása Hegelnél nem más, mint a kontextualizálás művészete: annak feladata, hogy megtaláljuk azt a szélesebb kontextust, vagy magasabb nézőpontot, amelyben vagy amely felől megmutatkozik a szembenálló felfogások szembenállásának viszonylagossága, így a szembenállás megszűnik, és nyilvánvalóvá válik, hogy a két álláspont csak ugyanannak a dolognak különböző oldalait tárja fel. Hegelnél minden ellentmondás és ellentét végső soron az állandó történeti létesülésben lévő Abszolútumban oldódott fel, a filozófiai álláspontok végső kontextusául pedig az abszolút szellem hegeli filozófiája szolgál.

Husserl bizonyos pontokon Hegelhez nagyon hasonló módon járt el. Husserl szintén egy olyan végső kontextust keresett, ami minden különös filozófiai álláspont szembenállását feloldja úgy, hogy kölcsönös, szükségszerű és lényegi összetartozásukat láthatóvá teszi. Ez a végső kontextus nála episztémikus tekintetben a transzcendentális fenomenológia, ontológiai vonatkozásban pedig a konstituáló transzcendentális szubjektivitás.¹⁴ Husserl szerint az

¹³ *i.m.*, 47.

¹⁴ Husserl sajátos monizmusát Mezei Balázs „modális monizmusnak” nevezi, mert „A végtelen valóság [...] egyetlen eredeti működés – a transzcendentális tudat – különböző modalitásaiból tevődik össze (konstituálódik), melyek tényleges és lehetséges összekapcsolódását az időiség biztosítja”. Mezei Balázs, „Utószó,” in

univerzális transzcendentális racionalitás az emberi nem, végső soron pedig a filozófia történetében bontakozik ki egy végtelen folyamatban. Az emberi nem, és ezzel szoros összefüggésben a filozófia története nem más, mint a transzcendentális szubjektivitás önmegismerésének története.

Ezen a ponton több lényeges különbségre kell felhívunk a figyelmet Hegel és Husserl felfogásával kapcsolatban. Először is: Husserlnél a szemléletnek mindig alapvető, megalapozó szerepe van. Még a kései munkásságban felbukkanó „konstruktív”, tehát a szemléleti hozzáférhetőség körén túllépő fenomenológiát is apodiktikusan betöltött szemléleteknek kell nála motiválnia.¹⁵ Ezzel szemben Hegelnél hangsúlyozottan a fogalmi elemzés dominál. Mint írja: „csak a fogalom az igazság egzisztenciájának eleme”.¹⁶ Fichte, Schelling és a korabeli német romantika képviselőinek „intellektuális szemléletével” Hegel „a fogalom [...] hidegen lépkedő szükségszerűségét” állította szembe.¹⁷ Husserlnél azonban a fogalmi elemzésnek mindig szükségszerűen szemléleti bázisra kell támaszkodnia; az a fogalmi analízis, amely nélkülözi ezt a bázist, Husserlnél talajtalan üres spekuláció, amit nem lehet tudományosnak tekinteni.

Lényeges különbség másodszor az, hogy véleményem szerint a filozófiatörténetnek van egy olyan nyitottsága Husserlnél, amelyről úgy vélem, hogy Hegelnél kevésbé van jelen. Noha Hegel a matematikai és a filozófiai megismerés különbségét éppen abban látja, hogy az előbbi számára külsődleges a mozgás és külsődleges a történelem, míg ezek a filozófiai igazság kifejtésének lényegéhez tartoznak,¹⁸ mégis, Hegelnél az egyes konkrét, történetileg kialakult filozófiai álláspontok, amennyire meg tudom ítélni, a filozófiatörténet, illetve az Abszolútum mozgásával elnyerik zárt, kikristályosodott értelmüket; azzal együtt, hogy megszületésük és történetük, ahogy utóéletük is, szerves része az Abszolútum életének. Vagyis számomra úgy

Edmund Husserl, *Kartézianus elmélkedések* (Budapest: Atlantisz Kiadó, 2000), 186. Vö. pl. Hua 9: 299skk. vagy Husserl, „Fenomenológia,” 223–226.

15 Husserl konstruktív fenomenológiájáról lásd pl. Alexander Schnell, *Husserl et les fondements de la phénoménologie constructive*, Grenoble: Editions Jérôme Millon, 2007.

16 Hegel, *A szellem...*, 11.

17 *i.m.*, 12.

18 *i.m.*, 28–35.

tűnik, hogy Hegelnél az egyes filozófiai álláspontok értelme zárt, és a filozófiatörténet múltjában meghatározott helyük van. Egyszer kifejtették a maguk lényeges szerepét, nélkülözhetetlen jelentőségük van abban, hogy megismerjük a jelen filozófiai fejleményeit, de az általuk hordozott értelem mégis véges, zárt és kimeríthető. A jelen megértéséhez nélkülözhetetlenek, de az idő eljárt fölöttük, túl kell lépnünk rajtuk.

Ez a túllépés – amit én Hegelnél felfedezni vélek – Husserlnél semmiképpen sem áll fenn. Husserl számára a filozófiatörténet lényegileg nyitott, és az egyszer már kialakult filozófiai álláspontok értelme sohasem záródott le teljesen. Mindig többet tartalmaznak, többet ragadnak meg a valóságból, mint azt képesek volnánk felmérni. Folyamatosan kifejtik hatásukat a jelenre; a kései Husserlnél dinamikus visszacsatolás, oda-vissza történő meghatározás áll fenn a filozófiatörténet múltja és jelene között. Mindig fennáll annak a lehetősége, hogy *retroaktív módon módosítsuk a múltat*. Úgy érzem, ez a retroaktív visszahatás ebben a formában Hegelnél nem található meg.

A kései Husserl filozófiatörténet-filozófiája szerint mindig nyitva áll annak a lehetősége, hogy egy korábban kialakult filozófiai álláspontban olyan értelmet fedezzünk fel, mely korábban nem volt látható (csak egy meghatározott álláspontra, nézőpontba helyezkedve fed fel magát), és amely gyökeresen új irányt szab a filozófiatörténet menetének.¹⁹ Ezáltal a filozófiatörténet Husserlnél az időben kiterjedt, önmagát az időben, az időn keresztül – a múltba is visszanyúlva – folyamatosan újraszervező élőlény alakját ölti.

Mind Hegelnél, mind Husserlnél általában a megismerés, és speciálisan a filozófiai megértés kontextualista felfogásáról kell beszélnünk. Ez azt jelenti, hogy az igazság mindig egy kontextuson belül, arra vonatkoztatottan nyeri el értelmét. Ez a kontextus mindkettejünkél hangsúlyosan történeti. A lényeges különbség szerintem az, hogy Husserlnél a megismerés fontos mozzanata a retroaktivitás,²⁰

19 vö. Hua 29: 292. Ld. ezzel kapcsolatban még: Varga Péter András, „Husserl »utolsó könyve«. Filozófiatörténet és véglegességigény Husserl késői filozófiájában,” in *Elpis* 11 (2012): 57–76.

20 A retroaktivitás témáját illetően Husserlnél – speciálisan az egyéni tapasztalat szintjén – lásd: Ullmann Tamás, *A láthatatlan forma. Sematizmus és intencionalitás* (Budapest: L'Harmattan, 2010), 267–298, különösen: 275.

míg ez a speciálisan retroaktív mozzanat, ha nem tévedek, Hegelnél hiányzik. Hegelnél a jelen csak a múltból kiindulva érthető meg, de a múlt lezárult, és elnyerte a maga végleges helyét a történelem menetében. Husserlnél a múlt értelme sohasem teljesen lezárt, múlt és jelen között folyamatos kölcsönhatás zajlik, kölcsönösen meghatározzák, formálják és módosítják a másik értelmét.

Filozófiai optika

A filozófia történetében minden kiemelkedő filozófiai teljesítmény fontos velejárója volt, hogy nyújtott egy olyan speciális nézőpontot, melynek révén a valóságot egységes egészként volt képes láttatni, és amelyhez képest meg tudta határozni a többi filozófiai pozíció relatív helyzetét, valamint képes volt megmagyarázni ellentmondásait egymással, és alkalmasint magával, a szóban forgó állásponttal szemben. Ezt a speciális nézőpontot hívom én optikának. Ezen optika segítségével a filozófusok egységes, koherens beszámolókat voltak képesek adni a valóságról mint egységesen összefüggő egészből, valamint arról, hogy a többi filozófia eddig miért nem volt képes arra, hogy választ adjon „az első és legfőbb kérdésekre”, vagyis arra, hogy beteljesítse a filozófia alapfeladatát, vagy legalábbis azt a küldetést vagy feladatot, amit többen a filozófia legfontosabb feladatának tartanak.

Ezt az optikát néha egy alapgondolat, egy alapterminus nyújtotta, illetve néhány alapgondolat vagy -terminus egységes rendszere. Némi eufémizmussal azt mondhatnánk, hogy olyan „varázsszavakról” van szó, melyek kimondásával és szisztematikus végiggondolásával a valóság egésze, illetve a filozófiatörténet megmutatta addig rejtett értelmét, és azt is, hogy a korábbi filozófusok, vagy a kortársak miért voltak képtelenek feltárni ezt az értelmet, vagy feltárásuk miért mondható csupán részlegesnek, illetve erősen korlátozottnak. Ilyen „varázsszavak” voltak például a filozófia történetében az „idea” Platónnál, a „szubsztancia” („hüpokeimenon”) és a „négy ok” Arisztotelésznél, a „cogito” Descartes-nál, a „transzcendentális” Kantnál, az „Abszolút Szellem” Hegelnél, a „transzcendentális szubjektivitás” Husserlnél, a „létkérdés” Heideggernél, a „hús” Merleau-Ponty-nál, az „írás”, illetve a „nyom” Derridánál – és a sort tetszőlegesen lehetne folytatni, illetve kiegészíteni.

Nem előfeltevésként, hanem bizonyítandó tételként kell felvenni a filozófiai problémák végérvényes eldönthetőségéhez a valóság kontextuális voltát, és ennél fogva a rá vonatkozó megismerés, a valóságot feltáró (hétköznapi, tudományos, filozófiai) igazság kontextuális jellegét. Ezek a tézisek távolról sem magától értetődőek, mégis olyanok, amelyek mellett többek között Hegel és Husserl erőteljes érveket vonultattak fel.²¹ Mindenesetre ez a tézis, illetve ezek a tézisek – a valóság és az azt feltáró megismerés kontextuális természete – még további megvitatást, kifejtést és bizonyítást igényelnek. Úgy gondolom mindenesetre, hogy ha ezt a tételt sikerült igazoltként elfogadnunk, vagy legalábbis olyanként, amelynek igazságát nagyon erős érvek támasztják alá, akkor út nyílik afelé, hogy további, szintén nagyon komolynak, bizonyos mértékig bizonyító erejűnek számító érveket hozzunk fel a filozófiai problémák bizonyíthatósága, eldönthetősége mellett; mégpedig a korlátozott racionalitás álláspontjáról.

Ez a korlátozott racionalitás interszubjektívan és történetileg meghatározott, az egymással folyamatos kommunikatív közösségben lévő szubjektumok racionalitása. Ezek a szubjektumok valamennyien hozzáférnek az igazsághoz, valamennyien ugyanannak a világnak a lakói, ugyanannak a valóságnak a részesei, de ehhez a valósághoz, világhoz csak korlátozott hozzáférésük van. Álláspontjukat megvitatathatják egymással, tudományos eredményeiket kicserélhetik, korlátozott, egymásnak mégoly ellentmondó nézőpontjaik kiegészíthetik egymást. Azt feltételezzük, hogy minden koherens, konzisztens filozófiai nézőpont az igazság egy kis szeletét nyújtja. A filozófusok, a tudósok ugyanannak a kirakós játéknak a résztvevői. Külön-külön talán nem, de együtt biztosan megválaszolhatjuk az alapvető kérdéseket egy hosszú történeti folyamat keretében. Ennek a történeti és kontextualista megközelítésnek – legalábbis annak husserliánus értelmezésében, amelyet jómagam favorizálok – a szükségszerű velejárója, hogy ha sikerül is kidolgoznunk a végső kérdésekre adott

21 A probléma egy újabban született kifejtéséhez lásd: Donald Rutherford, „The Future of the History of Modern Philosophy”, letöltés ideje: 2015. július 8. <https://philosophymodsquad.wordpress.com/2014/07/21/the-future-of-the-history-of-modern-philosophy-donald-rutherford/>

„végső” válaszokat, ezek értelme szükségképpen nyitott marad, és a válasz értelme, csakúgy, mint a kérdésé, folyamatosan módosulhat a jövőben.

Az egymásnak ellentmondó álláspontok közül nem kell hogy az egyik szükségképpen hamis legyen. Ez volt Hegel és Husserl álláspontja is, és én magam is így gondolkodom. Hiszen antagonizmusuk, antinomikus szembenállásuk pusztán abból fakad, hogy nem találtuk meg pontos helyüket a kirakós játék egészében, illetve nem találtunk meg még néhány puzzle-darabot, ami nyilvánvalóvá teszi, hogy a két álláspont voltaképpen elválaszthatatlan egymástól, kölcsönösen feltételezik és megkövetelik egymást, és egyformán szükségszerű, nélkülözhetetlen részei a nagy egésznek, az egészről alkotott teljes képnek. Vagyis amikor egy ilyen antagonisztikus ellentmondásba ütközünk, akkor a megfelelő szempont megtalálására, a megfelelő optika megszerzésére kell törekednünk; az ellentmondó fogalmak olyan értelmezésére, amely feloldja utólag látszólagosnak bizonyuló ellentmondásukat.

Az ellentmondás a filozófiában, vélte Hegel és Husserl egyaránt, az egyoldalúságból fakad. Az ellentmondó álláspontok csak azért mondhatnak egymásnak ellent, mivel egyoldalú képet adnak a valóságról. Mind Hegel, mind Husserl egyetértett abban, hogy ennek az egyoldalúságnak a meghaladásához egy teljesebb összefüggésbe kell illeszteni az egymásnak ellentmondó mozzanatokot. Azonban jelentős különbség van abban, hogy Hegel és Husserl a filozófiai álláspontok egyoldalúságát hogyan értelmezi. Hegelnél ez az egyoldalúság korlátozottságot és kimeríthetőséget jelentett (vagyis az adott álláspont értelemállományának kimeríthetőségét). Az egykor meghaladott álláspont továbbá Hegelnél nem érintette a jelent, jóllehet egy történeti folyamat szükségszerű fejlődési fázisát jelölte nála. Husserlnél ezzel szemben, mint láttuk, egy egyoldalú állásponthoz is potenciálisan végtelen, nyitott, kimeríthetetlen értelemtartalom társul, melynek bizonyos mozzanatai csak később válnak láthatóvá; ahogy a filozófiatörténet előrehaladtával az egyes álláspontok, fogások újabb és újabb, egyre tágabb kontextusba kerülnek bele. Az egykor létrehozott álláspont bizonyos szempontból korlátozott, egyoldalú, viszont mégis a kimeríthetetlen értelemgazdagság tulajdonságával rendelkezik, mindig tartogat számunkra – későn születettek számára – váratlan meglepetéseket. A valóság Husserlnél vég-

telenségek egymásba fonódó rendszere, ahol az egyes részelemek, részrendszerek is végtelenek.

IV. A filozófiai diskurzus normatív vonatkozásairól

Kooperáció vagy konfrontáció?

A filozófusok a filozófiát végső soron egymással szakmai, hivatásbeli közösségben művelik, egymást kritizálva, illetve egymással koepe-rálva. A kérdés, amelyre a tanulmány utolsó részében keressük a választ, az, hogy az együttműködésnek mely módjai képesek poten-ciólisan a leginkább előmozdítani a filozófia ügyét. Ha a filozófiai igazságokra a választ csak a közösen művelt filozófia révén, tehát egymással együttműködve tudjuk megtalálni, akkor az együttmű-ködés mely módjai segíthetik a leginkább a filozófia közös, szakmai ügyét?

A filozofálás normatív vonatkozásai közül ebben az összefüggés-ben először is a filozofáló személyére, az egyes szubjektumra magára vonatkozó normatív elvet kell kiemelnünk; a személyes felelősség (Selbstverantwortung) motívumát, ahogy azt Husserl nevezte.²² Husserl filozófiájának mindig is volt egy alapvetően normatív jellege; mely munkássága előrehaladtával egyre jobban kidomborodott. A személyes felelősség elve egyfelől azt jelenti, hogy a filozófusnak a legnagyobb gondossággal kell eljárnia akkor, amikor megfogal-mazza elméleteit, megfontolásait, kijelentéseit („ezen és ezen ismeretek birtokában, ezen és ezen előfeltevések alapján nem mondhatok mást, mint ezt és ezt”), a legnagyobb figyelmet kell szentelnie saját előfeltevései feltárásának, és ki kell tudnia tenni elveit, kijelentéseit és elméleteit a legradikálisabb kritikának, illetőleg időről-időre már megfogalmazott elveit új kritikai felülvizsgálatnak kell alávetnie az újabb fejlemények és eredmények tükrében. Másfelől – ezzel szerves összefüggésben – elméleteinek tudományosságáról, szigorúságáról nemcsak önmaga, hanem a filozófusok tágabb közönsége előtt is mindenkor számot kell tudnia adni.

Van azonban a normativitásnak egy tágabban értett interszub-jektív mozzanata is, és végezetül ezt szeretném most kifejezetten az

22 vö. pl. Hua 6: 103, 200, 272, 329, 423–429, 516.

előtérbe állítani. Filozófiai viták alkalmával megfigyelhetjük, hogy az egymással vitatkozó filozófusok összecsapása kis túlzással vére menő párviadallá fajul. Ebben a párviadalban olykor a felek mindegyike meg van róla győződve, hogy ő képviseli a – kimondatlanul is, de valamilyen jól körülhatárolható értelemben abszolútnak vett – igazságot, míg a másik fél álláspontja abszolút hamis, vagy legalábbis félreértések, egyoldalúságok és következtelenségek együttese.

Eddigi fejtegetéseink alapján nyilvánvaló kell hogy legyen, hogy a filozófiai vitának nem ez a legalkalmasabb módja a filozófiai igazság elérésére, vagy legalábbis arra, hogy közelebb kerüljünk a filozófiai igazsághoz. Az egyes vitatkozó felek ugyanis nem abszolút igazságot, és éppígy nem abszolút hamisságot, hanem relatív igazságot és hamisságot képviselnek, lévén álláspontjuk – a filozófus végességéből fakadóan – korlátozott és egyoldalú. Amikor tehát egy korlátozott és egyoldalú igazságot szeretnének abszolutizálni, azzal szükségképpen elvágják magukat attól, hogy egy olyan közös nézőpontra, álláspontra, egy olyan szélesebb kontextusra tegyenek szert, mely már valóban az adott kérdés megfelelőbb, „igazabb” értelmezését, illetve megválaszolását nyújtja.

Vagyis amikor egy filozófus egy vita során a másik legyőzésére, valamint saját álláspontja abszolutizálására törekszik, akkor szükségszerűen egyoldalúságokban fog megrekedni, amelyek elszigetelik őt a teljesebb igazságtól. Ezért normatíve helyesebbnek, filozófiailag pedig adekvátábbnak, célravezetőbbnek kell tekintenünk egy olyan vita- vagy diskurzusmódszert, amelyben a filozófus nem annyira a másik elméletének gyenge pontjait és ellentmondásait keresi, hanem annak igaz, vállalható, érvényesként elfogadható elemeit, és inkább annak meglátására törekszik, hogy a mégoly problematikusnak látott elmélethez miképpen rendelhetne olyan értelmezést, mely az elméletet igazzá vagy igazabbá teszi.²³

Azt hinni, hogy az igazság kizárólagos birtokosai vagyunk, ott, ahol az igazságkérdés korrelátuma az emberi megismerőerőket végtelenszer felülmúló abszolútum, egy végtelenül összetett valóság,

23 Ld. ehhez: Fehér M. István: „Metafizika, hermeneutika, szkepszis”, in *Vigilia folyóirat*, 2006/9: 651-661. Uő. „Szót érteni egymással. Jegyzetek a Gadamer-Derrida-vitához”, in Fehér M. István-Lengyel Zsuzsanna Mariann, Nyíró Miklós, Olay Csaba (szerk.), *„Szót érteni egymással. Hermeneutika, tudományok, dialógus”*, Budapest: L'Harmattan, 2013: 21-63.

nem más, mint hübrisz, önhittség, saját végeességünkről való elfeledkezés. Nemcsak morálisan kétséges dolog ez a hübrisz, hanem a valódi filozofálás tevékenységében akadályoz meg bennünket. Arra a kérdésre, hogy elérhető-e az abszolút igazság, vagy legalábbis bizonyos kérdésekben a viták – bizonyos mértékig, bizonyos pontokban – végérvényes nyugvópontra juttatása, a válasz tehát az, hogy egyedül biztosan nem, de együtt talán lehet erre esélyünk.

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While reading Max Weber’s writings on methodology, one faces the intensity of his efforts to exile all kinds of historical universalism. Yet, while Weber explicates his views on such an ideal of science in several studies, along with his understanding of ideal types as its central methodological tools, there are quite a number of paragraphs in his works examining specific historical phenomena which seem to reflect a standpoint essentially different from this interpretation: the standpoint of universal history in an evolutionary sense. Many interpreters of Weber, e.g. Karl Jaspers, Karl Löwith, Friedrich Tenbruck or Wolfgang Mommsen, treated him as a universal historian, and although they paid some attention to the discrepancy between Weber’s own views on the methodological nature of his investigations and the universal-historical character they held essential in them, they rarely tried to dissolve this discrepancy. In my study I will briefly summarise Weber’s account on the desirable methods of historical and sociological work (I), then, I will point to some problematic *loci* in his writings, using the different interpretations of the above-mentioned authors (II). Finally, I will suggest a solution for the described problem (III), which is based on examining the above discrepancy in the framework of the Weberian interpretation of ethics and its relation to the Kantian critique of reason.



“...the highly complex reality of history can be known only by means of sciences which investigate the uniformities that apply to the more simple facts into which we can analyze that reality.”

Wilhelm Dilthey¹

“...at any rate, one finds that, even in the case of the extremely abstract [Kantian] ethical principle, its ‘formal’ character does not mean that it remains indifferent to the substance of the action.”

Max Weber²

Introduction

While reading Max Weber’s writings on methodology, one faces the intensity of his efforts to exile all kinds of historical universalism. Yet, in other writings focused on historical and social phenomena instead of methodological questions, several of Weber’s remarks on historical change seem to reflect a universalistic view on history. This impression is strengthened by several of his illustrious interpreters, such as Jaspers, Löwith, Tenbruck and Mommsen, who all considered Weber’s views on history to be undoubtedly universalistic. In my study I will briefly summarise Weber’s own considerations on the role of the social scientist in the investigation of history (I), then, through some interpretations of Weber as a “universal historian” I will point to the problematic aspect of his thought to which his strict methodological rules cannot easily be applied (II), finally, I will give an explanation of the above-mentioned discrepancy while trying to provide an ethical framework for dealing with the conflicting *loci* in Weber’s writings (III).

1 Wilhelm Dilthey, *Selected Works, Vol. I.: Introduction to the Human Sciences*, ed. Rudolf A. Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 144.

2 Max Weber, “The Meaning of ‘Value Freedom’ in the Sociological and Economic Sciences,” in *Collected Methodological Writings* [henceforth: *CMW*], ed. Hans H. Bruun and Sam Whimster (Oxon – New York: Routledge, 2012), 314.

I. Weber's views on history: the sociological framework

"That you construct a philosophy out of Max Weber may be your rightful privilege, but to call him a philosopher is absurd".³ These were the words with which Heinrich Rickert bitterly summarised Karl Jaspers' commemoration speech on Max Weber. More than a decade later Jaspers turned Rickert's thoughts inside out: in his 1932 monograph on Weber he wrote: "Max Weber developed no philosophical system. [...] Max Weber taught no philosophy; *he was a philosophy*."⁴ It has to be noted here that although both Rickert and Jaspers are using the terms "philosophy" and "philosopher" in a positive sense, their opposition is due, at least partly, to the difference in what they are referring to with these terms. When Rickert says it is "absurd" to call Weber a "philosopher", what he has in mind is the classic 19th-century notion of great philosophical *systems*, while for Jaspers, calling Weber "a philosophy" is not so much a new interpretation of Weber as a new interpretation of *philosophy*. Of course, if Weber himself could have heard this debate, he would certainly have disagreed with Jaspers' reading philosophy out of his works, let alone the statement of him *being* a philosophy – however, the reason for this is that Weber, like Rickert, also referred to "philosophy" in the classic sense of the word, while, *unlike* Rickert, with an obviously negative emphasis on the system-like quality of 19th-century philosophical thought. "The social science that *we* want to pursue", he wrote, "is a *science of reality*."⁵ This science is not based on a philosophical *system* ("system" meant as a set of *laws* from which reality *in its infiniteness* can be deduced), but on the assumption that "life in its immediate aspect"

presents an absolutely infinite multiplicity of events "within" and "outside" ourselves [...]. And, even if we focus our attention on a

3 Jaspers: "Philosophical Autobiography" (1957, 33), cited by Christopher Adair-Totef, "Max Weber as Philosopher: The Rickert–Jaspers Confrontation," *Max Weber Studies* 3(1) (2002): 18.

4 Karl Jaspers, "Max Weber as Politician, Scientist, Philosopher," in *Leonardo, Descartes, Max Weber: Three Essays* (Oxon – New York: Routledge, 2009), 251. My italics.

5 Max Weber, "The 'Objectivity' of Knowledge in Social Science and Social Policy," in *CMW*, 114.

single, isolated "object" [...] the absolute infinitude of this multiplicity remains entirely undiminished in intensity; [this becomes apparent to us] as soon as we want to make a serious attempt just to describe this "single [object]" *exhaustively, in all* its individual components, let alone to comprehend it in its causal determination.⁶

While philosophical systems meant for Weber attempts to rule this "infinite multiplicity" by discovering laws behind it, his social science can be considered an attempt at ruling our understanding of the multiplicity by *methodological* laws. The passages where he most harshly criticised systems of laws aiming to constitute a universalistic background for practical inquiries of reality are to be found in his texts on the methodology of *historical* investigation. The reason for this was that such a system had been attributed to him by several critics, even though it was just that kind of interpretation of history that he wanted to avoid the most. When Karl Fischer questioned in his critique of *The Protestant Ethic* (PE) whether Baptists turned from "prophetical and eschatological hopes" to sober "labour in calling" as a result of "a logical progress in Hegel's sense",⁷ Weber replied temperamentally in his "anticritique" as follows:

whereas I unambiguously protested against using the historical connections I discussed to construct any kind of "idealist" (in my words "spiritualist") interpretation of history (XXI: 110⁸ [...]), my critic not only imputes just such an interpretation to me in the above remarks but even considers whether I imagine the transformation of the Baptist ethic as a "logical process in Hegel's sense."⁹

The passage referred to by Weber is the closing paragraph of the second essay of PE stating clearly that it was not Weber's

6 Weber, "Objectivity," 114. The bracketed additions to quotations from Weber's *Collected Methodological Writings* are from the English translation.

7 H. Karl Fischer, "Kritische Beiträge zu Professor Max Webers Abhandlung 'Die Protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus,'" in Johannes Winckelmann, ed., *Die Protestantische Ethik II.: Kritiken und Antikritiken* (Hamburg: Siebenstern, 1972), 16.

8 Weber's reference in the original to the Archiv. Cf. Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (London – New York: Routledge, 2001), 125.

9 "Weber's First Reply to Karl Fischer, 1907," in David J. Chalcraft and Austin Harrington, ed., *The Protestant Ethic Debate: Max Weber's Replies to his Critics, 1907–1910* [henceforth: PED] (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2001), 32.

aim to substitute for a one-sided materialistic an equally one-sided spiritualistic causal interpretation of culture and of history. Each is equally possible, but each, if it does not serve as the preparation, but as the conclusion of an investigation, accomplishes equally little in the interest of historical truth.¹⁰

As he added to this final paragraph in a footnote,

[t]he above sketch has deliberately taken up only the relations in which an influence of religious ideas on the material culture is really beyond doubt. It would have been easy to proceed beyond that to a regular construction which logically deduced everything characteristic of modern culture from Protestant rationalism. But that sort of thing may be left to the type of dilettante who believes in the unity of the group mind and its reducibility to a single formula.¹¹

Such single formulas cannot be applied in historical investigations which are necessarily connected to sociological research as the “science of reality”. “Sociology (in the sense in which this highly ambiguous word is used here) is a science concerning itself with the interpretive understanding of social action and thereby with a causal explanation of its course and consequences.”¹² Without this “casual explanation” our understanding remains incomplete. Thus, Weber required not a single “photograph” of the contemporary state of society as a result of sociological investigation, but a *series* of “photographs” taken of a specific realm of social phenomena, one after the other, within a specific timeframe, from a specific aspect. These “photographs” can be put into the social scientist’s symbolic “cinematograph” to “project” the *continuity* of these phenomena. It is clear, on the one hand, that depending on the aspect from which our photographs are taken we create quite different films of the very same chain of occurrences. Furthermore, it is not simply a possibility but a *necessary* prerequisite of historical and sociological investigation to choose and define the point of view from which our

10 Weber, *The Protestant Ethic*, 125.

11 Weber, *The Protestant Ethic*, 261, n118.

12 Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley – Los Angeles – London: University of California Press, 1978), 4. (I.1.)

photos are taken – in *this* respect, Hegel’s interpretations of the history of philosophy and the history of religion could be considered as two separate depictions of the same process, and in *this* respect, they could be acceptable for a social scientist in the Weberian sense. Yet, on the other hand, this does not mean that we would have any kind of “script” for our film *beforehand*, as several thinkers under the influence of “Hegelian emanatism” seemed, according to Weber, to have. The scientist whose science is a science of reality (*Wirklichkeitswissenschaft*) is not a talented writer but an extremely precise photographer. In his critique of Roscher’s “historical method” Weber describes two types of historical inquiry: “either the *generic* features are selected as being those worth knowing about and subordinated under generally valid abstract *formulas*; or the individually *significant* features are selected and ordered in universal – but individual – *interconnections*”,¹³ and then, he turns to the “emanationist” view based on the Hegelian interpretation of history as to a third kind. Such an approach means

to attempt [...] to surmount the “hiatus irrationalis” between concept and reality by forming “general” concepts – metaphysical realities in which individual things and events are comprehended and can be deduced as instances of *realization* [of these concepts]. [...] However, we are constantly kept away from conceptual knowledge of this kind by our analytical–discursive cognition, which by means of abstraction divests reality of its full actuality; and such conceptual knowledge could only be accessible to a [form of] cognition analogous (but not similar) to that [by which we acquire] knowledge in the field of mathematics.¹⁴

Weber points to three important conceptual distinctions Roscher had failed to make. These are distinctions between

- (1) “the concepts ‘general in a generic sense’ and ‘comprehensive in content’”
- (2) “the general *validity* of the concepts” and “the universal *significance* of their content”
- (3) the fact that “general concepts are formed by ascending from

13 Max Weber, “Roscher and Knies and the Logical Problems of Historical Economics,” in *CMW*, 11–12.

14 Weber, “Roscher and Knies,” 12.

reality by means of abstraction” and the possibility of deducing “reality by *descending from* these general concepts”¹⁵

These are the distinctions Weber claimed to have made insisting that he had not used the historical connections investigated in the *PE* “to construct any kind of ‘idealist’ [...] interpretation of history”.¹⁶ The concepts mentioned in (2) are early forms of his categories of “real cause” (*Realgrund*) and “cause of knowledge” (*Erkenntnisgrund*) (a distinction generally based on the terminology of jurisprudence¹⁷), which are extensively discussed a few years after the study on Roscher’s method in the “Critical Studies in the Logic of the Cultural Sciences”, a critique of Eduard Meyer’s *On the Theory and Method of History*. Here Weber makes it clear that a specific historical occurrence can be of relevance for the historian *in two senses*. First, it can be important at its face value, i.e., as an occurrence which in itself plays a significant role in history as a “real cause” for other occurrences following it in time. “Only real – that is to say: concrete – objects are, in their individual manifestations, *real* causes; and these are what history is looking for”¹⁸ – says Weber in his study on Knies. But, second, while looking for such “real causes”, the historian also applies “causes of knowledge” to understand specific kinds, i.e., *types* of processes. The phenomena and the occurrences which constitute “causes of knowledge” are, of course, *in some cases* historically significant in a broader sense, so they *can* be regarded as “real causes” as well, but the two kinds are only occasionally inter-related. To constitute a type merely means that the abstract forms of some distinctive features of a “cause” can be successfully applied in the explanation of other events and phenomena different in time and place – and not that the event in question would have actual historical significance.

In *research*, the ideal type seeks to render the scholar’s judgement concerning causal imputation more acute: it *is not* a “hypothesis”, but it seeks to guide the formulation of hypotheses. It *is not* a *depic-*

15 Weber, “Roscher and Knies,” 14.

16 “Weber’s First Reply,” 32.

17 Max Weber, “Critical Studies in the Logic of the Cultural Sciences,” in *CMW*, 172. ff.

18 Weber, “Roscher and Knies,” 32. n. 2.

tion of reality, but it seeks to provide [the scientific] account with unambiguous means of expression.¹⁹

Thus, for Weber *research* is the realm in which it is not only justified but also necessary to use *rules*. These rules are concepts “formed by ascending from reality by means of abstraction” (see (3) above), but never concepts descending from which reality could be deduced. It was extremely important for Weber to make it clear that it was not his “concern to discover ‘the motive factor of historical change’ in any epoch or some ‘truly driving forces’ – because for [him] phantoms like these do not exist in history.”²⁰ In this respect Weber accepted Rickert’s opinion that specific realities analysed by social sciences are significant in their *uniqueness*.²¹ Yet, he did not accept that the solution for the debate on the methodological difference of natural and “cultural” sciences (*Methodenstreit*) would be to regard the former group as “nomothetic”, while characterising “cultural” sciences with the lack of *any* kind of laws. Historical investigation requires “a reference to rules of experience”²² which are *always* used by the historian, even if one is unaware of them. This is exactly the reason why one has to become aware of the necessity of such rules.²³ However, it is also an essential point of the explanation that while cultural sciences *do* apply general rules, these are rules for *understanding* in the form of *abstractions* (ideal types) which help us define the framework of our investigation, the aspect from which our “photographs” are taken.

What we are concerned with is the construction of relationships that our *imagination* considers to be sufficiently motivated and therefore “objectively possible”, and that seem *adequate* in the light of our nomological knowledge.²⁴

Grounding ideal types on our nomological knowledge means avoiding all kinds of preconceptions. In this sense, Weber strongly

19 Weber, “Objectivity,” 125.

20 “Weber’s Second Reply to Karl Fischer, 1908,” in *PED*, 45.

21 Cf. Heinrich Rickert, *Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft* (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1926), 92–93.

22 Cf. Weber, “Critical Studies,” 175.

23 Weber, “Objectivity,” 126.

24 Weber, “Objectivity,” 126.

opposed the idealistic tradition,²⁵ as we can see in his interpretation of Roscher's method for whom "causality" and 'law-like regularity' are identical: the former only exists in the shape of the latter";²⁶ as well as the generalisation of the Marxian concept, the "terms and 'laws'" of which, as Rossi writes,

are for Weber also ideal typical and have to be applied accordingly; the error occurs when someone interprets them as 'empirically valid', i.e., assigns to them a reality which they do not possess, this way mixing up theory and history.²⁷

Thus, if the Marxian approach to historical change is regarded to be turning the Hegelian interpretation "on its feet", then Weber's approach is a warning, saying that it is in vain to turn this axis on its head and back, because the reality that "we want to pursue" is *between* its two extremes. The aim of the social scientist is to develop an *objective* method for the description and investigation of this reality, and for its comparison with other realities.²⁸

This is the reason why it is important to distinguish between "real causes" and "causes of knowledge", and why it is very problematic that "even modern 'methodologists' (specifically historical methodologists) cannot always distinguish these two sets of facts"²⁹ – says Weber in his "Anticritical Last Word on *The Spirit of Capitalism*" in 1910, referring to Meyer again. In the "Anticritical Last Word" Weber points to these "two sets of facts" from the viewpoint of monks and of ascetic Protestantism – but with the reference to the methodological level he shows that the reason why his critics

25 Cf. Talcott Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action: A Study in Social Theory with Special Reference to a Group of Recent European Writers* (New York: The Free Press, 1966), 580.

26 Weber, "Roscher and Knies," 7.

27 Pietro Rossi, "Max Weber und die Methodologie der Geschichts- und Sozialwissenschaften," in *Max Weber, der Historiker*, ed. Jürgen Kocka, (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1986), 40–41. Cf. Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action*, 511. Cf. Weber, "Objectivity," 132.

28 Cf. Wolfgang Schluchter, "Value-Neutrality and the Ethic of Responsibility," in Guenther Roth and Wolfgang Schluchter, *Max Weber's Vision of History: Ethics and Methods* (Berkeley – Los Angeles – London: University of California Press, 1979), 92.

29 "Weber's Second Reply to Felix Rachfahl, 1910" ["Anticritical Last Word on *The Spirit of Capitalism*"], in *PED*, 115.

fail to make the distinction of “real cause” (*Realgrund*) and “cause of knowledge” (*Erkenntnisgrund*)³⁰ in the minds of the objects of their investigation is the fact that they have not made this distinction on the methodological level either. Hundreds of examples taken from different continents, ages and cultures in *Economy and Society* are examples of “causes of knowledge”, some of them being also “real causes”, others not. In these cases, however, it is rather unproblematic to decide which category they belong to, while regarding the case of protestant inner-worldly asceticism as depicted in *PE*, the debate on the studies can be interpreted as a debate on the question whether this inner-worldly asceticism should be regarded as a “real cause” or as a “cause of knowledge”. If we accept Weber’s 1920 summary of the studies, which he gave in the “Introduction” to the volume containing the *PE* and the studies on the “economic ethics of world religions” (*Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen*, *WEWR*), we can read the studies on Protestantism as investigations of “causes of knowledge” inasmuch as they

attempt, at one important point, to approach the side of the problem which is generally most difficult to grasp: the influence of certain religious ideas on the development of an economic spirit, or the *ethos* of an economic system.³¹

We have seen that Weber had indeed made efforts to make it clear that these works were only partial case studies, even if his critics could not accept this explanation.³² But how can we understand, then, Weber’s famous sentence at the very beginning of his Introduction, reading as follows:

A child of modern European civilization [*Kulturwelt*] will unavoidably and justifiably treat problems of universal history in the light of the question: to what combination [*Verkettung*] of circumstances should the fact be attributed that in Western civilization, and here only, cultural phenomena have appeared which – at least as we like

30 In the cited translation: “actual ground” and “cognitive ground”.

31 Max Weber, “Authors Introduction,” in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (London – New York: Routledge, 2001), xxxix.

32 On this cf. Anthony Giddens, introduction to *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, by Max Weber (London – New York: Routledge, 2001), xx.

to think – lie in a line of development having *universal* significance and validity?³³

Shall we say that after making it clear so many times that our types have to be applied only to find universally applicable *rules*, Weber claimed to have found not only a rule but a real historical progress which is of “*universal* significance and validity”? What does the remark “at least as we like to think” mean, and what does “we” refer to? Is it “we” who “want to pursue” the “science of reality” or “we” Westerners, “we” Europeans? Furthermore, does “like” suggest that we only *like* to think this way, while such “*universal* significance and validity” are illusions? Or, on the contrary, does “at least” suggest that from *our* point of view this significance and validity are certainly justified *but* their presence should become clear for *others* as well? At this point I have to turn to the interpretations of Weber’s views on history.

II. Interpretations: the historical framework

First of all, let us go through some facts which I listed in two groups in order to articulate the problem.

(1) As we have seen in the previous section, when Weber published the *PE*, he placed, in fact, several remarks in it stating that the causal relation between Protestant inner-worldly asceticism and the “spirit” of capitalism should *not* be treated as a universal law. His critics stated – to put it simply – that they did not *believe* the causal relations examined in *PE* to merely exemplify a *possible* (“typical”) relation between “religious ideas” and an “economic spirit”, and they read the studies as arguments for the existence of an *actual* causal relation between Protestantism and the “spirit” of capitalism, effective all through the West. To such critiques Weber replied vehemently that his attitude and methods were misunderstood and misinterpreted. Thus, we can conclude that before and while writing the

33 Weber, “Authors Introduction,” xxviii. Translation altered considering the original (cf. Max Weber, “Vorbemerkung,” in *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie, I*. [Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1986], 1.) and Parsons’ original typescript cited by Lawrence A. Scaff, *Max Weber in America*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 222.

PE as well as after reading its critiques, Weber was convinced that he had not made any universal statement. He stressed that he only called attention to the fact that there can be a correlation³⁴ between certain religious ideas and the emergence of an economic "spirit" in several historically relevant cases in which, as he wrote referring to the example of New England, "the causal relation is certainly the reverse of that suggested by the materialistic standpoint."³⁵

(2) Almost at the same time as he wrote his "Anticritical Last Word", which *explicitly* ended the debate on *PE* in 1910, he started to collect materials for a study on China. This work was published under the title "Confucianism" ("Der Konfuzianismus"³⁶) in the *Archiv* in 1915 and was followed by two other studies, "Hinduism and Buddhism" ("Hinduismus und Buddhismus") and "Ancient Judaism" ("Das antike Judentum"). If we take a closer look at these works, it becomes clear that the "Anticritical Last Word" was only the last "anticritical" word, but in no way Weber's last word on the topic itself. Reading the studies we find that the reason for starting these new investigations was his being dissatisfied with the *extent* to which he had examined the question in the studies of *PE*. Already "[i]n the second essay of 1905, we find many indications that he intended to supply, in a third essay, the 'other side of the causal chain', as he put it later."³⁷ Yet, instead of writing this third part on the relations examined in a Western framework, Weber returned to the question from a different point of view in a series of comparative studies on the "economic ethics of world religions". While the studies of *PE* examined "only one side of the causal chain", these works attempted

in the form of a survey of the relations of the most important religions to economic life and to the social stratification of their environment, to follow out *both* causal relationships, so far as it is

34 Cf. Weber, *The Protestant Ethic*, 49–50.

35 Weber, *The Protestant Ethic*, 20.

36 Later in its extended version the study was titled "Confucianism and Daoism" ("Konfuzianismus und Taoismus"), translated to English misleadingly as "The Religion of China" (Cf. Wolfgang Schluchter, "How Ideas become Effective in History": Max Weber on Confucianism and Beyond," *Max Weber Studies* 14(1) (2014): 13.)

37 Schluchter, "How Ideas become Effective," 12.

necessary in order to find points of *comparison* with an Occidental development[, which is to be further analyzed]. For only in this way is it possible to attempt a causal evaluation of those elements of the economic ethics of the Western religions which differentiate them from others, with a hope of attaining even a tolerable degree of approximation.³⁸

We can clearly understand from Weber's words that the main question of these works is not only how religious ideas influenced the "economic life" and "the social stratification" of a specific culture ("one side" of the causal chain, already examined in the *PE*), but also how economic and social factors influenced religious ideas ("the other side" of the causal chain). Yet, we have to pay special attention to the sentence "so far as it is necessary in order to find points of comparison with the Occidental development", because only in the light of these two considerations *together* can we get to the actual focus of the studies. The focus is, namely, on the question why other cultures (i.e., non-Western ones) have not developed an economic system of the Occidental kind (why "in Western civilization, and in Western civilization only" such cultural phenomena had appeared), and *if* the reason lies in certain religious ideas ("one side" of the causal chain), *then* which non-religious factors could have had an influence on *those* religious ideas ("the other side" of the causal chain). It can be demonstrated on examples taken from the studies on world religions that Weber did actually detect the reason in question in religious ideas, but *in a negative way*, i.e., in the fact that it was "the central, methodically *life-orienting* force of a salvation religion that was *missing* [in China]";³⁹ or in the fact that "[s]ince Antiquity, Jewish pariah capitalism, like that of the Hindu trader castes, felt at home in the very forms of state- and bootycapitalism [sic!]

38 Weber, "Author's Introduction," xxxix–xv. Translation slightly altered following Wolfgang Schluchter, *Rationalism, Religion and Domination: A Weberian Perspective* (Berkeley – Los Angeles – Oxford: University of California Press, 1989), 421.

39 Max Weber, *The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism*, ed. Hans H. Gerth (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959), 170. Translation altered. The modified words are also in italics (italics from the German original). Cf. Max Weber, *Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen. Konfuzianismus und Taoismus. Schriften 1915–1920. (Max Weber Gesamtausgabe, I:19.)*, ed. Helwig Schmidt-Glintzer in collaboration with Petra Kolonko (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1989), 369.

along with pure money usury and trade, *precisely what Puritanism abhorred*."⁴⁰ This means that regarding "the other side" of the causal chain, Weber was looking for the non-religious (economic, social etc.) factors that had played a role in the formation of economic ethics of different cultures *insofar* as he was examining how and why such factors *hindered* the emergence of a religious formation similar to Protestant inner-worldly asceticism. "The *PE* and *WEWR* do not belong together as hypothesis and control evidence. *WEWR* is the legitimate consolidation and extension of the path Weber had started with the *PE*."⁴¹ Tenbruck clearly shows the importance of this "path", stressing the central role of *PE* and *WEWR* in the Weberian oeuvre instead of *Economy and Society*. However, such a "consolidation and extension" of the scope of *PE* cannot be strictly distinguished from, or, as Tenbruck tried to do, *confronted* with a verification of the single claim which certainly played a central role in Weber's lifelong investigations. Tenbruck was, so to speak, trying to argue for an interpretation of the studies on world religions as if they presented a photograph of *similar* processes in different *contexts*, while the studies themselves rather justify an interpretation which considers them as photographs taken of the *same* process from different *aspects*, that is, of the same process through different *mirrors*. To decide whether Weber was right or wrong (in what he said about China, India, and ancient Judaism) would not be possible, but, fortunately, neither is it necessary here. Instead, I have to point to the discrepancy between (1) and (2) above which can best be done with the help of the figure on the following page.

Row (A) depicts that side of the causal relation which Weber examined in *PE*. In row (B) we can see two possible ways in which Weber could have examined "the other side" of this relation. Finally, in row (C) it is shown that what Weber actually analysed in *WEWR* was not so much the other side of the chain as the "negative" of the "photograph" he had taken of the West before. This means that Weber, after arguing, debating, and we could even say, struggling *for years* against those who doubted that he considered Protestant

40 Max Weber, *Ancient Judaism*, ed. Hans H. Gerth and Don Martindale (New York: The Free Press. London: Collier and Macmillan, 1967), 345. My italics.

41 Friedrich H. Tenbruck, "The Problem of Thematic Unity in the Works of Max Weber," *The British Journal of Sociology* 31(3) (1980): 328.

	THE PRESENCE OF CAPITALISM AS "CAPITALISTIC CALCULATION" EVERYWHERE*	Causal effect(s)	THE AGE OF THE EMERGENCE OF PROTESTANTISM IN THE WEST	Causal effect(s)	THE AGE OF THE "SPIRIT" OF CAPITALISM IN THE WEST
(A) CAUSAL EXAMINATION IN PE			Protestant inner-worldly asceticism (religious factor)	→	the "spirit" of capitalism
(B) POSSIBLE EXAMINATION OF "BOTH SIDES" OF THE CAUSAL CHAIN	non-religious (economic, social etc.) factors	A/1 →	Protestant inner-worldly asceticism (religious factor)	A/2 →	the "spirit" of capitalism
			non-religious (economic, social etc.) factors	B →	
(C) ACTUAL EXAMINATION OF "BOTH SIDES" IN WEWR	non-religious (economic, social etc.) factors	→	the <i>lack</i> of a religious ethic similar to that of Protestantism (religious factor [?])	→	the <i>lack</i> of the "spirit" of capitalism

*Cf. Weber, *The Protestant Ethic*, 14., *Economy and Society*, 164. (II. 31.), "Author's Introduction", xxxiii.

inner-worldly asceticism only as *one* (and not *the one and only*) cause of the “spirit” of capitalism in the West; after trying to prove that this relation was only an example of a *type*; in short, after all his *methodological* efforts, he himself is doing nothing else than using the historical phenomenon of Protestant asceticism as the main reference point of the investigation when he characterises different economic-ethical processes precisely with the *lack* of it. Two sentences in the study on China, which I cite here in German as well, are of central importance in this respect:

[...] was *fehlte* [in China], war: die zentrale methodisch *lebensorientierende* Macht einer Erlösungsreligion. Die Wirkung davon, daß sie fehlte, werden wir weiterhin kennen lernen.⁴²

[...] [it was] the central, methodically *life-orienting* force of a salvation religion that was *missing* [in China]. [In the following chapters] we are going to find out about the effects of [the fact that] it was missing.⁴³

Of course, the word “*fehlte*” can mean that something was “non-existent” (Gerth translated it this way), still, based on the previous chapters of the study on Confucianism, we have a good reason to argue that it is more plausible to read it here as “missing”. As Weber wrote in a letter to Below before the First World War, “[w]e are absolutely in accord that history should establish what is specific to, say, the medieval city; but this is possible only if we first find what is missing in other cities (ancient, Chinese, Islamic).”⁴⁴ More importantly, such a reading is also strengthened by the sentence left out from Gerth’s translation, “we are going to find out about the effects of [the fact that] it was missing”. For if the *lack* of something has an *effect*, this thing is not simply “non-existent”, but something that *can be expected* to exist, and things can only be expected to exist according to a *rule*. Of course, it would be natural in the Weberian framework to say “ideal type” (of an economic “spirit” emerging from a religious ethic) instead of “rule” here. But what kind of type is the one which can be applied to a historical phenomenon that appeared

42 Max Weber, *Konfuzianismus und Taoismus*, 369.

43 Weber, *Religion of China*, 170. Translation altered.

44 Cited by Guenther Roth, “Charisma and the Counterculture,” in Roth and Schluchter, *Weber’s Vision*, 121.

“in Western civilization, and in Western civilization only”; if there is not even one other example in history showing a pattern similar to that of the relation between Protestant inner-worldly asceticism and the “spirit” of capitalism in the West; if all cases Weber analyses differ from this, but for him they seem to differ *because* of the lack of “the central, methodically *life-orienting* force of a salvation religion”? What else could this so-called “type” be, then, if not a certain *stage* (and not simply an age) of a *developmental progress* (and not simply a process of change) of world history? Aren’t we facing the danger of turning back the Marxian approach on its head?

It comes as a shock [...] to read in the *Intermediate Reflections* [“Zwischenbetrachtung”] that in one instance Weber didn’t wish to exclude “real” types.

From this methodological shock there emanates a whole series of sociological shocks as soon as one has comprehended the situation. The exception, the quasi-real types, are religious world images. The growth of these world views produce predominantly rational compulsions that make the genesis of religion a contribution to the progress of rationalism, and the stages of this development becomes a sociology of rationalism that Weber outlines ideal-typically.⁴⁵

In these shocks we are asking ourselves: was Weber, then, a strict methodologist of historical investigation or a “universal historian” (*Universalhistoriker*)?

When reading interpretations on Weber’s views of history, the answer to this question often seems to be easily decided – yet, the interpretations of Weber *as a universal historian* also differ in many ways (this is the main reason why the term “universal history” cannot be defined here more precisely). Mommsen observes in his 1986 study that

[t]he growing interest in Max Weber’s sociology which is observable today must be due, among other things, to the fact that it explicitly or implicitly encompasses the historical dimension of social reality, even in its purely theoretical elements. It may well be said that

45 Tenbruck, “The Problem of Thematic Unity,” 333.

his sociological theory derives its strength from the fact that it is unfolded against the backcloth of universal history.⁴⁶

Mommsen is, of course, one of the sociologists sharing this view, but he is absolutely correct in stating that the interest in Weber's works is, to a relatively high degree, motivated by such a view.⁴⁷ Reinhard Bendix calls our attention to Ernst Troeltsch's interpretation written only two years after Weber's death.

Max Weber declared his methodological affinity to Rickert. This implies a renunciation of every kind of dialectic or organicist notion of development. For him such a notion is pure romanticism and fallacious emanationist logic. For the same reason he consciously abandoned universal history and replaced it by comparative sociology [...].⁴⁸

However, in Troeltsch's interpretation, abandoning the “organicist notion of development” is not in contradiction with an “inclusive evolutionary and sociological view”:

[All of Weber's] inquiries are fragments of an inclusive evolutionary and sociological view, which rethinks Hegelian and Marxian thought in a completely new, if essentially sociological, manner and provides historiography with new insights of the greatest significance.⁴⁹

Ten years after these words were written down by Troeltsch, Karl Jaspers also called attention to the sociological character of Weber's investigations, but *in this sense* he called him a “universal historian”.

[...] Max Weber the universal historian is not a narrator like Ranke, nor a philosopher of history like Hegel, nor a collector of data like Schmoller, nor a contemplator of great figures like Burckhardt, but

46 Wolfgang J. Mommsen, “The Two Dimensions of Social Change in Max Weber's Sociological Theory,” in *The Political and Social Theory of Max Weber: Collected Essays* (Cambridge: The University of Chicago Press, 1989), 145.

47 It can be added that the critics, Fischer's and Rachfahl's “interest” in Weber's works was also motivated by such an interpretation, but of course, in a negative sense.

48 Troeltsch: *Der Historismus und seine Probleme* (1922, 361, 367ff.) cited by Reinhard Bendix, “The Historical Relationship to Marxism,” in Reinhard Bendix and Guenther Roth, *Scholarship and Partisanship: Essays on Max Weber* (Berkeley – Los Angeles – London: University of California Press, 1980), 230.

49 Troeltsch cited by Bendix, “Historical Relationship,” 231.

a sociologist. Each in its place, narrative, construction, collection, vision serve him as means. Because he takes none of these as his goal and lets none of them close him in, the world of human affairs is fully opened to his inquiry into the causes. His sociology is universal history because, engaged in a process that can never be completed, he rises to the *radical questions* in order to penetrate the great decisions, the root causes in the development of human affairs.⁵⁰

What Jaspers describes here is nothing else but the “objectivity” of the “cultural sciences” in the Weberian sense of the word. However, the interpreters also disagree whether the *explicit* abandonment of the Hegelian tradition actually meant the exile of conceptual presuppositions. Karl Löwith published his essay *Max Weber und Karl Marx* in the same year as Jaspers. Analysing Weber’s critique of Roscher’s and Knies’ “emanatism”, he stresses that “the constructivist and ‘nominalistic’ character of Weber’s basic methodological concepts” has to be interpreted in the light of his notion of a “human being who is specifically ‘free of illusions’”, who must “‘create’ meaning in both theoretical and practical terms”, and who is situated in the modern state, which meant for Weber “a kind of rational ‘institution’, an ‘enterprise’”.⁵¹ The pure methodological character of Weber’s analysis, says Löwith, is illusory:

Weber misunderstands himself as a specialised scientist when he insists (*vis-à-vis* Spann) on the purely “methodological” significance of his “individualistic” and “rational” definition and denies its substantive character as well as its value-relatedness. What Weber proved in regard to Roscher and Knies holds equally true for himself: ultimate presuppositions and *Weltanschauungen* extend right into the “logical” structure.⁵²

This passage would seem to be a critique – at least Weber would certainly read it as such. However, Löwith stresses that despite this “misunderstanding” of himself, Weber could keep his stand against *a specific kind* of presupposition: the “transcendent” one.

50 Jaspers, “Max Weber,” 237.

51 Karl Löwith, *Max Weber und Karl Marx* (London – New York: Routledge, 1993), 60–61.

52 Löwith, *Max Weber und Karl Marx*, 61.

[T]he ultimate assumption inherent in Weber’s “individualistic” definition of so-called social “structures” is this: that today only the “individual”, the self-sufficient single person, is true and real and entitled to existence, because “objectives” of all kinds have been demystified (through rationalisation) and no longer have any independent meaning. [...] Here again Weber’s scientific open-mindedness (*Unbefangenheit*) shows itself as a matter of no longer being enmeshed in transcendent prejudices.⁵³

On the one hand, we can hardly be satisfied with the explanation that Weber insisted on the “methodological significance” of any of his definitions because he *misunderstood* himself in any sense. On the other hand, we have to face the question whether Weber was really unaware of the discrepancy described by Löwith. As Merleau-Ponty wrote in 1955 in the insightful chapter on Weber in his *Adventures of the Dialectic* after enumerating several problems regarding Weber’s interpretation of history,

the objection can [also] be made that historical consciousness lives off this indefensible paradox: fragments of human life, each of which has been lived as absolute, and whose meaning thus in principle eludes the disinterested onlooker, are brought together in the imagination in a single act of attention, are compared and considered as moments in a single developmental process. It is necessary, therefore, to choose between a history which judges, situates, and organizes – at the risk of finding in the past only a reflection of the troubles and problems of the present – and an indifferent, agnostic history which lines up civilizations one after another like unique individuals who cannot be compared. *Weber is not unaware of these difficulties; indeed, it is these difficulties which have set his thought in action.*⁵⁴

Twenty years later Friedrich Tenbruck also stresses the fact, referring to Reinhard Bendix’s efforts, that only by eschewing “reductionism to either methodological or theoretical conceptualization”⁵⁵ can we grasp the Weberian oeuvre as a whole. However, if the result of eschewing the extremes is an enforced homogeneity, like in the case

53 Löwith, *Max Weber and Karl Marx*, 61.

54 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Adventures of the Dialectic* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 19. My italics.

55 Tenbruck, “The Problem of Thematic Unity,” 318. The study was written generally in 1975 in German.

of Bendix, who misleadingly “merged” *Economy and Society* and the *Collected Essays on the Sociology of Religion* together, we are still far from the actual character of Weber’s works. As an example, Tenbruck cites the well-known passage from the “Introduction” of *WEWR*:

Not ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly govern men’s conduct. Yet very frequently the world-images that have been created by “ideas” have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interests.⁵⁶

Such passages can hardly fit the homogenizing interpretation: “Bendix too”, as Tenbruck adds, “can make little of this ‘cryptic remark.’”⁵⁷ The reason is that such interpretations are, so to speak, embarrassed by Weber’s mentioning “ideas” in such a context. This causes misinterpretation. In Tenbruck’s reading “Weber’s usage [of the term ‘ideas’] is that of the preceding century”, and

[i]n treating ideas as historical and social facts Weber is completely conventional. Entirely unconventional is his “cryptic” theory (not “remark”) of the role of ideas as switchmen. [...] For Weber [...] not the power of ideas through their persistence but the dynamic of their own logic makes them the switchmen in history. Certain ideas under the compulsion of an inner logic (*Eigenlogik*) develop their rational consequences and thereby effect universal-historical processes; this is the import of *WEWR*.⁵⁸

With this remark we return to the question: what kind of concept dominates Weber’s views on history? The cited fragments were meant to reflect four important facts about our understanding of the Weberian oeuvre: (1) that it is hardly possible to develop a scheme for interpreting it without facing the *question* whether its hidden (?) leitmotif was a “universal-historical” concept, (2) that the answers to this question are usually in agreement with each other insofar as

56 Weber’s “Introduction” to *WEWR* cited by Tenbruck, “The Problem of Thematic Unity,” 335. (Cited by Tenbruck with slight modification from *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, 280.)

57 Tenbruck, “The Problem of Thematic Unity,” 319. “Cryptic remark” is cited from Bendix: *Max Weber, an Intellectual Portrait* (1965, 68.) – Tenbruck’s reference).

58 Tenbruck, “The Problem of Thematic Unity,” 336–337. On the “neo-idealist” interpretation of Weber’s views on history in Tenbruck’s works cf. Mommsen, “Two Dimensions,” 147.

they read, *in some sense*, a universal-historical concept out of several works of Weber, (3) that the sense in which they treat this concept is different in almost all cases, and (4) that such interpretations are always struggling (explicitly or implicitly) with the problem that because of this, they disagree with Weber’s own interpretation of the aim of his writings. Now I will turn to the question which, in my opinion, must precede the one regarding Weber’s universal-historical concept: why was he, *whether he had such a concept or not*, making so many efforts to expel *all kinds* of universal-historical interpretation of his works, or, to borrow the words of Troeltsch, why was he so “*consciously* abandon[ing] universal history”?

The answer was, it seems, obvious for Weber, as well as for the cited interpreters, although it is rather only implied – sometimes quite vaguely – than explicated in their works. For Weber it was extremely important to keep all kinds of universal-historical concepts away from his investigations, because such concepts would undermine his principles of sociological work: the principles of *objectivity* and *value freedom*. If he gave an interpretation of history as a developmental process in an evolutionary sense, it would hardly be possible to argue, for example, that “technical progress” means nothing more than that

if, in a given case, the proposition holds that the measure *x* is a means (let us assume: the only one) for achieving the result *y* (this is an empirical question, and is in fact simply the inversion of the causal statement “*x* is followed by *y*”), and if people deliberately make use of this proposition when they orient their action towards achieving the result *y* (this can also be established empirically), *then* the orientation of their action is “technically *correct*”.⁵⁹

Similarly, an explicitly universal-historical interpretation of social phenomena, indicating a developmental progress *towards* something more advanced or more *perfect*, cannot go hand in hand with the definition of the ideal type as something “totally indifferent to *evaluative* judgements” that “has nothing to do with any other ‘perfection’ than a purely *logical* one. There are ideal types of brothels as well as of religions [...]”.⁶⁰

59 Weber, “Value Freedom,” 325–326.

60 Weber, “Objectivity,” 130.

Since Weber assumed that the real is always individual, he could state the premise of the historical school also in these terms: the individual is an emanation from the general or from the whole. According to Weber, however, individual or partial phenomena can be understood only as effects of other individual or partial phenomena, and never as effects of wholes such as folk minds.⁶¹

These are the words of Leo Strauss, one of Weber's most vehement critics, whose polemic was based on the assumption that by "the idea of science" Weber was "forced"

to insist on the fact that all science as such is independent of *Weltanschauung*: both natural and social science claim to be equally valid for Westerners and for Chinese, i.e., for people whose "world views" are radically different.⁶²

From this (in my point of view, false) interpretation Strauss formulates a critique regarding Weber's *ethical* teaching, in other words, the *lack* of ethics in the classical sense of the word in Weber's views on science or politics as vocation. Strauss tried to argue that Weber's

categoric imperative actually means "Follow thy demon, regardless of whether he is a good or evil demon." For there is an insoluble, deadly conflict between the various values among which man has to choose.⁶³

Although Strauss' reading is strongly predetermined by his own concept, with his critique we reach the final point of defining the problem we are facing: the fact that the methodological character of Weber's writings on which he insisted throughout his life, and the universal-historical view read out of (or into) his writings by his interpreters *collide in the field of ethics* – not, or not only, in the field of religious or economic ethics, but Weber's own "ethics" as well. In the next section I will try to give a plausible solution to the difficulties described above by examining Weber's views on history from this aspect.

61 Leo Strauss, *Natural Right and History* (Chicago – London: The University of Chicago Press, 1965), 37.

62 Strauss, *Natural Right and History*, 38.

63 Strauss, *Natural Right and History*, 45.

III. Methodological rationality and historical rationalisation: the ethical framework

There are two interpretations of Weber's views on history resulting from what we have seen so far, but both of them are facing serious difficulties. „Weber's own account of the “purely methodological character” of his writings is challenged by the views of interpreters like Troeltsch, Jaspers, Löwith, Tenbruck or Mommsen, while regarding Weber as a “universal historian” (in any sense of the word) underestimates Weber himself as someone who is childishly defending an ideal of science, and still cannot avoid a concept – which is in obvious conflict with this ideal – seeping through his system of thought. Instead of these two inadequate interpretations I suggest a third one which might be able to provide a common ground for the two conflicting readings. I suggest making a distinction, *not* between methodological and practical analysis, *not* between sociological and historical investigations, but simply between Weber's two *manners of speaking*.

(1) The first one, which I will call the *controlled manner of speaking*, characterises the studies on objectivity and value freedom as well as the methodological remarks in the polemics against Meyer or in *Economy and Society*. These *loci* reflect Weber's idea of scientific knowledge. Such knowledge is using abstractions which are, indeed, *artificial*, that is, not instinctive, not natural to the human mind. In the text where Weber's most problematic sentences regarding a universal view on history can be found, he also writes:

It is true that the path of human destiny cannot but appal him who surveys a section of it. But he will do well to keep his small personal commentarie[s] to himself, as one does at the sight of the sea or of majestic mountains, unless he knows himself to be called and gifted to give them expression in artistic or prophetic form.⁶⁴

Thus, Weber was making an effort to give a neutral account of socio-historical phenomena, but he never meant this to equal the imperative “Follow thy demon, regardless of whether he is a good or evil demon”.⁶⁵ Instead of this Weber says: here are the facts, the

64 Weber, “Author's Introduction,” xli.

65 Strauss, *Natural Right and History*, 45.

possible results of such and such deeds and occurrences – measure them and deliberate on your own actions. The scientist, when providing the reader with the possibility of this *deliberation*, calls the reader's attention to the fact of her being *liberated* from all determinations, i.e., *being free to decide how to act*. As Merleau-Ponty wrote, "action consults history, which teaches us, says Weber, certainly not what must be willed, but the true meaning of our volitions."⁶⁶ Löwith shed light on this aspect of Weber's views on the freedom of action by citing a passage from the polemics with Meyer where Weber makes it clear that freedom of the will is not just unequal, but *contradictory* to the irrationality of action.⁶⁷ "Rationality", says Löwith,

goes together with the freedom of action in that it is freedom itself in the form of a "teleological" rationality: the pursuit of a purpose defined by ultimate values or "life-meanings" through the free consideration of adequate means.

[...]

The freedom to bind oneself in the pursuit of one's ultimate aims to the available means signifies nothing more nor less than the responsibility of human action. But knowledge of means – though only of means and not of purposes – is provided by rational "science".⁶⁸

(2) Thus, we arrive at the second category which is *not* an "uncontrolled", but a *reflexive manner of speaking*: not the opposite but the complementary pair of the previous one. Wolfgang Schluchter argues that although Weber's distinction of the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility is a methodological distinction, and in this sense they both are described as value-free categories by the scientist, this does not mean that Weber would not consider them in a certain hierarchy.

The substantive irrationalities of the rationalism realized in the modern Occident require the orientation of an ethic of responsibility. Only by means of it, in recognition of this cultural tradition, can the primacy of subject over object, of self-determination over reification, of freedom over necessity be reached.⁶⁹

66 Merleau-Ponty, *Adventures*, 11.

67 Löwith, *Max Weber and Karl Marx*, 66. Cf. Weber, "Critical Studies," 146.

68 Löwith, *Max Weber and Karl Marx*, 66, 67.

69 Schluchter, *Rationalism*, 363.

Schluchter made it clear that “Weber’s famed postulate of freedom from value judgment has not only one central but also a double meaning” for “[e]mpirical science should be protected against the irresoluble struggle of the different value systems because a science that is independent in this sense has an intrinsic value.”⁷⁰ This position is reflected in several studies which Strauss tried to use as examples of the unethical character of Weber’s concept:

if anyone, then professional “thinkers” are under a special obligation to keep a cool head when confronted with the dominant ideals – even the most majestic ones – at any given time; and this means that they should continue to be able to “swim against the current” if necessary.⁷¹

[I]t is not enough simply to yearn and wait; we should [...] attend to our work and face up to the “demands of the day”, both personally and professionally. And those demands are plain and simple, as long as each of us finds and obeys the daemon who holds the threads of *his* life.⁷²

Where is, then, the “daemon” holding the “threads” of Weber’s life? In my opinion, it can be discovered, primarily, in the way he selected his topics. In the fact that although “[t]here are ideal types of brothels as well as of religions”, he never wrote the sociology of brothels because *he*, “personally and professionally”, did not hold such an investigation necessary. His aim was to *understand* the emergence of the “spirit”, the *ethos* of capitalism in order to provide ourselves with tools for answering the question: which are the opportunities and *ethical* decisions politicians, scientists, or simply *individuals* of the modern West (of Bismarckian, later post-war, Germany) were facing?

Future generations, and particularly our own successors, would not hold the Danes, the Swiss, the Dutch or the Norwegians responsible if world power – which in the last analysis means the power to determine the character of culture in the future – were to be shared out, without a struggle, between the regulations of Russian officials on the one hand and the conventions of English-speaking “soci-

70 Schluchter, “Value-Neutrality,” 79.

71 Weber, “Value Freedom,” 334.

72 Max Weber, “Science as a Profession and Vocation,” in *CMW*, 353.

ety”⁷³ on the other, with perhaps a dash of Latin *raison* thrown in. They would hold *us* responsible, and quite rightly so, for we are a *Machtstaat* and can therefore, in contrast to those “small” nations, throw our weight into the balance on this historical issue. That is why we, and not they, have the accursed duty and obligation to history and to the future to resist the inundation of the entire world by those two powers.⁷⁴

The fact that the issue is “historical” means it is of historical *relevance* – this stresses our responsibility, and *not* any kind of historical necessity. On the contrary, being obliged “to history and to the future” to act in a specific way does not imply the necessity of this state, but a situation of choice. Just like when Weber stated that Western cultural phenomena “lie in a line of development” that has “*universal* significance and validity”, we are facing here an assumption which can be freely debated from many aspects, but only as Weber’s reflexive manner of speaking, and not as a viewpoint of “universal history”, neither in a Hegelian, nor in a Marxian sense. This reflexive manner of speaking dominates the *loci* where Weber’s own view on history, the *meaning* of the investigation of history breaks through the limits of methodological considerations. The rarity of such “non-scientific” (in this sense, “cryptic”) remarks is not the result of timid temperance, but of conscious self-control (in the sense of (1) above).

Though he scrupulously left out of his teaching anything which might have favored some cause or have exhibited his personal beliefs, he is in favor of professors who become engaged in politics. However, they should do this outside the classroom – in essays, which are open to discussion, and in public gatherings, where the adversary can respond.⁷⁵

Merleau-Ponty’s formulation reminds us of one of the most important texts of the modern age, of Immanuel Kant’s “Answer to the Question: ‘What is Enlightenment?’”. Of course, Weber would never say that “the public use of one’s reason” means “the kind of use that

73 Weber uses the word “society” in the original.

74 Max Weber, “Between Two Laws,” in *Political Writings*, ed. Peter Lassmann and Ronald Speirs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 76.

75 Merleau-Ponty, *Adventures*, 26–27.

one makes thereof as a *scholar* before the *reading world*”⁷⁶ – he says that one’s reason is, in a specific sense, *the most limited* as a scholar. The most limited, but not by any kind of institution. The fact that for Weber one’s reason has to be limited *as a scholar* is not a result of a contradiction between Kant’s and Weber’s views on science, but of Weber’s conviction that his age was already at the end of a process Kant described this way:

When nature has fully developed the seed concealed in this hard casing, to which it gives its most tender care, namely, the tendency and the calling to free *thinking*, then this seed will gradually extend its effects to the disposition of the people (through which the people gradually becomes more capable of *freedom of action*) [...].⁷⁷

Weber’s distancing himself from taking any ethical, political or universal-historical stand *as a scientist* results from his assumption that the readers of his day have to be reminded, not of specific values, but of the fact that they *have to* choose between values.

The *nature* of the cause, in the service of which the politician seeks power and uses it, is a matter of belief. [...] But always some belief must be *present*. Otherwise, it is quite true to say that even the outwardly greatest political successes will be subject to the curse of creaturely nullity.⁷⁸

Thus, the objectivity of science should not serve the scientist’s *not* making a choice, but the readers’ *making* their choices *based on objective grounds*. This objectivity is ensured by the limits of the scientist’s reason, and by stressing these limits, as Pietro Rossi wrote, “[a]lso in distancing himself from the Rickertian standpoint, Weber remained loyal to the Kantian critique.”⁷⁹ This critique, the *critique of reason*, is strongly related to an “ethic of reason” in the Kantian

76 Immanuel Kant, “An Answer to the Question: ‘What is Enlightenment?’” in *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace and History*, ed. Pauline Kleingeld, (New Haven – London: Yale University Press, 2006), 19.

77 Kant, “What is Enlightenment,” 23.

78 Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in *Max Weber’s Complete Writings on Academic and Political Vocations*, ed. John Dreijmanis (New York: Algora Publishing, 2008), 194–195.

79 Rossi, “Max Weber,” 38.

sense, as Schluchter points out mentioning a *locus* in Weber's "Intermediate Reflections" where Weber

speaks of the ethic of religious brotherhood in distinction from a priori rigorism,⁸⁰ presumably a reference to the Kantian ethic and thus to the ethic of reason. *Only through this reference does it become clear that Weber's notion of the ethic of responsibility can serve to clarify the ethical problem in Kant's sense.* However, this is possible only if we distinguish between religious and non-religious ethic of conviction and put both, together with the ethic of responsibility, in an historical model of development.⁸¹

Now we have to ask ourselves again, in what sense can we talk about a "historical model of development" in Weber's works? To answer this question I have to cite another famous essay of Kant – just as "cryptic" in the Kantian oeuvre as Weber's remarks on universal history in Bendix's sense – which reflects a notion that characterised the whole tradition of 19th-century German historical thought.

The only option for the philosopher here, since he cannot presuppose that human beings pursue any rational *end of their own* in their endeavors, is that he attempt to discover an *end of nature* behind this absurd course of human activity, an end on the basis of which a history could be given of beings that proceed without a plan of their own, but nevertheless according to a definite plan of nature.⁸²

Although a lot of interpretations state that this short essay has to be handled separately from Kant's other works, I agree with Tamás Miklós that this essay is not an exception but an essential element of the Kantian oeuvre, for his "consideration of the hypothesis of the philosophy of history", as Miklós writes,

[u]nfolds an aporetic situation in which a philosophical concept of history directed at a rational purpose appears to be indispensable, while the rational imagination of such a concept is severely contradictory, and thus, in a broader sense, *the tension between the self-con-*

80 Schluchter refers to the text as "Religious Rejections of the World and Their Directions" translated in *From Max Weber*, 341.

81 Schluchter, "Value-Neutrality," 89. n. 64. (My italics)

82 Immanuel Kant, "Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Aspect," in *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace and History*, ed. Pauline Kleingeld (New Haven – London: Yale University Press, 2006), 4.

cept of man as a mental being of special status and the rational method is thematised, thus, it defines, so to speak, the context in which any epistemological, political or moral reasoning is articulated.⁸³

Max Weber, on the one hand, explicitly rejected any philosophical concept of the history of mankind. On the other hand, it is undeniable that he realised the *need* for such a coherent view on history, and he indeed satisfied this need in his own framework, that is, *on the methodological level of sociology*. Weber, who was not a philosopher, but still “remained loyal to the Kantian critique”, provided a solution to the problem of a universal history in a similar *manner* to that of Kant, i.e., with a critique which we can call the *sociological critique of historical reason*.⁸⁴ He was fully aware of the fact that, as Merleau-Ponty wrote,

[a] historical solution of the human problem, an end of history, could be conceived only if humanity were a thing to be known – if, in it, knowledge were able to exhaust being and could come to a state that really contained all that humanity had been and all that it could ever be.⁸⁵

Weber never chased any such knowledge. But the fact that such knowledge of our *future* is impossible does not mean that we should not have to make all possible efforts to understand the *past* in order to *make* sense of our present, and so to be able to *influence* our future. To be able to understand *any* event of the past, we need a *universal* scheme on the meta-level of scientific investigation, applicable to any age or region in history (such a scheme was provided by ideal types), and only then, after our understanding has given us a clear scientific insight into causes, can we make responsible decisions in our actions.

The fate of a cultural epoch that has eaten from the tree of knowledge is that it must realize that we cannot read off the *meaning* of events in this world from the results – however complete they may be – of our scrutiny of those events, but that we ourselves must be

83 Miklós Tamás, *Hideg démon. Kísérletek a tudás domesztikálására* [Cold Daemon. Attempts to the Domestication of Knowledge] (Pozsony: Kalligram, 2011), 63.

84 Here I have to stress the relation between Weber’s and Dilthey’s solution. Cf. Dilthey, *Introduction*, 165.

85 Merleau-Ponty, *Adventures*, 22–23.

able to create that meaning. We have to realize that the advance of empirical knowledge can never produce “world views”, and that consequently, the most lofty ideals, those that move us most profoundly, will forever only be realized in a struggle against other ideals, [ideals] that are just as holy for others as ours are for us.⁸⁶

Thus, the kind of science Weber “wanted to pursue” was a science that, specifically due to its objectivity, serves our need of *creating* such meanings of events as grounds for our actions. “An empirical science cannot tell someone what he *ought to* do, but only what he *can* do and – possibly – what he *wants to* do.”⁸⁷ Here, in the field of ethics, the *empirical* science of Weber becomes *practical*.

Scientific reflection which can judge the religious as well as the secular variant of the ethic of conviction as being politically out of step with the times is a practical science. However, it becomes practical, not in Marx’s sense, by striving to transcend (*aufheben*) itself, but by maintaining itself, not by growing into a philosophy of totality, but by limiting itself to specialized disciplines. It is only through standing its ground and knowing its limits that scientific reflection becomes a practical science.⁸⁸

Conclusion

In my study I argued that the discrepancy between Weber’s own account of his scientific investigations (section I) and those of later interpreters (section II) can be dissolved by making a distinction between two manners of speaking in the Weberian oeuvre: a *controlled* one, reflected in the methodological character of his works, and a *reflexive* one, reflected in the universal-historical remarks. As I tried to show, both these manners are related in a specific sense to the Kantian critique of reason. The described discrepancy can be dissolved when looked at through these manners inasmuch as they are not simply “not in conflict”, but reciprocally follow from each other. On the one hand, Weber gave a solution to our *need* of a universal view on history on the methodological level in order for

86 Weber, “Objectivity,” 104–105. Cf. Rossi, “Max Weber,” 47.

87 Weber, “Objectivity,” 103.

88 Schluchter, “Value-Neutrality,” 92.

us to be enabled to examine and judge all kinds of social or historical phenomena of our history. In *this* sense, the methodological background of Weber's works is prior to the historical interpretation. On the other hand, this universal view on history makes the strict methodological standpoint (on the field of science) even more *necessary* insofar as it gives *historical* significance to our individual actions which are considered on the basis of historical experience described in scientifically objective terms. In this sense, the notion of universal history is prior to the extremely strict character of Weberian methodology. If one's actions can be considered as parts of the whole which *we* can make sense of, then the ethic of responsibility gains extreme relevance. "[T]he historian who estimates the causal importance of a concrete event is proceeding in the same way as the striving human being who takes a stand and who would never 'act' if he regarded his own action as 'necessary' and not just as 'possible'."⁸⁹ Thus, we can say that the historian is examining the thoughts of a historical figure from the viewpoint of ethical responsibility. Looking at history from such an aspect means not only the satisfaction of the need for a unified process which human beings are part of, but also their being *conscious actors* of that process. The *responsibility* of the scientist as a "cinematographer" in the sense used in section (I) is to provide us with a series of the most detailed photographs possible, so that we – and not the scientist – become the scriptwriter of our own film.

Science gives *clarity*. It discloses given facts on which my action depends and gives awareness of the rational *standpoint* from which action meaningfully follows. It possesses its characteristic compelling truth only if it is free from prophecy. We are free to believe a prophet or not to believe him; scientific insight is compelling for every man, or else it is not scientific insight.⁹⁰

Thus Tenbruck's sentence saying that "[w]ith the disclosure of religious rationalization Weber brings back reason into history"⁹¹ can only be correct if "reason" is meant (*not* as Tenbruck understands it, in the Hegelian but) in the Kantian sense: in the sense of a criti-

⁸⁹ Weber, "Critical Studies," 170.

⁹⁰ Jaspers, "Max Weber," 253.

⁹¹ Tenbruck, "The Problem of Thematic Unity," 340.

cal reason which, in the Weberian framework, “limits knowledge” to a methodological level, in order to “make room for faith” in a common course of our history – “at least as we like to think”.

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Abbreviations

CMW: Max Weber. *Collected Methodological Writings*. Edited by Hans Henrik Bruun and Sam Whimster, translated by Hans Henrik Bruun. Oxon – New York: Routledge, 2012.

PED: David J. Chalcraft and Austin Harrington, ed. *The Protestant Ethic Debate: Max Weber's Replies to his Critics, 1907–1910*. Translated by Austin Harrington and Mary Shields. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2001.

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On the Origins of Carnap's Aufbau
From reductive empiricism
to the Geisteswissenschaften

Ádám Tamás Tuboly

Rudolf Carnap's *Der logische Aufbau der Welt* is considered to be the magnum opus of (early) analytic philosophy. Contrary to this analytic tradition stands, as the saying goes, everything else – the so called continental *philosophies*. It has been highlighted recently, however, that the contexts of the *Aufbau* differ radically from the usual received view. In order to obtain a better picture of (the influences of) the *Aufbau*, I will present in Sect. 1 the received view which characterizes the book as a reductive empiricist, foundationalist and phenomenalist work. In Sect. 2 I will show step-by-step that this view is mistaken and the influences on the *Aufbau* could be located around Neo-Kantianism, the philosophy of Husserl and the human sciences [Geisteswissenschaften]. The contribution of this paper is connected to these approaches and argues for a different and currently unanalyzed and mainly ignored aspect of Carnap's work, namely his theory of geistige Gegenstände. After all, I will claim that *the motivations and continental roots of the Aufbau are just much deeper than it is usually thought*.



Rudolf Carnap's early major work¹, *Der logische Aufbau der Welt*,² is considered to be the magnum opus of (early) analytic philosophy. Seemingly it instantiates every features of it: precise argumentation, rigorous concept usage, radical empiricism, anti-metaphysical and anti-historical basic stance and formal logical treatment of classical problems. This attitude and style contrast the work with the so-called *continental philosophies*. One could say that if analytic philosophy is to be characterized with one work – as opposed to the continental tradition – it is the *Aufbau*.

We have, however, very good reasons to think otherwise. The origins of the work, as well as the published material, are just more complex and cannot be approached from the perspective of one or two general tendencies. In order to facilitate our understanding of Carnap's philosophy in the *Aufbau*, I will overview the general (or received) reading of the book in Section 1. After that, in Section 2, I shall focus on those doubts and alternative traditions which undermine the main theses of the received view. At the end, our attention will be focused on a new and hitherto mostly unanalyzed aspect of the book, namely on Carnap's relation to the human sciences [Geisteswissenschaften]. The thesis which is supposed to be defended all along the way is that *the motivations and continental roots of the Aufbau go much deeper than they are usually thought*.

1 During my research connected to the basic idea of the paper I got many important and fruitful questions and suggestions (and also some unpublished manuscripts). I am indebted to André Cauris, Hans-Joachim Dahms, Christian Damböck, István Faragó-Szabó, Megyer Gyöngyösi, Thomas Mormann and Guillermo E. Rosado Haddock. I am also indebted to the Carnap Archives at Los Angeles (Rudolf Carnap papers (Collection 1029). UCLA Library Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library) and at Pittsburgh (Rudolf Carnap Papers, 1905-1970, ASP.1974.01, Special Collections Department, University of Pittsburgh) for the permission to quote the archive materials. All rights reserved. I cite the Pittsburgh Archive as follows: ASP RC XX-YY-ZZ, where XX is the box number, YY the folder number, and ZZ the item number. The present study is an extended and modified translation of my earlier Hungarian articles on Carnap. The research was supported by the Hungarian National Grant of Excellence.

2 Rudolf Carnap, *The Logical Structure of the World* (Chicago and La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1928/2005). I will refer to it as *Aufbau* with the number of the paragraphs.

1. The Received View

I will name as the “received view” that textbook-like idea which characterizes the *Aufbau* with three “isms”: (1) empiricism, (2) foundationalism, (3) phenomenalism. Though the received view is not without reason – also Carnap seemed to strengthen this view from time to time retrospectively – we will see that at certain points it requires some completion, but at other points, it is just simply misleading.

1.1. *The Aufbau as an empiricist work*

The *Aufbau* is considered to be a work in the tradition of empiricism. By empiricism we understand here simply that approach which locates the origins of our knowledge solely in our senses, in our experiences. In a stronger sense, one could say that for a logical empiricist only those statements are intelligible which describe one’s own immediate experiences, or which follow from statements describing one’s experiential sensations. It is usually pointed out that the Vienna Circle is the most famous logical empiricist group and Carnap is often identified with the Circle.³ Carnap’s name has interwoven with the *Aufbau* and thus (transitively) the *Aufbau* is joined with empiricism.

Quine took Carnap as an integrant part of the empiricist tradition and characterized him “[as] the first empiricist who, not content with asserting the reducibility of science to terms of immediate experience, took serious steps toward carrying out the reduction.”⁴

One should not overlook, of course, that even the logical empiricists made a lot to strengthen this reading of them.⁵ The authors of the Circle’s manifesto, Carnap, Hans Hahn, and Otto Neurath,

3 Quine writes, for example, in a letter to Carnap that “Last term I gave a course on ‘Logical Positivism’, which is to say ‘Carnap.’” See 66/QC/1938-2-4/239.

4 W. V. O. Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” in *From a Logical Point of View* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1951/1963), 39.

5 According to the received view the pre-eminent example of this is the reductivist verificationism of Carnap. Rudolf Carnap, “The Elimination of Metaphysics Through the Logical Analysis of Language,” in *Logical Positivism*, edited by Alfred J. Ayer (New York: The Free Press, 1932/1959), 60–81.

which marks their official phase from 1929, claimed that “[w]e have characterized the *scientific world-conception* essentially by two features. First it is *empiricist* and *positivist*: there is knowledge only from experience, which rests on what is immediately given.”⁶ Even Alfred J. Ayer, who joined the meetings of the Circle for a short period and attended the seminars of Schlick, tried to connect the Vienna Circle to the heritage of Hume and Russell in his *Language, Truth and Logic*.⁷ Therefore, one can easily conclude that, according to the received view, the *Aufbau* and even logical empiricism, in general, are just modern versions of classical British empiricism.

1.2. The *Aufbau* as a foundationalist work

The second panel of the received view is centered on foundationalism. A foundationalist claims that there is a fundamental, certain, infallible base of knowledge on which our whole system of knowledge is built on; the ontological parallel of this claim is that the world consists of certain basic and fundamental entities from which the other entities are constructed.⁸ The fundamentalist program in the modern era goes back at least to Descartes’ “cogito ergo sum” but it emerged also in classical empiricism where the fundamental elements of one’s knowledge were special *ideas*.

Quine and Goodman are responsible – in the United States – to present the *Aufbau* as a foundationalist work. In the former’s “Epistemology Naturalized” – when Quine discussed the history of empiricist epistemology and Carnap’s place in the story – one finds such passages as: “The Cartesian quest for certainty had been the

6 Rudolf Carnap, Hans Hahn and Otto Neurath, “Scientific Conception of the World: The Vienna Circle,” in *Empiricism and Sociology*, edited by Marie Neurath and Robert S. Cohen (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1929/1973), 309. A similar reconstruction of the Circle and especially the *Aufbau* is given by Victor Kraft, a former member of the group. See Victor Kraft, *Der Wiener Kreis. Der Ursprung des Neopositivismus* (Springer-Verlag, 1950).

7 See Alfred J. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic* (New York: Dover Publications, 1936/1952), 32. ff.

8 In Russell’s external-world-project the ontological and the epistemological points of view seem to coincide at certain points.

remote motivation of epistemology, both on its conceptual and its doctrinal side; but that quest was seen as a lost cause.”⁹

The received view tells us that the main motivation of Carnap was to continue and elaborate Russell’s 1914 external-world-project: to find that fundamental base from which our knowledge of the world could be built up with certainty. As the textbook story goes, the *Aufbau* as a foundationalist work was doomed to failure due to its logical and epistemological errors.

1.3. *The Aufbau as a phenomenalist work*

The third element of the received view combines the first two since an answer is to be provided to the question: what is that epistemological/ontological base to which an empiricist should reduce the complex elements of knowledge? The answer is a special form of phenomenism, the theory of sense data: statements about physical objects could be defined by those terms that describe one’s private *sense data*. Thus, in this case, the fundament of one’s knowledge is formed by isolated, atomic and private sense data which could not be analyzed further.

According to Nelson Goodman, “[t]he system [of the *Aufbau*] is plainly phenomenistic.”¹⁰ Phenomenism in itself is not enough to characterize the system of the *Aufbau*; it shows only that the source of knowledge is located in one’s private sensations. Sense data theory is a special version of phenomenism which was quite familiar back then. In the Vienna Circle, Ernst Mach’s sense data theory was referred to quite frequently but they also considered Carnap’s external world project as such a conception.¹¹ On the other hand, Carnap emphasized the important role of Russell’s sense data

9 W. V. O. Quine, “Epistemology Naturalized,” in *Ontological Relativity and other Essays* (Columbia University Press, 1969), 74.

10 Nelson Goodman, “The Significance of Der logische Aufbau der Welt,” in *The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap*, edited by Paul A. Schilpp (Open Court, 1963), 545. Carnap also emphasizes this in his reply to Goodman. See Rudolf Carnap, “Nelson Goodman On *Der logische Aufbau der Welt*,” in *The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap*, edited by Paul A. Schilpp (Open Court, 1963), 945.

11 See for example Carnap–Hahn–Neurath, “Scientific Conception...”; and Philipp Frank, *Modern Science and its Philosophy* (New York: George Braziller, 1949).

theory and its effect on his early philosophy. In his intellectual autobiography, he described Russell's project as the main source of his *Aufbau*.¹² Furthermore, the motto of the *Aufbau* (§1) was a quotation from Russell: "The supreme maxim in scientific philosophizing is this: Wherever possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities."¹³

Quine could be marked, at least partly, as responsible also for the sense data/phenomenalist reading of the *Aufbau*.¹⁴ Both in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" and "Epistemology Naturalized" he viewed the *Aufbau* from the mentioned perspective:

Radical reductionism, conceived now with statements as units, set itself the task of specifying a sense-datum language and showing how to translate the rest of significant discourse, statement by statement, into it. Carnap embarked on this project in the *Aufbau*.¹⁵

To account for the external world as a logical construct of sense data – such, in Russell's terms, was the program. It was Carnap, in his *Der logische Aufbau der Welt* of 1928, who came nearest to executing it. [...] Carnap's constructions, if carried successfully to completion, would have enabled us to translate all sentences about the world into terms of sense data, or observation, plus logic and set theory.¹⁶

To summarize the received view: Carnap's *Aufbau* is such a work in philosophy which is a logical heir of classical (and Russell-type) empiricism where the fundamental base of our knowledge is the phenomenalist sense-data. The set of meaningful statements consists only in statements about sense-data or a logical construction from those statements.

12 Rudolf Carnap, "Intellectual Autobiography," in *The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap*, edited by Paul A. Schilpp, (Open Court, 1963), 13.

13 See Bertrand Russell, "The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics," *Scientia* 1914 (16):155.

14 In the United Kingdom this role was fulfilled by Ayer who presented and defended the sense data theory in his *Language, Truth and Logic*.

15 Quine, "Two Dogmas...", 39.

16 Quine, "Epistemology Naturalized ...," 74.

2. The rehabilitation of the *Aufbau*

My aim is twofold in this section. On the one hand, I will overview the main panels of the recent secondary literature on Carnap in order to shed some light on how people on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean consider the rehabilitation of Carnap. I shall deal with it in three steps following the three aspects of the received view. On the other hand, I will sketch such a partial interpretation of the *Aufbau* which was neglected so far.

2.1. *The non-empiricists roots of the Aufbau*

Though it is well motivated to view the *Aufbau* from the tradition of empiricism, in fact, it never served as the *only* and *absolute* base for Carnap as it was, for example, for Locke, Berkeley or Hume.¹⁷ If empiricism is not the only source of the *Aufbau* then what are the other sources? Neo-Kantianism was in the last few decades the most discussed and investigated tradition in the context of Carnap. This reading of the *Aufbau* was defended mainly by Michael Friedman and Alan Richardson¹⁸ who claimed that the main notions, motivations, and solutions of the *Aufbau* are organically related to the German Neo-Kantian tendencies. In their view, the main question of the work is a transcendental one: “How is intersubjective/objective scientific knowledge possible at all?” One should read the

17 In “Testability and Meaning” Carnap claimed that though empiricism is obviously present in his works it is only a *hypotheses*, a *suggestion* which should be judged by its success and pragmatic virtues and not by its truth (Rudolf Carnap, “Testability and Meaning – Continued,” *The Philosophy of Science* 4 (1): 33). Hence one shall think of a *methodological empiricism* and not a substantive, true-or-false philosophical thesis. This seems to be confirmed also by the fact that in the *Aufbau* Carnap developed a neutral language for the then-current epistemological schools, see §§176–178.

18 See Alan W. Richardson, *Carnap’s Construction of the World – The Aufbau and the Emergence of Logical Empiricism* (Cambridge University Press, 1998); and Michael Friedman, *Reconsidering Logical Positivism* (Cambridge University Press, 1999). Of course many other scholars have claimed for a (Neo-)Kantian reading of the *Aufbau* before the 1990s – for them see the references in the mentioned works.

Aufbau as providing a detailed answer to this question¹⁹ (and I will come back to that later).

The Neo-Kantian roots of Carnap's intellectual development are documented quite well. He was educated at the universities of Jena and Freiburg between 1910 and 1914. In Jena, one of his teachers was the Neo-Kantian Bruno Bauch (who was also the editor of *Kant Studien* until 1916) who gave lectures on Kant's first critique for two semesters. After the First World War Bauch became Carnap's *Doktorvater*.²⁰ In the dissertation (which was completed in 1921 and published in *Kant Studien* in 1922) Carnap discussed the different meanings and frames of the notion of space, one of which was "intuitive space" based on the ideas of Kant and partly of Husserl.²¹

19 The (Neo-)Kantian tendencies could be detected in many other places of the *Aufbau*. For example see Friedman's claim: "[logical empiricists and Carnap's] central philosophical innovation is not a new version of radical empiricism but rather a new conception of a priori knowledge and its role in empirical knowledge." Friedman, *Reconsidering...*, xv.

20 Carnap had a lot of problems with his dissertation. First he wanted to submit a proposal (about axiomatic foundations of kinematics) to the physics department but it was too philosophical for them (as claimed by Max Wien), then he went to the philosophy department but it was too physical for them. At one point he asked also Hugo Dingler to be his supervisor (ASP RC 028-12-11) but after all Bruno Bauch has undertaken the task and oriented Carnap towards the philosophy of geometry. See Carnap, "Intellectual Autobiography," 11.

21 About Carnap's conception of space and geometry and his dissertation see Adolf Grünbaum, "Carnap's View on the Foundations of Geometry," in *The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap*, edited by Paul A. Schilpp (Open Court, 1963), 599-684; and Thomas Mormann, "Geometrical leitmotifs in Carnap's early philosophy," in *The Cambridge Companion to Carnap*, edited by Michael Friedman, Richard Creath, (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 43-64. According to Mormann Carnap's philosophy of geometry in the 1920s contained the leitmotifs of the later metaphysical commitments. Interestingly, after that Carnap presented his method of quasi-analyses in the *Aufbau* which was applied also to geometrical objects, in his later works he did not touch upon the questions of the recent developments of geometry. A few exceptions could be found in his introductory book to philosophy of science (Rudolf Carnap, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science*, edited by Martin Gardner (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1966/1995)), in his reply to Grünbaum (Rudolf Carnap, "Adolf Grünbaum on the Philosophy of Space and Time," in *The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap*, edited by Paul A. Schilpp, (Open Court, 1963), 952-958) and a few lectures in the Vienna Circle in the early 1930s (see ASP RC 110-09-04 and a lecture presented at the Dessau Bauhaus, ASP RC 110-07-48).

Though it is really hard to neglect the tradition of Neo-Kantianism in the case of a scholar who had been socialized and educated in the institutional frameworks of the early twentieth century Germany, the defenders of the influence of German philosophy on Carnap's work claim that the motivation and aims of the *Aufbau* cannot be understood without referring to Neo-Kantianism (so the influence is not just a contingent fact but a substantial one):

Carnap's problem [in the *Aufbau*] is how to account for the objectivity of knowledge despite its subjective origins. The *problem itself* and the *role of formal notions* in its solution, combined with indubitable facts about the sort of *philosophical education* Carnap received in the 1910s in Jena, reorient the story toward a rather different philosophical tradition from Russell's – the *tradition of scientific neo-Kantianism* that was in full flower in the Marburg and Southwest schools in the first quarter of the twentieth century.²²

We cannot move on without mentioning another tradition that had a huge influence on Carnap's general thought and world-view.²³ André Carus devoted a whole book to the interpretation which claims that Carnap's philosophy and

[t]he conceptual framework he created is still the most promising instrument [...] for the very purpose he invented it to serve, in the somewhat utopian Vienna Circle context of the 1920s and early 1930s: it is still the best basis for a comprehensive and internally consistent *Enlightenment world view*.²⁴

Carus argues that the works of Carnap (and some other members of the Vienna Circle) could be interpreted as the most successful attempts to revive the spirit of Enlightenment in the twentieth century.²⁵ Though Carus' main aim is to show that through the late Carnap's notion and method of explication provide the base to understand the idea of Enlightenment and conceptual engineering

22 Richardson, *Carnap's Construction...*, 2. Italics added.

23 The further non-empiricists roots of the *Aufbau* will be discussed in sections 2.2-3-4.

24 André Carus, *Carnap and Twentieth-Century Thought: Explication as Enlightenment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 8. Italics added.

25 On the influence of Enlightenment on Carnap see also Jacques Bouveresse, "Rudolf Carnap and the Legacy of *Aufklärung*," in *Carnap's Ideal of Explication and Naturalism*, edited by Richard Wagner, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 47–62.

of Carnap, some traits, and leitmotifs of them could be revealed also in the social and cultural connotations of the *Aufbau* as well as in its worldview [*Weltanschauung*] (I will discuss these points later on).

2.2. The non-foundationalist reading of the *Aufbau*

Many passages of the *Aufbau* seem to imply that one cannot interpret it as a work in the tradition of foundationalism. Though – as I mentioned earlier – Carnap designates Russell as his principal source in the *Aufbau*, in fact, he distanced himself from Russell's more metaphysical foundationalist project (§176). If we take the foundational project as a substantive ontological claim which states that there is a basic, fundamental level of entities (sense data, according to Russell) to which we can reduce all the other complex entities (hence the elements of the external world would be logical constructions of these basic entities), then this thesis is not contained in the *Aufbau*.

Carnap treated these kinds of metaphysical claims as being outside of science and scientific philosophy, hence the question – how is the world built up from an ontological point of view – is not a concern of the *Aufbau*-project.²⁶ Though Carnap dealt with our knowledge about the external world and reality (§§170–178) he distinguished the *empirical* and the *metaphysical* notions of reality (§§175–178). While the former involves scientific questions – which shall be answered by empirical means – and hence its conceptual

26 The *Aufbau* does not contain the usual verificationist arguments against metaphysics as they were present in the “Überwindung” article. Carnap started to use them only in his *Scheinprobleme in der Philosophie*; the reason is that while the most parts of the *Aufbau* was already written before Carnap went to Vienna, he worked out the *Scheinprobleme* during his stay in Vienna and thus it shows the influence of the Circle (the *Aufbau* was after all his *Habilitationsschrift* which he submitted to University of Vienna in 1925). That time Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* was still on the table and the members of the Circle interpreted it as presenting a verificationist argument against metaphysics (see Carnap, “Intellectual Autobiography,” 24. ff.). The Circle started to read the *Tractatus* (after that Kurt Reidemeister introduced it in 1924) in November 1925 (ASP RC 029-32-34) and continued reading it in the next semester (ASP RC 029-32-27). About the specific arguments of the *Aufbau* see Michael Friedman, “The *Aufbau* and the rejection of metaphysics,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Carnap*, edited by Michael Friedman, Richard Creath (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 129–152.

framework could be integrated into the language of the *Aufbau*, the questions about the metaphysical reality stem from the fact, in a Kantian fashion, that particular philosophical schools “*transgress their proper boundaries*” (§178).

The foundationalist approach, however, has an epistemological reading too. From this angle, it claims that we depict one of our cognitive faculties and states its priority over the others. One could claim (quite schematically) that empiricism emphasized the role of sensation while rationalism emphasized the role of our intellectual capacities.²⁷

The structure of the *Aufbau*’s system differs from both foundationalist projects. Instead of one final base on which one can construct our knowledge, Carnap developed a *constitution system* [Konstitutionssystem] of knowledge. A constitutional system is just “an epistemic-logical system of objects or concepts” (§1), that is “a step-by-step ordering of objects in such a way that the objects of each level are constituted from those of the lower levels” (§2). Though Carnap is talking about the constitution of objects, he makes it clear at the beginnings that he takes “object” [Gegenstand] in a wide sense, so “among objects [Gegenständen] we count not only things [Dinge], but also properties and classes, relations in extension and intension, states and event, what is actual as well as what is not” (§1). Similarly, a few paragraphs later Carnap says that he won’t make any difference between objects and concepts [Begriffe], since

[a]ctually, we have here not two conceptions, but only two different interpretative modes of speech. Thus, in a constitution theory we sometimes speak of constituted objects, sometimes of constituted concepts, without differentiating. These two parallel languages which deal with concepts and with objects and still say the same thing are actually the languages of realism and idealism. [...] Constitution theory employs a neutral language and maintains that objects are neither “created” nor “apprehended” but *constituted*. I wish to emphasize from the beginning that the phrase “to constitute” is always meant in a completely neutral sense. From the point of view of constitution theory, the controversy between “creation”

27 In the preface to the second edition of the *Aufbau* Carnap emphasized the very same mistake of pure empiricism and pure rationalism. See *Aufbau*, vi.

[Erzeugen] and “apprehension” [Erkennen] is an idle linguistic dispute.²⁸

One can see from these passages that Carnap is not concerned with ontological questions; when he is dealing with the constitution of objects he is not engaged in the logical *construction* of objects – as Russell – but in the *constitution of our conceptual knowledge*.

One should note here the following. The Anglo-Saxon reception of the *Aufbau* was highly determined by the English translation of Rolf A. George.²⁹ First of all the title of the English edition, *The Logical Structure of the World* is somehow misleading and obscures the *cultural* and *social* involvement of the German term “Aufbau”. As Peter Galison pointed out, “Aufbau” means not just structure, reconstruction or rebuilding, but refers to the process of “sweep[ing] out the old order and to build anew”.³⁰ All of those who belonged to the different “Aufbau-projects” tried to break with past traditions in order to achieve an unprecedented building and were deeply convinced that the “Aufbau” could not be superficial.³¹ “It had to embody not just the trappings of political change — it had to transform culture, education, architecture, and the modes of reasoning that guide us through the world” because “[w]orld structure and inner life were bound together: modifying even the vocabulary of expression became a way of modifying thinking.”³²

“Aufbau” meant, therefore, the overall and comprehensive reform and transformation of culture and social order; it had to include also the modernization and rationalization of our theoretical and

28 *Aufbau*, §5.

29 Of course, many of the articles which document the received view were published before the English edition of the *Aufbau*, so one shall not blame solely the translation of George.

30 Peter Galison, “Constructing Modernism: The Cultural Location of *Aufbau*,” in *Origins of Logical Empiricism*, edited by Ronald N Giere, Alan W. Richardson (University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 18.

31 Dilthey, for example, had his own “Aufbau”, *Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften*. Later in 1932, Alfred Schütz, the Austrian social scientist, inspired by phenomenology, also wrote an “Aufbau”, *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt: eine Einleitung in die verstehende Soziologie*, which could be read as a reaction to Carnap’s allegedly pure logical “Aufbau” showing the meaningful structure (*sinnhafte Aufbau*) of the world.

32 Galison, “Constructing Modernism...”, 18 and 31.

practical knowledge and conceptualization usually after a huge failure, destruction, trauma or drama. From a social and political point of view, these traumas were the First and Second World Wars along with the status of technology in the wars and in the life of society. From the side of philosophy, it was connected to the revolutions in physics around the turn of the twentieth century. The philosophical “Aufbau” relies on the phenomenon that philosophy couldn’t keep abreast of its time and the scientific achievements within it.³³

We have to note, however, that the title of the book, “Aufbau”, was suggested by Schlick – Carnap’s earlier preferred titles were, for example, “Vom Chaos zur Wirklichkeit”, “Prolegomena zu einer Konstitutionstheorie der Wirklichkeit.”³⁴ This could mean that it shows the preferences of Schlick and not that of Carnap, but the content of the *Aufbau* and Carnap’s intellectual development makes it clear that the title suggested by Schlick was just apt for Carnap’s purposes.

George translated the core concepts of the *Aufbau* (“konstituieren” and “Konstitutionssystem”) as “construction” and “constructional system” and so strengthened the received view of the book.³⁵ While Russell dealt with the logical construction of objects of the external world, Carnap used the German “Konstruktion” quite rarely, and especially not in the context of describing his own aims

33 Galison connects the translation of “Aufbau” to “structure” in the title with the cultural and social influences of the 1960s in the United States, cf. Galison, “Constructing Modernism...”, 40 ff.

34 Cf. Alberto Coffa, *The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap: To the Vienna Station* (Cambridge University Press, 1991), 403, n. 11. In the unedited autobiography Carnap also mentions Schlick in the context of choosing the final title. See Carnap 1957, UCLA, Box 2, CM3, MA-3, p. E28. I would like to thank Christian Damböck for pointing this out. See also the correspondence between Schlick and Carnap about the title, ASP RC 029-32-23; ASP RC 029-32-21; ASP RC 029-32-17; ASP RC 029-30-36.

35 For the origins and details of the term “konstituieren” see Robert Sokolowski, *The Formation of Husserl’s Concept of Constitution* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1970). In the case of Husserl, Sokolowski connects the notion to the Neo-Kantian Paul Natorp, who also had an important influence on the young Carnap (see Carnap, “Intellectual Autobiography,” 12; and 1957, UCLA, Box 2, CM3, MA-3.) and who is referred to in the *Aufbau* quite frequently (§§5, 64, 65, 162, 163, 179.) It is also known from the personal reading list of Carnap that he read the works of Natorp several times between 1920 and 1922. See ASP RC 025-03-05.

and works. The translation of George is dangerous because it moves Carnap's metaphysically neutral and Russell's metaphysically committed projects too close to each other and thus obscures the context of the *Aufbau* – those cultural, social, political and philosophical traditions in which it was born.

The notions of “constitution”, “constitution system” and “constitution theory” suggest that Carnap is strongly connected both to Neo-Kantianism and to the philosophy of Edmund Husserl. It is known that when Carnap was living in Buchenbach near to Freiburg between 1919 and 1925 (just before he went to Vienna), he attended the seminars of Husserl and even some Husserlian circles after the seminars in the academic year 1924/25.³⁶ But Carnap was dealing with many works of Husserl even at the time when he was working on his dissertation between 1919 and 1921.³⁷ Though there are different views about Husserl's role in the *Aufbau*,³⁸ it is evidently true

36 Karl Schuhmann, *Husserl-Chronik* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1977), 281.; and Karl Schuhmann, *Edmund Husserl: Briefwechsel, Band IV* (Boston: Kluwer, 1994), 298. Carnap's diary also proves this. In that we can follow step-by-step that he asked permission from Husserl to join his seminar (ASP RC 025-72-02, Nov. 13.), that Husserl allowed it (Nov. 17.), that Carnap read *Ideen* in order to prepare for the seminar (Nov. 1923), that he gave a talk at the seminar (ASP RC 025-72-03, Jan. 23.), and that he attended the discussions after Husserl's seminars in January 1924 (among the participants were Ludwig Landgrebe and Bernhard Merten).

37 Rosado Haddock (2008, ix-x) argued that Kant was integrated into Carnap's dissertation only due to the influence of Bauch and Husserl's influence was much more important. Guillermo E. Rosado Haddock, *The Young Carnap's Unknown Master* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2008), ix–x. André Carus showed quite convincingly, however, that the first versions of the dissertation did not contain any reference to Husserl so the citation of Kant could be not just a “cosmetic-move”. André Carus, *Carnap and Twentieth-Century Thought: Explication as Enlightenment* (Cambridge University Press, 2007: 109–115, 127–138); and André Carus, “Carnap and Phenomenology: What Happened in 1924?,” in *Influences on the Aufbau*, edited by Christian Damböck (Springer, 2016:137–162).

38 According to Sarkar and Rosado Haddock Husserl provided the main influence on the early Carnap's thought. Others (like Carus and Roy) are skeptical about Husserl's role. See further V. E. Mayer Mayer, “Die Konstruktion der Erfahrungswelt: Carnap und Husserl,” in *Erkenntnis Orientated: A Centennial Volume for Rudolf Carnap and Hans Reichenbach*, edited by Wolfgang Spohn, (Springer, 1991), 287–303; and Thomas Ryckman, “Carnap and Husserl,” in *The*

that when Carnap refers to Husserl in the *Aufbau* (§§3, 64, 65, 124, 164) he does it in a quite positive manner.

To account for one possible effect of Husserl on the *Aufbau* one has to take a look at its constitution system which is a *multilayered theory of knowledge* (MTK). MTK is characterized by Deodáth Zuh as

[...] a theory on the structure and functioning of human cognition set up as a layered architecture of simple and complex factual capacities and faculties of knowledge. [...] They are separate faculties fulfilling separate cognitive roles, which must communicate and cooperate with each other to implement a coherent way of perceiving and understanding the world. It should be admitted, that such communicating layers could be unequal in their concrete working (in everyday or enclosed scientific cases), or that a specific faculty could dominate the other(s), but their theoretical ease for cooperation is of utmost importance. This is why it is a theory on the possible grounds of knowledge, on how knowledge should be set together and not on a current state of representing something through a unique source of knowledge. It must be labeled as a transcendental theory of cognition, where the one-sided priority of a specific faculty is considered to be strongly reductive and subsequently a philosophical error.³⁹

The two cornerstones of MTK are that (1) our cognitive capacities are divided into simple and complex ones where the latter are built on the former ones and (2) these capacities are “communicating” with each other or work together in order not to exceed their own boundaries and to produce knowledge.

Besides Husserl,⁴⁰ the most important figure is Kant who claimed in accordance with (1) and (2) that “[t]houghts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.”⁴¹ Kant tried to show

Cambridge Companion to Carnap, edited by Michael Friedman and Richard Creath (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 81–105.

39 Deodáth Zuh, “Arnold Hauser and the multilayer theory of knowledge,” *Studies in East European Thought*. Forthcoming. 45–46.

40 Most of Husserl remarks about the MTK are scattered in his writings but important points could be found in his 1930/1960, especially 67–69; 1936/1970, §§2–4 and 1929/1969. Some important ideas of MTK are also to be found in his 1891/2003.

41 Immanuel Kant, *The Critique of Pure Reason* (Cambridge University Press, 1787/2000), 193–194. See also Immanuel Kant, “On the Form and Principles of the

that the erroneous moment in empiricism and rationalism was that both of them highlighted one of our cognitive capacities and tried to force it to produce the substantial knowledge elements. Kant's transcendental philosophy, however, was one of the first steps to show that knowledge can be achieved only through the joint work of all our cognitive faculties.

While Kant and Husserl aimed to reveal our epistemic capacities, the cognitive structures of the mind and how they yield various kinds of knowledge, Carnap was interested only in our *conceptual knowledge* (see §§180-182), in the logical relations between (empirical) concepts and sentences made out of them.⁴²

Carnap's MTK works with at least four different layers,⁴³ or levels of objects: at the first level are the *autopsychological* objects (§§106-122): "the acts of consciousness: perceptions, representations [Vorstellungen], feelings, thoughts, acts of will, and so on. (§18)" On the second layer are the *physical* objects: "these are characterized by the fact that, at a given time, they occupy a given space (i.e., an extended piece of space). Thus, place, shape, size, and position belong to the determining characteristics of any physical body. (§18)" The third level consists of the so-called *heteropsychological* objects which are the same as the autopsychological ones but belong to another individual. The fourth layer is for *geistige Gegenstände* (I shall deal with them later).

These layers are built on each other, and though each base has its own laws, properties and structure, they are reducible: *geistige Gegenstände* can be reduced to heteropsychological (and physical) ones, which in turn can be reduced to physical ones and they could

Sensible and Intelligible World," In *Theoretical Philosophy 1755-1770*, Cambridge University Press (1770/1992), 373-410; and Immanuel Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (Cambridge University Press, 1800/2006).

42 Carnap mentions Husserl also in the historical context of the constitution theory (§3) and despite the many similarities, Jean-Michel Roy lists important differences. Jean-Michel Roy, "Carnap's Husserlian Reading of the *Aufbau*," in *Carnap Brought Home - The View from Jena*, edited by Stewe Awodey and Carsten Klein (La Salle: Open Court, 2004), 41-62.

43 In §25 Carnap is introducing more layers and object types than the ones discussed here. He talks about logical objects, mathematical objects, the object types of spatial configurations, colors, pitches, odors, tastes, biological objects, ethical objects, values etc.

be reduced to the autopsychological objects.⁴⁴ This reduction is, however, not an ontological, but a *logical* one as I mentioned earlier: it deals with sentences about these objects and their logical relationships.⁴⁵ Thus, the *Aufbau* is not concerned with the more and more complex cognitive capacities but with the logical reduction and constitution of sentences which *codifies* our knowledge about the various objects. Constitution theory is just about the idea that the (empirical) statements describe different spheres of objects (§29) which “are brought into a stratified order within the constitutional system by constituting some of these objects on the basis of others” (§41). So Carnap’s constitution theory – by contrast to Husserl’s who was interested in the pre-predicative level also – is applied mainly to the predicative level, to the linguistically articulated concepts.

The first level of the *Aufbau* is the domain of the autopsychological objects (§§63–64). Carnap tried to derive the statements about the higher-level objects from the statements about the lower level objects. At this point one is faced with an important difference between Carnap and the usual reductive empiricist works which search for the fundamental level of our knowledge. Carnap states that such a constitutional system whose basic level contains not autopsychological but *physical objects* is also possible and legitimate (§§59, 62). It is a practical decision, according to him, which one we choose and our decision depends on our aims: if we want to follow the epistemic order of knowledge, then we shall choose the autopsychological level, but if we focus on the needs of the empirical sciences, then “the constitution system with physical basis constitutes a more appropriate arrangement of concepts than any other” (§59).

This tolerance was always in the foreground of Carnap’s intellectual development, i.e. Carnap committed himself not to certain philosophical positions but to a methodology and attitude; this atti-

44 Interestingly the domain of values [Werte], for example, seems to be reducible directly to the autopsychological layer. Cf. *Aufbau*, §152.

45 See Thomas Uebel, “Carnap’s *Aufbau* and Physicalism: What Does the ‘Mutual Reducibility’ of Psychological and Physical Objects Amount to?” in *European Philosophy of Science – Philosophy of Science in Europe and the Viennese Heritage*, Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook, Vol. 17., edited by Maria C. Galavotti, Elisabeth Nemeth and Friedrich Stadler, Springer, 2014), 45–56.

tude was formulated later explicitly in his *principle of tolerance*.⁴⁶ As Michael Friedman said,

Carnap nowhere employs the traditional epistemological vocabulary of “certainty,” “justification,” “doubt,” and so on in the *Aufbau*. He nowhere says that knowledge of autopsychological objects is more certain or more secure than knowledge of physical objects, and the distinction between “hard data” and “soft data” central to Russell’s motivation for his construction of the external world is entirely foreign to the *Aufbau*.⁴⁷

Recall our earlier transcendental question: “How is intersubjective scientific knowledge possible at all?” – Carnap gives not a typical foundationalist answer, but a structuralist one:

[...] even though the material of the individual streams of experience is completely different [...] certain structural properties are analogous for all streams of experience. Now, if science is to be objective, then it must restrict itself to statements about such structural properties [...].⁴⁸

One should conclude therefore that the *Aufbau* is not a foundationalist work in the camp of reductive empiricism and most of its passages could be interpreted more properly in the context and tradition of the Kantian-Husserlian constitution theory.

2.3. *The Aufbau and the readings of phenomenism*

Most critiques of the *Aufbau* objected to Carnap that his book is a reductionist, phenomenalist work and as such – based on the arguments against the sense data theory – was doomed to failure. Since Carnap chose the autopsychological level as his base (and started from the private sensations of individuals) it could be hard to deny that a certain phenomenalist view dominated the *Aufbau*. From this angle some of the criticisms against the book seem to be justified; nonetheless, we shall consider one important aspect of Carnap’s work.

46 See Rudolf Carnap, *Logische Syntax der Sprache* (Wien: Springer, 1934), §17.

47 Friedman, *Reconsidering...*, 119.

48 *Aufbau*, §66.

The approach to be found in the *Aufbau* was not a typical and classical phenomenalist sense data theory. Such theories (like Hume's, Mach's, Russell's and Ayer's) take as given the primitive and atomic sensations (like colors, forms, sounds) and reduce the complex ones to these. In Carnap's constitution system, however, the typical sense data occurs only at a late and complex level.⁴⁹ Carnap's starting points were the "elementary experiences" [*Elementarerlebnisse*],⁵⁰ a special totality of experiences instead of isolated and atomic ones (§67): "Modern psychological research has confirmed more and more that, in the various sense modalities, the total impression is epistemically primary, and that the so-called individual sensations are derived only through abstractions [...]." So on the base of the results of Gestalt-psychology,⁵¹ Carnap defended a holistic picture of knowledge and experience and rejected the "atomist" approaches.⁵²

49 Cf. Friedman, *Reconsidering...*, 91.

50 Carnap claims that knowledge is constituted on the base of a single relation between the *Elementarerlebnisse* called "the recollection of similarities" [Ähnlichkeitserinnerung]. The idea of the recollection of the similarities and the role of memory in knowledge-forming was a quite common approach that time. One source of Carnap might have been the Nobel-prize winner chemist Wilhelm Ostwald. Ostwald claimed in his *Grundriß der Naturphilosophie* from 1908 [*Outline of Natural Philosophy*] that "[f]or the human mind [...] the world appears first as a chaos which consists in discrete experiences. The only connection between them is limited to the fact that they are sequenced. From these experiences [Erlebnisse] [...] some of them emerges as recurring more often and thus gets a distinctive character: it become *familiar*. It stems from the fact that we *remember* [sich erinnern] the earlier similar experiences, i.e. we feel a certain connection between the present and certain earlier experiences." (Wilhelm Ostwald, *Grundriss der Naturphilosophie* (Leipzig: Philipp Reclam.1908), 19. My translation.) It is known that Carnap read Ostwald already before his student years (ASP RC 025-98-01 and ASP RC 025-97-01) and before the preparation of the *Aufbau* (ASP RC 025-03-05). On the relation between Carnap and Ostwald see Hans-Joachim Dahms, "Carnap's Early Conception of a 'System of all Concepts': The Importance of Wilhelm Ostwald," in *Influences on the Aufbau*, edited by Christian Damböck (Springer, 2016), 163-185.

51 On the influence of Gestalt-psychology see Carnap, "Intellectual Autobiography," 16.

52 See *Aufbau*, §§76, 36, 71. Some of the main representatives and defenders of Gestalt-psychology (like Wolfgang Köhler and Kurt Lewin) was a close associate of Carnap as a member of the Berlin Group led by Hans Reichenbach.

Based on this, Friedman's question – namely that if Carnap were to justify the classical foundationalist-phenomenalist empiricism, then why would he spend so much time and energy on constituting one's individual sensations – seems to be rather rhetorical.⁵³

2.4. The *Aufbau* and the “geistige Gegenstände”

The *Aufbau* contains passages which could be seen at first as perplexing since they do not fit into the problem-horizon of early *analytic* philosophy. One of the most outstanding examples is when Carnap considers *geistige Gegenstände* and the theory of values (§§23–24, §§150–152). Nonetheless, Carnap (§23) is definitely stating that “[f]or philosophy, the most important types of objects, outside of the physical and the psychological ones are the ‘geistige Gegenstände’ in the sense of ‘cultural’, ‘historical’, ‘sociological’ objects.” Among the *geistige Gegenstände* one finds “individual incidents and large scale occurrences, sociological groups, institutions, movements in all areas of culture, and also properties and relations of such processes and entities” (§23) and some later points Carnap considers various customs and habits (§§24, 150), the object state [Staat] (§151), technology, economics, law, politics, language, science, religion (§151).

Geistige Gegenstände form one of the highest levels of the constitution system though our knowledge of them depends on the lower levels – we know the *geistige Gegenstände* through their physical *manifestations* and *documentations* (§24): Carnap calls “documentations of a geistiger Gegenstand those permanent physical objects in which the mental life [das geistige Leben] is, as it were, solidified: products, artifacts, and documents of the mental [des Geistigen].”

One could differentiate the usual cliché about Carnap by noting that beyond the *geistige Gegenstände* he accounts for values as forming an independent level in the constitution system and thus considers also the theory of values (§152): “For aesthetic values, we take into account experiences of (aesthetic) pleasure or other attitudes in the appreciation of art, experiences of artistic creation, etc. The particular nature of the value experiences of the different value types is investigated by the phenomenology of values [...]” In order

53 See Friedman, *Reconsidering...*, 92.

to understand aesthetic values and experiences Carnap's examples are ethical ones which are connected to the feeling of obligation and responsibility. To account for the individual character and structure of the value-experiences – on the base of value sensations [Wertgefühl] – one has to turn to phenomenological investigations (§152).

After the phenomenological investigations are done, the results could be integrated into the system of the *Aufbau*. Carnap, in fact, did not spend more time on these questions since, in the *Aufbau*, he only sketches his system and theory and as we move along between the different levels his expositions get thinner. Its reason is to be found not solely in the lack of space: Carnap's motivation is philosophical. Both in the preface of the *Aufbau* and in his intellectual autobiography he claimed that the formation of a comprehensive scientific system is a task of the scientific *community* where everyone has her own task and field of research and he carried out only *his part*.⁵⁴

We cannot here give an explicit account of [the constitution of geistige Gegenstände]. The reason for this is that the psychology (or phenomenology) of the cognition of cultural items [die Psychologie (oder Phänomenologie) der Kulturerkenntnis] has not been researched and systematically described to the same degree as the psychology of perception. Thus we give only a few examples and indicate briefly how they could be generalized. These indications may suffice, since we are here mainly concerned with the possibility of constitution of geistige Gegenstände from psychological objects and since we are less concerned with the question precisely what forms these constitutions must take.⁵⁵

One could still raise the question: how did the geistige Gegenstände and the values end up in the *Aufbau*? What were the sources of Carnap when he tried to integrate them into his own system? With respect to the theory of values, one could emphasize the role of Heinrich Rickert the leading philosopher of the Baden-school of Neo-Kantianism, who tried to develop a systematic value theory. Rickert argued that values give the key to the understanding and knowing of the world and hence have a certain priority over the

54 See *Aufbau*, xvi-xvii and Carnap, "Intellectual Autobiography," 16.

55 *Aufbau*, §150.

de-individualize method of the natural sciences.⁵⁶ It is known that Rickert was one of the main teachers of Carnap in Freiburg before the First World War and so – next to Bauch and Natorp – in the Neo-Kantian tradition Rickert had the biggest effect on Carnap's thought from *this* respect.

Regarding the notion of geistiger Gegenstand we are facing a complex situation. Carnap was influenced indirectly by Wilhelm Dilthey's approach to the *Geisteswissenschaften* [human sciences] and particularly by his empirical account. Though according to Carnap, he never dealt with the works of Dilthey at firsthand,⁵⁷ some of Dilthey's students were the teachers of Carnap and hence forwarded Dilthey's ideas to him. One such teacher at the University of Jena was Herman Nohl and Carnap remembered him with "great enthusiasm" in his intellectual autobiography.⁵⁸ Christian Damböck connects the idea to Dilthey that we have to access the geistige Gegenstände from a posteriori experiential base (by contrast to the a priori approaches of Kant and Hegel).⁵⁹ As Dilthey formulated it: "All science is experiential; but all experiences must be related back to and derives its validity from the conditions and context of consciousness in which it arises, i.e., the totality of our nature."⁶⁰

56 After all only the first volume of Rickert's purported system was published, see Heinrich Rickert, *System der Philosophie* (Tübingen, 1921). About the comparison of Rickert and Carnap see Thomas Mormann, "Werte bei Carnap." *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 62 (2): 169–189. Carus argues against the overemphasizing of the similarities between Rickert and Carnap. Carus, *Carnap and Twentieth-Century Thought...*, 106–108.

57 See Carnap's letter to Wilhelm Flitner (ASP RC 102-28-07) from the 11th of December, 1968.

58 See Carnap, "Intellectual Autobiography," 4. Cf. with the unpublished version of the autobiography, 1957, UCLA, Box 2, CM3, MA-3, pp. B3-4.

59 In his article Damböck gives a detailed exposition of Dilthey's special empiricism and its effect on Carnap. Christian Damböck, "Rudolf Carnap and Wilhelm Dilthey: 'German' Empiricism in the *Aufbau*," in *Rudolf Carnap and the Legacy of Logical Empiricism*, edited by Richard Creath, Dordrecht: Springer, 2012), 67–88. Gabriel also contains many relevant discussions about Carnap's time in Jena, his connection to romanticism and the ideas of Dilthey. Gottfried Gabriel, "Introduction: Carnap Brought Home," in *Carnap Brought Home – The View from Jena*, edited by Steve Awodey, Carsten Klein (Open Court, 2004), 3–23.

60 Wilhelm Dilthey, *Introduction to the Human Sciences. Selected Works, Volume I*, Edited by Rudolf A. Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi (Princeton University Press,

Carnap showed in the first detailed part of the *Aufbau* how we can constitute the physical objects from our personal stream of total experiences. As long as the geistige Gegenstände could be constituted and grasped through the mediation of physical objects,⁶¹ the Geisteswissenschaften would be in a position to account for the various irrational (or better: arational and atheoretical) configurations of experiences, i.e. for the different worldviews [Weltanschauungen] which are *documented through their objectual-physical objectivation*. The geistige Gegenstände appears to us in two similar ways: (i) on the one hand they are *manifested temporarily* in (broadly taken) physical objects (for example, the lifting of a hat manifests the gesture of greetings), and on the other hand (ii) they are *documented permanently* by material objects (for example the main building of the Dessau Bauhaus documents some trends and styles of the artistic movement). Both the lifting of the hat and the building of the Bauhaus are physical objects, thus, we know the geistige Gegenstände “behind them” through the mediation of *physical objects*, i.e. in a *posterior* way.

This special empiricist approach shows in itself the role of Dilthey⁶² but we can be more specific. Dilthey took the range of the Geisteswissenschaften quite broadly: the object of the Geisteswissenschaften is the “socio-historical reality.”⁶³ Among the Geisteswis-

1883/1989), 50.

61 At this point – contrary to the received view – one should not search for the origins of the radical and contemporary physicalism. Neurath, for example, made a distinction between physicalism [Physikalismus] and the physicalist [physikalistisch] approach. The former is a narrow physical approach (based on current mechanical and electro dynamical descriptions) while the latter operates only with *spatiotemporal* descriptions. See Otto Neurath, “Sociology in the framework of physicalism,” in *Otto Neurath: Philosophical Papers 1913–1946*, edited by Robert S. Cohen and Marie Neurath (D. Reidel Publishing, 1931/1983), 58–90. Neurath 1931/1983, 61. In this sense the codifications of the geistige Gegenstände (language, buildings, paintings etc.) could be grasped in a physicalist language.

62 Damböck considers the case of a special “German empiricism” and shows convincingly a line on which both Dilthey and Carnap could be placed. Christian Damböck, *Das empirische Erbe des deutschen Idealismus. Mit Einzelstudien zu Wilhelm Dilthey, Hermann Cohen und Rudolf Carnap* (Dordrecht: Springer, forthcoming).

63 Dilthey, *Introduction...*, 56.

senschaften, one finds anthropology, political economy, history, philology, aesthetic, philosophy etc. What is more important for us now is that according to Dilthey, even a certain version of psychology is to be accounted for in the *Geisteswissenschaften*: "The simplest results which an analysis of socio-historical reality is able to attain are found in psychology. For that reason, *psychology is the first and most fundamental of the particular human sciences*. Accordingly, its truths constitute the basis of the further formation of the human sciences."⁶⁴

By contrast, Rickert claimed that the non-natural-sciences are to be contrasted not with the *Geisteswissenschaften* but with the *Kulturwissenschaften* [cultural sciences]:

Those who do empirical research have started to realize that – contrary to the philosophers' mainstream belief – the term 'Geisteswissenschaften' is insufficient to characterize each and every types of non-natural-scientific sciences. And I am of the opinion, indeed, that those attempts of categorization which are based on the opposition between nature and mind [Geist] [...] are not able to understand the *real existing* differences between the empirical sciences, which would be crucial in this respect. [...]⁶⁵

For Rickert, however, the debate is not just about terminology. Among the *Kulturwissenschaften* psychology does not play a significant role like in the *Geisteswissenschaften*: the notion of *Kulturwissenschaft* "includes every objects of religious studies, jurisprudence, history, philology, national economics etc., so the objects of all kind of 'Geisteswissenschaften' except psychology [...]"⁶⁶ Rickert argues as follows: though the human Geist and psychic [seelische] processes indeed have an important role in demarcating the non-natu-

64 Dilthey, *Introduction...*, 84. Italics added.

65 Heinrich Rickert, *Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft* (Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr, 1899/1926), 12. My translation.

66 Rickert, *Kulturwissenschaft...*, 22. My translation. About the notions of *Kulturwissenschaft* and *Geisteswissenschaft* see Rudolf A. Makkreel, "Wilhelm Dilthey and the Neo-Kantians. On the Conceptual Distinction between *Geisteswissenschaften* and *Kulturwissenschaften*," in *Neo-Kantianism in Contemporary Philosophy*, edited by Rudolf A. Makkreel and Sebastian Luft (Bloomington: Indiana University, 2010), 253–271.

ral-sciences, “psychic life as such is also grasped as nature”⁶⁷ As such it could not serve as a proper signpost to draw a line between the non-natural-sciences and the natural sciences; according to Rickert, we have to mobilize the notion of culture [Kultur] for this task. But “one cannot use [the notion of Geist] to *define* the notion of culture”⁶⁸ because of the former reasons and thus Rickert connects it to the idea of *values* [Werte].⁶⁹ Culture goes hand in hand with values. Agriculture in itself, for instance, does not seem to be relevant for the Geisteswissenschaften; but various and significant cultural and other values stick to it and hence agriculture is a proper field of investigation for the Kulturwissenschaften. Therefore, we have to prefer the Kulturwissenschaften over the Geisteswissenschaften.

If one takes only the English translation of the *Aufbau* then she finds that Carnap considers only *cultural objects* and *cultural sciences*. If we supplement this remark with the fact the Carnap was a student of Rickert in Freiburg, then one is inclined to see here another proof of the Neo-Kantian influence on Carnap. Nevertheless, it is not the case. Carnap deals with the so-called cultural objects [kulturelle Gegenstände] just occasionally (§§23, 150) and solely in a broader context. Likewise, he is not dealing with the Kulturwissenschaften. The objects of the system of the *Aufbau* are the geistige Gegenstände and the Geisteswissenschaften. Considering the influence of the students of Dilthey⁷⁰ one should draw the conclusion that despite the suggestion of the English translation of the *Aufbau*, in the debate between the Kulturwissenschaften and

67 Rickert, *Kulturwissenschaft...*, 26. My translation.

68 Rickert, *Kulturwissenschaft...*, 26. My translation.

69 Rickert suggests the following definition: “The way we use the term ‘culture’ is close to its common use, i.e. we understand by it all real objects to which generally accepted *values*, or sense constructions constituted of them, are adhered; and which objects are *maintained* with regard to these values.” Rickert, *Kulturwissenschaft...*, 27–28. My translation.

70 Damböck considers a sort of a Dilthey-school with such names and themes as Herman Nohl (history of philosophy, pedagogy), Wilhlem Flitner (pedagogy), Franz Roh (aesthetic), Hans Freyer (sociology). Damböck, “Rudolf Carnap...”, 67–68. About these authors see further Gabriel, “Introduction...”, and Hans-Joachim Dahms, “Neue Sachlichkeit in the Architecture and Philosophy,” in *Carnap Brought Home – The View from Jena*, edited by Steve Awodey and Carsten Klein (Open Court Publishing, 2004), 357–375.

Geisteswissenschaften Carnap took the side of Dilthey against Rickert (and neo-Kantianism).⁷¹

But we have to mention another important mediator of Dilthey, namely Hans Freyer. Hans Freyer (1887–1969) was a conservative German sociologist. Though nowadays he doesn't seem to be one of the most discussed and cited authors (especially in the English-speaking world) and actually he is just forgotten, "he was perhaps the most articulate and historically self-conscious thinker associated with the movement for a 'conservative revolution' in the 1920s [...]. In the years after the First World War his status as a social theorist was acknowledged by intellectuals as diverse as Georg Simmel, Karl Mannheim, Herbert Marcuse, and Talcott Parsons."⁷²

Though there isn't any correspondence between Carnap and Freyer in Carnap's *Nachlass* and Carnap mentioned Freyer only a few times in his correspondence with others, it is known that they were good friends until around 1933 when Freyer joined the national-socialist groups.⁷³ In his *Theorie des objektiven Geistes. Eine Einleitung in die Kulturphilosophie* (*Theory of Objective Mind – Introduction to the Philosophy of Culture*, Freyer 1928/1998, first published in 1923) Freyer tried to work out his philosophy of culture [Kulturphiloso-

71 The hypotheses seems to be plausible also on the base that Carnap was aware of the mentioned debate since he read the above mentioned work of Rickert (*Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft*) and several others. See ASP RC 025-03-05.

72 Jerry Z. Muller, *The Other God that Failed – Hans Freyer and the Deradicalization of German Conservatism* (Princeton University Press, 1987), 3. Muller's book is one of the most detailed works on Freyer's cultural, political and philosophical development in English. It also contains a comprehensive intellectual history of the early 20th century German-speaking world with a biography of Freyer. See also Elfriede Üner, *Soziologie als „geistige Bewegung“*. *Hans Freyers System der Soziologie und die „Leipziger Schule“* (Weinheim: Acta Humaniora, VCH Verlag, 1992) and Gerhard Schäfer, "Wider die Inszenierung des Vergessens," *Jahrbuch für Soziologiegeschichte* 1990, 121-175.

73 Both Freyer and Carnap participated before the First World War in the so-called *Jugendbewegung* [German Youth Movement]; in particular they were members of the group formed around Eugen Diederichs in Jena called *Serakreis*. See Carus, *Carnap and Twentieth-Century Thought...*; and Ádám Tamás Tuboly, "Carnap's Weltanschauung and the Jugendbewegung: the story of an omitted chapter," In *Integrated History and Philosophy of Science*, edited by Friedrich Stadler (Dordrecht: Springer), forthcoming.

phie] on the base of the empirically given manifestations and documentations of the geistige Gegenstände and thus he wanted to give a solid foundation for the Geisteswissenschaften.⁷⁴

In 1920, Carnap organized a scientific meeting in Buchenbach where besides him and Franz Roh the other participant was Freyer.⁷⁵ Since I was dealing in a detailed manner with the comparison of Carnap's *Aufbau* and Freyer's *Theorie* at another place,⁷⁶ I will just mention here a few things. Freyer was considering his work in a way as a counterpart of the *Aufbau* or at least with Carnap's intention in the *Aufbau* when he was forming it on the early 1920s. The contemporary philosophy and logic that Freyer is mentioning in the following paragraph is just Carnap's constitution system and his logic of relations:

The relation between the philosophy of culture and philosophy is actually one of a remarkable two-sidedness. Whoever thinks along the lines of the philosophy of culture must doubly arrange his work in the philosophical movement of the present. [...] the philosophy of culture is today merely an anticipation, [...]; it works with a logic that is still not developed [...]. On the other hand, even for that reason, it may hope that its results will reach far beyond the boundaries of its own formulation of the problem, and that its work is of that kind of power from which the whole of philosophy can be advanced.⁷⁷

The *Aufbau* shows many more similar considerations and ideas that surfaced also in *Theorie*: like Carnap, Freyer was too working in a Kant-inspired transcendental framework when he asked the question: "what makes the experience of the Geisteswissenschaften possible in the first place?"⁷⁸ Freyer's answer was based on struc-

74 Carnap's example about the lifting of the hat (§24) as a documentation of a geistiger Gegenstand came from Freyer. Hans Freyer, *Theory of Objective Mind – Introduction to the Philosophy of Culture* (Ohio University Press, 1928/1998), 55; 66. Carnap is referring to Freyer in the *Aufbau* quite enthusiastically (§§12, 19, 56).

75 About the Buchenbach-meeting – which was motived by the ideas of Ostwald about the "system of the sciences" – see Dahms, "Carnap's Early..."

76 See Ádám Tamás Tuboly, "From the Jugendbewegung to the *Aufbau* – Carnap relation to Hans Freyer." Forthcoming manuscript.

77 Freyer, *Theory of...*, 14. See also page 10.

78 Freyer, *Theory of...*, 5. See also page 1.

turalism (just like Carnap's answer to the objectivity of knowledge was based on structuralism)⁷⁹ and in fact, he claimed that if one is to know a geistiger Gegenstand then two minds are facing each other (the knower and the one made the object) and the condition of understanding is made possible by the identity of the (transcendental) structures of minds. Furthermore, Freyer is working with a multilayered theory of knowledge and also his layers in the case of the geistige Gegenstände are similar to that of the later *Aufbau*.

The list could be continued; however, it seems to be plausible that, influenced by Dilthey, Freyer investigated the empirical access to the objects of the Geisteswissenschaften and he did not talk about the Neo-Kantians cultural sciences. But besides the comprehensive similarities between the *Aufbau* and the *Theorie* we know from the correspondence of Franz Roh and Wilhelm Flitner that Carnap and Freyer were considering a common project:

It's a pity that the expected program which C[arnap] were to (or had) reconcile with FREYER didn't work out after all. From the 3 big complexes in which we were involved to which shall we turn now? To politics? To Ethics? To the system of sciences? Freyer mentioned in a letter that we shall appreciate ethics and the value of science.⁸⁰

In the light of their common interests and goals we could reconstruct the happenings of the 1920s as follows: though Carnap and Freyer did not work together each of them has done his part of the project separately in the *Theorie* and in the *Aufbau*.

79 On Carnap's structuralism and its comprehensive effects and role in the *Aufbau*, see Christian Damböck, "Beyond Pure Structure: Hermeneutic Objectivity in Carnap's *Aufbau*." Forthcoming manuscript.

80 Quoted by Priem and Glaser. Karin Priem and Edith Glaser, "'Hochverehrter Herr Professor!' – 'Sehr geehrter Herr Kollege!'" Rekonstruktion von Erziehungswissenschaft durch Biographik am Beispiel der Korrespondenzen Eduard Sprangers und Wilhelm Flitners," *Zeitschrift für Erziehungswissenschaft* 2002, 1: 171. My translation.

III. Summary

According to the usual story about Carnap, though his *Aufbau* was an important product of early analytic philosophy – due to his reductive empiricist tendencies – it showed the characteristic features of a failure. We have discussed several reasons to undermine this picture and consider the *Aufbau* in its original and much broader context.

If one characterizes Carnap's work only in the framework of the received view she will miss something very important: namely its relation to the typical non-analytic, continental movements, such as Neo-Kantianism, phenomenology, the *Geisteswissenschaften* etc.

One final remark. If one aims at reconstructing the history of philosophy in the twentieth century, then in order to account for the development of both analytic philosophy and continental philosophy, Carnap's *Aufbau* seems to be a viable starting point since the continental roots of the *Aufbau* go much deeper than they are usually thought and this fact forces us to revise our frameworks and narratives.

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*On the Psychodynamics
of Doing Philosophy*

Josef Ehrenmüller

As a psychoanalyst I have run psychoanalytically oriented self experience groups with students of philosophy in the department of Philosophy in Vienna. In this paper, I will present some of the results that I have gathered. The main focus in these groups has been why and how these students became interested in philosophy. For most of them problems and difficult life circumstances are the departure points. Many have to deal with the experience of being an outsider, feelings of otherness and withdrawal and solitude for some period of time. That is to say, they suffer in various ways from a lack of recognition, which leads to a characteristic psychodynamic development involving a mutual devaluation that I will outline. Furthermore, this lack of recognition and this psychodynamics can be observed in some of the motives and themes throughout the history of Western philosophy, which I will demonstrate using the examples of the Thales anecdote and the allegory of the cave. In addition, I will seek to establish why recognition remains a precarious issue for people doing philosophy, or more generally, engaging in a discipline where worldviews are at stake and clash. The main reason for this is, among others, that doing philosophy is not only trying to argue in a rational way; it is essentially a gut issue too.



The focus of my paper will be on the emotional aspects of doing philosophy, based on self experience groups with students of philosophy. First I will examine the reasons and circumstances leading to an interest in philosophy in the first place, thereby comparing various historical philosophical perspectives on this question with my empirical results in the groups. I will show that problems and difficult life circumstances are, for most students, the departure points for their interest in philosophy. Many have to deal with the experience of being an outsider, feelings of otherness, and withdrawal and solitude for some period of time. That is to say, they suffer in various ways from a lack of recognition, which leads to a characteristic psychodynamic development involving a mutual devaluation that I will address in the following sections. This lack of recognition and its resulting psychodynamics will be the core of this paper. It is not exclusively a contemporary phenomenon as it can be observed in some of the motives and themes throughout the history of Western philosophy, which I will demonstrate using the examples of the Thales anecdote and the allegory of the cave. Although the role of an outsider is accompanied by its various challenges, it seems to be attractive and productive as well. In addition, I will seek to establish why recognition remains a precarious issue for people doing philosophy, or more generally, engaging in a discipline where worldviews are at stake and clash. The main reason for this is, among others, that doing philosophy is not only trying to argue in a rational way; it is essentially a gut issue too.

In order to give you a better understanding of what I am trying to do, I will briefly outline the reasons why I became interested in this topic.

As I studied medicine first and philosophy afterwards (both in Vienna) I came to realise that there was something different about the philosophy department. For example, all of you know that the situation where the students are waiting for the professor to come in and start the lecture or seminar is often a bit unpleasant: many of the students sitting there silent and not talking with each other. In medicine when I started a conversation the other students generally were happy to have a bit of small talk and to stop this unpleasant situation. In philosophy on the other hand I had to realise that quite a few of the students weren't happy at all and didn't want a conversation.

Another striking phenomenon seems to be typical for big departments like the Viennese: In Vienna there are nearly all the philosophical schools and branches you can imagine: there are a few who do only Greek philosophy, some are German idealists (where the one or other is convinced that with Hegel the pinnacle has been reached and since then there has been nothing really important philosophically), there are some phenomenologists, and some are inclined to the tradition of analytic philosophy (to mention only a few important schools). And there you can see occasionally someone of one school of philosophy making pointed remarks against exponents of other schools.

And there is surely a third phenomenon. I remember that I have been a determinist even before I began to study philosophy, or, more accurately, I didn't believe that there is anything like a free will. So I had a lot of discussions with people who held opposing views and asked myself more and more frequently: how is it possible that everyone sticks to her own view with certainty like it is the only possible truth, when it is clear that at least one of these views is obviously wrong. The same holds for political debates and every other discussion, where some kind of *Weltanschauung* (or world-view) is at stake. Although everyone tries to argue rationally, the conclusions appear to be very different or even opposing. So there have to be some determining factors beyond rationality.

Therefore my aim was to figure out some of these factors. Because parallel to my philosophy studies I was undergoing a psychoanalytic training it seemed to be reasonable to look for psychoanalytic approaches. So I went down that avenue but was very disappointed, for most of this literature can hardly be taken seriously because of severe methodological failures and insufficiencies.¹ Thus the next step for me was a kind of empirical, namely clinical approach: In the meanwhile I had finished my psychoanalytic training and had some years of practice already, so I started to run psychoanalytically orientated self experience groups with students of philosophy in the department of philosophy in Vienna and did that for a period of 10 years. Altogether there have been 40 groups with 7–8 students on

1 For a savage criticism see for example Fritz Schmidl, "Zur Methodenfrage der angewandten Psychoanalyse," *Psyche* 19 (1965): 616–629.

average per group, a total of 300 students. The groups took the form of tutorials accompanying a seminar run by Prof. Rhemann. The main focus in these groups has been on the time when the students got interested in philosophy, and the accompanying circumstances at that time and their psychic, social, and intellectual development afterwards until they entered the university to study philosophy.

With this approach I cannot provide a satisfactory answer to my third question. We are far from being able to understand how the different philosophical systems and opinions develop in an individual brain. Maybe neuroscience will be able to give us an answer sometime in the future. What I did find out instead are some conclusions concerning the conditions, why and how people get interested in philosophy on the one hand and some characteristic psychodynamic features that are related to doing philosophy on the other hand. And this psychodynamics will provide answers to my first two questions.

1. Preconditions for doing philosophy

In the history of philosophy you can find various perspectives with regard to the preconditions for doing philosophy, where cognitive, emotional, or existential factors are emphasised as a very few examples will illustrate:

For Hegel it is some kind of “dichotomy” in the sense of becoming aware of antagonisms that “is the source of *the need of philosophy*”.² Philosophy then is enabling oneself to re-establish the “harmony”. Therefore, Hegel is mentioning only cognitive aspects, but the reference to a “reestablished harmony”³ indicates the involvement of additional emotional factors. Wittgenstein’s notion might be similar to that when he says: “Thoughts that are at peace. That’s what someone who philosophizes yearns for.”⁴

2 G.W.F. Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, trans. E.S. Haldane (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. Ltd., 1892), 89.

3 Ibid.

4 Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Vermischte Bemerkungen/Culture and Value*, ed. G. H. v. Wright and Heikki Nyman, trans. Peter Winch (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publisher, 1980), 43e.

Plato⁵ and Aristotle⁶ both accentuate astonishment as the origin of doing philosophy and they therefore stress emotional factors. Schopenhauer, among many others, agrees to that but additionally mentions fear as an important factor and points to cognitive factors as well:

[...] the philosophical wonder which springs from this is conditioned in the individual by higher development of the intellect, yet in general not by this alone; but without doubt it is the knowledge of death, and along with this the consideration of the suffering and misery of life, which gives the strongest impulse to philosophical reflection and metaphysical explanation of the world.⁷

Michael Theunissen on the other hand underlines existential experiences when he says: “Presumably a man gets into philosophy only if he is in some way separated from the given social context either right from the beginning or sometime later in his life.”⁸ In his case there has been an injury of one of his eyelids when he was 15 years of age so that he had to undergo a couple of operations and had to spend several months in hospital blindfolded. Theunissen adds: “Having to lie there and not being able to see anything – that nearly forces someone into an exercise in dying, as Socrates defines philosophy, and to a radical challenge of all matters of course.”⁹ In a similar way, Plato already emphasised that in some cases the connection between unhealthiness and doing philosophy might be crucial, pointing to his friend Theages as an example: “For in Theages’ case all the other conditions for an exile from philosophy were present, but the sickliness of his body shutting him out of politics, restrains him.”¹⁰

5 Plato, *Theaetetus*, 155d.

6 Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, I. 982b.

7 Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Idea*, Vol. II., trans. R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp (Boston: Ticknor and Company, 1887), 360.

8 Joachim Schickel, *Grenzenbeschreibung. Gespräche mit Philosophen* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1980), 21. My translation.

9 Ibid.

10 Plato, *The Republic*, translated with notes and an interpretive essay by Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1968), 496 c.

2. Results from the self experience groups

In about 80% of the participants in the groups there are problems and difficult life circumstances that are the reasons for getting interested in philosophical questions. Such circumstances might be: troubles in the family or in the peer group (for instance in the class at school or in the circle of friends) or existentially significant experiences like serious diseases, death of a near relative and so on. In about 20% there is either an intellectually inspiring environment or there are no noticeable problems in their development.

Facing difficulties of any kind might be a necessary causal factor in a few cases, but most of the time it is merely a reason for getting interested in philosophy at the time, when they have to face such problems. For nearly all boys and girls have to deal with more or less difficult situations sometime during their development, but only a very few of them, who are inclined to theoretical reflection and to philosophy, tend to cope with such problems partly in this way. Rather I see the causal factors for doing philosophy in special cognitive abilities combined with emotional factors like astonishment, interest, and fear without being able to specify that. With the mentioned percentages I can refute such generalising claims as those made by Theunissen that some kind of separation is a necessary condition for philosophising.

The difficult circumstances the young people had to face very often lead to or are accompanied by typical phenomena ("very often" means again about 80% of them facing at least one of the following phenomena):

- Experiences of being an outsider: if somebody is more or less actively excluded in some way or other (in school or in the circle of friends).
- Feeling of otherness: although in ordinary language we talk about that in this way it is not a feeling but a cognitive coping strategy for dealing with the very unpleasant experience, that other people don't understand us. This might relate to us as a whole person, or to some needs or interests (for instance to do philosophy) that are important to us, where we get the feeling that others don't understand and recognise us or even dislike, laugh at, or spurn us. Then our conclusion that we are

different and therefore cannot at all be understood helps us to obtain a purported understanding of the unpleasant situation, whereby the suffered offences and disappointments can be born a little easier.

- Withdrawal and solitude are to be seen very often – at least for a period of time – as a reaction to these experiences. In typical cases this results in these persons spending more time with books than with other people and possibly turning towards some philosophical literature at this point already.

3. Lack of recognition

This outlined development involves a lack of recognition, “recognition” not meant in an epistemic sense like “identifying”, “re-cognising”, or “realising”, but in the sense of “appreciation”. Recognition I consider as a basic human need, maybe as a part or even as the basis of two of the seven motivational systems according to Joseph Lichtenberg, who is a psychoanalyst, more precisely a self psychologist.¹¹

Lichtenberg, together with Frank Lachmann and James Fosshage, developed his motivational systems theory since the late 1980s. Emmanuel Ghent counts it “as the most systematic alternative to the dual drive-theory of classical psychoanalysis”.¹² Lichtenberg’s seven motivational systems are built around fundamental needs:

1. The need to fulfil physiological requirements,
2. the need for attachment,
3. the need for affiliation,
4. the need for caregiving,
5. the need for assertion and exploration,

11 This is a branch within psychoanalysis that evolved in the 1960s–70s, mainly from Heinz Kohut. There the focus does not lie on the drives, but rather on the self and its development, where the concrete relationships are the centre of attention. Accordingly, in self psychology there is a lot of research done on the relationship between an infant and its mother and/or father.

12 Emmanuel Ghent, “Wish, Need, Drive: Motive in the Light of Dynamic Systems Theory and Edelman’s Selectionist Theory,” *Psychoanalytic Dialogues* 12 (2002), 765.

6. the need to react aversively through antagonism and/or withdrawal,
7. the need for sensual and sexual pleasure.¹³

These needs are seen as “hard-wired and are present throughout the life span”.¹⁴ As for the needs for attachment and affiliation Lichtenberg noted various desires: the “desire for affective attunement, for empathic resonance, for guidance as a relief from the distress of uncertainty, for the comfort of sharing in intimacy, and for the sense of value that accrues from idealization”.¹⁵ James Fosshage adds “the need for confirmation of one’s perceptions, leading to a self-validating experience and aiding self-delineation”.¹⁶ In all of these desires there is a need for recognition involved, at least as a part of it, maybe even as their basis.

On the other hand, there is an intense philosophical debate on the need for recognition going on, initiated by Axel Honneth in Germany about 20 years ago. He posits recognition as an “anthropological premise”¹⁷ and differentiates three kinds of recognition that serve the overall aim of autonomy. As Joel Anderson¹⁸ puts it:

The possibility for sensing, interpreting, and realizing one’s needs and desires as a fully autonomous and individuated person – in short, the very possibility of identity-formation – depends crucially on the development of self-confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem. These three modes of relating practically to oneself can only be acquired and maintained intersubjectively, through being granted recognition by others whom one also recognizes. As

13 Joseph Lichtenberg, Frank Lachmann, and James Fosshage, *Psychoanalysis and Motivational Systems. A New Look* (New York: Routledge, 2011), 13ff.

14 James Fosshage, “An Expansion of Motivational Theory: Lichtenberg’s Motivational Systems Model,” *Psychoanalytic Inquiry* 15 (1995): 423.

15 Joseph Lichtenberg, “A Theory of Motivational-functional Systems as Psychic Structures,” *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 36 (1988), Supplement: 65.

16 Fosshage, “An Expansion of...”, 427.

17 Axel Honneth, *Der Grund der Anerkennung. Eine Erwiderung auf kritische Rückfragen*. In: *Kampf um Anerkennung* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2003), 335.

18 The translator of *Kampf um Anerkennung*.

a result, the conditions for self-realization turn out to be dependent on the establishment of relationships of mutual recognition.¹⁹

These relationships include

“close relations of love and friendship”,
 “legally institutionalized relations of universal respect for the autonomy and dignity of persons”,
 “networks of solidarity and shared values within which the particular worth of individual members of a community can be acknowledged.”²⁰

Honneth in his account not only refers to Hegel and Mead as his main philosophical resources but also to psychoanalysis, mainly to the British psychoanalyst Donald Winnicott, an important precursor of self psychology.

Self-esteem²¹ and emotional well-being can only be developed and maintained, if our parents and other closely attached persons who are emotionally significant for us recognise us in terms of understanding, affirmation, appreciation, love etc. and so give us the feeling of being a loveable person in the way we are, with our properties, attitudes, needs, interests, behaviour and so on. If this is not the case in a sufficient way – even if only in the one or other important respect – then this lack of recognition leads to low self-esteem, uncertainty, self-doubt, sense of inferiority to the point of states of depression.

Coming back to my students, this lack of recognition is dealt with by the prospective philosophers very often in a quite productive way, whereby a characteristic psychodynamic process is implemented:

These young boys and girls facing the experience of being an outsider or with the feeling of otherness do not try to stay in the peer group any longer. They do not conform to the behaviour of those from whom they suffer depreciation. Instead they in return depre-

19 Joel Anderson, “Translator’s Introduction,” in *The Struggle for Recognition. The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*, Axel Honneth, trans. Joel Anderson (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1995), xi.

20 Ibid., xiv.

21 I am only concerned with this aspect, leaving self-confidence and self-respect aside, a distinction from Honneth that is, in my opinion, too artificial.

ciate the others themselves. Their interests, which might be sports, fashion, parties, small talk etc., are devalued as superficial, dull, and unreflecting. By contrast, the dedication to “important” things, to the fundamental questions of life, reading, reflection, knowledge and so on is appreciated.

As the self experience groups have shown there is a significant difference between the genders: While the male adolescents much easier manage to withdraw from the others and are able to go their own way, often restoring themselves in opposition to the others or even to the whole society, the female ones often put aside their needs and interests, so that they can keep in touch and feel part of the peer group. But they thus have to face the consequence, that their low self-esteem and uncertainty will last all the longer.

With these experiences that many had to face in the forefront of studying philosophy we get an answer to my first observation and question: Because of such frustrating experiences of not being understood by the others they are a bit more anxious with respect to social contacts and tend to avoid them. Although they hope to find likeminded people in the department of philosophy they still fear that such unpleasant and frustrating experiences might arise again.

4. High ego ideal and shame

From a psychoanalytic point of view the prospective philosophers develop a high ego ideal, which helps them to pull themselves up. Thus they can overcome their insecurities and stabilise their self-esteem. Now they don't need the recognition from the depreciated others anymore. Instead there has developed a dependence upon an inner authority – a high ego ideal. The result is an imbalance: Emotional well-being and a high self-esteem can be maintained only, if they satisfy the high demands of this ego ideal. That is to say, they set a high standard for themselves, by which they inevitably judge themselves. And if they don't fit these demands in a sufficient way, then the consequences again are low self-esteem, self-doubt and feelings of shame.

This outlined psychodynamic development brings about a characteristic “symptom”, that more or less goes along with doing philosophy: The self-ascription of being a philosopher is accompanied by a

very high demand, quite in contrast for example to medicine or psychology. (But in the different kinds of fine arts it seems to be similar.) This very high demand, derived from the high ego ideal, is accompanied by a – often merely unconscious – fear of not being able to satisfy this demand, and shame (as the downside of the high ego ideal).

Gerd Achenbach²² says: “We think too high about philosophy, so that we cannot call us philosophers without being ashamed – and: we think in this respect to meanly of ourselves”,²³ thereby bringing the tension between high ego ideal and real ego to the point. That is to say, if we can call ourselves philosophers at all, we can do so only with a slight feeling of shame. This is due to our fear, that somebody could criticise and refute this claim by pointing to the notion that someone can call herself a philosopher only if she has written something important already, has gone down in philosophical history or similar things. To give an example of this high demand – and feelings of shame – here is an excerpt of an interview that Rainer Rosenberg conducted with Konrad Paul Liessmann, professor of philosophy in the department of philosophy in Vienna:

Rosenberg: Are you a philosopher?

Liessmann: (after a 4-seconds break): Well, this is a bit of an inquisitorial question.

Rosenberg: Do you feel as a philosopher?

Liessmann: Well, on the one hand I’m trying to take seriously the academic duties that are inherent with this position, and on the other hand so to speak I’m trying to preserve this, this freedom of thought and this reflecting capacity, especially concerning the proximate social and political situation that I am living in, in order to so to speak be able to gradually meet this, this, this demand to be a philosopher.²⁴

According to Kurt Rudolf Fischer²⁵, in the US the philosophers generally call themselves philosophical teachers, thereby avoiding high

22 He is the founder of philosophical counselling.

23 Gerd B. Achenbach, *Philosophische Praxis: Vorträge und Aufsätze* (Köln: Verlag Karl Alber, 1984), 18. My translation.

24 Konrad Paul Liesmann, Interview in the Ö1 programme series *Denken und Leben*. February 7, 1999. My translation.

25 An Austrian philosopher, who spent most of his philosophical life in the United States.

demands and likely unpleasant questions or criticism. Achenbach tries to give an explanation for this phenomenon that is much too narrowly considered to my mind, namely that there is a special kind of philosophy, which he calls “ambitious philosophy”: “the old traditional discoverer, administrator and executor of truth”.²⁶ To this kind of philosophy “we cannot reconcile, and it divides us from ourselves”²⁷ Although this ambitious philosophy has run out, it is still present in the shame of the philosophers, according to Achenbach. This may be part of the explanation, but my claim is that with the outlined psychodynamics I can give a more valid explanation for this phenomenon.

Of course, this high ego ideal is quite often to see during adolescence and varies in content depending on the respective systems of value the young people have, but normally it is very unstable, and typically their personalities switch between high and low self-esteem very often and rapidly. Thus, some call adolescence in general a kind of narcissistic phase of development. By contrast, the high ego ideal of the prospective philosophers is much more stable, and again in contrast to the normal development, where this high ego ideal later on is put into perspective and more or less decreased, with doing philosophy it is maintained or even strengthened. There are several reasons for that:

- The lack of recognition, that many had to face in the past, leads to a more pronounced need for a like-minded role model that they can identify with and try to emulate.
- In the way we study philosophy, where we don't acquire the relevant body of knowledge as it is the case in the sciences. Instead we study the “great philosophers”, who at the same time serve as a role model, with which we unavoidably match ourselves. And this is all the more the case especially for people, who have a more pronounced need for such role models due to their having suffered a lack of recognition.
- The huge amount and vast extent of the matter that we have to deal with as well as the included demands – the notion that philosophy is the queen of the sciences is rarely advanced,

26 Achenbach, *Philosophische Praxis*, 19. My translation.

27 Ibid., 21.

but it is nevertheless still a valid and effective theme. This makes it much more difficult or even impossible to meet our demands for comprehensive knowledge on the one hand and for accuracy in the detail (maybe with additional knowledge in the sciences as well) on the other hand and to be content with ourselves in this respect.

5. The Thales anecdote

The psychodynamics here outlined have been brought up from time to time throughout the history of western philosophy, directly or indirectly. Note, for example, the Thales anecdote, originally introduced by Plato, and subsequently often cited and modified:

Socrates: Just like Thales, Theodorus, while star gazing and looking up he fell in a well, and some gracefully witty Thracian servant girl is said to have made a jest at his expense – that in his eagerness to know the things in heaven he was unaware of the things in front of him and at his feet. The same jest suffices for all those who engage in philosophy. For someone of this sort has truly become unaware of his neighbour next-door, not only as to what he's doing but almost to the point of not knowing whether he is a human being or some different nursling.²⁸

Hans Blumenberg gives an exaggerated paraphrase: “The philosopher [...] doesn't recognise the human being in his neighbour, while and because he is focussed on the human being.”²⁹ Blumenberg dedicated himself in *Das Lachen der Thrakerin* to elucidating the meaning and history of this anecdote and calls it the “primal history of theory”.³⁰ One reason for it is that Plato chose Thales, of all people, as the “founder of philosophy”³¹ as the protagonist of this anecdote. Blumenberg emphasises two aspects of ridiculousness in this story:

28 Plato, *Theaetetus*, translated and with commentary by Seth Bernadete, (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1984), 174a.

29 Hans Blumenberg, *Das Lachen der Thrakerin. Eine Urgeschichte der Theorie*, (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1987), 17. My translation.

30 Ibid. 13.

31 Ibid., 13. My translation.

1. The philosophical interest and the activities involved with it are incomprehensible and strange for the maidservant (a representative of ordinary people). Plato repeatedly dealt with this phenomenon, for instance towards the end of "Protagoras" Socrates sums up: "The result of our discussion appears to me to be singular. For if the argument had a human voice, that voice would be heard laughing at us and charging us: 'Socrates and Protagoras, you are strange beings'".³² Another example of this type of ridiculousness is from Wittgenstein: "I am sitting with a philosopher in the garden; he says again and again 'I know that that's a tree', pointing to a tree that is near us. Someone else arrives and hears this, and I tell him: 'This fellow isn't insane. We are only doing philosophy'".³³
2. The figure of the absent-minded professor, so obsessed with her research that she forgets her surrounding appears ridiculous and becomes a laughing stock.

In his enquiry, Blumenberg detected more than 40 modifications of the Thales anecdote throughout the history of philosophy and asked himself, why this story seems to be so attractive to philosophers, a story, where they are mocked and laughed at. He realises that it provides a "service to the self-esteem of the philosophers", but is only able to point to a "specific presumption, that is characteristic of philosophy right from its beginning".³⁴

Here my claim is that in the light of the psychodynamics that I tried to sketch this phenomenon becomes much more comprehensible: An inner re-evaluation has taken place. These – assumed or factual – insufficiencies are no longer seen as shortcomings. On the contrary, now they are seen as a distinctive feature. They confirm us that we are on the right track with our focus on the important, fundamental questions of life and they are just a consequence of our

32 Plato, *Protagoras*, Benjamin Jowett's translation, extensively revised by Martin Ostwald, edited, with an introduction, by Gregory Vlastos, (Indianapolis and New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1956), 361a.

33 Ludwig Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*, ed. by G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. v. Wright, translated by Denis Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publisher, 1975), § 467, p. 61.

34 Blumenberg, *Das Lachen der Thrakerin*, 160. My translation.

disregard or even disdain of the everyday occurrences. The other people like the maidservant, who laugh at us, only show their lack of understanding and “in the end become ridiculous themselves”.³⁵ The lack of recognition that is suffered in such situations, by contrast with earlier experiences (like the experiences of many of the prospective philosophers that I mentioned above), hardly hurts anymore or does not do so at all, instead serving as a confirmation of superiority. Therefore the telling of the Thales anecdote is a kind of reenactment of the unpleasant situations experienced in the past, whereby it provides a “service to the self-esteem of the philosophers”. These hurtful situations, especially experiences of being an outsider, aren’t a necessary precondition for these dynamics though, but aggravate it in its intensity and importance.

Various modifications of the Thales anecdote sharpen these dynamics of mutual devaluation that develop from a lack of recognition. The sense of superiority thereby is often pointed out directly. A few examples may illustrate this phenomenon:

- Aristotle for instance additionally refers to the story of Thales getting rich by investing in olive-presses, because he foresaw a great harvest of olives in the coming year. Aristotle concludes that Thales “showed the world that philosophers can easily be rich if they like, but that their ambition is of another sort”.³⁶
- Hegel at first cites the version of the anecdote favoured by Diogenes Laertius, in which Thales falls into a ditch, and Hegel adds with a quite aggressive, pejorative undertone that “the people laugh at such things, and boast that philosophers cannot tell them about such matters; but they do not understand that philosophers laugh at them, for they do not fall into a ditch just because they lie in one for all time, and because they cannot see what exists above them”.³⁷

35 Ibid., 161.

36 Aristotle, *Politics*, translated by Benjamin Jowett with introduction, analysis and index by H. W. C. Davis. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1908), 1259a 9f..

37 G.W.F. Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, trans. E. S. Haldane. Vol. I. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. Ltd., 1892), 172.

- For Heidegger on the other hand “the fall of the philosopher has become the sign for being on the right track”.³⁸ Because philosophy is “invariably mad [and] enacts a steady displacement of perspectives and levels of thinking”,³⁹ so it is “that kind of thinking that essentially means nothing to the people and which the maidservants necessarily laugh at”.⁴⁰ On another occasion he takes that to extremes: “To make itself understandable is the suicide of philosophy.”⁴¹

Plato has already emphasised this inner re-evaluation and on several occasions has given a lot of examples of insufficiencies and failures in everyday life, although often embellishing these in a kind of caricature. And in addition, he sees these insufficiencies as a confirmation and a sign of being on the right path inasmuch as one is focusing on the essential things. There is another very famous story, in which Plato brings this dynamics of mutual devaluation to the fore in a striking way, namely the allegory of the cave.

6. Allegory of the cave

From the view of the people, sitting chained up in the cave, the path to knowledge appears to be an aberration and a wrong track. Because the one, who was forced to go along this burdensome and uphill path and in the end saw the sun, the light of knowledge, seems to come back with ruined eyes and his sight has even – at least for a while – deteriorated, and therefore the chained up people laugh at him:

And if he once more had to compete with those perpetual prisoners in forming judgments about those shadows while his vision was still dim, before his eyes had recovered, and if the time needed for getting accustomed were not at all short, wouldn't he be the source

38 Blumenberg, *Philosophische Praxis*, 149.

39 Martin Heidegger, *Die Frage nach dem Ding* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1962), 1.

40 Ibid., 2.

41 Martin Heidegger, *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*. *Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe*, Band 65, hg. von Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann Verlag, 1994), 435. My translation.

of laughter, and wouldn't it be said of him that he went up and came back with his eyes corrupted, and that it's not even worth trying to go up? And if they were somehow able to get their hands on and kill the man who attempts to release and lead up wouldn't they kill him?⁴²

As we can see here in the past it was not only about laughing at the critical nonconformist but even sentencing him to death as it was the case with Socrates and in a few other cases later on. Conversely the one, who has seen the light and the sun, debases the others with their "shadow plays" and doesn't have any more interest in taking part in such superficial activities:

When he recalled his first home and the wisdom there, and his fellow prisoners in that time, don't you suppose he would consider himself happy for the change and pity the others? [...] And if in that time there were among them any honors, praises, and prizes for the man who is sharpest at making out the things that go by, and most remembers which of them are accustomed to pass before, which after, and which at the same time as others, and who is thereby most able to divine what is going to come, in your opinion would he be desirous of them and envy those who are honored and hold power among these men? Or, rather, would he be affected as Homer says and want very much "to be on the soil, a serf to another man, to a portionless man," and to undergo anything whatsoever rather than to opine those things and live that way?⁴³

7. Productivity of the role of an outsider

The position of an outsider or a marginal position, or sometimes just feelings of displacement and alienation, due to a lack of recognition, which many of the prospective philosophers had to face in a more or less unpleasant way, may nevertheless turn out to be productive for their philosophical activity later. The distance from the others that accompanies this position, as well as a kind of critical faculty, that often evolves in such circumstances are a very characteristic,

42 Plato, *The Republic*, translated with notes and an interpretive essay by Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books), 516 e–517 a.

43 Ibid., 516 c-d.

if not essential feature of a philosophical life. In this respect for instance Axel Honneth sees in the social status of being an outsider a “mental source of social criticism”,⁴⁴ whereas for Michael Hampe outsidership is symptomatic for every kind of doing philosophy. He distinguishes three functions or kinds of philosophy:

- the function of a judge,
- the function of a prophet or charismatic teacher,
- the function of a fool.

The common denominator of all three according to him is *the* function of philosophy, namely critique. And all three of them share the “common ground that they are able to fulfil their function only because they are outsiders in society”.⁴⁵ The judge (Hampe mentions Locke and Kant as examples here), as well as the prophet (for instance Marx and Nietzsche) stand above the scene, whereas the fool (like Socrates and Feyerabend) takes on the role of the underdog or the ludicrous outsider, but in private places himself in almost the same manner above those, to whom he holds a mirror up. Therefore a facet of superiority is common to all the functions and a necessary feature of doing philosophy.

8. Attractiveness of the role of an outsider

If you read interviews, biographies, or a critique in a journal or newspaper you will find a significant amount of hints – with reference to figures of philosophy, fine arts and science – that they are or have been outsiders in some way or other. For me this is an evidence that the role of an outsider appears attractive to us and fulfils a need, not only to the journalists and people fishing for and reporting it, but also for us recipients of such texts. It provides an opportunity for identification: We can identify with these figures with respect to some certain aspects of us – needs and interests that we aren’t or weren’t able to develop in a sufficient way and because of them we

44 Axel Honneth, „Die mythischen Mächte zerstören. Gesellschaftskritik im Zeitalter des normalisierten Intellektuellen,“ *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, March 9/10 (2002): 50. My translation.

45 Michael Hampe, *Propheten, Richter, Narren und ihre Philosophien* (Unpublished manuscript, 2000), 3. My translation.

feel as being different or being an outsider, in any case kind of misunderstood and lonely. By identifying with these figures, who have been more or less successful in their field of activity, we indirectly share in their success and therefore are able to feel as someone special and recognised.

9. Recognition remains a precarious issue

The psychodynamics here outlined reveal that with doing philosophy recognition remains an issue in a special way. There are some other factors not yet mentioned, which contribute to this problem:

The partial abstinence from social activities: We are social beings and as such are dependent on social contacts, from which we can derive satisfaction and recognition in various ways. If we decide to abstain from such activities, because we prefer to spend more time with reading and writing books and articles, we miss lots of opportunities to obtain satisfaction and recognition. And here again seems to be a difference between the genders: Quite a few female students quit philosophy even after having successfully finished their studies, on the grounds that they can't stand doing reading and writing most of their life. Instead they want to look for a job where there is much more contact with people and social interaction. Granted, this is just my private observation, but it fits very well with the gender difference mentioned earlier.

Poor chances of institutional recognition, especially nowadays with more and more philosophers and precious few jobs in the area. Therefore the chances of finding a job where the philosophers are able to use and deploy their philosophical skills and interests are rather low. For example, as Beatrice Uerlings has shown, "92 percent of the philosophers in the USA in the end opt for a job that has nothing to do with their actual studies".⁴⁶

Doing philosophy is not only trying to argue in a rational way, it is essentially a gut issue too. There is an intense emotional identification with our philosophical opinions and theories. Therefore we

46 Beatrice Uerlings, „Nicht pragmatisch, sondern philosophisch. In: Postgraduatestandard,“ Beilage zur Zeitung *Der Standard*, March 21./22, 2011: 2. My translation.

often take it personally, and react emotionally, even if only some of our arguments are criticised, and this is to be understood as arising from a lack of recognition. Furthermore the amount of people with whom we like to interact and to argue, where we can hope for mutual understanding and recognition is severely reduced. Moreover as far as philosophical systems are elaborated in full detail there is never full agreement. Sooner or later differences to other fellow philosophers occur – and with them the feeling of not being understood. Heinrich Heine talks in this respect about “the comical aspect of our philosophers, who are perpetually lamenting that they are misunderstood. When Hegel was lying on his deathbed, he said: ‘Only one man has understood me,’ but shortly afterwards he added fretfully: ‘And even he did not understand me.’”⁴⁷ With respect to Johann Gottlieb Fichte Heine adds:

About intelligibility in general he had quite a peculiar caprice. As long as Reinhold was of the same opinion with him, Fichte declared that no one understood him better than Reinhold. But when the latter differed from him in opinion, Fichte declared that he had never been understood by him. When he himself took a different view from Kant, he had it put in print that Kant did not understand himself.⁴⁸

To compensate this lacking, there is a demanding need for like-minded people. As a result there are some typical phenomena, for example the formation of elitist well-informed circles: The close relationship – and therefore recognition – within the group is accompanied by a feeling of superiority over outside parties. Philosophical “argots” are helpful in this respect and serve not the least to exclude and devalue all the others who are not able to understand these kinds of “languages”.

Another typical phenomenon is that philosophical friendships are often very fragile: The demanding need for likeminded people often leads to close connections because of factual or projected accordance, which is followed by a radical break, after it is realised

47 Heinrich Heine, *Religion and Philosophy in Germany. A Fragment*, trans. John Snodgrass, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1959), 123.

48 Ibid.

that there are differences in one or other philosophical belief. To mention just a few famous examples:

1. Johann Gottlieb Fichte for instance in his thirties had friendships with the philosophers Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, Carl Leonhard Reinhold, and Friedrich Wilhelm Schelling succeedingly. All of them ended because of philosophical differences, and when he was 40 years of age he didn't have any close philosophical friend any more until the end of his life.
2. Sigmund Freud had friendships with Josef Breuer, Wilhelm Fließ, Alfred Adler, and Carl Gustav Jung, one succeeding the other and most of them very close and very important for him, and again all of them had been terminated by him because of intellectual differences (as I said this kind of psychodynamics applies not only to philosophy but to all sciences as far as some kind of world-view is of significance). Even more than 20 years after the split with Adler and Jung respectively Freud made pejorative statements regarding Adler and Jung, which reveal that Freud still was disappointed and hadn't overcome this breakup.
3. And the same holds for Ernst Bloch and his relationships with Georg Lukács, Max Scheler, and Walter Benjamin. Bloch himself even uses the term "symbiosis" to emphasise the closeness of these friendships, but nevertheless they ended after a couple of months or years respectively.

Especially in philosophy and the social sciences (and in every other discipline where worldviews are at stake and clash) there is nearly no possibility of empirical testing of rivalling theories. As a result the disputes between them are going on and on.

All the mentioned examples illustrate on the one hand the desperate need for intellectual friendships, where we can exchange our views, feel understood, and recognised, and on the other hand the difficulties for us philosophers to fulfil this need. Thus there seem to be some problems not only between the philosophers and the other people, but also amongst the philosophers themselves.

Normally we feel superior over people with diverging beliefs and theories and more or less devalue them. William James for example talked about empiricists and rationalists in this respect: Although their difference is only a difference of emphasis, "it breeds

antipathies of the most pungent character between those who lay the emphasis differently”.⁴⁹ “They have a low opinion of each other. [...] Each type believes the other to be inferior to itself”.⁵⁰ And Hilary Putnam describes his relationship with Robert Nozick with respect to their political disputes and disagreements: “To be perfectly honest, there is in each of us something akin to *contempt*...”.⁵¹

And here we can go back to one of the phenomena mentioned in the beginning: Teasing each other from time to time is a very good and even funny strategy to cope with this frustration and lack of recognition. But otherwise, especially when the philosophical differences are too wide philosophers might follow a proposal that is attributed to Sartre:⁵² “When two philosophers encounter one another it is best they just say ‘good morning’ to each other.”⁵³ Obviously there are quite a few of them who follow this proposal: In 1980, Paul Arthur Schilpp talked about his project of the *Library of Living Philosophers*. He gave a disenchanted résumé and asserted that in retrospect he wouldn’t undertake this project anymore. For his main idea for the project has been, according to Bartlett, “that if only a philosopher, during his own life, could respond to his critics, much philosophical misunderstanding could be avoided”.⁵⁴ But after so many years Schilpp “has come to see that ‘philosophers do not *want* to understand one another.’ They do not wish to communicate. They are concerned only with their own private, personal sets of beliefs, views.”⁵⁵

Of course, all these phenomena are often very subtle, so that we may not even acknowledge them. To sum up the psychodynamic mechanism going on here: The crucial point is the emotional identification with our philosophical opinions and theories. So two

49 William James, *Pragmatism. A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking, together with Four Related Essays Selected from The Meaning of Truth*, (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1946), 9.

50 Ibid., 12f.

51 Hilary Putnam, *Reason, Truth and History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 165.

52 According to http://www.quotez.net/german/jean-paul_sartre.htm

53 Ibid. My translation.

54 Steven J. Bartlett. “Philosophy as Ideology,” *Metaphilosophy* 17 (1986): 1.

55 Ibid.

philosophers who diverge in some important respects may be able to understand each other in their diverging beliefs if they give it a try, but only in a rational and not in an emotional way. As William James has put it: "The truth is that in the metaphysical and religious sphere, articulate reasons are cogent for us only when our inarticulate feelings of reality have already been impressed in favor of the same conclusion."⁵⁶

And therefore the emotional reaction is a lack of understanding, and feeling of being misunderstood. This lack of recognition leads to frustration, which in turn can be eased by making jokes at the expense of the other. Or according to Sartre's proposal this frustration can be avoided in the first place by avoiding a confrontation with philosophers who hold annoying diverging beliefs.

10. Conclusion

Finally, I want to stress once more that the need for recognition, the resulting problems and psychodynamics are universal human phenomena. Nevertheless, as I tried to show there is a lot of evidence that these phenomena have a specific form and intensity in the area of philosophy as well as in every other discipline where worldviews are at stake and clash. And in the different kinds of fine arts there might be similar problems, although of course there the conditions are a bit different.

I am sure too that these results gathered in the department of philosophy in Vienna can more or less be found similarly in all the other departments of philosophy at least in the western world. A good reason for this belief is that these phenomena are a recurring issue throughout the history of Western philosophy. And I am able to mention another empirical study: Wolfgang Kellner and others have conducted in-depth interviews with graduates from the institute of philosophy in Klagenfurt.⁵⁷ The approach of this study has

56 William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature* (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1902), 74.

57 Wolfgang Kellner, Wolfgang, Klaus Ratschiller and Hubert Wank, *Endbericht zum Pilotprojekt: Philosophie im Kontext von Studium, Beruf und Alltag: Exemplarisch an den Erfahrungen der Philosophieabsolventen der UBW-Klagenfurt 1975-1987* (Klagenfurt: Unpublished manuscript, 1990).

been different, but similar problems and psychodynamics came to light. Additionally Simon Bartlett who studied philosophy at the University of Santa Cruz in California has been puzzled by the behaviour of his fellow students: "When an undergraduate in philosophy, I began vaguely to notice some traits in my fellow majors that seemed to set them apart from students in other fields."⁵⁸ Then he goes on to describe how these students of philosophy kept boundaries in various ways between themselves and the other students.

And I would like to emphasise that I do not want to pathologise. Quite the contrary: with this account I am able to reject pathologising claims. Steven Bartlett for example posits a correlation between philosophy and narcissism in just a way that I want to refute:

Philosophers, like other people, are subject to human frailties. Some are probably clinical narcissists. I do not know if a larger proportion of philosophers is narcissistic than are theologians, poets, composers, artists, or writers. But probably [...] a greater proportion of the philosophical population suffers from characteristics of unacknowledged narcissism than do, for example, scientists.⁵⁹

In contrast to Bartlett, I don't believe that philosophers are more narcissistic than scientists. My remarks on the various factors that bring forward problems with recognition in philosophy in a specific way are able to explain why such interpretations are put forward in the first place: Because the lack of recognition that philosophers tend to have to face generates characteristics and behaviour patterns, which are related to narcissism – as every human being would react in such a way under similar circumstances. And this leads to the incorrect assumption that such narcissistic phenomena are due to some kind of narcissistic personality disorder.

58 Steven J. Bartlett, "Psychological Underpinnings of Philosophy," *Metaphilosophy* 20 (1989): 296.

59 Steven J. Bartlett, "Narcissism and Philosophy," *Methodology and Science* 19 (1986): 21f.

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In the center of the following investigation lies the question: does philosophy have anything to offer to the wider public, and should it do so? During the last couple of centuries philosophy has often been accused of drawing back to its “ivory tower”, leaving behind the troubles of everyday life for the sake of abstract problems which bear little to no importance to the actual lives of actual people. In today’s demanding times all disciplines of higher learning are forced to prove their right to existence, and philosophy is hardly exempt of the task of explaining what, if anything, it can offer to the wider public. The answer I propose is as follows: although philosophy under the regime of the institutional settings and research projects within which philosophers operate today does not have such an offer, it could. It could provide the wider public with what I call ‘worldviews’, understood not as static systems of technical concepts, but rather discursive spaces in which people can come to terms with their convictions, commitments, and acquire skills to revise them and engage in debates about them.



We philosophers usually think of our profession as something important. What we do is part of the grand human endeavour aimed at finding fundamental truths about the surrounding reality, our own nature, what we ought and ought not to do. Being, knowledge, good, and bad – the ultimate objects of our inherent intellectual curiosity; we study them. Thus we forward humankind's everlasting mission to understand its place in the order of creation and to realize itself. We provide present and future generations with a more complete account of who we are, where we come from, and where we ought to head. Even if we do not give answers we open perspectives, deepen comprehension, and show new directions. This is the usual story.

But when I engage in the rather precarious day to day activity of doing philosophy, when I read through hundreds and hundreds of pages of dull papers and books on miniscule technicalities of puzzles that no sane person would consider to be even remotely relevant to the “big questions” we are supposed to be answering, I often wonder – why are we really doing this? Can we really say honestly and with clear conscience that the 100th paper on mereology, on externalist solutions to the Gettier problem, or on trolley problem will actually contribute to the aforementioned grand endeavour?

Okay, working on these topics might get me into good programs, get me a good job (although it's more probable than not that no matter how many papers I write I will never get a job in philosophy). I might end up being a great philosopher at a top university (I wish...), or I can mentor a prospective student who becomes a great philosopher. What then? Will mine or her works help others live a better life, influence public debates, etc.? Will my work, my imaginary student's work, or the work of any of us ever actually matter?

Unlikely. As Hans-Johann Glock,¹ Bruce Wilshire,² and many others have remarked professional philosophers rarely if ever partake in ever growing public conversations about the global issues and challenges we face at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

1 Hans-Johann Glock, *What is Analytic Philosophy* (Cambridge University Press, 2008), 247.

2 Bruce Wilshire, “Nihilistic Consequences of Analytic Philosophy,” in *Fashionable Nihilism: A Critique of Analytic Philosophy* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2002), 1–31.

Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons, and Barry Smith argue that in most parts of the world (where the so-called “analytic” tradition prevails) philosophy is “pursued, still on the basis of the attitude of *horror mundi*, among practitioners of philosophy whose horizon extends little further than the latest issue of *Mind* or *The Journal of Philosophy*.”³ In my experience continental philosophers and historians of philosophy (if these distinctions really do make sense) are hardly any better, although I admit that they often have better PR.

There are, of course, superstars, like Karl Marx, Richard Rorty, and John Rawls, who really did exert great influence on modern society. But, you know, the thing is that Rawlses and Rortys are very, very rare. The APA alone has some ten thousand members – almost none of them are John Rawls. Of course, geniuses do not pop up from nothing. Even Rawls and Marx needed a lively intellectual environment that nurtured their minds, and that eventually played a huge role in giving rise to their marvellous ideas. But before you convince yourself that your work or the tiny bits and pieces that the everyday post-doc and associate professor contributes to the field of philosophy will eventually influence the big, the world-changing philosophers, let me tell you this. Studies show that some 80% of humanities articles are never cited.⁴ It’s 30% in the social sciences. And as a 2003 study at University of California reminds us, citation doesn’t always mean reading!⁵

So most of the papers we write don’t get even close to the reading list of the big guys who write the great world-changing articles. There are of course lucky accidents, but except for the few hundred people who are in the philosophical A-League, the hundreds of thousands of philosophers all around the world who write papers, give talks, teach boring introductory courses to sleepy students do not make any difference whatsoever. I think it is fair to say that as of today, we philosophers do not offer anything to the extra-academic world.

3 Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons, and Barry Smith, “What’s Wrong with Contemporary Philosophy?,” *Topoi* 25, no. 1–2 (2006): 3.

4 Vincent Larivière et al. “The decline in the concentration of citations, 1900–2007.” *Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology* ([JASIST](#)), 60(4)

5 M. V. Simkin and V. P. Roychowdhury, “Read Before You Cite!,” *Complex Systems* 14 (2003): 269–74.

But the question remains: *can* we offer something, despite the fact that we currently don't? And should we offer anything at all? Or should we at last admit that we are useless? Wear it as a badge of honour? Some philosophers do that. In 2011 at a roundtable talk at the New School British philosopher Simon Critchley proudly admitted that philosophy does not matter.⁶ That it is kind of superfluous but in a good way. Heck, this is what Aristotle was saying. We should be proud that we can afford doing philosophy, that we can dedicate our lives to these higher arts that lack immediate or apparent connection to the real world. The job of philosophy is to enrich our intellectual lives, not to mess around in the dirt with all those real life issues.

Others say it's good that philosophy can't offer anything to the world, because this shows its seriousness. W. V. Quine's ingeniously titled essay "Has Philosophy Lost Contact with People?" argues that the farther philosophy gets from everyday life the more scientific it is.⁷ This is what happened to all real sciences: they started as useful instruments for the organization of life; their purpose was to ease this otherwise quite burdensome existence. But later they became rigorous, that is, boring, and quite detached from that life that we, unfortunately, all have to live. Students of the history of philosophy may know that Edmund Husserl reached similar results in his *Crisis of European Sciences*, although he drew somewhat different conclusions from them.

More recently Saul Kripke has proclaimed that it has never been the business of philosophy to deal with real life issues (I suppose Socrates wasn't quite the philosopher for him).⁸ The sentiment behind this statement is shared by so many philosophers that Scott Soames even made it part of the official history and self-definition of analytic philosophy by writing in his groundbreaking *Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century* that "philosophy done in the analytic tradition aims at truth and knowledge, as opposed to moral

6 "Does Philosophy Still Matter?" https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RBmlRihA9_s

7 W. V. Quine, "Has Philosophy Lost Contact with People?," in *Theories and Things* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1981), 190–94.

8 Andreas Saugstad, "Saul Kripke, Genius Logician." <http://bolesblogs.com/2001/02/25/saul-kripke-genius-logician/>

or spiritual improvement.”⁹ Approvingly writes Timothy Williamson in his *Philosophy of Philosophy* (a work from which this volume borrowed its name) that we should concentrate on rigor and truth instead of depth and meaning.¹⁰

And there is, of course, another strong case against the idea that philosophy should be “useful”, or that it should be more connected to the real life. This argument is well known and admired among academics, for it seemingly relieves us from all obligations towards people who don’t happen to work for a university. The argument is the following: demanding usefulness from philosophy actually means requiring market value. When we say that philosophy should serve the public, we mean it should produce money. When we say that it should prepare students for the real world, we mean it should give them skills easily translatable to cash.

This is the spirit of business and capitalism that’s currently taking over academia. This is what everyone from the deans of universities to Martha Nussbaum and Terry Eagleton warns us against. This we must resist! We must not make higher education, or philosophy in particular, about money, or about preparing people for jobs and other earthly, unholy things – as if asking for resources for self-sustenance was something horrendously materialist on the part of a college student –, no, no we ought not to fetter philosophy by binding it to these petty subjects normal people are interested in, but we ought to let the spirit freely fly.

To this objection let me say this: this whole thing, this question, “What can we offer?” is not about that. It’s not about money, it’s not about market value, it’s not about utility. It’s about justification. Justification that we owe to each other. That each and every one of us owes to the whole society. To those workers and taxpayers who *give* us electricity, heat, these buildings. To our parents who raised us, our teachers, who have made tremendous effort, spent money so that we can have our education, our life. We have to be able to tell them why we are writing these papers, why we are giving these talks. We have to be able to tell them why we’re moving continents away.

9 Scott Soames, *Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), xiv.

10 Timothy Williamson, *The Philosophy of Philosophy* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 289.

We have to be able to tell our spouses why we won't have enough money, or even a single steady job before we're forty. We have to be able to tell them. We owe them this much. We owe them a sound and proper justification of why what we are doing is worthwhile. We have to be able to offer something.

So what is it that we can offer? In the present situation I would say, nothing. The prevailing mode of production and distribution of philosophical knowledge does not allow for a fruitful interaction between philosophy and public debates, politics, let alone the wider territory of the life-world. Today's philosophy is virtually inaccessible to non-philosophers. The institutional structures within which philosophers work not only discourage outreach and popularization in favour of "professional work", research, publishing, but it also creates a self-enclosed bubble, an ivory tower if you wish, from which philosophical knowledge, even if it's "relevant", hardly, if ever, escapes into the real world.

But suppose it isn't so. Suppose we succeed in abolishing this long obsolete institutional setup, this so often so inhumane environment that produces nothing but misled gradstudents, unemployed PhDs, and unread papers. What could, in a better world in which academia does not exist for its own sake but for the betterment of society, what could philosophy offer there? There are the usual candidates. Say, critical thinking. But surely, others can think critically as well, right? I mean this is how basically all disciplines in humanities justify themselves. Do we have any reasons for thinking that philosophy is especially good when it comes to critical thinking?

What about argumentation, spotting contradictions, and so on? These are all handy in "the real life", right? Well, do you really need philosophers for that? I'm pretty sure lawyers and mathematicians are quite good in putting forward arguments, in logic, and stuff. Some of them are even better than us. We never really had to engage in debates where the conclusion affected actual lives, mostly we influence nothing but our professional reputation. But lawmakers and policy makers engage in such debates all the time! Shouldn't they teach everyone to debate and argue? Well, maybe.

What else can philosophy give to wider public? There is historical knowledge. The opportunity to encounter with the Other, a viewpoint completely different from yours. Reading St. Augustine,

or Plato can give you new perspectives, you can experience how dissimilar other people's thinking can be to yours, thus making you more tolerant, more open-minded. What can be more valuable? Sure, but again, do you need philosophers for that? Can't historians give you that perspective? Sometimes even better so, since they study the whole history and not only its philosophically relevant parts?

It starts to seem that you don't really need professional philosophy for anything besides professional philosophy itself. Apparently only one resort remains for us. We have to go for the bold claim that philosophical knowledge has intrinsic value. It is worthwhile in and of itself. And you'll be surprised, I think it's correct. Sort of. I think the problem is not with *what* we're saying. The problem is *how* we say it and *why*. The problem is that we lost sight of the purpose of the practice we engage in. That is not because we study stupid things – although I do believe that we should reprioritize our tasks, and maybe get rid of some verbal problems. But generally the problem is that philosophy has become a shop floor where papers, and theses, and arguments are produced instead of a lively forum organically tied to the average everydayness of ordinary life. Philosophical work is alienated. It needs to be emancipated.

But what is it about philosophical knowledge that's so valuable? How can it contribute to "life"? I think the keyword here is "worldview". Let me explain. Michael Della Rocca once said that the aim of philosophy is to deepen understanding. Even though we don't give answers, we can give a fuller grasp of the world. I deeply agree. Understanding, I think (and I'm not alone), is the holistic comprehension of something that renders the initially strange and alien object familiar and intelligible. But that is possible only against the background of a "complete" picture, a whole system of meaning and significance, or what I would like to call a "worldview".

Those, however, are hard to find nowadays. The amount of accessible information in the twenty-first century is immense. Yet this information is fragmentary, pieces of knowledge are disconnected from each other, they are like molecules accidentally moving together without bonding. This isn't only detrimental to public conversations, the prospects of science and politics, but also people suffer from this condition. They are anxious to get that fuller grasp I

was talking about. Radical ideologies, fundamentalist religion, new atheism, conspiracy theories are all ways in which people try not only to know and explain but also to understand the world around them.

Now philosophy, being the study of the fundamental principles of... well, everything, really does have a chance to come up with such worldviews. Unlike science or art, philosophy really does have the resources, the intellectual equipment so to speak, for going all the way down and clarify the deep connections between the seemingly different and disconnected, yet in reality profoundly intertwined fields. It is philosophy that can connect the biology of the human species with international law through the metaphysics of personhood and the ethics of human rights. Philosophy alone, I think, is capable of connecting the dots, so to speak – something that we need very much. This is the purpose of philosophy, this is, in my view, our job: to make the world a whole again.

You might say now, “but I don’t know how to do that! Do you really expect me to go to people and tell them how to understand the world? I don’t really understand it at all!” But it is important to see that what I propose is not that we engage in system building in, say, Hegel’s or Spinoza’s way. We don’t have to come up with all-encompassing theories from which we can derive everything from the movement of celestial bodies to financial crises.

Instead we have to provide the wider public with a particular mode of approaching things, a particular kind of questioning. This is what pertains to the essence of philosophy. A good philosopher of this or that field knows perfectly well the main questions of that field as well as the possible answers, what this or that commitment entails, excludes, and so on. Really good philosophers also know what, in Collingwood’s words, absolute presuppositions are at work in her thinking, how historically conditioned these presuppositions are, and in which ways they are open to criticism. I think this almost amounts to having a worldview.

Much like Critical Theory or better even early logical positivism with their thoroughgoing and philosophically informed social and political agenda, we should aim at creating discursive spaces (instead of professional dialogues) where people can come to terms with their convictions, commitments, and acquire skills to revise

them and engage in debates about them. That's not simply critical thinking, nor merely argumentation, that's doing philosophy. Our aim should not simply be to enable people to know about philosophy, or to think about philosophy. We should enable people to *be* philosophers.

Under today's conditions, however, that cannot be done. It cannot be done because research projects within philosophy are disconnected – metaphysicians tend to know very little about the philosophy of law, ethicists rarely consult philosophers of science (though I have seen that fortunately), and so on, and so forth. Also, philosophy is detached from the world; which is unfortunate not only because one can hardly create worldviews without knowing the world to be viewed – we really need to know about the dots we are to connect –, but also because unless we're present in the world, we cannot offer it anything.

I'm sure some of you want to ask now: okay, let's say I buy it, but what should we do exactly? When I return to my home institute, how should I proceed? Here is my idea: first and foremost we have to redefine our research projects. We have to identify through interdisciplinary dialogues fields of problems, as narrow and concrete as possible to which we as philosophers can contribute either with knowledge that we already have or that we can produce. That will enable us to spot the most important fractures we can help fix. Fear not! There is a lot of shit out there we can help clean up.

After that we have to initiate trans-institutional co-operations focusing on those problems that we have identified. This practice of piecemeal soldering of the smaller and larger ruptures in various worldviews will pave the way for the wider recognition of philosophy and the transformation of its self-image. So the way to go is not popularization, Sophie's World, funny YouTube videos, but actual problem solving. The end point of this is of course radical institutional reform, so there is a lot of work to do and it can only be done one step at a time. But such initiatives already exist, so there are examples to rely on. There is the "Climate Ethics and Economics" project at the University of Helsinki. Not specifically philosophical, but similar in aims are the PACE Center at Princeton, and Liz Coleman's Center for the Advancement of Public Action at Bennington College.

The task is large, and, again, there is a lot to do. But we have to do it. We have an obligation to our fellow citizens, to present and future generations, to come up with accessible and relevant ways of comprehending the surrounding reality better and in greater depth. Unless our papers are read, our speeches are heard, and our opinions are taken into consideration, it is naïve for us to think that we can make a difference. We should stop pretending that we are all Kant sitting in our studies far away in Königsberg writing books that eventually, maybe in a hundred years or so, end up being the manifestos of movements and great politicians and writers and scientists will be thankful for us, magnificent, though in their own time unacknowledged thinkers, who showed them the way. This is both petty romanticism and textbook false consciousness that conceals the fact that we have work to do right here, right now.

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